In writing only: email and e-filing

KSTGeneral information, not legal advice

Open Decision Ledger · Civil obligations & remedies

Delivery to the proper consignee as the start of the carrier's one-year time bar

Supreme Court, June 13, 2019, 2019Da205947 (judgment)

Case name: 운송대금

Official text on the National Law Information Center

  1. Question

    Does the one-year period in Article 814(1) of the Commercial Act, by which the carrier's claims and obligations towards the shipper or consignee lapse, run as a peremption period from the date the cargo was delivered to the consignee or the date on which it was to be delivered, and does arrival at the agreed discharge port end the carrier's carriage obligation so as to start that period?

  2. Holding

    It is a peremption period running from the date the cargo was delivered to the consignee or the date on which it was to be delivered, and the parties may extend it by agreement. Delivery means the transfer of possession, that is actual control and management, of the cargo to the proper consignee, and where a bill of lading has been issued, to its legitimate holder; taking the cargo from the hold to the place of delivery and handing it to a bonded warehouse operator after arrival at the agreed discharge port is not enough. Where the cargo is lost or delivery becomes impossible, expiry is judged by the date on which delivery was to be made, meaning the date on which delivery would have had to be made had the contract been performed according to its terms; the expiry is examined by the court of its own motion and may be newly asserted and proved on appeal even if it was not raised before the close of oral argument below.

    Summary of the holding, verbatim

    이러한 해상 운송인의 송하인이나 수하인에 대한 권리·의무에 관한 소멸기간은 제척기간이고, 제척기간의 기산점은 ‘운송물을 인도한 날 또는 인도할 날’이다.

    Unofficial English translation

    Such period for the extinction of the rights and obligations of a sea carrier against the shipper or consignee is an exclusion period, and the starting point of the exclusion period is 'the date the goods were delivered or the date they were to be delivered.'
  3. Disposition

    Reversed and remanded Stated in the decision

    원심판결을 파기하고, 사건을 서울고등법원에 환송한다. 원심판결의 당사자 표시 중 피고 “대표이사 ○○○, 파키스탄국인 △△△”을 “대표이사 ○○○, 파키스탄국인 □□□”으로 경정한다.

    Unofficial English translation

    The judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. In the designation of the parties in the judgment of the court below, the defendant 'representative director ○○○, Pakistani national △△△' is corrected to 'representative director ○○○, Pakistani national □□□'.
  4. Form of the test

    Elements stated Stated in the decision

    여기서 ‘운송물을 인도할 날’이란 통상 운송계약이 그 내용에 좇아 이행되었으면 인도가 행하여져야 했던 날을 의미한다.

    Unofficial English translation

    Here, 'the date the goods were to be delivered' means ordinarily the date on which delivery would have had to be made had the contract of carriage been performed according to its terms.
  5. Factors

    • 운송물에 대한 점유, 즉 사실상의 지배·관리가 정당한 수하인에게 이전되는 것을 말한다
    • 선하증권이 발행된 경우에는 선하증권의 정당한 소지인에게 인도하여야 한다
    • 운송물을 선창에서 인도 장소까지 반출하여 보세창고업자에게 인도하는 것만으로는
    • 운송계약에서 정한 양륙항에 입항한 시점에 종료되는 것이 아니라 정당한 수하인에게 인도되어야 완료되는
    • 상법 제814조 제1항의 제척기간을 도과하였는지는 법원의 직권조사사항이므로

    Unofficial English translation

    • means the transfer to the legitimate consignee of possession of the goods, that is, de facto control and management

    • where a bill of lading has been issued, the goods must be delivered to the legitimate holder of the bill of lading

    • merely by transporting the goods from the ship's hold to the place of delivery and delivering them to a bonded warehouse operator,

    • is not completed at the time of entry into the port of discharge stipulated in the contract of carriage, but is completed only upon delivery to the legitimate consignee

    • because whether the exclusion period under Article 814 paragraph (1) of the Commercial Act has elapsed is a matter for the court to investigate ex officio,

  6. Relation to precedent

    Follows earlier decisions Stated in the decision

    대법원 1997. 11. 28. 선고 97다28490 판결(공1998상, 68)

    Unofficial English translation

    Supreme Court Decision 97Da28490 decided November 28, 1997 (Gong 1998 Sang, 68)

    Decisions referred to

    [1][3] 대법원 1997. 11. 28. 선고 97다28490 판결(공1998상, 68) / [2] 대법원 2004. 5. 14. 선고 2001다33918 판결 / [3] 대법원 2007. 4. 26. 선고 2005다5058 판결(공2007상, 754) / [4] 대법원 2000. 10. 13. 선고 99다18725 판결(공2000하, 2313)

  7. Burden of proof

    Not addressed Not in the decision

  8. Open question and revisit condition

    Where customs clearance is refused indefinitely and the parties place the cargo in a storage facility in the country of transit pending a solution, on what date would delivery have had to be made had the carriage contract been performed according to its terms?

    The judgment of the Seoul High Court after remand, once it fixes the date of delivery or the date on which delivery was to be made, will show how the commencement point is applied in practice. Any amendment to Article 814(1) of the Commercial Act, or a later decision on when a refusal of clearance makes delivery impossible, would require this entry to be read again.

Cross-family AI independent reading & axis check

8 of 8 axes matched GPT-6 Astra (OpenAI, codex CLI) · 2026-10-25

A reader from another model family (GPT-6 Astra), given the official text but not the primary reading, agreed on all 8 axes.

Raw responses and comparison record: Protocol · Blind readings (JSONL) · Axis comparison (JSONL) · SHA-256 (JSON)

Lower-court contrast & scope of application

Lower-court reading vs. Supreme Court holding

Lower-court context: The Seoul High Court, in its judgment of 21 December 2018 (2018Na2043461), held that the plaintiff's carriage ended when the cargo entered the Turkish ports of Mersin and Iskenderun, and calculated the one-year period under Article 814(1) of the Commercial Act from that date. The decision does not record what the court below held about the contractual destination. The parties' dispute is styled as a claim for carriage charges.

Supreme Court standard: The Supreme Court agreed that the destination under the contract was Mersin and Iskenderun, but held that the plaintiff's obligation to deliver does not end on arrival at the agreed discharge port and completes only on delivery to the proper consignee. The court below should have calculated the period from the date of delivery, or, where delivery became impossible, judged expiry from the date on which delivery was to be made; by taking arrival as the end of the carriage it misapprehended the law on the commencement point and failed to examine what was needed. It therefore reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the Seoul High Court, correcting an obvious error in the designation of the defendant party, on the unanimous opinion of Chief Justice Cho Hee-dae and Justices Kim Jae-hyong, Min Yu-sook and Lee Dong-won.

Distinguishing conditions

  • A case in which the parties agreed to extend the one-year period, since Article 814(1) of the Commercial Act allows extension by agreement.
  • A case in which the cargo in fact reached the proper consignee, or the legitimate holder of the bill of lading where one was issued, and the date of delivery is not in dispute.
  • A case in which the cargo was lost or delivery became impossible, where the test is the date on which delivery would have had to be made had the contract been performed, so arrival at the discharge port is not the operative date.

Record verification notes

Establish from the carriage contract and the bill of lading, if one was issued, what the agreed discharge port was, who the proper consignee or legitimate holder is, and on what date control of the cargo actually passed. Then, if delivery never happened, fix the date on which delivery would have had to be made had the contract been performed as agreed, and check whether the period was extended by agreement. Finally, note that expiry is examined by the court of its own motion and may be raised for the first time on appeal, so it is not lost by silence below.

From the official text

Points at issue

[1] 상법 제814조 제1항에서 정한 해상 운송인의 송하인이나 수하인에 대한 권리·의무의 소멸기간이 제척기간인지 여부(적극) 및 그 기산점(=운송물을 인도한 날 또는 인도할 날) [2] 운송인이 운송계약상 양륙항에 도착한 후 운송물을 선창에서 인도 장소까지 반출하여 보세창고업자에게 인도하는 것만으로 운송물이 수하인에게 인도된 것으로 볼 수 있는지 여부(소극) [3] 운송물이 멸실되거나 운송물의 인도가 불가능하게 된 경우, ‘운송물을 인도할 날’을 기준으로 상법 제814조 제1항의 제척기간이 도과하였는지를 판단하여야 하는지 여부(적극) 및 여기서 ‘운송물을 인도할 날’의 의미 [4] 상법 제814조 제1항의 제척기간이 도과하였는지가 법원의 직권조사사항인지 여부(적극) 및 당사자가 제척기간 도과 여부를 사실심 변론종결 시까지 주장하지 않았더라도 상고심에서 이를 새로이 주장·증명할 수 있는지 여부(적극) [5] 갑 주식회사가 송하인(Shipper)을 위해 을 주식회사에 운송물을 양륙항(Port of Discharge)인 터키 내 항구까지 운송할 것을 위탁하였고, 송하인과 수하인(Consignee) 사이에는 위 운송물을 양륙항에서 하역한 다음 환승하여 최종 목적지인 시리아로 운송할 것이 예정되었는데, 운송물이 양륙항에 입항한 후 터키 당국이 자국을 경유하여 시리아로 들어가는 것을 허용하지 않아 통관이 불허되자, 갑 회사와 을 회사가 통관이 이루어질 때까지 잠정적으로 터키 내 보관장소에 운송물을 임치하고 해결책을 찾기로 하였으나, 결국 통관이 이루어지지 않아 운송물이 시리아로 운송되지 못한 사안에서, 을 회사의 인도의무는 운송물이 정당한 수하인에게 인도되어야 완료되는 것인데도, 양륙항인 터키 내 항구에 입항한 시점에 을 회사의 운송이 종료되었다고 보아 그날로부터 상법 제814조 제1항의 제척기간을 계산한 원심판단에 제척기간 기산점에 관한 법리오해 등 잘못이 있다고 한 사례

Unofficial English translation

[1] Whether the period for the extinction of the rights and obligations of a sea carrier against the shipper or consignee provided in Article 814 paragraph (1) of the Commercial Act is an exclusion period (affirmative), and its starting point (= the date the goods were delivered or the date they were to be delivered) [2] Whether the fact that the carrier, upon arrival at the port of discharge under the contract of carriage, transported the goods from the ship's hold to the place of delivery and delivered them to a bonded warehouse operator alone may be regarded as delivery of the goods to the consignee (negative) [3] Where the goods were lost or delivery of the goods became impossible, whether the exclusion period under Article 814 paragraph (1) of the Commercial Act has elapsed must be determined on the basis of 'the date the goods were to be delivered' (affirmative), and the meaning of 'the date the goods were to be delivered' here [4] Whether the exclusion period under Article 814 paragraph (1) of the Commercial Act has elapsed is a matter for the court to investigate ex officio (affirmative), and whether, even if a party did not assert whether the exclusion period had elapsed until the close of oral argument in the fact-finding instance, the party may newly assert and prove it in the final appellate instance (affirmative) [5] In a case where A Corporation entrusted B Corporation, on behalf of the shipper (Shipper), with carrying the goods to a port in Turkey, the port of discharge (Port of Discharge), and it was scheduled between the shipper and the consignee (Consignee) that, after the goods were unloaded at the port of discharge, they would be transshipped and carried to the final destination, Syria, but after the goods entered the port of discharge the Turkish authorities did not permit entry into Syria through their country and customs clearance was refused, whereupon A Corporation and B Corporation agreed to provisionally deposit the goods at a storage place in Turkey until customs clearance was effected and to seek a solution, yet customs clearance was ultimately not effected and the goods were not carried to Syria; where B Corporation's obligation to deliver was completed only upon delivery of the goods to the legitimate consignee, the court below nevertheless regarded B Corporation's carriage as having ended at the time of entry into the port of discharge, a port in Turkey, and calculated the exclusion period under Article 814 paragraph (1) of the Commercial Act from that day; a case in which it was held that the judgment of the court below contained an error, including a misapprehension of legal principles concerning the starting point of the exclusion period

Summary of the holding

[1] 상법 제814조 제1항은 운송인의 송하인 또는 수하인에 대한 채권과 채무는 그 청구원인의 여하에 불구하고 운송인이 수하인에게 운송물을 인도한 날 또는 인도할 날부터 1년 이내에 재판상 청구가 없으면 소멸하되, 당사자의 합의에 의하여 위 기간을 연장할 수 있도록 규정하고 있다. 이러한 해상 운송인의 송하인이나 수하인에 대한 권리·의무에 관한 소멸기간은 제척기간이고, 제척기간의 기산점은 ‘운송물을 인도한 날 또는 인도할 날’이다. [2] 해상운송계약에서 운송인은 운송물의 수령·선적·적부·보관·운송·양륙 및 인도의무를 부담하므로(상법 제795조 제1항), 운송인은 운송채무의 최종 단계에서 운송물을 정당한 수하인에게 인도함으로써 운송계약의 이행을 완료하게 된다. 여기서 운송물의 인도는 운송물에 대한 점유, 즉 사실상의 지배·관리가 정당한 수하인에게 이전되는 것을 말한다. 선하증권이 발행된 경우에는 선하증권의 정당한 소지인에게 인도하여야 한다(상법 제861조, 제132조). 따라서 운송인이 운송계약상 정해진 양륙항에 도착한 후 운송물을 선창에서 인도 장소까지 반출하여 보세창고업자에게 인도하는 것만으로는 그 운송물이 운송인의 지배를 떠나 정당한 수하인에게 인도된 것으로 볼 수 없다. [3] 운송물이 멸실되거나 운송물의 인도가 불가능하게 된 경우에는 ‘운송물을 인도할 날’을 기준으로 제척기간이 도과하였는지를 판단하여야 한다. 여기서 ‘운송물을 인도할 날’이란 통상 운송계약이 그 내용에 좇아 이행되었으면 인도가 행하여져야 했던 날을 의미한다. [4] 상법 제814조 제1항의 제척기간을 도과하였는지는 법원의 직권조사사항이므로 당사자의 주장이 없더라도 법원이 이를 직권으로 조사하여 판단하여야 한다. 또한 당사자가 제척기간의 도과 여부를 사실심 변론종결 시까지 주장하지 아니하였다 하더라도 상고심에서 이를 새로이 주장·증명할 수 있다. [5] 갑 주식회사가 송하인(Shipper)을 위해 을 주식회사에 운송물을 양륙항(Port of Discharge)인 터키 내 항구까지 운송할 것을 위탁하였고, 송하인과 수하인(Consignee) 사이에는 위 운송물을 양륙항에서 하역한 다음 환승하여 최종 목적지인 시리아로 운송할 것이 예정되었는데, 운송물이 양륙항에 입항한 후 터키 당국이 자국을 경유하여 시리아로 들어가는 것을 허용하지 않아 통관이 불허되자, 갑 회사와 을 회사가 통관이 이루어질 때까지 잠정적으로 터키 내 보관장소에 운송물을 임치하고 해결책을 찾기로 하였으나, 결국 통관이 이루어지지 않아 운송물이 시리아로 운송되지 못한 사안에서, 운송계약에 따른 운송물의 목적지는 양륙항인 터키 내 항구로 보아야 하나, 을 회사의 인도의무는 운송계약에서 정한 양륙항에 입항한 시점에 종료되는 것이 아니라 정당한 수하인에게 인도되어야 완료되는 것이므로, 을 회사가 운송물을 정당한 수하인에게 인도한 날을 기준으로 상법 제814조 제1항의 제척기간을 계산하거나, 만약 운송물의 인도가 불가능하게 된 경우에는 운송물을 인도할 날을 기준으로 위 제척기간이 도과하였는지를 판단하여야 하는데도, 이와 달리 운송물이 양륙항인 터키 내 항구에 입항한 시점에 을 회사의 운송이 종료되었다고 보아 그날로부터 제척기간을 계산한 원심판단에 제척기간 기산점에 관한 법리오해 등 잘못이 있다고 한 사례.

Order

원심판결을 파기하고, 사건을 서울고등법원에 환송한다. 원심판결의 당사자 표시 중 피고 “대표이사 ○○○, 파키스탄국인 △△△”을 “대표이사 ○○○, 파키스탄국인 □□□”으로 경정한다.

Unofficial English translation

The judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. In the designation of the parties in the judgment of the court below, the defendant 'representative director ○○○, Pakistani national △△△' is corrected to 'representative director ○○○, Pakistani national □□□'.

Provisions referred to

[1] 상법 제814조 제1항 [2] 상법 제132조, 제795조 제1항, 제814조 제1항, 제861조 [3] 상법 제814조 제1항 [4] 상법 제814조 제1항, 민사소송법 제134조 [5] 상법 제132조, 제795조 제1항, 제814조 제1항, 제861조

Read 2026-10-25 · Cross-read 2026-10-25. All quotes matched against the official text. The Chinese-character placeholders the court used for anonymised parties are given in their Korean readings, and parenthetical Chinese-character glosses are omitted.

Every entry is published only after all quotes have been matched character by character against the official text, and audited by an independent second reading from a different model family across all eight axes. Both agreed axes and text-grounded interpretive divergences are recorded openly. The ledger is a research record, not an assessment of the court or advice on any matter.

Back to the ledger
You are reading PRO SE
RISCON Labsrisconlabs.com