Summary
An agreement on jurisdiction must be a written agreement concerning suits arising from a certain legal relationship.
4.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
The statement that jurisdiction has been designated does not bind the entire dispute without limit. Plaintiff A filed an action in a place other than Defendant B's location, citing the jurisdiction clause of the contract. As confirmed earlier, related jurisdiction operates within the relationships of claim and co-litigation prescribed by law. Then, in what circumstances does the jurisdictional wording in the contract take effect and open the channel through which the case enters the chosen court? This question is separate from the validity of the contract clause itself; it asks for the standard governing whether the action may be received by that court and undergo a hearing on the merits. If this entrance is deemed open merely by the existence of an agreement, the determination remains unspecified.
Article 29 of the Civil Procedure Act declares, "(1) The parties may, by agreement, designate a court of first instance having jurisdiction," and then adds, "(2) An agreement under paragraph (1) shall be in writing with respect to an action arising from a certain legal relationship" (Article 29 of the Civil Procedure Act). Here, the court of first instance designated by the parties joined in agreement is the object of jurisdiction by agreement; an action arising from a certain legal relationship is the scope of the disputes to which the agreement extends; and the writing is the form necessary for the agreement to be formed. This wording confers the authority to designate jurisdiction itself, while confining its exercise to actions concerning a particular legal relationship and requiring that the written form be observed.
Connecting this wording to the preceding determination, for the jurisdiction clause of the contract to have effect, the agreement must pertain to an action arising from a particular legal relationship and must be made in writing. Put differently, when it appears from the complaint that the action is one the agreement was aimed at, and the opposing party has an opportunity to contest that jurisdiction, this entrance of relief opens when the chosen court has jurisdiction or when a want of jurisdiction has been corrected by a lawful transfer. The formal requirement of the agreement and the scope of disputes to which the agreement extends are two axes that must be examined side by side. Neither can substitute for the other, and even an agreement satisfying the form does not automatically draw in actions that go beyond the legal relationship its wording targets.
The counterargument that presses hardest is the doubt whether a signature on standard terms amounts to substantive consent. Where one has merely signed a jurisdiction clause pre-printed in the terms, without negotiation and without any trace of having read or discussed its content, can that signature carry the same weight as an individualized jurisdictional agreement? Where party autonomy, the value that jurisdiction by agreement seeks to vindicate, is weak, recognizing the effect of the designation as it stands may unfairly determine the place where the opposing party must mount its defense. Even so, so long as the form of the agreement and the scope of its object are examined separately, the agreement cannot be automatically extended to disputes beyond the targeted legal relationship. This answer neither unconditionally affirms nor denies the binding force of the signature; it maintains the boundary of deciding only the disputes targeted by the wording of the agreement.
From this scene alone it cannot be confirmed which legal relationship the jurisdiction clause of the contract targeted, whether the written agreement was concluded individually or formed part of standard terms, or where Defendant B is located. If exclusive jurisdiction is confirmed, the conclusion on jurisdiction reached solely on convenience and agreement changes. Where the scope of the jurisdiction agreement or Defendant B's location is unconfirmed, one cannot assert from this scene alone that the entrance has been opened.
The conclusion permitted by this section is that, where the jurisdiction clause of the contract constitutes a written agreement concerning an action arising from a particular legal relationship, satisfying both form and scope, and where the dispute targeted by that agreement is specified in the prayer for relief such that a defense can be made, this channel of relief opens once the jurisdiction of the chosen court is established or corrected by a lawful transfer. The conclusion not permitted is to bind, under the same jurisdiction, disputes exceeding the wording of the written agreement, or to assume that one may obtain a trial on the merits in a chosen court whose jurisdiction has not been established. A state of insufficient materials remains undetermined and does not immediately mean that relief is unavailable.
4.2The Conditions That Block Relief
When is the jurisdiction clause of a contract effective? In this scene, the remaining question is not how far a jurisdictional agreement binds, but what the conditions are for obtaining a trial in this court in reliance on that wording. If the preceding stage addressed the scope within which related jurisdiction operates, this stage asks about the limits on the formation of the jurisdictional agreement itself.
The governing provision is Article 29 of the Civil Procedure Act, which reads as follows: "Article 29 (Jurisdiction by Agreement) (1) The parties may, by agreement, designate a court of first instance having jurisdiction. (2) An agreement under paragraph (1) shall be in writing with respect to an action arising from a certain legal relationship." The actor indicated by this wording is the party seeking to designate jurisdiction, and the act is an agreement made in writing. And the condition is that the agreement operates only when it concerns an action arising from a certain legal relationship.
Accordingly, the wording distinguishes two levels of designating jurisdiction. One is fixing the court chosen by the parties; the other is delimiting how far that choice binds actions. This is why the designation of the chosen court and the limitation on the scope of actions must be read together. Jurisdiction by agreement means jurisdiction designated by the parties through a written agreement, and that designation must be confined to an action arising from a certain legal relationship. If it is not settled which legal relationship was targeted, and whether the claim arose from that relationship, the scope of the agreement's effect is likewise unsettled.
The strongest counterargument concerns whether a signature on standard terms amounts to substantive consent. Where one has merely signed a set form, it remains in issue whether the party truly read and accepted the jurisdiction clause, and whether, in circumstances where the effect of the terms is already being contested, the signature alone settles consent to that clause. The point this counterargument targets is that the formalization of a jurisdiction agreement can stand in for the parties' substantive choice. Even so, the agreement cannot be automatically extended to disputes beyond the targeted legal relationship. Even if doubt remains as to the substance of the signature, the conclusion that the scope of actions bound by the agreement must not exceed the limits of the legal relationship remains intact.
In this scene it is not confirmed whether the jurisdiction clause of the contract was in writing, and the record does not specify which legal relationship the clause targeted. Only the types of materials are set — the complaint, location materials, the jurisdiction agreement document, the basis for exclusive jurisdiction, and the transfer decision — but those materials have not been assembled. In a case that assumes one may obtain a trial on the merits in the chosen court although that court lacks jurisdiction, if even one of the requirements for jurisdiction by agreement is unmet, the channel of relief is closed. However, whether the conclusion on jurisdiction reached solely on convenience and agreement would change if exclusive jurisdiction were confirmed cannot be determined from this scene alone.
The conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. Where the jurisdiction clause of the contract is a written agreement concerning an action arising from a certain legal relationship, and that agreement is joined with the jurisdiction of the chosen court, a hearing or a lawful transfer becomes possible. Conversely, if the writing requirement is unconfirmed, or if it is not specified which legal relationship the agreement binds, one cannot conclude from that wording alone that a trial on the merits may be obtained in that court. Insufficiency of materials means undetermined, and does not immediately mean that relief is unavailable.
4.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
From the preceding stage of analysis, one carries over only the procedural condition that related jurisdiction operates within the relationships of claim and co-litigation prescribed by law. In this scene there remains the question of distinguishing and determining separately the scope of effect of the jurisdictional agreement and the handling of unconfirmed materials.
The basis of the wording that sets jurisdiction by agreement is Article 29 of the Civil Procedure Act. That wording first limits the matter with "The parties may, by agreement, designate a court of first instance having jurisdiction," and then sets forth the form and scope by adding, "An agreement under paragraph (1) shall be in writing with respect to an action arising from a certain legal relationship" (Article 29 of the Civil Procedure Act). Here the actor is the parties, the act is an agreement designating a court having jurisdiction, and the condition is that the matter be in writing concerning an action arising from a certain legal relationship; each of these is distinguished phrase by phrase.
This wording leads to the basis for confirming that a jurisdictional agreement is jurisdiction designated by the parties through a written agreement. Yet the reason the legal relationship that is the object of the agreement and the form of the agreement are required side by side is that a signification of the designation of jurisdiction does not extend into a comprehensive assumption of jurisdiction over the entire dispute. If the two elements are not examined separately but bundled into one, an error arises in which items lacking materials are handled as though they were capable of determination.
The strongest counterargument in this section is the point that, where one has signed standard terms, doubt remains whether that signature is substantive consent. It is concretely raised, as a loss and inconvenience, that satisfying the form of signature does not, in turn, settle the content of consent. That uncertainty targeted by the counterargument cannot be resolved in the direction of broadening the scope of the agreement.
What is confirmed in the synthetic scene is only the fact that Plaintiff A filed an action in a place other than Defendant B's domicile and relied on the jurisdiction clause of the contract. There are no confirmed materials as to whether the jurisdictional agreement is in writing concerning an action arising from some particular legal relationship, or as to where Defendant B is domiciled. Accordingly, where the scope of the jurisdictional agreement and Defendant B's domicile are unconfirmed, matters unspecified because the materials for determination are lacking must remain undetermined, distinguished from impossibility where the determination itself cannot be made. The point that, if exclusive jurisdiction were confirmed, the conclusion on jurisdiction reached solely on convenience and agreement would change likewise operates only within the same boundary.
The conclusion permitted by this section is to determine the matters for which the materials of decision have been specified, after confirming the form and the targeted scope of the jurisdictional agreement; it does not permit declaring as impossible those matters left unspecified for lack of materials. However, at the stage of organizing and reviewing the confirmed materials, that handling does not turn into the actual achievement of payment, delivery, or recovery that opens as a legal channel.
4.4The Records Needed for Determination
Jurisdiction by agreement means jurisdiction designated by the parties through a written agreement. In this scene, what records must be assumed in order to judge the effect of the jurisdictional wording? If the preceding stage dealt with the scope within which related jurisdiction operates, the present question, separate from that, asks at what point the effect of the contract wording is established and what materials are needed for that determination. To confirm whether the court in which the action was filed is the chosen court, and whether that choice is bound to a particular legal relationship, materials revealing the content and scope of the written agreement are needed. This question is not answered by the bare fact that the contract contains a jurisdiction clause; it demands records setting out the scope of actions to which the wording is directed.
Article 29 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that "An agreement under paragraph (1) shall be in writing with respect to an action arising from a certain legal relationship." The actor indicated by this wording is the parties who agreed on jurisdiction, the act is a written agreement concerning an action arising from a certain legal relationship, and the conditions are that the agreement be in writing and that its object be confined to an action arising from a particular legal relationship. That is, the provision requires a jurisdictional agreement not as a general stipulation of unlimited duration and unlimited scope, but as a writing bound to a particular legal relationship. If Plaintiff A relied on the jurisdiction clause of the contract, materials showing which legal relationship's action that clause targets as a writing must follow. On the wording, this requirement leads beyond the existence of the agreement to the question of confirming the scope of the agreement's object.
This connects the wording with the materials recorded in the complaint, the domicile materials, the jurisdiction agreement document, the basis for exclusive jurisdiction, and the transfer decision. Stage determinations are made only on the records that exist, and missing records are not filled in by assumption. In this determination two things must be distinguished: one is whether the agreement exists in writing; the other is whether that writing is directed at an action arising from a certain legal relationship. The former is satisfaction of form, the latter is limitation of the scope of the object, and the two are confirmed separately. The jurisdiction clause cited in the complaint alone does not reveal the latter scope, so a record is required stating which legal relationship the wording of the jurisdiction agreement document refers to. The materials stating Defendant B's domicile must also be collated together, so that the relation between the chosen court and the court of Defendant B's domicile is set in order.
The point at which the counterargument that doubt remains whether a signature on standard terms amounts to substantive consent aims most persuasively is whether the act of inscribing one's name in the signature field secures actual understanding of and assent to a stipulation concluded without individual negotiation. This loss leads to the inconvenience that the right to choose the place of defense is pushed aside by the mere form of the stipulation. Even leaving intact the doubt that remains as to the substantive consent of the signature, jurisdiction by agreement does not depart from the scope of a written agreement concerning an action arising from a certain legal relationship. While not erasing the disadvantage pointed out by the counterargument, it is maintained that one cannot, by invoking that doubt, automatically draw in disputes that are not the object of the agreement. Rather, so long as doubt remains, one simply cannot assert that there was an agreement exceeding the established scope.
The fact confirmed in the synthetic scene is only that Plaintiff A filed an action in a place other than Defendant B's domicile and relied on the jurisdiction clause of the contract. Contrasting this fact with the foregoing conditions, whether the jurisdiction clause is a writing directed at an action arising from a particular legal relationship is not settled by the scene alone. Whether the claim set out in the complaint falls within the legal relationship referred to by the jurisdiction agreement document is likewise unconfirmed, and whether materials stating Defendant B's domicile were actually submitted is not established by this scene either. This assumption is not an established fact but merely a contrast that alters the conditions of determination, and is handled only within the range corresponding to this scene. Accordingly, one cannot assert that the effect of the jurisdictional wording has been established, and the state in which the scope of the object and the domicile records are unconfirmed remains undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is that the jurisdictional wording operates within the range in which a written agreement concerning an action arising from a certain legal relationship has been confirmed, and that each stage is determined on the records that exist. The conclusion not permitted is to treat the entire dispute as bound by that wording merely because the contract contains a jurisdiction clause, or to fill in items lacking records by assumption so as to fix the scope of the agreement. Elevating the stage by facts beyond the range of the materials recorded in the complaint, the domicile materials, the jurisdiction agreement document, the basis for exclusive jurisdiction, and the transfer decision is likewise not a conclusion of this section. A state in which the legal channel is open is not restated as the actual achievement of payment, delivery, or recovery.
4.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
In this scene, one must ask why the statement that jurisdiction has been determined does not operate without limit. The preceding analysis is taken only as the starting point of this section, and the consequences of a determination exceeding the scope of the agreement are examined separately. The boundaries at which the jurisdiction phrase takes effect, and the conditions under which the determination falters once those boundaries are exceeded, are asked together.
A jurisdiction agreement must be a written agreement concerning an action on a certain legal relationship. Article 29 of the Civil Procedure Act provides, "The parties may, by agreement, designate the court of first instance having jurisdiction." The same Article adds, with respect to the agreement under paragraph (1), that "it shall be made in writing with respect to an action arising from a certain legal relationship." Here the subject of the agreement is the parties, the act is the designation of the court of first instance having jurisdiction, and the condition is a writing concerning an action arising from a certain legal relationship. Disputes exceeding the range required by the text are not governed by this sentence.
The written agreement required by the text of Article 29 and the limitation to the legal relationship at issue are conditions bound up with one another. If the former is form, the latter is the range of disputes contained in the agreement, and the establishment of one does not automatically supply the other as well. The conclusion of this section is that, once exclusive jurisdiction is confirmed, the jurisdictional conclusion reached on the basis of convenience and agreement alone is altered, and that, once the specified change is confirmed, the existing blocking and effectiveness determinations are discarded and the matter is re-adjudicated from the earlier stage. This is why the mere circumstance that a writing remains cannot be taken to mean that the agreement covered disputes beyond a particular group of claims.
The counterargument that doubts remain whether the signature to standard terms and conditions constitutes substantive consent points to the unease that, from the mere circumstance that a formal signature procedure was followed, one cannot know whether the parties truly accepted the content of the jurisdiction agreement. This point may be preserved; even so, the agreement cannot be automatically extended to disputes beyond the legal relationship at issue. Even if the defect of consent identified by the counterargument remains, the scope of the agreement does not broaden apart from the text. The doubts concerning substantive consent and the scope of the agreement are separate questions, and the persistence of the former does not cause the latter's limitation to disappear.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene go no further than that plaintiff A brought an action in a place other than the domicile of defendant B and relied on the jurisdiction clause of the contract as its basis. This scene contains only the facts necessary to adjudicate the scope of effect of the jurisdiction phrase; it does not reveal what the certain legal relationship to which the contract refers is, whether that phrase was preserved in writing, or whether a basis for exclusive jurisdiction is confirmed together with it. The condition that nothing can be determined unless the scope of the agreement or the domicile of the defendant is confirmed remains in place here. Items not confirmed by the scene are not filled in.
The jurisdiction clause of a contract has effect when it is confirmed to be a written agreement concerning an action on a certain legal relationship, and it does not cover disputes beyond that scope. If exclusive jurisdiction is confirmed, the jurisdictional conclusion reached on the basis of convenience and agreement alone is altered; no less importantly, the agreement must not be automatically extended to disputes beyond the legal relationship at issue. If the specified change is confirmed, the existing blocking and effectiveness determinations are discarded and the matter is re-adjudicated from the earlier stage; and the question whether a new action must be brought if jurisdiction is mistaken is not closed by this sentence.
4.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
In this scene, jurisdiction by agreement means jurisdiction fixed by the parties through a written agreement. The preceding analysis set out that related jurisdiction operates in the relationship between the claim prescribed by law and co-litigation (joinder of parties). If so, the question now remaining is whether the jurisdiction clause written in the contract can be taken to bind all disputes. In particular, doubts remain whether the signature to standard terms and conditions constitutes substantive consent. At this stage, where such doubts persist, it remains at issue how far the scope of a jurisdiction agreement may be recognized.
In this stage, which asks the effect of the jurisdiction clause of the contract, the text is examined first. Article 29 of the Civil Procedure Act provides, "Article 29 (Jurisdiction by Agreement) (1) The parties may, by agreement, designate the court of first instance having jurisdiction." The subject indicated by this text is the parties who made an agreement concerning an action, and the act is the designation, by agreement, of the court of first instance having jurisdiction. What range of actions that agreement reaches must be read together with the formal condition of the same Article. However, the scope corresponding to this section is limited to Article 29, and is not explained by extending to other issues of the text. The author's application of this text to this question is treated in the divisions set out below.
A jurisdiction agreement shall be made in writing with respect to an action arising from a certain legal relationship. The written form prescribed by this text and the limitation to a certain legal relationship are distinct stages of determination. The written form is a condition asking whether the agreement was formed; the limitation to a certain legal relationship is a condition asking to what actions that agreement extends. Accordingly, the agreement cannot be automatically extended to disputes beyond the legal relationship at issue. Even if doubts remain whether the signature to standard terms and conditions constitutes substantive consent, the doubt as to consent and the scope of the agreement are separate questions. Even if consent is shaken, no ground arises for extending the agreement outside the scope already fixed. The denial of extension derives not from a denial of consent but from the limitation of the agreement.
The strongest counterargument against this conclusion is aimed at the point that doubts remain whether the signature to standard terms and conditions constitutes substantive consent. The signature is a mere formality, and if one did not in fact read or negotiate, it is argued, the convenience of having the entire dispute handled in the court fixed by the agreement is more substantive. To this is added the concern that the convenience of transfer may infringe the opposing party's choice of the place of defense and exclusive jurisdiction. The opposing party loses the interest in choosing the place where it will defend, and may be carried outside the court fixed by exclusive jurisdiction. Even without erasing such loss and inconvenience, the conclusion that the agreement cannot be automatically extended to disputes beyond the legal relationship at issue is maintained. For the doubt as to the signature does not justify an expansion of scope.
The facts confirmed in this scene are that plaintiff A brought an action in a place other than the domicile of defendant B and relied on the jurisdiction clause of the contract as its basis. Set against the text of jurisdiction by agreement, a jurisdiction agreement must be a written agreement concerning an action arising from a certain legal relationship. By this contrast alone it cannot be determined whether the jurisdiction clause of the contract exceeds the scope of the legal relationship at issue, or whether the signature to standard terms and conditions corresponds to substantive consent. No year, amount, commencement date, or judgment outcome is set in the scene, and the facts, service, and performance outcomes of an actual case are also unconfirmed. Accordingly, the scope of the agreement and the formation of consent remain undetermined. However, this assumption is merely a contrast that alters the conditions of adjudication, not an additional fact of an actual case.
The conclusion permitted in this section is that the jurisdiction clause of a contract has effect only within the scope of an agreement made in writing with respect to an action arising from a certain legal relationship; the conclusion not permitted is that of automatically extending the agreement to disputes beyond the legal relationship at issue. Thus the scope of the agreement does not broaden merely because doubts remain whether the signature to standard terms and conditions constitutes substantive consent. However, the determination of scope set by this section is not a confirmation that the chosen court has jurisdiction, nor a guarantee that trial on the merits can be had in that court. Where the scope of the jurisdiction agreement or the domicile of the defendant is unconfirmed, the determination remains undetermined.
4.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The preceding section took the view that the agreement cannot be automatically extended to disputes beyond the legal relationship at issue. In this scene, when does the jurisdiction clause of the contract take effect? What is asked here is the formal condition for whether the court fixed by agreement can take charge of that dispute. A phrase that fails to satisfy this formal condition does not take effect.
Article 29 of the Civil Procedure Act declares, "The parties may, by agreement, designate the court of first instance having jurisdiction," and then adds, "The agreement under paragraph (1) shall be made in writing with respect to an action arising from a certain legal relationship." Here the subject is the parties who wish to determine for themselves the attribution of jurisdiction, the act is an agreement designating the court having jurisdiction, and the condition is that the agreement was made in writing. Furthermore, the action targeted by the agreement is limited to an action arising from a certain legal relationship. The text requires written form and limitation of subject matter together; other issues of the provision are not the province of this section.
Carrying this text through to the conclusion of this section, a jurisdiction agreement must be a written agreement concerning an action on a certain legal relationship. Here the written requirement and the limitation of subject matter do not refer to the same thing and must be examined separately. An agreement without a writing is not a matter of weak proof that an agreement was formed, but a case in which the form required by the text was not satisfied; and even where a writing exists, whether that phrase concerns an action on a particular legal relationship is a matter to be judged separately. If the two stages are conflated, the misunderstanding arises that because there was a signature all disputes are bound, and this exceeds the scope set by the text.
The strongest counterargument lies in the point that doubts remain whether the signature to standard terms and conditions constitutes substantive consent. If a transaction counterparty, able to negotiate nothing, merely signed a prearranged phrase, it is doubtful whether that signature reached consent extending even to jurisdiction. This loss is real. A may lose the opportunity to defend not at the agreed court but at the domicile of B. Even so, the more the signature appears to be consent, the more the scope of that consent is bound by the certain legal relationship set by the text. The conclusion that the agreement cannot be automatically extended to disputes beyond the legal relationship at issue is maintained here.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are that A brought an action in a place other than the domicile of B and relied on the jurisdiction clause of the contract as its basis. Whether the clause is contained in a writing is a matter to be seen from the facts, but it is difficult to determine from this scene alone. Instead, whether the range of disputes covered by the clause extends even to claims unrelated to the contract is not answered by the scene and remains undetermined. If exclusive jurisdiction is confirmed for this court, the jurisdictional conclusion reached on the basis of convenience and agreement alone is altered. Conversely, if the scope of the jurisdiction agreement is confirmed and the action is confirmed to fall within that scope, jurisdiction by agreement satisfying the written requirement has effect.
What this section permits is narrow. The jurisdiction clause of the contract, as a written agreement concerning an action on a certain legal relationship, has the effect of designating the court of first instance having jurisdiction within that scope. What this section does not permit is the interpretation that the clause, by signature alone, draws in disputes outside the contract, displaces the choice of the place of defense, and goes beyond exclusive jurisdiction. The statement that jurisdiction was fixed by agreement speaks only within the subject and form of that agreement.
4.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Bringing an action in another place on the basis of the jurisdiction clause of a contract first prompts the question of the range within which jurisdiction is determined. Related jurisdiction operates in the relationship between the claim prescribed by law and co-litigation (joinder of parties). Yet, apart from that conclusion, the statement that jurisdiction has been determined does not bind the entire dispute without limit. The question of this section is when the jurisdiction clause of a contract takes effect.
Article 29 of the Civil Procedure Act provides, "The parties may, by agreement, designate the court of first instance having jurisdiction." This text limits the subject of a jurisdiction agreement to the parties, its act to a written agreement, and the object designated to the court of first instance having jurisdiction. That is, the agreement spoken of in this provision is not conjecture or practice; its range is bound to a written agreement formed between the parties.
The same provision also limits the scope of the agreement. Paragraph (2) provides, "The agreement under paragraph (1) shall be made in writing with respect to an action arising from a certain legal relationship." This means that a jurisdiction agreement has effect only with respect to an action on a particular legal relationship. Accordingly, for the jurisdiction clause of a contract to have effect, the legal relationship covered by that phrase and the action actually brought must lie within the same range. Here, the range of 'a certain legal relationship' and the satisfaction of the written form are distinct stages of determination. Even if the form is satisfied, the agreement cannot cover an action beyond the legal relationship it targeted.
Notwithstanding such doubts, in this section the scope of the agreement cannot be read broadly so as to automatically extend the agreement to disputes beyond the legal relationship at issue. The counterargument points out that the convenience of transfer may infringe the opposing party's choice of the place of defense and exclusive jurisdiction, and it does not conceal the disadvantage that the written-form requirement misses substantive consent. Even so, that inconvenience does not serve as a ground for automatically expanding the scope of the agreement, and the preceding answer preserves the limits of the agreement as they stand.
From this scene alone it is not confirmed which legal relationship's action the jurisdiction clause of the contract targeted, nor whether a written agreement was formed. Accordingly, whether that court has jurisdiction remains in a state that can be confirmed through the records of the complaint, materials on domicile, the jurisdiction agreement, the basis for exclusive jurisdiction, and the transfer order. However, if exclusive jurisdiction is confirmed, the jurisdictional conclusion reached on the basis of convenience and agreement alone is changed; and where the scope of jurisdiction by agreement or the domicile of the defendant is unconfirmed, no determination can be made.
The conclusion permitted in this section is limited to the qualification that, for the jurisdiction clause of a contract to have effect, the agreement must be a written agreement concerning an action on a certain legal relationship. The conclusion not permitted is a determination that binds, on the basis of the agreement, disputes beyond the legal relationship at issue. A case that assumes trial on the merits can be had in the chosen court although that court lacks jurisdiction falls outside the scope of adjudication of this section.
4.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
앞 절에서 관련재판적은 법이 정한 청구와 공동소송 관계에서 작동한다는 전제를 받았다. 이 전제 위에서 계약서의 관할 문구는 언제 효력이 있는가? 합의관할의 형식이 이 물음의 출발점이다. 원고 A는 피고 B의 소재지와 다른 곳에 소를 내고 계약서의 관할 조항을 근거로 들었으므로, 그 조항이 어떤 범위의 분쟁에 작용하는지가 먼저 가려져야 한다. 관할을 정했다는 표시만으로 모든 분쟁이 묶인다고 보면 그 문구의 대상이 어디까지인지 확인할 필요가 없다. 반대로 관할합의는 일정한 법률관계의 소에 관한 서면 합의여야 한다는 기준이 서면 형식과 대상 범위를 함께 요구한다. 이 기준을 적용하기 전에 해당 문언이 무엇을 요구하는지부터 읽어야 한다.
이 물음에 해당하는 원문은 민사소송법 제29조이다. 그 제1항은 "당사자는 합의로 제1심 관할법원을 정할 수 있다"(민사소송법 제29조)고 선언한다. 문언이 말하는 주체는 당사자이고, 행위는 합의이며, 그 대상은 제1심 관할법원의 지정이다. 이 항은 합의로 관할을 정할 수 있다는 권능을 확인할 뿐, 그 합의의 범위와 형식을 여기서 정하지 않는다. 형식과 범위는 제2항에 맡겨진다. 제2항은 제1항의 합의가 일정한 법률관계로 말미암은 소에 관하여 서면으로 하여야 한다고 요구한다(민사소송법 제29조). 이 항의 문언은 합의의 대상이 되는 소를 일정한 법률관계로 말미암은 소로 한정하고, 그 합의의 방식을 서면으로 정한다. 문언이 가리키는 주체와 행위를 이 두 항에 나누어 읽어야 하는 이유가 여기에 있다.
제2항의 문언은 이 결론의 직접적인 근거가 된다. 관할합의는 일정한 법률관계의 소에 관한 서면 합의여야 한다는 판단은 서면 요건과 대상 요건을 함께 요구하는 제2항의 문구에서 나온다. 이 두 요건은 구별되어야 한다. 서면 요건은 합의의 성립 방식을 묻고, 대상 요건은 그 합의가 다루는 소의 범위를 묻는다. 전자가 충족되어도 후자가 함께 충족되어야 관할합의로 효력을 주장할 수 있다. 계약서의 관할 조항이 있다 하더라도, 그 조항이 특정 법률관계에서 생긴 소에 관한 것이 아닌 분쟁까지 덮는다고 읽으면 대상 요건을 충족하지 못한다. 저자의 결론은 이 문언에서 서면 합의와 일정한 법률관계라는 두 한정을 함께 읽어 낸 데에 있다. 서면 요건만 보고 합의의 범위를 넘겨짚는 것은 문언이 정한 대상 요건을 건너뛰는 일이다. 이 구별이 이번 물음에서 조문 문언이 이 결론을 뒷받침하는 방식이다.
이 한정에 가장 강하게 반론하는 지점은 표준약관의 서명이다. 표준약관에 미리 인쇄된 관할 조항에 서명했다는 사실이 당사자 간 실질적 동의를 뜻하는지 의문이 남는다. 서명란에 이름을 넣었지만 그 조항의 내용을 실제로 검토하고 선택한 것인지, 아니면 형식적인 절차를 거친 것인지는 기록만으로 확정하기 어렵다. 이 점은 서면 요건이 실질적 동의를 담보하지 못한다는 불편을 남긴다. 그러나 저자의 답은 이 불편을 지우지 않고도 성립한다. 표준약관 서명의 실질성이 의심된다고 하더라도 대상 법률관계를 벗어난 분쟁까지 합의를 자동 확장할 수는 없다. 서면 요건의 충족 여부가 불확실한 사정과, 합의의 대상 범위를 정하는 문언의 한정은 서로 다른 문제이다. 전자가 남아 있는 한에서도 후자의 한정은 그대로 적용된다. 동의의 실질성에 관한 의문이 대상 범위를 넘어선 확장을 정당화하지 못한다.
이 사실을 제2항의 요건과 대조하면, 계약서의 관할 조항이 어떤 법률관계에서 생긴 소에 관한 서면 합의인지가 관건이 된다. 조항이 특정 법률관계의 소를 대상으로 한 서면으로 확인된다면 관할합의의 형식 요건은 충족될 수 있다. 그러나 장면만으로 그 조항이 가리키는 법률관계의 범위, 표준약관 서명의 실질적 동의 여부, 피고 B의 소재지, 전속관할의 존재 여부는 확인되지 않는다. 이 항목들은 미확정으로 남는다. 만약 전속관할이 확인되면 편의와 합의만으로 정한 관할 결론은 바뀐다. 다만 이 가정은 판정 조건을 바꾸는 대조일 뿐, 장면에 없는 사실로 채워 넣은 것이 아니다. 합성 장면은 승패나 실제 이행 결과를 말하지 않는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 관할합의가 일정한 법률관계의 소에 관한 서면 합의여야 한다는 것이고, 그 근거가 민사소송법 제29조의 문언에 있다는 판단이다. 서면 요건을 갖추었더라도 대상 법률관계를 벗어난 분쟁까지 합의의 효력이 자동으로 미친다고 보는 것은 이 결론이 허용하지 않는 방향이다. 반대로 서면 형식과 대상 범위의 충족이 확인되지 않은 경우에 관할합의의 효력을 곧바로 부정하는 것도 이 절이 정한 한계를 넘는다. 합의관할은 당사자가 서면 합의로 정한 관할을 뜻하며, 이 정의가 다음 판단의 전제로 남는다.
4.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
앞 단계에서 계약서의 관할 문구가 효력을 가지는 시점과 그 한정이 정해졌다. 이제 이 장면에서 선택한 법원이 실제로 그 분쟁을 심리할 수 있는지, 아니면 관할 위반을 바로잡아 이송한 뒤에야 심리할 수 있는지가 남는다. 해당 법원의 심리 또는 적법한 이송 안에서 다시 나누어 판정할 부분은 무엇인가.
이 물음에 답하는 문언으로 민사소송법은 "제1항의 합의는 일정한 법률관계로 말미암은 소에 관하여 서면으로 하여야 한다"고 정한다(민사소송법 제29조). 이 문언은 먼저 합의의 주체를 당사자로 두고, 합의의 대상은 서면 형식을 갖춘 제1심 관할의 정함에 한정된다. 여기서 서면은 합의의 존재를 뒷받침하는 형식 요건이고, "일정한 법률관계로 말미암은 소"는 합의가 미치는 분쟁의 범위를 한정하는 대상 요건이다. 이 두 요건은 서로 다른 역할을 하므로 하나로 뭉뚱그려 읽을 수 없다. 조문의 다른 항이나 다른 관할 조항의 쟁점은 이번 물음의 범위 밖에 있다.
이 문언을 앞 장면의 사실에 붙이면 계약서의 관할 조항은 그 계약으로 말미암은 소에 관하여 작성된 서면에 해당하는지를 전제로 검토된다. 저자는 여기서 단계 안의 세부 구분을 세 가지 조건에 한정한다. 선택한 법원에 관할이 있거나 관할 위반을 적법한 이송으로 바로잡은 경우에는 그 법원의 심리 안에서 분쟁이 처리된다. 반대로 선택한 법원에 관할이 없는데 그 법원에서 본안 재판을 받을 수 있다고 전제하면 판단은 막힌다. 관할합의의 범위나 피고 소재지가 확인되지 않으면 단정할 수 없다. 이 세 구분은 명시한 조건에 한정되고, 여기에 새로운 단계를 더 만들어 넣지 않는다.
가장 강한 반론은 표준약관의 서명이 실질적 동의인지에 의문을 남긴다는 점에서 출발한다. 서명이라는 형식이 있었더라도 그 문구를 읽고 동의한 것인지, 다른 약관 조항에 섞여 넘어간 것인지가 불확실하면 합의의 존재 자체가 흔들린다. 서명의 진정성이 의심된다는 점과 합의의 대상 범위가 한정되어 있다는 점은 별개의 문제이고, 후자의 한정은 앞의 의심이 풀린 뒤에도 그대로 남는다. 반론이 지적한 동의의 불확실함을 지우지 않으면서도 그 불확실함이 범위 확장의 근거가 되지는 않는다.
이 장면에서 확인된 사실은 원고 A가 피고 B의 소재지와 다른 곳에 소를 내고 계약서의 관할 조항을 근거로 들었다는 점까지이다. 소장, 소재지 자료, 관할합의서, 전속관할 근거, 이송결정이 실제로 어떻게 구성되어 있는지는 확인되지 않았다. 따라서 관할합의가 어느 법률관계까지 미치는지, 피고 B의 소재지가 어디인지, 선택한 법원에 전속관할의 배제 사유가 있는지는 이 장면만으로 판정할 수 없다. 이 가정은 이미 일어난 사실이 아니라 판정을 뒤집는 조건 하나를 바꾼 대조일 뿐이다.
따라서 허용되는 결론은 이렇다. 선택한 법원에 관할이 있거나 관할 위반을 적법한 이송으로 바로잡은 경우에 한하여 해당 법원의 심리 안에서 분쟁이 다루어진다. 선택 법원에 관할이 없음에도 그 법원에서 본안 재판을 받을 수 있다고 전제하는 결론은 허용되지 않고, 확인되지 않은 사항을 채워 넣은 단정 역시 허용되지 않는다. 합의의 대상 범위를 넘어선 분쟁까지 자동으로 묶는 결론을 이 문언은 허용하지 않는다.
4.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
합의관할이라 함은 당사자가 서면 합의로 정한 관할을 뜻하는데, 이 말이 실제 심리를 여는지 여부는 선택한 법원의 관할이 서는지에 달려 있다. 앞서 정한 관련재판적은 법이 정한 청구와 공동소송 관계에서 작동한다는 점을 전제로, 지금은 그 문구가 심리나 이송에서 어떻게 자리하는지만 살핀다.
문제의 문언은 민사소송법 제29조에서 찾는다. "①당사자는 합의로 제1심 관할법원을 정할 수 있다. ②제1항의 합의는 일정한 법률관계로 말미암은 소에 관하여 서면으로 하여야 한다."라고 정한다. 여기서 다루는 주체는 계약 당사자이고, 행위는 서면에 의한 관할 법원의 지정이며, 조건은 일정한 법률관계로 말미암은 소에 관한 것에 묶인다. 이 문언은 형식과 대상 범위만을 요구할 뿐, 선택한 법원이 실제로 본안 심리를 맡는지까지 정하지 않는다. 이 절에는 제29조만을 근거로 삼는다.
그 문언과 이 절의 결론을 잇자면 두 단계를 나누어야 한다. 먼저 서면 합의가 대상 법률관계 안에 성립했는지 살피고, 다음으로 그 법원에 관할이 서는지 본다. 전자가 관할합의의 효력을 정하고, 후자가 그 합의를 따라 심리가 열리는지를 정한다. 관할합의는 일정한 법률관계의 소에 관한 서면 합의여야 한다는 요건이 지켜져도, 선택한 법원에 관할이 있거나 관할 위반을 적법한 이송으로 바로잡은 경우에만 해당 법원의 심리나 이송이 열린다. 이 둘을 하나로 뒤섞으면 합의가 성립했다는 사실만으로 본안 재판이 보장된다고 잘못 읽게 된다.
이 구별이 남기는 불편은 분명하다. 표준약관에 서명한 사람이 실질적으로 동의했는지 의문이 남고, 상대방에게는 방어할 장소를 고를 권한이 줄어들며, 전속관할이 정한 자리를 편의로 옮길 수 있다는 우려가 뒤따른다. 이에 대해 대상 법률관계를 벗어난 분쟁까지 합의를 자동 확장할 수는 없다고 답한다. 서면 합의의 범위가 대상 법률관계로 한정되는 이상, 그 경계 밖의 분쟁은 여전히 관할을 정하는 법리를 따로 적용한다. 반론이 지적한 방어 장소 선택의 제약은 그대로 남지만, 합의의 자동 확장으로 그 제약을 더 넓히지는 않는다.
합성 장면에 놓인 사실만 대조하면, 원고 A는 피고 B의 소재지와 다른 곳에 소를 내고 계약서의 관할 조항을 근거로 들었다는 점만 정해져 있다. 소장, 소재지 자료, 관할합의서, 전속관할 근거, 이송결정의 내용은 확정되지 않았다. 만약 전속관할이 확인되면 편의와 합의만으로 정한 관할 결론은 달라진다는 조건만 따로 놓아 판정을 점검할 수 있다. 관할합의의 범위가 특정 법률관계에 묶였는지, 피고 B의 소재지가 어느 곳인지는 자료로 확인되지 않으므로 이 장면만으로는 심리가 열리는지 차단되는지를 확정할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 조건부 구별이다. 선택한 법원에 관할이 있거나 관할 위반을 적법한 이송으로 바로잡은 경우에 심리나 이송이 열리고, 선택 법원에 관할이 없는데 그 법원에서 본안 재판을 받을 수 있다고 전제하는 경우는 막힌다. 관할합의의 범위나 피고 소재지가 확인되지 않은 경우는 미확정으로 남는다.
4.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
계약상의 관할 문구는 분쟁 전체를 무제한으로 묶지 않는다. 이 장면에서 관할합의가 어디까지 효력을 갖는지, 그리고 선택한 법원에 관할이 없을 때 어떤 절차로 바로잡는지가 남는다.
해당 문언은 민사소송법 제29조다. 그 제1항은 "당사자는 합의로 제1심 관할법원을 정할 수 있다"고 하고, 제2항은 그 합의를 일정한 법률관계로 말미암은 소에 관하여 서면으로 하여야 한다고 한다. 이 문언은 합의의 주체를 당사자로, 대상을 일정한 법률관계로 말미암은 소로, 형식을 서면으로 한정한다.
이 문언과 결론을 잇는 핵심은 법률관계의 한정이다. 여기서 합의관할은 당사자가 서면 합의로 정한 관할을 뜻한다. 합의가 효력을 갖는 범위는 그 서면이 겨눈 일정한 법률관계에서 나온 소에 이른다. 같은 계약서에 담겼더라도 다른 법률관계에서 생긴 분쟁까지 자동으로 끌어들이는 것은 이 문언이 정한 범위 밖이다.
계약서에 관할 조항이 인쇄되어 있고 서명이 있었다는 사정만으로는 당사자가 그 법정적 효과를 받아들였는지 확정하기 어렵다. 서명은 편의상의 서명이었을 수 있고, 조항은 눈에 띄지 않는 곳에 있었을 수도 있다. 그러한 의문이 남는다 해도 대상 법률관계를 벗어난 분쟁까지 합의를 자동 확장할 수는 없다.
피고 B의 소재지가 정확히 어디인지, 계약서의 관할 문구가 겨눈 법률관계가 이 청구와 같은지, 그 문구가 서면으로 존재하는지는 이 장면만으로 확정되지 않는다. 소장·소재지 자료·관할합의서·전속관할 근거·이송결정의 종류가 기록으로 정해져 있으나, 그 자료들이 실제로 모였다는 주장은 아니다.
따라서 관할합의가 그 범위 안에서 서면으로 성립했는지, 이 청구가 그 범위 안의 법률관계에서 나왔는지는 구분해서 살핀다. 이 절이 허용하는 것은 서면 합의로 정한 관할이 그 법률관계의 소에 관해 작동한다는 판단이고, 허용하지 않는 것은 합의 한 번으로 모든 분쟁이 한 법원에 묶인다는 판단이다. 선택한 법원에 관할이 없으면 그 법원에서 본안을 마저 판단할 수 있다는 전제는 성립하지 않으며, 관할이 틀리면 새로 소를 내야 하는가?