Summary
Rulings are divided into dismissal as unlawful, rejection as groundless, and upholding by type of relief, in order to determine the subsequent issues.
5.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
The case that stopped at the entrance and the case whose merits were not accepted are not the same defeat. What does it mean to say that one lost at the adjudication stage? As confirmed earlier, the period for filing a request for adjudication and the filing period for an action for revocation are separate rules, and the conditions for commencement upon service of the adjudication decision must be compared; yet the fact that this comparison is complete does not immediately open the entrance to the lawsuit. The question to be examined now is what the standard is by which the channel of this relief opens.
Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act divides the adjudication decisions of the Committee according to their grounds. "① Where a request for adjudication is not lawful, the Committee shall render a dismissal on procedural grounds of the request. ② Where the Committee finds that a request for adjudication is without grounds, it shall render a dismissal (rejection on merits) of the request." Here, the subject of a dismissal on procedural grounds is the Committee, the object of determination is the lawfulness of the request for adjudication, and the object of determination for a dismissal (rejection on merits) is the merits of the request for adjudication. The two provisions place the point of decision in different positions.
The distinction in the above provision becomes the foundation of fixed conclusions as it stands. That is, the unlawful dismissal on procedural grounds, the dismissal for lack of grounds, and the decision granting the claim according to the content of relief are separated in order to determine the issues that follow. The lawfulness and the merits, which are the points at which a dismissal on procedural grounds and a dismissal (rejection on merits) diverge, are different stages of determination. The entrance to this relief opens where the requirement of mandatory prior exhaustion and its exceptions are applied and the respective periods for adjudication and lawsuit are observed in accordance with the corresponding facts of commencement.
Despite that distinction, there remains the unfavorable reality that the burden of each stage is shifted onto the person contesting the error of the administrative agency. The reality that the outcome is unfavorable may be the same. A person who, having gone through an appeal petition and obtained an adjudication decision, must again prove the entrance requirements in the lawsuit pays the same time and cost twice. Even so, a dismissal on procedural grounds cannot be transformed into a definitive determination that no substantive right exists. A dismissal on procedural grounds is only a determination that the channel of this relief is closed, and is not a definitive determination that the requested benefit does not exist.
In the synthetic scene, Applicant A first filed a request for adjudication, and Administrative Agency B contends that the lawsuit was filed late. What can be confirmed in this scene is only the relationship of mandatory prior exhaustion and the dispute between the two periods as to lateness. As the statute governing mandatory prior exhaustion or the service that starts the period cannot be confirmed, whether the lawsuit was filed late remains undetermined. Where only the grounds for exemption from awaiting an adjudication decision are confirmed, this does not extend to the conclusion that filing the request for adjudication was itself unnecessary.
Accordingly, the conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. It is permitted to identify the point at which dismissal on procedural grounds, dismissal (rejection on merits), and granting diverge and, on the basis of that distinction, to regard the channel of this relief as open only where the conditions of mandatory prior exhaustion and the periods are met and the action chosen by a specified claim and prayer for relief can be defended. Conversely, it is not permitted to read a dismissal on procedural grounds as a definitive determination on the merits, or to regard the subject matter of the lawsuit as thereby fixed by this decision.
5.2The Conditions That Block Relief
In this scene, the dispute between A and B concerns the interval between the point in time at which the adjudication stage was passed and the point in time at which the lawsuit was filed. Therefore, what it means to say that one lost at the adjudication stage and what the conditions are under which the channel of relief is blocked must be examined together. The separateness of the period for filing a request for adjudication and the filing period for an action for revocation, confirmed in the preceding stage, is taken here only as a premise.
Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act sets out the classification of adjudication decisions in three branches. Paragraph (1) provides that where a request for adjudication is not lawful, a dismissal on procedural grounds is rendered; paragraph (2) provides that where it is found to have no grounds, a dismissal (rejection on merits) is rendered; and paragraph (3) provides that where the claim in a revocation adjudication is found to have grounds, an order to revoke or alter the disposition is issued (Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act). Here, the Committee is the subject that examines the lawfulness of the request for adjudication, the merits, and the content of the relief in that order. A dismissal on procedural grounds is the conclusion where the claim has not met its requirements, and a dismissal (rejection on merits) is the conclusion where the requirements have been met but the claim fails on the merits. This distinction marks the procedural position, irrespective of whether the disposition itself is right or wrong.
This wording connects directly to the fixed conclusion of this section. Where mandatory prior exhaustion was not undergone and no ground of exemption exists, or where the filing period has expired and no corresponding exception applies, if even one of the statutory requirements is unmet, the procedure ends with a dismissal on procedural grounds. The reason for distinguishing a dismissal on procedural grounds from a dismissal (rejection on merits) is that the former is a state of having stopped before the door of adjudication, while the latter is a state of having entered the door and not having the claim accepted on the merits. If the former is conflated as a kind of the latter, a defect in the requirements of the claim and an adverse outcome on the merits come to bear the same meaning. Only by separating the two stages in this way is it determined, in the lawsuit that follows, what has been definitively settled.
The strongest counterargument targets the point that the reality that the outcome is unfavorable may be the same. It is the criticism that the complex prior-exhaustion exceptions and periods shift the burden onto the person contesting the error of the administrative agency. In fact, a claimant who has received a decision of dismissal on procedural grounds has obtained no relief by any route, and the weight of that loss may not differ greatly from the case of a dismissal (rejection on merits). Even so, a dismissal on procedural grounds cannot be transformed into a definitive determination that no substantive right exists. A dismissal on procedural grounds is only a procedural conclusion for lack of requirements and is not a determination on the unlawfulness of the disposition or on the existence of the claimant's rights; the distinction must be maintained even though that disadvantage is not reduced.
Returning to the synthetic scene, whether A first filed a request for adjudication and whether the lawsuit was in fact filed late are matters to be confirmed from the records. Where the statute governing mandatory prior exhaustion or the service that starts the period cannot be confirmed, the conclusion of this section remains undetermined. If the confirmed records support an exception to mandatory prior exhaustion or an exception to the filing period, the channel of relief opens; but the fact that this has not been confirmed cannot at once be taken as a definitive judgment that relief is impossible. This section distinguishes the opening and the closing of the channel according to whether the conditions are met, and does not extend the determination by facts outside the scene.
The conclusion permitted by this section is that the conditions under which the channel of relief closes lie in a defect of the statutory requirements, and it does not permit reading a dismissal on procedural grounds as a definitive determination that no substantive right exists. Where the necessary prior-exhaustion procedure was not undergone and no ground of exemption exists, or where the filing period was exceeded and no corresponding exception applies, if any one of these fails to satisfy a statutory requirement, the adjudication stage is blocked. The distinction among a dismissal on procedural grounds, a dismissal (rejection on merits), and a granting is only the starting point for determining the issues that follow and does not by itself fix the substance of the disposition.
5.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
On the premise that the period for filing a request for adjudication and the filing period for an action for revocation are separate rules and that the conditions for commencement upon service of the adjudication decision must be compared, the question is where to place the boundary that cannot be determined for want of materials.
In establishing the classification of adjudication decisions, Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act provided that "① Where a request for adjudication is not lawful, the Committee shall render a dismissal on procedural grounds of the request," and that "② Where the Committee finds that a request for adjudication is without grounds, it shall render a dismissal (rejection on merits) of the request." Here the subject is the Committee, the act is the adjudication decision, and the conditions are divided into the lawfulness of the claim and the presence or absence of grounds on the merits. A dismissal on procedural grounds is the conclusion for a claim that is not lawful, and a dismissal (rejection on merits) is the conclusion reached after a lawful claim is found to be without grounds.
This distinction is necessary because the two stages of determination answer different questions. The determination of lawfulness concerns whether the request for adjudication can be dealt with on the merits, and the determination of grounds on the merits concerns whether that claim is established. Where, in the absence of materials, the statute governing mandatory prior exhaustion or the service that starts the period cannot be confirmed, the materials for determining which stage's conditions have been met are not specified. At that point the author does not pronounce the matter impossible, but leaves it undetermined. If this is treated as equivalent to a dismissal on procedural grounds, the absence of materials to determine and the unlawfulness of the claim itself become mingled together.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the burden of reality. In that the reality that the outcome is unfavorable may be the same, the complex prior-exhaustion exceptions and periods shift the burden onto the person contesting the error of the administrative agency. In the scene where Applicant A first filed a request for adjudication and Administrative Agency B contends that the lawsuit was filed late, what materials A failed to obtain is not fixed by the record. Even though the unfavorable outcome can be pronounced, the meaning of that conclusion does not change.
Comparing this scene with the foregoing conditions, what is confirmed is only the fact that A first filed a request for adjudication and that B contends the lawsuit was filed late. The statute governing mandatory prior exhaustion, the fact of commencement upon service of the adjudication decision, and the respective facts of commencement for the filing period are not specified by the materials. Accordingly, this matter remains undetermined, and one cannot proceed to a determination that the necessary prior exhaustion was not undergone or that the filing period has expired. If, merely because the materials that cannot be determined are unknown, one inclines as it stands toward the non-existence of a right, one thereby converts an unverified item into an adverse definitive finding.
Accordingly, the conclusion permitted by this section is that a matter for which the materials of determination are not specified, because the statute governing mandatory prior exhaustion or the service that starts the period cannot be confirmed, is left undetermined, distinct from impossibility. The conclusion not permitted is to read a dismissal on procedural grounds as a definitive determination that no substantive right exists, or to pronounce, on the sole ground that materials are lacking, that the prior-exhaustion requirements and the period requirements were not met.
5.4The Records Needed for Determination
At present, in the scene where Applicant A first filed a request for adjudication and Administrative Agency B contends that the lawsuit was filed late, the question is what records are necessary in order to identify the stage indicated by the statement that one lost at the adjudication stage.
The relevant wording is the classification of adjudication decisions prescribed by Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act. Where a request for adjudication is not lawful, the Committee renders a dismissal on procedural grounds of the request, and where the Committee finds that the request for adjudication is without grounds, it renders a dismissal (rejection on merits) of the request. These two paragraphs respectively indicate different subjects, acts, and conditions, namely the determination of lawfulness and the determination of grounds on the merits. A dismissal on procedural grounds is the conclusion where the act of claim constituted by the request for adjudication has not met the requirements of lawfulness, and a dismissal (rejection on merits) is the conclusion where a lawful claim has failed to obtain grounds on the merits. The distinction in the wording itself becomes the standard pointing the direction of the subsequent procedure.
This distinction becomes the starting point of the stage determination. The stage determination is made solely on the materials recorded as to the special-act prior-exhaustion provision, the request for adjudication, service of the adjudication decision, awareness of the disposition, urgency, and proof of exceptions, and missing records are not filled in by presumption. The point at which a dismissal on procedural grounds and a dismissal (rejection on merits) diverge is not the existence of the right on the merits but whether the claim is lawful; if the two conclusions are merged as one, it cannot be known where the prior-exhaustion procedure stopped. The author's conclusion is to specify that point with the materials remaining in the record and to leave unverified items undetermined.
Even so, the reality that the outcome is unfavorable may be the same. The counterargument that the complex prior-exhaustion exceptions and periods shift the burden onto the person contesting the error of the administrative agency is aimed, in the end, at the practical loss of the claimant stopped by a dismissal on procedural grounds, for whom the right has been closed. Even without denying that disadvantage, a dismissal on procedural grounds cannot be transformed into a definitive determination that no substantive right exists. In a case dismissed without prejudice because the request for adjudication was not lawful, the presence or absence of grounds on the merits has not been determined; if that dismissal on procedural grounds is read as a definitive determination that there is no right, a determination not contained in the record is added.
The fact confirmed in this scene is only that Applicant A first filed a request for adjudication and that Administrative Agency B contends the lawsuit was filed late. On that fact alone it is not determined which statute requires prior exhaustion, when the adjudication decision was served, when the disposition was learned of, or how urgency and exceptions were proved. The foregoing conditions to be compared with this are the list of necessary records, and whether the actual records have been collected is not settled. Accordingly, if it is difficult to specify a particular stage from this scene, that portion remains undetermined, and it is not extended to the conclusion that, once grounds for exemption from awaiting an adjudication decision are confirmed, filing the request for adjudication was itself unnecessary.
The conclusion permitted in this section goes no further than this: decisions of dismissal on procedural grounds, dismissal (rejection on merits), and granting the claim are read as distinctions according to lawfulness, grounds on the merits, and content of relief, and the stage determination is bound by the recorded materials. Converting that dismissal on procedural grounds into a definitive determination of the non-existence of a right, or inventing commencement dates and results not in the record, is not permitted.
5.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
This question opens in the limited form of what change at this place would overturn the existing stage determination.
The original text corresponding to this question is Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act. Its wording provides that where a request for adjudication is not lawful, the Committee renders a dismissal on procedural grounds of the request, and that where the Committee finds the request for adjudication to be without grounds, it renders a dismissal (rejection on merits) of the request. Here the subject is the Committee, the act is the classification of adjudication decisions, the condition for a dismissal on procedural grounds is the unlawfulness of the request for adjudication, and the condition for a dismissal (rejection on merits) is the absence of grounds for the claim.
The same provision separately distinguishes, according to the content of relief, decisions granting the claim in revocation adjudications, in adjudications confirming nullity and the like, and in adjudications ordering performance of an obligation. The reason this distinction is important is that the former deals with the question of the procedural entrance, while the latter deals with the question on the merits and the content of the relief. If these two stages of determination are mixed, a case dismissed without prejudice is mistakenly carried over and read as a case in which the absence of a right has been confirmed. Accordingly, the type of adjudication decision is read only as a classification of conclusions according to lawfulness, grounds on the merits, and content of relief.
This does not, however, alter the reality that the outcome is unfavorable. The strongest counterargument to this section is aimed at the point that the complex prior-exhaustion exceptions and periods shift the burden onto the person contesting the error of the administrative agency. Administrative Agency B contends that the lawsuit was filed late, but that disadvantage does not mean that Applicant A's claim is substantively wrong.
The facts confirmed in this synthetic scene are only that Applicant A first filed a request for adjudication and that Administrative Agency B contends the lawsuit was filed late. Whether it is a dismissal on procedural grounds, a dismissal (rejection on merits), or a granting, when the adjudication decision was served, and when the disposition was learned of are not settled by this scene. Accordingly, if the specified change is confirmed, the existing determinations of bar and effectiveness are discarded and the determination is redone from the stage itself; but if the statute governing mandatory prior exhaustion or the service that starts the period cannot be confirmed, this determination remains undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is only the limited distinction of reading the type of adjudication decision divided into lawfulness, grounds on the merits, and content of relief. A determination that mixes decisions of dismissal on procedural grounds, dismissal (rejection on merits), and granting the claim is not permitted.
5.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
Within this scene, A may be certain of the reality that the conclusion of the adjudication was unfavorable to him. Yet if one passes on to the issues without settling what kind of disadvantage it is, both the later determination of time limits and the determination of the object of the lawsuit will be shaken. Thus, even though the reality that the result was unfavorable may be the same, the question is whether a dismissal on procedural grounds can be converted into a confirmation of the nonexistence of substantive rights.
Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act sets out the Committee's decisions by the type of conclusion. Its text provides: "Article 43 (Classification of Decisions) (1) Where a request for adjudication is not lawful, the Committee shall render a dismissal on procedural grounds for that request for adjudication. (2) Where the Committee finds a request for adjudication to be without merit, it shall render a dismissal (rejection on merits) for that request for adjudication." (Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act) Here the actor is the Committee, the object is the request for adjudication, the condition in paragraph (1) is the case where the request for adjudication is not lawful, and the condition in paragraph (2) is the case where the request for adjudication is found to be without merit. Paragraphs (3) and following of the same Article merely set out the content of relief ordering revocation or modification, or confirmation or performance of an obligation, where the claim is found meritorious; this text does not convert a dismissal on procedural grounds into a conclusion confirming the nonexistence of substantive rights (Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act).
The arrangement of the above text means that the determination of lawfulness and the determination of merit on the merits are placed at different stages. Paragraph (1) addresses the case in which one does not reach the point of examining the request for adjudication, while paragraph (2) addresses the case in which the request for adjudication is taken up and examined but no merit is found (Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act). The reason for separating the two determinations is that the former is a determination guarding the procedural entrance and the latter is a determination addressing the merits of the claim. In accordance with this distinction, the decision type in this section means the classification of conclusions by lawfulness, merit on the merits, and content of relief. Accordingly, the conclusion of this section—that a dismissal on procedural grounds cannot be converted into a confirmation of the nonexistence of substantive rights—holds so long as one does not overwrite the stages of determination set by the text.
The loss targeted by this distinction is the disadvantage A encountered at the entrance stage. A requested adjudication first but was stopped by a dismissal on procedural grounds, and the concern at that point is whether that result leads to an obstacle barring his assertion of rights against the disposition. To this is attached the counterargument that the complex exceptions to prior exhaustion and the time limits shift the burden onto the person contesting the administrative agency's error. In the sense that the contesting person must separately reckon the period for requesting adjudication and the filing period for an action for revocation, and must bear alone the burden of even cross-checking the conditions for the commencement of time reckoning upon service of the decision, this counterargument points to the disadvantage A bears. Yet that burden cannot be eased by converting a dismissal on procedural grounds into a confirmation of the nonexistence of substantive rights, and the confirmed answer remains within the scope of preserving the stage distinction the text has set.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are that A requested adjudication first and that B contends the lawsuit was late. Comparing the text of Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act against this fact, the decision type diverges depending on whether A's request for adjudication was ended by a dismissal on procedural grounds because it was not lawful, or by a dismissal (rejection on merits) because it was found to be without merit (Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act). Yet from the scene alone it is not confirmed which type of decision was rendered, what the precise reason for the dismissal on procedural grounds was, or what the facts of commencement upon service of the decision or awareness of the disposition were. These items remain undetermined. Where the law governing the prior exhaustion requirement or the service fixing commencement cannot be confirmed, the determination of effectiveness must likewise be left open, and reading a lack of material straightaway as an inability to obtain relief lies outside the scope of this section.
The conclusion permitted by this section is to separate the dismissal on procedural grounds that stops at the lawfulness stage from the dismissal (rejection on merits) at the merits stage, and not to convert the dismissal on procedural grounds into a confirmation of the nonexistence of substantive rights. What is not permitted is an interpretation that erases the distinction and elevates every unfavorable decision into a declaration of the nonexistence of rights.
5.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The previous section arrived at the conclusion that a dismissal on procedural grounds cannot be converted into a confirmation of the nonexistence of substantive rights, but that does not mean that all cases lost in adjudication may be treated alike. In this scene, the subsequent issues differ according to what the adjudication outcome was. What, then, does it mean to say that one lost in adjudication?
To answer this question, Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act provides for five types of decisions. Under the text, the Committee renders a dismissal on procedural grounds where a request for adjudication is not lawful, and a dismissal (rejection on merits) where it finds the request for adjudication to be without merit. In addition, where a claim in a revocation adjudication is found meritorious, it revokes the disposition or modifies it into another disposition, or orders the respondent to make such modification; and for an invalidity-confirmation adjudication and a performance-of-obligation adjudication, it provides respectively for confirmation and for performance of the disposition. Here, the Committee means the Administrative Appeals Committee that conducted the adjudication, the request for adjudication means the claim raised by the applicant, and the respondent means the administrative agency that made the disposition.
The text of this provision indicates that the criteria for classifying decisions are the lawfulness of the request for adjudication, the presence or absence of merit on the merits, and the content of the relief granted. A dismissal on procedural grounds is a conclusion rendered where the request for adjudication is not lawful, while a dismissal (rejection on merits) is a conclusion rendered where no merit on the merits is found for a lawful claim. In other words, a dismissal on procedural grounds and a dismissal (rejection on merits) differ as to whether one stopped at the threshold that must be passed through first, or whether, having passed the threshold, the matter was not accepted through a determination on the merits. If this distinction is not maintained, there ceases to be any place for the judgment of the previous section itself—that a dismissal on procedural grounds cannot be converted into a confirmation of the nonexistence of substantive rights.
In that Applicant A did not obtain the relief he expected, both a dismissal on procedural grounds and a dismissal (rejection on merits) are disappointing endings, and for a person who followed the procedure requiring adjudication to be undergone first, the question of the time limits contended by the administrative agency additionally remains as a burden. The criticism that the complex exceptions to prior exhaustion and the time limits shift the burden onto the person contesting the administrative agency's error likewise targets this inconvenience. Yet the conclusion that a dismissal on procedural grounds cannot be converted into a confirmation of the nonexistence of substantive rights stands. What a dismissal on procedural grounds means is the unlawfulness of the claim, and it does not lead to a confirmation that substantive rights against the disposition are likewise absent.
Turning back to the synthetic scene, what is fixed in the current records is only the fact that Applicant A requested adjudication first and that administrative agency B contends that the lawsuit was late. What decision was rendered, whether that decision was a dismissal on procedural grounds, a dismissal (rejection on merits), or a decision granting the claim, and when it was served, are not made clear in this scene. Accordingly, from this scene alone one cannot fix the decision type or calculate the date of commencement. The reason such confirmation is necessary, however, is that the decision type, as a classification of conclusions by lawfulness, merit on the merits, and content of relief, sets the starting point for the subsequent issues.
What this section permits is a determination that separates the dismissal on procedural grounds for unlawfulness, the dismissal (rejection on merits) for absence of merit, and decisions granting the claim by content of relief, and thereby sets the subsequent issues; what it does not permit is treating a dismissal on procedural grounds as a confirmation of the nonexistence of substantive rights. The statement that one lost in adjudication should be read to mean that the matters to be handled thereafter differ according to the type of decision, and all unfavorable decisions must not be merged into one.
5.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Depending on the form in which the request for adjudication raised by A in this scene ended, the shape of the subsequent lawsuit dispute changes. So what must now be asked is what it actually means to say that one lost in adjudication. The single fact that the outcome of the decision was unfavorable to the applicant does not determine which determination produced that disadvantage. Since this question is the key that opens the procedure path after an unfavorable decision, the analysis considers what must first be confirmed before it.
Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act provides for the classification of decisions separately by paragraph. Paragraph (1) provides that where a request for adjudication is not lawful, the Committee shall render a dismissal on procedural grounds for that request for adjudication, and paragraph (2) provides that where the Committee finds a request for adjudication to be without merit, it shall render a dismissal (rejection on merits) for that request for adjudication (Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act). The object targeted by a dismissal on procedural grounds is the lawfulness of the claim, and the object targeted by a dismissal (rejection on merits) is the merit of the claim on the merits. Paragraphs (3) through (5) divide the content of decisions where a claim is found meritorious by type of relief (Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act). This text does not bind a dismissal on procedural grounds, a dismissal (rejection on merits), and a decision granting the claim together as 'defeats' of the same grade, but marks differently the level each determination reached.
Under this text, a dismissal on procedural grounds for unlawfulness is a determination that the formal requirements for the request for adjudication have not been met, while a dismissal (rejection on merits) for absence of merit is a determination that, going beyond that form and examining the merits, the claim is not accepted. Because the levels of the two determinations differ, this distinction must be maintained when the subsequent issues are set as well. Here, decision type means the classification of conclusions by lawfulness, merit on the merits, and content of relief. Decisions granting the claim under paragraphs (3) through (5) of Article 43 are in turn divided, by their content of relief, into revocation or modification, confirmation of invalidity, and performance of obligation (Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act). The reason the same provision separately provides for dismissal on procedural grounds, dismissal (rejection on merits), and grants is that this division serves as the criterion that distinguishes the issues that may be handled in the subsequent procedure.
The practical burden cast by the statement that one lost in adjudication is not light. From the applicant's standpoint, the desired result was not obtained in any event and in some form, and whether the unfavorable result is a dismissal on procedural grounds (procedural grounds) or a dismissal (rejection on merits), the loss felt may be the same. The criticism that the complex exceptions to prior exhaustion and the time limits shift the burden onto the person contesting the administrative agency's error is also an observation pointing to the weight of that burden. Yet a dismissal on procedural grounds (procedural grounds) cannot be converted into a confirmation of the nonexistence of substantive rights. So long as the text remains as written—that the scope of determination of a dismissal on procedural grounds (procedural grounds) stays with lawfulness—a determination that has not gone beyond the formal requirements may not be read expansively as a declaration of the nonexistence of rights in the merits.
Whether the request for adjudication raised by Applicant A is a procedure undergone pursuant to the prior exhaustion provision of a special Act, whether the fact of service of the decision remains in the records, and how the delay of the lawsuit pointed out by administrative agency B meshes with the conditions for commencement after service of the decision, are not settled by this scene alone. All that is confirmed is the fact that A requested adjudication first and that B contends that the lawsuit was late. Accordingly, what can be fixed in this section is the boundary that decision types are divided by lawfulness, merit in the merits, and content of relief, and that a dismissal on procedural grounds (procedural grounds) cannot be converted into a confirmation of the nonexistence of substantive rights. Even if only a ground for exemption from awaiting the decision is confirmed, one cannot regard the filing of the adjudication itself as unnecessary.
The conclusion permitted in this section is to read the unfavorable outcome in adjudication divided into a dismissal on procedural grounds (procedural grounds) for unlawfulness, a dismissal (rejection on merits) for absence of merit, and decisions granting the claim by content of relief, and to set the issues that may be handled thereafter according to those types. What is not permitted is the direction that re-reads the formal determination of a dismissal on procedural grounds (procedural grounds) as a confirmation of the nonexistence of substantive rights, and the direction that ignores the fact that the content of relief in decisions granting the claim differs from one another and binds them into one. What the timing of service or the outcome of performance in an actual case may be cannot be fixed by this scene.
5.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
What that one sentence left is the confirmation that the period for requesting adjudication and the filing period for an action for revocation are separate rules, and that the conditions for commencement upon service of the decision must be cross-checked. On the basis of this confirmation, what must now be asked is what it means to say that one lost in adjudication. The dispute between A and B can only be aimed after each has measured the other's time limit; before that, the issues already diverge according to what conclusion the decision reached. This question becomes clear only when the different determinations contained in the word 'lost' are laid out.
The source text corresponding to this question is Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act. Paragraph (1) of Article 43 provides that "where a request for adjudication is not lawful, the Committee shall render a dismissal on procedural grounds (procedural grounds) for that request for adjudication," and paragraph (2) provides that "where the Committee finds a request for adjudication to be without merit, it shall render a dismissal (rejection on merits) for that request for adjudication." Here the actor is the Committee, and its act is choosing the form of conclusion known as the classification of decisions. The condition addressed by paragraph (1) is the lawfulness of the request for adjudication, and the condition addressed by paragraph (2) is the presence or absence of merit in the claim in the merits. The same term 'request for adjudication' is used in both, but the former is a determination of whether one passes at the door, and the latter a determination of right and wrong inside the door.
The very fact that the text places these two conditions separately becomes the ground of decision. If lawfulness is reached first, the merits are not determined; a case ended by a dismissal on procedural grounds (procedural grounds) has not received a confirmation that the right does not exist, but has merely failed to reach the threshold of the merits. Conversely, a case found to be without merit had its merits taken up and ultimately not overturned. The reason this distinction matters is that the decision type means the classification of conclusions by lawfulness, merit in the merits, and content of relief. The content of relief takes forms that diverge even within decisions granting the claim, such as revocation or modification in paragraph (3), confirmation of the presence or absence of effect in paragraph (4), and a disposition or an order to make a disposition in paragraph (5). Yet the ground of decision in this section is bound to the text within the scope of the corresponding source, and is not broadened by the reasoning of a judgment.
Reading the text in that divided way may in fact feel heavier to the person for whom the result was unfavorable. With mandatory prior exhaustion in place and exceptions and time limits to be reckoned together, it appears that the person contesting the administrative agency's error carries the burden of procedure. One cannot deny that in the same case the sense of defeat is in practice no different whether it is a dismissal on procedural grounds (procedural grounds) or a dismissal (rejection on merits). But that unfavorable reality cannot erase the distinction the text has set up. To change it thus would merge the determination at the door and the determination inside the door into one mass, so that the condition in paragraph (1)—that a dismissal on procedural grounds (procedural grounds) is rendered where a request for adjudication is not lawful—would be dragged all the way into a determination on the merits. This is an extension beyond the scope the corresponding text permits.
Returning to the synthetic scene, only the fact is fixed that A requested adjudication first and that B's contention is that the lawsuit was late. Whether the decision rendered a dismissal on procedural grounds (procedural grounds) or a dismissal (rejection on merits), and when the decision was served so as to become the starting point of the filing period, the scene leaves unset. Where the law governing the prior exhaustion requirement and the service fixing commencement are not confirmed, matters remain undetermined. Although one cannot say that the route to relief is closed merely because the empirical material is lacking, neither can one say that the route is open on the basis of this scene alone.
Accordingly, what this section permits is to read the dismissal on procedural grounds (procedural grounds), the dismissal (rejection on merits), and decisions granting the claim divided by the criteria of lawfulness, merit in the merits, and content of relief, and to prepare the subsequent discussion of time limits and subject matter in accordance with that distinction. What is not permitted is to speak as though the presence or absence of substantive rights has been fixed by the form of the decision alone, or to broaden the conclusion on grounds outside the corresponding text.
5.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
The time limit for a request for adjudication and the time limit for filing a lawsuit are separate rules, and the premise is that the conditions for the commencement of each period upon service of the adjudication must be compared against one another; against that premise, Applicant A filed a request for adjudication first, and Administrative Agency B contends that the lawsuit was filed late. Within this scene, the questions are what it means to say that one lost at the adjudication stage, and what parts must be separately determined again within the proper linkage between the administrative appeal and the action for revocation.
The provision that answers this question is set out in Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act. If a request for adjudication is not lawful, the Commission dismisses it without prejudice; if the request for adjudication is found to be without merit, the Commission dismisses it; and if the claim in a request for revocation adjudication is found to be meritorious, the Commission revokes the disposition or modifies it into another disposition, or orders the respondent to modify the disposition into another disposition. This provision divides the components of an adjudication as follows: the body rendering it is the Commission, the act is a conclusion on the request for adjudication, and the conditions are legality, merits of the claim, and the content of relief (Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act). The author calls this classification the type of adjudication, that is, a classification of conclusions according to legality, merits of the claim, and the content of relief.
Linking this basis with the conclusions of this section, the differences among dismissal on procedural grounds, dismissal (rejection on merits), and grant of the claim become the axis of determination. The detailed distinctions within the stage are limited to the conditions of the case operating, the case being blocked, and the case being undetermined. Even if a request for adjudication was filed first, the nature of the issues to be handled thereafter diverges according to which type that adjudication was, and even for the same unfavorable outcome, the scope of the conclusion actually established differs. If a case that failed to pass legality and a case that litigated the merits of the claim but was not accepted are placed in one lump, it becomes impossible to see on which side what was established.
While Administrative Agency B contends that Applicant A filed the lawsuit late, it is pointed out that the complex exceptions to the requirement of prior adjudication and the period provisions impose loss and inconvenience by shifting burdens onto a person contesting the agency's wrongdoing. This counterargument targets the procedural disadvantage that befalls both the person whose claim was dismissed (rejection on merits) and the person whose claim was dismissed without prejudice (on procedural grounds), and therefore its weight cannot be disregarded. The answer is maintained within the scope already fixed. Dismissal on procedural grounds marks only that the request for adjudication was not lawful, and it cannot be carried over into a determination that the claimant possesses no substantive right.
Among the facts of the synthetic scene, the only ones relevant to this question are that Applicant A filed a request for adjudication first and that Administrative Agency B contends the lawsuit was filed late. Compared with the conditions stated above, the channel is open where the question of whether prior adjudication is mandatory and the exceptions are applied, and the respective periods for the adjudication and the lawsuit are observed in accordance with the corresponding facts giving rise to their commencement; the channel is blocked where mandatory prior adjudication was not undergone and there is no ground for exemption, or where the time limit for filing a lawsuit has expired and no corresponding exception applies; and it remains undetermined where the law subject to the prior-adjudication requirement or the service giving rise to the commencement of the period cannot be confirmed. On the records, only the kinds of the special Act's prior-adjudication provision, the request for adjudication, service of the adjudication, awareness of the disposition, urgency, and explanation of the exception have been fixed; the actual year, amount, date of commencement, or the outcome of the judgment have not been set.
What this section permits as a conclusion extends no further than dividing the type of adjudication according to legality, merits of the claim, and the content of relief, and thereby determining the issues to follow; it does not permit reading dismissal on procedural grounds as a confirmation of the nonexistence of substantive rights, nor erecting additional steps outside the conditions expressly stated. The date of service and the result of performance in an actual case are unverified, and a lack of materials does not at once convert into an inability to grant relief.
5.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
This, interlocking with the previously confirmed separation of the time limit for a request for adjudication and the time limit for filing an action for revocation, reveals that the statement that one lost at the adjudication stage does not point to a single conclusion. In this scene, examining to which fact each of the two periods attaches its commencement becomes the work of deciding whether this linkage is open or blocked, and whether confirmation is itself possible.
Here the body is the Commission, and the act is the work of fixing the type of adjudication. The condition in paragraph (1) is the legality of the claim, and the condition in paragraph (2) is the merits of the claim; these two have different objects of determination at the adjudication stage.
From paragraph (3) onward, the content of relief diverges again. If the claim in a request for revocation adjudication is found meritorious, the Commission orders the disposition revoked or modified into another disposition, or orders the modification (Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act); a request for confirmation of nullity, etc. adjudication confirms whether or not the disposition is effective or whether or not it exists, and a request for performance of duty adjudication makes the disposition sought in the application or orders that disposition (Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act). This division comes into contact with the definition of the type of adjudication that runs from legality, through the merits of the claim, to the content of relief. The reason why the two points must be held together—that, as seen above, the fact giving rise to the commencement of each period is separate, and that this type of adjudication is the key that opens the subsequent procedure—is that what dismissal on procedural grounds, dismissal (rejection on merits), and grant of the claim leave behind differs from one another.
However, where mandatory prior adjudication was not undergone and there is no ground for exemption, or where the time limit for filing a lawsuit has expired and no corresponding exception applies, the linkage is blocked, and dismissal on procedural grounds does not change into a confirmation of the nonexistence of substantive rights. Dismissal on procedural grounds is only a conclusion reached on the legality of the claim, and dismissal (rejection on merits) is a conclusion reached after examining the merits of the claim; if the determination of the former is read as the confirmation of the latter, the two stages of judgment overlap in contradiction. Even if Administrative Agency B contends that the lawsuit was filed late, that contention concerns the fact giving rise to the commencement of the time limit for filing a lawsuit, and it does not alter the meaning of the adjudication of dismissal on procedural grounds.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are that Applicant A filed a request for adjudication first and that Administrative Agency B contends the lawsuit was filed late. The conditions stated above for comparison are that the linkage is open where the question of whether prior adjudication is mandatory and the exceptions are applied, and the respective periods for the adjudication and the lawsuit are observed in accordance with the corresponding fact giving rise to their commencement, and that the linkage is blocked otherwise. Yet the scene sets no year, amount, or date of commencement, and the special Act's prior-adjudication provision, the service of the adjudication, the awareness of the disposition, and the actual record of urgency and explanation of the exception are not confirmed. Therefore, at present, when the law subject to the prior-adjudication requirement or the service giving rise to the commencement of the period cannot be confirmed, it is difficult to assert categorically that this linkage is open or blocked, and it remains undetermined.
What this section permits is the distinction of comparing whether prior adjudication is mandatory and the exceptions, together with the fact giving rise to the commencement of each period, and thereby sorting the open, the blocked, and the undetermined; what it does not permit is the interpretation that reads dismissal on procedural grounds as a confirmation of the nonexistence of substantive rights.
5.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
In this scene, what does it mean to say that one lost at the adjudication stage? Not the surface of victory and defeat, but the gate at which that defeat was established becomes the starting point of the next judgment.
Article 43 of the Administrative Appeals Act divides the Commission's adjudications into five cases. (1) If the request for adjudication is not lawful, it is dismissed without prejudice; (2) if it is found to be without merit, it is dismissed; (3) if the claim in a request for revocation adjudication is found meritorious, the revocation or modification of the disposition is ordered. In the same Article, a request for confirmation of nullity, etc. adjudication deals with whether or not the disposition is effective or whether or not it exists, and a request for performance of duty adjudication deals with the disposition sought in the application or an order for that disposition. Here, the body that renders the dismissal on procedural grounds is the Commission, and its object is the unlawful request for adjudication.
This division is the starting line for determining the issues that follow. Dismissal on procedural grounds (on procedural grounds) attaches in the case where the request for adjudication is not lawful, so that, in terms of the wording, it points to the state in which the procedural claim known as the request for adjudication has not been accepted. Dismissal (rejection on merits), by contrast, attaches where the request for adjudication is found to be without merit, and thus it contains the judgment that, although the door of procedure was opened, there is no merit in the substance. Even though both are equally unfavorable, the distance between the former, which stopped at the entrance, and the latter, which follows deliberation on the merits, is reflected directly in what will next be made the object of the lawsuit.
Whether the adjudication received by Applicant A was a dismissal on procedural grounds or a dismissal (rejection on merits), the weight of A's frustration is no different, and the inconvenience is greater still if the ground for the dismissal on procedural grounds lay in complex exceptions to the prior-adjudication requirement or period requirements. As in the situation where Administrative Agency B contends that the lawsuit was filed late, criticism is also possible that the thresholds of procedure and the calculation of periods shift burdens onto the person contesting a right rather than onto the person who committed the wrong. Dismissal on procedural grounds is a conclusion on an unlawful request for adjudication, and not a declaration that the claimant's substantive right does not exist. While leaving intact the valid part of the counterargument, one cannot cross the line the wording has drawn.
According to the standard fixed by this section, the type of adjudication means a classification of conclusions according to legality, merits of the claim, and the content of relief. What type of adjudication the adjudication first requested by Applicant A ended in remains on the records. What can be confirmed in this section is only the standard for distinguishing types; at which gate A's request for adjudication actually stopped, and to which point in time and which period the lateness of the lawsuit asserted by B relates, remain undetermined. The fact that there are no materials merely suspends determination; it does not transform dismissal on procedural grounds into the nonexistence of rights.
What is permitted in this section is to establish the distinction that, according to whether the adjudication is a dismissal on procedural grounds, a dismissal (rejection on merits), or a grant of the claim, the problem to be handled thereafter differs. If dismissal on procedural grounds and dismissal (rejection on merits) are crushed together as a single defeat, a distortion arises in which, at the very place where a question of rights rather than a question of the entrance must be handled, the question of rights is excluded. That said, this distinction does not at once yield the conclusion that a particular lawsuit is possible for a particular reason. That judgment belongs to the next section, and this section merely passes along the question: after an unfavorable adjudication, what is made the object of the lawsuit?