Summary
The time at which the beneficiary later learns that there was no legal cause is distinguished from the point at which a good-faith beneficiary who loses the suit is deemed by law to be in bad faith.
6.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
The fact that one did not know at the outset does not justify even the retention that follows after learning of it later. Taking up the conclusion of the previous step, which distinguishes the good-faith limit of the existing benefit (unjust enrichment) from the scope of interest and damages in bad faith, the present question asks whether the stage of that responsibility remains the same from beginning to end, and what the criterion is for opening the gateway to this remedy. In the scene where recipient B claims to have received the performance sent by plaintiff A but learned later that there was no cause for payment, the issue is where that post hoc recognition changes the responsibility.
The provision corresponding to this question is Article 749 of the Civil Act. Its paragraph (1) provides that "where the recipient, after receiving the benefit, learns that there is no ground in law, the recipient shall be liable to make restitution of the benefit as a recipient in bad faith from that time," and this provision points to the recipient as the party receiving the benefit, the post hoc recognition after that receipt, and "that time" as the point at which liability begins (Article 749 of the Civil Act).
The reason paragraph (1) shifts the relevant point in time so as to impose liability not from the time of the performance but from the time of learning is that the circumstance of having been in good faith at the outset is regarded as not justifying even the retention that follows after the later recognition. The author distinguishes, on the basis of that point in time, the conversion to bad faith, that is, the fact that responsibility varies according to post hoc recognition or statutory deeming. The deeming upon losing under paragraph (2) of the same Article stands at a separate stage of judgment from the timing of this recognition (Article 749 of the Civil Act).
Yet there is a concern that the scope of liability may be widened merely by the raising of a dispute. If B's status is fixed as bad faith merely by A's filing of a suit, even without post hoc recognition, a disadvantage arises whereby the scope of restitution extends beyond the limit of the existing benefit (unjust enrichment) to interest and damages. The author responds that, notwithstanding this concern, the deeming of bad faith cannot always be established by the mere filing of a suit without the requirement of losing. The provision of paragraph (2) that "where a recipient in good faith loses, the recipient is deemed a recipient in bad faith from the time the suit was filed" places together the requirement of losing, which gives rise to the deeming, and the point in time of filing the suit as the starting point; it does not make the filing of the suit itself the establishment of bad faith (Article 749 of the Civil Act).
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only that B received the performance and claims to have learned later that there was no cause for that payment. If B's assertion of post hoc recognition is accepted as fact, the point in time corresponding to "from that time" in paragraph (1) must be separately identified, and this connects to the post hoc recognition item among the judgment records of performance and cause, recognition at the time of payment, attribution of the illegal cause, continued existence of the benefit, and post hoc recognition. By contrast, whether the connection between the benefit without cause and the loss is recognized, whether the restriction on restitution applies, the specification of the scope such as the existing benefit (unjust enrichment), the performance, parties, and conditions specified in the demand for judgment, and whether the right of the chosen action can be defended, cannot be confirmed from this scene alone and therefore remain undetermined.
Accordingly, the entrance to this remedy opens where the point is identified at which the good-faith limit of the existing benefit (unjust enrichment) distinguished above differs from the scope of interest and damages in bad faith. Responsibility cannot be regarded as forever the same merely because one was in good faith at the outset, nor is bad faith established merely by the fact that a dispute has begun.
6.2The Conditions That Block Relief
Where the connection between the benefit without cause and the loss is recognized, the restriction on restitution does not apply, and the scope such as good or bad faith and the existing benefit (unjust enrichment) is specified, this remedy operates. Then what are the conditions under which that remedy is blocked? Set side by side with the conditions for operation confirmed in the preceding section, the conditions under which liability to make restitution begins and the conditions under which that liability is blocked are judgments at different stages. Recipient B claims to have received the performance sent by plaintiff A but learned later that there was no cause for payment. Since B's assertion alone does not determine when the conversion to bad faith occurred, the grounds for fixing that point in time are examined first.
The provision corresponding to this question is Article 749 of the Civil Act. That provision sets the points in time separately in two paragraphs. Paragraph (1) provides that "where the recipient, after receiving the benefit, learns that there is no ground in law, the recipient shall be liable to make restitution of the benefit as a recipient in bad faith from that time." Here the subject is the recipient, the act is the recipient's learning, after receiving the benefit, that there is no ground in law, and the condition is that this recognition arose after the receipt of the benefit. Since liability as a recipient in bad faith is recognized from that time, one route of conversion to bad faith is post hoc recognition.
Paragraph (2) provides another route. The provision that "where a recipient in good faith loses, the recipient is deemed a recipient in bad faith from the time the suit was filed" means that where a recipient who was in good faith loses, the recipient is deemed to have been in bad faith retroactively to the time the suit was filed. Since this deeming is a statutory standard different from the point in time of actual recognition, the two paragraphs must be distinguished. On the basis of this distinction under Article 749 of the Civil Act, the remedy is blocked where one, knowing that no debt was owed, made payment, or where the restriction on restitution for payment for an illegal cause applies and no statutory exception exists. In other words, conversion to bad faith means that responsibility varies according to post hoc recognition or statutory deeming, and each route has its own requirements to be confirmed separately.
However, there is a concern that the scope of liability may be widened merely by the raising of a dispute. If the recipient's status is reversed merely by filing a suit and the scope of restitution is widened, then no matter how much in good faith the person who received the performance was, that person is placed at a disadvantage from the moment the lawsuit begins. The counterargument that narrowing liability to the existing benefit (unjust enrichment) results in a person who spent another's money escaping restitution arises from the same context. Yet since Article 749, paragraph (2) of the Civil Act sets losing as a requirement, the deeming of bad faith cannot always be established by the mere filing of a suit without the requirement of losing. The deeming under paragraph (2) does not arise in advance on the procedural fact of filing a suit alone; the deeming applies only when the requirement of losing is added.
In this scene, B's assertion is only that B learned of it later. When and in what manner B learned that there was no cause for payment, and how that recognition stands in relation to the time of receipt of the performance, are not fixed in the synthetic scene. To judge the point of conversion to bad faith, the records of performance and cause, recognition at the time of payment, attribution of the illegal cause, continued existence of the benefit, and post hoc recognition must appear in the record. On the basis of B's account alone, it cannot be determined whether it falls under the route of post hoc recognition, whether it falls under the statutory deeming of paragraph (2), or whether it falls short of both. Nor is the fact of losing established, so it cannot be asserted that the deeming under paragraph (2) applies. What can be fixed is only the conditional distinction.
The conclusion permitted in this section is narrow. If the point in time of post hoc recognition is confirmed, liability as a recipient in bad faith is determined from that time under paragraph (1); and if the losing of a recipient in good faith is confirmed, the recipient is deemed to have been in bad faith from the time the suit was filed under paragraph (2). Conversely, where one, knowing that no debt was owed, made payment, or where the restriction on restitution for payment for an illegal cause applies and no statutory exception exists, this remedy is blocked. However, the conclusion that bad faith is always established merely by the filing of a suit cannot be drawn in this section.
6.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
In this scene, the question whether being in good faith at the outset means bearing the same responsibility to the end is narrowed to the question whether the prior good faith remains as it is even after post hoc recognition has taken hold. Conversion to bad faith means that responsibility varies according to post hoc recognition or statutory deeming. Where the point in time and basis of this conversion are clear, the scope of liability from that point can be determined. But where materials that cannot be verified remain, the judgment itself enters a different phase.
Paragraph (1) provides that "where the recipient, after receiving the benefit, learns that there is no ground in law, the recipient shall be liable to make restitution of the benefit as a recipient in bad faith from that time," and paragraph (2) provides that "where a recipient in good faith loses, the recipient is deemed a recipient in bad faith from the time the suit was filed" (Article 749 of the Civil Act). Here the subject is the recipient who received the benefit, the act is the receipt of the benefit, the condition of paragraph (1) is learning after receipt that there is no ground in law, and the condition of paragraph (2) is that a recipient in good faith has lost. The suit spoken of in paragraph (2) is a provision that only after that condition is fulfilled turns the starting point of the deeming back to the time the suit was filed.
This provision places the two routes of conversion to bad faith as different things. One is the point at which the recipient actually learned that there was no cause; the other is the deeming prescribed by law where a recipient in good faith loses. Under the author's application, the former rests on the fact of recognition and the latter on the result of a judgment, so the two cannot be merged into the same point in time. The reason for separating here the point of post hoc recognition from the point of the statutory deeming is that the point at which liability begins and the character of that point differ. Where the cause of payment or the recipient's knowledge and the remaining benefit cannot be confirmed, matters for which the materials of judgment are not specified are left undetermined, distinguished from impossibility.
If the mere fact of having received a complaint is taken to mean that the recipient learned at that time that there was no cause, or if the deeming under paragraph (2) is fixed in advance without confirming whether the recipient lost, that recipient bears in advance a liability exceeding the original scope of good faith. Even so, the deeming of bad faith cannot always be established by the mere filing of a suit without the requirement of losing. The provision has attached the condition of losing to the deeming under paragraph (2), and the recognition under paragraph (1) is required as a separate fact. The counterargument that narrowing liability to the existing benefit (unjust enrichment) results in a person who spent another's money escaping restitution does not fail, so long as a route of restitution remains within the narrowed scope.
In the synthetic scene, B's assertion is that B learned of it later, and of A, B, and C, the persons handled in this section are only A and B. Among the record items of performance and cause, recognition at the time of payment, attribution of the illegal cause, continued existence of the benefit, and post hoc recognition, what this scene fixes is only the receipt of the performance and the assertion of post hoc recognition. Whether there was in fact no cause for payment, when that absence of cause was learned, how much benefit remains, and whether a recipient in good faith has in fact ever lost, are not determined by the scene. The contrast condition that, where it is confirmed that the illegal cause lies only with the recipient, it corrects the exclusion of restitution on the sole ground that it was an illegal performance, has meaning only within the scope of this section, namely the scope of restitution. On the basis of this material alone, both the starting point of the conversion to bad faith and the limit of the remaining benefit are undetermined.
Accordingly, the conclusion permitted by this section is to distinguish post hoc recognition from the statutory deeming, to determine the point in time and effect of that conversion, and to leave undetermined, rather than to pronounce as impossible, matters for which the materials of judgment are not specified because no confirmed material exists. This section does not permit establishing bad faith on the fact of filing a suit alone, nor concluding that there is no liability to make restitution itself on the sole ground that there is no material.
6.4The Records Needed for Determination
In the preceding stage, the good-faith limit of the existing benefit (unjust enrichment) was distinguished from the scope of interest and damages in bad faith. Then the question remains whether being in good faith at the outset means bearing the same responsibility to the end. This question does not ask again about the breadth of the liability; it asks by what to judge the point at which the liability changes. What record points to that point in time is the object of interest.
Article 749 of the Civil Act provides separately for two cases. Paragraph (1) provides: "Where the recipient, after receiving the benefit, learns that there is no ground in law, the recipient shall be liable to make restitution of the benefit as a recipient in bad faith from that time." Here the subject is the recipient, the act is the recognition after receiving the benefit, and the condition is when one learns that there is no ground in law. In that the recipient is treated as being in bad faith from that time, the point of recognition meets the point of liability.
Paragraph (2) provides another route: "Where a recipient in good faith loses, the recipient is deemed a recipient in bad faith from the time the suit was filed." Thus, even where there was no actual knowledge, if the requirement of losing is met, the recipient is deemed to have been in bad faith, tracing back to the time the suit was filed. This deeming is a statutory device standing in for the record of knowledge. Accordingly, the conversion arising from post hoc recognition and the deeming arising from losing differ in basis and in requirements, and that distinction becomes the axis of the stage determination. The stage is determined solely on the material recorded in performance and cause, recognition at the time of payment, attribution of the illegal cause, continued existence of the benefit, and post hoc recognition. The stage determination is made only on the established record. It is not filled in by conjecture where no record exists.
However, the disadvantage brought about by this distinction cannot be lightly regarded. If even a person who disputes in the belief that no debt is owed is treated as being in bad faith from the moment of receiving the complaint, the scope of restitution is widened and that person may bear liability beyond the limit of the existing benefit (unjust enrichment). The criticism that narrowing liability to the existing benefit (unjust enrichment) results in a person who spent another's money escaping restitution comes from the same point. Even so, the conclusion is maintained. Paragraph (2) presupposes losing, and paragraph (1) requires the point of recognition, namely from the time one learned.
On the basis of this assertion alone, it is not stated what the recognition at the time of payment was, or when and by what route one came to know it. When there is a record concerning the performance and cause, a record concerning the recognition at the time of payment, a record concerning to whom the illegal cause is attributed and whether the benefit remains now, and a record of post hoc recognition that one came to learn of it later, the stage is determined on the basis of those materials. From the scene alone it is also not determined whether there was a loss in the lawsuit, and therefore whether the deeming under paragraph (2) can apply. Where it is confirmed that the illegal cause lies only with the recipient, it corrects the exclusion of restitution on the sole ground that it was an illegal performance. So long as the cause of payment, the recipient's knowledge, and the remaining benefit are not confirmed, that place remains undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is narrow: the record of post hoc recognition and the statutory deeming upon losing have different points in time and requirements, and that distinction is judged only as laid upon the established record. The conclusion this section does not permit is equally clear. This section does not accept justifying the subsequent retention by the single fact of having been in good faith at the outset, nor, conversely, establishing bad faith by the single fact that a suit has been filed.
6.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
If that contention is accepted, from when does the responsibility change? Whether one who was in good faith from the outset bears the same responsibility to the end, and what kind of change upsets the existing stage-by-stage assessment, are the questions that remain now. These questions must necessarily stand together at the moment of asking whether an obligation to return the performance has arisen and how far that obligation extends.
The provision that answers this question is Civil Act Article 749, which is divided into two parts. Paragraph (1) provides: "Where the recipient, after receiving the benefit, learns that there is no ground in law, the recipient shall, from that time, bear the obligation to return the benefit as a bad-faith recipient" (Civil Act Article 749). Here the subject is the recipient, the act is the receipt of the benefit, and the condition is learning, after receipt, that there is no ground in law. The provision fixes the time of that knowledge as "from that time," so that possession before the knowledge is not placed under the same responsibility as the knowledge itself. Paragraph (2) establishes a separate deeming rule: "Where a good-faith recipient loses the lawsuit, the recipient is deemed a bad-faith recipient from the time the lawsuit was filed" (Civil Act Article 749).
The subsequent knowledge under paragraph (1) and the statutory deeming under paragraph (2) only derive the same responsibility by different routes; they are not the same event. They distinguish the limit of a good-faith existing benefit from the scope of a bad-faith interest and damages. In accordance with that distinction, if the fact of later learning is established, B's responsibility as recipient changes from that time to the responsibility of a bad-faith recipient. By contrast, if a good-faith recipient loses the lawsuit, the recipient is deemed a bad-faith recipient from the time the lawsuit was filed. The deeming does not manufacture a knowledge that in fact never existed; it is a device that, after the dispute has ended, turns the time of assessment back to the time the lawsuit was filed. If these two are bundled into one and described as conversion to bad faith, the fact of B's subsequent knowledge and the statutory time fixed by the assessment become intermingled. Conversion to bad faith means that responsibility varies according to subsequent knowledge or statutory deeming, which is why this definition must preserve the grounds of the two separately.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the concern that the scope of responsibility may widen merely from the raising of a dispute. Filing a lawsuit looks as though it widens the scope of return, and for the defendant the act of contesting itself brings about heavier responsibility. That loss is real. If the scope of interest and damages is opened to a good-faith recipient who had been within the limit of existing benefit, the burden grows merely by mounting a defense. Conversely, it cannot be overlooked that if responsibility is narrowed to existing benefit, a person who spent another's money ends up avoiding return. The wording of paragraph (2) attaches losing to the deeming, making clear that the deeming is not completed by the single fact of filing a lawsuit.
What can be confirmed in this scene is that Recipient B received the performance sent by plaintiff A and contends that B later learned that there was no ground of payment. If subsequent knowledge is established in accordance with that contention, the existing determination of blocking and effectiveness is discarded and the assessment is redone from the stage. Returning to the stage of return and scope, one re-examines in order the payment and cause, the knowledge at the time of payment, the attribution of the illegal cause, the existence of the benefit, and subsequent knowledge. Yet the scene fixes no year, amount, or date of accrual, and the time of subsequent knowledge is not specified either. If the ground of payment, B's knowledge, and whether the remaining benefit exists cannot be confirmed, that item remains undetermined. Undetermined does not immediately mean that no relief is available.
Accordingly, the fact of having been in good faith at the outset does not fix the later responsibility as well. If subsequent knowledge is confirmed, the responsibility changes from that time; and if a good-faith recipient loses, the assessment turns back to the time the lawsuit was filed. Conversely, the deeming of bad faith cannot be established by the single fact of filing a lawsuit alone, and if a loss is not confirmed, no ground for statutory deeming arises either. Within this boundary, a confirmed change causes the existing assessment to be discarded and re-read from the stage, while unconfirmed matters remain undetermined.
6.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
That single sentence was that it distinguishes the limit of a good-faith existing benefit from the scope of a bad-faith interest and damages. If so, when and how this knowledge arises determines the boundary of that responsibility. What is at issue here is the interval between the point when Recipient B claims to have learned late that there was no ground of payment and the period during which B undergoes the dispute while still not knowing. How this interval is handled is the present question.
The provision that answers this question is Civil Act Article 749. Here the subject is the recipient who received the benefit, the act is the receipt of that benefit, and the condition is learning, after that receipt, that there is no ground in law. The time of that knowledge is precisely the baseline from which the responsibility of the bad-faith recipient begins. Possession before that knowledge falls outside the scope targeted by the wording of this paragraph.
The same Article divides recognition and deeming into separate stages. Paragraph (1) takes actual knowledge, that is, subsequent knowledge, as a requirement. By contrast, paragraph (2) provides that "where a good-faith recipient loses the lawsuit, the recipient is deemed a bad-faith recipient from the time the lawsuit was filed," thereby going back in time irrespective of proof of that knowledge. The reason this distinction is necessary is that the former is bound to the time of actual recognition, whereas the latter is a deeming that takes effect only when the statutory requirements are satisfied. Herein lies the conversion to bad faith, that is, the variance of responsibility according to subsequent knowledge or statutory deeming.
The strongest counterargument against this distinction is aimed at the point that if responsibility is narrowed to existing benefit, a person who spent another's money ends up avoiding return. If Recipient B has already disposed of the benefit so that nothing remains, the responsibility to return is greatly reduced within the good-faith limit, and that disadvantage is borne by plaintiff A, who sent the performance. That loss and inconvenience are real. Yet this counterargument must find its answer not in the convenience of the defender but in the requirements of paragraph (2). The deeming arises only where a good-faith recipient has lost, and therefore possession at a time when that requirement is not met cannot be extended to bad faith.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only that Recipient B received the performance of plaintiff A and claims to have learned later that there was no ground of payment. When B learned that fact, whether B did not know at the time of receiving the performance, and how much of the benefit remains, are all undetermined. Payment and cause, knowledge at the time of payment, existence of the benefit, and subsequent knowledge are fixed in the judgment record, but this scene alone does not fill in their values. Whether a dispute has been raised, and whether B lost that lawsuit, are also absent from the scene. Accordingly, the time of subsequent knowledge and whether the statutory deeming applies cannot be determined in this scene.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow: that Recipient B may be treated as a bad-faith recipient from the time B learned that there was no ground of payment, and that the time may be traced back to the filing of the lawsuit only where good-faith Recipient B has lost. What this section does not permit is a determination that fixes bad faith on the sole fact of filing a lawsuit without confirming the requirements of both routes. Unconfirmed records remain undetermined, and that does not mean there is no responsibility to return. In cases of infringement of personality rights, is damages the only remedy?
6.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
If this contention is true, did B's legal position change between the time B first received it and the time B later learned? The preceding section held that bad faith cannot always be deemed established merely by filing a lawsuit without the requirement of losing. It must be examined how the scope of responsibility is determined in the case where one did not know at the time of receipt but learned later. Here the standard adopted is the conversion to bad faith, that is, the variance of responsibility according to subsequent knowledge or statutory deeming.
The provision in question is Civil Act Article 749. Its paragraph (1) provides: "Article 749 (Recognition of Bad Faith of Recipient) (1) Where the recipient, after receiving the benefit, learns that there is no ground in law, the recipient shall, from that time, bear the obligation to return the benefit as a bad-faith recipient." The subject of this paragraph is the recipient, the act is learning, after receiving the benefit, that there is no ground in law, and the time is the very moment of that learning. Paragraph (2) provides: "(2) Where a good-faith recipient loses, the recipient is deemed a bad-faith recipient from the time the lawsuit was filed," thus taking losing as a requirement and deeming retroactively from the time of filing. This section deals with this provision alone.
The wording of the two paragraphs above places the grounds of conversion to bad faith on different routes. Paragraph (1) takes as its standard the recipient's own actual recognition, that is, the time of learning afterwards of the absence of cause. By contrast, paragraph (2) provides that only where a good-faith recipient loses does the law deem the recipient to have learned later, and it turns the starting point of that deeming back to the time the lawsuit was filed. In other words, the time of actual knowledge and the time deemed by law must be distinguished. If this distinction is erased, the recipient could be treated as having converted to bad faith merely by reason of the lawsuit being pending, and this contravenes the wording of paragraph (2), which expressly stipulates losing.
The concern is that the moment plaintiff A files a lawsuit, the scope of B's responsibility is immediately fixed, and the scope of return may become broader than existing benefit. The counterargument that narrowing responsibility to existing benefit lets a person who spent another's money avoid return is also attached here. However, bad faith cannot always be deemed established merely by filing a lawsuit without the requirement of losing. Since paragraph (2) places the requirement of losing in its wording, the deeming cannot be fixed before that requirement is satisfied. This is not a conclusion exempting responsibility; it is a judgment that binds the time of fixing the conversion to bad faith to the requirements set by law.
The facts confirmed in this scene are only to the effect that B received the performance of plaintiff A and claims to have learned later that its ground of payment was absent. If this contention is accepted, the route of subsequent knowledge under paragraph (1) is at issue, but no specific time of learning is set in the scene. Whether a lawsuit was filed against B, and whether B later lost that lawsuit, are likewise absent from the scene. Accordingly, whether the statutory deeming of paragraph (2) can be applied cannot be judged on this scene alone, and the matter remains undetermined.
What can be established in this section is that conversion to bad faith is effected through two different routes, subsequent knowledge and statutory deeming, and that responsibility varies accordingly. Where the recipient learns, after receipt, that there is no ground in law, the recipient bears responsibility as a bad-faith recipient from that time; but where the statutory deeming is at issue with respect to a good-faith recipient, the requirement of losing must be satisfied. Going beyond this distinction, this section does not permit the conclusion that bad faith is always deemed established merely by the filing of a lawsuit. Nor, however, does the fact of having been in good faith at the outset justify the subsequent possession.
6.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Having distinguished the limit of a good-faith existing benefit from the scope of a bad-faith interest and damages, what is asked now is the starting point of responsibility. In other words, even if the recipient did not know at the time of receiving the performance, it is at issue whether the possession during the continuation of that state of not knowing and the possession after the knowledge arose can be viewed under the same responsibility. Here, subsequent knowledge and statutory deeming are the two branches of the point at which responsibility changes.
The ground for answering this question is Civil Act Article 749. In this provision the subject is the recipient who received the benefit, the act is the receipt of that benefit, and the condition is the time of learning, after that receipt, that there is no ground in law. What the provision fixes as the time is 'from that time.' That the provision takes not the time of receipt but the time of knowledge as its standard means that the time of knowledge is to serve as the branch point of responsibility.
Connecting the above provision with the conclusion of this section, conversion to bad faith means that responsibility varies according to subsequent knowledge or statutory deeming. The reason the two stages must be distinguished here is that the fact of having been in good faith at the outset and the fact of having later turned to bad faith are not mutually exclusive. Even if the recipient did not know at the time of receipt, the recipient converts into a bad-faith recipient from the point when subsequent knowledge arose. Conversely, where the recipient was in bad faith from the beginning, there is no room for this conversion rule to apply. Thus, as to whether one who was in good faith from the outset bears the same responsibility to the end, the standard of distinction confirmed in the provision is that, once subsequent knowledge has arisen, that is not the case.
The strongest counterargument against this distinction is the concern that if responsibility is narrowed to existing benefit, a person who spent another's money ends up avoiding return. This concern is real. If the recipient has already consumed the benefit so that nothing remains, the good-faith recipient is exempt from responsibility within the limit of existing benefit, and then a claim for return may end in vain. The observation that the scope of responsibility may widen merely from the raising of a dispute arises from the same context. Its basis lies in the provision of Article 749, paragraph (2), that where a good-faith recipient loses, the recipient is deemed a bad-faith recipient from the time the lawsuit was filed. That is, the single fact of filing a lawsuit is insufficient, and the condition that a loss must follow for the statutory deeming to arise remains the unfavorable part of the counterargument.
The facts relevant to this question in the revised scene are that Recipient B received the performance and claims to have learned later that there was no ground of payment. This contention alone does not confirm what the recognition at the time of receiving the performance and the subsequent knowledge actually were. Since there are no materials to check as to the payment and cause, the knowledge at the time of payment, the attribution of the illegal cause, the existence of the benefit, and the subsequent knowledge, when the subsequent knowledge arose and whether the resulting conversion to bad faith is established remain undetermined. In addition, the condition that, where it is confirmed that the illegal cause lay with the recipient alone, the exclusion of return on the sole ground of illegal payment is corrected, can be used only when the limitation of return within the scope of this section is examined in this scene.
Accordingly, the conclusion this section permits goes no further than distinguishing the point that the recipient's responsibility changes into that of a bad-faith recipient from the time of learning, after receipt, that there is no ground in law, and the point that where a good-faith recipient loses, the recipient is deemed a bad-faith recipient from the time the lawsuit was filed. The fact of having been in good faith at the outset does not justify the subsequent possession, but neither is the deeming of bad faith fixed immediately merely by the filing of a lawsuit. The point at which the scope of responsibility widens is limited to when subsequent knowledge is confirmed or the statutory requirement of losing is satisfied. Judgment is reserved as to unconfirmed materials, while the narrow conclusion that has been confirmed itself is maintained.
6.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
선의의 현존이익 한도와 악의의 이자·손해 배상 범위를 구분한 뒤에 남는 물음은, 그 구별을 만드는 책임의 기준시가 어디에서 시작되는가이다. B가 처음 급부를 받을 때 지급 원인의 부존재를 알았는지와 나중에 알게 되었는지가 갈리는 지점은 반환 범위의 판정에도 직접 이어진다.
이 물음에 해당하는 원문은 민법 제749조이다. 그 제1항은 "수익자가 이익을 받은 후 법률상 원인없음을 안 때에는 그때부터 악의의 수익자로서"라는 문언으로 사후 인식의 시점과 그때부터의 책임을 규정한다. 여기서 수익자는 급부를 받은 B를, 이익은 그 급부로 남은 것을, 법률상 원인없음은 지급 원인이 없었다는 사실을 가리킨다. 같은 조 제2항은 "선의의 수익자가 패소한 때에는 그 소를 제기한 때부터 악의의 수익자로 본다"고 하여, 별도의 인식과 무관하게 법정으로 간주하는 경로를 따로 둔다.
이 두 항의 문언이 가리키는 것은 인식의 경로가 서로 다르다는 점이다. 제1항은 수익자가 실제로 알게 된 시점을 악의의 책임의 기점으로 삼고, 제2항은 선의였던 수익자가 패소한 경우에 한하여 소 제기 시점을 간주의 기점으로 삼는다. 저자는 이 구별을 악의 전환, 즉 사후 인식 또는 법정 간주에 따라 책임이 달라지는 것으로 설명한다. 앞 절에서 선의의 현존이익 한도와 악의의 이자·손해 배상 범위를 나눈 것은 바로 이 전환의 시점이 어디에 놓이는지에 따라 반환과 그 범위의 판정이 달라지기 때문이다. 해당 원문 문언만 부당이득의 반환과 범위의 판정 근거로 쓰고, 판결이유나 다른 항으로 확장하지 않는 한도에서 이 구별은 유지된다.
그러나 분쟁 제기만으로 책임 범위가 넓어질 우려가 있다. 소를 제기하는 것만으로도 악의의 책임이 곧바로 확정된다면, 수익자는 방어권을 행사하기 전에 반환 범위가 넓어지는 불이익을 감당하게 된다. 아울러 현존이익으로 책임을 좁히면 타인의 돈을 쓴 사람이 반환을 피하는 결과가 생긴다는 반론도 남는다. 이 손실과 불편에도 불구하고 제2항의 문언은 패소라는 요건을 전제로 하고 있다. 저자는 이에 대해 패소 요건 없이 소 제기만으로 언제나 악의 간주를 확정할 수 없다고 본다. 반론이 지적한 불이익을 지우지 않으면서도, 문언이 정한 요건을 넘어서 책임을 확장하지 않는 범위에서 결론은 유지된다.
합성 장면에서 확인되는 사실은, B가 급부를 받았고 지급 원인이 없었다는 사실을 나중에 알았다고 주장한다는 것까지이다. 이 주장은 제1항이 정한 사후 인식의 경로에 대응하므로, 알게 된 시점부터의 책임을 검토하는 축에 놓인다. 다만 B가 언제 알았는지, 급부로 남은 이익이 얼마인지, 급부의 지급 원인이 어떻게 없어졌는지는 이 장면에서 정해지지 않았다. 따라서 이 사실들로 제1항의 문언이 바로 적용되는지, 혹은 제2항의 간주에 이르는지까지는 확정할 수 없다. 만약 불법원인이 수익자에게만 있음이 확인되면 불법급여라는 이유만의 반환 배제를 고쳐야 한다는 조건은 이 절의 문언 적용 담당에 속하지 않으므로 여기서 판정하지 않는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 악의의 책임 기점이 사후 인식에 따른 것인지 법정 간주에 따른 것인지에 따라 반환과 그 범위의 판정을 나눈다는 것에 있다. 제1항의 문언은 인식의 시점을, 제2항의 문언은 패소한 때와 소 제기 시점을 각각의 기준으로 삼으므로, 소 제기 사실만으로 악의를 확정하는 결론은 이 문언 범위에서 나오지 않는다. 반대로 수익자가 지급 원인 없음을 알았다는 사실만으로 제2항의 간주까지 확인되었다고 볼 수도 없다.
6.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
선의의 수익자가 받아들인 이익의 책임이 나중에 달라질 수 있다는 사실은, 그 변화가 언제 정해지는지를 정확히 물어야 비로소 가늘이 된다. 선의의 현존이익 한도와 악의의 이자·손해 배상 범위를 구별한다. 그 위에 놓인 오늘의 물음은 단순하다. 그렇다면 책임의 단계 안에서 다시 나누어 판정할 부분은 무엇인가.
민법 제749조는 악의 전환이 일어나는 두 경로를 따로 적는다. 제749조는 “수익자가 이익을 받은 후 법률상 원인없음을 안 때”를 한 경로로 두고, “선의의 수익자가 패소한 때”를 다른 경로로 둔다. 앞의 경로는 수익자 자신의 인식이 바뀌는 시점에 묶여 있고, 뒤의 경로는 패소라는 재판의 결과에 묶여 있다. 사후에 원인 없음을 안 때와 선의 수익자의 패소에 따른 법정 악의 간주 시점을 구별한다. 이 둘을 한 묶음으로 보고 같은 시점을 붙이면, 악의 전환의 시점이 흐려진다.
이 문언의 시점 구분을 고정하면, 단계 안의 세부 구분도 그에 맞추어 갈라진다. 먼저 급여의 원인과 지급 당시 인식을 묻는다. 이는 수익자가 받는 순간 선의였는지를 정하는 자료이므로, 사후의 앎과 뒤섞지 않는다. 다음으로 사후 인식을 묻는다. 수익자가 나중에 원인 없음을 알았다면, 그 앎의 시점부터 악의의 수익자로서의 책임이 놓이는 것으로 본다. 마지막으로 법정 간주의 조건을 묻는데, 여기에는 패소라는 요건이 붙는다. 소를 제기한 시점은 패소가 정해진 뒤에 비로소 악의로 보는 기산점이 될 뿐, 제기 자체로 악의가 확정되는 것은 아니다. 지급 원인 없음을 안 시점과 패소로 간주되는 시점은 각자의 조건에서 놓이므로, 책임의 범위를 특정할 때도 이 둘을 따로 대조한다.
채권자가 소를 내는 순간 수익자의 이익 유지가 정당화되지 않는 것처럼 보이고, 반환의 범위가 곧 늘어난다면, 수익자는 방어의 기회를 잃은 채 넓은 책임을 지는 셈이 된다. 현존이익으로 책임을 좁히면 타인의 돈을 쓴 사람이 반환을 피하는 결과가 생긴다는 불만도 여기에 겹친다. 민법 제749조는 소 제기의 시점을 기산점으로 삼을 뿐, 그 간주를 패소에 붙여 두었다. 이 답은 반론의 불안을 지우지 않으면서도, 제기와 확정을 나누어 책임이 넓어지는 때를 제한한다.
합성 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 나뉜다. 급여와 원인·지급 당시 인식은 아직 특정되지 않았고, 지급 원인 없음을 알았다는 주장만 주어져 있다. 이 주장이 맞다면 사후 인식의 경로가 열리지만, 그 앎이 언제 생겼는지는 정해지지 않았다. 반대로 패소라는 사실은 장면에 들어 있지 않으므로, 법정 간주로 책임을 넓힐 근거는 아직 없다. 따라서 선의였다는 전제와 사후 인식의 주장 사이에서 달라지는 것은 범위의 특정이지, 소 제기만으로 확정되는 악의가 아니다. 지급 원인 또는 수익자의 앎과 남은 이익을 확인할 수 없는 경우, 그 자리는 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절에서 허용되는 결론은 좁다. 사후에 원인 없음을 알았다면 그 앎의 시점부터, 그리고 패소했다면 소를 제기한 때부터 악의로 보는 두 경로가 각각의 조건에서 갈라진다는 것이다. 여기에 더해 소 제기만으로 악의를 확정하거나, 앎과 패소를 한 시점으로 묶는 것은 허용되지 않는다. 기록에 남길 항목은 급여와 원인·지급 당시 인식·불법 원인의 귀속·이익 현존·사후 인식이다.
6.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
이런 전제 아래에서 처음 선의이면 끝까지 같은 책임인가 하는 물음이 남는다. 이 주장만으로 반환 책임이 곧바로 정해지는 것은 아니고, 그 책임이 언제 어떤 범위로 작동하는지를 가려야 한다. 이 물음은 반환 제한에 걸리는지, 막히는지, 아니면 확인할 자료가 없어 미확정으로 남는지를 구별하는 데서 출발한다.
제749조는 수익자가 이익을 받은 후 법률상 원인 없음을 알았다면 바로 그때부터 악의의 수익자로서 반환 책임을 지고, 선의의 수익자가 소에서 패소했다면 그 소가 제기된 때를 악의의 시작으로 본다고 정한다. 여기서 주체는 이익을 받은 수익자이고, 행위는 그 이익의 반환이며, 조건은 법률상 원인 없음을 알았다는 인식과 선의 수익자의 패소라는 두 경로다. 이 문언은 악의의 시작 시점만 정할 뿐 반환 범위를 새로 늘리거나 줄이는 요건을 덧붙이지 않는다. 그러므로 이 조문은 언제 악의로 보는지를 가르는 기준일 뿐, 반환 책임의 성립 요건 전체를 다루는 것은 아니다.
이 문언과 이 절의 결론을 연결하면, 반환 책임이 작동하려면 원인 없는 이익과 손해의 연결이 인정되고 반환 제한에 걸리지 않으며 선의·악의와 현존이익 등으로 범위가 특정되어야 한다. 반면 채무 없음을 알고 변제했거나 불법원인급여의 반환 제한에 해당하고 법정 예외도 없는 경우에는 막힌다. 여기서 악의의 시작 시점과 반환 범위의 특정을 구별해야 하는 이유가 드러난다. 전자는 수익자가 언제부터 악의로 보이는지를 정하는 판단이고, 후자는 그 악의나 선의에 따라 책임이 얼마만큼 미치는지를 정하는 판단이다. 두 판단을 섞으면 악의의 시작 시점만으로 범위까지 확정된 것처럼 보이지만, 실제 범위는 선의·악의와 현존이익 등 별도의 요소로 특정된다. 따라서 시점 판단이 범위 판단을 대신하지는 않는다.
이 우려는 현실적인 불편을 가리킨다. 수익자가 처음에는 선의였더라도 상대방이 소를 내는 것만으로 곧바로 악의로 취급된다면, 그 시점부터 이자나 손해 배상 같은 넓은 책임이 붙어 선의 수익자가 큰 부담을 안을 수 있다. 자금을 써 버려 남은 이익이 줄어든 사람에게까지 반환 책임이 넓어지면 보유와 지출의 불안정이 생긴다. 그렇지만 앞의 답은 패소 요건 없이 소 제기만으로 언제나 악의 간주를 확정할 수 없다는 것이다. 민법 제749조는 선의의 수익자가 패소한 때에 한정하여 그 소를 제기한 때부터 악의로 본다고 하므로, 소 제기 자체가 곧 악의 간주가 되는 것은 아니다. 이 답은 소 제기 자체로 책임이 넓어지는 불이익을 막으면서도, 실제 패소라는 요건이 채워지는 경우에는 법이 정한 간주가 적용된다는 불리한 점도 함께 남긴다.
이 절이 다루는 판정 기록은 급여와 원인, 지급 당시 인식, 불법 원인의 귀속, 이익 현존, 사후 인식의 여섯 항목이다. 장면에서 B가 지급 원인이 없었다는 사실을 나중에 알았다고 주장한 것은 사후 인식 항목에 관한 주장일 뿐이고, 그 인식이 실제로 언제 있었는지, 급부 당시에 이미 알았는지, 남은 이익이 얼마나 되는지는 이 장면만으로 정해지지 않는다. 지급 원인이나 수익자의 앎, 남은 이익을 확인할 수 없으면 그 부분은 미확정으로 남는다. 다만 확인된 조건을 대조하면, 지급 원인이 없었다는 사실을 알게 된 뒤에도 그 전에 이미 채무 없음을 알고 변제했다면 반환은 막힌다. 이 대조는 확인된 조건 하나를 바꾼 검사일 뿐, 장면에 새로 더해진 사실이 아니다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 반환과 범위의 작동·차단·미확정을 구별한 판단이고, 허용하지 않는 것은 확인된 시점과 범위를 넘어서 책임을 확정하는 일이다. 악의 전환은 사후 인식과 법정 간주의 경로로 나뉘고, 그 전환에 따라 책임이 달라질 뿐 악의의 시작만으로 모든 범위가 정해지는 것은 아니다. 원인 없는 이익과 손해의 연결이 있고 반환 제한을 피하며 범위가 특정되면 작동하고, 채무 없음을 알고 변제했거나 불법원인급여의 반환 제한에 걸려 법정 예외도 없으면 막히며, 확인할 수 없는 항목은 미확정으로 남는다. 이 판단은 실제 지급이나 회수의 성과까지 말하는 것이 아니고, 법적 통로가 열린 상태를 가리킬 뿐이다. 따라서 분쟁 제기만으로 책임이 넓어지는 것은 막되, 확인된 조건 안에서 정해지는 책임은 그대로 유지한다.
6.12이 권의 결론과 남는 물음
선의의 현존이익 한도와 악의의 이자·손해 배상 범위를 구분한 뒤 남는 물음은, 처음 몰랐던 수익자의 책임이 언제 어떻게 달라지는지와 그 달라짐을 다음 논의로 넘길 때 무엇을 남겨 두어야 하는지이다. 이 절은 앞서 확정한 책임 범위의 구별을 재론하지 않고, 앎의 시점이 바뀌는 두 경로를 구분해 다음 절에 넘길 쟁점을 정리한다.
민법 제749조는 수익자의 악의 인정에 관해 두 항으로 나누어 규정한다. ①항은 "수익자가 이익을 받은 후 법률상 원인없음을 안 때에는 그때부터 악의의 수익자로서 이익반환의 책임이 있다."라고 선언한다. 이 문언은 인식의 대상인 법률상 원인 없음과 인식의 시점인 이익을 받은 후, 그리고 책임의 기산점인 그때를 함께 특정한다. 여기서 수익자는 급부를 받아 이익을 얻은 사람, 즉 장면의 B를 가리키고, 법률상 원인 없음은 급부를 정당화하는 관계가 존재하지 않았다는 사정을 뜻한다. 조문의 다른 쟁점은 이 절의 범위 밖에 있다.
그 문언은 악의 전환의 두 경로 중 첫째를 규정한다. 악의 전환이란 사후 인식 또는 법정 간주에 따라 책임이 달라지는 것을 뜻한다. 사후 인식은 수익자가 스스로 원인 없음을 알아차린 경우이고, 법정 간주는 그런 앎을 인정하기 어려운데도 법이 악의로 보는 경우를 말한다. 민법 제749조 ②항은 "선의의 수익자가 패소한 때에는 그 소를 제기한 때부터 악의의 수익자로 본다."라고 하여, 인식의 실제와 무관하게 소 제기 시점으로 책임의 기준을 옮긴다. 두 경로를 구별해야 하는 까닭은 책임이 달라지는 근거와 시점이 서로 다르기 때문이다.
가장 강한 반론은 분쟁 제기만으로 책임 범위가 넓어질 수 있다는 우려에서 나온다. 현존이익으로 책임을 좁히면 타인의 돈을 쓴 사람이 반환을 피하는 결과가 생긴다고 지적할 수 있고, 반대로 소를 제기한 때를 무조건 악의의 기준으로 삼으면 선량하게 다투던 수익자까지 이자와 손해 부담을 질 수 있다. 이 반론에도 불구하고 이 절은 ②항의 문언에 패소 요건이 함께 붙어 있음을 지적한다. 법이 간주하는 시점은 소 제기 때이지만 그 간주가 성립하려면 선의의 수익자가 패소해야 한다.
이 장면에 주어진 사실은 B가 급부를 받은 뒤에 지급 원인이 없었다는 사정을 알았다는 주장뿐이다. 이 주장이 확인된다면 민법 제749조 ①항의 인식 시점이 문제되고, 그때부터 악의의 수익자로서의 반환 책임이 논의된다. B가 급부를 받을 당시 이미 원인 없음을 알았는지, 남은 이익이 얼마인지, 다툼이 어떤 결과로 끝났는지는 장면에 설정되어 있지 않다. ②항의 법정 간주가 적용되는지도 기록만으로는 판단할 수 없다. "불법원인이 수익자에게만 있음이 확인되면 불법급여라는 이유만의 반환 배제를 고친다."는 이 절의 악의 전환 물음과 직접 연결되지 않으므로 여기서 판정하지 않는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 악의 전환은 사후 인식과 법정 간주라는 서로 다른 두 경로로 일어나며, 후자의 경우에조차 패소라는 요건이 붙어 있다는 것이다. 소를 제기했다는 사정 하나로 수익자를 악의로 확정하거나, 처음 선의였다는 이유로 앎이 생긴 뒤의 보유까지 정당화할 수는 없다. 나아가 이 절은 반환 채무의 성립이나 인격권 침해의 구제 형태를 판정하지 않는다. 책임의 범위를 결정한 뒤에 남는 별도의 물음은 그대로 다음 절로 넘긴다.
Statutes referred to
Questions left open
- 소비된 이익의 잔존을 어떻게 파악할 것인가?
- 원인관계가 복수인 거래에서 반환 상대방은 누구인가?
- 불법원인급여의 예외가 약한 당사자를 충분히 보호하는가?