Summary
Capacity to be a party and litigation capacity are distinguished and determined according to the basis in the relevant law.
1.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
소송에서 이름을 적을 수 있다는 사실이 그 이름으로 모든 행위를 할 능력까지 주지는 않는다. 청구 단계에서 필요한 주문을 분명히 하되 집행권원의 요건은 별도로 충족해야 한다는 전제 아래, 이번 단계는 소장에 적힌 이름이 그 이름을 가진 주체의 행위를 모두 유효하게 만드는지를 묻는다. 단체 A의 대표 B가 단체 이름으로 소를 냈으나 선임자료가 제출되지 않았다는 장면이 바로 이 물음의 출발점이다. 여기서는 소송의 주체가 될 자격과 그 주체가 스스로 소송행위를 할 수 있는지를 나누어 살핀다.
민사소송법 제51조는 “당사자능력, 소송능력, 소송무능력자의 법정대리와 소송행위에 필요한 권한의 수여는 이 법에 특별한 규정이 없으면 민법, 그 밖의 법률에 따른다”고 정한다. 이 문언은 판단 대상으로 네 가지를 나열한다. 소송의 주체가 될 수 있는 자격인 당사자능력, 스스로 소송행위를 할 능력인 소송능력, 무능력자의 법정대리, 그리고 대표 등 권한의 수여다. 조문이 이들을 한 문장에 묶어 둔 것은 판단 근거를 민법과 그 밖의 법률로 되돌리겠다는 뜻이지, 네 가지를 같은 요건으로 보라는 뜻은 아니다.
법원이 이 항목들을 같은 판정으로 합칠 수 없는 까닭은 각각이 묻는 것이 다르기 때문이다. 당사자능력은 누가 소송의 주체가 될 수 있는지를, 소송능력은 그 주체가 혼자 유효하게 소송행위를 할 수 있는지를, 대표권은 단체를 대신할 권한이 특정인에게 있는지를 각각 정한다. 이 셋을 모두 갖추거나 법정 보정·추인을 마친 경우에 한해, 요구하는 급부·당사자·조건이 청구취지에 특정되고 선택한 소의 권리를 방어할 수 있다면 이 구제의 입구가 열린다. 요건을 나누어 세는 일이 곧 요건을 새로 만드는 것은 아니며, 정해진 판단 항목을 지키는 일이다.
구분을 세분하면 정당한 권리자가 문턱에서 멈출 수 있다는 불만이 생긴다. 선임자료 한 장이 없어 소장이 그대로 반환된다면, 권리의 실체와 무관하게 서류 미비만으로 소송이 끊기는 것이다. 이 손실을 가볍게 볼 수는 없다. 그러나 당사자능력과 소송능력을 같은 판단으로 합칠 수는 없다. 두 능력을 하나로 뭉개면 자격이 있는 주체가 행위 능력을 이미 가졌다고 잘못 전제하거나, 그 반대의 경우에 부족한 부분을 보정할 기회를 잃게 된다. 흠을 세분하여 드러내는 편이 보정 가능성을 남기는 길이다.
합성 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 단체 A의 대표 B가 단체 이름으로 소를 냈고 선임자료가 제출되지 않았다는 것뿐이다. 단체 A가 소송의 주체가 될 자격을 가졌는지, 대표 B가 선임되었는지, 그 선임의 효력은 어떠한지는 단체 규약·대표자 선임자료·보정명령·추인서로 확인할 일이다. 그러한 자료가 아직 없으므로 이 항목들은 미확정으로 남는다. 다만 흠이 적법하게 보정·추인되면 보정 전 상태만으로 계속 차단하지 않는다. 자료가 없다는 사실을 곧바로 구제 불능으로 읽어서는 안 된다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 당사자능력과 소송능력을 구분하여 해당 법률의 근거를 따라 판단하고, 둘과 대표권을 갖추거나 법정 보정·추인을 마친 뒤 청구취지가 특정되면 이 구제의 입구가 열린다는 점이다. 허용하지 않는 결론은 이 구별을 접어 두고 통로를 한 번에 개폐하는 판단이며, 미확정인 선임 문제를 확정된 결격으로 대체하는 판단이다.
1.2The Conditions That Block Relief
단체 A의 대표 B가 단체 이름으로 소를 냈으나 선임자료가 제출되지 않았다. 이 장면에서 쟁점은 누가 소를 낼 수 있는지가 아니라, 이미 낸 소의 행위가 그 이름에 귀속될 수 있는가에 관한 것이다. 청구 단계에서 필요한 주문을 분명히 하되 집행권원의 요건은 별도로 충족해야 한다는 전제를 놓고, 제기된 소가 유효한 당사자의 소송행위로 인정되는 조건을 따져야 한다. 소의 명칭과 소의 효력을 나누어 보아야 하는 까닭이 여기에 있다.
이 문제에 대해 민사소송법 제51조는 "당사자능력, 소송능력, 소송무능력자의 법정대리와 소송행위에 필요한 권한의 수여는 이 법에 특별한 규정이 없으면 민법, 그 밖의 법률에 따른다"고 정한다. 이 문언은 네 가지, 즉 당사자능력, 소송능력, 소송무능력자의 법정대리, 소송행위에 필요한 권한의 수여를 나란히 열거한다. 여기서 당사자능력은 소송의 주체가 될 수 있는 자격을 뜻한다. 문언은 이들을 각각 별개의 항목으로 두면서도, 판단의 기준을 민법과 그 밖의 법률에 맡긴다. 조문이 스스로 결론을 주지 않고 판단 근거의 위치만 정하고 있다는 점이 이번 물음의 출발점이다.
위 문언에 따르면 소송의 주체가 될 자격과 그 이름으로 소송행위를 할 능력은 별개로 판단한다. 전자인 당사자능력은 누가 소송의 당사자가 되는지를 정하고, 후자인 소송능력은 그 당사자가 스스로 유효한 소송행위를 할 수 있는지를 정한다. 이 둘을 같은 판단으로 합치면, 소의 명칭이 정해졌다는 이유만으로 그 이름의 모든 행위가 유효해지는 결과가 나온다. 반대로 필요한 것은 두 능력과 대표권이 갖추어졌는지를 각각 확인하는 일이다. 필요한 능력 또는 대표권의 흠이 남아 해당 소송행위를 유효한 것으로 취급할 수 없는 경우, 법정 요건 중 하나라도 충족되지 않으면 구제 통로는 닫힌다.
구분이 복잡하면 정당한 권리자가 문턱에서 멈출 수 있다. 흠을 세분하면 보정 가능한 사안을 지나치게 일찍 배제할 수 있다는 반론은, 문턱의 높이가 아니라 문턱을 세는 횟수를 걱정한다. 이 반론이 겨냥하는 손실은 권리자가 본소송에 나아가지 못하고 절차적 지연 속에서 권리를 잃는 상황이다. 그러나 이 걱정에도 불구하고 당사자능력과 소송능력을 같은 판단으로 합칠 수는 없다. 합치면 두 판단이 동시에 맞거나 동시에 틀린 것으로 취급되어, 자격은 있으나 능력에 흠이 있는 경우와 그 반대의 경우가 구별되지 않는다. 구별은 오히려 보정 가능한 흠을 찾아내어 되돌릴 수 있게 한다.
이 장면에 보이는 사실은 두 가지다. 단체 A의 대표 B가 단체 이름으로 소를 냈고, 선임자료는 제출되지 않았다. 이 사실만으로는 단체 A가 소송의 주체가 될 자격을 가졌는지, 대표 B가 그 자격을 행사할 권한을 가졌는지 확정할 수 없다. 필요한 것은 단체 규약, 대표자 선임자료, 보정명령, 추인서 같은 기록이다. 단체의 동일성이나 대표 선임의 효력을 확인할 자료가 없는 경우, 판단은 미확정으로 남는다. 이는 조건을 바꾼 대조일 뿐, 장면에 실제로 일어난 사실을 말하는 것은 아니다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 소의 이름이 정해졌다는 사실만으로 그 이름으로 한 모든 행위가 유효해지지는 않으며, 당사자능력과 소송능력은 구분하여 판단한다. 필요한 능력과 대표권이 갖추어졌거나 법정 보정·추인을 마친 경우에만 문이 열린다. 반대로 흠이 남아 해당 소송행위를 유효한 것으로 취급할 수 없으면, 법정 요건 중 하나라도 충족되지 않은 것으로 보아 구제 통로는 닫힌다. 자료가 없다는 사실은 곧 구제 불능을 뜻하지 않으며, 미확정으로 남겨 두어야 한다.
1.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
그런데 필요한 능력 또는 대표권의 흠이 남아 해당 소송행위를 유효한 것으로 취급할 수 없는 경우에는 이 구제가 막힌다. 이 막힘과 달리 자료가 없어 판정할 수 없는 상태가 따로 있는가. 이 장면에서 단체의 동일성과 대표 선임의 효력을 무엇으로 확인할 수 있는가. 자료가 없는 상태를 곧 구제가 막힌 상태로 돌려도 되는가. 확인자료의 부재가 무엇을 뜻하는지부터 따져야 한다.
이 물음에 해당하는 근거는 민사소송법 제51조이다. (민사소송법 제51조) 이 문언은 판정의 주체가 될 자격과 그 주체가 소송행위를 할 능력을 나란히 놓고, 각각의 근거를 민법과 그 밖의 법률에서 찾도록 지시한다. 대표 선임의 효력은 소송행위에 필요한 권한의 수여에 관련된 문제로 다룬다.
이 문언이 두 판단을 나란히 두는 까닭은 판정의 단계가 다르기 때문이다. 먼저 소송의 주체로 적을 수 있는 자격이 있는지를 묻고, 다음으로 그 주체가 특정 소송행위를 할 능력과 권한을 갖추었는지를 묻는다. 단체 A가 소송의 주체가 될 자격을 지녔는지와, 대표 B가 단체 이름으로 소를 낼 권한을 유효하게 받았는지는 같은 질문이 아니다. 자료가 없어 후자의 효력을 확인할 수 없으면 그 단계의 판정만 미확정으로 남긴다. 미확정은 흠이 있다는 확정도 아니고 흠이 없다는 확정도 아니다. 이 미확정을 구제가 막힌 확정된 상태와 섞으면, 자료를 보탤 여지가 남은 단계를 앞서 끊어 버린다.
구분을 세분하는 대가가 크다는 반론이 겨냥하는 지점은 분명하다. 흠을 단계별로 나누어 보면 정당한 권리자가 소를 내는 문턱에서 멈추고, 보정 가능한 사안을 지나치게 일찍 배제할 수 있다. 소송의 이름으로 적법하게 다툴 자격이 있는 자가 자료 형식의 문제로 절차 밖으로 밀려나는 불이익도 함께 커진다. 그렇더라도 당사자능력과 소송능력을 같은 판단으로 합칠 수는 없다. 자격의 유무를 묻는 판단과 행위의 효력을 묻는 판단을 한 덩어리로 만들면, 어느 쪽 결론이 다른 쪽을 끌고 가게 된다. 반론이 지적한 문턱의 불이익은 미확정을 구제 불능으로 바꾸지 않는 방식으로 다룬다.
합성 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 소를 단체 A의 대표 B가 단체 이름으로 냈다는 것과, 대표자 선임자료가 제출되지 않았다는 것뿐이다. 단체 A의 동일성을 확인할 자료와 선임의 효력을 확인할 자료가 기록에 없으므로, 단체가 소송의 주체가 될 자격을 지녔는지와 B에게 단체 이름으로 소를 낼 권한이 유효하게 수여되었는지는 이 장면만으로 확정할 수 없다. 다만 자료 미제출을 흠의 확정으로 읽는 것은 허용되지 않는다. 자료가 채워지면 판정이 달라질 수 있으므로 현재 상태는 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 자료가 없어 판정할 수 없는 경우를 미확정으로 남기고, 필요한 능력 또는 대표권의 흠이 남아 구제가 막힌 경우와 구별하는 데까지이다. 자료 미제출만으로 단체의 동일성이나 선임의 효력을 부정하거나, 반대로 그 능력과 권한이 갖추어졌다고 확정하는 것은 이 절의 범위 밖이다. 미확정이라는 표시는 판정을 유보한 것이지 소송행위의 효력을 확정한 것이 아니다.
1.4The Records Needed for Determination
청구 단계에서 필요한 주문을 분명히 하되 집행권원의 요건은 별도로 충족해야 한다. 앞 단계가 청구의 주문을 정리한 뒤에도, 그 주문을 낸 주체가 스스로 소송행위를 마칠 자격을 가졌는지는 별도로 남는다. 이 장면에서 소장에 적힌 이름은 명료하나, 그 이름을 대표할 권한을 보이는 자료는 아직 없다. 그러면 법원은 무엇을 근거로 나아갈 수 있는가.
민사소송법 제51조는 "당사자능력, 소송능력, 소송무능력자의 법정대리와 소송행위에 필요한 권한의 수여는" 먼저 나열한 뒤, "이 법에 특별한 규정이 없으면 민법, 그 밖의 법률에 따른다"라고 정한다(민사소송법 제51조). 이 문언은 네 가지 대상, 즉 당사자능력·소송능력·소송무능력자의 법정대리·소송행위에 필요한 권한의 수여를 함께 다루되, 민사소송법에 특별한 규정이 없으면 민법과 그 밖의 법률을 판단의 준거로 삼는다. 따라서 조문은 어떤 주체가 소송의 주체가 되는지, 그 주체가 스스로 행위를 마치는지, 대리인이 그 행위를 할 권한을 받았는지를 각각 외부 법률에 따라 정하도록 지시한다. 이 절에서는 이 지시가 가리키는 주체와 행위의 분리만을 다룬다.
이 지시가 분리의 근거가 되는 까닭은, 당사자능력은 소송의 주체가 될 수 있는 자격이고 소송능력은 그 주체가 스스로 소송행위를 마칠 수 있는 자격이기 때문이다. 앞의 것은 '누가 서느냐'를, 뒤의 것은 '그가 스스로 무엇을 하느냐'를 각각 묻는다. 단체 A가 소송의 주체가 될 자격을 가졌는지와, 그 단체가 소를 낸 행위가 대표 권한을 갖춘 B에 의한 유효한 소송행위였는지는 같은 질문이 아니다. 그래서 판정은 정해진 기록, 곧 단체 규약·대표자 선임자료·보정명령·추인서에 담긴 자료만을 근거로 삼는다. 없는 기록은 추정으로 메우지 않으며, 자료가 들어오지 않은 상태는 자료가 없는 상태로 남는다.
구분을 세우면 문턱이 높아진다는 반론은 실질적인 손실을 겨냥한다. 흠을 세분하면 보정 가능한 사안을 지나치게 일찍 배제할 수 있고, 자료를 준비할 틈도 없이 정당한 권리자가 절차에서 물러나야 할지 모른다. 기록이 부족한 단계를 그대로 통과시키지 않는 편이 나중에 번복을 줄인다고 생각할 수도 있다. 그러나 저자는 이 반론에도 불구하고 당사자능력과 소송능력을 같은 판단으로 합칠 수는 없다고 답한다. 두 자격이 각기 요건을 달리하므로, 합치는 판단은 어느 한쪽의 흠을 다른 쪽으로 끌어와 둘 다를 넘기거나 둘 다를 막는 방식으로 흐를 수 있다. 반론이 지적한 보정의 여지는, 흠이 적법하게 보정·추인되는 조건 아래에서 남는 것이지, 구별 자체를 없애는 근거는 되지 못한다.
이 사실과 앞의 조건을 대조하면, 대표 선임의 효력을 확인할 자료가 없으므로 해당 소송행위를 유효한 것으로 취급할 단계까지 나아갈 수 없다. 단체의 동일성, 대표 선임의 효력, 이후 보정·추인의 유무는 자료로 확인되지 않는다. 장면에 연도·금액·기산일·판결 결과가 정해지지 않았으므로, 이 절에서는 승패나 이행 결과도 판단하지 않는다. 따라서 현재 기록으로 확정할 수 있는 것은 단계 판정을 정해진 기록에 묶어 두어야 한다는 점이고, 그 밖의 사항은 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 당사자능력과 소송능력을 같은 판단으로 합치지 않되, 어느 쪽의 자격을 인정하는지 여부는 단체 규약·대표자 선임자료·보정명령·추인서의 기록으로만 정한다. 없는 기록을 추정으로 메운다고 하여 주체가 될 자격과 행위를 마칠 능력이 함께 생기지는 않는다. 흠이 적법하게 보정·추인되면 보정 전 상태만으로 계속 차단하지 않으며, 이 문장은 실제 사실의 추가가 아니라 판정 조건 하나를 바꾸는 검사일 뿐이다. 반대로 기록이 여전히 비어 있으면 단계는 열리지 않는다.
1.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
In the preceding section, this determination rests on the association's bylaws, the materials appointing the representative, the order to correct, and the instrument of ratification. Without those records, the conclusion remains undetermined. This determination, which relies on the records, must now be carried one step further. If the circumstances change, as when the appointment materials are furnished belatedly or ratification is made, is the determination previously rendered to remain in place? In other words, what change in circumstances would overturn the determination? This question begins at the stage of distinguishing name from capacity.
The basis for answering this question is Article 51 of the Civil Procedure Act. The subjects this provision addresses are persons who seek to become parties to a lawsuit and persons who seek to perform acts on behalf of or as representative of such a person; the acts are acts of litigation such as bringing or defending an action; and the condition is that the relevant capacities and authority be in place. This section, however, addresses Article 51, and so does not set out here the specific content of the Civil Act or other statutes. The provision merely indicates which law supplies the basis for that judgment.
This basis comes into contact with the conclusion of this section. The reason the determination must be divided in this way is that what is asked is different in each case. Party capacity is the qualification to become the subject of a lawsuit, and litigation capacity is the capacity to validly perform an act of litigation on one's own. One cannot assert that the former becomes an issue only after the latter has been acquired; yet if each is flattened into a single judgment, a person who has acquired the qualification is treated as having passed over the defect in capacity as well. Accordingly, a defect existing at the time the action is brought is assessed against the act of litigation at that time; but if the defect is later lawfully corrected or ratified, the pre-correction state alone cannot continue to bar that act.
The loss this counterargument targets is real. Because the stages have been subdivided, a rights holder who possesses the qualifications but is merely late with one document cannot advance to the substance of the case; time and expense are incurred in the meantime, and in the end the person may turn back at the threshold. In terms of inconvenience and values, the counterargument is not a small one. This answer does not erase the difficulty of the counterargument. Even as it acknowledges that the threshold produced by the distinction remains, it does not permit the method of determining both capacities at once and absorbing the judgment on capacity into the judgment on qualification.
Returning to the synthetic scene, there is only one fact that answers to this question. That fact is only that the record known as the appointment materials is missing; it does not mean that there are no materials to check the identity of Association A or the validity of the appointment of the representative. Accordingly, whether Association A possesses the qualification to become the subject of a lawsuit and whether B is equipped with the authority to perform acts of litigation in its name must each be confirmed. Items that remain unconfirmed for want of materials stay undetermined. The conditional determination, however, that if a defect is lawfully corrected or ratified the pre-correction state alone does not continue to bar it, already holds within the scope already fixed.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. The circumstance that overturns the determination is one in which a defect in the necessary capacity or in the representative authority is lawfully corrected or ratified, and accordingly the pre-correction state alone cannot continue to bar the act of litigation. The conclusion that is not permitted is to merge party capacity and litigation capacity into a single judgment. It must not be read as defending even the case in which a defect remains and the act of litigation in question cannot be treated as valid; nor is it a matter of filling unconfirmed records with conjecture. It does not convert the state of being undetermined into an absence of remedy at once.
1.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
The preceding stage of analysis asked whether the qualification to become a party and the capacity to perform an act of litigation are the same. Taking as a premise that, at the claim stage, the necessary relief must be made clear while the requirements for an enforcement title must be satisfied separately, the analysis now examines the concern that, once the distinction becomes elaborate, a legitimate rights holder may be stopped at the threshold. The scene in which Representative B of Association A brought an action in the name of the association, but no appointment materials were submitted, stands squarely at that threshold. The question is whether one who was able to bring the action may continue to perform acts within the lawsuit, and whether that judgment may be handled bundled as a single mass.
The subjects indicated by this wording are the parties to a lawsuit; the acts are the acts of a party performed within a lawsuit, such as bringing or defending an action; and the condition is that there is no special provision in the Civil Procedure Act. The provision here sets out side by side party capacity, meaning the qualification to become a party to a lawsuit, and litigation capacity, the capacity of that party to perform acts of litigation personally, while attaching the same material to both items. This is to be read not as an instruction to merge the two judgments into one, but as a direction to find each one's legal basis separately.
The reason this wording places the two side by side is that they aim at different things. Party capacity asks whether one has the qualification to become the subject of a lawsuit—that is, whether, under a name recognized in procedural law, one can stand in the position of facing the opposing party in the lawsuit. Litigation capacity asks whether one who has already secured that position can validly perform acts of litigation on one's own. The former is not a question of name but of qualification, and the latter does not stop at whether one has the qualification but extends to the effect of the act. This is precisely why, at the preceding stage, it was asked separately whether the qualification to become a party and the capacity to perform an act of litigation are the same. If the two questions are covered by a single answer, then even the case in which one has not lost the qualification but has a defect in capacity receives the same treatment.
What the counterargument that, once the distinction becomes elaborate, a legitimate rights holder may be stopped at the threshold targets most sharply here is the risk that the method of subdividing minor defects and judging them may exclude curable matters too early. From the standpoint of an association or a representative unable to assemble the documents, the moment the court raises capacity as an issue, the door appears to have closed; beneath this lie the loss of being unable to reach a trial at all, and the real inconvenience of losing a right over a single document. Yet notwithstanding this counterargument, party capacity and litigation capacity cannot be merged into a single judgment. Even in the case where a defect in capacity remains and the act of litigation in question cannot be treated as valid, that treatment is dealt with as a question not of whether the qualification exists but of the effect of the act in question, and if the defect is lawfully corrected or ratified, the pre-correction state alone does not continue to bar it.
Viewing this scene only in terms of the facts that answer to this question, the point that Representative B of Association A brought an action in the name of the association is a scene in which the association asserted its qualification to stand as the subject of a lawsuit, while the point that no appointment materials were submitted means that there are as yet no underlying materials with which B may exercise the representative authority. The materials necessary for the determination are fixed as the association's bylaws, the materials appointing the representative, the order to correct, and the instrument of ratification. The scene, however, has made no provision of materials to check the identity of the association or the validity of the appointment of the representative, and so until the materials are assembled the question of that representation remains undetermined. This state of being undetermined does not itself mean deprivation of the qualification, and the lack of materials must not be written up as exclusion at the threshold.
The conclusion this section can put forward is narrow. Party capacity is the qualification to become the subject of a lawsuit, and litigation capacity is the capacity to act of one who holds that qualification, and the two cannot be merged and determined as a single judgment. If the question whether the qualification is absent and the question whether there is a defect in capacity are put through the same door, matters that are filled in by correction readily lead at once to a waiver of rights. Conversely, this conclusion does not extend to rendering a judgment that the existence or nonexistence of the qualification has been confirmed, or that the defect in capacity has been lawfully remedied; each rung of judgment becomes possible only after the relevant materials have been assembled.
1.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
In this scene the problem is whether Representative B, merely because the name was written in the document, may perform all acts of litigation in that name. In the preceding section the premise that "party capacity and litigation capacity cannot be merged into a single judgment" has already been received. On the basis of this premise, it must be examined whether the qualification to become a party and the capacity to perform an act of litigation are the same thing, or whether they are matters to be judged separately in each case.
The basis for answering this question is Article 51 of the Civil Procedure Act. Its wording provides that "Party capacity, litigation capacity, the legal representation of a person without litigation capacity, and the conferral of authority necessary for acts of litigation shall, unless this Act contains special provisions therefor, be governed by the Civil Act and other statutes" (Article 51 of the Civil Procedure Act). This provision enumerates four subjects together—party capacity, litigation capacity, the legal representation of a person without litigation capacity, and the conferral of authority necessary for acts of litigation—while entrusting their criteria of judgment to the Civil Act and other statutes. The very manner in which the provision calls them side by side presupposes that they are distinct concepts.
Connecting this wording with the foregoing distinction, the judgment that party capacity is in place and the judgment that litigation capacity is in place must each be rendered according to a separate basis. Party capacity is the qualification to become the subject of a lawsuit, and the recognition of this qualification does not by itself produce, in that subject or in one who stands in its stead, the capacity to perform acts of litigation. Article 51 of the Civil Procedure Act enumerates the two together while directing that "unless this Act contains special provisions therefor, [they] shall be governed by the Civil Act and other statutes" (Article 51 of the Civil Procedure Act). Accordingly, the mere fact that one of them has been satisfied cannot be taken to mean that the other has been satisfied as well.
The price of subdividing the distinction, however, is not nothing. If defects are subdivided, curable matters may be excluded too early, and a legitimate rights holder may be stopped at the threshold. If the complaint submitted by Representative B in the name of the association is rejected on the sole ground of a defect in litigation capacity or in the representative authority, when party capacity is in place, that disadvantage arises from something that could be covered by one document. This disadvantage must not be erased. For if the two concepts are merged, the structure of judgment that Article 51 entrusts to the bases of different statutes collapses.
What can be confirmed in the synthetic scene is the fact that Representative B brought an action in the name of Association A and the fact that no appointment materials were submitted. On the basis of these two facts alone, the identity of Association A or the validity of the appointment of the representative cannot be confirmed. What content the unsubmitted appointment materials had, and what the nature of the defect is, the scene likewise does not determine. Therefore, on the basis of this scene alone, whether the act of litigation can be treated as valid remains undetermined. What is confirmed is only the basis for the judgment that the two capacities cannot be bundled and treated under a single judgment.
The conclusion this section permits is that party capacity and litigation capacity be distinguished and judged according to the bases of the respective statutes. The existence or nonexistence of this qualification and the effect of acts done in that name must not be merged into a single question. Conversely, what this conclusion does not permit is to fix the other side in place by satisfaction of one side alone, or to render a definitive conclusion in advance on the ground of materials that were not submitted.
1.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Taking into account that, at the claim stage, the necessary relief must be made clear while the requirements for an enforcement title must be satisfied separately, the analysis now raises the question faced in the scene where Representative B of Association A brought an action in the name of the association but no appointment materials were submitted. The question is whether the name written in the complaint brings with it both the qualification to be recognized as the subject of the lawsuit and the capacity for acts done in that name to be recognized as valid.
The wording corresponding to this question is Article 51 of the Civil Procedure Act. Here party capacity means the qualification to become the subject of a lawsuit, and litigation capacity means the capacity to validly perform an act of litigation on one's own. The provision sets the two side by side without treating them as a single mass, and turns its gaze to the criteria of judgment—the Civil Act and other statutes.
This wording supports the proposition that the qualification to become a party and the capacity to perform an act of litigation are not the same subject of judgment. The first step of the determination is whether the subject bearing this name is equipped with the qualification to become a party to the trial, and the second step is whether the subject that has acquired the qualification possesses the capacity to validly perform acts of litigation on its own and the necessary authority. Even if one passes the preceding step, the following step must be confirmed separately, and that confirmation too, unless the Civil Procedure Act contains special provisions, follows the bases of the Civil Act and other statutes. If the two steps are merged into one judgment, the existence or nonexistence of the qualification is read in place of the existence or nonexistence of capacity.
Once the distinction is set up, the inconvenience is plain that, in matters where the defect is small, the rights holder may be stopped at the threshold first. If the action brought in the name appears to have been excluded from the outset merely because one item of appointment materials was not submitted, the substantive matter may be lost by passing over the place where correction was possible. This answer does not remove the inconvenience; it means that first distinguishing to which capacity the defect pertains is precisely the first step in dealing with that defect. The state in which the necessary materials are lacking remains undetermined, and it does not mean that relief has already come to an end.
In the synthetic scene, the fact that bears on this question is the passage that Representative B of Association A brought an action in the name of the association but no appointment materials were submitted. The name that brought the action is Association A, and the person who was to bring that action is designated as Representative B. The appointment materials are one type of the association's bylaws and materials appointing the representative, and correspond to the materials to check whether Representative B holds the authority to represent the association. At present, without these materials, the identity of Association A or the validity of the appointment of the representative cannot be confirmed, and so it cannot be determined in which capacity the defect lies. If the defect is lawfully corrected or ratified, the pre-correction state alone does not continue to bar it, but this sentence is only an inspection under altered conditions and is not something that actually occurred in the scene.
The boundary this section draws is as follows. It is not permitted to treat party capacity as in place merely because a name was written in the complaint, nor, conversely, to deny litigation capacity as well merely because the appointment materials are absent. What this section answers is that qualification and capacity be distinguished and judged according to the bases of the respective statutes, and whether Association A can stand as the subject of the trial and whether its acts of litigation are treated as valid remain as different questions.
1.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
Before this scene, the question whether the qualification to become a party and the capacity to perform acts of litigation are one and the same arises once more. With nothing more than the preceding rule that the demand required at the claim stage must be made clear while the requirements for an enforceable title must be satisfied separately, it treats as distinct questions the qualification upon which the name that brought this lawsuit stands and the authority to act held by the representative of that name. This section examines only how the provision in question establishes that distinction.
The provision in question is the text of Article 51 of the Civil Procedure Act. That Article provides: "Article 51 (Principles Governing Party Capacity, Litigation Capacity, and the Like) Party capacity, litigation capacity, the statutory representation of a person without litigation capacity, and the conferral of authority necessary for acts of litigation shall, unless this Act contains special provisions, be governed by the Civil Act and other statutes." (Civil Procedure Act, Article 51) The subjects addressed by this text are the person seeking to become a party to a lawsuit and the person seeking to act as that person's agent or representative, and the acts are those performed within a lawsuit, such as filing a claim, asserting a claim, and mounting a defense. The condition is the absence of special provisions in this Act, and the basis of decision is the Civil Act and other statutes. That the text lists four items together—party capacity, litigation capacity, the statutory representation of a person without litigation capacity, and the conferral of authority necessary for acts of litigation—is no accidental arrangement.
The manner in which that text is applied to the acts of litigation of a valid party is settled. Only the wording within the scope of the source provision is used as the basis for the determination, without extending to the reasons for the judgment or to other paragraphs. Here, party capacity means the qualification to become a party to a lawsuit, and litigation capacity means the capacity to perform acts of litigation oneself. Why these two must be distinguished is the heart of this question, because although the text lists the four items each under its own name, it does not say that the determination of one item substitutes for the determination of another. Whether the qualification exists is examined by the criteria of subjecthood prescribed by the Civil Act and other statutes, while whether the authority to act exists is examined separately by the criteria of agency and representation prescribed by the same statutes. Passing one does not automatically resolve the other.
That a complex distinction may stop a rightful holder of a right at the threshold is a real inconvenience, and the worry that subdividing defects may exclude too early matters capable of correction is also hard to shake off. If the result of inquiring separately into two qualifications, where submitting appointment materials alone would have sufficed, is to send the matter back with a dismissal, that in itself means a legitimate claim is extinguished. While acknowledging this loss, the conclusion stands. The moment the two are merged, it is no longer kept separate whether the absence of the former entails the absence of the latter, or whether a defect in the latter extends to the absence of the former, and the legal bases that the text fixes for each item become entangled as well. On the contrary, merging them into a single determination makes it impossible to explain which law was applied, and also makes it difficult to identify in time defects that are capable of correction.
Only two facts are confirmed in the synthetic scene: that Representative B of Organization A filed a lawsuit in the name of the organization, and that the appointment materials were not submitted. Contrasting these facts with the conditions stated above confirms that Representative B acted on behalf of Organization A and that the appointment materials that would serve as the basis for that authority are not in the record. In this case, whether the conferral of authority necessary for acts of litigation has been furnished, as the text in question requires, must be determined in accordance with the Civil Act and other statutes. Whether Organization A has the qualification to become a party to a lawsuit—that is, party capacity—is examined separately according to the same statutes' criteria of subjecthood. However, because there are no materials to check the identity of the organization or the effect of the appointment of the representative, neither can be established on the scene alone. The materials to check are the organization's articles, the materials for the appointment of the representative, the order to correct, and the instrument of ratification.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. The text of the source provision separately prescribes party capacity, litigation capacity, statutory representation, and the conferral of authority, and that distinction applies as it stands to the determination of the acts of litigation of a valid party. The mere fact that a name can be entered as that of the lawsuit cannot support the view that the representative of that name is equipped with the capacity to perform every act. Conversely, the mere fact that the appointment materials are absent cannot be said to negate even Organization A's party capacity. That the cases divide between those where a defect in the necessary capacity or representative authority remains so that the act of litigation in question cannot be treated as valid, and those where the defect has been lawfully corrected or ratified so that the state before correction does not continue to bar it, is likewise a result of the same distinction, and this section marks only that boundary. The outcome of the judgment, victory or defeat, and recovery performance cannot be established from the scene.
1.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
This scene shows that the act of filing a lawsuit in a disclosed name does not of itself render valid every subsequent act within that name. According to the conclusion carried over, the qualification to become a party and the capacity to perform acts of litigation are not the same thing, and the basis of each must be sought separately. Then, even where a party has already been recognized as a valid party, can that party's acts of litigation be viewed only as a single lump? Can it be said that acts following the complaint filed in the name of the organization—such as applications to correct, appeals, confessions, and settlements—are all placed in the same position?
To answer this question, the wording that serves as the basis of decision must first be fixed. The subject to which this wording refers is the party that raises issues of the qualification to become a party to a lawsuit and the capacity to perform acts of litigation, and further of statutory representation or the conferral of necessary authority; the acts are the acts of litigation that subject performs in court. The condition is that, where the Civil Procedure Act contains no special provision, the standards of the Civil Act and other statutes govern. This wording fixes not a single determination but a rule that divides which law shall govern each of a plurality of items.
Article 51 divides the items because they point to different qualifications and capacities. Here, party capacity means the qualification to become a party to a lawsuit; it is a question of the qualification to conduct a lawsuit in that name. Litigation capacity is a question of whether the subject possessing that qualification has the capacity to perform acts of litigation oneself; qualification and capacity are two stages differing in their object and statutory basis. The conferral of authority necessary for these two items leads, in turn, to the questions of agency and authorization. The conclusion of this section is that this distinction must be maintained, and that within the stage of the acts of litigation of a valid party, the parts to be separately determined are limited to the three conditions of the case where they operate, the case where they are barred, and the case where they remain undetermined. The case where they operate is one in which party capacity, litigation capacity, and representative authority are in place, or in which statutory correction and ratification have been completed; the case where they are barred is one in which a defect in the necessary capacity or representative authority remains so that the act of litigation cannot be treated as valid. The detailed subdivisions within the stage are limited to these conditions.
The price of subdividing the distinction—that a rightful holder of a right may be stopped at the threshold—does not disappear. Because qualification and capacity must be examined separately, matters capable of correction may be excluded too early, and a party may appear who turns back at the doors of the lawsuit for the sole reason of failing to prepare a single sheet of appointment materials. This disadvantage is the real cost the distinction creates. Because the statutory bases of the two items diverge under Article 51, merging them produces wrong results in matters where the absence of qualification and the absence of capacity must be treated as different things. This points in the same direction as not declaring immediately, upon a shortage of materials, that no relief is possible.
The range that can be determined on the facts given in this scene alone is narrow. The fact that Representative B of Organization A filed a lawsuit in the name of the organization but that the appointment materials were not submitted means that the lawsuit was instituted in a state where the appointment materials that would form the basis of representative authority do not speak to the validity of that act. Once the organization's articles, the materials for the appointment of the representative, the order to correct, and the instrument of ratification are confirmed, the defect in representative authority and whether it has been corrected can be weighed. However, where there are no materials to check the identity of the organization or the effect of the appointment of the representative, the matter remains undetermined, and that state does not forthwith become a ground for barring. The non-submission of the appointment materials does not immediately establish the absence of representative authority, and which parts among the subsequent acts of litigation of a valid party are barred is likewise not settled by this scene alone.
The conclusion permitted in this section is that, in determining the acts of litigation of a valid party, defects in qualification, capacity, and representative authority are divided only into the three conditions of the case where they operate, the case where they are barred, and the case where they remain undetermined; only the parts falling under those conditions are determined again, and the two capacities are not merged into a single determination. Beyond this, the remedial procedure for a defect in representative authority, the retroactive reach of ratification after correction, and the boundary between correction of a defect and substitution of a party cannot be settled here.
1.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
Is the qualification to become a party the same as the capacity to perform acts of litigation? The preceding stage confirmed only the point that the two qualifications must be examined separately; now, on the basis of that distinction, it must be determined when the acts of litigation of a valid party are opened and when they are barred. The question is what must be in place for an act such as filing a complaint or making a statement at oral argument to remain valid as such.
In answering this question, reference is made to Article 51 of the Civil Procedure Act. Its text reads as follows: "Party capacity, litigation capacity, the statutory representation of a person without litigation capacity, and the conferral of authority necessary for acts of litigation shall, unless this Act contains special provisions, be governed by the Civil Act and other statutes." This Article places the four side by side yet refers the basis of determination to the respective statutes; here, party capacity and litigation capacity are distinguished and determined according to the basis of the statutes concerned. Party capacity means the qualification to become a party to a lawsuit, and litigation capacity is the question whether the person who has acquired that qualification can perform acts of litigation personally.
The reason these two concepts are separated is that the stages of determination differ. Asking whether one has the qualification to have one's name entered on a document is the first stage; asking whether acts done in that name remain valid is the next. Even after passing the first stage, a separate authority—representative authority—may still be required. The condition for opening is that party capacity, litigation capacity, and representative authority are in place, or that statutory correction and ratification have been completed. Conversely, the condition for barring is that a defect in the necessary capacity or representative authority remains so that the act of litigation in question cannot be treated as valid. If the two stages are lumped together at once, it becomes impossible to know which qualification is defective, and hence impossible even to fix the direction of correction or ratification.
The concern may be raised that a complex distinction may stop a rightful holder of a right at the threshold. Subdividing defects may exclude too early matters capable of correction, and a right holder unfamiliar with formal procedure may turn back before even learning what must be prepared. If the matter is rejected in a single lump without asking what kind of capacity is required, the route of correction or ratification suited to the nature of the defect is blocked. The way to lighten the burden of this concern lies in lawfully correcting and ratifying the defect that remains after the two qualifications are separated; once the defect is lawfully corrected or ratified, the state before correction does not continue to bar.
The circumstances presented in the synthetic scene are now compared with these standards. Here, whether Organization A has the qualification to become a party to a lawsuit and whether Representative B received the authority to act in that name are distinct questions. Because the appointment materials are the record that confirms the effect of the appointment of the representative, the circumstance that they were not submitted remains in the realm of the undetermined. For want of materials to check the identity of the organization or the effect of the appointment of the representative, neither opening nor barring can be asserted. What determinations the organization's articles, the materials for the appointment of the representative, the order to correct, and the instrument of ratification will serve as the basis for is a matter to be decided only after the materials have been gathered.
The boundary between the conclusions this section permits and those it does not is drawn as follows. Where capacity and authority are in place, or where a defect has been lawfully corrected or ratified, the act of litigation in question may be treated as valid; where a defect remains so that it cannot be treated as valid, it is barred. Where matters cannot be confirmed for want of materials, they are left undetermined, and this is not converted immediately into a bar. Opening, barring, and the undetermined: these three are marked separately without mixing and then adjudicated.
1.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
The conclusion reached up to the preceding stage is carried over here in a single sentence: at the claim stage, the necessary disposition must be made clear, while the requirements for an enforceable title must be satisfied separately. The question of the qualification of the entity indicated by the act of writing a name, and the question whether acts such as filing a complaint or filing an answer may be performed in that name, are placed on different axes. This section asks where these two axes diverge.
The relevant provision is set out in Civil Procedure Act Article 51. That Article declares: "Party capacity, litigation capacity, the legal representation of persons without litigation capacity, and the conferral of authority necessary for acts of litigation shall, except as otherwise specially provided in this Act, be governed by the Civil Act and other Acts" (Civil Procedure Act Article 51). Here, party capacity denotes the qualification to be the subject of a lawsuit, while litigation capacity denotes the ability of a person possessing that qualification to perform valid acts of litigation on his or her own. Legal representation and the conferral of authority are again written alongside them as separate items.
The reason this provision places the three items side by side is to establish distinct standards of adjudication. A person lacking party capacity cannot occupy the position of the subject of a lawsuit, so the existence or absence of the qualification as a subject is at issue before litigation capacity can even be asked. Conversely, where party capacity is present but litigation capacity or the conferral of representative authority is deficient, whether the act of bringing that action or subsequent acts of litigation can be treated as valid becomes a separate matter for adjudication. The provision leaves this determination to the Civil Act and other Acts, except as otherwise specially provided in this Act. Accordingly, if the two capacities are merged into a single question, the result of the judgment on qualification as a subject will be absorbed automatically into the judgment on capacity to act, or vice versa.
If the distinction is carried too far, the inconvenience may arise that, in cases involving a defect, the rightful holder is stopped at the threshold, or a curable problem is excluded too early. Suppose the representative, B, of Organization A brought an action in the name of the association, but the document of appointment was not submitted. If the action itself is turned back at once on the ground of the absence of the document of appointment, the room for correction that might later be made disappears. That adverse consequence should not be effaced. If the two are distinguished and adjudicated according to the respective legal bases applicable to each, defects in qualification as a subject and defects in capacity to act can each be dealt with in their proper place, and defects capable of correction or ratification are left a place where that procedure may be followed.
What is confirmed in this scene is only the fact that the association brought the action in its own name, the fact that Representative B brought that action, and the fact that the document of appointment was not submitted. Whether Organization A possesses the qualification as a subject to be tried in its own name is not established by this scene alone, and it is likewise undetermined whether authority to represent the association was validly conferred on Representative B. If one adjudicative condition here is altered, then, where the defect has been validly corrected or ratified, the state prior to correction alone does not continue to bar the matter. Which of the association's articles, the document appointing the representative, an order to correct, or an instrument of ratification was submitted is not settled by the scene, so the lack of materials in this section cannot be declared irremediable. Whether a defect in the required capacity or representative authority remains, such that the act of litigation cannot be treated as valid, is still open.
What this section permits is confirmation of the principle that party capacity and litigation capacity are distinguished and each adjudicated according to the relevant legal basis. To declare, solely from the name written in the complaint, that party capacity is recognized for the principal bearing that name, or to declare, solely because party capacity is recognized, that every act of litigation performed in that name is valid, are conclusions this section does not permit. Conversely, it is equally impermissible to declare that all acts of litigation are void merely because one defect has been confirmed. This distinction only sets the starting point for the judgments that follow. Can an unincorporated association, too, be tried in its own name?