Summary
The general forum of a corporation or similar entity is determined by statutory criteria concerning its principal office, place of business, and the like.
2.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
The fact that the address of the representative personally and the corporation's office may lie in different places is the starting point of this question. The court adjudicating the corporation's debts and the place where the representative personally lives may differ. On the premise of this difference, the analysis examines in turn whether the representative's personal address determines the corporation's Jurisdiction, and what the criterion is by which the channel of this relief opens. The preceding section concluded that the defendant's general forum is taken as the starting point, while other jurisdictions prescribed by statute are examined separately.
The statutory criterion for determining the general forum of a corporation and others is laid down in Article 5 of the Civil Procedure Act. Its text provides: "The general forum of a corporation, or any other association or foundation, shall be determined by the place where its principal office or business office is located, and where there is no office or business office, by the address of the person in charge of its principal business." The subjects determined here are the corporation and other associations or foundations, the place serving as the criterion is the principal office or business office, and only where both are absent does the address of the person in charge of the principal business fill that place.
The link joining this text with the conclusion previously established is the distinction of subject matter. What the provision takes as the address is the corporation's own office or business office, not the place where the representative personally lives. The representative's personal address may be at issue when discussing that individual's general forum, but it cannot be carried over as such into the criterion determining the corporation's Jurisdiction. It is upon the same distinction that the entrance to this relief opens only where the relief demanded, the parties, and the conditions are specified in the statement of claim and the right of the chosen action can be defended, and where the chosen court has Jurisdiction or the jurisdictional violation is corrected by a lawful transfer.
The strongest counterargument targets the inconvenience that fixing the criterion would bring. The actual place of business and the registered place may diverge, so that if the center of activity shifts while the office on paper remains in place, the statutory criterion may miss the reality. This inconvenience must not be erased. Yet the answer to the counterargument lies in the direction that the forum of the corporation and that of the representative personally cannot be treated as the same. The problem of diverging places remains within the task of determining what shall be regarded as that corporation's principal office, and it is not resolved by drawing in the representative's personal address in its stead.
In this scene, Plaintiff A brought an action in a place other than the location of Defendant B and relied on the jurisdiction clause of the contract. The jurisdiction clause of the contract, however, does not itself conclusively determine the judgment as to the corporation's principal office, and in the intervals where the scope of the jurisdiction agreement or the location of the defendant remains unconfirmed, the adjudication is left undetermined. The condition that, once exclusive jurisdiction is confirmed, the jurisdictional conclusion reached solely on the basis of convenience and agreement changes also operates within the same scope.
What this section permits extends no further than the distinction that the representative's personal address is not placed as the criterion for the corporation's general forum, and the confirmation, upon that distinction, of the conditions under which the channel opens. This conclusion does not support proceeding to the direction of presuming that a trial on the merits may be had in that court even though the chosen court lacks Jurisdiction. The corporation's Jurisdiction begins from the statutory criteria of the principal office or business office and the like.
2.2The Conditions That Block Relief
The principal office means the office that forms the center of the corporation's activities. Accepting the premise established at the preceding stage—that the defendant's general forum is taken as the starting point while other jurisdictions prescribed by statute are examined separately—and following the question whether the representative's personal address determines the corporation's Jurisdiction, the analysis examines the conditions that block that determination. Plaintiff A brought an action in a place other than the location of Defendant B and relied on the jurisdiction clause of the contract. In this scene it becomes apparent that the place where the representative personally lives and the criteria for the corporation's Jurisdiction are separate issues.
Under the relevant text, it is provided that "the general forum of a corporation, or any other association or foundation, shall be determined by the place where its principal office or business office is located, and where there is no office or business office, by the address of the person in charge of its principal business" (Article 5 of the Civil Procedure Act). This text limits the subjects whose general forum is to be determined to the corporation and other associations or foundations, and designates the relevant act and place as the place where the principal office or business office is located. Only where there is neither office nor business office does it exceptionally take the address of the person in charge of the principal business as the criterion. Here, the address of the person in charge of the business means the address of the person acting as an organ of the corporation, and it is not the same as the separate place of life where the representative personally resides.
Connecting this text with the conclusion, the criterion determining the corporation's Jurisdiction is the statutory criterion concerning the principal office and the like, not the representative's personal address. Accordingly, the reason the representative's personal address must be distinguished from the corporation's Jurisdiction is that the facts the law refers to when determining the corporation's general forum are the corporation's organizational location. Where one presumes that a trial on the merits can be had in the chosen court although that court lacks Jurisdiction, if even one of the statutory requirements is unmet, the channel of relief is closed. Those requirements are that the chosen court has Jurisdiction or that the jurisdictional violation is corrected by a lawful transfer. If neither of the two cases applies, the channel at the stage of correcting the jurisdictional violation does not open.
The strongest counterargument aimed at this conclusion lies in the point that the actual place of business and the registered place may diverge. If the place where the corporation actually operates differs from the place entered in the registry, the court of jurisdiction will vary according to which side is regarded as the principal office, and depending on that choice the place where a party mounts its defense may also vary. There follows, too, the concern that the convenience of transfer may encroach upon the opposing party's choice of the place of defense and upon exclusive jurisdiction. Even so, the forum of the corporation and that of the representative personally cannot be treated as the same. The inconvenience the counterargument points out remains a matter to be adjusted in applying the jurisdictional criteria, but it cannot be resolved by adopting the representative's personal address as the ground for the corporation's Jurisdiction.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only that Plaintiff A brought an action in a place other than the location of Defendant B and relied on the jurisdiction clause of the contract. Contrasting this with the preceding conditions, the location of the defendant corporation has not been confirmed, and the scope of the jurisdiction agreement likewise is not confirmed from the records. The complaint, the materials on the location, the jurisdiction agreement, the basis for exclusive jurisdiction, and the transfer decision were merely left as items to be confirmed from the records, and are not collected materials. Accordingly, where the scope of the jurisdiction agreement or the location of the defendant is unconfirmed, the corporation's general forum cannot be determined, and whether the channel of relief has opened also remains undetermined. If exclusive jurisdiction is confirmed, however, the jurisdictional conclusion reached solely on the basis of convenience and agreement changes.
The conclusion permitted in this section is limited to the points that the corporation's general forum is determined by the statutory criteria concerning the principal office or business office and the like and that the representative's personal address cannot take its place, and that where one presumes a trial on the merits can be had in the chosen court although that court lacks Jurisdiction, the channel of relief is closed when the statutory requirements are unmet. The conclusion that the representative's personal address is applied directly as the corporation's Jurisdiction, and the conclusion that a trial on the merits may continue to be had in a state of jurisdictional violation, are not derived from this section.
2.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
The preceding section took the view that where one presumes a trial on the merits can be had in the chosen court although that court lacks Jurisdiction, this relief is blocked. While receiving that conclusion, this section does not open the door to a new alternative; confining itself to the question whether the representative's personal address determines the corporation's Jurisdiction, it examines where the boundary lies at which no adjudication is possible for want of materials. If the preceding section addressed the conditions under which relief is blocked, what remains now is to distinguish the state in which no adjudication can be rendered at all from that blockage.
The statute governing this question is Article 5 of the Civil Procedure Act, and its paragraph (1) provides: "The general forum of a corporation, or any other association or foundation, shall be determined by the place where its principal office or business office is located, and where there is no office or business office, by the address of the person in charge of its principal business." This text designates the ground of the general forum as the principal office or business office of the corporation and others, not the representative's personal address, and the address of the person in charge of the principal business becomes a supplementary criterion only where there is no office or business office. The subjects prescribed by paragraph (1) are the corporation and others, the act it denotes is the determination of the general forum, and the conditions vary according to the presence or absence of an office or business office.
Linking the above text with the conclusion of this section, the representative's personal address does not determine the corporation's Jurisdiction. Here there are two stages to be distinguished. One is where the general forum of the corporation and others is to be regarded as lying under the statutory criteria; the other is whether unconfirmed materials, such as the scope of the jurisdiction agreement or the location of the defendant, remain and leave the adjudication undetermined. The former is the work of setting out the criteria of adjudication by unpacking the concept of the principal office through definition; the latter is the work of withholding the conclusion for want of materials to apply those criteria. If the two stages are handled at once, the shortage of materials may be mistakenly carried over into an absence of relief.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the point that the actual place of business and the registered place may diverge. If weight is given to the place where the work actually occurred, an adjudication adhering to the registered place is uncomfortable, and the temptation arises to take the representative's personal place of life as a nearer clue. Beyond that, the concern that the convenience of transfer may encroach upon the opposing party's choice of the place of defense and upon exclusive jurisdiction also operates at the same time. The answer given earlier, however, is that the forum of the corporation and that of the representative personally cannot be treated as the same, and within this scope the conclusion is maintained without erasing the disadvantage urged by the counterargument. If the materials are wanting, the adjudication is left undetermined, but that want does not become a ground for merging the two forums.
The fact confirmed in the synthetic scene is that Plaintiff A brought an action in a place other than the location of Defendant B and relied on the jurisdiction clause of the contract. This scene did not itself determine the location of Defendant B, and did not settle how far the scope of the jurisdiction agreement reaches or whether there is a basis for exclusive jurisdiction. Accordingly, even when contrasted with the preceding condition of the principal office, so long as the materials on the location and the jurisdiction agreement are unconfirmed, the adjudication remains undetermined. If exclusive jurisdiction were confirmed, the jurisdictional conclusion reached solely on the basis of convenience and agreement would change, and only in that case could the existing conclusion be overturned. Conversely, at present, where confirmation of exclusive jurisdiction is absent, the conclusion does not change.
The conclusion permitted by this section is that, where the scope of the jurisdiction agreement or the location of the defendant is unconfirmed, the adjudication is left undetermined, and that this is distinguished from the case in which relief is blocked. The conclusions this section does not permit are converting the shortage of materials directly into an absence of relief, or taking the representative's personal address as the ground for the corporation's general forum. Accordingly, the undetermined state is a state in which the adjudication has been held in abeyance, not a state in which relief is blocked, and that boundary is maintained within the statutory criterion of the principal office and the scope of the confirmed materials.
2.4The Records Needed for Determination
If those two places differ, the threshold question in an action against a corporation (juristic person) as defendant is by which court's standard jurisdiction is to be determined. In this scene, alongside the question whether the address of the representative as an individual determines the corporation's jurisdiction, it must also be settled what records are needed for the stage-by-stage determination of that question. The conclusion set out from the preceding stages is that the defendant's general forum serves as the starting point, while other jurisdictions prescribed by statute are examined separately. If that conclusion is accepted as it stands, the direction opens up that the starting point of the jurisdictional determination is the general forum standard as to the corporation itself, and that the address of the representative as an individual does not belong within that starting point. Accordingly, what is needed at the present stage is not deciding whether to substitute the address of the representative as an individual, but rather distinguishing and confirming, first, the statutory text as to what the legal standard is for determining the corporation's general forum and, second, what materials are taken as the basis when that text is applied.
The statutory standard for determining the general forum of a corporation and others is set out in text in Article 5 of the Civil Procedure Act. That provision states: "Article 5 (General Forum of Corporations, Etc.) (1) The general forum of a corporation, or of any other association or foundation, is determined by the place where its principal office or business office is located; where there is neither an office nor a business office, it is determined by the address of the person chiefly in charge of its affairs." This text limits the subject to a corporation, or any other association or foundation, and designates as the place for determining their general forum the place where the principal office or business office is located. And only in the case where there is neither an office nor a business office does it make the address of the person chiefly in charge of affairs a supplementary standard. Here, the principal office means the office that forms the center of the corporation's activities, and it is a concept distinct from the address at which the representative as an individual actually lives. Since the subject, act, and conditions indicated by the text of the provision are of this kind, the address of the representative as an individual cannot be drawn up directly as the corporation's standard of jurisdiction. Paragraph (2) of the same Article provides that, as applied to foreign corporations and others, the determination is made by the office, business office, or address of the person in charge of affairs located in the Republic of Korea; thus it is made clear that this provision itself designs the general forum of a corporation on a place-based standard centered on offices and business offices.
On the basis of the above text, the conclusion of this section is that the forum of a corporation and the forum of a representative as an individual cannot be treated as identical. Because the standard for determining the forum of a representative as an individual and the standard for determining the general forum of a corporation and others each concern a different subject, the place of the one cannot be applied to the other as it stands and merged into one. This distinction carries over to the standard for the stage-by-stage determination, and the determination is made solely on the materials recorded in the complaint, the location materials, the jurisdiction agreement, the grounds for exclusive jurisdiction, and the transfer decision. That is to say, both when answering the question whether the address of the representative as an individual determines the corporation's jurisdiction, and when confirming whether that answer hardens into a stage-by-stage determination, the analysis does not go beyond the fixed scope of the records. Missing records are not filled in by conjecture, and if the records contain no materials as to where the actual place of work was or where the registered place was, that item remains unverified. An unverified item does not turn directly into the conclusion that the corporation lacks jurisdiction; it merely cannot serve as the basis for the stage-by-stage determination. Accordingly, the determination proceeds on the premise that the judgment may vary with what remains in the records, but in a manner that honestly indicates what cannot be known if a given thing is absent from those records.
The strongest counterargument starts from the point that the actual place of work and the registered place may diverge. If the place where the corporation's activities actually take place differs from the place recorded in the register, practical inconvenience and disputes may arise as to which side is to be regarded as the principal office in the text. Beyond that, a concern is also raised that the convenience of transfer may encroach upon the opposing party's choice of a place to defend itself and upon exclusive jurisdiction. In other words, handling that moves jurisdiction as a matter of convenience may deprive the opposing party of the opportunity to choose the place where it will defend itself, or may produce the result of neutralizing an exclusive jurisdiction separately prescribed by statute. Such losses and inconveniences are substantive and must not be erased from the conclusion. The foregoing answer, however, is that the forum of a corporation and the forum of a representative as an individual cannot be treated as identical, and that answer holds despite the inconvenience to which the counterargument points. The reason is that, if the counterargument points to the divergence between actual places or to the side effects of transfer on grounds of convenience, then taking the address of the representative as an individual as the corporation's standard of jurisdiction is not a method of resolving that divergence but amounts to transplanting the forum standard of a different subject. The adverse aspects identified by the counterargument are left as they are, but the boundary is maintained whereby the corporation's jurisdiction is judged by the statutory standard applicable to the corporation, and the address of the representative as an individual is treated under a separate standard.
The facts in the scene relating to this question are limited to the point that plaintiff A brought the action in a place other than the location of Defendant B and relied on the jurisdiction clause of the contract as grounds. On this fact alone, it is not confirmed where the address of the representative as an individual is, where the corporation's principal office or business office is, or whether both the office and the business office were absent. Accordingly, what is recorded in the present scene is the assertion of the existence of the complaint and the jurisdiction agreement, and the content of the location materials and the presence or absence of grounds for exclusive jurisdiction cannot be determined from the scene alone. Where the scope of the jurisdiction agreement or the defendant's location is not confirmed, the basis for the stage-by-stage determination is insufficient. This comparison is not a fact that actually occurred but a hypothesis that changes one of the conditions of determination, and therefore it must not be described outside the scene as though exclusive jurisdiction were actually confirmed.
The conclusion permitted in this section is that the address of the representative as an individual cannot determine the corporation's jurisdiction; that the general forum of a corporation and others is determined by the statutory standard concerning the principal office, the business office, and the like; and that such judgment is made solely on the materials recorded in the complaint, the location materials, the jurisdiction agreement, the grounds for exclusive jurisdiction, and the transfer decision. Within the scope in which the condition that missing records are not filled in by conjecture is confirmed as well, this conclusion is maintained. Conclusions not permitted are the substitution of the address of the representative as an individual as the corporation's standard of jurisdiction; the filling in of facts absent from the records so as to assert definitively whether jurisdiction exists; and any handling that presupposes that a trial on the merits may be had before a court that lacks jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction exists, or where a violation of jurisdiction has been corrected by a lawful transfer, the determination at that stage may be maintained, but whether such an achievement has occurred is not fixed by the records of this section alone. Even if there is a divergence between the actual place of work and the registered place, the boundary remains that the forum of a corporation and the forum of a representative as an individual cannot be merged.
2.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
Does the address of the representative as an individual determine the corporation's jurisdiction? What change overturns the existing stage-by-stage determination? On the premise that the defendant's general forum serves as the starting point while other jurisdictions prescribed by statute are examined separately, plaintiff A brought the action in a place other than the location of Defendant B and relied on the jurisdiction clause of the contract as grounds. In this scene, what the court must first determine is on what basis the corporation's forum is determined, and it must also clarify whether the place of life of the representative as an individual can serve as that standard. Since the jurisdiction clause of the contract is a separate source of jurisdiction, it is examined apart from the stage of determining the corporation's general forum.
The statutory standard corresponding to this question is Article 5 of the Civil Procedure Act. "Article 5 (General Forum of Corporations, Etc.) (1) The general forum of a corporation, or of any other association or foundation, is determined by the place where its principal office or business office is located; where there is neither an office nor a business office, it is determined by the address of the person chiefly in charge of its affairs." This text limits the subject whose general forum is determined to a corporation, an association, and a foundation, and designates as the place serving as the standard the place where the principal office or business office is located. Only where both are absent does the address of the person chiefly in charge of affairs become the supplementary standard. Here, the address of the person in charge of affairs means the address of the person who bears the principal work within the corporation's organization, and it is not treated as synonymous with the place where the representative as an individual maintains a separate life.
This statutory standard, at the first stage of determining jurisdiction, links the corporation's forum to the place of the organization. As a result, the corporation's jurisdiction and the forum of the representative as an individual become distinct objects of judgment, and neither can be substituted for the other as its basis. If a change is confirmed, the existing determinations on blocking and effectiveness are discarded and the determination is redone from the stage. In other words, exclusive jurisdiction operates as a superior ground that draws other jurisdictions toward it, and that conclusion cannot be sustained merely by the contract's jurisdiction clause or by the convenience of the parties. Accordingly, the stages must not be mixed, and the order of general forum, jurisdiction agreement, and exclusive jurisdiction must be kept distinct.
The counterargument that the actual place of work and the registered place may diverge points to practical inconvenience. If the office recorded in the register is not the center of the activities, it is difficult to determine the corporation's jurisdiction promptly from the complaint and the location materials alone, and the party that filed the action in the wrong place may suffer procedural loss. The counterargument takes the view that, if the convenience of transfer is placed first, both the right of the opposing party to choose for itself the place where it will defend and exclusive jurisdiction are shaken together. Yet the forum of a corporation and the forum of a representative as an individual cannot be treated as identical. The standard prescribed by statute is fixed on the corporation's principal office and business office, and even if the office differs from the registration, the address of the representative as an individual cannot be filled in as its substitute. The confirmed conclusion is narrow, but it holds.
The record items of this scene are fixed as the complaint, the location materials, the jurisdiction agreement, the grounds for exclusive jurisdiction, and the transfer decision. These items show only what is to be compared, and they do not fix the service or the performance outcome of an actual case. Whether the location of Defendant B is the same as the corporation's principal office, and whether the jurisdiction clause of the contract falls within the grounds for exclusive jurisdiction, cannot be determined from the scene alone. If exclusive jurisdiction is confirmed, the point that the jurisdictional conclusion reached on convenience and agreement alone would change is not a fact that actually occurred but a hypothesis that compels the determination to be redone. Where the scope of the jurisdiction agreement or the defendant's location is not confirmed, the judgment remains undetermined.
What is permitted in this section is the distinction that the corporation's general forum is first determined by the statutory standard of the principal office and business office, and that the address of the representative as an individual is not substituted into that standard, together with the conditional judgment that, if exclusive jurisdiction is confirmed, the jurisdictional conclusion reached on convenience and agreement alone is changed and the stage is determined anew. What is not permitted is treating the place of life of the representative as an individual as identical to the corporation's forum, and presupposing that a trial on the merits may be had before a court that lacks jurisdiction. Only where the chosen court has jurisdiction, or where a violation of jurisdiction has been corrected by a lawful transfer, is the examination of that court maintained.
2.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
피고 B의 주된 사무소는 법인의 활동 중심이 되는 사무소를 뜻하며, 대표자 개인의 주소와 구별된다. 법인의 채무를 다투는 법원과 대표자 개인의 생활 장소는 다를 수 있고, 이러한 어긋남은 앞서 살펴본 대로 대표자 개인의 주소가 법인의 관할을 정하는지의 물음과 맞닿아 있다. 피고의 보통재판적을 출발점으로 삼되 법이 정한 다른 관할을 별도로 살펴보는 태도를 그대로 두고, 이제 실제 업무 장소와 등기된 장소가 어긋날 수 있다는 점이 이 구별을 흔들 수 있는지 묻는다. 원고 A는 피고 B의 소재지와 다른 곳에 소를 내고 계약서의 관할 조항을 근거로 들었는데, 이 장면에서 등기된 장소와 실제 업무 장소가 서로 다르다면 무엇을 기준으로 삼아야 하는가. 이 물음에 답하기 전에 해당 문언이 무엇을 정하는지 먼저 확인해야 한다. 법인과 대표자 개인이 각각 다른 재판적을 가진다는 점을 전제로 두지 않으면, 이후의 판단 기준이 섞여 버린다.
민사소송법 제5조는 "법인, 그 밖의 사단 또는 재단의 보통재판적은 이들의 주된 사무소 또는 영업소가 있는 곳에 따라 정하고, 사무소와 영업소가 없는 경우에는 주된 업무담당자의 주소에 따라 정한다"라고 정한다. 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 법인과 그 밖의 사단·재단이며, 개인인 대표자가 아니다. 그 보통재판적을 정하는 기준은 주된 사무소 또는 영업소의 소재이고, 사무소와 영업소가 없는 경우에 한하여 주된 업무담당자의 주소가 그 자리를 대신한다. 즉 이 조문은 법인의 재판적을 법인 자신의 업무상 중심지에 묶어 두고, 대표자 개인의 생활 장소를 법인의 기준으로 끌어들이지 않는다. 법인의 채무를 다투는 법원을 정할 때 이 문언은 법인의 주된 사무소를 먼저 찾아야 함을 알려 주며, 등기된 장소가 그 주된 사무소와 일치하는지는 별도의 사실 확인 문제로 남는다.
이 문언과 이 절의 결론을 이으면, 실제 업무 장소와 등기된 장소가 어긋난다 하더라도 법인의 보통재판적은 주된 사무소라는 법정 기준에 따라 정해진다. 여기서 두 판단 단계를 구별해야 하는 이유가 드러난다. 첫째 단계는 법인의 재판적을 무엇으로 정할지의 문제이고, 둘째 단계는 대표자 개인의 재판적을 무엇으로 정할지의 문제이다. 주된 사무소는 "법인의 활동 중심이 되는 사무소"를 뜻하므로, 이 정의는 법인의 활동에 관한 것이지 대표자 개인의 거주에 관한 것이 아니다. 등기된 장소와 실제 업무 장소가 어긋날 수 있다는 사정은 첫째 단계에서 주된 사무소를 어떻게 특정할지의 문제를 일으킬 뿐, 둘째 단계를 첫째 단계에 흡수시키는 근거가 되지 못한다. 법인과 대표자 개인의 재판적을 같은 것으로 처리할 수는 없다는 결론이 유지되는 까닭이 바로 여기에 있다.
이러한 구별이 겨냥한 반론은 이송의 편의가 상대방의 방어 장소 선택과 전속관할을 침해할 수 있다는 점이다. 실제 업무 장소와 등기된 장소가 어긋날 때 법인의 주된 사무소를 특정하기 어렵고, 그 불확실성이 방어를 준비하는 상대방에게 어느 법원에서 응소해야 할지의 부담을 키울 수 있다는 것이 반론의 불리한 측면이다. 등기된 장소를 기준으로 삼으면 예측이 쉬워지는 반면 실제 업무와 동떨어질 수 있고, 실제 업무 장소를 기준으로 삼으면 실질에 가까워지는 반면 제3자의 예측이 흔들릴 수 있다. 이 곤란을 부인하지 않더라도 법인과 대표자 개인의 재판적을 같은 것으로 처리하는 방식으로 해소할 수는 없다. 대표자 개인의 주소를 법인의 보통재판적 기준으로 바꾸는 것은 반론이 지적한 예측 가능성을 회복하기는커녕, 법인의 재판적과 개인의 재판적이 서로 다른 두 문제라는 점 자체를 무너뜨린다. 반론이 남긴 손실은 그대로 두고, 법인의 보통재판적은 주된 사무소라는 문언의 기준을 지키는 방향에서만 답한다.
합성 장면에서 이 물음과 관련된 사실만 꺼내 보면, 원고 A는 피고 B의 소재지와 다른 곳에 소를 내고 계약서의 관할 조항을 근거로 들었다. 이 장면은 대표자 개인의 주소가 법인의 관할을 정하는가라는 물음과 맞물리며, 법인의 주된 사무소가 대표자 개인의 생활 장소와 다를 수 있다는 전제 위에 놓인다. 민사소송법 제5조의 문언과 대조하면 법인의 보통재판적은 주된 사무소 또는 영업소에 따라 정해지고, 대표자 개인의 주소는 그 기준이 아니다. 다만 이 장면만으로는 피고 B의 주된 사무소가 실제 업무 장소인지 등기된 장소인지 특정되지 않으므로, 그 부분은 미확정으로 남는다. 관할합의의 범위가 어디까지인지, 그리고 계약서의 관할 조항이 전속관할에 관한 근거에 해당하는지도 이 장면에서 확인되지 않았다. 전속관할이 확인되면 편의와 합의만으로 정한 관할 결론을 바꾼다.
이 절에서 허용되는 결론은 법인의 보통재판적을 주된 사무소라는 법정 기준에 따라 정하고, 대표자 개인의 재판적과 섞지 않는 것까지이다. 허용되지 않는 결론은 대표자 개인의 주소를 법인의 관할 기준으로 삼거나, 두 재판적을 같은 것으로 처리하는 것이다. 실제 업무 장소와 등기된 장소가 어긋난다는 사정은 주된 사무소를 특정하는 데 참고할 사실일 뿐, 대표자 개인의 재판적을 법인의 재판적에 편입시키는 근거가 되지 못한다. 해당 법원의 심리 또는 적법한 이송이라는 단계에 서기 위해서는 선택한 법원에 관할이 있거나 관할 위반을 적법한 이송으로 바로잡아야 하고, 소장·소재지 자료·관할합의서·전속관할 근거·이송결정이 그 판단의 기록이 된다. 관할합의 범위나 피고 소재지가 확인되지 않은 경우에는 미확정으로 남긴다.
2.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
이러한 장면에서 대표자 개인의 주소가 법인의 관할을 정하는가 하는 물음이 앞서 남긴 문제와 맞물린다. 앞 절은 법인과 대표자 개인의 재판적을 같은 것으로 처리할 수는 없다고 결론지었다. 이 결론을 전제로 이번 물음은 법인 자체의 보통재판적을 무엇으로 정할 것인가에 모아진다. 대표자의 거주지나 생활 기록이 아니라 법인의 조직상 중심에 주의를 두어야 하는 이유가 여기에 있다.
관련 법문은 그 기준을 먼저 정한다. 이 문언에서 보통재판적의 주체는 법인, 그 밖의 사단 또는 재단이다. 그리고 기준이 되는 장소는 이들 자신이 두는 주된 사무소 또는 영업소이며, 예외는 사무소와 영업소가 없는 경우에 한해 주된 업무담당자의 주소를 쓰는 것으로 한정된다. 여기서 업무담당자는 법인의 기관으로서의 지위를 전제로 하는 것이지 대표자 개인의 거주처와 같은 것은 아니다.
이 문언이 가리키는 판단 순서는 주된 사무소 또는 영업소의 존재를 먼저 살핀 뒤 그것이 없는 경우에만 보충 기준으로 넘어가는 것이다. 저자는 이 결론을 두 단계로 나누어 설명하는데, 그 까닭은 일상 언어로는 대표자의 주소가 곧 회사의 소재지처럼 들릴 수 있기 때문이다. 그러나 법정 기준은 법인의 활동 중심이 되는 사무소, 곧 주된 사무소를 첫 번째로 놓고, 사무소와 영업소가 없는 예외적 상태에서만 담당자의 주소를 허용한다. 대표자 개인의 생활 장소를 이 예외의 자리에 끼워 넣는 것은 법문이 정한 보충 기준의 범위를 벗어나는 일이며, 대표자 개인의 주소가 법인의 관할을 정하지 못하는 이유가 정확히 이 구별에 있다.
물론 실제 업무 장소와 등기된 장소가 어긋날 수 있다는 반론은 무시하기 어렵다. 회사의 활동이 실제로 이루어지는 곳과 서류상 남아 있는 사무소의 위치가 다르면, 그 불일치를 해소하기 위해 편의상 어느 쪽을 채택하는가에 따라 소를 제기하거나 방어하는 쪽의 부담이 달라진다. 이송의 편의를 앞세운 해석이 상대방의 방어 장소 선택이나 전속관할을 침해할 수 있다는 지적도 같은 결에서 나온다. 그러나 저자의 답은 여기서 변하지 않는다. 편의상의 장소 선택이 대표자 개인의 주소를 법인의 기준으로 삼는 결과를 낳는다면, 법문이 정한 주된 사무소 또는 영업소라는 요건 자체가 무력해진다.
합성 장면에 등장하는 사실만으로 한정하면, 원고 A는 피고 B의 소재지와 다른 곳에 소를 내고 계약서의 관할 조항을 근거로 들었다. 이 장면에서 피고가 법인인지 대표자 개인인지, 그리고 계약서의 관할 조항이 전속관할에 해당하는지는 확인되어 있지 않다. 따라서 이 장면만으로는 선택한 법원에 관할이 있는지, 혹은 관할 위반이 적법한 이송으로 바로잡혔는지 판단할 수 없다. 다만 전속관할이 확인되면 편의와 합의만으로 정한 관할 결론은 달라진다는 점은 이번 물음과 맞닿아 있다. 법인의 보통재판적을 정하는 법정 기준과는 별개로, 합의나 편의에 기대는 접근이 어떤 경우에 뒤집히는지를 보여 주기 때문이다.
정리하면 이 절이 허용하는 결론은 법인 등의 보통재판적은 주된 사무소 또는 영업소가 있는 곳에 따라 정하고, 사무소와 영업소가 없는 경우에 한해 주된 업무담당자의 주소에 따라 정한다는 범위에 머문다. 대표자 개인의 주소를 법인의 관할 기준으로 삼거나, 등기된 장소와 실제 업무 장소의 차이를 이유로 법정 기준을 대표자의 생활 장소로 대체하는 결론은 이 절이 허용하지 않는다.
2.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
보험료 수령을 맡긴 사람들이 법인의 채무를 다투는 법원과 대표자 개인의 생활 장소가 서로 다를 수 있다는 점에서 출발한다. 이 장면에서 대표자 개인의 주소가 법인의 관할을 정하는가?
민사소송법 제5조는 "법인, 그 밖의 사단 또는 재단의 보통재판적은 이들의 주된 사무소 또는 영업소가 있는 곳에 따라 정하고" 있다. 이 문언은 보통재판적의 근거를 대표자의 주소가 아니라 법인 자체에 속하는 장소에 두며, 그 장소는 주된 사무소 또는 영업소로 한정한다. 사무소와 영업소가 모두 없을 때만 주된 업무담당자의 주소가 보충 기준이 된다. 외국법인에는 대한민국에 있는 사무소·영업소 또는 업무담당자의 주소가 적용된다.
이 문언에 따라 법인 등의 보통재판적은 주된 사무소·영업소 등에 관한 법정 기준으로 정해지고, 대표자 개인의 주소는 같은 역할을 하지 않는다. 저자가 적용한 구별은 이렇다. 대표자는 법인을 대표하는 지위에 있을 뿐이고, 그 개인의 생활 장소는 법인의 활동 중심과 분리된 별개의 사실이기 때문이다. 따라서 두 주소가 서로 다르다는 사실만으로 관할 판단이 흔들리지 않으며, 같은 것으로 처리하면 이 구별 자체가 무너진다.
가장 강한 반론은 실제 업무 장소와 등기된 장소가 어긋날 수 있다는 점을 겨냥한다. 등기부에 적힌 사무소가 이미 이전한 뒤이고 실무가 다른 곳에서 이루어진다면, 법정 기준이 당사자가 마주한 실제와 어긋나 방어할 장소를 고르는 불편이 생길 수 있다. 대표자 개인의 주소가 오히려 분쟁에 가까운 실체적 중심이라는 주장도 같은 맥락에서 나온다. 다만 저자의 답은 달라지지 않는다. 그런 불편이 있어도 법인과 대표자 개인의 재판적을 같은 것으로 처리할 수는 없다.
이 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 원고 A가 피고 B의 소재지가 아닌 곳에 계약서의 관할 조항을 근거로 소를 냈다는 점뿐이다. 피고 B가 법인인지, 법인이라면 주된 사무소가 어디인지, 대표자의 주소가 어느 곳인지는 장면에 정해지지 않았다. 따라서 주된 사무소를 특정할 수 없어 이 절의 범위의 결론을 장면 사실로 확정하기는 어렵다. 전속관할이 확인되면 편의와 합의만으로 정한 관할 결론을 바꾼다는 조건만이, 법인의 보통재판적을 법정 기준으로 정해야 한다는 판단과 함께 유지된다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 법인 등의 보통재판적을 주된 사무소·영업소 등에 관한 법정 기준으로 정하고, 주된 사무소를 법인의 활동 중심이 되는 사무소로 이해하며, 대표자 개인의 주소를 그 기준으로 삼지 않는 범위에 머문다. 잘못 선택한 법원이 권리구제의 종착점이 되는지, 계약서의 관할 조항이 효력을 갖는지, 관할이 틀리면 새로 소를 내야 하는지는 이 절에서 다루지 않는다.
2.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
피고의 보통재판적을 출발점으로 삼되 법이 정한 다른 관할을 별도로 살핀다는 전제 위에서, 대표자 개인의 주소가 법인의 관할을 정하는가 하는 물음이 제기된다. 이 장면에서 법인의 보통재판적을 무엇으로 볼 것인가에 따라 선택한 법원에서의 심리가 정해진다.
해당 원문은 민사소송법 제5조이고, 제1항은 "법인, 그 밖의 사단 또는 재단의 보통재판적은 이들의 주된 사무소 또는 영업소가 있는 곳에 따라 정하고, 사무소와 영업소가 없는 경우에는 주된 업무담당자의 주소에 따라 정한다"고 정한다. 여기서 보통재판적이라 함은 당사자에 대한 소를 제기할 수 있는 관할 법원을 정하는 기본 기준을 뜻하고, 그 주체는 법인·사단·재단이다. 제2항은 외국법인 등의 경우 대한민국에 있는 사무소·영업소 또는 업무담당자의 주소를 기준으로 삼는다. (민사소송법 제5조)
제1항과 제2항이 삼는 기준은 모두 법인 등 자신의 사무소나 영업소, 나아가 업무담당자의 주소이며, 대표자 개인의 주소는 그 문언 어디에도 포함되지 않는다. 이 문언을 해당 범위 안에서 적용하면, 법인의 보통재판적은 주된 사무소 또는 영업소가 있는 곳에 따라 정해지고, 둘이 없는 경우 주된 업무담당자의 주소가 대신 그 역할을 한다. 이 판단은 법원이 본안을 심리할 관할을 확정하거나 관할 위반을 적법한 이송으로 바로잡는 단계에서의 근거로만 쓰인다. 법인의 재판적과 대표자 개인의 재판적은 별개의 기준으로 나누어 살피며, 둘을 같은 것으로 취급하지 않는다. (민사소송법 제5조)
실제 업무 장소와 등기된 장소가 어긋날 수 있다는 점은 이 기준이 주는 불편을 드러낸다. 사무소를 옮겼는데 등기가 그대로이면 등기된 곳과 활동 중심이 달라지고, 당사자는 어느 쪽을 기준으로 삼아야 할지 다툴 수 있다. 이송의 편의가 상대방의 방어 장소 선택과 전속관할을 침해할 수 있다는 우려도 같은 맥락에 있다. 대표자 개인이 주소를 두는 곳은 그 개인의 생활 중심을 말할 뿐, 법인의 활동 중심이 되는 사무소가 무엇인지를 정해주지 않는다. 문언상 법인의 보통재판적은 사무소·영업소·업무담당자의 주소라는 법정 기준을 따르므로, 편의만으로 그 기준을 대표자 개인의 주소로 옮길 수 없다. (민사소송법 제5조)
이 정의에 따라 대표자 개인의 주소와 법인의 활동 중심이 다른 경우, 후자가 보통재판적의 기준이 된다. 다만 합성 장면만으로는 법인의 주된 사무소가 어느 곳인지, 사무소와 영업소가 없는 상태인지, 피고 B의 소재지가 어느 곳인지 확정되지 않았다. 관할합의 범위나 피고 소재지가 확인되지 않았으므로 이 사건의 관할 결론은 미확정으로 남는다. 장면으로 확인되는 것은 원고 A가 계약서의 관할 조항을 근거로 들었다는 점뿐이고, 그 조항이 어느 법원을 가리키는지, 또 전속관할에 저촉되는지에 대해서는 자료가 없다. (민사소송법 제5조)
따라서 이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 해당 원문 문언만 해당 법원의 심리 또는 적법한 이송의 판정 근거로 쓴다. 대표자 개인의 주소가 법인의 보통재판적을 정한다는 결론, 또는 주된 사무소의 문언을 넘어서 다른 사실관계의 보통재판적까지 함께 정한다는 결론은 이 문언에서 도출되지 않는다.
2.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
Within this scene, the question to be asked now is whether the personal address of the representative determines the Jurisdiction over the corporation; through the preceding analytical stage, the defendant's general forum is taken as the starting point, but the analysis proceeds as far as separately examining the other forums prescribed by law. This stage tests whether that starting point operates in the same manner for a corporation.
The statutory standard for answering this question is found in Article 5 of the Civil Procedure Act. Its text provides: "The general forum of a corporation or any other association or foundation is determined by the place of its principal office or business office, and, where there is no office or business office, by the address of the person principally in charge of business." This provision limits the subjects whose general forum is determined to corporations, associations, and foundations, sets the standard as the location of the principal office or business office, and brings in the address of the person in charge of business only when neither place exists.
Article 5 thus places the place designating an office and the address designating a person in a different order. The personal address of the representative does not fall within the order that Article 5 directly prescribes, and the text of this provision alone cannot be drawn upon to raise the representative's address to the status of a forum standard for the corporation. Only where there is no office or business office does the address of the person principally in charge of business serve as a supplementary standard; the two standards must therefore not be mixed into one, and must be read in their prescribed order. The author observes this distinction and does not extend it so as to substitute the personal address of the representative.
The counterargument targets the mismatch between places. The actual place of business and the registered place may diverge. If the place to which the office has moved is taken as the standard, it will differ from the place remaining in the registry, and the counterparty to a transaction will have difficulty determining which side is the center of the corporation. When the convenience of transfer, aimed at reducing inconvenience, collides with the convenience of defense, one must choose which convenience to prioritize. Adding the representative's home address to the standard as well would simplify the calculation, but that address does not indicate the corporation's affiliation. The author's answer is therefore not to take the personal address of the representative as an alternative standard, and that answer does not disturb the perspective that asks the corporation for the ground determining Jurisdiction.
What can be confirmed in this synthetic scene is the place of the grounds to be submitted with the complaint. Plaintiff A cited the Jurisdiction clause of the contract, and chose a court in a place other than the location of defendant B. The complaint, the materials on the location, the jurisdiction agreement, the ground for exclusive Jurisdiction, and the transfer decision support this judgment. When, within these records, one reads separately where the corporation's principal office and business office are and where the personal address of the representative is, one can discern whether the order prescribed by Article 5 and the grounds of this scene diverge. The side on which the scope of the jurisdiction agreement or the defendant's location is unconfirmed remains undetermined on the strength of this scene alone.
What this section permits is the judgment of distinguishing, in the order prescribed by Article 5, the personal address of the representative from the corporation's general forum, and of taking the confirmed location of the office and business office as the standard first. What is not permitted is the judgment of mixing the personal address of the representative into the corporation's forum on the strength of the contract clause and convenience alone.
2.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
The general forum of a corporation and the like is determined by the statutory standard relating to the principal office, business office, and so forth. In this scene, it is at issue whether the personal address of the representative determines the Jurisdiction over the corporation, and whether the hearing before the chosen court proceeds as it stands. Since the preceding section has confirmed the standard for the corporation's general forum, one must now examine how that standard actually operates, or is blocked, at the stage of filing the lawsuit.
The text corresponding to this question is as follows. In this text, the subjects of the general forum are corporations, associations, and foundations; the place serving as the standard is their principal office or business office; and, exceptionally, only where there is neither office nor business office does the address of the person principally in charge of business become the standard. Here, the personal address of the representative is not included among the enumerated place-based standards.
Connecting this text with the standard of the preceding section yields the conclusion that the Jurisdiction over a corporation cannot be determined by the personal address of the representative. The representative's personal place of living is a concept distinct from the principal office, which is the center of the corporation's activities; if the two are treated as the same, the standard prescribed by law itself collapses. Following the conclusion of this section, the hearing operates where the chosen court has Jurisdiction or where a violation of Jurisdiction has been corrected by a lawful transfer, and it is blocked where, despite the chosen court's lack of Jurisdiction, it is presupposed that trial on the merits can be had before that court. The reason for the distinction is that the presence or absence of Jurisdiction can be judged only after the standard of the principal office has been fixed.
The strongest counterargument is that the actual place of business and the registered place may diverge. Where the office remaining in the registry differs from the place where business is actually conducted, taking the formal registered place as the standard produces the inconvenience that the court the party must visit diverges from the place of communication in practice, and that burden may fall upon the counterparty who chooses the place for defending the lawsuit. This answer does not eliminate the inconvenience identified by the counterargument; rather, it is that the inconvenience must be borne to the extent of not mixing the forum dealing with the corporation's obligations with the representative's personal sphere of life. The moment the places of the two subjects are merged for convenience, the standard of the general forum prescribed by law is itself changed.
The facts confirmed in this scene are that the place of filing the lawsuit differs from the location of defendant B, and that a Jurisdiction clause was presented as the ground therefor. The court will then first find the principal office or business office of defendant B, a corporation, determine the general forum on that basis, and then examine whether the chosen court has Jurisdiction. From the scene alone, however, the scope of the jurisdiction agreement and the defendant's location are not fixed. If exclusive Jurisdiction is confirmed, the conclusion on Jurisdiction reached through convenience and agreement alone changes. The state in which the scope of the jurisdiction agreement or the defendant's location is unconfirmed is undetermined, and the mere fact that there are no materials cannot be converted into a denial of Jurisdiction.
In sum, the corporation's general forum is determined not by the personal address of the representative but by the standards prescribed by law, such as the principal office and business office; following this standard, where the chosen court has Jurisdiction or the matter has been corrected by transfer, the hearing operates; where there is no Jurisdiction yet trial on the merits is presupposed possible, it is blocked; and where the scope of the agreement or the location is unverified, it remains undetermined. An interpretation that takes the personal address of the representative as the ground for the corporation's Jurisdiction cannot be reconciled with this conclusion.
2.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
This presupposes the conclusion that, taking the defendant's general forum as the starting point, the other forums prescribed by law are examined separately. This circling leaves unsettled the problem of where Jurisdiction should be placed in a lawsuit against a corporation. Here only one question is addressed: whether the personal address of the representative determines the Jurisdiction over the corporation. The term principal office, meaning the office that serves as the center of the corporation's activities, is used as the reference point in the judgment below.
The statutory text contains the standard for determining the general forum of a corporation and the like. Article 5(1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "The general forum of a corporation or any other association or foundation is determined by the place of its principal office or business office, and, where there is no office or business office, by the address of the person principally in charge of business." This text limits the subjects to corporations and other associations and foundations, and places the standard of conduct on the location of the principal office or business office. The personal address of the representative is treated as a concept different from the address of the person principally in charge of business, which appears as an alternative standard only where there is neither office nor business office.
In that the above text binds the corporation's general forum to the location of the office and the business office, it leads to the conclusion that the representative's personal place of living cannot serve as that standard. Two stages of judgment are separated here. First there is the stage of determining the corporation's Jurisdiction according to the statutory standard, and then there is the stage of separately examining the forum of the representative as an individual. If the two stages are bundled together at once, the erroneous result follows that the circumstance that the location of the corporation's office and the representative's personal address differ can shake the corporation's general forum.
Where the corporation's activities are conducted in one place but a different place is entered in the documents alone, adherence solely to the statutory standard may produce the inconvenience that the parties cannot be tried in the place where the actual dispute is handled. Notwithstanding such inconvenience, this conclusion is maintained. The mismatch cannot be corrected by drawing the personal address of the representative into the standard for the corporation's general forum. Determining the forum of a corporation and grounding it on the representative's personal place of living are distinct problems, and substituting the latter for the standard of the former is not permitted.
This scene does not reveal whether the general forum of defendant corporation and the jurisdictional agreement under the contract mesh with each other, or whether a stipulation of exclusive Jurisdiction exists. Unless the scope of the jurisdiction agreement, the defendant's location, and the location of the principal office are confirmed, which court has Jurisdiction cannot be determined from this scene alone. Accordingly, one applies only the judgment that the corporation's general forum is determined according to the statutory standard relating to the principal office, business office, and so forth, while whether the particular court in the scene has Jurisdiction remains undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is limited to the points that the personal address of the representative does not serve as the standard determining the corporation's general forum, and that the general forum of a corporation and the like is determined by the statutory standard relating to the principal office, business office, and so forth. Going further to determine how to handle the discrepancy between registration and the actual place of business surrounding the principal office, when the Jurisdiction clause of a contract takes effect, and how to correct matters if Jurisdiction is wrong, lies beyond the scope of this question.