Summary
Return of value where return of the original thing is impossible is distinguished from the liability of a subsequent acquirer deemed by law to be in bad faith.
4.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
The destruction of the object does not eliminate the question of recovering the benefit as well. After leaving in place both the restriction on restitution of performance for an illegal cause and the exception in which the illegal cause lies only with the recipient, the question that remains is what the conditions are under which this remedy actually operates. Recipient B asserts that the performance sent by plaintiff A was received, but that the absence of a cause for payment came to be known only later; what is asked here is whether the absence of the object received also extinguishes the liability to make restitution.
The text that answers this question is found in Article 747 of the Civil Act. Article 747 provides: "Article 747 (Inability to Return the Original Object and Return of Value; Liability of the Subsequent Acquirer) (1) Where the recipient is unable to return the object of the performance received, the recipient shall return its value." (Civil Act, Article 747) This text designates as the recipient the person unable to return the object received, as the state of being unable to return the impossibility of returning the object received, and as the effect the return of its value, respectively.
This Article distinguishes the return of value in cases where return of the original object is impossible from the liability of a subsequent acquirer in statutory bad faith. Impossibility of returning the original object is not a condition for extinguishing the liability to make restitution; it is a condition that changes the object of restitution from the object received to its value. For this remedy to operate, first the connection between enrichment without cause and loss must be recognized; second, it must not fall under the restriction on restitution; and third, the scope, including good or bad faith and existing benefit, must be determined. These three are judgments belonging to different stages.
Disputes may remain as to the point in time and the scope for determining value. In particular, the counterargument remains that if liability is narrowed to existing benefit, the result is that a person who spent another's money avoids restitution. However, the absence of the original object cannot be turned into an automatic extinguishment of the duty to make restitution. Article 747 provides the effect for cases of inability to return as return of value, while not abolishing the duty of restitution itself, and leaves disputes arising in the scope of calculating value as matters of that calculation.
Recipient B asserts that the performance sent by plaintiff A was received, but that the absence of a cause for payment came to be known only later; in this scene, the facts relevant to this question are that the performance and cause, the understanding at the time of payment, and the existence of the benefit become subjects of the record. However, since this scene has not determined whether the benefit remains, whether the object to be returned actually does not exist, or when this became known, it cannot be asserted that all the conditions of this section have been satisfied. If it is confirmed that the illegal cause lies only with the recipient, what remains as a condition is the correction of the exclusion of restitution on the sole ground that the performance was illegal.
The conclusion this section permits is a narrow one: that the liability to make restitution is not extinguished merely because the original object has been destroyed, and that when the object to be returned is absent, its value becomes the subject of restitution. To view the recipient's liability as extinguished solely because the object received is absent is a conclusion this section does not permit, and neither can the point in time or the scope of calculating value be determined in this section. Even after the conditions under which this remedy operates have been confirmed, what remains is the question: what are the conditions that block this remedy?
4.2The Conditions That Block Relief
The preceding section concluded that this remedy operates where the connection between enrichment without cause and loss is recognized, the restriction on restitution does not apply, and the scope, including good or bad faith and existing benefit, is determined. Where, then, is the point at which the same remedy ceases to operate? In the scene in which recipient B asserts that the performance sent by plaintiff A was received, but that the absence of a cause for payment came to be known only later, it is at issue whether the absence of the object received also extinguishes the liability to make restitution.
On this question, Article 747 of the Civil Act directly governs the relationship between the original object and its value. The Article provides: "Article 747 (Inability to Return the Original Object and Return of Value; Liability of the Subsequent Acquirer) (1) Where the recipient is unable to return the object of the performance received, the recipient shall return its value. (2) Where the recipient is unable to return that benefit, a third party in bad faith who acquired gratuitously the object of that benefit from the recipient shall be liable to make restitution in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph." Here the actor is the recipient; the act is the return of the object received; the condition is the impossibility of that return; and the standards applied in its place in that case are the return of value and the liability of a third party in bad faith who acquired gratuitously.
The reason the above text places the impossibility of returning the original object alongside the duty to return its value is that the subjects of judgment at the two stages differ from each other. The former concerns the existence of the object to be returned; the latter concerns the size of the benefit that remains despite the absence of the object. The conclusion of this section is that where a person performed knowing that there was no debt, or where the case falls under the restriction on restitution of performance for an illegal cause and no statutory exception applies, this remedy is blocked. Here return of value is defined as returning its value when the original object cannot be returned, and this definition prevents the absence of the original object from being read as the extinguishment of the duty to return its value.
Disputes may arise as to the value of what point in time to take as the standard and how far the scope of restitution extends, and the fact that this dispute remains does not disappear. The counterargument that narrowing liability to existing benefit results in a person who spent another's money avoiding restitution also aims at this point. Even so, the absence of the original object cannot be turned into an automatic extinguishment of the duty to make restitution. If the single fact that the object to be returned has disappeared were taken to wipe out the liability to make restitution, the avoidance pointed out by the counterargument would instead be justified.
In the synthetic scene, only the assertion that recipient B later learned that there was no cause for payment for the performance received is determined, and the present state of that performance and the size of the remaining benefit are not recorded. Accordingly, whether payment was made knowing that there was no debt, whether the case falls under the restriction on restitution of performance for an illegal cause and no statutory exception applies, and the extent of the impossibility of returning the object received and the scope of value cannot be determined from this scene alone. If it is confirmed that the illegal cause lies only with the recipient, the condition that the exclusion of restitution on the sole ground that the performance was illegal is corrected remains, but whether that condition has been satisfied remains undetermined.
Therefore the conclusion of this section remains at a conditional distinction. The liability to make restitution does not disappear merely because the object received has been destroyed; instead, return of value where return of the original object is impossible and the liability of a bad-faith subsequent acquirer provided by statute are separated into distinct judgments. Conversely, where a person performed knowing that there was no debt, or where the case falls under the restriction on restitution of performance for an illegal cause and no statutory exception applies, this remedy is blocked. Beyond this, not determining, as new facts, other conditions that block this remedy or the specific effect that the absence of the original object has on liability is also a limit of this section.
4.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Starting from the point where the preceding stage left in place both the restriction on restitution of performance for an illegal cause and the exception in which the illegal cause lies only with the recipient, the present question aims at a narrower boundary. Recipient B asserts that the performance sent by plaintiff A was received, but that the absence of a cause for payment came to be known only later. Since neither the year, nor the amount, nor the commencement date is set in the scene, the whereabouts of the object received and the size of the remaining benefit are likewise not established facts. In such a situation, should the liability to make restitution be regarded as extinguished together on the sole ground that the original object is already gone?
As to the question whether the absence of the object received also extinguishes the liability to make restitution, the relevant text in this section is Article 747 of the Civil Act. Its paragraph (1) provides that "Where the recipient is unable to return the object of the performance received, the recipient shall return its value," and paragraph (2) continues: "Where the recipient is unable to return that benefit, a third party in bad faith who acquired gratuitously the object of that benefit from the recipient shall be liable to make restitution in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph" (Civil Act, Article 747). The actor designated by the text is the recipient; the act is divided into the return of the object received and the return of its value; and the condition is the inability to return that object or benefit. The subsequent acquirer written together in the same paragraph is a separate subject of liability distinguished from the recipient.
When this text is connected with the situation in which the object received is absent, the impossibility of returning the original object is read not as a ground for extinguishing the duty of restitution but as a ground for changing the object of restitution from the object to its value. Return of value means returning its value when the original object cannot be returned; it is the form of substitute performance that paragraph (1) in the preceding paragraph attaches to the impossibility of returning the original object. The reason the two stages must be distinguished here is clear. The judgment whether to make restitution and the judgment what to return are different questions, and the fact that the latter is not decided does not at the same time negate the former. Even if disputes remain as to the point in time and the scope for determining value, restitution itself does not disappear.
The counterargument this boundary targets is clear. If liability is narrowed to existing benefit, a person who spent another's money avoids restitution, and if the recipient merely asserts that the original object was consumed or disposed of so that no benefit remains, the creditor recovers nothing at all — a loss. Disputes also remain as to the point in time and the scope for determining value. However, the author's answer is that the absence of the original object cannot be turned into an automatic extinguishment of the duty to make restitution. The wording of Article 747(1), which makes inability to return the condition for return of value, is read as not accepting such automatic extinguishment. Without erasing the disadvantage pointed out by the counterargument, it also maintains together the boundary that leaves matters, which might be passed off as inability, in a state of undetermination.
The judgment materials recorded in the synthetic scene are the performance and cause, the understanding at the time of payment, the attribution of the illegal cause, the existence of the benefit, and the subsequent knowledge. The part in which B asserted that the absence of a cause for payment came to be known only later corresponds to subsequent knowledge, while the understanding at the time of payment, the content of the cause for payment, and the presence and size of the remaining benefit are not captured. Whether the performance received by recipient B still remains, or has already been spent and destroyed, is also undetermined. These matters, which cannot be settled because the materials are absent, are in a state where the judgment materials are not specified. In that state, liability cannot be extinguished by asserting inability to return, nor can the duty of restitution be confirmed as established. Leaving the two judgments undetermined is the boundary this section maintains.
The conclusion this section permits is that, where the cause for payment or the recipient's knowledge and the remaining benefit cannot be ascertained, matters for which the judgment materials are not specified are left undetermined, distinguished from inability. What it does not permit is the conclusion that treats the absence of the original object itself as the extinguishment of the duty of restitution, and the attitude of filling in unconfirmed issues and fixing them as inability. This section's treatment of undetermination does not turn a lack of materials directly into a denial of relief, while leaving the door to adjudication open.
4.4The Records Needed for Determination
On the premise of this scene, the question is asked whether the absence of the object received also extinguishes the liability to make restitution. The statutory text corresponding to this question is Article 747 of the Civil Act. Its paragraph (1) provides: "Where the recipient is unable to return the object of the performance received, the recipient shall return its value." This text specifies, respectively, as the recipient the person unable to return, as the act the impossibility of returning the object, and as the condition the nonexistence of the object received. In other words, it is not a structure in which the duty arises only when the object is in hand; when it cannot be returned, its value takes its place. Since the liability of the subsequent acquirer in paragraph (2) of the same Article is a provision that sets separate subjects and requirements, its interpretation is not carried over to this text as it stands.
Accordingly, under the above text, the possibility of returning the original object and the existence of the liability to make restitution are placed as different issues. Here return of value means returning its value when the original object cannot be returned. This definition separates the two stages of judgment. The preceding stage asks about the existence of the performance received and the cause for payment; the later stage asks whether the object to be returned remains. If the two are mixed, the circumstance of the object's disappearance would erase even the fact of the performance at the preceding stage. Thus this section adjudicates the stages solely on the basis of the materials recorded in the performance and cause, the understanding at the time of payment, the attribution of the illegal cause, the existence of the benefit, and the subsequent knowledge, and does not fill in absent records by presumption.
That said, the disputes do not disappear. Views may still differ as to the point in time and the scope for determining value, and on what standard and how much to determine may become a separate contest. This inconvenience is acknowledged, but there is a conclusion that cannot be accepted as its result. If the disappearance of the object were taken to bring the question of recovering the benefit to an end as well, even the confirmation that a performance had been received would be left entirely meaningless. Rather than reducing the loss pointed out by the counterargument, this would lose even the starting point of the liability to make restitution; this section therefore does not accept that automatic extinguishment.
Among the facts placed in the scene, those bearing on this question are only that recipient B received the performance, that the cause for the payment of that performance did not exist, and the assertion that this circumstance came to be known only later. Comparing these facts with the record items set out above, the performance and cause, the understanding at the time of payment, and the subsequent knowledge can have their orientation identified from the scene. By contrast, the attribution of the illegal cause and the existence of the benefit are not settled by the scene. Whether the object received is now in hand, whether it is already gone, and whether that nonexistence corresponds to the impossibility of returning the original object also cannot be determined from this scene alone. These items are left undetermined, and undetermination does not mean an immediate denial of relief. The same holds where, rather than a synthetic scene, actual records are absent.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. The mere circumstance that the object received has become impossible to return does not automatically extinguish the liability to make restitution, and there is a statutory text that places return of value in its stead (Civil Act, Article 747). And this conclusion bears together with it the condition that the stages are adjudicated only within the scope in which the established record items have been filled in. Filling circumstances left out of the record by guesswork and passing them to the next stage is the side this section does not permit, and the conclusion that turns the absence of the original object into an automatic extinguishment of the duty of restitution is likewise not permitted. No judgment is rendered beyond the scope that can be confirmed from the record.
4.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
The preceding section found that this decision rests on performance and cause, knowledge at the time of payment, attribution of the illegal cause, existing benefit, and subsequent knowledge, and that without such records the conclusion remains undetermined. On the basis of such records, the point now asked is whether the duty to return also disappears when the thing received no longer exists—that is, whether the mere fact that the original object of the extinguished performance no longer remains in hand also eliminates the duty to return. In the scene in which the beneficiary B claims to have received the performance sent by plaintiff A but to have learned later that there was no cause for payment, it must be examined whether the absence of the original object also determines the disposition of the remaining benefit.
The statutory text corresponding to this question is paragraph (1) of Article 747 of the Civil Act, which provides that where "the beneficiary" is "unable to return" "the object received," "the beneficiary shall return its value." The subject spoken of in this text is the beneficiary of the object received; the act is the return of value in place of the return of the object itself; and the condition is the case in which return is impossible. Accordingly, what this provision addresses is the situation in which the beneficiary cannot return the object itself, while neither the procedure by which return is performed nor the scope of what the counterparty is to receive is determined within this text. However, since the liability of a bad-faith third party who acquired the object gratuitously under paragraph (2) is prescribed by separate language, the two must not be conflated even within the same Article.
Connecting the subject and condition prescribed in the text of paragraph (1) with the preceding decision, where return of the original object is impossible the beneficiary bears the duty to return the value of the object received. Return of the original object and return of value are not two names for the same duty; they are distinct stages in which the object of return changes from the object itself to its value, and must therefore be distinguished. Following this distinction, once it is confirmed that the illegal cause lies with the beneficiary alone, a decision is rendered that corrects the exclusion of return on the sole ground that the performance was for an illegal cause. The exclusion of return is not maintained merely because the original object no longer remains; rather, it is understood that the return changes from the original object to its value.
The strongest counterargument aimed at this conclusion is that narrowing liability to existing benefit produces the result that a person who spent another's money avoids return. It is further pointed out that disputes may remain as to the point in time and scope for determining value. If the object received has already ceased to exist, what its value is and the value as of what point in time may become matters of dispute, and the consequent disadvantage—that the practical benefit of return may diminish—must not be erased. Because paragraph (1) merely requires return of value where return is impossible and does not provide for the extinction of the liability to return, the foregoing counterargument shows only the difficulty of measurement that arises in determining value, and does not mean that the duty to return itself disappears.
The facts confirmed in this scene are that the beneficiary B received the performance sent by plaintiff A and claims to have learned later that there was no cause for payment. Viewed in light of these facts, the existence of the performance and the absence of a cause for payment lie on the confirmed side, while B's knowledge at the time of payment must be determined separately from subsequent knowledge. Whether the illegal cause lies with the beneficiary alone, whether the object received still remains, and how much the remaining benefit amounts to are not fixed by this scene and therefore remain undetermined. What is clear, however, is that the confirmed performance and the absence of a cause are placed separately from the possibility of returning the original object; accordingly, the absence of the original object is not established as a fact of this scene and cannot lead to the automatic extinction of the duty to return.
What can be confirmed in this section is that the liability to return does not disappear merely because the thing received has been lost, and that where return of the original object is impossible the question of returning its value remains. Conversely, what cannot be fixed in this section is what value in fact applies, the value as of what point in time, and to whom the illegal cause is attributed; these items remain undetermined without the records examined above. How is the strongest counterargument against this decision answered?
4.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
Up to the preceding stage, both the restriction on the return of performance based on an illegal cause and the exception where the illegal cause lies with the beneficiary alone have been left in place. On that framework, this section now draws a line at the question whether the duty to return also disappears when the thing received no longer exists, on the premise that disputes may remain as to the point in time and scope for determining value.
The text that answers this question is found in paragraph (1) of Article 747 of the Civil Act. That provision states: "Article 747 (Cases Where Return of the Object Is Impossible and Return of Value; Liability of the Transferee) (1) Where the beneficiary is unable to return the object received, the beneficiary shall return its value." Here the subject is the beneficiary, the act is the return of the object received, the condition is the impossibility of that return, and what follows as a result is the return of value.
Return of value is the return of its value when the original object cannot be returned, and the return of the original object and the return of value as its substitute are structured as separate stages. This distinction matters because the impossibility of returning the object is not written as a condition that extinguishes the return of value as well. Paragraph (2) of the same Article provides: "Where the beneficiary is unable to return that benefit, a third party in bad faith who acquired the object of the benefit from the beneficiary gratuitously shall be liable to return it pursuant to the provisions of the preceding paragraph." This is a separate channel that divides the liability of the beneficiary from the liability of a statutory transferee in bad faith.
The strongest counterargument targets this point, arguing that narrowing liability to existing benefit produces the result that a person who spent another's money avoids return. The loss pinpointed by this argument is a real one. If, even where the recipient of a performance has already consumed that benefit and become unable to return the original object, the liability disappears along with it, the party that sent the performance bears the cost while recovering nothing at all. Even so, the absence of the original object cannot be converted into the automatic extinction of the duty to return, because impossibility of return is set as the condition that opens the door to return of value and is not written as a condition that eliminates the duty to return itself.
What is fixed in this scene is only the receipt of the performance and the subsequent recognition of the absence of a cause, and this corresponds to part of the items of the records—performance and cause, knowledge at the time of payment, attribution of the illegal cause, existing benefit, and subsequent knowledge. Whether the object of the performance still remains, whether, if return is impossible, its value is specified as of what point in time and within what scope, and whether the restriction on the return of performance based on an illegal cause and its exception apply cannot be determined from this scene alone. The contrast—that once it is confirmed that the illegal cause lies with the beneficiary alone, the exclusion of return on the sole ground that the performance was for an illegal cause is corrected—remains only as a condition for confirming the scope in which this dispute remains.
What this section permits is the exclusion of the judgment that the absence of the original object automatically erases the duty to return; what it does not permit is the conclusion that the amount of value or the point in time for its calculation has already been fixed. The confirmation of impossibility of return and the specification of value remain separate matters, and up to the point where a scope condition such as existing benefit is specified, the text of this section provides the framework for substitute return. By contrast, what amount is determined as of what reference point, and in what scope the avoidance concern raised by the counterargument materializes, is not fixed by this text alone.
4.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
If the original object of the performance has already disappeared and can no longer be returned, does B's duty to return disappear along with it? This question asks about one concrete facet of the conclusion confirmed in the preceding section.
The relevant text shows how Article 747 of the Civil Act separately prescribes the impossibility of returning the original object, the return of value, and the liability of third parties. The provision states: "(1) Where the beneficiary is unable to return the object received, the beneficiary shall return its value. (2) Where the beneficiary is unable to return that benefit, a third party in bad faith who acquired the object of the benefit from the beneficiary gratuitously shall be liable to return it pursuant to the provisions of the preceding paragraph." (Civil Act Article 747). Here the 'beneficiary' is the party unable to return the object received, and 'impossibility of returning the object' is the condition under which that act gives rise to the duty to return value.
This text makes clear that the impossibility of returning the original object does not erase the duty to return itself but changes the object of return into value. Accordingly, the conclusion fixed by this section is to distinguish the return of value where return of the original object is impossible from the liability of a statutory transferee in bad faith. The two judgments follow one another within the same provision, yet their requirements differ. The former addresses the beneficiary's own impossibility of returning the object; the latter addresses the case in which liability is shifted to a third party in bad faith who acquired the object gratuitously when the beneficiary is unable to return that benefit.
Value that changes with the point in time leaves disputes over the size of liability, and a narrowing standard may reduce the actual amount recovered. The counterargument that narrowing liability to existing benefit produces the result that a person who spent another's money avoids return likewise carries force. Since the provision treats the impossibility of returning the object as the conversion condition for return of value and not as a ground for extinguishing the obligation, this answer holds.
Contrasting B's claims in this scene, it is confirmed that a performance was received and that B claims to have learned later that there was no cause for payment. The decision in this section leaves records of performance and cause, knowledge at the time of payment, attribution of the illegal cause, existing benefit, and subsequent knowledge. However, in the synthetic scene, whether and when the original object was extinguished, and the basis for calculating its value, are not determined. Since the scope or amount of performance cannot be fixed from the scene alone, such matters remain undetermined. The condition that, once it is confirmed that the illegal cause lies with the beneficiary alone, the exclusion of return on the sole ground that the performance was for an illegal cause is corrected is taken into account only when it falls within the scope of this section.
The conclusions this section permits are narrow. They are the judgment that even when the original object received has been lost and cannot be returned, the liability to return changes into return of value, and the judgment that the beneficiary's own liability to return value is distinguished from the statutory liability of a third party in bad faith who acquired the object gratuitously. Conversely, the conclusion that reads the absence of the original object as the automatic extinction of the duty to return is not permitted in this section. Practical issues surrounding the point in time and scope for calculating value remain, but those issues do not shake the very existence of the obligation.
4.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Even if this argument is correct, if the object received has already disappeared, nothing remains to be returned. Yet the fact that the object is gone does not immediately erase the question of the recovery of the benefit as well. This section examines whether liability survives after the thing to be returned has vanished, and what questions it alone is charged with.
The statutory text places two liabilities side by side in response to this question. Article 747 of the Civil Act provides that where the beneficiary is unable to return the object received, the beneficiary shall return its value, and that where the beneficiary is unable to return the benefit, a third party in bad faith who acquired the object of the benefit from the beneficiary gratuitously shall be liable to return it pursuant to the provisions of the preceding paragraph (Civil Act Article 747). The former refers to the object received itself, while the latter refers to the third party who received the object of the benefit gratuitously. Rather than speaking of the extinction of the liability to return, this text requires another form of return in place of the return of the original object.
The distinction of two stages established by this text is necessary to divide the scope of the liability to return. The first concerns the beneficiary personally and means returning the value when the object received cannot be returned. Here, return of value is defined as returning the value when the original object cannot be returned. The second concerns a third party in bad faith who acquired the object of the benefit gratuitously: when the beneficiary is unable to return the benefit, a third party who meets the requirements set by the text bears the same form of return liability. Because the two liabilities differ in subject and requirements, the absence of one cannot be read across as the extinction of the other.
The text does not directly answer as to the value of what point in time is to be taken as the standard, or how far the scope of return extends. If the duty to return were deemed to vanish even where the beneficiary consumed or disposed of the benefit received and so produced nothing to return, the party that sent the performance could not expect recovery of a benefit without cause. This disadvantage meshes exactly with the distinction of the two stages examined above and cannot serve as a ground for bypassing the return of value required by the text.
What is confirmed in the synthetic scene is only that the beneficiary B received the performance of plaintiff A and claims to have learned later that there was no cause for payment. The operative judgment of this section functions only at the stage of the return and scope of unjust enrichment, where the connection between the benefit without cause and the harm is recognized, the restriction on return does not apply, and the scope is specified, as with good or bad faith and existing benefit. Where a person performed payment knowing that no debt existed, or where the restriction on the return of performance based on an illegal cause applies and no statutory exception exists, and where the cause of payment, the beneficiary's knowledge, and the remaining benefit cannot be confirmed, the judgment remains open. Once it is confirmed that the illegal cause lies with the beneficiary alone, the exclusion of return on the sole ground that the performance was for an illegal cause is corrected.
This section is charged with whether the liability to return is automatically extinguished even when the thing received has been lost, and with how to distinguish return of value from the statutory liability of a transferee in bad faith where return of the original object is impossible. Return of value is the return of its value when the original object cannot be returned, while the liability of a third party in bad faith who acquired the object gratuitously is handled as a form with separate requirements. Beyond this scope, fixing the basis for calculating value, expanding the range of application of the restriction on the return of performance based on an illegal cause and its exceptions, or reaching a conclusion on how the recipient's knowledge alters the scope of return is not the task of this section.
4.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
받은 물건이 없으면 반환 책임도 사라지는가라는 물음에 대해, 해당 원문 문언만 부당이득의 반환과 범위의 판정 근거로 삼는다. 해당 원문 범위 안의 문언만 적용하며 판결이유나 다른 항으로 확장하지 않는다. 이 장면에서 물건 자체가 없어진 경우, 그 회복 문제는 별도로 남는다. 따라서 지금 묻는 것은 원물의 존재 여부가 반환 의무를 끝낼 수 있는가이다.
이 절에서 다룰 원문은 민법 제747조이다. 제1항의 문언은 주체를 수익자로, 행위를 받은 목적물의 반환 불능으로, 효과를 가액 반환으로 정한다. 이 문언의 범위를 넘어 다른 요건을 읽어 넣지 않는다.
제1항의 문언이 반환 불능의 때에 가액 반환을 둔 것은, 원물 반환과 가액 반환을 서로 다른 단계로 다루기 때문이다. 원물 반환이 가능한 때에는 반환의 대상과 방식이 달라지며, 불가능한 때에 가액이 그 자리를 대신한다. 그러므로 받은 목적물이 남아 있지 않다는 사실만으로 반환 의무가 소멸한다고 읽을 수 없다. 같은 조 제2항은 수익자로부터 무상으로 이익의 목적물을 양수한 악의의 제삼자에게 책임을 두므로, 반환 책임의 소재를 수익자로 한정하지 않는다.
그 가치가 언제 기준으로 계산되는지, 반환할 범위가 받은 목적물에 그치는지 확정하는 데에서 다툼이 생길 수 있다. 이러한 다툼이 남는다고 해도, 원물 부재를 반환 의무의 자동 소멸로 바꿀 수는 없다. 원물이 없다는 사정은 반환할 목적물의 형태가 바뀌는 사정으로만 작용할 뿐이다. 반론은 타인의 돈을 쓴 사람이 반환을 피하는 결과가 생긴다는 손실을 지적한다. 그 불리함은 남겨 두되, 문언상의 구별을 지워 원물 부재를 의무의 소멸로 바꾸는 것은 허용되지 않는다.
이 장면에서 확인되는 것은 수익자 B가 원고 A의 급부를 받았고 지급 원인이 없었다는 사실을 나중에 알았다고 주장한다는 점이다. 이 장면에 급부의 대상이 된 목적물이 지금 남아 있는지, 반환할 수 있는지의 사실은 정해져 있지 않다. 원물 반환이 불가능함이 확인되면 가액 반환의 문언이 적용될 자리는 생긴다. 반대로 반환 불능 자체가 확인되지 않은 장면에서 가액 반환의 필요를 단정할 수는 없다. 지급 원인의 부존재도 이 절의 장면에는 주장으로만 놓여 있으며, 확정된 사실로 다루지 않는다. 따라서 현재 확인된 사실로 판정할 수 없는 항목은 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은, 원물 반환이 불가능할 때 가액 반환의 문언이 적용되고 책임의 소재를 수익자에만 한정하지 않는 판단이다. 반면 반환 불능의 확인 없이 가액 반환을 미리 정하거나, 가액의 기준 시점과 범위를 지금 확정하는 것은 허용되지 않는다. 원물 부재를 반환 의무의 자동 소멸로 바꾸는 판단 역시 이 절의 범위 밖에 있다. 받은 물건이 없다는 사정만으로 돌려줄 책임이 끝난다고 보아서는 안 된다. 다만 이 절은 문언의 적용에 한정하며, 받은 사람의 앎이 반환 범위를 어느 선까지 바꾸는지는 따로 묻지 않는다.
4.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
원물이 남아 있지 않아도 반환 책임이 그 자리에서 사라지는지가 지금 남은 물음이다. 이 주장이 성립하더라도 받은 목적물이 지금 B에게 남아 있는지는 별도로 살펴야 한다. 목적물이 소멸되었거나 처분되어 돌려줄 수 없게 된 경우, 반환 의무가 원물 부재와 함께 없어지는지가 쟁점이다. 이 물음은 앞 절에서 남겨 둔 불법원인급여의 반환 제한과 그 예외와는 별개로, 반환의 대상이 무엇인지에 관한 문제다.
이 문제에 해당하는 원문은 민법 제747조다. 같은 조 제1항은 "수익자가 그 받은 목적물을 반환할 수 없는 때에는 그 가액을 반환하여야 한다"(민법 제747조)고 정한다. 이 문언은 주체를 수익자로, 행위를 받은 목적물의 반환으로, 조건을 반환 불능으로 각각 특정한다. 반환 불능이라는 조건이 충족되면 의무의 소멸이 아니라 반환 대상이 목적물에서 그 가액으로 바뀐다. 이 정의는 목적물의 물리적 소멸에 한정되지 않고, 처분 등으로 특정 수익자에게 반환할 수 없게 된 경우도 함께 가리킨다. 이 항의 문언은 가액을 어느 시점 기준으로 정할지까지 정하지 않는다.
민법 제747조 제1항이 정한 이 전환은 원물 반환과 가액 반환을 서로 다른 단계로 구별해야 하는 이유를 드러낸다. 반환의무는 원인 없는 이익과 손해의 연결이 인정되고 반환 제한에 걸리지 않는 범위에서 성립한다. 그다음 단계에서 반환 대상이 특정되는데, 원물이 있으면 원물 반환을, 원물이 없으면 가액 반환을 각각 살핀다. 이 두 구분은 요건이 아니라 반환의 대상을 정하는 단계 안의 세부 구분이다. 따라서 단계 안의 세부 구분은 작동하는 경우와 막히는 경우와 미확정인 경우의 조건에 한정되며 명시한 조건 밖으로 넓히지 않는다. 채무 없음을 알고 변제했거나 불법원인급여의 반환 제한에 해당하고 법정 예외도 없는 경우는 반환 자체가 막힌다.
가액 반환을 인정하면 가장 강하게 제기되는 반론은 가액을 정할 시점과 범위에 다툼이 남을 수 있다는 점이다. 목적물의 가치가 급부 시점과 반환 청구 시점에서 다르면 어느 값을 기준으로 삼을지, 이익 중 얼마가 수익자에게 남아 있는지를 둘러싸고 당사자 사이에 분쟁이 남는다. 나아가 현존이익으로 책임을 좁히면 타인의 돈을 쓴 사람이 반환을 피하는 결과가 생긴다는 우려도 뒤따른다. 그러나 이런 불편과 우려가 있어도 원물 부재를 반환 의무의 자동 소멸로 바꿀 수는 없다. 반론은 가액 산정의 어려움을 지적할 뿐, 반환 의무가 소멸한다는 근거가 되지 않는다. 산정 기준의 다툼은 남은 이익이 얼마인지의 문제로 돌려서 다룰 사정이다.
합성 장면에 정해진 사실은 수익자 B가 급부를 받았고, 지급 원인이 없었다는 점을 나중에 알았다고 주장한다는 것까지다. 여기에 원물의 반환 가능 여부가 더해져야만 민법 제747조 제1항이 비로소 작동한다. B가 받은 목적물이 여전히 반환 가능한 상태라면 가액 반환을 논하기 전에 원물 반환의 문제가 먼저 놓인다. 목적물이 이미 없어졌거나 처분되어 돌려줄 수 없다면 그때 가액 반환의 문단이 열린다. 다만 이 장면에는 목적물의 소멸 시점, 처분 경위, 급부 당시 B의 인식, 남은 이익의 범위가 정해져 있지 않다. 연도·금액·기산일도 설정하지 않았다. 이런 항목은 미확정으로 남기며, 자료 부족을 곧바로 구제 불능으로 읽지 않는다.
이 절에서 확인할 수 있는 것은, 받은 목적물을 반환할 수 없게 되었다는 사정만으로 반환 의무가 소멸하지 않는다는 점과, 그때 반환 대상이 가액으로 바뀐다는 점이다. 여기서 한 걸음 더 나아가 가액의 산정 시점과 범위를 이 장면만으로 확정할 수는 없고, 남은 이익의 유무도 확인되지 않았다. 채무 없음을 알고 변제한 경우나 불법원인급여의 반환 제한에 해당하고 법정 예외도 없는 경우는 가액 반환의 논의에 이르기 전에 반환 자체가 막힌다는 경계도 함께 둔다.
4.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
불법원인급여의 반환 제한과 불법원인이 수익자에게만 있는 예외는 함께 남겨둔다. 그 제한과 예외를 전제로, 수익자 B는 원고 A가 보낸 급부를 받았으나 지급 원인이 없었다는 사실을 나중에 알았다고 주장하는 장면에서, 받은 물건이 없으면 반환 책임도 사라지는지가 이번에 정할 물음이다. 이 물음은 반환 책임의 발생 여부가 아니라 발생한 책임의 이행 대상이 무엇으로 바뀌는지를 묻는 것으로 좁혀 읽는다. 반환 범위를 특정할 때 함께 보아야 할 선악의와 현존이익의 판단은 뒤의 단계로 남겨둔다.
이 물음에 해당하는 문언은 민법 제747조이다. 제747조는 제1항에서 "수익자가 그 받은 목적물을 반환할 수 없는 때에는 그 가액을 반환하여야 한다"고 정하고, 제2항에서 "수익자로부터 무상으로 그 이익의 목적물을 양수한 악의의 제삼자"가 반환 책임을 진다고 덧붙인다. 여기서 '수익자'는 부당이익을 받은 사람, '목적물'은 받은 물건 자체, '반환할 수 없는 때'는 그 물건을 그대로 돌려줄 수 없게 된 경우를 가리킨다. 조문은 원물 반환과 가액 반환을 나란히 놓아, 목적물이 남아 있는지에 따라 이행 대상이 달라질 뿐임을 전제한다.
이 문언과 앞의 물음을 연결하면, 물건의 소멸은 반환 의무를 없애는 것이 아니라 반환의 형태를 바꾸는 사건으로 놓인다. 수익자가 받은 목적물을 돌려줄 수 없으면 그 가액을 반환하여야 한다는 제1항의 구조는, 반환 의무가 먼저 성립한 뒤에 그 이행 수단이 가액으로 치환되는 순서를 보여준다. 이때 가액 반환은 원물을 돌려줄 수 없을 때 그 가치를 반환하는 것을 뜻하며, 이는 반환 의무의 자동 소멸과 구별된다. 제2항의 악의 제삼자 책임은 원물과 이익 모두 반환할 수 없을 때 전득자의 책임을 따로 정한 것으로, 수익자 자신의 가액 반환과 그 책임 주체를 나누어 보아야 한다.
가액을 정할 시점과 범위에 다툼이 남을 수 있다는 반론은, 회복할 이익의 크기를 확정하는 데 실무적 어려움이 있음을 지적한다. 원물이 없어지면 그 가치를 산정할 기준 시점과 범위를 두고 당사자 사이에 이견이 생기고, 그 측정이 논쟁적인 한 반환 청구가 실제로 회복으로 이어질지 불확실하다는 점도 함께 지적된다. 그러나 저자는 이런 측정상의 다툼은 반환 의무의 존부를 좌우하는 문제가 아니라고 본다. 측정 기준이 확정되지 않았다는 사정은 이행 대상을 특정하기 어렵게 만들 뿐, 원물 부재를 반환 의무의 자동 소멸로 바꾸는 근거가 되지 않는다. 반론이 가리키는 불확실함은 남은 이익 확인의 문제로 옮겨 놓아야 한다.
합성 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 수익자 B가 원고 A가 보낸 급부를 받았고, 지급 원인이 없었다는 사실을 나중에 알았다고 주장한다는 점뿐이다. 급여의 수령과 지급 원인 부존의 사후 인식 주장은 기록으로 볼 항목으로 정해져 있으나, 지급 당시의 인식이나 남은 이익의 현황은 이 장면에서 확인되지 않는다. 따라서 급부가 특정된 원물인지도, 그 원물이 지금 반환 불능한지도, 반환 불능이라면 그 가액이 얼마인지도 이 장면만으로는 판정할 수 없다. B의 사후 인식 주장은 범위 판단의 자료로 남기되, 제747조의 적용 요건을 채우는 사실로 확정할 수는 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 받은 물건이 없어졌다는 사정만으로 반환 책임이 사라진다고 보지 않는 것이다. 원물 반환이 불가능하면 제747조 제1항에 따라 가액 반환의 문제로 이어지고, 이익을 반환할 수 없을 때의 무상 양수 악의 제삼자 책임은 제2항에서 따로 구별된다. 남은 이익과 지급 원인, 수익자의 앎을 확인할 수 없는 범위는 미확정으로 남긴다.
4.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
이러한 장면 앞에서 받은 물건이 없으면 반환 책임도 사라지는지가 물음이다. 그 물음은 반환의 대상이 사라진 경우에도 의무의 존속을 따지는 일이다.
이 물음에 해당하는 원문은 민법 제747조이다. 이 문언은 주체를 수익자로, 행위를 목적물의 반환과 가액의 반환으로, 조건을 반환 불능으로 각각 한정한다. 조문의 다른 쟁점까지 해설하지 않는다.
위 문언은 목적물의 반환 불능이 곧 의무의 소멸이 아님을 전제로 한다. 즉 수익자는 목적물을 돌려주지 못하는 대신 그 가액을 반환하여야 하는데, 여기서 가액 반환은 원물을 돌려줄 수 없을 때 그 가치를 반환하는 것을 뜻한다. 원물 반환과 가액 반환은 대상만 다를 뿐 같은 반환 의무 안에서 단계가 달라질 뿐이다. 반면 제2항의 악의 제삼자 책임은 수익자로부터 무상으로 이익의 목적물을 양수한 악의의 제삼자를 별도의 책임 주체로 두는 경우이므로, 원물 반환이 불가능한 경우의 가액 반환과 법정 악의 전득자 책임을 구별하여야 한다.
이러한 불편은 이익을 회복하려는 쪽과 그 이익을 이미 잃었다고 보는 쪽 사이에서 가액의 기준 시점을 어떻게 잡을지에서 생긴다. 원물 부재를 반환 의무의 자동 소멸로 바꾸면 타인의 돈을 쓴 사람이 반환을 피하는 결과를 막는 길도 함께 닫힌다.
이 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 수익자 B가 원고 A의 급부를 받았고, 지급 원인이 없었음을 나중에 알았다고 주장한다는 것까지이다. 이 사실만으로는 급여와 원인·지급 당시 인식·불법 원인의 귀속·이익 현존·사후 인식 가운데 어느 기록이 채워졌는지 정할 수 없다. 따라서 이 절의 범위는 원물 부재와 반환 의무의 관계를 가액 반환으로 연결하는 데 묶인다. 불법원인급여의 반환 제한과 불법원인이 수익자에게만 있는 예외는 함께 남기되, 이 절에서 확정하지 않는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 원물이 없어지더라도 그 자리에 가액 반환의 문제가 남는다는 것까지이다. 다만 받은 사람의 앎이 가액의 시점이나 범위를 어떻게 움직이는지, 나아가 현존이익의 한도를 넘어서는지의 여부는 이 절에서 단정하지 않는다. 불법원인이 수익자에게만 있음이 확인되면 불법급여라는 이유만으로 하는 반환 배제를 고친다는 점도 조건으로만 남는다. 받은 사람의 앎은 반환 범위를 바꾸는가?