Summary
Where a loss on the merits becomes final after execution of a preservative measure, this chapter retains both the case-law presumption of intent or negligence and the possibility of rebuttal.
5.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
Merely having obtained a provisional determination does not make one's responsibility for the other party's harm disappear. Read together the principle of mutatis mutandis application of the provisional attachment procedure and the distinction from provisional disposition, and maintain the difference between the object of preservation and the provisional position. In the face of the question that follows from this conclusion—whether one always bears no-fault liability upon losing on the merits—the scene is set in which, after Creditor A's provisional attachment, the loss on the merits became final and Debtor B demands compensation for business losses. Because a ruling that fixes a provisional position is not the realization of a claim that has been confirmed, one asks what the outcome on the merits, following its enforcement, leaves behind.
Where a loss on the merits became final after enforcement of preservation, the case law's presumption of intent or negligence and the possibility of rebuttal are both left in place. Supreme Court Decision 2000Da46184 decided September 24, 2002 explains, in Summary of Decision [1], that preservative measures such as provisional attachment or provisional disposition are executed by a ruling of the court, yet whether the substantive claim exists is left to the action on the merits and is done merely upon a prima facie showing and under the creditor's responsibility. This wording pairs the act of enforcing a preservative measure with the prima facie showing as the ground of the creditor's responsibility.
Supreme Court Decision 2000Da46184 decided September 24, 2002 goes on to state that if, after such enforcement, the enforcing creditor has become the losing party by a final judgment in the action on the merits, then, absent special rebuttal evidence, the enforcing creditor is presumed to have acted with intent or negligence as to the harm the debtor suffered due to the enforcement of that preservative measure, and accordingly bears liability to compensate for the harm caused by that unjust enforcement. The occasion for the presumption is the final loss on the merits, and the conclusion leads to damages. Here, the presumption of negligence means a legal judgment recognizing fault unless circumstances are otherwise, and its wording places alongside it the possibility of rebuttal as the condition for the activation of liability.
To hold a creditor who believed the application to be justified liable for the outcome is harsh. At a moment when urgent protection is needed, one has no choice but to decide to apply on a prima facie showing alone, and the fact that the burden of compensation may chill that judgment does not disappear. Even so, the presumption of intent or negligence cannot be converted into no-fault liability that cannot be rebutted. The presumption recognizes fault unless circumstances are otherwise; it is not a rule that forecloses contrary circumstances, and thus the appeal to harshness cannot be answered by closing the door of the presumption.
Debtor B demands compensation for business losses, but the scene has not fixed what among the provisional attachment ruling, objection, change of circumstances, outcome on the merits, rebuttal evidence of fault, and damages materials is in the records. Therefore, neither the scope of harm nor causation can be determined by this scene, and the grounds for revocation or the presence or absence of rebuttal evidence of fault likewise remain undetermined. Still, the range in which the entrance to this relief is open has already been fixed. Even after a loss on the merits, if circumstances that break the presumption of fault are recognized, the conclusion of automatic compensation is abandoned.
Accordingly, one must not take it that no-fault liability is established by a loss on the merits alone; one can speak only to the extent that the loss on the merits serves as the occasion for the presumption while the possibility of rebuttal is maintained alongside it. The entrance to this relief opens where grounds for revoking the preservation are recognized, or where fault, harm, and causation concerning unjust enforcement are recognized such that the corresponding relief opens up.
5.2The Conditions That Block Relief
Through the preceding stage, the principle of mutatis mutandis application of the provisional attachment procedure and the distinction from provisional disposition have been read together, maintaining the distinction between the object of preservation and the provisional position; but now the only matter at issue is what happened afterward. Once Creditor A's loss on the merits became final after the provisional attachment, Debtor B demands compensation for business losses. What is asked in this scene is not simply the result of the loss. The questions remain whether one always bears no-fault liability upon losing on the merits, and what the conditions are that block the relief.
Supreme Court Decision 2000Da46184 decided September 24, 2002 has wording that answers this question. Its Summary of Decision premises that "whether the substantive claim exists is left to the action on the merits and is done merely upon a prima facie showing and under the creditor's responsibility," and continues: "if, after such enforcement, the enforcing creditor has become the losing party by a final judgment in the action on the merits, then, absent special rebuttal evidence, the enforcing creditor is presumed to have acted with intent or negligence as to the harm the debtor suffered due to the enforcement of that preservative measure." The subject addressed by this wording is the enforcing creditor, the act is the enforcement of the preservative measure, and the condition is a final loss in the action on the merits after that enforcement.
The link joining this wording and the conclusion of this section is the placement of the presumption. The above wording does not fix liability directly; it places a stage of judgment that shifts the proving of fault. Here the presumption of negligence means a legal judgment recognizing fault unless circumstances are otherwise. Conversely, even thereafter the statutory requirements are not all in place. Where an objection alone is raised without grounds for revocation or suspension and enforcement continues, or where in a damages action the presumption is broken and there is no other basis of fault, if any one of the statutory requirements is not met, the channel of relief is closed.
The strongest counterargument aims at the magnitude of the loss. The concern is that, where the creditor has marshaled a prima facie showing and obtained the court's permission and believed the application itself to be justified, bearing the risk of compensation on the basis of the outcome on the merits alone may make the creditor shrink back from the next application for urgent protection. Such chilling harms the value of urgent protection that preservative measures aim at from the outset. That concern, however, does not lead in the direction of eliminating the presumption entirely.
The limits of the facts confirmed in this scene are clear. Only the provisional attachment ruling and its enforcement, and the final loss on the merits, are fixed; whether Creditor A produced rebuttal evidence breaking the presumption, and to what extent Debtor B's business losses actually amount and their causation, are not fixed by the materials. Therefore the criteria of judgment for this section are divided into two stages. First, one looks at whether grounds for revoking the preservation are recognized or whether there are circumstances in which enforcement stopped on the basis of an objection alone; next, one examines whether fault, harm, and causation concerning unjust enforcement are recognized. Items not confirmed remain undetermined.
What this section permits is the judgment that a loss on the merits may serve as the opening clue for the presumption of fault; what it does not permit is the judgment that the loss itself immediately establishes no-fault liability. If contrary circumstances emerge, the presumption is broken, and there is no other basis of fault, then the conclusion of automatic compensation does not remain.
5.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
In this scene, what remains is whether the final loss on the merits already confirmed alone leads to prompt compensation for the whole of B's harm, or whether something more must be confirmed. Further, if even those materials are absent, one must determine whether no answer whatever can be given to this question, or whether the form of judgment alone remains. Here, no-fault liability means liability imposed on the outcome alone, without regard to the recognition of fault.
To establish that distinction, one first examines the wording of the source text as it stands. Supreme Court Decision 2000Da46184 decided September 24, 2002 describes preservative measures as executed by a ruling of the court, while leaving the existence or non-existence of the substantive claim to the action on the merits and proceeding merely upon a prima facie showing and under the creditor's responsibility; and it holds that if, after the enforcement, the enforcing creditor has become the losing party by a final judgment in the action on the merits, then, absent special rebuttal evidence, the enforcing creditor is presumed to have acted with intent or negligence as to the harm the debtor suffered from that enforcement, and accordingly bears liability to compensate for the harm caused by that unjust enforcement (Supreme Court Decision 2000Da46184 decided September 24, 2002). This wording specifies the subject as the enforcing creditor, the act as the enforcement of the preservative measure, and the condition as the final loss in the action on the merits and the presence or absence of special rebuttal evidence.
The judgment indicated by this wording differs from no-fault liability in that it takes the final loss on the merits as the starting point of fault while leaving rebuttal open. The preceding paragraph divided matters into two stages because one must distinguish the confirmation of the fact that the loss on the merits became final from the question of what judgment of fault that finality leads to. The case law made the former a condition while leaving the latter open to rebuttal, and the author reads that latter judgment as remaining under the creditor's responsibility. Accordingly, matters as to which harm and causation are unconfirmed and grounds for revocation likewise unparticularized are neither a determination that there is no liability nor a determination that there is liability. That place is situated not in the impossibility of adjudication but in an undetermined state where the materials of judgment have not yet been particularized.
Meanwhile this conclusion leaves a heavy burden on the creditor. Imposing liability for the outcome on a creditor who, at the time of application, marshaled a prima facie showing and obtained the court's judgment and believed himself to be justified is felt to be harsh, and moreover, if the risk of compensation grows, applications for urgent preservation themselves may be chilled. This disadvantage and the possibility of chilling must not be erased. Still the answer does not change. The presumption may be broken when contrary circumstances exist, and the recognition of fault and the confirmation of harm and causation each remain.
All that is confirmed by this scene is A's provisional attachment, B's demand concerning business losses, and A's final loss on the merits. Measured against the foregoing conditions, the final loss on the merits functions as the starting point of the presumption, but B's business losses themselves, the causation between those losses and the enforcement of the provisional attachment, and the circumstances constituting A's rebuttal have not yet been particularized as materials of judgment. If, even after the loss on the merits, circumstances breaking the presumption of fault are confirmed, the conclusion of automatic compensation is abandoned. Conversely, even if A's rebuttal or the scope of harm remains unconfirmed, that absence does not immediately mean a denial of A's liability. Accordingly, this scene draws only the line of the undetermined and does not fix the actual records and the content of the rebuttal.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. The fact of having lost on the merits alone cannot impose no-fault liability on the debtor, and the presumption of intent or negligence remains a judgment that may be broken by contrary circumstances. Matters as to which grounds for revocation or harm and causation are unconfirmed cannot be called impossible and moved over to a denial of liability; that place remains undetermined. Conversely, neither can it be held that the scope of harm and causation have been determined by the presumption and the rebuttal alone.
5.4The Records Needed for Determination
After the preceding stage confirmed the difference between the object of preservation and the provisional position, the question of this stage concerns whether one always bears no-fault liability upon losing on the merits. This question asks, along with the nature of liability, the scope of the records needed for the judgment that recognizes or limits liability. In this scene A had merely obtained a provisional preservative measure, and that determination had not fixed the substance of the claim.
The basis for this question is the case-law wording that confirms both the nature of preservative measures and the meaning of a loss on the merits. Summary of Decision [1] of Supreme Court Decision 2000Da46184 decided September 24, 2002, premising that preservative measures such as provisional attachment or provisional disposition are executed by a ruling of the court, explains that whether the substantive claim exists is left to the action on the merits and is done merely upon a prima facie showing and under the creditor's responsibility. Here, the prima facie showing refers to the procedural basis by which the creditor roughly demonstrates to the court the need for preservation, and this is distinguished from an examination that determines the existence or non-existence of the substantive claim. The subject indicated by this wording is the enforcing creditor, the act is the enforcement of the preservative measure, and the condition is the case in which, after that enforcement, the enforcing creditor has become the losing party by a final judgment in the action on the merits.
Between this basis and the conclusion of this section the stages are divided. The case-law wording, while stating that if the foregoing condition is met then, absent special rebuttal evidence, the enforcing creditor is presumed to have acted with intent or negligence as to the harm the debtor suffered due to the enforcement of that preservative measure and bears liability to compensate for the harm caused by that unjust enforcement, nonetheless leaves room alongside for special rebuttal evidence. For this reason, the stage determination is made only on the materials recorded in the provisional attachment and provisional disposition rulings, objection, change of circumstances, outcome on the merits, rebuttal evidence of fault, and damages materials, and does not fill absent records with presumptions. When the presumption of negligence is defined as a legal judgment recognizing fault unless circumstances are otherwise, this judgment and the recognition of liability that leaves the possibility of rebuttal open belong to different stages and must not be merged into one.
The strongest counterargument is that this liability for the outcome operates harshly against a creditor who believed the application to be justified, and that if the risk of compensation grows, even justified applications for urgent protection are chilled. The loss and inconvenience targeted by this counterargument are real. In a situation requiring urgent preservation of a claim, if liability is borne on the outcome alone with respect to a provisional determination obtained on nothing more than a prima facie showing, the creditor may hesitate over necessary and justified applications. The author leaves this adverse aspect untouched, answering only that the presumption of intent or negligence cannot be converted into no-fault liability that cannot be rebutted. The range in which the counterargument is recognized lies in the point that the presumption may be overturned to the contrary; it does not deny the existence of the presumption itself.
The facts recorded in this scene are only A's provisional attachment, the ensuing final loss on the merits, and B's claim for compensation for business losses, and these can be contrasted with the foregoing conditions of judgment. Yet on these records alone it is not confirmed whether the special rebuttal evidence spoken of in the above wording exists, nor how the scope of harm and causation stand. Materials concerning objection or change of circumstances, and the content of the provisional attachment and provisional disposition rulings themselves, are not particularized in the scene. The mere circumstance that there are no materials supporting the rebuttal cannot warrant the categorical statement that the possibility of rebuttal does not exist, and whether there is any other basis of fault likewise lacks a record. Accordingly, what can be confirmed in this scene is only that the presumption of intent or negligence operates upon the final loss on the merits; the actual establishment and scope of compensation remain undetermined as matters to be judged when further records are added.
The conclusion this section permits is that once a loss on the merits becomes final, the presumption of intent or negligence follows as to harm arising from the enforcement of preservation, and unless circumstances contrary to that presumption appear in the records, the creditor is recognized as bearing liability to compensate for the harm caused by that unjust enforcement. Yet the same section has not recognized no-fault liability, nor has it barred the presumption against rebuttal. What remains undetermined is the final establishment and scope of liability, and a lack of materials must not be read straightaway as an inability to obtain relief.
5.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
What is newly asked here is not a simple matter of winning or losing. Two questions are placed together: whether the execution creditor should be held to no-fault liability on the sole ground of having lost on the merits, and what kind of change would be sufficient to overturn the step-by-step determinations of blocking and effectiveness that have been rendered so far. The starting point of this inquiry is that interim preservation occupies a position different from a final and conclusive judgment.
The provision that prescribes the character of the preservative measure and the basis of liability together continues as follows: "Whether the substantive claim exists is left to the action on the merits, and the execution is carried out merely on the strength of a prima facie showing and at the creditor's responsibility; hence, if after that execution the execution creditor has suffered a final and conclusive defeat in the action on the merits, then, with respect to the loss suffered by the debtor from the execution of that preservative measure, unless there is special evidence to the contrary, the execution creditor is presumed to have acted with intent or negligence" (Supreme Court Decision 2000Da46184 decided September 24, 2002). Once this condition is met, intent or negligence is presumed, and that presumption can be rebutted by special evidence to the contrary. The preservative measure itself does not mean that the substantive claim has been finally determined.
The reason the two steps set by this provision must be distinguished is that the object of the presumption and its effect differ from each other. At the first step, a direction is set in which blameworthiness is recognized on the strength of the mere outward circumstance of a final and conclusive defeat on the merits. The legal judgment of recognizing blameworthiness in the absence of any circumstance to the contrary is the presumption of negligence. Yet that judgment does not mean that liability is established unconditionally no matter how deficient the other party's proof may be. The provision attaches the proviso "unless there is special evidence to the contrary." The intent of the precedent, which leaves the presumption and the possibility of rebuttal together, lies precisely at this point. If evidence to the contrary is presented and the presumption is broken, then, absent some other basis for recognizing blameworthiness, the conclusion of automatic compensation does not arise. Accordingly, converting the presumption of intent or negligence into a no-fault liability that cannot be rebutted runs against the structure of this provision. If it were so converted, the existing determination of blocking and effectiveness could not be maintained.
At the same time, the existence of the presumption cannot be taken lightly. The strongest counterargument targets precisely this point. The creditor obtained the court's decision through a prima facie showing and, believing the application to be well founded, must bear compensation despite being substantially free of any fault. The concern that raising the compensation risk will chill even legitimate applications for emergency protection springs from the same root. This disadvantage cannot be denied. Even so, the precedent, once there is a final and conclusive defeat on the merits, sets the direction of blameworthiness, while leaving the presumption open to being overcome by evidence to the contrary. The hardship that the counterargument points out is addressed through the device of the opportunity to offer rebutting evidence that breaks the presumption.
The facts confirmed in this scene are only Creditor A's execution of the provisional attachment, the subsequent final and conclusive defeat on the merits, and Debtor B's demand for compensation for business losses. Measured against the conditions of the provision, the outward condition of a final and conclusive defeat on the merits appears to be satisfied. The synthetic scene, however, does not disclose on what circumstances Creditor A applied for the provisional attachment, or whether there is any circumstance amounting to evidence that would break the presumption. Hence, while the direction of the presumption of blameworthiness is set, whether the presumption is actually broken cannot be determined on the strength of this scene alone. The scope of the loss and causation are likewise unconfirmed. Whether the expression "business losses" is supported by confirmed material also cannot be asserted here. The intervals where the grounds for revocation and the loss and causation remain unconfirmed must be left undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is as follows. Where, after the execution of the preservative measure, a defeat on the merits becomes final and conclusive, intent or negligence is presumed; but since that presumption can be overturned by special evidence to the contrary, it must not be held that no-fault liability is established on the mere ground of the final defeat. Conversely, a determination that reads the presumption as a no-fault liability incapable of rebuttal is excluded. If a circumstance that breaks the presumption of blameworthiness is confirmed, the existing determination of blocking and effectiveness changes. That the material is lacking leaves matters in a state of undetermination, not without remedy.
5.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
As examined earlier, the fact that an interim determination was obtained does not extinguish liability for the other party's loss. Yet if, at the time of application, A sincerely believed that a substantive claim existed in A's favor, is it right that A should bear liability for compensation on the sole ground that that belief proved mistaken? The concern that imposing liability on the basis of the outcome alone will chill legitimate applications for emergency protection arises here. This question is the strongest counterargument confronted at this stage.
On the premise that the precedent leaves the existence or nonexistence of the substantive claim underlying a preservative measure to the action on the merits and carries it out merely on the strength of a prima facie showing and at the creditor's responsibility, it declares as follows regarding the case where, after execution, the execution creditor suffers a final and conclusive defeat in the action on the merits: "with respect to the loss suffered by the debtor from the execution of that preservative measure, unless there is special evidence to the contrary, the execution creditor is presumed to have acted with intent or negligence" (Supreme Court Decision 2000Da46184 decided September 24, 2002). This provision fixes the subject as the execution creditor, the act as the execution of the preservative measure, and the conditions as the final and conclusive defeat in the action on the merits and the absence of special evidence to the contrary. The intent or negligence spoken of here is not an inquiry into the subjective doubts entertained at the time of application, but the starting point of a legal judgment for recognizing blameworthiness upon the occurrence of the result of a final and conclusive defeat.
The link connecting this basis to the conclusion of this section concerns the character of the presumption. The foregoing provision places two things side by side: a presumption in the direction of recognizing blameworthiness, and the possibility of rebuttal that breaks that presumption. The reason these two elements must be distinguished is that, if one is removed, the nature of the legal judgment changes. If only the presumption remains, a defeat on the merits immediately becomes the basis of no-fault liability; but only by retaining the possibility of rebuttal together with it does the device remain one that shifts the burden of proof rather than substitutes for the requirements of liability. To this the author's application is added: the judgment that the presumption of intent or negligence cannot be converted into a no-fault liability incapable of rebuttal. What the language of the precedent takes as the basis of liability is intent or negligence, not the result itself.
Let it be assumed that, at the time of application, A firmly believed A's claim to be well founded. In that case, if the risk of compensation is set heavily, even creditors urgently in need of protection will hesitate to apply, and the system of preservative measures will lose its original function. This loss does not stop at A's individual disadvantage but extends to other creditors whose need for protection is pressing. Even so, the convenience targeted by this counterargument cannot lead to abandoning the conclusion set out above. The presumption of blameworthiness is open to being broken where there is special evidence to the contrary, and the circumstances on which A reasonably relied can be dealt with precisely at the place of that rebuttal. The answer is thus settled on the line that neither erases the risk of chilling pointed out by the counterargument nor converts the presumption into a no-fault liability incapable of rebuttal.
Returning to the synthetic scene, the facts that can presently be confirmed are only A's provisional attachment and the subsequent final and conclusive defeat on the merits, and B's demand for compensation for business losses. What grounds A adduced as prima facie showing when applying, and on what circumstances that belief was rooted, are not revealed in the scene. Accordingly, while the place where evidence to the contrary may be submitted remains open, whether circumstances worthy of being accepted as such rebuttal actually exist cannot be judged on the strength of this scene alone. In that respect the matter remains undetermined. Only this much is clear as a test that alters the conditions: even after a defeat on the merits, if a circumstance that breaks the presumption of blameworthiness is recognized, the conclusion of automatic compensation is abandoned. The determination of this section ends here.
The boundary between the conclusion this section permits and the conclusion it does not permit is clear. Where a defeat on the merits becomes final and conclusive after the execution of a preservative measure, blameworthiness is presumed and liability for compensation is recognized accordingly, but the possibility of rebuttal that breaks that presumption always remains. Conversely, holding that liability is exempted solely by a legitimate belief at the time of application, or that no-fault liability is established immediately upon a final and conclusive defeat alone, is an excess on both sides that this section does not permit.
5.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
Accepting the premise that the presumption of intent or negligence cannot be converted into a no-fault liability incapable of rebuttal, this section examines how liability is situated in the case where, after the execution of a preservative measure, a defeat on the merits becomes final and conclusive. What is fixed in this scene is only the facts: that A applied for a provisional attachment, that execution took place, and that thereafter the judgment finding A defeated in the action on the merits became final and conclusive. What is needed to reach this determination is whether liability is to be fixed on the single result of having lost on the merits, or whether a separate stage of judgment on blameworthiness is to be set up, leaving room for rebuttal.
The Summary of Decision of the precedent corresponding to this question states as follows: "Preservative measures such as provisional attachment and provisional disposition are indeed executed by a court ruling; however, whether the substantive claim exists is left to the action on the merits and is carried out merely on the strength of a prima facie showing and at the creditor's responsibility. Accordingly, if after that execution the execution creditor has suffered a final and conclusive defeat in the action on the merits, then, with respect to the loss suffered by the debtor from the execution of that preservative measure, unless there is special evidence to the contrary, the execution creditor is presumed to have acted with intent or negligence, and therefore is liable to compensate for the loss caused by that wrongful execution" (Supreme Court Decision 2000Da46184 decided September 24, 2002). In this provision the subject is the execution creditor who executed the preservative measure, the act is the execution of measures such as provisional attachment and provisional disposition, and the condition is that, after that execution, the execution creditor suffered a final and conclusive defeat in the action on the merits. The prima facie showing procedure spoken of in the provision is not a procedure for determining the existence or nonexistence of the substantive claim, but concerns the basis for the preservative execution carried out provisionally and at the creditor's responsibility. Since this precedent did not go so far as to set the requirements for the establishment of a direct claim for B's business losses, the explanation of the provision is limited to the confirmation of the foregoing conditions.
Connecting this basis with the conclusion of the preceding section, the result of the defeat on the merits and the judgment of blameworthiness must be dealt with together but must not overlap. The provision states that, where a final and conclusive defeat on the merits has occurred, the execution creditor is, unless there is special evidence to the contrary, presumed to have acted with intent or negligence; and this presumption has the character of a presumption of negligence, meaning a legal judgment that recognizes blameworthiness in the absence of any circumstance to the contrary. Therefore, a final and conclusive defeat on the merits becomes at once the starting point of the judgment on blameworthiness and a fact that gives rise to a presumption open to rebuttal. Reflecting this, the preceding section concluded that the presumption of intent or negligence cannot be converted into a no-fault liability incapable of rebuttal. Only by separating and viewing the two steps—on the one hand, the presumption operating as the basis of liability for compensation, and on the other, the possibility of escaping that presumption where special evidence to the contrary is accepted—does the judgment, as the author has set it out, of leaving the presumption of intent or negligence and the possibility of rebuttal together remain intact.
At the same time, this does not leave only convenient conclusions on every point. The counterargument that it is harsh to impose liability on the creditor who believed the application to be well founded points to the disadvantage that a creditor who, at the time when the end of the dispute was already fixed, acted in reliance on the basis of the interim determination and proceeded to execution must now bear an unpredictable risk of compensation. It also adds the worry that raising the compensation risk will chill even legitimate applications for emergency protection. Yet since the language of the precedent presumes blameworthiness on the premise of the condition "unless there is special evidence to the contrary," the harshness pointed out by the counterargument is a matter to be dealt with in the direction of widening the scope of the possibility of rebuttal. While acknowledging the purport of the counterargument, if on the strength of that counterargument the presumption were converted into a no-fault liability incapable of rebuttal, the very room for judgment that the foregoing provision leaves would be erased.
What is confirmed in the synthetic scene is only A's execution of the provisional attachment, the subsequent final and conclusive defeat on the merits, and B's demand for compensation for business losses. The scene records no circumstance that A's execution involved intent or negligence, nor any fact as to whether there is material that might constitute special evidence to the contrary. No material has been confirmed regarding the provisional attachment and provisional disposition decisions, objections, change of circumstances, the outcome on the merits, rebuttal of blameworthiness, or loss materials. Accordingly, on the strength of the present scene alone it cannot be determined whether rebuttal is possible or whether liability for compensation is established, and that part remains undetermined. If, even after a defeat on the merits, a circumstance that breaks the presumption of blameworthiness is confirmed, the conclusion of automatic compensation changes.
What can be said in this section is the distinction that the result of a final and conclusive defeat on the merits serves as the basis for presuming the execution creditor's intent or negligence, and that the presumption can be escaped by special evidence to the contrary. What cannot be said is the conclusion that no-fault liability is established unconditionally because one lost on the merits; nor, conversely, the conclusion that all liability for compensation is extinguished because the presumption has been broken. Within the scope the author has set, the realization of liability is bound to the stages of release from the restraints of the preservative measure and redress for losses from wrongful execution, and whether that redress opens up varies with the recognition of grounds for revoking the preservative measure or the recognition of blameworthiness, loss, and causation with respect to the wrongful execution.
5.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Even after a preservative measure such as a provisional attachment has been issued, the existence or nonexistence of the substantive claim remains a separate matter. After Creditor A executed a provisional attachment against Debtor B and suffered a final and conclusive defeat on the merits, B demands compensation on the ground of having suffered business losses because of that provisional attachment. What is asked in this scene is, after the legitimacy of the preservative execution has collapsed, who must make good the losses sustained in the meantime, and on what ground.
The provision capable of answering this question is found in Summary of Decision [1] of (Supreme Court Decision 2000Da46184 decided September 24, 2002). The provision explains that whether the substantive claim underlying a preservative measure exists is left to the action on the merits and is carried out merely on the strength of a prima facie showing and at the creditor's responsibility. Here, a prima facie showing means the light material of prima facie showing that the creditor presents at the application stage, and "at the creditor's responsibility" means an execution that is not the enforcement of a claim already determined but an execution placed upon the applicant's own judgment. If, after such execution, the execution creditor reaches a final and conclusive defeat in the action on the merits, a basis arises for judging the loss suffered by the debtor.
The conclusion to which this provision continues is that one is liable to compensate for the loss caused by that wrongful execution. That liability, however, is not recognized unconditionally; it passes through the stage in which, unless there is special evidence to the contrary, the execution creditor is presumed to have acted with intent or negligence. Accordingly, two judgments must be distinguished. One is the presumption of negligence, a legal judgment that recognizes blameworthiness in the absence of any circumstance to the contrary; the other is the liability that is fixed with that presumption remaining in place. This section confirms the former while leaving the possibility of rebuttal together with it.
That distinction removes the point unfavorable to the side that holds Creditor A liable. The counterargument that it is harsh to impose liability on the creditor who believed the application to be well founded is directed at the substantial loss and inconvenience that may chill the protection of persons in need of urgent preservation. The burden that the counterargument points out remains unless the method of the presumption is changed, and that burden is placed together with the responsibility to present the circumstance that breaks the presumption.
What is recorded in the synthetic scene is only the provisional attachment and the final and conclusive defeat on the merits, and the claim for compensation for business losses. These facts are set against the conditions that switch on the presumption in the precedent. However, on what circumstances Creditor A applied for the provisional attachment, the amount of B's loss, and whether that loss is attributable to the execution of the provisional attachment are not settled by the scene. It is likewise unconfirmed in what form the provisional attachment and provisional disposition decisions, objections, change of circumstances, the outcome on the merits, rebuttal of blameworthiness, and loss materials were left. Therefore, in what content evidence to the contrary will be presented cannot be determined in this section.
The conclusion permitted by this section is that, where a defeat on the merits becomes final and conclusive after the execution of a preservative measure, both the precedent's presumption of intent or negligence and the possibility of rebuttal are left in place. Conversely, it is not permitted to read liability for damages as disappearing immediately on the sole ground that special evidence to the contrary exists, nor is it permitted to hold that every defeat on the merits leads to no-fault liability on the sole ground that no rebutting evidence exists.
5.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
A의 가압류는 법원의 재판으로 집행되었지만 그 실체상 청구권의 존부는 본안소송에 맡겨진 채 남았다. 이제 B가 회수를 구하기 전에 먼저 물어야 할 것은, 본안에서 졌다는 사정만으로 무과실 책임까지 성립하는가이다. 이 물음은 임시적 지위를 정하던 보전처분의 성격에서 출발한다.
대법원 2002. 9. 24. 선고 2000다46184 판결은 판결요지 [1]에서 "그 집행 후에 집행채권자가 본안소송에서 패소 확정되었다면 그 보전처분의 집행으로 인하여 채무자가 입은 손해에 대하여는 특별한 반증이 없는 한 집행채권자에게 고의 또는 과실이 있다고 추정되고, 따라서 그 부당한 집행으로 인한 손해에 대하여 이를 배상할 책임이 있다"고 설시한다. 이 문언은 보전처분을 "법원의 재판에 의하여 집행되는 것이기는" 하나 "그 실체상 청구권이 있는지 여부는 본안소송에 맡기고 단지 소명에 의하여 채권자의 책임 아래 하는 것"으로 규정한다. 여기서 판정의 주체는 본안소송에서 확정된 집행채권자이고, 행위는 보전처분의 집행이며, 조건은 그 집행 뒤 본안소송의 패소 확정이다.
이 문언에 따르면 귀책의 인정은 두 단계로 나뉜다. 먼저 본안 패소 확정이라는 사실로부터 "특별한 반증이 없는 한" 고의 또는 과실의 추정이 선다. 이어서 그 추정이 살아 있는 동안 부당한 집행으로 인한 손해에 대한 배상책임이 뒤따른다. 따라서 문언이 남겨 둔 반증의 여지는 책임의 성립 요건을 새로 더하는 것이 아니라, 추정된 귀책을 실제 귀책으로 굳히지 못하게 하는 통로이다. 해당 원문 문언만을 판정 근거로 삼는 범위 안에서, 보전 구속의 해제와 부당집행 손해의 구제는 각각 이 추정을 전제로 하되 그 추정의 존속 여부에 따라 갈린다.
A는 소명을 거쳐 법원의 재판으로 가압류를 얻었고, 그 판단을 신뢰한 채 신청을 유지했을 뿐인데 패소 확정만으로 배상 위험이 커지면 정당한 긴급보호 신청까지 위축된다는 걱정이다. 문언이 "특별한 반증이 없는 한"이라는 조건을 함께 두었다는 점이 바로 그 경계이며, 이의만으로 귀책이 소멸하지 않는 것과 마찬가지로 반증의 가능성까지 지워 버리는 것도 문언 밖의 확장이다.
합성 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 A의 가압류 집행과 본안에서의 패소 확정, 그리고 B의 영업상 손해 배상 요구뿐이다. 이 사실들은 판례 문언의 조건부 추정이 시작되는 자리에 대응한다. 다만 B의 손해가 가압류 집행으로 인한 것인지, 그 인과관계와 손해액이 어느 자료로 뒷받침되는지, A가 추정을 깨는 사정을 내놓았는지는 장면에 정해져 있지 않다. 가압류·가처분 결정·이의·사정변경·본안 결과·귀책 반증·손해 자료에 관한 자료가 확인되지 않아 미확정으로 남는다. 만약 본안 패소 뒤라도 귀책 추정을 깨는 사정이 인정되면 자동 배상이라는 결론에 이를 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은, 본안에서 졌다는 사정으로 특별한 반증 없는 한 집행채권자의 고의나 과실이 추정되고 그 부당한 집행으로 인한 손해의 배상책임으로 이어진다는 판단이다. 허용하지 않는 것은, 본안 패소를 무과실 책임의 근거로 삼거나 반증의 여지 없이 배상을 확정하는 결론이다. 문언이 둔 추정과 반증의 짝을 떼어 놓지 않는 한, 임시 판단을 얻었다는 사정만으로 책임이 소멸하지 않는다고 하여 책임이 자동으로 확정되는 것도 아니다.
5.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
책임이 사라지는지에 대한 물음은 별도로 남는다. 이 장면에서 보전 집행이 남긴 손해를 누가, 어떤 조건에서 부담하는지가 문제이다. 그런데 본안에서 졌다고 하여 언제나 무과실 책임을 지는 것인가, 아니면 판정 안에 다시 나누어 볼 자리가 있는가. 지금 물음은 이 책임 판단의 안쪽 구분을 어디까지 두는가에 한정된다. 보전 대상과 임시지위의 차이를 유지하면서 읽어도, 부당한 집행의 책임 문제는 그대로 남는다. 이 절에서는 보전 구속의 해제와 부당집행 손해의 구제 안에서 다시 나누어 판정할 부분만을 다룬다.
보전 집행 뒤 본안 패소가 확정된 경우, 해당 원문은 다음과 같다. “가압류나 가처분 등 보전처분은 법원의 재판에 의하여 집행되는 것이기는 하나, 그 실체상 청구권이 있는지 여부는 본안소송에 맡기고 단지 소명에 의하여 채권자의 책임 아래 하는 것이므로, 그 집행 후에 집행채권자가 본안소송에서 패소 확정되었다면 그 보전처분의 집행으로 인하여 채무자가 입은 손해에 대하여는 특별한 반증이 없는 한 집행채권자에게 고의 또는 과실이 있다고 추정되고, 따라서 그 부당한 집행으로 인한 손해에 대하여 이를 배상할 책임이 있다.” 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 집행채권자이고, 행위는 보전처분의 집행이다. 조건은 그 집행 후 집행채권자가 본안소송에서 패소 확정된 경우이며, 귀속되는 손해는 그 집행으로 인해 채무자가 입은 손해이다. 여기서 특별한 반증이 없는 한이라는 단서가 함께 놓여 있다.
이 문언과 앞의 결론을 잇는 줄은 추정의 성격이다. 즉 본안 패소 확정이라는 조건이 갖추어지면 귀책이 먼저 인정되는 셈이고, 그 자리는 특별한 반증으로 되돌릴 수 있다. 그래서 두 판단 단계를 구별해야 한다. 하나는 추정이 성립하는 조건이고, 다른 하나는 그 추정이 깨지는 반증의 자리이다. 추정을 무과실 책임으로 읽어 버리면 반증의 자리를 지워 버리는 셈이므로, 이 구별은 결론을 유지하는 데 필요하다.
그런데 여기서 가장 강한 반론은 손실과 불편을 겨냥한다. 신청이 정당하다고 믿은 채권자에게 결과 책임을 묻는 것은 가혹하다는 주장이다. 보전조치는 긴급한 상황에서 소명만으로 얻는 임시 판단이므로, 나중에 본안에서 졌다는 이유만으로 배상 위험을 떠안으면 정당한 긴급보호 신청까지 위축된다는 우려도 함께 온다. 이 반론의 불리한 부분을 지우지 않은 채로도 결론은 유지된다. 문언이 남긴 특별한 반증이라는 자리는 바로 이 채권자의 사정을 다룰 자리이다. 그래서 고의·과실 추정을 반증 불가능한 무과실 책임으로 바꿀 수는 없다. 추정은 반증 가능성을 품은 채로 서 있을 뿐이다.
합성 장면으로 돌아가 보면, 확인되는 사실은 채권자 A의 가압류와 그 뒤의 본안 패소 확정, 그리고 채무자 B의 영업상 손해 배상 요구뿐이다. 이 사실들은 추정이 성립하는 조건 쪽과 겹친다. 그런데 채권자 A가 특별한 반증으로 자신의 고의·과실이 없음을 밝혔는지, 채무자 B가 제시한 영업상 손해가 그 가압류 집행으로 인한 것인지의 인과관계가 기록상 확인되는지는 장면에 들어 있지 않다. 가압류·가처분 결정·이의·사정변경·본안 결과·귀책 반증·손해 자료에 관한 내용은 확인되지 않았다. 반증 여부가 확인되지 않은 자리는 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론과 그렇지 않은 결론을 나누어 보면 이렇다. 보전 집행 뒤 본안 패소가 확정된 경우 고의·과실이 추정되고 부당한 집행의 손해 배상 책임이 인정될 수 있다는 것은 가능하다. 하지만 이는 추정에 반증이 더해질 자리를 함께 남긴 결론이며, 추정을 깨는 사정이 인정되면 자동 배상이라는 결론에 이르지 않는다. 반대로 취소·정지 근거 없이 이의만 제기해 집행이 계속되거나, 손해배상에서 추정이 깨지고 다른 귀책 근거도 없는 경우에는 그 구제가 막힌다. 취소사유나 손해·인과관계가 확인되지 않은 경우는 미확정으로 남긴다. 이 밖에 추가 단계를 만들어 넣는 결론은 이 절이 허용하지 않는다.
5.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
이 장면에서 지금 묻는 것은 보전 구속의 해제와 부당집행 손해의 구제를 각각 언제 열고, 언제 막고, 언제 미확정으로 남기는지의 구별이다. 이 둘은 같은 집행의 뒤에서 신청인의 사정에 따라 신청하여 멈추는 구제 단계와 과거의 집행으로 발생한 손해를 청구하는 책임 단계로 나뉘어 다루어진다.
해당 문언은 보전처분의 집행 뒤 집행채권자가 본안소송에서 패소 확정된 경우를 다룬다. 대법원 2002. 9. 24. 선고 2000다46184 판결은 이렇게 말한다. "그 집행 후에 집행채권자가 본안소송에서 패소 확정되었다면 그 보전처분의 집행으로 인하여 채무자가 입은 손해에 대하여는 특별한 반증이 없는 한 집행채권자에게 고의 또는 과실이 있다고 추정되고, 따라서 그 부당한 집행으로 인한 손해에 대하여 이를 배상할 책임이 있다." 이 문언이 정하는 주체는 집행채권자이고, 행위는 보전처분의 집행이며, 조건은 그 집행 뒤 본안소송에서의 패소 확정과 그로 인한 채무자의 손해이다. 여기까지가 확인한 원문이고, 그 뒤의 적용은 별도로 구분한다.
이 문언과 앞의 물음을 연결하면, 채무자 B에게 배상 책임이 열리는 근거는 본안 패소만이 아니라 그 패소와 함께 인정되는 귀책·손해·인과관계이다. 그러므로 열리는 조건은 보전 취소사유가 인정되거나 부당집행에 관한 귀책·손해·인과관계가 인정되어 해당 구제가 열린 경우이고, 막히는 조건은 취소·정지 근거 없이 이의만 제기해 집행이 계속되거나 손해배상에서 추정이 깨지고 다른 귀책 근거도 없는 경우이다. 보전 구속의 해제는 집행을 앞으로 멈추거나 뒤로 푸는 단계이고, 부당집행 손해의 구제는 이미 발생한 손해를 청구하는 단계라는 두 판단을 이렇게 나누어 놓아야, 어느 한 쪽이 열렸다는 사실만으로 다른 쪽까지 자동으로 열린 것으로 보지 않는다.
가장 강한 반론은 신청이 정당하다고 믿은 채권자에게 결과 책임을 묻는 것은 가혹하다는 데 있고, 나아가 배상 위험을 높이면 정당한 긴급보호 신청까지 위축된다는 점을 함께 걱정한다. 그 걱정되는 손실은 긴급 보전의 신청 자체가 위축되어 실체상 청구권을 임시로 지키는 통로가 좁아지는 불편이고, 신청 당시 소명에 의존해 판단한 집행채권자 개인의 귀책을 확정하지 않은 채 본안 결과만으로 책임을 지우는 것은 공정하지 않다는 가치이다. 다만 반론의 불리한 부분을 지우지 않은 채로도, 그렇더라도 고의·과실 추정을 반증 불가능한 무과실 책임으로 바꿀 수는 없다. 추정은 반대 사정이 있는 경우 깨지는 판단이고, 그 추정이 깨지고 다른 귀책 근거도 없다면 책임이 자동으로 남지 않는다.
합성 장면에서 확인된 것은 채권자 A의 가압류, 그 뒤 본안에서의 패소 확정, 그리고 채무자 B의 영업상 손해 배상 요구뿐이다. 이 사실을 앞의 조건에 대조하면, 본안 패소 확정이 있으므로 판례의 추정이 시작될 자리는 있다. 그러나 이 장면만으로 보전 취소사유의 인정 여부, 손해의 범위와 액수, A의 반증이 받아들여지는지, 다른 귀책 근거가 있는지는 확정할 수 없다. 따라서 이 장면에서 내릴 수 있는 판단은 추정이 깨지는지 아닌지를 살필 자료가 모이면 그 결과에 따라 열리고 막히는 조건이 갈린다는 것에 그친다. 실제 사건의 사실·송달·이행 결과와 장면에 없는 연도·금액·기산일·판결 결과는 미확인으로 남는다.
이 절에서 허용되는 결론은, 보전 구속의 해제는 취소사유가 인정되어야 열리고, 부당집행 손해의 구제는 귀책·손해·인과관계가 인정되어야 열린다는 구별이며, 반대로 취소·정지 근거 없이 이의만 제기해 집행이 계속되거나 추정이 깨지고 다른 귀책 근거도 없다면 막힌다는 점이다. 허용되지 않는 것은 본안에서 졌다는 이유만으로 언제나 무과실 책임을 진다는 결론과, 추정이 반증 불가능한 무과실 책임이라는 결론이다. 미확정은 취소사유나 손해·인과관계가 확인되지 않은 경우로 분리해 두고, 자료 부족을 곧바로 구제 불능으로 바꾸지 않는다. 다만 뒤에 남는 것은, 가압류가 풀리면 그동안의 손해도 회복된 것인가라는 별개의 물음이다.
5.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
A는 가압류를 신청할 때 자신의 채권이 확실하다고 믿었을 수 있고, 법원의 결정에 따라 집행까지 이어졌다는 점을 강조한다. B와 A의 입장이 이처럼 갈리는 지점에서, 본안에서 졌다는 사실만으로 언제나 무과실 책임을 지는지가 문제로 남는다. 이는 가압류와 가처분을 함께 다룬다.
대법원 2002. 9. 24. 선고 2000다46184 판결은 "그 집행 후에 집행채권자가 본안소송에서 패소 확정되었다면 그 보전처분의 집행으로 인하여 채무자가 입은 손해에 대하여는 특별한 반증이 없는 한 집행채권자에게 고의 또는 과실이 있다고 추정되고"라고 설시한다. 여기서 주체는 집행채권자이고, 대상은 보전처분의 집행으로 채무자가 입은 손해이며, 조건은 그 집행 후 집행채권자가 본안소송에서 패소 확정된 경우이다. 이 문언은 문언상 책임의 근거를 부당한 집행에 두고 있어, A의 신청 자체를 문제 삼는 것이 아니라 집행과 연결된 손해에 대한 귀책을 가리킨다.
위 문언은 이 절의 결론과 직접 맞닿는다. 문언은 두 단계를 함께 놓는다. 먼저 보전처분 집행 뒤 본안 패소가 확정되면 집행채권자에게 고의 또는 과실이 있다고 본다. 그런데 이어서 특별한 반증이 없는 한이라는 문구가 붙는다. 이 문구는 추정의 장소가 고정되지 않았음을 보여준다. 추정은 출발점이고 반증은 그 출발점을 밀어낼 수 있는 요소이다. 두 단계를 구별해야 A의 신청 정당성과 B의 손해 사이의 책임이 반증의 여지까지 담은 판단으로 남는다.
그럼에도 가장 강한 반론은 그 구별이 부담스럽다는 것이다. A가 채권 소명을 마치고 법원의 결정에 따라 집행했음에도, 본안에서 지면 그동안 집행된 사실 자체로 B에게 손해를 배상해야 한다면, 정당한 긴급보호 신청이 위축될 수 있다는 걱정이 뒤에 놓인다. 결과만으로 책임이 따라붙는 것처럼 보이는 인상을 받는다는 뜻이다. 특별한 반증이 길을 여는 반면 무과실 책임은 그 길을 닫는다. 결과 책임의 인상과 반증의 여지를 동시에 남기는 한에서 판단을 유지한다.
합성 장면에서 이 절과 관련된 사실의 범위는 분명하다. 이 가운데 판례의 조건에 대응하는 부분은 가압류의 집행이 있었고, 그 집행 뒤 A의 본안소송에서 패소가 확정된 지점이다. 다만 B의 영업상 손해가 어떤 형태이며 그 손해가 가압류 집행과 인과적으로 연결되는지, A가 어떤 자료로 반증에 나설 수 있는지는 이 장면에서 정해지지 않았다. 반증 사유나 손해의 인과관계가 확인되지 않은 지금은 미확정으로 남는다. 따라서 그 자료가 무엇일지는 확인이 필요한 항목으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 가압류 집행 뒤 본안 패소가 확정된 경우에, 채무자의 손해에 대해 집행채권자에게 고의 또는 과실이 있다고 추정하되, 그 추정은 특별한 반증으로 깨질 수 있다는 점을 함께 남긴다. 반대로, 본안에서 지면 어떠한 사정도 살피지 않고 무조건 무과실 책임을 진다거나, 채권자가 신청을 정당하게 믿었다는 이유만으로 책임이 완전히 사라진다고 보는 것은 이 절이 허용하지 않는 양쪽 끝이다. 가압류가 풀리는 것과 그동안의 손해가 회복되는 것이 같은지, 나아가 구제가 언제 열리는지에 대해서는 여기서 답하지 않는다.