Summary
In the relevant precedent on declaration of land ownership, the court held that a judgment in which the owner is not identified cannot serve as proof of a particular person's ownership.
5.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
Even if a name remains on the judgment, if one does not know whose right it is, subsequent procedure cannot move forward. The preceding section set out only the point that a successor's participation in the lawsuit has the retroactive effect prescribed by law of interrupting prescription and meeting time limits. The question that follows is whether a declaratory judgment obtained by a creditor seeking to assert another's right through subrogation or through the route of selection and succession—having secured the basis for having been entrusted with that right, yet without being able to identify its owner—can find its proper place. Here, identification means a designation by which a person or right can be distinguished from others, and which designations suffice to effect such a distinction marks the entrance to this relief.
The precedent on confirmation of land ownership clearly reveals that standard. Supreme Court Decision 2020Da300893 decided July 21, 2021, states: "Article 65, subparagraph 2 of the Registration of Real Estate Act provides that a person who proves his or her ownership by a final and conclusive judgment may apply for an ownership preservation registration concerning unregistered land," thereby arranging that the door of preservation registration opens on the premise of the probative value of the final and conclusive judgment. Furthermore, that Article 46, paragraph (1), subparagraph 6 of the Enforcement Rule of the Registration of Real Estate Act requires the address and resident registration number of the registration right holder as attached information points in the same direction. Its wording makes it a condition that the subject indicated by the judgment be recognizable in the registration procedure.
According to that basis, "where, concerning unregistered land, the column for the name of the owner in the land register or forest land register contains no entry of a specific address or personal details so that the name holder cannot be identified, even if a creditor of that nominal owner obtains a final and conclusive judgment confirming ownership against the State by subrogating the nominal owner, that declaratory judgment does not have the owner identified and therefore cannot be regarded as a final and conclusive judgment proving that a specific person is the owner of the said land," and this is of the same purport as Registration Precedent No. 201112-2, No. 201005-1, and the like (Supreme Court Decision 2020Da300893 decided July 21, 2021). Here, the qualification to conduct the action for a declaratory judgment and whose right that judgment proves are distinguished. When the claim to be preserved of the subrogation and the need for preservation, or the basis of the right to conduct the lawsuit under selection and succession, is recognized, and the demanded performance, parties, and conditions are specified in the claim and prayer so that the right of the chosen action can be defended, the entrance to this relief opens; but that alone does not identify the owner of the right contained in the judgment. The former condition distinguishes the qualification to conduct, and the latter identification distinguishes the subject of proof of the judgment.
The counterargument that the older the right, the scarcer the identifying materials, targets the difficulty arising where collective and subrogation-based protection of rights proceeds without the direct participation of the right holder. Even if Creditor A seeks to conduct the lawsuit on behalf of the named owner of an old parcel of land, the register entries alone leave personal details blank, and in that case, although there is a basis for the right to conduct, one cannot state whom the effect of the judgment will reach, so subsequent procedure stops. That loss cannot be ignored, but the answer to it is that, all the same, an owner who cannot be identified cannot be supplemented by treating a specific person as the owner. Where the designation of the name holder fails to effect a distinction, filling that place with an arbitrary designation diverges from the proof required by the registration procedure. The poverty of materials pointed out by the counterargument cannot shake the conditions of confirmation.
In the synthetic scene, Creditor A seeks to exercise Debtor B's right but has not separately presented the basis for its own claim and the need for preservation. In this scene, whether A has secured the statutory basis to conduct another's right differs according to whether it is confirmed by any of the materials on the claim to be preserved, the selection document, the succession materials, or the application for participation. Conversely, even if that basis is recognized, if identification has not been accomplished, the declaratory judgment cannot become proof of a specific person's ownership. The scene fixes no year, amount, or commencement date, and contains neither service in an actual case nor the result of performance; accordingly, A's qualification to conduct and the probative value of the judgment remain matters to be judged separately. If the existence of the claim to be preserved is confirmed to be denied, the conclusion on the standing in the subrogation lawsuit changes.
The conclusion permitted at this stage goes no further than this: when the demanded performance, parties, and conditions are specified in the claim and prayer, the right of the chosen action can be defended, and the basis of the right to conduct is recognized as well, the entrance to the action opens. That door does not open all the same where the judgment fails to identify whose right it proves; only where the determination that distinguishes the qualification to conduct and the subject of proof fixed through identification are not mixed together is the direction of subsequent procedure determined. If an owner who cannot be identified is supplemented by a specific person, this determination collapses.
5.2The Conditions That Block Relief
In this scene, when a subrogee seeks to exercise another's right, the issue is whether a declaratory judgment that does not identify the right holder can achieve that purpose. If the correspondence between name and right breaks down, it is not determined what the ensuing procedure should execute and what it should take as the basis for registration. Accordingly, both whether the basis of the qualification to conduct the lawsuit is clear and whether the judgment itself indicates the right of a specific person must be examined together.
In the precedent on confirmation of land ownership, it was held that a judgment that does not identify the owner cannot become proof of a specific person's ownership (Supreme Court Decision 2020Da300893 decided July 21, 2021). This wording presupposes the case where, in the land register or forest land register of unregistered land, there is no address or personal details by which to distinguish the nominal owner. The subject it designates is the creditor of the nominal owner; the act is the obtaining of a final and conclusive judgment confirming ownership by subrogating the nominal owner against the State. The condition is the case where, owing to the absence of specific entries in the column for the name holder, that name holder cannot be identified. That Article 65, subparagraph 2 of the Registration of Real Estate Act provides for an application for preservation registration by a person who proves his or her ownership by a final and conclusive judgment, and that Article 46, paragraph (1), subparagraph 6 of the Enforcement Rule of the Registration of Real Estate Act requires, as attached information, information proving the address and resident registration number of the registration right holder, support this condition (Supreme Court Decision 2020Da300893 decided July 21, 2021).
This basis separates two stages of judgment. One concerns whether the lawsuit can be conducted; the other concerns whether that judgment becomes a document proving the right of a specific person. At the former stage, the subrogee's claim to be preserved and the need for preservation, or the basis of the right to conduct the lawsuit under selection and succession, must be recognized before that path opens. Yet where the subrogee's claim to be preserved is not recognized or there is no statutory basis to litigate for another's sake, if even one of the statutory requirements is unmet, the channel of relief closes. Even where the requirements are met, if the designation of the right holder falls short of identification, no probative value arises at the latter stage—a point that must not be read as overlapping with the earlier determination of qualification.
The counterargument that compels this distinction is the reality that the older the right, the scarcer the identifying materials. The criticism follows that requiring the right holder's direct participation would in effect block collective and subrogation-based protection of rights. The circumstance that, for land where only old and scattered records remain, the absence of an address and personal details cannot be laid at the door of the right holder as individual fault adds weight to that loss. Even so, an owner who cannot be identified cannot be supplemented by a specific person. For a final and conclusive judgment to prove the ownership of a specific person, a distinguishable designation must remain in the text of the judgment; hence even a judgment obtained by subrogation, if it lacks that designation, cannot become a document of proof for a registration application. The scarcity of materials pointed out by the counterargument remains unverified, and it is not resolved by designating a specific person in substitution.
This fact corresponds to the case where the basis of the subrogee's claim to be preserved and the need for preservation has not been presented; accordingly, the state is one in which the statutory basis is unconfirmed. However, the scene leaves undetermined the content of B's right itself, whether entries exist in the column for the nominal owner's designation, and whether the text of the judgment reaches identification. Whether the judgment lacks identification cannot be concluded from this scene alone. Since the point at which the path closes differs according to which is confirmed, the undetermined items are left as they are.
The conclusion permitted by this section is the determination that, where the subrogee's claim to be preserved is not recognized or there is no statutory basis to litigate for another's sake, if even one of the statutory requirements is unmet, the channel of relief closes. Here, that the channel closes means that the legal path does not open; it does not mean the presence or absence of results in actual payment, delivery, or recovery. At the same time, even a judgment in which all requirements are met cannot become proof of a specific person's ownership if the designation of the right holder is indistinguishable, and therefore is not a document to hand over to subsequent registration procedure. Yet a state of insufficient materials must not be summarily declared incapable of relief; the confirmed conclusion is limited to the conditional distinction stated above.
5.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Even after it has been summarized that a successor's participation in the lawsuit has the retroactive effect prescribed by law of interrupting prescription and meeting time limits, if the right holder who is the subject of confirmation has not been revealed, how far subsequent procedure may advance remains a separate question. What is asked now is whether a declaratory judgment that fails to identify the right holder still achieves its purpose, and, within that, where the boundary lies that cannot be settled for want of materials. In this scene, even if A seeks confirmation against the State by subrogating B's right, if the result of the confirmation cannot indicate whose it is, subsequent registration or performance procedure will find nowhere to take hold of that judgment.
In the precedent on confirmation of land ownership, it was held that a judgment that does not identify the owner cannot become proof of a specific person's ownership. This wording presupposes that Article 65, subparagraph 2 of the Registration of Real Estate Act is the provision conferring on a person who proves his or her ownership by a final and conclusive judgment the qualification to apply for ownership preservation registration of unregistered land, and together notes that Article 46, paragraph (1), subparagraph 6 of the Rules on Registration of Real Estate requires, upon an application for preservation registration, information proving the address and resident registration number of the registration right holder as attached information (Supreme Court Decision 2020Da300893 decided July 21, 2021). The subject designated by this wording is the owner as registration right holder; the act is the application for preservation registration; and the condition is that the applicant proves his or her own ownership by a final and conclusive judgment.
That condition is met only where the judgment has fixed a specific person as owner. The precedent made clear that "where, concerning unregistered land, the column for the name of the owner in the land register or forest land register contains no entry of a specific address or personal details so that the name holder cannot be identified, even if a creditor of that nominal owner obtains a final and conclusive judgment confirming ownership against the State by subrogating the nominal owner, that declaratory judgment does not have the owner identified and therefore cannot be regarded as a final and conclusive judgment proving that a specific person is the owner of the said land" (Supreme Court Decision 2020Da300893 decided July 21, 2021). Here, the fact that a declaratory judgment has been obtained and the determination that that judgment proves a specific person's ownership are placed at different stages. The former is the result of conducting the lawsuit; the latter concerns from whom the right holder indicated in the text of the judgment can be distinguished. If the latter determination does not hold, then even if the former occurred, it cannot be used as proof to obtain a preservation registration.
The older the right, the scarcer the personal details remaining in the register or ledger, and the greater the inconvenience targeted by the counterargument that requiring the right holder's direct participation would in effect block collective and subrogation-based protection of rights. The very reason the institution of subrogation was permitted was to supplement circumstances in which one cannot await the participation of the original right holder; yet if the indication for confirmation must itself single out the original right holder as an individual, that supplementation is in effect blocked. Even without denying that loss, for a declaratory judgment to operate as proof for registration, information indicating the registration right holder is necessary; hence the condition for opening this legal path is that a specific person appears in the text of the judgment. All the same, an owner who cannot be identified cannot be supplemented by a specific person. The circumstance that identification is impossible for want of materials does not itself bar the conduct of subrogation, but nor can it serve as a basis for converting that declaratory judgment into proof of a specific person's ownership.
Contrasting what the materials of judgment are in this scene, A has not separately presented the fact that what A seeks to exercise is B's right and the basis for the need to preserve it. At the stage of conducting the lawsuit concerning another's right, the right to conduct stands only where the subrogee's claim to be preserved and the need for preservation are recognized, and that determination diverges according to which of the materials on the claim to be preserved, the selection document, the succession materials, or the application for participation has been submitted. Over this falls the present question. Where the legal relationship between the right holder and the one conducting the lawsuit is not revealed—that is, where A's claim relationship against B and the basis for the need for preservation have not been revealed together—that matter is not fixed as impossible but remains undetermined. If the existence of the claim to be preserved is denied, it changes the conclusion on the standing in the subrogation lawsuit; but the mere circumstance that materials have not been presented does not deny its existence. On the facts of the scene alone, the outcome of the judgment or victory or defeat cannot be determined either.
Therefore the conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. Even if a declaratory judgment has been obtained, if the owner indicated in that judgment has not been identified, that judgment does not possess the effect of a final and conclusive judgment proving that a specific person is the owner of the land, and for that reason cannot be used as proof material for an application for preservation registration. At the same time, the argument up to this point does not mean that, because it cannot be identified who the owner is, that right must be left blank. A matter that cannot be identified for lack of materials of judgment is left not as impossible but as undetermined. Undetermined is a state in which the determination may change once the materials are furnished, and reading the lack of materials straightaway as an inability to obtain relief runs contrary to this distinction. Filling that gap in the manner of supplementing an owner who cannot be identified with a specific person is not permitted.
5.4The Records Needed for Determination
It asks whether a declaratory judgment that fails to identify the right holder still achieves its purpose. The preceding stage of analysis carries forward the conclusion that a successor's participation in the lawsuit has the retroactive effect prescribed by law of interrupting prescription and meeting time limits. Yet the procedural benefit left open by that retroactive effect is a question distinct from what a person who obtained a declaratory judgment without ultimately identifying the right holder can prove with that judgment. To answer this question, one must first read, within a defined scope, what the wording of that judgment requires.
The relevant precedent first quotes Article 65, subparagraph 2 of the Registration of Real Estate Act, explaining that it provides that a person who proves his or her ownership by a final and conclusive judgment may apply for ownership preservation registration concerning unregistered land. It then holds that, pursuant to Article 46, paragraph (1), subparagraph 6 of the Rules on Registration of Real Estate, upon an application for preservation registration, information proving the address and resident registration number of the registration right holder must be furnished to the registry office as attached information (Supreme Court Decision 2020Da300893 decided July 21, 2021). Here, 'registration right holder' means the person seeking to fix his or her own ownership by that registration, and the wording reveals that a designation sufficient to distinguish that person is required as attached information.
Connecting this basis to the standard of judgment at this stage makes it clear that the capacity of a declaratory judgment to support an ownership preservation registration is confined to the case where it is identified to whom the status of owner is attributed. At this point the two determinations must be distinguished. One is the stage at which the qualification to exercise another's right is recognized procedurally; the other is the stage at which the judgment obtained through that procedure actually proves a specific person's ownership. Since these two are not decided on the same records, the standard is required that a missing record is not filled by presumption.
There is a clear counterargument to this standard. It is that the older the right, the scarcer the identifying materials, and that requiring the right holder's direct participation would in effect block collective and subrogation-based protection of rights. This inconvenience cannot be denied. A right with sparse materials can hardly advance a step beyond the fixed record requirements, and that loss is sometimes felt as indistinguishable from the extinction of the right itself. But the answer does not change. Filling the lack of materials with a new designation would amount to performing in its stead the task of identifying the registration right holder entrusted to the wording of the judgment.
From this scene alone it cannot be confirmed which of the materials on the claim to be preserved, the selection document, the succession materials, or the application for participation actually exists. Accordingly, the standing in the subrogation lawsuit cannot be fixed by this scene, and the parts the records do not reveal remain undetermined. Only one condition is clear. Whether this condition holds can be confirmed only within the defined scope of the records.
The conclusion this section permits goes no further than examining, by the defined records, whether the materials concerning identification constitute the designation required by the judgment. Conclusions not permitted are to substitute an arbitrary specific person merely because identifying materials are lacking, or to read the undetermined status of a stage determination straightaway as a denial of the right.
5.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
승계인의 소송참가에는 법이 정한 시효중단·기간준수의 소급효가 있다는 점까지 앞 단계에서 확인한 바이다. 다만 그 소급효가 권리자를 표시하지 못한 판단을 보완해 주는 것은 아니다. 이렇게 권리를 대신 행사한 사람이 판결을 얻더라도 남는 물음은 따로 있다. 권리자를 특정하지 못한 확인판결도 목적을 달성하는가? 이 물음은 대위로 받은 확인판결이 곧 소유권 증명으로 쓰일 수 있는지와 직결된다.
판례의 문언은 이 물음에 대해 명시적이다. "토지대장이나 임야대장의 소유자 명의인 표시란에 구체적 주소나 인적사항에 관한 기재가 없어서 그 명의인을 특정할 수 없는 경우에는 그 소유명의인의 채권자가 국가를 상대로 소유명의인을 대위하여 소유권확인의 확정판결을 받더라도 이 확인판결에는 소유자가 특정되지 않아 특정인이 위 토지의 소유자임을 증명하는 확정판결이라고 볼 수 없다(등기선례 제201112-2호, 제201005-1호 등도 같은 취지로 규정하고 있다)"고 판시하였다(대법원 2021. 7. 21. 선고 2020다300893 판결). 여기서 말하는 채권자는 소유명의인의 권리를 대위하여 소를 낸 사람이다.
이 판결요지는 근거와 결론을 나누어 놓고 있다. 앞부분의 근거는 부동산등기법 제65조 제2호와 부동산등기규칙 제46조 제1항 제6호의 문언이다. 확정판결에 의하여 자기의 소유권을 증명하는 자가 미등기 토지의 소유권보존등기를 신청할 수 있고, 그 신청에는 등기권리자의 주소와 주민등록번호를 증명하는 정보를 첨부하여야 한다는 것이다. 이 두 규정을 통해 등기 절차가 요구하는 것은 이름이 아니라 다른 사람과 구별할 수 있는 표시, 즉 '특정'임이 드러난다. 이 특정 요건을 충족하지 못하면 확인판결 자체는 존재하되 특정인의 소유권 증명으로는 작동하지 못한다. 즉 판결의 성립과 판결의 증명 목적 달성은 별개의 단계이다.
이 구별을 굳이 요구하는 까닭은 반론이 지적하는 손실을 인정하면서도 그 손실이 결론을 바꾸지 않기 때문이다. 오래된 권리일수록 특정 자료가 부족하다. 오래 전에 형성된 토지 대장의 명의인 표시란이 비어 있으면 그 이름 뒤의 인적사항을 오늘날 새로 만들 방법이 없다. 이런 사정으로 대위소송으로 확인을 구하는 통로가 사실상 좁아진다는 불편은 실재한다. 그렇더라도 특정 불가능한 소유자를 특정인으로 보충할 수는 없다. 확인판결은 존재하는 사실을 기록하는 것이지, 기록되지 않은 인적사항을 판결을 통해 새로 만들어 내는 수단이 아니기 때문이다. 저자가 보기에 특정 자료의 부족은 심증의 문제이 아니라 판결이 증명할 수 있는 대상의 한계에 관한 문제이다.
합성 장면으로 돌아오면, 채권자 A는 채무자 B의 권리를 행사하려 하지만 자기 채권과 보전 필요의 근거를 따로 내지 않았다. 이 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 사실은 그 하나뿐이다. 피보전채권 자료·선정서·승계 자료·참가신청 가운데 어느 것이 실제로 제출되었는지, 그리고 대위자가 소를 수행할 법정 근거를 갖추었는지는 밝혀지지 않았다. 다만 확정된 조건 하나는 분명하다. 남의 권리에 대한 소송수행에서 대위자의 피보전채권이 인정되지 않거나 타인을 위하여 소송할 법정 근거가 없으면, 기존에 내려졌던 차단 판단과 실효 판단은 모두 폐기되고 처음부터 다시 판정하여야 한다. 반대로 권리자와 수행자의 법률관계가 밝혀지지 않은 경우에는 미확정으로 남는다. 자료가 없다는 사정만으로 곧바로 구제 불능으로 단정할 수는 없다.
따라서 이 절이 허용하는 결론은 한정되어 있다. 특정 불가능한 소유자를 확인한 판결이더라도 그 판결 자체가 무효가 되는 것은 아니며, 다만 특정인의 소유권을 증명하는 확정판결이라고 볼 수 없다는 데 그친다. 특정이란 다른 사람이나 권리와 구별할 수 있는 표시이며, 이 표시가 없는 판결은 후속 등기 절차에서 요구되는 증명 목적을 달성하지 못한다. 허용되지 않는 것은 확인된 사실이 아닌 인적사항을 판결의 이름으로 채워 넣는 해석이다. 만약 피보전채권의 존재 부정이 확인되면 이전의 차단과 실효 판단은 그대로 유지할 수 없고 처음부터 새로 시작하여야 한다.
5.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
앞의 분석에서는 승계인의 소송참가에는 법이 정한 시효중단과 기간준수의 소급효가 있다는 결론에 이르렀다. 이제 권리자를 특정하지 못한 확인판결이 제 목적을 달성할 수 있는지 묻는다. 이 물음은 오래된 권리에서 특히 무겁다. 오래된 권리일수록 특정 자료가 부족하기 때문이다. 그럼에도 판결문에 기록된 이름만으로 누구의 권리인지 특정되지 않는다면, 그 판결이 이후 등기나 이행 같은 후속 절차의 근거가 될 수 있는지가 지금의 쟁점이다.
판례는 그 물음에 대해 이렇게 말한다. 「미등기토지에 대하여 토지대장이나 임야대장의 소유자 명의인 표시란에 구체적 주소나 인적사항에 관한 기재가 없어서 그 명의인을 특정할 수 없는 경우에는 그 소유명의인의 채권자가 국가를 상대로 소유명의인을 대위하여 소유권확인의 확정판결을 받더라도 이 확인판결에는 소유자가 특정되지 않아 특정인이 위 토지의 소유자임을 증명하는 확정판결이라고 볼 수 없다」(대법원 2021. 7. 21. 선고 2020다300893 판결). 여기서 판례가 말하는 주체는 소유명의인이고, 행위는 그 명의인을 대위한 소유권확인이며, 조건은 명의인 표시란에 주소나 인적사항 기재가 없어 그 명의인을 특정할 수 없는 경우이다.
이 문언은 판결 자체의 형식적 효력과, 그 판결이 특정인의 소유권을 증명하는 자료가 될 수 있는지를 구분한다. 전자가 확정되었다는 사실만으로는 후자가 자동으로 충족되지 않는다. 특정인의 소유권 증명이 되려면 그 판결의 주체가 다른 사람이나 권리와 구별할 수 있는 표시, 즉 특정을 갖추어야 한다. 앞서 승계인의 참가에 소급효가 인정된다고 한 것은 소송수행권의 근거를 말할 뿐이며, 판결이 특정인의 소유권을 증명하는 자료가 되는 별개의 요구까지 면제하지 않는다. 즉 수행권의 근거와 증명력의 조건은 서로 다른 단계의 판단이다.
이 구분에 가장 강한 반론은 실제 불편을 겨냥한다. 특정 자료가 부족한 오래된 권리일수록, 권리자 본인의 직접 참여를 요구하면 집단적·대위적 권리보호가 사실상 막히지 않겠느냐는 것이다. 이 반론은 자료 부족으로 인한 권리구제의 사각지대라는 손실을 분명하게 드러낸다. 그러나 대위에 나서는 자는 채권자이고, 그가 수행하려는 대상은 소유명의인의 권리이다. 소유명의인 자체가 표시로 특정되지 않는다면, 특정인을 대신하여 수행한다는 대위의 전제가 처음부터 성립하지 않는다. 따라서 특정 불가능한 소유자를 특정인으로 보충할 수는 없다. 자료 부족을 이유로 특정의 요구를 누그러뜨리면, 오히려 대위의 대상인 권리자가 누구인지가 정해지지 않은 채 그 권리를 증명하는 판결이 생겨난다.
이 장면에서 권리를 행사하려는 대상인 B가 누군지는 표시되어 있다. 따라서 판례가 지적한 특정 결핍, 즉 명의인을 특정할 수 없는 경우와 이 장면을 단정적으로 등치할 수는 없다. 다만 대위의 피보전채권이나 보전 필요처럼 수행권의 근거가 인정되는지에 대해서는 이 장면만으로 판단할 수 없다. 이 조건에 대한 자료는 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 다음과 같이 좁다. 특정 자료가 부족해 소유자를 특정할 수 없는 경우, 그 소유명의인을 대위하여 받은 소유권확인의 확정판결은 특정인의 소유권 증명이 되지 못한다. 여기서 판결이 무효이거나 소송 자체가 성립하지 않는다는 뜻은 아니다. 다만 특정인의 소유권을 증명하는 자료로는 쓸 수 없다는 한정된 결론이며, 특정인으로 보충하여 그 결함을 고치는 것은 허용되지 않는다. 특정은 다른 사람이나 권리와 구별할 수 있는 표시이고, 그 표시가 결여된 판결은 증명력의 단계에서 목적을 달성하지 못한다. 다만 실제 권리자의 지위나 후속 등기의 구체적 결과는 이 장면으로 확정되지 않는다.
5.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
앞 절의 결론은 특정 불가능한 소유자를 특정인으로 보충할 수는 없다는 것이다. 이 장면에서 묻는 것은 권리자를 특정하지 못한 확인판결도 목적을 달성하는가이다. 특정의 결여가 확인을 넘어 등기와 같은 후속 절차까지 가로막는지를 가른다.
토지소유권 확인의 해당 판례는 이 물음에 관해 이렇게 설시한다. 「확정판결에 의하여 자기의 소유권을 증명하는 자는 미등기의 토지에 관한 소유권보존등기를 신청할 수 있는 것으로 규정하고 있고, 부동산등기규칙 제46조 제1항 제6호는 보존등기 신청 시 등기권리자의 주소 및 주민등록번호를 증명하는 정보를 첨부정보로서 등기소에 제공하여야 한다고 규정한다」(대법원 2021. 7. 21. 선고 2020다300893 판결). 이 문언은 확정판결의 주체를 자기의 소유권을 증명하는 자로, 신청의 행위를 미등기 토지의 소유권보존등기 신청으로, 첨부 정보를 주소와 주민등록번호로 정한다.
그리고 그 판례는 그 조건 아래 이렇게 이어간다. 「그 명의인을 특정할 수 없는 경우에는 그 소유명의인의 채권자가 국가를 상대로 소유명의인을 대위하여 소유권확인의 확정판결을 받더라도 이 확인판결에는 소유자가 특정되지 않아 특정인이 위 토지의 소유자임을 증명하는 확정판결이라고 볼 수 없다」(대법원 2021. 7. 21. 선고 2020다300893 판결). 앞의 근거와 이 결론의 사이에는 확인판결을 받는 단계와 그 판결이 증명을 이루는 단계의 구별이 있다. 대위로 소송을 수행해 판결을 얻었다는 사정만으로는 특정인이 소유자임을 증명하는 판결에 이르지 못하며, 이 절이 밝힌 결론도 여기에 묶인다.
가장 강한 반론은 오래된 권리일수록 특정 자료가 부족하다는 점을 겨눈다. 권리자의 직접 참여를 요구하면 집단적·대위적 권리보호가 사실상 막힌다는 불리함을 지우지 않은 채로 답하면, 특정 불가능한 소유자를 특정인으로 보충할 수는 없다. 자료가 부족한 권리자를 임의의 다른 사람으로 대신 채우는 것은 보호가 아니라 표시의 바꿔치기이며, 증명의 대상을 옮겨 버리는 결과가 된다.
합성 장면의 사실만으로 대조하면, 채권자 A는 채무자 B의 권리를 행사하려 하지만 자기 채권과 보전 필요의 근거를 따로 내지 않았다. 남의 권리에 대한 소송수행 단계에서 피보전채권 자료와 선정서·승계 자료·참가신청 가운데 어느 것으로 권리자와 수행자의 법률관계가 밝혀지는지 이 장면만으로는 정해지지 않았으므로 미확정이다. 만약 피보전채권의 존재가 부정되는 것으로 확인되면 대위소송의 적격에 관한 결론은 달라지지만, 성립 여부를 이 장면으로 확정할 수 없다.
그러므로 확인판결 자체가 목적을 이루는 것이 아니라, 판결이 특정인을 가리켜야 비로소 후속 절차가 그 사람을 향해 움직인다. 이 결론은 특정된 권리자에 대한 증명을 요구하며, 특정 불가능한 소유자를 다른 사람으로 채운 판결까지 같은 증명으로 인정하지 않는다. 반면 권리자의 자료가 부족하다는 사실만으로 구제가 닫힌다고 단정하거나, 수행자의 적격과 권리의 존재를 같은 것으로 보는 판단은 이 절이 허용하지 않는다.
5.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
그 결론이 확인해 준 승계인의 소송참가에 따른 시효중단·기간준수의 소급효와는 별개로, 지금 놓인 장면에서 채권자 A는 채무자 B의 권리를 행사하려 하지만 자기 채권과 보전 필요의 근거를 따로 내지 않았다. 소를 수행할 수 있다는 판단은 권리의 존재까지 뜻하는가? 이 물음에 답하려면 먼저 판결문에 남은 이름이 누구를 가리키는지 밝혀지는 문제가 앞에 놓인다. 이름이 적혔는데도 그 명의자가 어떤 사람인지 특정되지 않으면, 그 판결을 근거로 움직이는 후속 절차는 대상을 잡지 못한 채 멈춘다.
이 물음에 해당하는 원문은 (대법원 2021. 7. 21. 선고 2020다300893 판결) 판결요지 [3]이다. 그 문언은 미등기 토지에 대하여 토지대장이나 임야대장의 소유자 명의인 표시란에 구체적 주소나 인적사항에 관한 기재가 없어서 그 명의인을 특정할 수 없는 경우를 다룬다. 그 상황에서 소유명의인의 채권자가 국가를 상대로 소유명의인을 대위하여 소유권확인의 확정판결을 받더라도, 그 확인판결에는 소유자가 특정되지 않는다. 그 판례는 그러한 판결을 특정인이 위 토지의 소유자임을 증명하는 확정판결이라고 보지 않았다. 여기서 말하는 주체는 소유명의인이고, 행위는 채권자의 대위에 따른 소유권확인소송 수행이며, 조건은 대장 표시란에 명의인을 특정할 인적사항이 결여된 경우이다. 부동산등기법 제65조 제2호는 확정판결에 의하여 자기의 소유권을 증명하는 자는 미등기의 토지에 관한 소유권보존등기를 신청할 수 있는 것으로 규정하고, 부동산등기규칙 제46조 제1항 제6호는 보존등기 신청 시 등기권리자의 주소 및 주민등록번호를 증명하는 정보를 첨부정보로서 제공하도록 한다(대법원 2021. 7. 21. 선고 2020다300893 판결).
그 근거와 결론을 잇는 고리는 ‘특정’이라는 개념이다. 여기서 특정은 다른 사람이나 권리와 구별할 수 있는 표시를 뜻한다. 확정판결이라는 형식이 갖추어졌다고 그 판결의 주체가 자동으로 확정되는 것은 아니며, 소유권확인의 심리 대상인 소유권과 그 소유권을 가진 사람을 구별할 수 있어야 비로소 등기와 같은 후속 절차가 그 판결을 근거로 삼을 수 있다. 앞 문단의 문언이 확인판결이 특정인의 소유권 증명이 되지 않는다고 본 것은, 판결의 존재 자체를 부정하기 때문이 아니라 판결이 가리키는 소유자를 구별할 수 없어 그 증명 기능이 닿지 않는다고 본 것이다. 이 구별은 판결의 성립 여부와 판결이 특정인의 소유권을 증명하는지 여부를 나누는 단계이므로, 전자를 갖추었다고 후자를 당연히 얻었다고 볼 수 없다.
이 구별에는 실질적인 손실이 뒤따른다. 오래된 권리일수록 보존 등기의 필요성이 큰데 정작 그 권리를 뒷받침할 특정 자료는 부족하기 쉬우며, 채권자가 대위소송까지 수행하고도 얻은 확정판결을 등기 신청의 근거로 쓰지 못하면 그 노력과 기대가 헛돌 수 있다. 집단적·대위적 권리보호의 통로가 막힌다는 비판도 같은 맥락에서 나온다. 그러나 특정 불가능한 소유자를 특정인으로 보충할 수는 없다. 특정 자료가 부족하다는 사정은 그 자체로 결여된 표시를 임의의 개인에게 대응시킬 근거가 되지 않으며, 확인판결이 특정인의 소유권을 증명하지 못한다고 본 결론을 뒤집지 못한다. 반론이 지적한 보호의 공백이 불리한 점으로 남는다 해도, 구별 불가능한 명의인을 특정인으로 채우는 방식으로 그 공백을 메우는 것은 이 절의 결론이 아니다.
이 장면의 사실만으로는 A가 B의 권리를 대위하여 행사하기 위한 피보전채권과 보전 필요가 인정되는지, 아니면 선정이나 승계에 따른 소송수행권의 근거가 있는지 판단할 수 없다. 마찬가지로 B의 권리를 특정할 수 있는 자료가 대장 표시란에 있는지, 그 명의인을 구별할 인적사항이 결여되었는지도 밝혀지지 않았다. 따라서 남의 권리에 대한 소송수행 단계에서 대위의 피보전채권과 보전 필요, 또는 선정·승계에 따른 소송수행권의 근거가 인정되는 경우와 인정되지 않는 경우의 구별은 조건으로만 남는다. 권리자와 수행자의 법률관계가 밝혀지지 않은 이 장면에서는 확인판결이 특정인의 소유권을 증명하는지 여부도 미확정이며, 특정 자료의 결여를 전제한 판례의 결론을 그대로 적용하기 어렵다. 피보전채권의 존재가 부정되면 대위소송의 적격에 관한 결론이 바뀐다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 소유자를 특정하지 못한 확인판결은 특정인의 소유권을 증명하는 확정판결이 되지 못하며, 특정은 다른 사람이나 권리와 구별할 수 있는 표시를 뜻한다. 이와 구별하여, 대위의 피보전채권과 보전 필요, 또는 선정·승계에 따른 소송수행권의 근거가 인정되는 경우에 소를 수행할 수 있다는 판단과 그 수행이 실제로 특정인의 권리를 증명하는지 여부는 서로 다른 물음이다. 전자를 갖추었다고 후자가 저절로 따라오지 않으며, 특정 자료가 부족한 사정을 이유로 특정 불가능한 소유자를 특정인으로 보충할 수도 없다. 장면에 없는 연도·금액·판결 결과는 확정할 수 없고, 실제 사건의 승패나 이행 결과도 이 절에서 단정하지 않는다.
5.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
The present question is to find, in the wording of that source passage itself, the basis on which that declaratory judgment functions in a lawsuit conducted on behalf of the right of another. How is the wording of that source passage (Supreme Court Decision 2020Da300893 decided July 21, 2021) applied to the conduct of a lawsuit concerning the right of another?
In the context of confirmation of land ownership, the case law left the following wording. This wording takes the possibility of identification as a step of adjudication. The above case law only excludes the probative value of a declaratory judgment lacking identification of the owner; it contains no wording denying the existence of the conduct of a lawsuit concerning the right of another. Only the wording within the scope of that source passage is made the basis for adjudicating the conduct of a lawsuit concerning the right of another, and it is not extended into the reasons for judgment.
The loss this distinction aims at lies in the fact that the older a right is, the more the identifying materials are lacking. Where no mark distinguishing the owner from other persons remains in the records, if an arbitrary identified person is filled in, that declaratory judgment acquires a probative value at odds with the facts, and subsequent registration or enforcement procedures move against the wrong target.
Where the subrogating creditor's claim to be preserved is not recognized, or where there is no statutory basis for litigating on behalf of another, the basis for the right to conduct a lawsuit closes. If the actual materials have not been assembled, the matter remains undetermined.
What this section permits is the judgment that reads the lack of identification of the owner as a limit on the probative value of a declaratory judgment, within the scope of the wording of that source passage. What it does not permit is an interpretation that supplements an owner who cannot be identified with an identified person, or that broadens the scope of application of the wording into the reasons for judgment.
5.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
Following the earlier question of whether a declaratory judgment that failed to identify the right holder still achieves its purpose, this section now examines what parts must be separately adjudicated within the conduct of a lawsuit concerning the right of another. In this scene, unless they are asked about separately, the judgment recognizing the authority to conduct the lawsuit and the conditions under which that authority actually operates become mixed together.
The case law addressed in this section, while dealing with confirmation of land ownership, explains as follows. "Where, with respect to unregistered land, the owner name column of the land register or the forest register contains no entry of a specific address or personal details so that the name holder cannot be identified, even if a creditor of that registered owner obtains a final and conclusive judgment confirming ownership against the State by subrogating the registered owner, that declaratory judgment cannot be regarded as a final and conclusive judgment proving that a specified person is the owner of the above land, because the owner is not identified in it" (Supreme Court Decision 2020Da300893 decided July 21, 2021). Here the subject of the declaratory judgment is an identified person, and absent that designation the judgment cannot prove the identified person's ownership.
Connecting this wording with the conclusion of this section makes it clear that the detailed distinctions within the step are limited to the conditions of the cases where it operates, the cases where it is blocked, and the cases that remain undetermined. Where the claim to be preserved underlying the subrogation and the need for preservation, or the basis for the right to conduct a lawsuit by selection and succession, is recognized, the conduct is possible; where the subrogating creditor's claim to be preserved is not recognized, or where there is no statutory basis for litigating on behalf of another, it is blocked. Where the legal relationship between the right holder and the person conducting the lawsuit has not been clarified, the matter remains undetermined. Because the judgment that a lawsuit may be conducted and the substance of the right that such conduct reaches are placed at distinct stages, the conclusion of one stage cannot be transcribed onto another.
The strongest counterargument aims at the point that the lack of materials is common with old rights. The older the right, the more the identifying materials, such as the entries in the land register or personal details, are lacking, and if the participation of the right holder is required merely on the ground that materials are absent, the path of collective and subrogation-based rights protection is in effect blocked. Yet the settled answer does not change. Lack of materials only leaves the matter undetermined, and undetermined does not immediately become incurable, nor can one invent an identification that does not exist.
The basis for the claim to be preserved and the need for preservation is not confirmed in the scene, and therefore whether the conduct of a lawsuit concerning the right of another is constituted under these conditions cannot be determined from this scene alone. The places left in the remaining records are materials on the claim to be preserved, the instrument of selection, materials on succession, and the application to participate. If the legal relationship between the right holder and the person conducting the lawsuit remains unclarified, it is left undetermined, and it is not resolved by filling an owner who cannot be identified with an arbitrary identified person.
What this section permits is only the distinction according to the stated conditions, and it does not permit inventing additional steps to hasten the result. Adjudication is made with only the three of the cases where it operates, the cases where it is blocked, and the cases that remain undetermined, and no other circumstance can be erected as a new stage.
5.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
On this premise, the question is what criterion divides the operation, the blockage, and the undetermined status of the conduct that exercises the right of another in its stead. In this scene, the question is on what basis the conduct opens and what absence closes it.
Supreme Court Decision 2020Da300893 decided July 21, 2021 dealt with the case where the registered owner of unregistered land could not be identified in the designation column of the land register. The wording of its holding presupposes that a person who proves his or her own ownership by a final and conclusive judgment may apply for a preservation registration of ownership, and that upon application he or she must provide information proving the address and resident registration number of the person entitled to registration. It then holds that even if a creditor of the registered owner who cannot be identified obtains a final and conclusive judgment confirming ownership against the State by subrogating the registered owner, that judgment cannot be regarded as a final and conclusive judgment serving as proof of the ownership of an identified person, because the owner is not identified in it.
This holding distinguishes the pathway of the conduct and the point at which that pathway closes. The pathway of the subrogation lawsuit opens with the basis of the subrogating creditor's claim to be preserved and the need for preservation standing in place. Yet if the judgment obtained through that conduct fails to identify the right holder, the purpose of proving the right of an identified person remains unachieved. In the end, recognition of the basis of the conduct itself and that conduct's leading to proof of the right of an identified person are separate stages. Even for a conduct whose basis is recognized, if identification of the right holder is lacking, the achievement of the purpose is blocked, and a conduct with no basis for the conduct at all is blocked from the outset.
The reality that the older a right is, the more the identifying materials are lacking shakes this distinction. The disadvantage also remains that if identifying materials are demanded, collective and subrogation-based rights protection becomes in effect difficult. Even so, the author's answer is that an owner who cannot be identified cannot be supplemented with an identified person. What that judgment required was not conferring the status of an identified person through supplementation, but the point that a judgment lacking identification itself cannot function as proof of an identified person. The difficulty arising from the lack of materials does not disappear, but that difficulty does not justify identification by supplementation.
In this scene, where materials on the claim to be preserved underlying the subrogation or materials concerning the need for preservation have not been presented together, one cannot confirm that the basis for subrogation is recognized. Therefore, one cannot say that the subrogation conduct operates on the basis of this scene alone. Records such as materials on the claim to be preserved, the instrument of selection, materials on succession, and the application to participate are merely the kinds of materials that become the object of adjudication, and the synthetic scene did not set their actual collection or the outcome. The extent to which the legal relationship between the right holder B and the person conducting the lawsuit A has not been clarified remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Where the claim to be preserved underlying the subrogation and the need for preservation, or the basis for the right to conduct a lawsuit by selection or succession, is recognized, the conduct operates. Where the subrogating creditor's claim to be preserved is not recognized, or where there is no statutory basis for litigating on behalf of another, the conduct is blocked. And where the legal relationship between the right holder and the person conducting the lawsuit has not been clarified, the matter is undetermined. Even if the right holder's name remains in the judgment, if identification is lacking it does not lead to proof of an identified person; this conclusion cannot be restated in terms of whether the basis for the conduct is recognized.
5.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
Accepting the premise that, for the participation in the lawsuit of a successor in interest, the retroactive effect of interruption of prescription and observance of time limits as provided by law is recognized, the question now remaining is whether that judgment actually makes clear whose right it indicates. This question requires separating the fact that a name is entered in the written judgment from the judgment that that name can be distinguished from other persons or rights. If the preceding section dealt with the problem of connecting the time of the lawsuit, this section draws the boundary on whether the connected procedure can determine the object it reaches.
The discussion in question begins from the wording left by the case law surrounding confirmation of land ownership. Supreme Court Decision 2020Da300893 decided July 21, 2021 holds that a person who proves his or her own ownership by a final and conclusive judgment pursuant to Article 65, subparagraph 2 of the Registration of Real Estate Act may apply for a preservation registration of ownership of unregistered land. The same case law, citing Article 46, paragraph (1), subparagraph 6 of the Enforcement Rule of the Registration of Real Estate Act, confirms that upon application for preservation registration, information proving the address and resident registration number of the person entitled to registration must be provided as attached information. The subject indicated by this wording is the person entitled to registration, the act is the application for preservation registration, and the condition is proving one's own ownership by a final and conclusive judgment. Therefore, if the person whom the judgment targets is not identified, that judgment can hardly function as a means of proof satisfying the requirements for a registration application.
This judgment requires that two stages be viewed separately. First is the problem of whether someone is qualified to conduct the lawsuit, that is, whether the basis for the right to conduct, such as the claim to be preserved underlying the subrogation and the need for preservation, is recognized; and second is the problem of whether the judgment obtained by conducting that lawsuit identifies and proves the person who holds the substantive right. Supreme Court Decision 2020Da300893 decided July 21, 2021 holds that where, in the owner name column of the land register or the forest register, there is no entry of a specific address or personal details so that the name holder cannot be identified, even if a creditor of that registered owner obtains a final and conclusive judgment confirming ownership against the State by subrogating the registered owner, that declaratory judgment cannot be regarded as a final and conclusive judgment proving that a specified person is the owner of the above land, because the owner is not identified in it. This distinction separates the qualification to conduct a lawsuit from the probative value of the judgment, and reveals that a judgment permitting the conduct does not immediately determine the substance of the right.
This position entails a clear loss. The older a right is, the more the identifying materials, such as a specific address or personal details, are bound to be lacking, and with such records alone it is difficult to proceed to subsequent registration or enforcement. Here the counterargument gains force that if the direct participation of the right holder is additionally required, collective and subrogation-based rights protection is in effect blocked. Yet the boundary the author sets is maintained without erasing this loss. Whether the subrogating creditor or the person conducting the lawsuit is identified, and whether the target right exercised is identified as belonging to someone, are different problems, and no statutory means of filling the former with the latter can be found within this wording.
Contrasting this scene with the foregoing criterion, unless the materials on the claim to be preserved, which are the basis for the right to conduct, are confirmed, the conduct of a lawsuit concerning the right of another is blocked, and nor were the instrument of selection, materials on succession, or application to participate that might fill this gap separately presented. The conduct of a lawsuit concerning the right of another operates where the basis for the right to conduct a lawsuit, arising from the claim to be preserved underlying the subrogation and the need for preservation, or from selection and succession, is recognized. Because the legal relationship between A and B has not been clarified by this scene alone, the adjudication remains undetermined. The contrast condition that, if the existence of the claim to be preserved is denied, it changes the conclusion regarding the standing of the subrogation lawsuit likewise does not confirm the absence of materials as incurable.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. A declaratory judgment that failed to prove the ownership of an identified person cannot be regarded as having achieved its purpose, and this judgment depends not on whether a name remains in the judgment but on whether that name is distinguishable from other persons or rights. At the same time, the conclusion that is not permitted is equally clear. An interpretation that conclusively treats the judgment that the requirements of the right to conduct are satisfied as the existence of a substantive right, or that makes up for the lack of identifying materials by designating an arbitrary identified person, goes outside this wording. Accordingly, the recognition of the qualification to conduct and the substantive attribution of the right remain separate stages.