If the Offence of Speaking the Truth Is Narrowed, What Will Remain a Grave Secret of Private Life?

The Text Under Review Is a Bill

This entry reads Partial Amendment Bill to the Criminal Act No. 2219543, introduced on June 26, 2026 by Assembly Member Kang Dae-sik and nine others (ten members in total). The National Assembly progress status on the National Participatory Legislation Center, checked on September 30, 2026, shows referral to the Legislation and Judiciary Committee on July 1, 2026. No subsequent resolution or promulgation could be confirmed on that page. The discussion below examines the wording of the original bill and does not assume that the law has already changed.

The bill would narrow defamation by stating facts under Article 307 (1) to cases in which the facts stated infringe a grave secret concerning private life, and would convert this offence and the offence of defamation by printed materials, etc. under Article 309 (1) into offences prosecutable only upon complaint. It does not propose to abolish Article 307 (2), which covers the stating of false facts. It is necessary to examine how far the legislative aim of protecting private life while reducing the chilling effect on expression is actually realised in the provisions themselves.

Sources for this section: National Participatory Legislation Center · Progress Status of Partial Amendment Bill to the Criminal Act No. 2219543 · Original PDF of Bill No. 2219543 · Statement of reasons, amending provisions, addenda, and comparison table of new and old provisions · Criminal Act, Article 307 · Defamation · Criminal Act, Article 312 · Complaint and Victim's Wishes

How Should the Line Between Facts One Wishes to Conceal and a Grave Secret Be Explained?

The current Article 307 (1) contains no limitation referring to secrets of private life. The bill introduces the elements of private life, secrecy and gravity, but provides no separate definition clause or list of examples. Because the new requirement narrows the scope of punishment, both the person making a statement and the person exposed by it must be able to foresee on which side of the line they stand.

Compare, for example, material that exposes improper expense handling in a workplace with material that spreads an individual's medical treatment history. This is a hypothetical for the purpose of review, not an actual case. The question is whether the mere fact that the person concerned does not wish disclosure makes both materials the same kind of secret, and how the nature of the information, the extent to which it has already been made public, and the harm expected from exposure are to be distinguished. Since the requirement of injury to reputation under Article 307 (1) also remains, disclosure of a secret and injury to reputation should not be explained as though they were the same fact.

The question to be examined during deliberation is how specifically the factors for assessing gravity should be set out in the provision or in the legislative materials. An explanation that is too broad may again sweep in public criticism, while reliance solely on a fixed list may miss serious invasions of private life that fall outside it. The question is whether examples are needed that explain not only the type of information but also the extent of disclosure and the context of the case. This is an editorial suggestion, not a presentation of an established interpretive standard.

Sources for this section: Original PDF of Bill No. 2219543 · Statement of reasons, amending provisions, addenda, and comparison table of new and old provisions · Criminal Act, Article 307 · Defamation

Where a Document Explaining a Matter of Public Interest Also Contains Private Information

The bill does not amend Article 310. The current Article 310 provides that an act under Article 307 (1) is not punishable if it concerns true facts and relates solely to the public interest. The relationship between the new secrecy requirement and the existing public-interest provision must therefore be explained together. A statement that information is classified as a grave secret and a statement that the expression is ultimately punishable are not conclusions reached at the same stage.

Suppose, as a hypothetical for review, that a person alleging improper spending of a subsidy discloses a statement of accounts that includes medical expenses. The amounts and the circumstances of payment are necessary to the allegation, but whether the content of the treatment must also be disclosed may be a separate question. Conversely, if every part explaining the nature of the expenditure is redacted, it may become difficult to see why the spending is said to be improper. This hypothetical alone is not intended to determine the lawfulness of any particular act of disclosure.

A question remains as to the order in which the public-interest purpose of a post as a whole and the individual items of private information within it should be examined, and an explanation of this is requested. Distinguishing disclosure necessary to expose a problem from unnecessary exposure requires showing which parts are necessary and why. The difference between partially redacted material and the original material may be considered, but guidance should not suggest that redaction alone always exempts a person from liability, or that failure to redact alone leads directly to punishment. Is there a plan to address such mixed cases in the deliberation materials for this bill?

Sources for this section: Original PDF of Bill No. 2219543 · Statement of reasons, amending provisions, addenda, and comparison table of new and old provisions · Criminal Act, Article 310 · Exclusion of Unlawfulness

May Conversion to an Offence Prosecutable Only Upon Complaint Be Read as a Total Bar on Investigation Itself?

The current Article 312 (2) provides that a prosecution for the offences under Articles 307 and 309 may not be instituted against the victim's expressed wishes. The bill moves Article 307 (1) and Article 309 (1) out of that category into the category of offences for which a prosecution may be instituted only upon complaint. Whether the victim has expressed a wish that the offender not be punished, and whether the required complaint has been filed, are different questions.

The statement of reasons for the bill explains that its purpose is to give greater respect to the victim's wishes in the exercise of investigative powers. What the actual amending text directly governs, however, is the condition for instituting a prosecution. This wording alone does not support the conclusion that all inquiries or preservation of evidence before a complaint are uniformly prohibited. The label of an offence prosecutable only upon complaint should not be used to explain every stage of investigation and prosecution at once.

How should the legislative explanation distinguish between a case in which the victim does not want proceedings that would expose their private life again, and a case in which the victim has not yet decided whether to file a complaint but the post is at risk of disappearing? The need to prevent evidence from being lost may conflict with the need to respect the wish not to be drawn into proceedings. This question does not purport to settle anew the permissible scope of investigation before a complaint; it is a request to explain separately the purpose of the bill and the stage that the provision directly governs.

Sources for this section: Original PDF of Bill No. 2219543 · Statement of reasons, amending provisions, addenda, and comparison table of new and old provisions · Criminal Act, Article 312 · Complaint and Victim's Wishes

Is There Readiness to Explain the Complaint Period and the Effect of Withdrawal Together?

If the offences become prosecutable only upon complaint, the explanation cannot stop at the statement that a complaint is required. Article 230 (1) of the current Criminal Procedure Act, as verified, sets the complaint period for offences prosecutable only upon complaint at six months from the date on which the complainant came to know the offender, and provides that, where there is a cause of force majeure preventing a complaint, the period is counted from the date on which that cause ceased. Guidance that mechanically treats the date on which a post was first discovered as the same as the date on which the offender became known does not accord with the provision.

Suppose a situation in which a person who discovered a post by an anonymous account disputes when they learned the identity of its author. The calculation of the period in any actual case is not determined here. The question is how post-amendment guidance would help distinguish the relevant facts and dates. Even in a design intended to respect the victim's wishes, if the required complaint and the time limit are difficult to understand, the victim may miss the opportunity to exercise that right, and this point should be included in the legislative review.

Article 232 provides that a complaint may be withdrawn until the judgment of the first instance is pronounced, and that a person who has withdrawn a complaint may not file it again. Paragraph (3) applies this provision mutatis mutandis where, in a case not prosecutable against the victim's wishes, the expression of a wish for punishment is retracted. It should therefore not be explained as though the hard-to-reverse effect of withdrawal or retraction arose for the first time under this bill. Guidance is needed that separates what changes with conversion to an offence prosecutable only upon complaint from what already existed. The original text of this bill contains no new special rule extending the period or permitting a withdrawal to be reversed.

Sources for this section: Original PDF of Bill No. 2219543 · Statement of reasons, amending provisions, addenda, and comparison table of new and old provisions · Criminal Procedure Act, Articles 230 and 232 · Complaint Period and Withdrawal

Should the Remaining Difference Between Printed Materials and Online Posts Not Also Be Explained?

Article 309 (1) of the current Criminal Act covers cases in which the offence under Article 307 (1) is committed by means of a newspaper, magazine, radio or other publication with intent to defame. Because it refers directly to Article 307 (1), amending the scope of that provision also bears on how Article 309 (1) is read. In Article 312, the bill likewise moves Article 309 (1) into the list of offences prosecutable only upon complaint.

At present, however, Article 70 (1) of the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection contains a separate provision for cases in which a person, with intent to defame, injures another's reputation by publicly revealing facts through an information and communications network. Paragraph (3) of the same Article provides that a prosecution may not be instituted against the victim's specifically expressed wishes. The provisions amended by this bill are Articles 307 and 312 of the Criminal Act, and the attached original bill contains no wording amending Article 70 of the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection.

This bill therefore cannot be presented as abolishing defamation by stating facts in its entirety or as converting all posts into offences prosecutable only upon complaint. The question asks for an explanation of how the requirements and procedures of each statute connect when the same content is conveyed through different media, and whether coordination with other amendment bills is needed. This entry does not determine whether an intent to defame is established or which offence applies to any individual post. If the separate provision is left in place while only the promotional wording expands, readers may understand the stated aim of broadening freedom of expression as going further than the actual scope of the change.

Sources for this section: Original PDF of Bill No. 2219543 · Statement of reasons, amending provisions, addenda, and comparison table of new and old provisions · Criminal Act, Article 309 · Defamation by Printed Materials, etc. · Criminal Act, Article 312 · Complaint and Victim's Wishes · Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Article 70

The Phrase "Six Months After Promulgation" Is Not a Fixed Effective Date

The addenda to the original bill provide that it enters into force six months after the date of its promulgation, and contain no separate transitional measures beyond that sentence. The effective date cannot be calculated by adding six months to the date of referral to the National Assembly committee or the date of introduction. The actual resolution and promulgation, and the final text of the provisions, must be confirmed.

During deliberation, it is also necessary to explain how posts made before the effective date, pending cases, and the time limit for newly required complaints are each to be treated. The mere absence of separate transitional measures in the original bill does not determine the outcome of existing cases. This entry is not the result of a review of the relevant legal doctrine as a whole or of any future revised bill; it collects the questions that remain between the original bill as verified and the current related provisions.

Sources for this section: Original PDF of Bill No. 2219543 · Statement of reasons, amending provisions, addenda, and comparison table of new and old provisions · National Participatory Legislation Center · Progress Status of Partial Amendment Bill to the Criminal Act No. 2219543 · Criminal Procedure Act, Articles 230 and 232 · Complaint Period and Withdrawal