Summary
A successor's intervention in the litigation carries the statutory retroactive effect of interrupting prescription and complying with time limits.
4.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
Because of a transfer of rights, the temporal protection of a lawsuit already in progress may be cut off. Following the conclusion of the previous stage that the conduct of the lawsuit by a selected party can be explained only where there is a common interest and a proper selection, the present question points to where the standard for opening the channel of this remedy lies. Here the channel of this remedy means the threshold at which the route of entering the lawsuit by exercising another's rights or by asserting succession is permitted, and that threshold is judged not by the timing or manner of participation but by what the participant asserts as its ground and what it demands.
The provision corresponding to this question is Article 81 of the Civil Procedure Act. That Article provides: "Where, while a lawsuit is pending in court, a third party asserts that it has succeeded to all or part of the right or obligation that is the subject-matter of the lawsuit and participates in the lawsuit pursuant to Article 79, such participation shall, retroactively to the time when the lawsuit was first pending in court, have the effect of interrupting the statute of limitations or of complying with statutory periods." Here the subject is the third party who enters while the lawsuit is pending, the act is participation made while asserting succession, and the condition is that the requirements for participation under Article 79 are satisfied. What this text directly addresses is what temporal effect such participation has upon the interruption of the statute of limitations or the observance of statutory periods.
The effect indicated by this basis is that participation, retroacting to the time when the case was first pending, preserves the interruption of the statute of limitations or the observance of periods, and the conclusion stated by the author explains that threshold as lying somewhat further forward. That is, the entrance to this remedy is opened where the basis of the claim to be preserved in subrogation and the need for preservation, or the basis of the right to conduct the lawsuit arising from selection or succession, is recognized. In this judgment, the basis of the claim to be preserved and the specification of the statement of claim are distinct stages. The former determines why another's rights may be exercised, the latter what is demanded; accordingly one cannot substitute for the other.
The counterargument that abuse of assertions of succession renders the procedure unstable aims at the point that actual loss falls upon those who frequently cross this threshold. If the temporal protection already secured by a true successor is swayed by a false assertion, that person's legal position is shaken, and an inconvenience also arises whereby one who wishes to drag out the lawsuit commandeers the flow of the procedure by nothing more than an assertion of succession. Even so, however, the temporal effect of participation cannot be converted into a determination of the substance of succession. What the Article confers is only the effect of interrupting the statute of limitations and observing periods by reason of retroactivity; it is not a declaration that the participant has been confirmed as a successor, and therefore the determination of the substance is left to a separate judgment.
In the synthetic scene, Creditor A seeks to exercise the rights of Debtor B but has not separately presented the basis of its own claim and of the need for preservation. Contrasted with the foregoing conditions, in this scene the basis of the claim to be preserved in subrogation and of the need for preservation is not revealed, and so the channel for exercising another's rights remains unopened. Whether materials evidencing actual succession were submitted, whether it is all or part of the rights and obligations, and whether the assertion of succession is true are all unconfirmed. Even assuming a case in which the existence of the claim to be preserved is confirmed to be denied, this scene alone does not lead to that determination, and so the matter remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is that where the basis of succession or the basis of the right to conduct the lawsuit is recognized, the demand is specified in the statement of claim, and the chosen action can be defended, the entrance to this remedy is opened; and it extends to the point that such participation has the retroactive effect, provided by law, of interrupting the statute of limitations and observing periods. The conclusion it does not permit is that participation itself determines the substance of succession, or that the participant is judged to have actually obtained the fruits of recovery or performance. What remains unconfirmed for want of material is merely undetermined and does not immediately mean the denial of the channel.
4.2The Conditions That Block Relief
Amid such concerns, the question opens of how the time of the lawsuit continues when a right has passed to another. Where the basis of the claim to be preserved in subrogation and the need for preservation, or the basis of the right to conduct the lawsuit arising from selection or succession, is recognized, this remedy operates. Yet the operating conditions already determined above at once teach what the conditions of blockage are as well. In this scene, the criterion dividing whether the temporal protection of the lawsuit already in progress continues or is cut off must be examined separately.
Participation in the lawsuit by a successor means the participation of a person who asserts that he has taken over the rights and obligations. Article 81 of the Civil Procedure Act concerning it provides that where, while a lawsuit is pending in court, a third party asserts that it has succeeded to all or part of the right or obligation that is the subject-matter of the lawsuit and participates in the lawsuit pursuant to Article 79, such participation shall, retroactively to the time when the lawsuit was first pending in court, have the effect of interrupting the statute of limitations or of complying with statutory periods. This text takes the third party as the subject, participation in the lawsuit under Article 79 as the act, and the assertion of succession as the condition. And its effect is bound to the retroactivity of the interruption of the statute of limitations and the observance of statutory periods.
The retroactivity of the temporal effect prescribed by Article 81 arises only when the requirements for participation are satisfied. One cannot read it to mean that, merely because the participant asserts succession, the substantive transfer of rights has already been confirmed. Participation is a procedural act, and the retroactive effect attaching to that act is the form of temporal protection that the law confers on that participation. Where the subrogating creditor's claim to be preserved is not recognized, or where there is no legal ground for conducting the lawsuit for another, this remedy is blocked. The fact that the retroactivity of the temporal effect is fixed does not erase the antecedent condition that the basis for the conduct of subrogation itself must be recognized.
The counterargument that abuse of assertions of succession renders the procedure unstable is sufficiently weighty. If temporal protection can be obtained by an assertion of succession alone from the position of exercising another's rights, then when that assertion diverges from the facts the opposing party bears the burden of a defense prepared late and of new procedure. The confusion the counterargument points out cannot be resolved in a manner that goes beyond the scope of the retroactive effect prescribed by Article 81 to insert into that participation the determination of substantive succession as well. That substantive confirmation would be required is the disadvantageous point of the counterargument; acknowledging that point, the settled conclusion is nonetheless maintained.
The fact fixed in the synthetic scene is only one: Creditor A seeks to exercise the rights of Debtor B but has not separately presented the basis of its own claim and of the need for preservation. Contrasting this fact with the conditions determined earlier, it is difficult to view the subrogating creditor's claim to be preserved as recognized, and no legal ground for conducting the lawsuit for another has been revealed. Accordingly, whether the conduct of the lawsuit regarding another's rights is possible remains undetermined on this scene alone. However, whether there was an assertion of succession or participation under Article 79 in the scene, and whether actual materials of the claim to be preserved, a selection document, succession materials, or an application for participation were submitted, is not stated in it, and as to those matters it remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is one. This judgment does not lead to the meaning of taking an assertion of succession alone as confirming a substantive transfer of rights, nor does it reach the point of making the retroactive effect of Article 81 a basis that covers even the lack of antecedent ground for the conduct of subrogation. Conversely, the conclusion that the temporal protection of a lawsuit already in progress was of course cut off cannot be fixed in this paragraph either.
4.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Although it was shown above that a common interest and a proper selection are required before the conduct of the lawsuit by a selected party can be explained, that judgment alone cannot fill the gap that remains after a right passes during the pendency of the lawsuit. When a right has passed, how does the time of the lawsuit continue? This question becomes clear only when a separate boundary is set for what cannot be determined for want of materials of judgment.
Article 81 of the Civil Procedure Act states the condition in these words: "Where, while a lawsuit is pending in court, a third party asserts that it has succeeded to all or part of the right or obligation that is the subject-matter of the lawsuit and participates in the lawsuit pursuant to Article 79, such participation shall, retroactively to the time when the lawsuit was first pending in court..." Here 'a person who asserts that he has succeeded to all or part of the right or obligation that is the subject-matter of the lawsuit' refers to the participant who asserts that he has taken over the right, and this section calls this succession participation. When that participation takes the form prescribed by Article 79, the retroactive effect of interrupting the statute of limitations and observing periods provided by law attaches to it.
This text draws a clear line between the assertion of succession and the substance of that assertion. The temporal effect depends on whether a person who participated after the lawsuit became pending 'asserted' succession in proper form; it does not presuppose any determination of whether the right has in fact passed. On the premise of this distinction, the author takes the view that where the legal relationship between the right-holder and the person conducting the lawsuit is unclear, matters as to which the materials of judgment are unspecified remain undetermined, distinguished from impossibility. If the absence of a substantive judgment is elevated into a condition governing the temporal effect of procedural participation, the structure in which the Article has bound the two things separately is undone.
The counterargument that abuse of assertions of succession renders the procedure unstable has real weight. If the right-holder's direct participation is required, there are positions where the exercise of rights through the person conducting the lawsuit is needed to the point that collective and subrogatory protection of rights would in fact be blocked, and the stage requiring a legal ground for exercising another's rights is also entangled here. Even so, the temporal effect of participation cannot be converted into a determination of the substance of succession. The position where participation, once it takes proper form, obtains the temporal protection of interruption of the statute of limitations or observance of statutory periods, and the position where it is judged whether that participant is in fact a successor, each remain. The instability the counterargument points out is not a problem arising from mixing the two.
The fact directly entangled with this question in this scene is only that no basis for conducting the lawsuit regarding another's rights was presented. Which of the materials of the claim to be preserved, the selection document, the succession materials, and the application for participation was submitted is likewise not determined by this scene alone. This gap, where the materials of judgment are unspecified, means neither that the assertion of having taken over the right is false nor that the formal requirements for participation have been met, and it remains undetermined as stated earlier. However, as an examination that changes one of the adjudication conditions, if the existence of the claim to be preserved is denied, the conclusion regarding eligibility in the subrogation lawsuit changes.
The scope this section permits is as follows: where a person who asserts succession to a right participates in proper form, temporal protection retroacting to the time when the lawsuit was first pending arises. On the other hand, because whether the participant has substantively succeeded is not determined within the temporal effect of this participation, the position where materials are lacking is left vacant and undetermined without a determination on the merits, and that gap cannot be declared to be an impossibility barring the effect of participation. Matters that cannot be adjudicated in this section are left as they are.
4.4The Records Needed for Determination
Accepting the premise that a common interest and a proper selection are required before the conduct of the lawsuit by a selected party can be explained, the question is whether the time of the lawsuit already begun remains unbroken after the right has passed. In this scene, it remains at issue who continues the time of the lawsuit in what capacity.
Article 81 of the Civil Procedure Act provides as follows: "Where, while a lawsuit is pending in court, a third party asserts that it has succeeded to all or part of the right or obligation that is the subject-matter of the lawsuit and participates in the lawsuit pursuant to Article 79, such participation shall, retroactively to the time when the lawsuit was first pending in court, have the effect of interrupting the statute of limitations or of complying with statutory periods." This text takes as its subject the third party during the pendency of the lawsuit. That third party participates while asserting that he has succeeded to all or part of the right or obligation that is the subject-matter of the lawsuit. Here succession participation means the participation of a person who asserts that he has taken over the rights and obligations. The conditions are that a lawsuit is pending in court and that participation is made under Article 79, and its effect is the retroactivity of the interruption of the statute of limitations and the observance of statutory periods.
The temporal protection this Article gives and the adjudication criterion established at this stage lie in different dimensions. The retroactive effect fixed by the statutory text is the temporal effect attaching to the procedural act of participation, while the stage adjudication is the work of ascertaining the relationship between the right-holder and the person conducting the lawsuit on the basis of the settled records. The stage is therefore adjudicated solely on the materials recorded in the materials of the claim to be preserved, the selection document, the succession materials, and the application for participation. If missing records are filled in by inference, the work of confirming when the retroactive effect arises and the work of determining who may assert that effect become entangled. Only by distinguishing the two does it appear precisely what the temporal effect of participation attaches to.
The counterargument that abuse of assertions of succession renders the procedure unstable targets actual loss. Since temporal protection retroacts into the past as soon as a third party participates asserting succession, a rash assertion invoking a transfer of rights can shake the certainty of the procedure. Nor is the inconvenience slight whereby, for collective and subrogatory protection of rights to be achieved, the right-holder's direct participation is in fact blocked. The Article recognizes the retroactive effect on the premise of a case of participating while "asserting" succession; it does not make the substantive confirmation of that assertion a requirement. While the instability the counterargument points out remains as it is, it cannot be resolved by placing the ground of the temporal effect upon substantive confirmation.
Returning to the synthetic scene, Creditor A seeks to exercise the rights of Debtor B but has not separately presented the basis of its own claim and of the need for preservation. On what is recorded in this scene, no material supporting A's claim to be preserved or the need for preservation is revealed. The contents entered in the succession materials or the application for participation are also unconfirmed. Accordingly, this scene alone cannot adjudicate in what capacity the time of the lawsuit continues. The state in which the legal relationship between the right-holder and the person conducting the lawsuit is unclear remains undetermined. This undetermined status does not immediately mean that no relief is available; it is limited to determining what records are to be examined.
The conclusion permitted is that participation in the lawsuit by a successor carries the retroactive effect, provided by law, of interrupting the statute of limitations and observing periods. What is not permitted is a conclusion that converts the temporal effect of participation into a determination of the substance of succession, or one that fills in missing records by inference.
4.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
Taking up the conclusion of the preceding step—that the selected party's conduct of the lawsuit can be explained only where there is a common interest and a proper selection—this step is confined to two questions: how the time of the lawsuit continues when a right has been transferred, and which of the changes involved overturns the determinations of the existing stage. Unlike the preceding step, which addressed the basis for the selected party's conduct, this step examines how, where a succession to rights or obligations occurs during the pendency of the lawsuit, that succession handles the temporal protection of proceedings already carried out.
The text corresponding to this question is Article 81 of the Civil Procedure Act. The subject prescribed by this provision is a person who claims to have succeeded, while the lawsuit is pending, to the rights or obligations that are the subject matter of the lawsuit; the act is participation in the lawsuit under Article 79; and the condition is the assertion of that succession and the participation that follows it.
The result prescribed by Article 81 is the retroactive effect of participation, the direction of that retroactivity being toward the time when the lawsuit was first pending before the court, and its content being the effect of the interruption of prescription or compliance with statutory periods. This result arises where the condition of an assertion of succession and the participation that follows it is satisfied, and it does not separately require that the substance of the succession be determined. It is precisely this distinction that is established together with the conclusion that the successor's participation in the lawsuit carries the retroactive effect, prescribed by law, of the interruption of prescription and compliance with statutory periods. Only by viewing separately the procedural result, namely the temporal effect of participation, and the distinct determination of the substance of the succession, can one accurately discern the cases in which the designated change requires that the existing determination of blocking or effectiveness be discarded and the stage be re-determined from the beginning.
A corresponding measure of unease remains with this distinction. The counterargument that abuse of an assertion of succession renders the procedure unstable is aimed at the loss and inconvenience that, if the retroactive effect of participation is broadly recognized, the time of a lawsuit that has already come close to determination may be shaken by the mere assertion of a third party without an interest, and that the opposing party may lose the opportunity to respond or incur only increased defense costs. This answer does not say that the possibility of abuse is slight; it means that the conditions prescribed by law for triggering the retroactive effect cannot be replaced by a different determination, namely the determination of the substance of the succession, and the procedural instability the counterargument points out remains as it stands.
In this scene the facts relevant to this question are limited. Creditor A seeks to exercise the rights of Debtor B, but has adduced no separate basis for its own claim and the need for preservation; and the scene does not determine which materials among the materials on the claim to be preserved, the written selection, the succession materials, and the application for participation were presented, nor whether a third party filed an application for participation claiming to have succeeded to all or part of the rights or obligations that are the subject matter of the lawsuit. Accordingly, the analysis distinguishes only between the case in which the basis for the right to conduct the lawsuit—whether the claim to be preserved and the need for preservation in subrogation, or selection or succession—is recognized, and the case in which the subrogating creditor's claim to be preserved is not recognized or there is no statutory basis for conducting a lawsuit for another; and which of the two applies remains undetermined. However, if it is confirmed that the existence of the claim to be preserved is denied, the conclusion as to the standing of the subrogation lawsuit changes.
The conclusion this section permits is that, if the assertion of succession and the participation that follows it are confirmed, that participation relates back to the time when the lawsuit was first pending before the court and produces the effect of the interruption of prescription or compliance with statutory periods; that if the existence of the claim to be preserved is denied at this point, the conclusion as to the standing of the subrogation lawsuit changes; and that if the designated change is confirmed, the existing determination of blocking or effectiveness is discarded and the stage is re-determined from the beginning. Conclusions not permitted are that the temporal effect of participation is tantamount to a determination of the substance of the succession, that participation alone determines even the basis for conducting a lawsuit over another's rights, or that one asserts categorically the performance results of an actual case not found in the scene. Unless it is confirmed that a legal channel has opened at the stage of conducting a lawsuit over another's rights, the matter must be left undetermined.
4.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
There must be a common interest and a proper selection for the selected party's conduct of the lawsuit to be explained. The manner in which this risk hardens into reality can first be traced in this scene. Here, if the right to conduct has not been explained by a prior agreement or selection, the application for participation and the time of the lawsuit are placed at risk of being cut off. At that point the question is over what range the assertion of succession joins on even to the time of the lawsuit. If abuse of an assertion of succession renders the procedure unstable, the nature of that instability must be examined separately, for the grant of retroactive effect itself may readily be diverted into a tool for determining the substance of the succession in advance.
As the provision corresponding to this question there is Article 81 of the Civil Procedure Act. That article provides: "Where, while a lawsuit is pending before a court, a third party claims to have succeeded to all or part of the rights or obligations that are the subject matter of the lawsuit and participates in the lawsuit pursuant to Article 79, that participation relates back to the time when the lawsuit was first pending before the court, and the effect of the interruption of prescription or compliance with statutory periods arises." (Civil Procedure Act, Article 81) Here the subject is a third party who until then was not a party to the lawsuit; the act is a participation in the lawsuit that satisfies the requirements of Article 79; and the condition is the claim to have succeeded to all or part of the rights or obligations that are the subject matter of the lawsuit. Once a participation containing that claim is received, the effects prescribed by law are limited to two: the interruption of prescription and the retroactivity of compliance with statutory periods. What the text requires is not a determination of the substantive truth of the succession, but the grant of a protective effect that joins the time before and after according to the point of participation.
This text is connected to the judgment of the present question. Whether a transfer of rights occurred may itself be contested before the lawsuit, but the temporal effect of participation is a protective device that arises by relating back to the time when the lawsuit was first pending. The two must be distinguished. The former concerns whether the rights or obligations that are the subject matter of the lawsuit actually passed—that is, the existence or nonexistence of the substance of the succession; the latter concerns only whether, the point of participation tracing back to the time when the lawsuit was first pending, it produces the effect of preserving prescription and periods—that is, only the alignment of the time axis. Even if the scope of retroactivity is broadly construed, that expansion operates only on the time axis and does not extend to a determination of the substance of the succession. The moment the latter is used as evidence of the former, or is regarded as a determination of the former, the two stages of judgment that the text has kept apart become entangled. The reason the condition, 'claims to have succeeded,' attached as a condition, is only the starting point of the retroactive effect and does not itself yield in advance the conclusion of a substantive determination of succession lies precisely in this distinction.
The strongest counterargument to that distinction aims its force elsewhere. If the direct participation of the right holder is required, collective and subrogation-based protection of rights is effectively blocked. If the many right holders whose interests are entangled must each rush into the lawsuit, time and cost increase sharply, and in situations where one must rely on a subrogation actor or a selected party standing behind their own claim, the practical channel for protecting rights is closed. The resulting loss exceeds mere procedural convenience. At stake is the value of the very rights that can no longer be protected through adjudication. The observation that, even if some uncertainty attends an assertion of succession, a basis for the right to conduct must at least be provisionally accepted if a path to relief is to remain, carries weight. Yet that burden cannot be grounds for elevating even the temporal effect of participation into a determination of the substance of the succession. The convenience of conduct spoken of by the counterargument and the protection at the point of receipt both deal with the time of the lawsuit, but determining the substance of the succession in advance for the sake of that convenience exceeds the range set by the text. Even leaving the counterargument's hardship in place, the separation of the stages of judgment is preserved.
Returning to this scene and considering only the relevant facts, A seeks to exercise B's rights while adducing no separate basis for its own claim and the need for preservation. If the basis for the right to conduct the lawsuit by virtue of selection or succession were to emerge from the record as it now stands, the question of whether the point of participation obtains protection joining the time before and after would remain separately open. If that basis had led to a participation satisfying the requirements of Article 79, the retroactive effect of Article 81 operates within the range prescribed by law. The scene does not determine whether there was an actual succession to the rights or obligations, the specific timing of the application for participation, or the organization of the record. Accordingly, from this scene alone one cannot assert that the substance of the succession has been determined or that the temporal effect of participation has already taken effect. Items not confirmed from the record remain undetermined.
In sum, the permitted conclusion goes no further than the judgment that, if the participation satisfies the requirements, the temporal protections of the interruption of prescription and compliance with statutory periods arise retroactively. Whether the time before and after is joined according to the point of participation is a question of the protective effect prescribed by law. Adding to this a determination of the substance of the succession is a conclusion this stage does not permit. Treating the retroactive effect as overlaying materials that prove the existence of the succession, or regarding the rights as having actually passed by participation alone, is a judgment beyond that range. Moreover, if, in the actual record, the basis for the claim of succession has not yet been sorted out, that confirmation remains undetermined, and it does not immediately mean that no relief is available.
4.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The analysis takes up the conclusion of the preceding section—that the temporal effect of participation cannot be turned into a determination of the substance of the succession. This problem asks whether, even after the participation has taken place, the effect of the interruption of prescription or compliance with statutory periods arising at an earlier point continues to be maintained. Whether the conduct of a lawsuit over transferred rights inherits even the temporal protection of the past is the present question.
The provision corresponding to this question is Article 81 of the Civil Procedure Act. This article provides that where, while a lawsuit is pending before a court, a third party claims to have succeeded to all or part of the rights or obligations that are the subject matter of the lawsuit and participates in the lawsuit pursuant to Article 79, that participation relates back to the time when the lawsuit was first pending before the court, and the effect of the interruption of prescription or compliance with statutory periods arises. In terms of the text, the subject is the third party claiming to have succeeded to the rights or obligations that are the subject matter of the lawsuit; the act is participation in the lawsuit under Article 79; and the point in time is while the lawsuit is pending before the court. As a result, the effect of the interruption of prescription and compliance with statutory periods arises retroactively to the time when the lawsuit was first pending.
If the requirements of the provision are satisfied, that participation carries the temporal protection back to the original point at which the lawsuit became pending. At this point, participation by succession means the participation of a person who claims to have succeeded to the rights or obligations, which is why it is distinguished from the determination of the substance of the succession. While the provision sets out the requirements and temporal effect of participation, it does not determine the substance of the succession itself. Accordingly, the retroactive effect arising from participation and the recognition of the substance of the succession are separate stages of judgment, and one does not substitute for the other. The retroactive effect of the interruption of prescription and compliance with statutory periods prescribed by law is limited to the temporal effect of participation.
The strongest counterargument is that abuse of an assertion of succession renders the procedure unstable. If a third party advances a formal assertion of succession, its relationship with the existing parties is shaken, and the scope of the temporal protection already secured may be contested. The truth or falsity of the assertion of succession may be contested separately, but the retroactive effect of the interruption of prescription and compliance with statutory periods arising from participation is maintained as an effect prescribed by law. Reducing the instability the counterargument points out is ultimately the province of the determination of substance, and mixing that determination into the temporal effect of participation would rather cause the distinction prescribed by law to collapse.
However, since the question of this section concerns the temporal effect of participation, the presence or absence of a basis for one's own claim or the need for preservation is not an object of determination in this section. Where participation by succession has occurred, whether that participation carries the retroactive effect of the interruption of prescription and compliance with statutory periods prescribed by law is judged according to confirmed conditions. Yet the scene does not settle whether succession materials or an application for participation were actually submitted. Accordingly, from this scene one cannot determine even the standing in subrogation or the satisfaction of the requirements for participation.
The conclusion this section permits is that the successor's participation in the lawsuit carries the retroactive effect of the interruption of prescription and compliance with statutory periods prescribed by law, and that effect is limited to the temporal effect of participation. The determination of the substance of the succession remains a separate determination, and participation does not determine that substance. Conversely, an interpretation under which rights are recognized as to their substance by participation alone lies outside the conclusions of this section.
4.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Even if the person who will exercise the right changes after the right passes during the lawsuit, the proceedings already begun do not become meaningless from the outset. If the selected party's conduct of the lawsuit could be explained only where there is a common interest and a proper selection, the question now is how the time of the lawsuit continues under the different circumstance of a transfer of rights. This question examines together whether the successor can enter the procedure on their own and the effect at the point in time that entry reaches.
The text in question is found in Article 81 of the Civil Procedure Act. That text takes as its premise the case "where, while a lawsuit is pending before a court, a third party claims to have succeeded to all or part of the rights or obligations that are the subject matter of the lawsuit and participates in the lawsuit pursuant to Article 79." Here the subject is the person who appears in the status of a third party during the pendency of the lawsuit, and the act is participating in the lawsuit while claiming to have succeeded to all or part of the rights or obligations that are the subject matter of the lawsuit. The participation spoken of by this text is precisely participation by succession, and it means the participation of a person who claims to have succeeded to the rights or obligations. The fact that the element of a claim is placed at the starting point of the participation is reflected as such in the judgment of this section.
The same text specifies in concrete terms the temporal effect accompanying that participation: "that participation relates back to the time when the lawsuit was first pending before the court, and the effect of the interruption of prescription or compliance with statutory periods arises." Accordingly, the successor's participation in the lawsuit carries the retroactive effect prescribed by law of the interruption of prescription and compliance with statutory periods. This distinction matters because the procedural event of participation and the substantive circumstance of succession—a transfer of rights or obligations—are judged at different stages. The retroactivity of the temporal effect is an effect taken by the procedure of participation, whereas the succession that is the object of that participation remains a circumstance that is still only asserted.
Yet the counterargument that abuse of an assertion of succession renders the procedure unstable has force. If anyone may participate by invoking succession and assert the retroactive effect, the course of the lawsuit's progress and the determination of its duration may be shaken by the participation of one who puts forward a claim unrelated to substance. These losses and inconveniences cannot be ignored. The text recognizing the retroactive effect of the interruption of prescription and compliance with statutory periods with respect to participation deals with the question of temporal protection, while the determination of the substance of the succession is a judgment concerning the transfer of rights or obligations that serves as the basis for that participation. The problem of abuse is a matter whose weight should be assessed in the latter judgment.
In this scene A is set as the person seeking to exercise another's rights, and B as the person holding those rights. Insofar as no basis of one's own claim and the need for preservation has been presented, the basis for the right to conduct the lawsuit—namely the claim to be preserved and the need for preservation in subrogation—is not confirmed in this scene. The scene, however, contains no facts as to whether a transfer of rights occurred, whether a third party participated claiming succession, or whether the requirements for participation under Article 79 were satisfied. Accordingly, whether the retroactive effect of participation by succession can be applied to this scene remains undetermined.
What this section permits is narrow. Its task is to reveal that the retroactive effect of the interruption of prescription and compliance with statutory periods prescribed by law attaches to the specified participation by succession, and that that participation rests on a claim. What is not permitted is an interpretation that reads the temporal effect of participation as a determination of the substance of the succession, or that holds the legal relationship of the right holder or the basis for the right to conduct the lawsuit to be determined by that retroactive effect alone. The circumstance of insufficient materials is a matter of undetermination, and does not immediately mean that no relief is available. Next, the question goes in a different direction.
4.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
이 문장은 앞 단계의 범위에서 온 전제이며, 이번 단계는 같은 절 안에서 남의 권리에 대한 소송수행을 설명하는 데 필요한 원문 문언의 적용 범위만을 다룬다. 물음은 민사소송법 문언이 승계 주장이 개입된 소송수행에 어떻게 적용되는가이다.
해당 원문은 「민사소송법」 제81조이다. 그 문언은 승계인의 소송참가에 관하여 "소송이 법원에 계속되어 있는 동안에 제3자가 소송목적인 권리 또는 의무의 전부나 일부를 승계하였다고 주장하며 제79조의 규정에 따라 소송에 참가한 경우 그 참가는 소송이 법원에 처음 계속된 때에 소급하여 시효의 중단 또는 법률상 기간준수의 효력이 생긴다"(민사소송법 제81조)고 정한다. 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 승계를 주장하며 참가한 제3자이고, 행위는 제79조에 따른 소송참가이며, 조건은 소송 계속 중에 소송목적인 권리·의무의 전부나 일부를 승계하였다고 주장하는 것이다.
위 문언은 참가의 효력을 시효의 중단과 법률상 기간준수에 한정하여 소급시키므로, 판정 단계를 나누어 읽어야 한다. 먼저 남의 권리에 대한 소송수행이 가능한지는 별도로 판단한다. 소송이 법원에 계속되어 있는 동안 제3자가 소송목적인 권리 또는 의무의 전부나 일부를 승계하였다고 주장하며 민사소송법 제79조에 따라 참가하면, 그 참가는 소송이 법원에 처음 계속된 때에 소급하여 시효 중단 또는 법률상 기간 준수의 효력이 생긴다(민사소송법 제81조). 이어서 참가의 시간적 효력은 그 수행 자격을 확정한 뒤에야 비로소 의미를 갖는다. 따라서 소급효의 문언은 수행의 실체적 근거를 대신 확정해 주지 않고, 확정된 수행 안에서 시간적 보호가 끊기지 않게 하는 규칙으로만 작동한다.
승계 주장의 남용이 절차를 불안정하게 만든다는 반론은 실질적인 불편을 겨냥한다. 권리를 이어받았다는 주장만으로 참가가 허용되면, 누구든 승계를 내세워 이미 진행된 소송의 시간에 끼어들어 절차를 흔들 수 있다. 즉 참가자가 실제로 승계하였는지는 별론으로 하고, 그 주장에 기한 참가가 시효 중단과 기간준수의 소급효를 낳는다는 문언의 효과는 그대로 유지된다. 반론이 지적한 남용의 불편은 지워지지 않지만, 문언이 정한 시간적 보호를 수행 자격의 실체 심사로 대체하는 것은 허용되지 않는다.
이 사실만으로는 피보전채권 자료·선정서·승계 자료·참가신청 가운데 어떤 기록이 존재하는지, 권리자와 수행자의 법률관계가 무엇인지 밝혀지지 않았다. 장면의 사실만으로는 이러한 근거의 인정 여부를 확정할 수 없어 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 민사소송법 제81조의 문언 범위 안에서, 승계를 주장하며 참가한 경우 그 참가가 시효의 중단과 법률상 기간준수에 관하여 소급효를 갖는다는 것이다. 허용되지 않는 결론은 그 문언만으로 참가자의 실제 승계나 남의 권리에 대한 소송수행의 실체적 근거를 확정하거나, 판결이유로 판단을 넓히는 것이다. 수행 자격의 근거는 별도로 인정되어야 하고, 참가의 시간적 효력은 그 자격을 대신하지 않는다.
4.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
공동 이해관계와 적법한 선정이 있어야 선정당사자의 소송수행을 설명할 수 있다는 전제 아래, 권리가 넘어간 뒤에 이미 열린 소송의 시간이 어떻게 이어지는지가 남는다. 이 물음은 시간적 보호의 단절을 막는 장치를 찾는 데서 출발한다.
민사소송법 제81조는 승계인의 소송참가에 관하여 "소송이 법원에 계속되어 있는 동안에 제3자가 소송목적인 권리 또는 의무의 전부나 일부를 승계하였다고 주장하며 제79조의 규정에 따라 소송에 참가한 경우 그 참가는 소송이 법원에 처음 계속된 때에 소급하여 시효의 중단 또는 법률상 기간준수의 효력이 생긴다."고 정한다. 이 문언은 승계인의 소송참가, 다시 말해 권리·의무를 이어받았다고 주장하는 사람의 참가를 그 주체로 삼는다. 그리고 소송 계속 중의 참가라는 조건 아래, 시효의 중단과 법률상 기간준수의 효력이 법원에 처음 계속된 때로 소급하여 생긴다고 말한다.
이 조문이 정하는 소급효는 참가라는 소송행위의 시간적 효력을 다룬다. 승계참가를 인정하면 그 참가는 소송이 처음 계속된 때로 돌아가 시효 중단과 기간준수의 보호를 이어받는다. 바로 여기서 두 판단이 갈린다. 하나는 참가의 시간적 효력이고, 다른 하나는 실제로 권리가 넘어갔는지, 즉 승계 실체의 확정이다. 전자는 법이 정한 소급효에 관한 것이고, 후자는 별개의 실체 판단이다. 따라서 단계 안의 세부 구분은 작동하는 경우, 막히는 경우, 미확정인 경우의 조건에 한정하며, 이 조건들 밖에 추가 단계를 만들어 넣지 않는다.
승계 주장의 남용이 절차를 불안정하게 만든다는 반론은 실질적 손실에 뿌리를 둔다. 주장만으로 참가를 받아주면, 승계를 꾸며낸 제3자가 끼어들어 당사자 구성을 흔들고 심리를 지연시킬 수 있다. 그렇게 되면 절차의 안정을 지키려는 쪽이 오히려 불안정을 감수하게 된다. 제81조가 정한 것은 시효 중단과 기간준수의 소급효라는 시간적 보호이지, 승계의 실체가 확정되었다는 선언이 아니다. 이 반론이 지적한 남용의 위험은 그대로 남지만, 그렇다고 법이 나누어 둔 두 판단을 하나로 합칠 수는 없다.
이 장면을 명시한 조건과 대조하면, 대위자의 피보전채권과 보전 필요 또는 선정과 승계에 따른 소송수행권의 근거가 인정되면 수행이 가능하다. 반대로 대위자의 피보전채권이 인정되지 않거나 타인을 위하여 소송할 법정 근거가 없으면 막히며, 이 장면처럼 근거가 따로 제시되지 않은 때에는 권리자와 수행자의 법률관계가 밝혀지지 않았으므로 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 승계인의 소송참가에 법이 정한 시효중단·기간준수의 소급효가 있고, 그 효력을 승계 실체의 확정으로 환원할 수 없다는 판단에 한한다. 여기에서 나아가 참가의 실체적 정당성을 확정한다거나, 남의 권리 소송수행의 적격을 최종 판정하는 결론까지 이 절에서 내리는 것은 아니다. 자료가 부족한 부분은 미확정으로 두되, 미확정이라는 사정이 곧 구제 불능을 뜻하지는 않는다.
4.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
공동 이해관계와 적법한 선정이 있어야 선정당사자의 소송수행을 설명할 수 있다는 전제를 받아, 채권자 A는 채무자 B의 권리를 행사하려 하지만 자기 채권과 보전 필요의 근거를 따로 내지 않았다. 이 장면에서 남의 권리를 수행하는 절차의 문이 열리고 닫히며, 기록이 남지 않을 때 무엇을 미확정으로 두어야 하는지를 구별하는 물음이 남는다.
그 조문은 "소송이 법원에 계속되어 있는 동안에 제3자가 소송목적인 권리 또는 의무의 전부나 일부를 승계하였다고 주장하며 제79조의 규정에 따라 소송에 참가한 경우" 참가의 효력을 규정한다. 여기서 주체는 소송목적인 권리·의무를 이어받았다고 주장하는 제3자이고, 행위는 제79조에 따른 소송참가이며, 조건은 소송이 법원에 계속되어 있는 동안의 승계 주장과 그에 따른 참가이다.
그 조건이 갖추어지면 그 참가는 소송이 법원에 처음 계속된 때에 소급하여 시효의 중단 또는 법률상 기간준수의 효력이 생긴다(민사소송법 제81조). 이 소급효는 참가 행위가 가지는 시간적 효력을 말하며, 승계 주장 자체가 참가와 함께 법이 정한 효력을 얻는다는 뜻이다. 이와 구별하여 남의 권리에 대한 소송수행이 열리는 조건은 대위의 피보전채권과 보전 필요 또는 선정·승계에 따른 소송수행권의 근거가 인정되는 경우이고, 막히는 조건은 대위자의 피보전채권이 인정되지 않거나 타인을 위하여 소송할 법정 근거가 없는 경우이다. 승계참가의 시간적 효력을 논하기 전에 그 소송수행 자체가 무엇에 근거하여 열리는지를 따로 확인해야 한다.
승계 주장의 남용이 절차를 불안정하게 만든다는 반론은, 참가 신청이 반복되거나 실체 없는 주장이 이어질 때 소송의 진행과 상대방의 대응이 흔들릴 수 있다는 손실과 불편을 겨냥한다. 민사소송법 제81조가 정한 것은 승계를 주장하며 제79조에 따라 참가한 경우의 시효중단·기간준수의 소급효일 뿐, 그 참가만으로 승계 실체가 확정된다는 법적 효과가 함께 정해지지는 않았다. 따라서 남용 우려는 참가의 시간적 효력과 승계 실체의 확정을 서로 다른 판단 단계로 두어 다루어야 한다.
합성 장면에서 채권자 A가 채무자 B의 권리를 행사하려는 경우, A가 대위로 행사할 자기 채권과 보전 필요의 근거를 따로 내지 않았다면 그 남의 권리에 대한 소송수행은 열리는 조건에 관한 자료가 함께 제시되지 않은 상태이다. 다만 이 장면에서는 승계자나 그 참가신청, 선정서 같은 구체적 기록이 지정되지 않았으므로, 수행자와 권리자 사이의 법률관계가 무엇인지에 대해서는 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절에서 확인할 수 있는 것은, 대위의 피보전채권과 보전 필요 또는 선정·승계에 따른 소송수행권의 근거가 인정되면 수행의 문이 열리고, 대위자의 피보전채권이 인정되지 않거나 타인을 위하여 소송할 법정 근거가 없으면 막힌다는 구별이며, 권리자와 수행자의 법률관계가 밝혀지지 않은 경우에는 미확정으로 둔다는 구별이다. 이 구별이 소송수행권의 근거 인정 여부에 관한 것일 뿐, 이를 권리의 존재 그 자체나 실체적 귀속을 확정한다는 뜻으로 확장하면 이 절의 결론을 넘어서게 된다.
4.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
이미 법원에 계속된 소송에서 소송목적인 권리나 의무가 제3자에게 넘어가면, 그때까지 쌓인 시효의 중단이나 법률상 기간준수의 상태가 새 권리자를 따라가지 못하는 문제가 생길 수 있다. 앞의 분석 단계에서 선정당사자의 소송수행에는 공동 이해관계와 적법한 선정이 있어야 한다는 점을 확인한 데서, 이번에는 그와 별개로 승계라는 권리 이동이 이미 진행된 시간에 어떤 영향을 주는지를 묻는다.
이 물음에 답하는 문언은 민사소송법 제81조에 놓여 있다. 그 조문은 소송이 법원에 계속되어 있는 동안에 제3자가 소송목적인 권리 또는 의무의 전부나 일부를 승계하였다고 주장하며 제79조의 규정에 따라 소송에 참가한 경우 그 참가는 소송이 법원에 처음 계속된 때에 소급하여 시효의 중단 또는 법률상 기간준수의 효력이 생긴다고 정한다(민사소송법 제81조). 여기서 주체는 이미 계속된 소송의 소송목적인 권리·의무를 이어받았다고 주장하면서 그 소송에 참가한 사람이고, 행위는 그러한 주장에 따른 소송참가이며, 조건은 참가의 시점이 소송이 법원에 계속되어 있는 동안이라는 점과 참가가 제79조의 규정에 따른다는 점이다. 그 조건이 갖추어지면 시효의 중단과 법률상 기간준수라는 두 가지 시간적 보호가 처음 계속된 때로 소급하여 생긴다.
이 소급효가 생긴다는 결론은, 참가의 시간적 효력과 승계라는 실체의 확정을 나누어 생각해야 한다는 점과 짝을 이룬다. 전자는 이 소송에서 이어받았다고 주장하는 참가에 법이 부여한 시효중단·기간준수의 소급효이고, 후자는 실제로 권리·의무가 이동했는지를 둘러싼 실체의 문제이다. 제81조가 정한 것은 후자의 실체 확정을 전제로 시간적 효력이 생긴다는 뜻이 아니라, 앞서 정한 주체·행위·조건을 갖춘 참가에 시간적 효력이 생긴다는 것이므로, 이 둘을 한 범주로 묶으면 조문이 정한 효력의 범위를 넘어서게 된다.
승계 주장이 남용되면 절차가 불안정해질 수 있다는 반론이 이 구별을 겨냥한다. 권리를 이어받았다고 주장하기만 하면 과거로 소급하는 시간적 보호가 붙고, 그 주장이 나중에 잘못된 것으로 드러나더라도 그동안 절차의 흐름이 달라질 수 있으므로, 참가만으로 그러한 효과를 주는 것은 남용의 여지를 넓힌다는 우려이다. 저자의 답은 여기서도 변하지 않는다. 반론이 지적한 불안정은 그대로 남지만, 그 불안정을 이유로 제81조가 참가에 정해 둔 시간적 효력을 실체의 확정까지 요구하는 조건으로 옮길 수는 없고, 앞의 조건 안에서만 그 효력이 설명된다.
이 장면에서 다루는 것은 남의 권리에 대한 소송수행과 그 수행에 붙는 시간적 보호가 아니라, 승계 주장에 따른 참가에 법이 정한 소급효가 어디까지 설명되는가 하는 점이다. 수행의 근거인 피보전채권과 보전 필요는 이 장면에서 자료로 정해져 있지 않고, 권리를 이어받았다고 주장한 참가신청이나 승계 자료의 유무도 확인되어 있지 않다. 따라서 장면만으로는 참가의 조건이 갖추어졌는지, 그래서 소급효가 생겼는지 정할 수 없고, 법률관계가 밝혀지지 않은 부분은 미확정으로 남는다. 다만 피보전채권의 존재가 부정되면 대위소송의 적격에 관한 결론을 바꾼다는 대조 조건이 성립하는 것은 별개로 확인된다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은, 승계 주장에 따른 참가에 대해 법이 정한 시효중단·기간준수의 소급효를 설명하면서도, 그 참가의 시간적 효력과 승계의 실체 확정을 나누어 보는 결론이다. 이 절이 허용하지 않는 것은, 참가만으로 실체의 권리 이동까지 확정된 것으로 보는 판단이거나, 그 확정을 전제로만 시간적 효력을 인정하는 판단이다. 반대로 승계 실체가 확정되지 않았다는 사실만으로 이미 조건을 갖춘 참가에 붙은 시간적 효력을 지워버릴 수도 없다. 권리를 특정하지 못한 확인판결도 목적을 달성하는가?