Summary
This chapter distinguishes exceptions that dispense with filing an administrative appeal altogether from exceptions that relieve the applicant of waiting after filing.
3.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
Even where two shortcuts look similar, the acts required to set out are different. Is not waiting for the adjudication decision the same as not filing for adjudication? The preceding section applies, together, the grounds for not waiting for the adjudication decision—such as delay of the decision or urgent necessity—and the demand to substantiate those grounds. Applicant A filed a request for adjudication first, and administrative agency B contends that the lawsuit was late. In this scene, the standard by which the entrance to this remedy opens must be set.
The statutory text that answers this question is found in Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act. Article 18 (3) provides, "(3) In the case of the proviso to paragraph (1), where any of the following grounds exists, an action for revocation may be filed without filing a request for administrative adjudication," and then enumerates four instances. Among them, subparagraph 1 is "where a decision dismissing an administrative adjudication has already been rendered with respect to a case of the same type"; subparagraph 2 is "where any one of dispositions related to one another in content or dispositions carried out step by step for the same purpose has already been subject to an administrative adjudication decision"; subparagraph 3 is "where the administrative agency, after the close of oral argument in the fact-finding hearing, alters the disposition that is the subject of the lawsuit and an action is filed with respect to such altered disposition"; and subparagraph 4 is "where the administrative agency that made the disposition erroneously informed that there was no need to undergo administrative adjudication" (Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act). The subject of this statutory text is the person who intends to file an action, and the act is filing an action for revocation without filing a request for administrative adjudication. The condition is limited to the case of falling within any one of the enumerated grounds.
These grounds correspond to the exceptions that omit the act of filing for adjudication itself—that is, the statutory instances in which one may litigate without a request for adjudication. Article 18 (4) provides, "(4) The grounds under paragraphs (2) and (3) shall be substantiated" (Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act). Accordingly, a person who invokes the above grounds must substantiate those grounds. The entrance to this remedy opens when the required relief, the parties, and the conditions are specified in the statement of claim, when the right underlying the chosen form of action can be defended, and when, applying the mandatory preliminary exhaustion requirement and its exceptions, the respective periods for adjudication and for litigation are observed in accordance with the facts from which they run. Here two stages of judgment must be distinguished. One is whether one need not wait for the adjudication decision; the other is whether one need not file for adjudication. That the former is accepted does not automatically establish the latter.
The counterargument that fine-grained classification may increase the mistakes of the parties is aimed at substantive loss. Because the exhaustion requirement and its exceptions, and the facts from which each period runs, must each be examined separately, a person contesting the agency's error is placed in a maze of procedure, and if the wrong starting point is chosen, the claim itself may be blocked at the threshold. This disadvantage must not be erased. Even so, exemption from waiting for the adjudication decision cannot be automatically extended into exemption from filing for adjudication itself. The two exceptions require different acts from each other, and Article 18 (3) separately enumerates the grounds on which one may litigate without filing for adjudication. Only when one of those enumerated grounds is confirmed is the filing for adjudication itself regarded as omitted.
Returning to the synthetic scene, Applicant A filed a request for adjudication first, and administrative agency B contends that the lawsuit was late. If A actually filed for adjudication, the omission of filing for adjudication itself, as provided in Article 18 (3), does not coincide with A's choice. B's contention that the suit was "late" remains a matter of the statutory period for filing suit and the facts from which it runs. Because the relevant statutory text in this section deals only with the enumerated grounds for omission and their substantiation, whether the period was observed cannot be determined from the materials of this section alone. Where the statute mandating preliminary exhaustion or the service from which the period runs cannot be confirmed, the judgment is left undetermined. For a lawful connection between administrative adjudication and an action for revocation to be established, where mandatory preliminary exhaustion was not undergone and there is no ground for exemption, or where the statutory period for filing suit has expired and no relevant exception applies, the passage is closed. Even if only a ground for exemption from waiting for the adjudication decision is confirmed, it cannot be regarded as meaning that filing for adjudication itself was unnecessary.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Where a case falls within a statutory instance in which one may litigate without filing for adjudication and that ground has been substantiated, the filing for adjudication itself may be omitted; and that omission is limited to the grounds enumerated in Article 18 (3). Conversely, to determine on the basis only of grounds for not waiting for the adjudication decision that one need not file for adjudication, or to confirm observance of the statutory period for filing suit from the materials of this section, are conclusions this section does not permit. The outcome of the scene—winning or losing, recovery, and on-the-ground effect—cannot be determined.
3.2The Conditions That Block Relief
In this scene, the question is whether the ground for not waiting for the adjudication decision and the ground for not filing for adjudication at all mean the same starting point, and further, what the conditions are under which the passage to relief is blocked. Both grounds lead to litigation without fully completing the preliminary procedure, but the quantity of acts required beforehand is not the same.
Article 18 (3) of the Administrative Litigation Act provides, "In the case of the proviso to paragraph (1), where any of the following grounds exists, an action for revocation may be filed without filing a request for administrative adjudication," and as such grounds it lists "where a decision dismissing an administrative adjudication has already been rendered with respect to a case of the same type," "where any one of dispositions related to one another in content or dispositions carried out step by step for the same purpose has already been subject to an administrative adjudication decision," "where the administrative agency, after the close of oral argument in the fact-finding hearing, alters the disposition that is the subject of the lawsuit and an action is filed with respect to such altered disposition," and "where the administrative agency that made the disposition erroneously informed that there was no need to undergo administrative adjudication" (Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act). The subject designated by this statutory text is the plaintiff contesting the disposition; the act is filing an action for revocation directly without a request for adjudication; and the condition is that a ground in any of the subparagraphs exists.
Read as written, the grounds in paragraph (3) are cases in which the starting act of the request for adjudication itself is omitted. By contrast, the grounds for not waiting for the adjudication decision, such as delay of the decision or urgent necessity, skip only the stage of waiting for the adjudication decision after a request for adjudication has been made, and thus are exceptions distinct from the subparagraphs of paragraph (3). The reason the two exceptions must be distinguished is that the acts they require differ, and in the author's view, following this distinction, exemption from waiting for the adjudication decision cannot be automatically extended into exemption from filing for adjudication itself. The conclusion of this section that the author draws from this distinction is that where mandatory preliminary exhaustion was not undergone and there is no ground for exemption, or where the statutory period for filing suit has expired and no relevant exception applies, if even one of the statutory requirements is not satisfied, the passage to relief is closed.
The disadvantage this distinction is aimed at concerns the burden that Applicant A would actually bear. Because the preliminary exhaustion exceptions and the running of each period are laid out separately, if a party selects the wrong ground for exemption, the action cannot be properly filed, and the statutory period for filing suit may even be missed. Where grounds such as the agency's erroneous information leading to omission of preliminary exhaustion, or one of the related dispositions having already been subject to an adjudication decision, are finely classified, the counterargument aimed here is that the greater the burden falls on the person contesting the defect of the agency that committed the error, the heavier the burden of choosing the proper statutory instance becomes. Even so, the author's answer does not shake. It must also be considered that paragraph (4) requires that "the grounds under paragraphs (2) and (3) shall be substantiated" (Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act), and the conclusion that exemption from waiting for the adjudication decision cannot be automatically extended into exemption from filing for adjudication itself is maintained. The adverse burden identified by the counterargument does not disappear, but that burden cannot serve as the ground for merging the two exceptions into one.
The facts confirmed in this scene are only that Applicant A filed a request for adjudication first and that administrative agency B contends the lawsuit was late. The fact that a request for adjudication was filed first touches on the point that there was a starting act to enable discussion of the ground for omitting the filing of adjudication itself under paragraph (3), and agency B's contention of lateness appears aimed at the running of the statutory period for filing suit or satisfaction of the relevant exception. Yet of the special statute's preliminary exhaustion provision, the request for adjudication, the service of the adjudication decision, notice of the disposition, urgency, and substantiation of the exception—all of which were designated to be placed on the record—none has been secured as an actually existing record, and the statute mandating preliminary exhaustion and the service from which the period runs have not been confirmed either. Therefore, which exception applies and whether the statutory period for filing suit was observed cannot be judged from this scene alone and remain undetermined. The conclusion is not extended to say that if only a ground for exemption from waiting for the adjudication decision is confirmed, filing for adjudication itself is also unnecessary.
The conclusion permitted in this section is narrow. Exemption from waiting for the adjudication decision and omission of the filing of adjudication itself are distinct; only when which of the two exceptions applies and the facts from which the respective periods run are confirmed does the passage to this remedy open, and if even one of the statutory requirements is not satisfied, that stage is closed. Conversely, to assert the outcome on the strength of unconfirmed facts, or to merge the two exceptions on the ground solely of the burden produced by fine-grained classification, are conclusions this section does not permit. Likewise, to read a state of insufficient materials immediately as unavailability of relief is not permitted.
3.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
From B's vantage point, to answer the defense that the lawsuit was late, one must first ask whether the two exemptions excuse the same starting point.
The statutory provision corresponding to this question enumerates the cases in which an action for revocation may be filed without filing a request for administrative adjudication. "(3) In the case of the proviso to paragraph (1), where there falls any of the following grounds, an action for revocation may be filed without filing a request for administrative adjudication. <Amended July 27, 1994>" Following this come a dismissal decision in a case of the same type, one of the related dispositions having already been subject to an adjudication decision, an altered disposition after the close of oral argument in the fact-finding hearing, and the administrative agency's erroneous guidance (Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act). The subject this statutory text addresses is the person who intends to skip a request for adjudication and file an action directly; the act is the omission of the filing of adjudication; and the condition is falling within one of the enumerated statutory instances.
Based on this statutory text, the adjudication-omission exception—that is, the statutory instance in which one may litigate without a request for adjudication—is not the same as the grounds for not waiting for the adjudication decision. The exception omitting the filing of adjudication itself and the exception dispensing with waiting after filing are distinct. The former is a passage that skips, for a statutory reason, the first act of entering the adjudication procedure; the latter is a passage that, having already made a request for adjudication, moves on to a lawsuit without waiting further for the adjudication decision to arrive. In B's organization of the matter, these two stages are separate, and thus the mere fact that a ground for exemption on one side has been confirmed does not make the starting act on the other side unnecessary as well.
What this fine-grained classification is aimed at is the mistakes of the parties and the losses caused by them. Because the preliminary exhaustion exceptions and the period provisions are divided, a person who chose the wrong item or failed to prepare substantiation may bear the procedural cost as it stands before the defense that the action was filed late. B's conclusion does not waver here either. Only, this distinction does not do away with the unfavorable aspect of shifting the burden onto the person contesting the administrative agency's error, and the relevant ground requires substantiation (Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act).
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only that A filed a request for adjudication first and that B contends the lawsuit was late. The point that A has already filed for adjudication indicates that the start relevant to the exception omitting the filing of adjudication itself has already been passed, so under B's criterion of distinction this becomes a judgment separate from whether the omission exception exists. Whether the lawsuit was late, by contrast, requires confirmation aligned with the facts from which the statutory period for filing suit runs, and the scene fixes neither the date from which the period runs nor the fact of service. In a state of insufficient materials where the statute mandating preliminary exhaustion or the service from which the period runs cannot be confirmed, matters on which the materials of judgment are not specified are left undetermined rather than declared impossible. Insufficient materials are not unavailability of relief.
The conclusion this section permits is the narrow distinction that the existence of grounds not to wait for adjudication is not extended to mean that one need not file for adjudication at all. The conclusions not permitted are the judgments that automatically extend—upon confirmation only of the ground for the omission exception—to filing for adjudication itself being unnecessary, and that widen—upon confirmation only of the ground for exemption from waiting for the adjudication decision—into the conclusion that filing for adjudication itself is likewise unnecessary. The boundary that cannot be fixed for lack of materials remains undetermined in this way, and that does not speak to the outcome of the defense of lateness against A's action, A having already completed the filing for adjudication itself.
3.4The Records Needed for Determination
The preceding section leaves the judgment undetermined where the statute mandating preliminary exhaustion or the service from which the period runs cannot be confirmed, and distinguished this from cases where relief is blocked. What must now be asked is what must remain in the record for that judgment to be set. In this dispute, not waiting for the adjudication decision and not filing for adjudication are not the same, and what records sustain that distinction is examined.
The relevant statutory text enumerates the cases in which one may litigate without undergoing adjudication. Article 18 (3) of the Administrative Litigation Act provides, "(3) In the case of the proviso to paragraph (1), where there falls any of the following grounds, an action for revocation may be filed without filing a request for administrative adjudication," and as grounds it lists a dismissal decision in a case of the same type, one of the related or sequential dispositions having already been subject to an adjudication decision, an action on the disposition altered after the close of oral argument, and the administrative agency's erroneous notice. The subject spoken of here is the person who, dissatisfied with a disposition, intends to file an action; the act is the filing of the request for administrative adjudication itself; and the condition is falling within any one of the enumerated grounds.
Article 18 (4) of the same Act requires that "(4) The grounds under paragraphs (2) and (3) shall be substantiated" (Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act). These two provisos are aimed at different stages within the same judgment. Paragraph (3) provides for the omission of the start—that one need not begin a request for adjudication—while paragraph (4) provides for the requirement of proof substantiating the ground for that omission. Hence the conclusion that the start may be skipped and the conclusion that its ground has been substantiated cannot be lumped together in a single sentence. This judgment takes as its basis the special statute's preliminary exhaustion provision, the request for adjudication, the service of the adjudication decision, notice of the disposition, urgency, and substantiation of the exception.
The counterargument that this fine-grained classification increases the mistakes of the parties is aimed at real inconvenience. It is the observation that complex preliminary exhaustion exceptions and periods shift the burden onto the person contesting the administrative agency's error. Nonetheless, exemption from waiting for the adjudication decision cannot be automatically extended into exemption from filing for adjudication itself. For the latter to be established, the grounds of paragraph (3) examined above and their substantiation must appear in the record, and the circumstance of there being no need to wait for the adjudication decision alone does not reach the conclusion that the filing itself was unnecessary.
What is confirmed in the synthetic scene is the fact that A filed a request for adjudication first and that B contends that the lawsuit was late. This scene, however, establishes only that there was a request for adjudication; it cannot judge whether the grounds of paragraph (3) apply or whether substantiation under paragraph (4) exists. Therefore, even if the necessary records are determined to be the special statute's preliminary exhaustion provision, the request for adjudication, the service of the adjudication decision, notice of the disposition, urgency, and substantiation of the exception, whether those records have actually been assembled cannot be confirmed from this scene alone. Where the statute mandating preliminary exhaustion or the service from which the period runs cannot be confirmed, the judgment is left undetermined, as in the preceding section, and this is distinguished from cases where relief is blocked.
Accordingly, the conclusion this section permits is limited to the scope that exemption from waiting for the adjudication decision and omission of the filing of adjudication itself constitute different stages of judgment, and that for that judgment to stand, records containing the enumerated grounds and their substantiation are required together. Conversely, the conclusions that the path to litigation is closed on the strength of the mere absence of these records, and that confirmation of a ground for exemption from waiting for the adjudication decision is extended into omission of the filing of adjudication itself, are not permitted by this section.
3.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
The question on which the two parties collide in this scene is whether the reasons for not awaiting the adjudication and the reasons for not filing a request for adjudication at all are the same thing. If two seemingly similar routes require different initiating acts, the propriety of the action turns on which route applies.
Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act provides in paragraph (3): "(3) In the case of the proviso to paragraph (1), where any one of the reasons in the following subparagraphs exists, an action for revocation may be filed without filing a request for administrative adjudication," and then sets out four cases. Among these are "1. Where, in a case of the same type, an administrative adjudication has already been rendered dismissing the request," "2. Where, among dispositions that are related to one another in content or that are carried out in stages for the same purpose, any one of them has already undergone an administrative adjudication," "3. Where, after the close of oral arguments in the fact-finding stage, the administrative agency alters the disposition that is the object of the suit and an action is filed with respect to the altered disposition," and "4. Where the administrative agency that made the disposition erroneously informed the party that there was no need to undergo administrative adjudication" (Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act). The actor and the act spoken of by the text are clear. Because an action for revocation is filed "without filing" an administrative adjudication, these exceptions fall within cases that do not require the initiating act of a request for adjudication itself. Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act adds in paragraph (4): "(4) The reasons under paragraphs (2) and (3) shall be substantiated" (Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act). In other words, the existence of an exceptional reason is not established by mere assertion and requires substantiation.
Connecting this text with the conclusion of this section reveals the reason for the distinction. The exception for omitting adjudication means the statutory cases in which one may litigate without a request for adjudication, and it is an exception at the starting stage that permits an action to be filed without passing through adjudication. By contrast, the reasons for not awaiting the adjudication are an exception at the stage after filing that permits moving on to litigation without waiting for the adjudication to issue, once the request for adjudication has already been made. The two stages require different acts. The former omits the request for adjudication from the outset; the latter skips the waiting once the request for adjudication has been completed.
Fine-grained classification may increase the mistakes of the parties. The criticism that the complex exhaustion exceptions and the periods shift burdens onto the person contesting the administrative agency's error is felt with particular weight in this scene, where the administrative agency contends that the action was filed late. The requirement that evidentiary materials for substantiation be prepared separately for each exception imposes on Applicant A the labor of gathering records. Because the two exceptions protect different starting conditions, confirmation of one cannot be taken to satisfy the requirements of the other as well. The disadvantage pointed out by the counterargument remains as it is, but it does not erase the distinction that the text prescribes.
The facts that can be confirmed in this scene are only that Applicant A first filed a request for adjudication and that administrative agency B contends that the action was filed late. Accordingly, whether any subparagraph of Article 18(3) applies, whether there was an exceptional reason to omit the request for adjudication, or whether the reason was one that merely dispenses with awaiting the adjudication cannot be determined from the scene alone. Because the law governing the exhaustion requirement or the service from which the period is computed cannot be confirmed, that reason remains undetermined. What is confirmed, however, is narrow. Even if a reason dispensing with the wait for the adjudication is confirmed, that does not lead to the dispensability of the filing of the request for adjudication itself. If the designated change is confirmed, the principle operates here of discarding the existing blocking and invalidity determinations and re-adjudicating from the stage itself.
The conclusion permitted by this section is clear. The reasons for not awaiting the adjudication and the reasons for not filing a request for adjudication are not the same thing, and confirmation of the former cannot be taken to satisfy the requirements of the latter as well. Conversely, if a statutory case in which one may litigate without a request for adjudication is confirmed, it is treated as a separately defined exception at the starting stage. Beyond a distinction of this kind, a dispensation with awaiting the adjudication cannot be automatically extended to a dispensation with the filing of the adjudication itself.
3.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
Whether the reasons for not awaiting the adjudication and the reasons for litigating immediately without filing a request for adjudication are the same thing is the question here. The concern that fine-grained classification may increase the mistakes of the parties bears equally on this scene.
The text corresponding to this question delimits the cases in which an action for revocation may be filed without filing a request for administrative adjudication. <Amended July 27, 1994.> (Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act). The four enumerated cases are an adjudication dismissing a request in a case of the same type, the adjudication of one among related dispositions, an action filed over an altered disposition after the close of oral arguments in the fact-finding stage, and the administrative agency's erroneous guidance. Of these, the first three cases deal with matters that have already passed through adjudication, and the fourth deals with a case in which the need for exhaustion was mistakenly heard.
The act pointed to by this text is filing an action without first making the request for adjudication itself. Accordingly, the standard the author sets here is simple. Reducing the duty to wait does not do away with the duty to initiate, and the grounds for removing each of the two duties are set out separately. This discussion goes no further than comparing the statutory cases of omission with the cases actually enumerated.
The counterargument that fine-grained classification may increase the mistakes of the parties aims at the loss that this distinction creates a dispute at every starting point. It is the criticism that, if even the reason that the administrative agency wrongly guided the need for exhaustion is treated differently stage by stage, only the parties bear the cost of delay for as long as the dispute is prolonged. Even without erasing this disadvantage, the answer is one. Reasons such as delay of the adjudication or urgent necessity, recognized in the preceding section, also require substantiation, and confirmation of such a reason does not give rise to any new statutory case under the subparagraphs of Article 18(3) (Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act).
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only that Applicant A first filed a request for adjudication and that administrative agency B contends that the action was filed late. Because A's request for adjudication came first, the omission of the filing of the request for adjudication itself, as provided in Article 18(3), appears to depart from the basic route of this scene, and the cause of the delay and the substantiation record are not stated in the scene. The items to be compared against the records are the exhaustion provision of the special Act, the request for adjudication, the service of the adjudication, awareness of the disposition, urgency, and the presence or absence of substantiation of the exception. Whether there was a reason falling under any subparagraph of paragraph (3), and whether the contention of administrative agency B concerns an alteration of the disposition after the close of oral arguments in the fact-finding stage, cannot be determined from the scene alone.
The conclusion permitted in this section remains within the bounds that whether Applicant A could file an action without filing a request for administrative adjudication depends on confirming each of the reasons in Article 18(3) and furnishing the substantiation under paragraph (4). What is not permitted is the extension that, once reasons for not awaiting the adjudication alone are confirmed, the filing of the request for adjudication itself also becomes unnecessary.
3.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The conclusion of the preceding section is that a dispensation with awaiting the adjudication cannot be automatically extended into a dispensation with the filing of the adjudication itself. Carrying that conclusion forward, what is now asked is whether not awaiting the adjudication and not filing a request for adjudication are the same thing. They resemble each other in that both are exceptions, but the acts that the respective exceptions omit or dispense with lie at different stages. Hence, if the two exceptions are treated as one lump, one loses sight of which stage's burden remains.
Article 18(3) of the Administrative Litigation Act provides: "(3) In the case of the proviso to paragraph (1), where any one of the reasons in the following subparagraphs exists, an action for revocation may be filed without filing a request for administrative adjudication," and as such reasons lists from "1. Where, in a case of the same type, an administrative adjudication has already been rendered dismissing the request" through "4. Where the administrative agency that made the disposition erroneously informed the party that there was no need to undergo administrative adjudication." The actor pointed to by this text is the party seeking to file an action, the act is the filing of a request for administrative adjudication, and the condition is falling under one of the reasons in the respective subparagraphs. Paragraph (4) provides: "(4) The reasons under paragraphs (2) and (3) shall be substantiated," thereby requiring substantiation of those reasons (the foregoing, Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act).
The thread that connects this text with the conclusion of this section lies in the point that the exceptions loosen different stages. The subparagraphs of paragraph (3) are reasons that permit litigation without filing a request for administrative adjudication. That is, they point to cases that skip the initiating act of a request for adjudication itself, and here the exception for omitting adjudication means the statutory cases in which one may litigate without a request for adjudication. By contrast, the dispensation with awaiting the adjudication is a matter of shortening only the time spent waiting for the adjudication to issue after the initiating act has already been performed. The two distinctions pose two separate stages of judgment. One is whether a request for adjudication is required at the starting point; the other is whether the wait after that request is required.
The point that fine-grained classification may increase the mistakes of the parties is the practical value of this distinction. In the position where administrative agency B contends that the action was filed late, if a party confirms only a reason dispensing with the wait for the adjudication and mistakenly concludes that the filing of the request for adjudication itself is also unnecessary, the party may miss a filing requirement and suffer a disadvantage. Paragraph (3) delimits to four the reasons permitting litigation without filing a request for administrative adjudication, and paragraph (4) requires substantiation of those reasons. Accordingly, the reasons for not awaiting the adjudication and the reasons for not filing a request for adjudication must each satisfy the conditions set by law, and confirmation of one does not bring the other along.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only that Applicant A first filed a request for adjudication and that administrative agency B contends that the action was filed late. Paragraph (3) addresses the case of litigating without filing a request for administrative adjudication, so the scene in which A has already completed the request for adjudication does not overlap with the picture directly targeted by its text. On this scene alone, it cannot be determined which of the four reasons in paragraph (3) is established in A's case, or which reason the delay contention of administrative agency B reaches. The items to serve as the records are set as the exhaustion provision of the special Act, the request for adjudication, the service of the adjudication, awareness of the disposition, urgency, and the substantiation of the exception, and the service and performance outcomes of the actual case are not fixed. If the law governing the exhaustion requirement or the service from which the period is computed cannot be confirmed, the determination remains undetermined.
What this section permits is only judging the two exceptions separately; it does not extend the matter so that, upon confirmation of a reason dispensing with the wait for the adjudication alone, the request for adjudication itself may also be omitted. Conversely, it is also not permitted to regard the mere fact of having first filed a request for adjudication as dispensing with awaiting the adjudication as well. Each exception must separately pass the list of reasons in paragraph (3) and the substantiation requirement of paragraph (4), and this section addresses only that distinction.
3.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Having applied together the reasons for not awaiting the adjudication, such as delay of the adjudication and urgent necessity, and the substantiation requirement for them, one must now consider, in the scene where Applicant A first filed a request for adjudication and administrative agency B contends that the action was filed late, how the choice to undergo adjudication first preserves the path to litigation. Are not awaiting the adjudication and not filing a request for adjudication the same thing?
Article 18(3) of the Administrative Litigation Act provides that "in the case of the proviso to paragraph (1), where any one of the reasons in the following subparagraphs exists, an action for revocation may be filed without filing a request for administrative adjudication," and as such reasons enumerates an adjudication dismissing a request in a case of the same type, one of related dispositions having undergone an adjudication, an action filed over an altered disposition after the close of oral arguments, and the administrative agency's erroneous guidance (Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act). Here the actor pointed to by the phrase "without filing" is the counterparty to the disposition, the act is the filing of the request for adjudication, and the conditions are falling under one of the reasons in the respective subparagraphs and substantiating it. Article 18(4) adds: "The reasons under paragraphs (2) and (3) shall be substantiated" (Article 18 of the Administrative Litigation Act).
On the basis of this text, the exception that omits the filing of the request for adjudication itself and the exception that dispenses with the duty to await the adjudication after filing must be distinguished. The exception for omitting adjudication means the statutory cases in which one may litigate without a request for adjudication, and if a case falls within it, the initiating act of the request for adjudication itself is not required. The exception dispensing with the wait points to the case of proceeding without awaiting the adjudication once the initiating act has already been completed; thus, even if the same words are used, the stage of the act presupposed is different.
The point that fine-grained classification may increase the mistakes of the parties is a telling observation of burden. This is because the types of exhaustion exceptions and the respective periods may amount to shifting procedural burdens onto the person contesting the administrative agency's error. Given that the statutory reasons and the substantiation requirements are prescribed stage by stage, bundling the two exceptions together and extending them would result in skipping the starting conditions set by the statutory text.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are that Applicant A first filed a request for adjudication and that administrative agency B contended that the action was filed late. Contrasted with the foregoing conditions, A is a person who has already completed the initiating act, so this scene does not stand at the stage of judging whether the exception for omitting adjudication applies. However, because the law governing the exhaustion requirement, the service from which the period is computed, and the time of filing are not set in the scene, neither which exception is established nor whether the periods were observed can be fixed on this scene alone.
What this section permits is the distinction between the exception omitting the filing of the request for adjudication itself and the exception dispensing with the wait after filing, together with the judgment that limits the exception for omitting adjudication to the statutory cases in which one may litigate without a request for adjudication. What is not permitted is the extension that, upon confirmation of reasons for not awaiting the adjudication alone, the filing of the request for adjudication itself becomes unnecessary; in the light of the text of the provision and the substantiation requirement, that extension is not supported. The substantiation requirement, applied by taking up the conclusion of the preceding section, remains as a prior condition across both exceptions.
3.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
재결을 기다리지 않는 것과 심판을 내지 않는 것은 같은가라는 물음에 이어서, 이번에는 해당 원문 문언이 행정심판과 취소소송의 적법한 연결을 판정하는 데 어떻게 적용되는지를 살핀다. 이 물음은 신청인 A가 심판을 먼저 청구했고 행정청 B가 소송이 늦었다고 다투고 있는 장면을 배경으로 한다. 다만 심판을 먼저 청구한 경우와 심판을 청구하지 않은 경우는 출발점이 서로 다르다.
이 물음에 해당하는 원문은 행정소송법 제18조의 두 항이다. 제18조 제3항은 “③제1항 단서의 경우에 다음 각호의 1에 해당하는 사유가 있는 때에는 행정심판을 제기함이 없이 취소소송을 제기할 수 있다.”고 정하고, 이어서 동종사건의 기각재결, 관련 처분 중 하나의 재결, 변경된 처분에 대한 소, 행정청의 잘못된 안내의 네 경우를 예로 든다(행정소송법 제18조). 여기서 “행정심판을 제기함이 없이”란 심판을 거치는 단계 자체를 넘길 수 있다는 뜻이고, 네 경우는 그 넘어갈 수 있는 법정 경우에 해당한다.
이 문언은 앞에서 정의한 심판 생략 예외, 즉 심판청구 없이 소송할 수 있는 법정 경우에 그대로 들어맞는다. 각호의 네 경우는 모두 심판청구를 처음부터 하지 않아도 소송을 제기할 수 있게 하는 사유이고, 심판을 청구한 뒤 재결을 기다리지 않아도 되는 경우와는 그 출발에 필요한 행위가 다르다. 아울러 제18조 제4항은 “④제2항 및 제3항의 규정에 의한 사유는 이를 소명하여야 한다.”고 정하므로(행정소송법 제18조), 제3항의 사유로 소송을 제기하려는 자는 그 사유를 소명하여야 한다.
세밀한 분류가 당사자의 실수를 늘릴 수 있다는 불만은 실질적이다. 전치 예외의 경우가 나뉘고 각 경우에 소명이 붙으면, 행정청이 잘못 안내한 때 등 제3항 각호의 사유가 있는 사람조차 어느 사유에 해당하는지, 어떤 자료로 소명할지를 헷갈릴 수 있고 그 사이 제소기간은 흘러갈 수 있다. 재결 대기 면제는 이미 제기한 심판의 재결을 기다리지 않을 사유를 다루지만, 제3항의 심판 생략 예외는 애초에 심판청구를 하지 않고 소송할 수 있는 법정 경우를 다룬다. 두 예외의 문언상 근거가 다르므로, 한쪽 사유의 확인만으로 다른 쪽의 요건을 갖춘 것이 되지는 않는다.
합성 장면에서는 신청인 A가 심판을 먼저 청구한 사실이 확인된다. 이 사실만으로는 제3항 각호의 어느 사유에 해당하는지, 즉 동종사건의 기각재결이나 관련 처분의 재결 등이 있는지 확정되지 않으므로, 제3항에 따른 심판 생략의 성립 여부는 이 장면으로 판정할 수 없다. 행정청 B는 소송이 늦었다고 다투지만, 특별법 전치 규정, 심판청구, 재결 송달, 처분 인지, 긴급성과 예외 소명의 기록은 정해진 종류일 뿐 수집된 바 없어 기산일과 제소기간의 지남 여부도 미확정이다. 따라서 전치 적용 법률이나 기산 송달을 확인할 수 없어 그 판단은 보류되고, 확인된 문언에 따른 구별과 소명 요건의 적용만이 성립한다.
이 절의 결론은 해당 원문 문언만 행정심판과 취소소송의 적법한 연결의 판정 근거로 삼고, 판결이유로 확장하지 않는 것이다. 반대로 심판청구를 생략한 경우에도 제3항의 법정 사유와 제4항의 소명 요건을 함께 충족하여야 하고, 소명이 없다는 사실만으로 사유의 존재 자체가 부정되는 것도 아니다.
3.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
재결 지연·긴급 필요 등 재결을 기다리지 않을 사유와 그 소명 요구를 함께 적용하는 조건에서, 행정심판과 취소소송의 적법한 연결 안에서 다시 나누어 판정할 부분은 무엇인가?
이 물음에 해당하는 법문은 행정소송법 제18조 제3항이다. “③제1항 단서의 경우에 다음 각호의 1에 해당하는 사유가 있는 때에는 행정심판을 제기함이 없이 취소소송을 제기할 수 있다.”라고 정하고, 네 가지 경우를 덧붙인다. 각각은 동종사건에 관하여 이미 행정심판의 기각재결이 있은 때, 서로 내용상 관련되는 처분 또는 같은 목적을 위하여 단계적으로 진행되는 처분중 어느 하나가 이미 행정심판의 재결을 거친 때, 행정청이 사실심의 변론종결후 소송의 대상인 처분을 변경하여 당해 변경된 처분에 관하여 소를 제기하는 때, 처분을 행한 행정청이 행정심판을 거칠 필요가 없다고 잘못 알린 때이다. 여기서 주체는 소를 제기하는 당사자이고, 행위는 심판청구 없이 취소소송을 내는 것이며, 조건은 위 각 호의 사유 중 하나가 실제로 존재하는 것이다.
이 문언의 구조를 보면, 심판을 먼저 내는 출발 행위 자체를 건너뛰는 경우가 따로 정해져 있음을 알 수 있다. 행정소송법 제18조 제4항은 "④제2항 및 제3항의 규정에 의한 사유는 이를 소명하여야 한다."라고 하여, 제3항의 사유를 주장하는 쪽에 그 사유를 소명할 책임을 둔다. 이에 따라 심판 생략 예외는 심판청구 없이 소송할 수 있는 법정 경우를 뜻하고, 심판 제기 자체를 생략하는 예외와 제기 후 재결 대기를 면하는 예외는 서로 다른 단계에 붙는다. 소명 요구는 전자에 붙은 조건으로서, 후자의 대기 면제와 같은 것으로 처리할 수 없다. 단계 안의 세부 구분은 작동하는 경우·막히는 경우·미확정인 경우의 조건에 한정하며, 여기에 새로운 단계를 만들어 넣지 않는다.
복잡한 전치 예외와 기간이 행정청의 잘못을 다투는 사람에게 부담을 떠넘긴다는 비판은, 심판청구를 먼저 내고 재결을 기다리던 신청인 A가 정작 소송 단계에서 예외의 요건과 소명 형식을 따져야 하는 불편을 겨냥한다. 제18조 제3항이 요구하는 것은 심판을 제기함이 없이 소송할 수 있는 사유의 존재이고, 그러한 사유가 확인되지 않은 때에는 출발 행위를 생략할 근거가 문언상 없다. 반론이 지적하는 부담을 줄이는 일은 이 절이 정한 조건의 범위 밖에서 해결할 몫이다.
이 장면에서 신청인 A는 심판을 먼저 청구했다. 그러면 제3항의 생략 예외는 이미 출발 행위를 마친 사정과 어긋나 붙들 수 없다. 행정청 B는 소송이 늦었다고 다투는데, 이는 제소기간이 지났는지와 같은 별도의 기간 판단을 부르므로 여기서 확정할 수 없다. 전치 적용 법률이나 기산 송달을 확인할 수 없는 경우에는 판정을 미확정으로 남긴다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 심판을 내지 않고 곧장 소송할 수 있는지의 물음에는, 제3항의 네 사유 중 하나가 실제로 존재하고 그 사유가 소명되는 경우에만 예외가 작동한다고 답할 수 있다. 그 바깥에서는 심판 제기 자체를 생략했다는 사정만으로 적법한 연결이 이어졌다고 말할 수 없다. 앞 문단이 지적한 대로 기간과 소명의 부담은 남고, 미확정 항목은 미확정으로 남는다.
3.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
재결 지연·긴급 필요 등 재결을 기다리지 않을 사유와 그 소명 요구를 함께 적용하는 전제 위에서, 이번에는 심판 제기 자체를 생략할 수 있는 문제를 따로 놓고 살핀다. 이 장면에서 먼저 A는 제출 행위가 소송의 적법성과 어떤 관계에 있는지를 묻는다. 이 물음은 재결을 기다리지 않는 것과 심판을 내지 않는 것이 같은지를 가르는 기준이 된다.
심판 생략 예외를 규정한 문언은 이렇게 정해져 있다. 행정소송법 제18조 제3항은 "제1항 단서의 경우에 다음 각호의 1에 해당하는 사유가 있는 때에는 행정심판을 제기함이 없이 취소소송을 제기할 수 있다"고 하면서 네 가지 경우를 들고 있다(행정소송법 제18조). 이 문언에서 "행정심판을 제기함이 없이"는 행정심판의 제기 행위 자체를 요구하지 않는다는 뜻이고, 그 대상이 되는 주체는 취소소송을 제기하려는 원고이며, 적용 조건은 열거된 사유 중 하나에 해당하는 때이다. 같은 조 제4항은 "제2항 및 제3항의 규정에 의한 사유는 이를 소명하여야 한다"고 정하여, 사유의 존재를 소명하는 요구를 함께 둔다(행정소송법 제18조).
이 문언은 심판을 제기한 뒤 재결을 기다리는 단계와 심판을 제기하기 전 단계를 구분한다. 앞 절에서 다룬 재결 대기 면제는 제기한 심판에 대한 재결을 기다리지 않을 사유를 가리키지만, 여기서의 심판 생략 예외는 심판청구 없이 소송할 수 있는 법정 경우로, 출발에 필요한 행위 자체를 생략하는 경우를 뜻한다. 따라서 두 면제는 각각 다른 요소를 요구한다. 열리는 조건은 필요적 전치 여부와 예외를 적용하고 심판·소송의 각 기간을 해당 기산사실에 맞춰 지킨 경우이고, 막히는 조건은 필요적 전치를 거치지 않았고 면제 사유도 없거나 제소기간이 지나 해당 예외도 없는 경우이다. 미확정은 전치 적용 법률이나 기산 송달을 확인할 수 없는 경우로 남는다. 이 구별을 지키는 것은 사유의 소명 요구를 각 단계에 정확히 배치하기 위해서이다.
두 종류의 면제를 따로 읽어야 한다는 지적은, 재결 지연이나 긴급 필요 같은 사유를 준비하던 사람이 그 사유가 심판 제기 자체까지 불필요하게 만들 것으로 믿고 소송만 제기하는 불편을 낳는다는 데 겨눈다. 행정청 B가 소송이 늦었다고 다투는 장면에서는 이 불편이 절차의 출발 시점을 놓치는 손실로 돌아온다. 문언이 두 단계를 다른 문구로 나누어 두었고, 제4항이 사유의 소명을 요구하는 이상 그 사유를 어느 단계에 적용할지는 문언이 정한 범위에서 확인해야 한다. 반론이 가리키는 불편을 완전히 없애지는 못한다.
합성 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 신청인 A가 심판을 먼저 청구했다는 것과 행정청 B가 소송이 늿다고 다투는 것뿐이다. 이 사실과 앞의 조건을 대조하면, 신청인 A는 이미 심판을 제기한 사람이므로 심판 생략 예외가 문제되는 단계에 서 있지 않고, 대신 심판 기한과 소송 제기 시점이 각각의 기산사실에 맞게 지켜졌는지가 남는다. 그 기산사실에 대한 송달 여부, 필요적 전치를 정한 법률이 무엇인지, 긴급성과 예외의 소명이 있는지는 이 장면에서 확정되지 않는다. 따라서 실효로 판정할 수 있는 것은 조건을 모두 갖춘 경우에 한정되고, 차단은 전치를 거치지 않았고 면제 사유도 없거나 제소기간이 지나 해당 예외도 없는 경우에 해당하며, 나머지 확인할 수 없는 항목은 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 심판 제기 자체를 생략하는 예외와 제기 후 대기를 면하는 예외를 나누어 판단하고, 각 기간을 그 기산사실에 맞춰 지킨 경우에만 적법한 연결이 열린다는 것이다. 반대로 두 면제를 같은 것으로 보고 하나의 사유로 확대하는 결론은 허용하지 않는다. 다만 합성 장면만으로는 어떤 법률이 전치를 요구하는지, 어떤 송달이 기산점인지가 확인되지 않으므로 그 항목에 대해서는 미확정을 표시한다.
3.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
앞서 재결을 기다리지 않을 사유와 그 소명 요구를 함께 적용하기로 한 뒤, 이제는 재결을 기다리지 않는 것과 심판을 내지 않는 것이 같은지를 묻는다. 이 장면에서 당사자의 실수를 줄이기 위한 세밀한 분류가 오히려 혼란을 키운다면, 굳이 두 단계를 나눌 이유가 있는지 의문이 남는다. 그 의문에 답하려면 법문이 어느 시점의 어떤 행위를 면제하는지부터 살펴야 한다.
그 구별의 근거는 행정심판을 제기함이 없이 소송할 수 있는 경우를 열거한 조문에 있다. 행정소송법 제18조는 “③제1항 단서의 경우에 다음 각호의 1에 해당하는 사유가 있는 때에는 행정심판을 제기함이 없이 취소소송을 제기할 수 있다.”고 정하고, 네 가지 사유를 든다. 여기서 “제기함이 없이 취소소송을 제기할 수 있다”는 문언이 가리키는 행위는 심판청구라는 출발 행위이며, 주체는 그 사유에 해당하는 원고이고, 조건은 각호의 사유 가운데 하나가 갖추어진 때이다. 이 조문은 소송을 낸 뒤 행정심판의 재결을 기다려야 하는지까지 함께 다루지는 않는다.
따라서 심판 제기 자체를 생략하는 예외와, 심판을 제기한 뒤 재결을 기다리는 의무만을 면하는 예외는 서로 다른 판단 단계에 속한다. 앞 단계는 심판청구라는 첫 행위가 요건인지, 아니면 생략이 허용되는 법정 경우인지 가리고, 뒤 단계는 심판을 제기한 사람이 재결 전에 소로 나아갈 수 있는지 가린다. 이 물음의 이 절의 결론은 두 단계를 자동으로 연결할 수 없다는 것이다. 앞 단계의 면제가 뒤 단계의 면제까지 끌고 가거나, 뒤 단계의 면제가 앞 단계의 생략까지 허용한다고 읽을 수 없으며, 그에 따라 소송의 적법 여부도 각자의 요건에 따라 판단된다. 같은 출처가 정하는 소명 요구도 나뉘어 있다. 행정소송법 제18조는 “④제2항 및 제3항의 규정에 의한 사유는 이를 소명하여야 한다.”고 정하는데, 이는 예외 사유를 주장하는 쪽이 그 사유를 밝혀야 한다는 요구일 뿐, 두 예외를 하나로 합쳐 준다는 뜻은 아니다.
그럼에도 세밀한 분류가 당사자의 실수를 늘린다는 반론은 가볍게 넘길 수 없다. 신청인 A는 재결을 기다릴 필요가 없다고 보고 서둘렀는데, 막상 법정 사유에 해당하지 않거나 소명이 모자라면 그 허점은 그대로 소송의 하자가 된다. 행정청 B는 그런 혼선을 틈타 심판을 거치지 않은 채 나온 소를 늦은 것과 함께 문제 삼을 수 있다. 면제 사유의 경계가 모호하면 모호할수록 당사자는 더 자주 잘못된 출발점을 고르게 되고, 그 실수의 대가는 그대로 법적 불이익으로 돌아간다. 두 면제를 구분하지 않으면 오히려 심판을 건너뛴 채 낸 소까지 덩달아 허용해 주는 결과가 되고, 필요적 전치라는 출발 요건 자체가 무너지므로, 반론이 지적하는 불편은 인정하되 결론의 범위는 넓히지 않는 쪽으로 남긴다.
합성 장면에 정해진 사실만 놓고 보면, 신청인 A는 심판을 먼저 청구한 사람이고 행정청 B는 소송이 늦었다고 다투는 쪽이다. 확인할 것은 A가 심판 제기 자체를 생략할 법정 사유를 주장하는지, 아니면 이미 심판을 청구한 뒤 재결을 기다리지 않고 소로 나아간 것인지이다. 전자라면 행정소송법 제18조 제3항의 각호 가운데 어느 사유에 해당하는지와 그 소명이 따라야 하고, 후자라면 제기 자체는 이미 이루어졌으므로 별도의 대기 면제 사유가 문제된다. 나아가 전치를 요구하는 법률이 무엇인지, 송달로 기산할 시점이 언제인지 확인할 수 없어, 소송이 늦었는지까지는 이 장면만으로 판단할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 심판 제기 자체를 생략하는 예외와 제기 후 대기를 면하는 예외를 각각의 출발 행위에 맞추어 구별하는 것이며, 허용하지 않는 것은 재결 대기 면제 사유만으로 심판 제기 자체도 불필요하다고 넓혀 읽는 것이다. 확인된 사유가 하나라도 있고 그 소명이 갖추어졌다면 그 범위 안에서 예외가 성립하나, 미확인 항목은 미확정으로 남고 곧바로 구제 불능이 되지는 않는다. 심판 기한을 지켰으면 소송도 적시에 제기한 것인가?