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Asked Whether It Was Voice Phishing: Is the Question Evidence of Not Knowing?

Translated from the Korean original. Read the Korean

This is a case analysis of an actual, publicly available judgment. It distinguishes the facts and legal principles set out by the Supreme Court, PRO SE's competing readings, and hypotheticals that assume additional material. The Supreme Court reversed the acquittal below and remanded the case; the final outcome after remand was not verified in this analysis. This analysis does not make a fresh determination of any person's guilt or innocence, nor does it provide legal advice on any individual case.

A person who started out delivering documents was given the task of collecting cash and continued the work even after asking whether it was voice phishing. Following Supreme Court Decision 2025Do486, this analysis examines how the existence of the question, the explanation given in response, and the subsequent conduct connect in the determination of intent.

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A Single Question Points Towards Different Explanations

A person who had found a job asked the person giving work instructions whether the work was related to voice phishing. This fact can be read in two directions. It may have been an attempt to check out of concern that something was wrong, or it may be evidence that the person was already conscious of the risk of the work undertaken. The fact of having asked does not, by itself, allow either explanation to be chosen. What remains is what work was being done, what explanation was received, and what conduct followed.

Supreme Court Decision 2025Do486 decided May 29, 2025 is a case in which exactly such a question appears. The defendant started with a part-time job delivering documents, was then given the task of collecting cash, and on the day the work changed asked two instructors whether it was related to voice phishing. The Supreme Court connected that question with the remaining conduct and held that there was strong room to find that the defendant had at least dolus eventualis (conditional intent) as to fraud, etc.

This case invites an examination of which connections must be explained, and which gaps must be left open, when awareness at the time is assessed from externally observed facts. In particular, it allows two interpretations to be tested together: treating a record of a request for confirmation immediately as evidence of exculpation, and reading a record of expressed suspicion immediately as if it were a confession.

The Outcome to Confirm First: The Acquittal Was Reversed, but This Judgment Did Not Finalise a Sentence

The summary of the facts charged sets out, together with fraud, the act of remitting part of the collected cash using third parties' resident registration numbers. According to the Supreme Court judgment, the court of first instance convicted the defendant, and the appellate court, the Daejeon District Court, in Judgment 2023No3765 of December 18, 2024, held that the defendant lacked intent as to fraud, etc. and found the defendant not guilty as to the case against the defendant. The prosecutor appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court did not accept the court below's connection of the facts or its determination of intent, and sent the case back to the Daejeon District Court. It held that the court below had violated the rules of logic and experience and thereby exceeded the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, or had misapprehended the legal principles on intent. Accordingly, the conclusion confirmed in this analysis is the reversal and remand of the acquittal. What sentence was imposed on remand, and whether it subsequently became final, lies outside the material reviewed.

The publicly available full text of the Supreme Court judgment does not reproduce the detailed reasons for which the appellate court acquitted. The discussion below that examines explanations favourable to the job seeker is an editorial reading of the public facts; it is not a reconstruction of the reasoning actually adopted by the appellate judges. Nor does it assume that the defendant's non-public statements or the full set of messages have been read.

Breaking Down the Few Days in Which Documents Turned into Cash

The Supreme Court connected the job-seeking process and the actual work day by day. The specific times and amounts of the cash collections are set out in the summary of the facts charged at the beginning of the full text, and the sequence of receiving a total of KRW 36.66 million on three occasions also appears in the Supreme Court's reasoning. The conclusion of conspiracy stated in the facts charged must be read separately from the individual acts examined in the judgment.

The last row of the table below is particularly important. The day on which the defendant asked whether the work was related to voice phishing is identified as October 31, but the exact time of the question does not appear in the public full text. It cannot be concluded that the question preceded the first collection at 2:50 p.m. that day. The fact that the collections and remittances continued the next day is material for examining conduct after the question, but the original record is needed to assess more precisely when awareness arose for each of the three occasions.

TimeWhat appears in the public judgmentDistinction to keep in reading
Around October 27, 2022After the defendant registered on a job-search site, two persons offered document-delivery work. The defendant sent a résumé, a certified copy of the resident registration, and other documents, but there was no in-person interview and no employment contract was drawn up.The fact that materials resembling a hiring process were exchanged is different from the company and the persons in charge having been verified as real.
October 27–28The defendant delivered documents to the designated locations.Do not compress the timeline into a case in which only cash was collected from the outset.
October 31The work changed to cash collection under the description of financial assistance work. On the same day, the defendant asked the two instructors whether it was related to voice phishing.The fact that the question was asked is confirmed, but the full conversation and the exact time of the remarks were not made public.
October 31 and November 1The facts charged set out three collections of KRW 8.66 million, KRW 18 million, and KRW 10 million. The Supreme Court also relied in its reasoning on the sequence of collecting a total of KRW 36.66 million from three persons.The movement of money alone does not automatically prove awareness. It must be connected to whose explanation, and what explanation, the defendant acted upon.
Between the question and the first collectionThe time of the first collection in the facts charged is around 2:50 p.m. on October 31. The time of the question is confirmed only as to the date.Do not add a new fact that all three collections were carried out after the question was asked.

Not Knowing the Whole Organisation versus Not Knowing What One's Own Conduct Was Used For

The Supreme Court explained that conspiracy does not require all members of the organisation to gather in one place and agree on the crime, or each to know every role. The intention to jointly carry out a crime may be connected among several persons sequentially or tacitly. The fact that a person did not know the specific words others used to deceive the victims, or the overall method of the crime, does not alone negate conspiracy.

That does not mean the Court held that everyone who passes on money has intent to commit fraud. The judgment states expressly that a person who acts without knowing that the conduct is being used for a crime lacks intent and cannot be held criminally liable. Admitting the fact of collecting cash is not the same as admitting awareness of taking part in a crime. An awareness that the work simply involves sending money to a bank must be distinguished from an awareness of receiving victims' cash while carrying out a crime together with others.

The awareness the Supreme Court required in this case may be merely conditional. This expression, however, cannot be turned into a formula under which work that seems slightly odd means guilt. The judgment presupposes a combination of intentions to jointly carry out a crime and awareness of the cash collection, while requiring a connection among specific circumstances such as the hiring, the communications, the work, the conversations with victims, the remittances, and the remuneration. The task of explaining why traces of suspicion support awareness of participation in a crime is not skipped.

Article 13 of the Criminal Act, as checked on September 30, 2026, sets out the principle for acts committed without awareness of the facts constituting a crime and the exceptions provided by law, and Article 30 provides for co-principals. These two current provisions are presented as reference points for reading the issues of intent and joint participation addressed in the judgment. This analysis does not newly determine the scope of punishment for conduct in 2022 by reference to the 2026 amendments, nor does it calculate a sentence.

They Said It Was Legitimate Work. What Did That Answer Explain?

The defendant was told by the two instructors that the work involved passing money between a lending business and its customers. A possible favourable editorial reading runs as follows: the defendant first accepted the job by delivering documents, became uneasy when the work changed to handling cash and checked, and may have had the suspicion dispelled by the explanation received. There was a hiring process in which a résumé and other documents were sent, and the defendant also searched for the company on the internet. Such material rules out the story that the defendant went out to collect cash without any explanation at all.

However, the fact that the instructors described their work as legitimate is different from that description having actually been verified. The Supreme Court found that the defendant did not properly verify the company's organisation, business, or substance, or whether the two instructors actually existed. It also assessed as unusual the sequence in which the work was assigned without an in-person interview or contract and, within a few days, the defendant was made to collect large sums of cash, and it held that this was so even taking into account the COVID-19 situation at the time. Remote hiring itself was not treated as proof of voice phishing.

The conduct that followed is more concrete than the name of the work. According to the Supreme Court, the defendant told the victims that the defendant had come at the request of someone the defendant did not know, or posed as a team leader at a savings bank. The money received was remitted using other people's names and resident registration numbers. A method in which one's own identity and the name under which money is moved are altered is not explained simply by the label of financial assistance work. The Supreme Court considered these methods together with the continuation of the work.

The point at which the two explanations diverge here is not whether a question was asked, but the state of understanding after the question. For the explanation that the defendant believed the work to be legitimate to be persuasive, it must also be examined how that description led the defendant to understand the impersonation and the use of others' information actually undertaken. Conversely, the existence of such conduct alone does not justify concluding that the defendant's entire state of mind at the time is known. This paragraph is an editorial interpretation that unpacks the Supreme Court's connection of the facts; it does not assert that the defendant approved the crime in any non-public message.

The Manner of Receiving Money and Experience in Understanding the Work

The Supreme Court also noted that, when receiving the cash, the defendant did not count the amount in front of the victims. The defendant took part of the collected money directly as expenses and allowances, receiving KRW 260,000 or KRW 300,000 per job. The judgment assessed this as larger than ordinary part-time pay. What is involved here is not only that a large amount was received. There is also the structure of the work: although disputes could arise over exactly how much was received and how much was handed over to whom, checking and payment were handled in that way.

The editorial question in reading this is not whether high remuneration proves greed. It is why the payment and checking methods were as they were in work that carries responsibility for managing cash, and whether that process fits the explanation that the defendant understood it to be ordinary employment. Motives such as personal circumstances, desperation, or greed cannot be confirmed from the public full text. Turning the fact of receiving money into a psychological character sketch goes beyond the record.

The judgment added to the other circumstances the facts that the defendant was 57 years old at the time and had experience running a company for about seven years. These facts are recorded here to understand the judgment's reasoning, but they do not form a general rule that a person of a certain age or experience will necessarily recognise a crime. Material that goes to the specific understanding of the work by that person is different from classifying someone as a person who knew on the basis of age alone.

The same caution is needed regarding the discussion of ATM warning messages in the public full text. The judgment mentions that bank ATMs generally display warnings against taking part in voice phishing. The original record identifying the wording on the screen the defendant actually saw, how long it was displayed, or whether it was read was not verified in this analysis. Accordingly, no new fact is introduced that the defendant read the warning on the screen and ignored it.

Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which provides that evidence is freely evaluated, and Article 307, which requires that the facts constituting a crime be proved to a degree that leaves no reasonable doubt, must be read together. Saying that a determination may be made from circumstances does not mean lowering the standard of proof. The Supreme Court, too, did not count the number of clues but asked whether the connection of facts accorded with logic and experience. The current provisions used in this analysis are the relevant articles of the version in force from July 1, 2026.

If Other Material Existed, Where Could It Change the Explanation?

The following are not assertions that such evidence exists in the actual case, but hypotheticals for testing the facts connected by the Supreme Court. They are not a list of phrases for avoiding a conviction or of material that guarantees an acquittal. Even if additional material is introduced, its relationship with the entire record must be assessed afresh.

First, if the full conversation of the question and answer and the times the messages were sent were known, the timeline could change. Whether the question came before or after the first collection, and whether the answer was confined to an abstract description of the work or specifically explained the conduct at issue, are not the same information. It would also be possible to compare whether later accounts of the conversation match the contemporaneous record. Omitting the surrounding conversation because a single message is favourable risks missing the understanding at the time of the question.

Second, suppose there were material distinguishing the traces of searching for the company from what was actually verified through that search. The fact that the company's name appeared in a search does not, by itself, confirm that the person who made contact was an employee of that company. Conversely, if independent verification material actually supported some aspect, the grounds for examining the explanation that the defendant understood the work to be legitimate would increase. Whether that material existed at the time of hiring or was created after the collections must also be read differently.

Third, if the conversations at the meetings with the victims had been preserved, the expressions the defendant was instructed to use could be compared with those actually used. What matters is how the impersonation of a bank official cited by the Supreme Court appeared in the actual remarks, and how the defendant described the defendant's own affiliation. The existence of instruction messages and execution in accordance with those instructions are distinct facts. However, this cannot be used as a hypothetical that, without basis, turns the impersonation found in the public judgment into something that did not happen.

Fourth, if the point at which the work was stopped or continued were established differently, the assessment of each collection could be considered separately. The hypothetical of a person who actually stopped after asking is not the same as the sequence in this case, in which the defendant heard the explanation and continued the next day. Even if a cessation were established, liability for conduct already completed would not automatically disappear. Nor may it be stated that the defendant stopped, reported, or returned money, none of which is established in this case.

Not Stopping at the Fact of Asking, but Moving On to What Was Verified

This judgment does not establish a principle that asking once out of suspicion of voice phishing avoids liability, or that a person who asks already knew of the crime. It required the acquittal to be re-examined by connecting the document work first undertaken, the switch to cash work, the question and answer, what was said to the victims, the remittances using others' information, the handling of the cash and remuneration, and the individual's career experience.

The clearest shift in the public judgment is that the question is not read in isolation. A record that an answer was received cannot be treated as the same as a record that verification was completed, and in explaining that difference, awareness at the time must not be fixed retrospectively solely on the basis of the harm that later occurred. The full text of this case shows how that connection was attempted, and this analysis, lacking the full messages and the outcome after remand, does not extend its assessment beyond that.

Sources and verification notes

  1. Supreme Court Decision 2025Do486 decided May 29, 2025 — Official Full Text ↗

    The summary of holdings, referenced provisions, referenced precedents, and full text on the Korea Law Information Center were read in full and saved. The summary of the facts charged, the summary of the court below's determination, Reasons 3.(a) (legal principles) and 3.(b) 1) to 6) (facts and circumstances), and the reversal-and-remand disposition were cross-checked. The separate full texts of the lower-court judgments, the original record, and the outcome after remand were not verified. The exact time of the October 31 question does not appear in the public full text.

    Checked 2026-09-30
  2. Criminal Act, Article 13 — Intent ↗

    The whole of Article 13, as shown in force from September 13, 2026 under Act No. 21450, was read. This is a current-law reference source confirming the principle on awareness of the facts constituting a crime and the exceptions provided by law. The penal provisions or sentence applicable to conduct in 2022 were not analysed retroactively under current law.

    Checked 2026-09-30
  3. Criminal Act, Article 30 — Co-principals ↗

    The whole of Article 30, as shown in force from September 13, 2026 under Act No. 21450, was read. The provision on co-principals is presented separately from the legal principles on conspiracy and intent in this case.

    Checked 2026-09-30
  4. Criminal Procedure Act, version in force from July 1, 2026 — Articles 307 and 308 ↗

    The effective date and Act No. 21241 shown on page 1, and Articles 307 and 308 on page 91, of the 118-page official PDF were checked. The provisions on fact-finding based on evidence, proof beyond reasonable doubt, and the principle of free evaluation of evidence were read. The HTML for the individual articles displayed an effective date of December 31, 2027; this was not used as the current effective date, and the text was instead cross-checked against the official PDF for the specified date. The entire 118 pages of the Act were not read closely.

    Checked 2026-09-30

General information and research commentary, not legal advice. Each entry identifies its facts, assumptions and sources.

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