Summary
Grounds for not awaiting a ruling, such as delay in the ruling or urgent necessity, are applied together with the requirement of prima facie proof of those grounds.
2.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
기다리는 동안 회복이 사라지는 경우에는 기다림의 의무도 다시 물어야 한다. 이 사정이 합성 장면에서 현실이 되면 신청인 A는 심판청구 뒤 재결을 기다리는 동안 회복할 대상이 사라질까 두렵고, 행정청 B는 A의 소송이 늦었다고 다툰다. 취소소송은 심판을 거치지 않을 수 있다는 원칙과 특별법의 전치 규정을 함께 살펴야 한다. 이 전제 위에서 이번 단계의 물음은 필요적 전치의 예외를 들어 재결 전에 소를 제기할 수 있다고 주장하는 A에게 그 입구가 열리는지, 나아가 그 입구를 가늠하는 기준이 무엇인지 묻는다.
법령은 이 물음에 대답할 문언을 짧게 놓았다. 행정소송법 제18조 제2항은 재결을 거치지 아니하고 취소소송을 제기할 수 있는 사유를 네 가지로 들면서, 그 둘째로 “처분의 집행 또는 절차의 속행으로 생길 중대한 손해를 예방하여야 할 긴급한 필요가 있는 때”(행정소송법 제18조)를 적었다. 여기서 가리키는 주체는 처분의 집행 또는 절차의 속행으로 중대한 손해를 당할 처지에 놓인 당사자이고, 행위는 재결 전 취소소송의 제기이며, 조건은 긴급한 필요라는 사정의 존재다. 제2항 각호가 정한 것은 재결을 기다릴 수 없다는 예외의 법정 사유들이다.
그 문언에 같은 조항의 소명 규정을 붙여 읽어야 이 예외의 성립 단계가 드러난다. 제18조 제4항은 “제2항 및 제3항의 규정에 의한 사유는 이를 소명하여야 한다”(행정소송법 제18조)고 요구한다. 필요적 전치 여부를 먼저 정한 뒤, 그 예외에 해당하는지를 따지는 단계와, 심판청구 기간과 제소기간을 각 기산사실에 맞춰 지켰는지 살피는 단계는 구별해서 판단한다. 하나라도 다른 단계에 속한 판단을 섞어 넘어서면 그 문언에 맡긴 한정 범위를 잃는다.
이 구별은 곧바로 가장 강한 반론을 만난다. 반론은 복잡한 전치 예외와 기간이 행정청의 잘못을 다루려는 사람에게 부담을 떠넘긴다고 비판한다. 처분의 집행이 진행되는 동안 중대한 손해가 현실이 된다면, 절차로 소명을 요구받는 사이에 회복이 불가능해질 수 있다는 점이 그 손실이다. 그러나 인정한다 해도 긴급하다는 표현만으로 법정 사유의 소명을 대신할 수는 없다. 반론이 말하는 부담을 경감하는 길은 예외 문언과 소명 문언의 적용을 건너뛰는 데 있지 않고, 각 사유를 그 사유에 맞게 소명하는 데 있다.
합성 장면에 정해진 사실로 한정하면, A는 심판을 먼저 청구했고 B는 소송이 늦었다고 다투고 있다. 이 사실만으로는 재결이 송달되었는지, 처분의 인지 시점이 언제인지, 긴급성과 예외가 소명되었는지가 정해지지 않았다. 특별법 전치 규정·심판청구·재결 송달·처분 인지·긴급성과 예외 소명이라는 판단 기록이 가진 자료와 맞아떨어지는지도 확인된 바 없다. 그러므로 전치 적용 법률이나 기산 송달을 확인할 수 없는 이 사정은 미확정으로 남는다.
따라서 허용되는 결론과 허용되지 않는 결론의 경계는 이러하다. 필요적 전치 여부와 예외를 적용하고 심판·소송의 각 기간을 해당 기산사실에 맞춰 지킨 경우 이 구제의 입구가 열린다. 그러나 재결 대기 면제 사유만 확인되면 심판 제기 자체도 불필요하다는 결론으로 넓히지 않는다.
2.2The Conditions That Block Relief
이 맥락에서 지금의 물음은 필요적 전치를 정한 법률이 적용되는 사안에서 그 전치를 거치지 않고 곧바로 소송으로 나아갈 수 있는지, 그리고 그러한 나아감이 어떤 조건에서 막히는지를 가리는 것이다. 앞 절이 다룬 전치의 원리와 특별법 규정의 관계는 이미 정리된 것으로 두고, 여기에서는 재결을 기다리지 않고 소송을 제기하는 통로가 열리는 법정 사유와 그 소명 요구를 중심에 놓는다. 신청인 A는 심판을 먼저 청구했고 행정청 B는 소송이 늦었다고 다투고 있는 이 장면에서, 법정 사유에 해당하는지와 그 사유를 소명했는지가 구분되어 판단되어야 한다는 점을 먼저 밝혀 둔다.
행정소송법 제18조 제2항은 재결을 거치지 아니하고 취소소송을 제기할 수 있는 사유를 열거한다(「행정소송법 제18조」). 그 문언은 행정심판청구가 있은 날로부터 60일이 지나도 재결이 없는 때, 처분의 집행 또는 절차의 속행으로 생길 중대한 손해를 예방하여야 할 긴급한 필요가 있는 때, 법령의 규정에 의한 행정심판기관이 의결 또는 재결을 하지 못할 사유가 있는 때, 그 밖의 정당한 사유가 있는 때로 사유의 유형을 정한다(「행정소송법 제18조」). 여기서 다루는 주체는 심판청구를 마친 뒤 재결 없이 소송을 제기하려는 당사자이고, 행위는 취소소송의 제기이며, 조건은 위 각호의 사유 가운데 하나가 성립하는 것이다. 같은 조 제4항은 이러한 사유를 소명하여야 한다고 요구한다(「행정소송법 제18조」). 이 소명 요구는 사유의 유형을 정한 제2항과 결합되어, 사유가 있다는 주장과 그 사유를 보여 주는 자료가 함께 요구된다는 점을 가리킨다.
위 문언과 이 절의 결론을 연결하면, 재결 전 제소 예외는 심판청구 뒤 재결 없이 소송할 수 있는 법정 사유를 뜻한다. 이 예외는 심판청구라는 선행 행위가 이미 이루어진 뒤에 비로소 문제되는 것이므로, 심판을 내지 않은 경우와 구별된다. 재결을 기다리지 않는 것은 심판청구 뒤 재결을 기다리지 않고 소송으로 나아가는 것을 말하고, 심판을 내지 않는 것은 그러한 선행 청구 자체가 없는 경우를 말한다. 법이 정한 요건은 이 둘을 같은 것으로 보지 않으므로, 재결 전 제소 예외가 인정되는지와 심판청구 자체가 필요 없는지는 별도의 판단 단계로 나누어 살펴보아야 한다. 이 구별은 필요적 전치를 거치지 않았고 면제 사유도 없거나 제소기간이 지나 해당 예외도 없는 경우 법정 요건 중 하나라도 충족되지 않으면 구제 통로가 닫힌다는 결론의 바탕이 된다.
가장 강한 반론은 긴급하다는 주장으로 전치가 무력화될 수 있다는 점을 겨냥한다. 처분의 집행이나 절차의 속행으로 생길 중대한 손해를 예방하기 긴급한 경우라면, 재결을 기다리는 동안 손해가 현실이 되고 회복이 어려워질 수 있다. 이런 손실과 불편을 고려하면, 긴급성을 이유로 한 제소를 넓게 허용해야 한다는 주장은 무게를 가진다. 복잡한 전치 예외와 기간 규정이 행정청의 잘못을 다투는 사람에게 부담을 떠넘긴다는 비판도 같은 방향에서 나온다. 그렇더라도 긴급하다는 표현만으로 법정 사유의 소명을 대신할 수는 없다. 제2항 제2호는 긴급한 필요를 사유의 하나로 열거하면서도, 제4항은 그 사유를 소명하여야 한다고 요구하므로, 긴급하다는 주장만으로는 예외의 성립을 가릴 수 없다. 반론이 지적하는 손해의 위험을 결론에서 지우지 않으면서도, 법이 정한 소명 요구를 함께 지켜야 한다는 범위에서 결론을 유지한다.
합성 장면에서 이 물음과 관련된 사실은 신청인 A가 심판을 먼저 청구했다는 것과 행정청 B가 소송이 늦었다고 다투고 있다는 점이다. A의 심판청구가 이미 이루어졌으므로, 재결 전 제소 예외는 심판청구 뒤의 상황에서 문제되는 것으로 볼 수 있다. 그러나 이 장면에는 행정심판청구가 있은 날로부터 60일이 지났는지, 처분의 집행이나 절차의 속행으로 중대한 손해가 예상되는지, 행정심판기관이 재결을 하지 못할 사유가 있는지, 그 밖의 정당한 사유가 있는지가 정해져 있지 않다. 법령의 규정에 의한 행정심판기관이 의결 또는 재결을 하지 못할 사유를 판단하려면 적용 법률과 그 기관의 지위를 확인해야 하고, 처분의 인지나 송달로 재결을 기다려야 할 기간이 시작되는지도 확인되어야 한다. 이러한 기록이 없는 한, 법정 사유의 성립 여부와 소명의 충족 여부는 미확정으로 남는다. 제소기간이 지났는지와 그에 대한 예외가 있는지도 같은 이유로 확정할 수 없다. 장면만으로 판정할 수 없는 사항을 채우지 않는 것이 판단 범위다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 필요적 전치가 적용되는 경우에 재결 전 제소 예외의 법정 사유가 성립하고 그 사유가 소명된 때에는 재결을 거치지 아니하고 취소소송을 제기할 수 있다는 것이다. 여기서 긴급하다는 표현만으로 그 사유의 소명을 대신할 수는 없으므로, 긴급성을 주장하는 경우에도 소명 자료가 요구된다. 이 절이 허용하지 않는 결론은, 재결 대기 면제 사유만 확인되면 심판 제기 자체도 불필요하다는 결론으로 넓히지 않는 것이다. 재결을 기다리지 않는 것과 심판을 내지 않는 것은 다른 판단 단계에 속하므로, 전자의 예외가 인정된다고 하여 후자가 당연히 충족되는 것은 아니다. 필요적 전치를 거치지 않았고 면제 사유도 없거나 제소기간이 지나 해당 예외도 없는 경우 법정 요건 중 하나라도 충족되지 않으면 구제 통로는 닫힌다.
2.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
필요적 전치에서도 곧바로 소송할 수 있는가라는 물음은 앞 단계가 남긴 원칙과 특별법 전치 규정을 함께 둔 채, 자료가 없어 확정할 수 없는 경계는 어디인가를 새로 묻는다. 신청인 A는 심판을 먼저 청구했고 행정청 B는 소송이 늦었다고 다투고 있다.
이 물음에 해당하는 문언은 행정소송법 제18조가 정한다. 제2항은 “제1항 단서의 경우에도 다음 각호의 1에 해당하는 사유가 있는 때에는 행정심판의 재결을 거치지 아니하고 취소소송을 제기할 수 있다”고 하면서 그 사유로 “1. 행정심판청구가 있은 날로부터 60일이 지나도 재결이 없는 때”, “2. 처분의 집행 또는 절차의 속행으로 생길 중대한 손해를 예방하여야 할 긴급한 필요가 있는 때”를 둔다. 이 문언이 말하는 주체는 심판청구를 마친 뒤 소송을 제기하려는 사람이고, 행위는 재결을 거치지 아니한 취소소송의 제기이며, 조건은 각 호의 법정 사유가 있을 때이다.
행정소송법 제18조의 같은 항이 사유를 열거하면서도 제4항에서 “제2항 및 제3항의 규정에 의한 사유는 이를 소명하여야 한다”고 별도로 요구하는 까닭은, 사유가 있다는 사실과 그 사유를 들어 재결을 거치지 않겠다는 판단이 서로 다른 단계이기 때문이다. 이 구별을 지킬 때 전치 적용 법률이나 기산 송달을 확인할 수 없는 경우, 즉 판단 재료가 특정되지 않은 사항은 불능과 구별해 미확정으로 남긴다는 결론이 선다. 확인되지 않은 것은 확인되지 않은 채 두고, 그 자료가 없으므로 아예 열리지 않는 길로 단정하지 않는 태도가 여기서 요구된다.
가장 강한 반론은 긴급하다는 주장으로 전치가 무력화될 수 있다는 염려이며, 그 구체적인 손실은 행정청 B가 말하듯 제소기간과 전치 예외의 복잡성이 심판을 먼저 청구하려는 사람에게 그 자체로 부담이 된다는 점이다. 그러나 긴급하다는 표현만으로 법정 사유의 소명을 대신할 수는 없다. 제4항의 소명 요구는 표현의 강도를 법정 사유로 바꾸지 않으며, 반론이 가리키는 부담은 해소되지 않은 채 남는다.
합성 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 신청인 A가 심판을 먼저 청구했고 행정청 B가 소송이 늦었다고 다툰다는 것뿐이다. 이 사실만으로는 전치 적용 법률이 무엇인지, 기산 송달이 언제 있었는지가 정해지지 않으므로, 위에서 정한 미확정의 조건에 그대로 걸린다. 긴급성과 예외의 소명 기록도 장면에 지정되지 않았으므로, 이 항목 역시 미확인으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 자료가 특정되지 않은 사항을 불능으로 단정하지 않고 미확정으로 남긴 판단이며, 허용하지 않는 것은 확인되지 않은 법률이나 송달을 업은 채 예외의 성립이나 소명의 충족을 확정하는 판단이다.
2.4The Records Needed for Determination
취소소송은 심판을 거치지 않을 수 있다는 원칙과 특별법의 전치 규정을 함께 살펴야 한다는 전제 아래, 신청인 A는 심판을 먼저 청구했고 행정청 B는 소송이 늦었다고 다투고 있다. 이 장면에서 두 사람 사이의 다툼은 시점 자체보다 판단에 쓸 자료의 범위를 가른다. 지금 물음은 필요적 전치에서도 곧바로 소송할 수 있는지, 그리고 그 단계를 판단하려면 어떤 기록이 필요한지이다.
행정소송법 제18조 제2항은 "제1항 단서의 경우에도 다음 각호의 1에 해당하는 사유가 있는 때에는 행정심판의 재결을 거치지 아니하고 취소소송을 제기할 수 있다"고 정하고, 이어서 "1. 행정심판청구가 있은 날로부터 60일이 지나도 재결이 없는 때", "2. 처분의 집행 또는 절차의 속행으로 생길 중대한 손해를 예방하여야 할 긴급한 필요가 있는 때"를 든다. 여기서 말하는 주체는 심판청구를 마친 뒤 소송을 제기하려는 사람이고, 행위는 재결을 기다리지 않고 제기하는 취소소송이며, 조건은 항에 열린 사유 중 하나에 해당한다는 사실이다.
이 문언은 재결을 기다리지 않을 사유를 사전에 정해 둔 것이지, 전치를 처음부터 무시할 자리를 열어 둔 것이 아니다. 그래서 단계 판정은 두 덩어리로 나누어 본다. 하나는 특별법 전치 규정과 심판청구·재결 송달·처분 인지처럼 절차의 위치를 가리키는 기록이고, 다른 하나는 긴급성과 예외 사유를 뒷받침하는 소명 기록이다. 앞의 기록으로 지금 어느 단계에 있는지 정하고, 뒤의 기록으로 재결 없이 나아갈 사유가 있는지 본다. 없는 기록을 추정으로 메우지 않으므로, 자료가 비어 있는 자리는 비어 있는 채로 판단의 한계가 된다.
가장 강한 반론은 예외 사유를 둘러싼 부담이 행정청의 잘못을 다투는 사람에게까지 넘어간다는 점이다. 처분의 집행이나 절차의 속행으로 중대한 손해가 임박했는데도 재결을 기다려야 한다면, 그 기다림이 낙관할 수 없는 상태로 이어질 수 있다는 걱정이 반론의 축이다. 복잡한 예외 사유와 기간을 각각 소명해야 한다는 요구가 그 사람의 시간과 자료를 더 쓰게 만든다는 불리함도 지워지지 않는다. 그렇더라도 "긴급하다는 표현만으로 법정 사유의 소명을 대신할 수는 없다"는 답은 유지된다. 긴급성을 주장하는 것은 대개 소명의 출발점이 될 뿐이고, 제2항이 요구하는 사유에 해당한다는 기록이 함께 있어야 그 문언에 닿는다.
이 장면에서는 신청인 A가 심판을 먼저 청구했다는 점이 이미 기록의 축이고, 행정청 B는 소송이 늦었다고 다투고 있다. 이 사실을 놓고 보면, 소송이 언제 제기되었는지보다 심판청구가 있은 날과 재결의 유무, 그리고 재결을 기다리지 않을 사유의 소명이 함께 놓이는지가 단계를 판정하는 데 쓰이는 항목이 된다. 다만 장면은 연도나 기산일, 송달 결과를 정하지 않았다. 따라서 60일이 실제로 지났는지, 긴급한 필요가 어느 정도로 중대한지는 이 장면만으로 확정할 수 없고, 미확정으로 남는다. 결론을 좁혀도 빈 기록을 메우지는 않는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 정해진 기록으로 단계를 판정하고, 그 기록에 비추어 재결 전 제소 예외를 함께 보는 것이다. 허용하지 않는 것은 긴급하다는 표현 하나로 소명 자리를 메우거나, 예외 사유를 확인하는 데 그쳐 심판청구 자체가 필요 없었다고 넓혀 버리는 일이다.
2.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
The question whether, even under mandatory prior adjudication, suit may be brought at once begins from the problem-awareness that where recovery disappears during the wait, the duty to wait must itself be asked anew. Up through the preceding stage, the framework was confirmed that the principle that an action for revocation may proceed without passing through adjudication and the prior-adjudication provisions of special statutes must be examined together; now, within that framework, it must be weighed what circumstances overturn the existing stage determination. This scene is not a reproduction of an actual case but a fixed premise for comparing conditions.
Article 18(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act provides, "② Even in the case under the proviso to paragraph (1), where a ground falling under any one of the following subparagraphs exists, an action for revocation may be brought without undergoing an adjudication decision in administrative adjudication. 1. Where 60 days have elapsed from the date on which a request for administrative adjudication was made without an adjudication decision 2. Where there is an urgent need to prevent serious harm that would arise from enforcement of the disposition or continuation of the procedure 3. Where there exists a ground under statutes and regulations on which the administrative adjudication body is unable to deliberate or render an adjudication decision 4. Where there exists any other justifiable ground". The subject spoken of by this text is a party who, having completed a request for adjudication, seeks to move to litigation without an adjudication decision; the act is the filing of an action for revocation; and the condition is the existence of one of the statutory grounds enumerated in the subparagraphs. The grounds in the subparagraphs operate only as exceptions to the stage of litigating after undergoing an adjudication decision.
Article 18(4) of the Administrative Litigation Act provides, "④ A ground under paragraphs (2) and (3) must be substantiated." Accordingly, the grounds in the subparagraphs do not come into existence on assertion alone but must be substantiated, and this substantiation demand draws the boundary between text and application. When a substantiated ground is confirmed, only the waiting for the adjudication decision is excused; it cannot be regarded that the prior stage of requesting adjudication itself has also been omitted. In other words, the exception for filing suit before an adjudication decision means only the statutory grounds for litigating after a request for adjudication without an adjudication decision; it does not mean grounds that excuse the filing of the request for adjudication. Only by distinguishing the two stages does it become clear which judgment alone the specified change alters.
The strongest counterargument targets the point that the prior adjudication requirement may be neutralized by an assertion of urgency, and the point that the complex prior-adjudication exceptions and their periods shift the burden onto those who contest the administrative agency's error. From the vantage of Administrative Agency B, Applicant A has already filed a request for adjudication and thus advanced into the prior procedure, so the disadvantage remains that each time the delay of the adjudication decision or the urgency of enforcement is raised as an exception ground, new substantiating materials must be prepared. Even so, substantiation is demanded because the grounds in the subparagraphs have the effect of justifying the interruption of the stage of awaiting the adjudication decision, and the bare expression of urgency cannot substitute for substantiation of the statutory ground. The conclusion of removing the burden on the administrative agency's side that the counterargument identifies does not arise within this scope.
The fixed facts of the synthetic scene are only that Applicant A filed the request for adjudication first and that Administrative Agency B is arguing that the lawsuit was brought late. Contrast these with the subparagraphs of Article 18(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act: because A completed the request for adjudication, this is distinct from the case in which there was no filing of a request for adjudication at all; and whether it falls under the case where 60 days have elapsed from the date on which a request for administrative adjudication was made without an adjudication decision cannot be confirmed, because the commencement date is not specified in the scene. Nor is whether the urgent need or the justifiable ground has been substantiated included in the scene. Even if, through the specified change, only the ground for exemption from awaiting the adjudication decision is confirmed, the conclusion is not broadened to hold that the filing of the request for adjudication itself is also unnecessary. When such a change is confirmed, the existing stage determination of blockage and effectiveness is discarded and the stages are reassessed from the beginning, while unconfirmed grounds remain undetermined.
What this section permits is the judgment that, where a statutory ground for litigating after a request for adjudication without an adjudication decision has been substantiated, one may proceed to an action for revocation without awaiting the adjudication decision; it does not permit the judgment that the filing of the request for adjudication itself is unnecessary, or that the prior-adjudication stage collapses on an unsubstantiated assertion of urgency alone. Even where the confirmed change overturns the existing judgment, what is discarded is the stage determination of blockage and effectiveness, and the stages must be examined anew from the beginning in accordance with the content of that change.
2.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
The question handled here is whether, even after first filing a request for adjudication, suit may be brought at once without waiting for the adjudication decision. The exception for filing suit before an adjudication decision means the statutory grounds for litigating after a request for adjudication without an adjudication decision. In asking what conditions open this exception, one must examine whether circumstances in which harm hardens during the wait are recognized as one of the statutory grounds.
Article 18(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act provides, "Even in the case under the proviso to paragraph (1), where a ground falling under any one of the following subparagraphs exists, an action for revocation may be brought without undergoing an adjudication decision in administrative adjudication," and among its subparagraphs it lists, second, "Where there is an urgent need to prevent serious harm that would arise from enforcement of the disposition or continuation of the procedure" (Administrative Litigation Act Article 18). This text defines as follows: the subject who may move to litigation after a request for adjudication without an adjudication decision is the party contemplating filing suit; the act is the filing of an action for revocation without undergoing an adjudication decision; and the condition is falling under one of the grounds in the subparagraphs.
Alongside this, paragraph (4) of the same Article declares, "A ground under paragraphs (2) and (3) must be substantiated" (Administrative Litigation Act Article 18). Since the two texts point to different stages, they must be read together. Paragraph (2) is the stage that enumerates which grounds can open the exception, and paragraph (4) is the stage that supports by substantiation the point that the enumerated ground has actually come into existence. Confirming the circumstances bearing on the preceding stage does not at once mean that the substantiation of the following stage is also in place, nor may the exception be fixed by skipping the following stage.
Nevertheless, the counterargument that may be raised most strongly is this. Administrative Agency B argues that the prior adjudication requirement ought to be capable of being neutralized by an assertion of urgency alone, invoking the point that the complex prior-adjudication exceptions and their periods ultimately shift the burden onto those who contest the administrative agency's error. It is said that requiring the form of substantiation in the face of harm in which recovery disappears operates to their disadvantage. The reason the law separates ground from substantiation is that, if a passage for skipping the adjudication decision were opened by the mere urgent expression in the text, the exception would exceed its prescribed scope.
In the synthetic scene, the facts relevant to this question are only the point that Applicant A filed the request for adjudication first, and the point that Administrative Agency B is arguing that the lawsuit was late. Contrast these facts with the statutory conditions above: since A has already filed a request for adjudication, room is left for discussing the exception for filing suit before an adjudication decision. However, whether there is an urgent need to prevent serious harm that would arise from enforcement of the disposition or continuation of the procedure, and whether that ground has been substantiated, do not appear in the scene. Accordingly, the scene alone cannot fix whether the exception has come into existence, and whether the urgency and the substantiation of the exception are confirmed by the record remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is that a person invoking the exception for filing suit before an adjudication decision must present together the fact of falling within a statutory ground and the substantiation that the ground has come into existence. The conclusion this section does not permit is the judgment that the word of urgency itself has already completed the substantiation and that the need to await the adjudication decision has disappeared. Apart from whether the lawsuit was late as measured from the point at which the request for adjudication was first filed, the coming into existence of the exception ground and its substantiation must each be confirmed. Even under mandatory prior adjudication, may suit be brought at once?
2.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
Adopting the premise from the previous section that the bare expression of urgency cannot substitute for substantiation of the statutory ground, the question now is whether suit may be brought at once even in cases of mandatory prior adjudication. In this scene, what the circumstances were under which A filed suit without waiting for the adjudication decision is the starting point of the judgment.
「Article 18(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act」 provides: 「② Even in the case under the proviso to paragraph (1), where a ground falling under any one of the following subparagraphs exists, an action for revocation may be brought without undergoing an adjudication decision in administrative adjudication. <Amended July 27, 1994> 1. Where 60 days have elapsed from the date on which a request for administrative adjudication was made without an adjudication decision 2. Where there is an urgent need to prevent serious harm that would arise from enforcement of the disposition or continuation of the procedure 3. Where there exists a ground under statutes and regulations on which the administrative adjudication body is unable to deliberate or render an adjudication decision 4. Where there exists any other justifiable ground」. Here, statutory grounds are the requirements enabling suit to be filed after a request for adjudication without an adjudication decision, and are limited to the acts and conditions stated in each subparagraph.
The above text merely provides that an action for revocation may be brought without undergoing an adjudication decision; it does not say that the request for adjudication itself is excused. The object governed by Article 18(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act is the case in which a request for adjudication has already been made, and subparagraph 1 respectively requires the case where the state of there being no adjudication decision has continued for 60 days, and subparagraph 2 the case where there is an urgent need to prevent serious harm that would arise from enforcement of the disposition or continuation of the procedure. Accordingly, the ground for not awaiting the adjudication decision and the demand that the ground be disclosed must be judged together. On either one alone, it cannot be said that the requirements of this exception are fully met.
There is, however, the counterargument that if assertions of urgency are broadly accepted, mandatory prior adjudication may be neutralized. If harm cannot be recovered while one waits, the procedure of prior adjudication itself loses its practical benefit; this counterargument is aimed at the disadvantage that delay in procedure leaves with the parties. To this the author answers with the substantiation demand for statutory grounds. Yet the burden of leaving unaddressed even situations in which recovery disappears, precisely because the substantiation demand has become exacting, is not removed; hence the unfavorable portion left by this conclusion also remains.
In the synthetic scene, A filed the request for adjudication first and therefore falls within the case presupposed by Article 18(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act, where a request for adjudication has been made. What B puts in issue, by contrast, is that the lawsuit was late; whether the lateness spoken of here relates to the duration of the state of there being no adjudication decision, or to the need to prevent serious harm arising from enforcement of the disposition or continuation of the procedure, is not settled by this scene alone. The same applies to whether it falls under any other justifiable ground. In particular, since no year, amount, or commencement date is set in the synthetic scene, whether 60 days have elapsed and the seriousness of the harm remain unverified. In the assessment record, one must examine the prior-adjudication provisions of the special statutes, the request for adjudication, service of the adjudication decision, awareness of the disposition, and the presence or absence of urgency and of substantiation of the exception.
What is permitted in this section is the judgment that, after a request for adjudication has been made, an action for revocation may be brought without an adjudication decision when any one of the statutory grounds has been substantiated. What is not permitted is substituting the bare word of urgency for substantiation, or broadening the conclusion, once only the ground for exemption from awaiting the adjudication decision is confirmed, to hold that the filing of the request for adjudication itself is also unnecessary. If the law to which the prior adjudication applies or the service that starts the period cannot be confirmed, the application of this section remains undetermined.
2.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
The expression mandatory prior adjudication refers to cases in which a statute requires administrative adjudication to be undergone first, and whether the door to litigation opens at once is the question to be confirmed this time. What is handled here is not the prior adjudication requirement itself, but the task of judging together the statutory grounds on which a person who has already requested adjudication may proceed to litigation without an adjudication decision, and the substantiation demand for them.
The text corresponding to this question is the clause enumerating the grounds for not awaiting the adjudication decision in administrative adjudication. Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act provides, "② Even in the case under the proviso to paragraph (1), where a ground falling under any one of the following subparagraphs exists, an action for revocation may be brought without undergoing an adjudication decision in administrative adjudication.", and as such a ground it lists first, "1. Where 60 days have elapsed from the date on which a request for administrative adjudication was made without an adjudication decision". The subject of this text is a person who, having completed a request for adjudication, seeks to file suit; the act is the filing of an action for revocation without an adjudication decision; and the condition is that one of the enumerated grounds has come into existence.
This text is in the same direction as defining the exception for filing suit before an adjudication decision as the statutory grounds for litigating after a request for adjudication without an adjudication decision. Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act places alongside those grounds "2. Where there is an urgent need to prevent serious harm that would arise from enforcement of the disposition or continuation of the procedure", "3. Where there exists a ground under statutes and regulations on which the administrative adjudication body is unable to deliberate or render an adjudication decision", and "4. Where there exists any other justifiable ground", and demands, "④ A ground under paragraphs (2) and (3) must be substantiated." Thus the coming into existence of a ground and the substantiation of that ground must be examined separately. Substantiation is not excused merely by presenting fewer types of grounds, and the substantiation demand applies side by side with the judgment that the foregoing type of ground has come into existence.
The counterargument that an assertion of urgency can at once neutralize the prior adjudication requirement fears the delay that makes it difficult to prevent harm arising from enforcement of the disposition or continuation of the procedure. If the type of ground and its substantiation are demanded together, the procedure may feel heavier still to a person whose recovery may disappear. That disadvantage must not be erased. If the requirement called for by the text of the ground of urgent need is replaced with an expression, the distinction established by placing the enumerated grounds and the substantiation demand together collapses.
What is confirmed in the synthetic scene is only the fact that Applicant A filed the request for adjudication first and that Administrative Agency B argues that the lawsuit was late. Placing this fact against the foregoing conditions, since the request for adjudication has already been made, discussion is possible of the place left open by the text of the exception for filing suit before an adjudication decision. Whether, however, there was an adjudication decision, how the period runs against the awareness of the disposition and each fact of commencement, and what the urgency and the substantiation of the exception ground were, the scene does not determine. Therefore, even whether the lawsuit was late cannot be fixed by this scene, and where the law to which the prior adjudication applies or the service that starts the period cannot be confirmed, that judgment remains undetermined.
What can be drawn from this section is the narrow conclusion that the statutory types of grounds for not awaiting the adjudication decision and the substantiation demand for them are examined together; it is not broadened into the conclusion that, once only the ground for exemption from awaiting the adjudication decision is confirmed, the filing of the request for adjudication itself is also unnecessary.
2.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
This carries forward in one sentence the point confirmed by the preceding analysis stage: the principle of prior exhaustion of adjudication and the prior exhaustion provision of the special Act must be viewed together. That principle alone does not settle every issue presently in dispute. What must be asked in this scene is whether the applicant, having already requested adjudication, may bring an action without an adjudication decision—that is, the scope of application of the statutory ground known as the exception for bringing an action before an adjudication decision. Clarifying when grounds such as delay in the rendering of an adjudication decision or urgent necessity are recognized is the task that remains.
This provision forms part of the Article governing the connection between administrative adjudication and an action for revocation. It stipulates: "Even in the case of the proviso to paragraph (1), an action for revocation may be filed without undergoing an adjudication decision in administrative adjudication where any of the following grounds exists: 1. Where 60 days have elapsed from the date on which a request for administrative adjudication was filed and no adjudication decision has been rendered; 2. Where there is an urgent need to prevent serious damage that would arise from enforcement of the disposition or continuation of the procedure; 3. Where the administrative adjudication body prescribed by statutes and regulations has grounds for being unable to deliberate or render an adjudication decision; 4. Where there are other justifiable grounds." Here the subject is the party who requested adjudication, and the act is filing an action for revocation without an adjudication decision. Its condition is limited to the case where one of the four grounds is present. This provision makes clear that the exception is established even in the case of the proviso to paragraph (1).
Another part of the same Article addresses the question of proving those grounds. Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act provides: "④ A ground under paragraph (2) or paragraph (3) shall be substantiated." This provision stands apart from the earlier enumeration of grounds. To explain why the distinction must be made, paragraph (2) determines what the grounds are for not awaiting an award, while paragraph (4) requires it to be substantiated that such a ground actually exists. The establishment of a ground and the substantiation of that ground are separate stages of determination. If judgment is rendered only within the bounds of these two provisions, the grounds for not awaiting an award and the requirement to substantiate them are applied together. The provisions create no further requirements or new legal effects.
The strongest counterargument is that this complex prior exhaustion exception and the time-limit provisions shift the burden onto a person who contests the administrative agency's error. The criticism is that, even when the damage caused by a disposition lies before one's eyes, requiring substantiation of the ground for the exception makes redress difficult to obtain. Even so, the conclusion does not change. What subparagraph 2 of paragraph (2) prescribes is an urgent need to prevent serious damage that would arise from enforcement of the disposition or continuation of the procedure, and paragraph (4) requires that ground to be substantiated. The disadvantage identified by the counterargument is addressed by determining the recognition of the ground under paragraph (2) and the substantiation requirement under paragraph (4) separately; neither the definition of the ground nor the substantiation requirement is erased.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only that Applicant A requested adjudication and that Administrative Agency B argues the action was filed late. The items set to be entered in the adjudication record are the prior exhaustion provision of the special Act, the request for adjudication, service of the award, awareness of the disposition, urgency, and substantiation of the exception. Compared against the foregoing conditions, once the applicant has filed a request for adjudication, an issue arises concerning the grounds for the exception prescribed in paragraph (2). Yet the scene does not establish when the award was served, what serious damage would arise from enforcement of the disposition or continuation of the procedure, or how that urgency would be substantiated. Nor are the year or the date of commencement fixed, so it cannot be determined whether 60 days have elapsed. Where the Act to which the prior exhaustion requirement applies or the service that serves as the point of commencement cannot be verified, the matter remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. The provision in question is used solely as the basis for determining the lawful connection between administrative adjudication and an action for revocation. Extending it into the reasons for a judgment would go beyond its scope. The outcome of an actual case, or the effect of recovering damages, also cannot be fixed in this scene.
2.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
Before this dispute, what part must be divided again and determined within the lawful connection between administrative adjudication and an action for revocation? Administrative adjudication is the procedure of contesting a disposition before an administrative agency first, and the relationship in which an action for revocation is filed with a court after going through that procedure is called prior exhaustion. Before asking whether an action may be filed first even under prior exhaustion, the case in which one proceeds without awaiting an award after already having filed for adjudication must be examined separately.
Article 18 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act provides: "② Even in the case of the proviso to paragraph (1), an action for revocation may be filed without undergoing an award in administrative adjudication where any of the following grounds exists," and lists as grounds: "1. Where 60 days have elapsed from the date on which a request for administrative adjudication was filed and no award has been rendered"; "2. Where there is an urgent need to prevent serious damage that would arise from enforcement of the disposition or continuation of the procedure"; "3. Where the administrative adjudication body prescribed by statutes and regulations has grounds for being unable to deliberate or render an award"; and "4. Where there are other justifiable grounds." In this provision, the act referred to by "without undergoing an award in administrative adjudication" is filing an action without awaiting an award, and "the date on which a request for administrative adjudication was filed" takes as its reference point the period after adjudication has already been requested.
The reason the provisions enumerate grounds on the premise of a request for adjudication is so that not awaiting an award and not filing for adjudication are not commingled at the same stage. The exception for bringing an action before an award means a statutory ground permitting an action to be filed without an award after a request for adjudication, and this exception is distinct from whether the procedure of adjudication may be skipped altogether. Article 18 (4) of the same Administrative Litigation Act provides: "④ A ground under paragraph (2) or paragraph (3) shall be substantiated." Substantiation means the requirement that the person filing the action support the statutory ground with substantiating materials. Accordingly, the detailed distinctions within the stage are limited to the conditions of the working case, the blocked case, and the undetermined case. The passage opens only where the necessity of prior exhaustion and the exception are applied and each of the time limits for adjudication and litigation is observed according to the corresponding fact of commencement; it is blocked where the necessary prior exhaustion was not undertaken and there is no ground for exemption, or where the period for filing suit has lapsed and the corresponding exception likewise does not exist.
The strongest counterargument is directed at the point that prior exhaustion may be neutralized by a claim of urgency. It is also noted that the complex prior exhaustion exceptions and time limits shift the burden onto a person contesting the administrative agency's error. There is dissatisfaction that a system compelling one to knock on the court's door only after enforcement of the disposition or continuation of the procedure is imminent effectively forces one to endure the error. Yet, without imposing this unfavorable burden, a mere assertion of urgency cannot take the place of substantiating the statutory ground. A statutory ground refers to the requirements set out in the Article, such as an urgent need, and that requirement stands together with the substantiation requirement in the same paragraph. Asserting urgency in words is not the same as the basis showing that the requirement is met.
With these records, the Act to which the prior exhaustion requirement applies or the service serving as the point of commencement cannot be verified, so facts of commencement such as how much time has passed since adjudication was requested and when the disposition became known cannot be determined. In the synthetic scene, only the fact that Applicant A requested adjudication first is given, and it is not settled at what point the lateness spoken of by Administrative Agency B lies, nor whether an award has been issued. Accordingly, whether the grounds for not awaiting an award are established and whether they have been substantiated remain undetermined. For those grounds open the path of proceeding after a request for adjudication without an award; they do not eliminate the request for adjudication itself.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow: where adjudication has already been requested, a ground prescribed in the provisions exists, and that ground has been substantiated, an action for revocation may be filed without awaiting an award; and this determination is distinct from the case in which prior exhaustion need not be undertaken. The conclusion it does not permit is the interpretation that prior exhaustion is extinguished by the mere word "urgent," or that the request for adjudication itself becomes unnecessary. To the extent that the Act applying prior exhaustion or the service serving as the point of commencement is unverified, nothing remains that can be fixed.
2.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
In this scene, the question is whether the action could have been filed first or whether an award had to be awaited. Even where adjudication was pursued, a criterion is needed to distinguish whether the way to an action opens immediately, or whether it remains blocked until an award is issued.
The provision in question enumerates the grounds on which an action may be filed without awaiting an award. It provides: "② Even in the case of the proviso to paragraph (1), an action for revocation may be filed without undergoing an award in administrative adjudication where any of the following grounds exists," and the subparagraphs run from "1. Where 60 days have elapsed from the date on which a request for administrative adjudication was filed and no award has been rendered" through "2. Where there is an urgent need to prevent serious damage that would arise from enforcement of the disposition or continuation of the procedure," "3. Where the administrative adjudication body prescribed by statutes and regulations has grounds for being unable to deliberate or render an award," to "4. Where there are other justifiable grounds."
This provision sets out the 'exception for bringing an action before an award,' whereby an action may be filed without an award, and its subject is limited to the case in which one must await an award after completing a request for adjudication. Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act requires: "④ A ground under paragraph (2) or paragraph (3) shall be substantiated." This substantiation requirement separates the condition that opens the passage to filing an action immediately from the condition that determines whether that passage may actually be used. Asserting that a ground stated in the provision exists, and substantiating that ground so that it is recognized, are separate stages.
The reason for maintaining this distinction is that the stages of determination differ. In the working case, the necessity of mandatory prior exhaustion is examined first, and then whether the case falls under the exception for bringing an action before an award and whether each time limit has been observed according to its fact of commencement are determined together. In the blocked case, the necessary prior exhaustion was not undertaken and there is no ground for exemption, or the period for filing suit has lapsed and the corresponding exception also does not exist. The undetermined case remains where the Act to which prior exhaustion applies, or the very service that serves as the point of commencement, cannot be verified, so that no determination can be made either way.
The strongest counterargument is that the complex prior exhaustion exceptions and time-limit provisions shift the burden onto a person contesting the administrative agency's error. The criticism is that if a person who feels urgency must also satisfy the requirements of the statutory ground and prepare substantiating materials, the damage may become fixed while relief is delayed. Even so, a mere assertion of urgency cannot take the place of substantiating the statutory ground. If the substantiation requirement were relaxed, the basis for distinguishing the delay in rendering an award under subparagraph 1 from the urgent need under subparagraph 2 would disappear, and the exception would swallow the principle.
The items to be verified from the records are the prior exhaustion provision of the special Act, the request for adjudication, service of the award, awareness of the disposition, urgency, and substantiation of the exception. Yet whether 60 days have elapsed from the date on which the request for administrative adjudication was filed, whether the award has been served, and when the disposition became known are not established in the scene. Accordingly, on the present facts alone it cannot be determined whether the passage opens or is blocked, and the matter remains in the undetermined category.
The conclusion this section permits is confined to a conditional distinction. Prior exhaustion is applied, and only where the grounds for the exception and their substantiation are both in place and each time limit is observed does the door to litigation open; where prior exhaustion was not undertaken, or the time limits were exceeded with no exception available, it is blocked. If the Act applying prior exhaustion or the service serving as the point of commencement cannot be verified, judgment is reserved.
2.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
Keeping in mind that an action for revocation must be examined together with the principle that adjudication need not necessarily be undergone and the prerequisite provision of a special act, the question to be asked this time narrows down to one. In this scene, where Applicant A filed a request for adjudication first and Administrative Agency B disputes that the action came too late, the question is whether one may proceed directly to a lawsuit even under a mandatory prerequisite. This question differs in texture from the problem of bypassing the prerequisite altogether. The analysis considers together whether a case in which one moves forward without waiting for a ruling after a request for adjudication has already been made is truly a route the law permits, and who must show the ground for it and in what manner.
On this question, the Administrative Litigation Act sets out its text in Article 18 (2). That provision first states, "(2) Even in the case of the proviso to paragraph (1), an action for revocation may be filed without undergoing a ruling on the administrative adjudication when any of the following grounds exists," and then enumerates each of the following: "1. Where 60 days have elapsed from the date on which the request for adjudication was filed and no ruling has been rendered"; "2. Where there is an urgent need to prevent a serious harm that may arise from the enforcement of the disposition or the continuation of the procedure"; "3. Where the administrative adjudication body prescribed by statutes and regulations has grounds for being unable to adopt a resolution or render a ruling"; "4. Where there is any other justifiable ground" (Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act). The subject prescribed here is the plaintiff who seeks to file an action without waiting for a ruling; the act is filing an action for revocation directly without a ruling; and the condition is limited to cases falling under one of the grounds in the above subparagraphs. The requirement that the same provision imposes together must not be overlooked either: Article 18 (4) provides, "(4) The grounds under paragraphs (2) and (3) must be prima facie proved" (Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act). That is, the existence of a ground and the prima facie proof of that ground are laid down as separate items.
The above text must be read in two stages before the problem emerges in which not waiting for a ruling and not filing for adjudication cannot be asked to be the same thing. The first stage asks whether, after a request for adjudication has been placed first, there is a ground for moving forward without a ruling. Since the above paragraph (2) states that, on the premise of the grounds exemplified in the subparagraphs, an action for revocation may be filed without undergoing a ruling, waiting for a ruling may be omitted, but that omission is only an omission after a request for adjudication has already been made. The second stage asks whether the ground for seeking such omission has been shown in the manner the law requires, and the prima facie proof demanded by paragraph (4) is precisely that part. Accordingly, not waiting for a ruling is a matter of skipping one segment of the procedure, whereas not filing for adjudication is a matter of not placing anything in front of that segment at all; therefore, the permission of the former cannot be transferred to the permission of the latter.
However, the strongest counterargument is that this distinction operates only to the advantage of the administrative agency. The worry that the prerequisite may be neutralized by a claim of urgency touches upon the loss that, the more prima facie proof is demanded, the more the applicant who is experiencing urgency is made to bear the burden of the complex prerequisite exceptions and time-limit provisions, and in the meantime the possibility of recovery vanishes. In a scene such as the position of Administrative Agency B, where it is disputed that the action came too late, the stricter the standard, the more the consequences of delay fall entirely upon the plaintiff. Since the statutory text enumerates urgent need as a separate ground while also demanding prima facie proof of that ground, speaking of urgency and showing urgency come apart. The burden identified by the counterargument remains heavy, but its weight does not operate in the direction of abolishing the prima facie proof requirement itself.
Contrasting only with the facts placed in this scene, Applicant A filed a request for adjudication first, so there is room for discussing the exception of bringing an action before the ruling—that is, a statutory ground permitting an action to be brought after a request for adjudication without a ruling. Yet this scene leaves undetermined the date on which the application was made, whether a ruling was rendered, how much time has passed if no ruling was rendered, and what serious harm is caused by the enforcement of the disposition or the continuation of the procedure. On the records, what must be examined is only that the categories have been set out—the prerequisite provision of the special act, the request for adjudication, service of the ruling, awareness of the disposition, urgency, and proof of the exception—and it does not mean that actual materials have been gathered. If the law applying the prerequisite or the service that starts the period cannot be confirmed, the determination remains undetermined.
What is permitted in this section is the narrow conclusion that, after a request for adjudication, where one of the grounds under Article 18 (2) applies and that ground is prima facie proved, an action for revocation may be filed without undergoing a ruling. What is not permitted is the extension of regarding the earlier request for adjudication itself as having become unnecessary on the sole basis that such a ground was prima facie proved; the judgment that the mere expression of urgency substitutes for prima facie proof; and the conclusion of omitting the proof of the ground, or of turning back solely upon complaints about another person's delay to treat the action as having been filed in due time. The question whether one may proceed directly to a lawsuit even under a mandatory prerequisite is answered only within this boundary. Are not waiting for a ruling and not filing for adjudication the same thing?