Summary
In a transfer to avoid substantial harm or delay, the exception concerning exclusive jurisdiction must be preserved.
6.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
Even the convenience of reducing delay cannot cross the boundaries of jurisdiction that the law prescribes. Plaintiff A brought an action in a place other than the residence of Defendant B and relied on a jurisdiction clause in a contract. A court that finds it lacks jurisdiction follows the route of transferring the case to a court with jurisdiction. Whether the court where the action was brought possesses jurisdiction, or whether a judgment must first be made to send the case to another court with jurisdiction, determines the gateway to this remedy. The gateway to this remedy opens where the chosen court has jurisdiction, or where a violation of jurisdiction has been corrected by a lawful transfer. The gateway to this remedy referred to here means the point at which, with the performance demanded specified, the chosen lawsuit can be taken up as an object of defense and the examination begun. Accordingly, jurisdiction itself was determined first, and what could be adjudicated within that jurisdiction was then considered. (Article 35 of the Civil Procedure Act)
As to whether a case may be sent to another court even where jurisdiction exists, Article 35 provides: "Even where a court has jurisdiction over a lawsuit, it may, when necessary to avoid manifest harm or delay, by a decision rendered ex officio or upon a party's application, transfer all or part of the lawsuit to another court with jurisdiction. However, this shall not apply to an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed." The subject indicated by this language is the court that has jurisdiction over the lawsuit; the act is a transfer of all or part; and the condition is that it is necessary to avoid manifest harm or delay. The procedure opens by a decision rendered ex officio or upon a party's application, and the destination is another court with jurisdiction. The limit left by the final proviso is an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed. (Article 35 of the Civil Procedure Act)
The thread connecting this language with the conclusion of this section lies in the position of the proviso. Even where the court possesses jurisdiction, the door to transfer for convenience stands open, but in an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed, that door cannot be newly opened; such is the allocation fixed by the statutory text. Exclusive jurisdiction here means jurisdiction that the law entrusts to a specified court alone. This is why the following must be considered separately: the case where the chosen court has jurisdiction, or where a violation of jurisdiction has been corrected by a lawful transfer, and the case where, in addition, the performance demanded, the parties, and the conditions are specified in the claim and the rights of the chosen lawsuit can be defended. The former is the starting point of the qualification to enter; the latter concerns what may be defended upon that starting point. If the two are bundled into one, there arises the mistaken reading that the presence or absence of jurisdiction and the specification of the object of defense can be substituted for one another. The presence or absence of jurisdiction is the condition of entry, and the specification in the claim is the boundary of the matter to be handled within it. All that is determined is the order that the former must first be established before the latter can be considered. In an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed, meaning jurisdiction that the law entrusts to a specified court alone, no passage can be newly created to send the case outside that jurisdiction on grounds of convenience in the face of harm or delay alone.
The strongest counterargument aims at the point that exclusive jurisdiction may make actual access excessively difficult. If the exclusive jurisdiction court is far from where the parties live or where the evidence is located, a loss arises in that the place fixed by the law instead magnifies harm or delay. The inconvenience caused to the person who must receive a trial is beyond words, and it also collides with the value of bringing a dispute to a swift end. The concern that the convenience of transfer may infringe upon the opposing party's choice of the place of defense and upon exclusive jurisdiction also diverges here. That the law has fixed jurisdiction entrusting it to a specified court alone does not mean that one may be tried outside that jurisdiction; therefore, no new exception to exclusive jurisdiction can be created on grounds of convenience alone. The greater the degree of harm or delay, the stronger the wish to have the demand specified in the claim heard by a nearer court, yet that wish cannot newly alter the limits set by the jurisdictional language. This answer, however, is limited to leaving the inconvenience pointed out by the counterargument to be dealt with as a matter for the law of jurisdiction, rather than eliminating it.
Comparing the facts set in the synthetic scene with the foregoing conditions, Plaintiff A brought an action in a place other than the residence of Defendant B and relied on a jurisdiction clause in a contract. What can be confirmed in this scene is that the place where the action was brought differs from the residence of Defendant B, and that a clause of the contract was presented as the basis for jurisdiction. Yet in order to determine the presence or absence of jurisdiction, the complaint, materials on the residence, a jurisdiction agreement, the basis for exclusive jurisdiction, and confirmation of the transfer decision are needed. These records serve to confirm the scope of the jurisdiction agreement, what the residence of Defendant B is, and whether exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed for that action. The synthetic scene has fixed none of these items. Where the scope of the jurisdiction agreement or the residence of the defendant is unconfirmed, the presence or absence of jurisdiction cannot be determined, and so whether the gateway to this remedy has opened also remains undetermined. If exclusive jurisdiction were confirmed, applying to this the comparative condition that a jurisdictional conclusion reached on grounds of convenience and agreement alone is changed, it cannot be judged from the synthetic scene alone whether that condition is satisfied. Hence the determination of whether the chosen court has jurisdiction, or whether the violation of jurisdiction can be corrected by a lawful transfer, must be deferred; this does not mean that no remedy is available, but is a state in which the materials are not yet sufficient.
The boundary between the conclusions this section permits and those it does not is as follows. Where the chosen court has jurisdiction, or where a violation of jurisdiction has been corrected by a lawful transfer, the gateway to this remedy opens if the performance demanded, the parties, and the conditions are specified in the claim and the rights of the chosen lawsuit can be defended. To send the case, in an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed, to another court with jurisdiction on grounds of convenience alone is on the side that this section does not permit. The premise that a trial on the merits can be had in the chosen court even though that court lacks jurisdiction is placed on the same side. Because no new exception to exclusive jurisdiction can be established merely on the fact that the degree of convenience is great, the door to transfer in order to avoid manifest harm or delay opens only for a court that has jurisdiction, and that door too is closed where the proviso bars the way. A scene in which the scope of the jurisdiction agreement or the residence of the defendant is unconfirmed, however, remains one that lacks the materials to fix this conclusion.
6.2The Conditions That Block Relief
In this scene the question opens whether a case may be sent to another court even where jurisdiction exists. The aim of this stage is to determine whether moving the place of trial is permitted even where the court possesses jurisdiction and, if it is permitted, when that door closes. Where it is premised that a trial on the merits can be had in the chosen court although that court lacks jurisdiction, it must be confirmed that the remedy passage is closed if any one of the statutory requirements is not met. This question, apart from the existence of jurisdiction, asks whether the procedural device of transfer is in fact open.
The language that answers this question is found in Article 35 of the Civil Procedure Act. That Article provides that even where a court has jurisdiction over a lawsuit, it may, when necessary to avoid manifest harm or delay, transfer all or part of the lawsuit to another court with jurisdiction. Here the subject of the transfer is the court possessing jurisdiction, the act is the transfer to another court with jurisdiction, and the condition is that it is necessary to avoid manifest harm or delay. Transfer may be made ex officio or by a decision upon a party's application. A proviso is added, however, that this shall not apply to an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed. In this language the subject, the act, and the condition must stand together for the door to transfer to open, and where the proviso applies, that door closes (Article 35 of the Civil Procedure Act).
Connecting that basis with the conclusion of this section, the determination divides into two tiers. First one asks whether the chosen court has jurisdiction and, if it does, whether there is a need to avoid manifest harm or delay. Jurisdiction and the need for transfer are separate stages of judgment, and neither can take the place of the other. Even a court that has jurisdiction may send the case to another court on grounds of convenience, but even then the boundary of exclusive jurisdiction remains. Exclusive jurisdiction means jurisdiction that the law entrusts to a specified court alone, and within this boundary the door to transfer for convenience does not open. Therefore, where it is premised that a trial on the merits can be had in the chosen court although that court lacks jurisdiction, the remedy passage is closed if any one of the statutory requirements is not met.
If a party can bring an action only in a distant exclusive jurisdiction court, the cost and burden of access to litigation grow, and the very door to a transfer for convenience intended to reduce delay is blocked, leaving a substantive disadvantage. The loss pointed out by this counterargument is a practical difficulty of access beyond procedural convenience, and the concern that the choice of the place of defense may be shaken is placed alongside it. Yet the answer given above is that no new exception to exclusive jurisdiction can be created on grounds of convenience alone. Once exclusive jurisdiction is confirmed, it changes a jurisdictional conclusion reached on grounds of convenience and agreement alone. While not erasing the disadvantage pointed out by the counterargument, it does not surpass the boundary that the law sets in the form of exclusive jurisdiction by making it a new exception in order to open the door to transfer for convenience.
What can be confirmed from the synthetic scene is the fact that Plaintiff A brought an action in a place other than the residence of Defendant B and relied on a jurisdiction clause in a contract. On this fact alone it is not determined whether exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed for the action, what scope of jurisdiction the jurisdiction clause of the contract fixes, or where the residence of Defendant B lies. Where the scope of the jurisdiction agreement or the residence of the defendant is unconfirmed, the matter is left undetermined. Transfer operates where the chosen court has jurisdiction, or where a violation of jurisdiction has been corrected by a lawful transfer; where it is premised that a trial on the merits can be had in the chosen court although that court lacks jurisdiction, that door closes. Matters that cannot be determined from the scene alone are left undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is that, where the chosen court has jurisdiction, the case may be transferred to another court with jurisdiction when necessary to avoid manifest harm or delay. The conclusion it does not permit is to create, on grounds of convenience alone, an exception for transfer that reaches even actions for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed. The state in which a legal passage is open must be distinguished from the actual result of payment, delivery, or recovery; a lack of materials is undetermined, not immediate unavailability of a remedy.
6.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Yet whether the passage for a court that already possesses jurisdiction to send the case to another court is open, and under what name to place the matters for which materials to judge remain, must be examined separately. Here the examination is directed to the questions whether a case may be sent to another court even where jurisdiction exists, and where the boundary lies that cannot be determined for lack of materials.
Article 35 of the Civil Procedure Act provides as follows. "Even where a court has jurisdiction over a lawsuit, it may, when necessary to avoid manifest harm or delay, by a decision rendered ex officio or upon a party's application, transfer all or part of the lawsuit to another court with jurisdiction. However, this shall not apply to an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed." (Article 35 of the Civil Procedure Act) Here the subject is the court that already possesses jurisdiction, and the act is a decision to transfer when it is necessary to avoid manifest harm or delay. Transfer may be made ex officio or by a decision upon a party's application, and its object is all or part of the lawsuit. An action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed, however, is left out of this route.
Connecting this language with the conclusion of this section, the stage of judging the requirements for transfer must be distinguished from the stage of confirming whether materials remain. What Article 35 opens is the route of transfer in order to avoid manifest harm or delay, and that route is blocked in an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed. Yet if the scope of the jurisdiction agreement is not determined, or materials on the residence of Defendant B are lacking, even whether the action is one for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed is not particularized as material for judgment. This state is different from an inability to render judgment. Inability is a state in which the conclusion that nothing can be determined has already been reached; here judgment is deferred because the grounds have not yet been filled in. Exclusive jurisdiction means jurisdiction that the law entrusts to a specified court alone (Article 35 of the Civil Procedure Act).
Exclusive jurisdiction may make actual access excessively difficult. If the plaintiff can bring an action only in a distant court, the cost and time of filing grow, and the place to entrust the defense cannot be chosen. In that a transfer opened on grounds of convenience can reduce these burdens, the counterargument gains force that it may infringe both the opposing party's choice of the place where it must appear and the exclusive jurisdiction prescribed by law. Yet the scope of the answer to this counterargument is fixed. No new exception to exclusive jurisdiction can be created on grounds of convenience alone. Convenience operates only as a requirement for transfer in order to avoid manifest harm or delay, and does not serve as grounds for putting an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed back onto that route. The difficulty of access pointed out by the counterargument remains, but that disadvantage cannot be resolved in the direction of changing the boundary that the law prescribes.
What is settled in the synthetic scene is only the fact that Plaintiff A brought an action in a place other than the residence of Defendant B and relied on a jurisdiction clause in a contract. From this scene, neither the wording and scope of effect of the jurisdiction clause of the contract nor the residence of Defendant B can be confirmed. Since the scope of the jurisdiction agreement and the residence of the defendant are unconfirmed, this section leaves those matters undetermined as items whose material for judgment is not particularized. The designated comparative condition is one. Whether this condition is satisfied cannot be judged from this scene.
What this section permits is the judgment for a court possessing jurisdiction to send the lawsuit to another court with jurisdiction when it is necessary to avoid manifest harm or delay, and it does not render that judgment in an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed. What it does not permit is to create a new exception to exclusive jurisdiction on grounds of convenience alone, or to describe jurisdiction as though it had been determined while the scope of the jurisdiction agreement and the residence of the defendant remain unconfirmed. Matters whose material for judgment is not particularized are not asserted to be impossible but are left undetermined, and are examined again within the boundary above as soon as the remaining materials are supplied. Converting a lack of materials directly into unavailability of a remedy is likewise not the conclusion of this section.
6.4The Records Needed for Determination
Placed alongside the question in this scene of whether, even where jurisdiction lies, the case may be sent to another court, is the question of what records must be in place before such a transfer can be established. In examining whether a transfer for convenience touches the boundary of jurisdiction that the law entrusts to a particular court alone, the controlling standard is not the earlier argument but the kinds of material placed before the analysis this time. The scene is not an actual case but a fixed premise for judgment, and here the stages are adjudicated only within the prescribed scope of records.
The relevant text is drawn from Article 35 of the Civil Procedure Act. That Article provides that, even where a court has jurisdiction over a lawsuit, if necessary to avoid considerable damage or delay, it may transfer all or part of the lawsuit to another court with jurisdiction, by a decision made ex officio (by the court's own authority) or upon a party's application. It is qualified, however, by the proviso that this shall not apply to an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed. The subject indicated by this text is the court with jurisdiction; the act is a decision to transfer made ex officio (by the court's own authority) or upon application; and the conditions are that it be necessary to avoid considerable damage or delay and that the exception regarding exclusive jurisdiction operate together. Without unfolding the Article's other requirements here, only this text is read as to the question of the limits of transfer for convenience.
This text and the fixed conclusion of the stage interlock. The records necessary to judge transfer are fixed as the complaint, the location materials, the jurisdiction agreement, the grounds for exclusive jurisdiction, and the materials recorded in the transfer decision. Here the complaint means the assertions and claim raised when the action was filed; the location materials mean the parties' locations; the jurisdiction agreement means the scope of the agreement; the grounds for exclusive jurisdiction mean the basis for the jurisdiction entrusted to a particular court alone; and the transfer decision means the materials recorded in that decision. This list fixes what is to be considered in adjudicating the stage and is not an assertion that actual materials have been collected. The conclusion that the stage is adjudicated solely on the basis of the materials recorded in the complaint, the location materials, the jurisdiction agreement, the grounds for exclusive jurisdiction, and the transfer decision follows from placing this record together with the limitation of the text. The further point that missing records are not filled in by inference follows from the same distinction.
A person who wishes to bring an action must, because of jurisdiction entrusted to a particular court alone, litigate far away; and if a transfer for convenience cannot further reduce that inconvenience, the loss and inconvenience remain that defense or access becomes difficult. The concern that a transfer for convenience may infringe upon the opposing party's choice of the place of defense or upon exclusive jurisdiction also grows at the same point. Yet even acknowledging such inconvenience, an exception to exclusive jurisdiction cannot be newly created on grounds of convenience alone. Without erasing the difficulty of access that the counterargument points out, the conclusion is not shifted away from the limitation in the text that preserves the exception regarding exclusive jurisdiction.
The facts confirmed in this scene go no further than that Plaintiff A filed the action in a place other than Defendant B's location and cited the jurisdiction clause of the contract as its basis. Placing this fact within the foregoing conditions, the jurisdiction clause of the contract may be recorded as a jurisdiction agreement, and only if Defendant B's location materials are secured can a comparison be made with the complaint. The scene contains no year or amount, no accrual date, and no judgment outcome; such values cannot be inserted for judgment, and any portion where the scope of the jurisdiction agreement or Defendant B's location is not confirmed by the records remains undetermined. Undetermined does not create a space to be filled by inference.
What this section permits is the conclusion that the stage of transfer is adjudicated solely on the prescribed records; what it does not permit is filling missing records by inference or creating an exception to exclusive jurisdiction on grounds of convenience alone. Jurisdiction that the law entrusts to a particular court alone is a boundary set by law, and a transfer for convenience addresses within that boundary the need to avoid considerable damage or delay. Where the stage cannot be fixed because the scope of the jurisdiction agreement or Defendant B's location is not confirmed, that uncertainty is adjudicated as remaining undetermined.
6.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
Even where jurisdiction lies, can the case be sent to another court? What change overturns the existing stage determination?
The relevant text for the present question concerns transfer to avoid considerable damage or delay. Article 35 of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "Even where a court has jurisdiction over a lawsuit, if necessary to avoid considerable damage or delay, it may transfer all or part of the lawsuit to another court with jurisdiction, by a decision made ex officio (by the court's own authority) or upon a party's application. However, this shall not apply to an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed." In this text, the subject is the court in charge of the action, and the act is a decision transferring all or part of the lawsuit to another court with jurisdiction.
The transfer provided for in Article 35 is permitted not where there is no jurisdiction, but where, even though jurisdiction exists, it is necessary to avoid considerable damage or delay. Within those conditions, the exception regarding exclusive jurisdiction must be preserved. This explanation reveals why convenience of transfer must be judged separately: because the degree of convenience and the fixing of jurisdiction are different stages of judgment.
If a party has difficulty reaching the designated court, a transfer for convenience may be a procedural gain. This answer does not erase that inconvenience. It preserves only the boundary that jurisdiction the law entrusts to a particular court alone cannot be set aside by the degree of convenience.
In the synthetic scene, the relevant fact is that the court in which the action was filed differs from Defendant B's location, and Plaintiff A cited the jurisdiction clause of the contract as the basis. The foregoing condition is that transfer is limited even where jurisdiction exists; and if exclusive jurisdiction is confirmed, it changes the jurisdictional conclusion fixed by convenience and agreement alone. Whether the contract's jurisdiction clause constitutes a valid agreement, and whether that agreement overlaps with exclusive jurisdiction, cannot be determined from the scene alone. Where the scope of the jurisdiction agreement or Defendant B's location is not confirmed, the existing determination on blocking and effectiveness remains unfixed.
What this section permits is the conclusion that, even where jurisdiction lies, a transfer to avoid considerable damage or delay may be considered, and that, in an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed, that exception is not newly created. What this section does not permit is a determination folding away exclusive jurisdiction on grounds of convenience alone, or a determination fixing jurisdiction by the unconfirmed scope of an agreement.
6.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
That conclusion followed the route by which a court that finds it lacks jurisdiction transfers the case to the court with jurisdiction. Yet the question remains whether, even where jurisdiction exists, the case may be sent to another court. Here the premise is the scene in which Plaintiff A filed the action in a place other than Defendant B's location and cited the jurisdiction clause of the contract as the basis. In this scene, the issue is whether a transfer for convenience can go so far as to cross the boundary of exclusive jurisdiction.
Article 35 of the Civil Procedure Act sets out a route by which, even where jurisdiction exists, all or part of the lawsuit may be transferred to another court with jurisdiction, while placing a limitation at the end of its text. Transcribing the notation of that Article as written, it reads "However, this shall not apply to an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed" (Article 35 of the Civil Procedure Act). This text provides that, under the condition that it be necessary to avoid considerable damage or delay, transfer may be made by a decision ex officio (by the court's own authority) or upon a party's application. That limitation points not to the court making the transfer decision but to the type of action over which transfer is restricted, and an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed is precisely its subject.
This definition must be distinguished from the general standard for fixing jurisdiction, because the former points only to the court exclusively designated by law for that action, while the latter is a standard that leaves room for the parties' choice. The same reason explains why the Article places separately and contrasts the stage of convenience—transfer to avoid considerable damage or delay—and the attribute of the action that is exclusive jurisdiction. The judgment of convenience concerns the necessity of transfer, while the judgment of exclusive jurisdiction concerns whether transfer is permitted. Thus confirming the conclusion of the former does not automatically fix the latter. The conclusion of this section is that, for a transfer to avoid considerable damage or delay, the exception regarding exclusive jurisdiction must be preserved.
The counterargument that exclusive jurisdiction may make actual access excessively difficult is aimed at a heavy inconvenience in itself. If the law entrusts a case to a particular court alone, the plaintiff has no choice but to go to a court that is far away or that entails substantial time and expense, and meanwhile damage or delay may accumulate. The reason Plaintiff A, who relied on the jurisdiction clause of the contract, sought a court elsewhere also touches the same inconvenience. Yet the disadvantage entailed by this counterargument cannot be erased. In an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed, transfer is restricted, and that restriction is not automatically lifted simply because the difficulty of access is great. That is, difficulty of access is merely a factor gauging the necessity of transfer; it cannot serve as the basis for an exception regarding exclusive jurisdiction.
Contrasting this fact with the limitation of the Article, what remains is whether this is an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed. Examining the complaint, the location materials, the jurisdiction agreement, and the grounds for exclusive jurisdiction, including the transfer decision, the scope of the jurisdiction agreement or Defendant B's location has not been confirmed. Accordingly, whether the contract's jurisdiction clause prescribes exclusive jurisdiction, or instead designates another court without relation to exclusive jurisdiction, cannot be determined from this scene alone. If, however, one judgment condition is changed, then if exclusive jurisdiction is confirmed, it changes the jurisdictional conclusion fixed by convenience and agreement alone. Items where the scope of the jurisdiction agreement or Defendant B's location is not confirmed remain undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Even a court with jurisdiction may transfer if necessary to avoid considerable damage or delay, but not in an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed. Beyond this boundary, this section does not permit a conclusion newly creating an exception to exclusive jurisdiction on grounds of convenience alone. Even if there are items that could not be confirmed for want of remaining material, this narrow conclusion does not thereby disappear.
6.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
From the preceding section, the premise has been carried forward that an exception to exclusive jurisdiction cannot be newly created on grounds of convenience alone. Thus the question is whether even a court whose jurisdiction is recognized may pass the case to another court. The conclusion of the preceding section and the question of this transfer have different boundaries.
"Even where a court has jurisdiction over a lawsuit, if necessary to avoid considerable damage or delay, it may transfer all or part of the lawsuit to another court with jurisdiction, by a decision made ex officio (by the court's own authority) or upon a party's application. However, this shall not apply to an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed." In this text, the court possessing jurisdiction is the subject; avoidance of considerable damage or delay is the condition; and the transfer of all or part of the lawsuit is the act.
This Article opens the door to transfer even where jurisdiction is recognized, but separately limits the range over which that door opens. The judgment to avoid considerable damage or delay and the judgment regarding exclusive jurisdiction are different stages. The former asks whether there is a need to send the case to another court with jurisdiction; the latter asks whether, even if that need exists, the door is closed. In an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed, the exception is preserved in this latter judgment.
Yet there is the counterargument that exclusive jurisdiction may make actual access excessively difficult. That counterargument is aimed at the inconvenience of a party having to go to a distant court and the loss that, because of that inconvenience, the party may abandon a defense. Rewriting the allocation fixed by law with the benefits of convenience results in arbitrarily opening the door that the text has kept closed.
In the scene where Plaintiff A filed the action in a place other than Defendant B's location and cited the jurisdiction clause of the contract as the basis, if the scope of the jurisdiction agreement is fixed by the wording of the contract, jurisdiction is deemed recognized. Even in that case, a transfer to another court with jurisdiction is at issue only when it is necessary to avoid considerable damage or delay. However, if that action is one for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed, the transfer cannot be justified by the jurisdiction agreement and the benefits of convenience alone. Conversely, where the scope of the jurisdiction agreement or Defendant B's location is not confirmed, the jurisdictional judgment itself remains undetermined.
What this section permits is the judgment to transfer all or part of the lawsuit to another court with jurisdiction from a court whose jurisdiction is recognized when it is necessary to avoid considerable damage or delay; that judgment does not extend to an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed. What this section does not permit is a conclusion newly opening that door on the sole basis of the benefits of convenience, even though the door of exclusive jurisdiction is closed.
6.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
The question now is whether a court wrongly chosen must serve as the terminal point of remedies, and the scope this section addresses must be determined accordingly.
Article 35 of the Civil Procedure Act, laying the ground for transfer to avoid damage or delay, provides: "Even where a court has jurisdiction over a lawsuit, if necessary to avoid considerable damage or delay, it may transfer all or part of the lawsuit to another court with jurisdiction, by a decision made ex officio (by the court's own authority) or upon a party's application. However, this shall not apply to an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed." This text takes as its subject the court with jurisdiction, takes the need to avoid considerable damage or delay as its condition, and takes transfer to another court with jurisdiction as its act.
This text makes clear that even a court with jurisdiction may send the case to another court, but the proviso in the same sentence also records the limits of that power. Since a transfer for convenience is not permitted in an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed, the judgment of transfer is examined in two stages. First distinguish whether the chosen court has jurisdiction, and whether that jurisdiction is not exclusive jurisdiction that the law entrusts to a particular court alone; then determine the possibility of transfer accordingly. If the two judgments are mixed, the advantage of convenience will erase the exclusivity of exclusive jurisdiction.
The counterargument that exclusive jurisdiction may make actual access excessively difficult is weighty. Plaintiff A filed the action in a place other than Defendant B's location, so access to being tried in that court solely by the contract's jurisdiction clause may become difficult. The conclusion that the exception regarding exclusive jurisdiction must be preserved for a transfer to avoid considerable damage or delay means that, however great the difficulty of access, that difficulty alone does not newly open the boundary of exclusive jurisdiction.
What is confirmed in this scene is only the fact that the action was filed elsewhere on the basis of the contract's jurisdiction clause; the scope of the jurisdiction agreement and Defendant B's location are not fixed. While the scope of the jurisdiction agreement or Defendant B's location remains unconfirmed, that judgment must be left undetermined.
Accordingly, even a court with jurisdiction, if there is a need to avoid considerable damage or delay, may send all or part of the lawsuit to another court with jurisdiction; but in an action for which exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed, that route is closed. This section does not permit a conclusion newly recognizing an exception to exclusive jurisdiction on the advantage of convenience alone, and judgments going beyond the boundary of jurisdiction are likewise not bound here.
6.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
이 결론을 전제로 삼을 때, 원고 A는 피고 B의 소재지와 다른 곳에 소를 내고 계약서의 관할 조항을 근거로 들었다. 이 장면에서 합의와 편의가 관할의 정당성을 넘어설 수 있는지가 이 물음이다. 관할이 있어도 다른 법원으로 보낼 수 있는가라는 물음에 대해, 이번 단계는 해당 문언이 해당 법원의 심리와 적법한 이송을 어떻게 판정하는지를 묻는다.
해당 원문은 민사소송법 제35조가 현저한 손해나 지연을 피하기 위한 이송을 다룬다. 이 조문은 관할권이 있는 법원도 필요하면 직권 또는 신청에 따른 결정으로 소송의 전부 또는 일부를 다른 관할법원에 보낼 수 있되, 전속관할이 정하여진 소는 예외로 둔다(민사소송법 제35조). 문언은 주체를 관할권이 있는 법원으로, 행위를 다른 관할법원으로의 이송 결정으로, 조건을 현저한 손해 또는 지연의 방지를 위한 필요로 각각 특정한다.
이 문언과 판정의 연결은 두 단계를 구별해야 성립한다. 첫째, 해당 법원에 관할이 있는지 확인한다. 둘째, 관할이 있어도 이 손해나 지연을 피할 필요가 있는지 판단하고, 이 경우에도 전속관할이 정하여진 소인지 검토하여 이송 가능 여부를 갈라놓는다. 전자는 본안을 심리할 자격이고, 후자는 그 자격이 있어도 사건을 다른 법원에 넘길 수 있는지의 문제다. 현저한 손해나 지연을 피하기 위한 이송에는 전속관할에 관한 예외를 보존해야 한다는 결론은 두 번째 단계에서 전속관할이 정하여진 소를 이송 대상에서 빼야 한다는 의미다. 이 구별은 편의 이송의 경우 전속관할에 관한 예외를 보존해야 한다는 이 판단과 정확히 맞닿는다.
전속관할이 실제 접근을 지나치게 어렵게 만들 수 있다는 반론은 실질적 불편을 겨눈다. 원고 A는 피고 B의 소재지와 다른 곳에 소를 냈고, 그 법원에서 심리하는 것이 지연을 줄일 수 있는데도 전속관할 때문에 그 수단이 막힌다면 원고가 감당할 장소적 부담이 커진다. 이 점을 부정하지 않더라도 편의만을 이유로 전속관할 예외를 새로 만들 수는 없다. 법이 특정 법원에만 맡긴 관할을 편의의 사유로 넘어선다면 전속관할 자체가 붕괴하기 때문이다. 반론이 지적한 접근의 어려움은 남겨둔 채로, 편의 이송의 판단 근거는 해당 문언에 한정된다.
합성 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 사실은 원고 A가 피고 B의 소재지와 다른 곳에 소를 내고 계약서의 관할 조항을 근거로 들었다는 것뿐이다. 이 사실을 앞의 조건에 대조하면, 관할합의서와 소재지 자료가 정리된 뒤에야 그 합의가 전속관할 위반인지 판단할 수 있다. 합의의 범위와 피고의 소재지가 확인되지 않은 현재 상태에서 관할의 최종 판단은 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절의 결론이 허용하는 것은 해당 원문 문언만을 판정 근거로 삼아, 관할이 있는 법원의 심리와 현저한 손해나 지연을 막기 위한 적법한 이송을 구별하는 판단이다. 허용하지 않는 것은 그 문언 밖의 사유나 판결이유·다른 항으로 확장해 편의 이송의 예외를 새로 만드는 적용이다. 해당 범위 안의 문언과 조건만 다루었으므로, 확정된 결론은 관할 합의의 범위와 소재지 확인이라는 현재 남은 사실 문제와 분리된다.
6.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
관할권이 없다고 인정한 법원은 관할법원으로 이송하는 경로를 따르는데, 그 뒤에 남는 물음은 관할이 인정된 법원이 스스로 사건을 다른 법원으로 넘길 수 있는지를 다시 나누어 판정하는 일이다. 여기서는 그 판정의 단계 안에서 어떤 부분을 따로 가르고, 어떤 부분을 가를 수 없는지에 한정하여 검토한다.
해당 문언은 민사소송법 제35조가 현저한 손해 또는 지연을 피하기 위하여 필요하면 직권 또는 당사자의 신청에 따른 결정으로 소송의 전부 또는 일부를 다른 관할법원에 이송할 수 있다고 정하는 조문이다. 이 문언은 관할권이 있는 법원을 주체로 삼고, 현저한 손해 또는 지연이라는 조건 아래 결정이라는 방식으로 이송을 허용한다. 다만 전속관할이 정하여진 소의 경우에는 그러하지 아니하다는 단서가 그 허용을 가른다.
이 단서와 본문의 허용을 나란히 놓아야 하는 까닭은, 편의에 따른 이송과 관할 위반의 시정이 서로 다른 판단 단계에 속하기 때문이다. 작동하는 경우는 선택한 법원에 관할이 있거나 관할 위반을 적법한 이송으로 바로잡은 경우이고, 막히는 경우는 선택 법원에 관할이 없는데 그 법원에서 본안 재판을 받을 수 있다고 전제하는 경우이다. 여기에 미확정인 경우, 즉 관할합의 범위나 피고 소재지가 확인되지 않은 경우를 함께 둔다. 이 세 구분에 한정하여 단계 안의 세부를 나누고, 그 밖의 조건은 새로 세우지 않는다.
전속관할이 실제 접근을 지나치게 어렵게 만들 수 있다는 반론은, 원고 A가 피고 B의 소재지와 다른 곳에 소를 내면서 계약서의 관할 조항을 내세운 장면에서 무게를 얻는다. 맡긴 법원이 멀거나 비용이 크다면 원고의 접근 자체가 어려워질 수 있고, 그 불편은 구체적인 손실로 돌아온다. 그러나 현저한 손해나 지연을 피하기 위한 이송에는 전속관할에 관한 예외를 보존해야 한다. 전속관할은 법이 특정 법원에만 맡긴 관할을 뜻하며, 편의만을 이유로 전속관할 예외를 새로 만들 수는 없다는 답이 그 반론의 불리한 부분까지 남긴 채 결론을 지킨다.
소장, 소재지 자료, 관할합의서, 전속관할 근거, 이송결정을 놓고 대조하면, 관할합의의 범위와 피고 B의 소재지가 함께 확인된 것은 아니어서 미확정인 상태에 머문다. 만약 전속관할이 확인되면 편의와 합의만으로 정한 관할 결론이 달라진다는 점이 판정을 뒤집는 조건으로 놓인다. 장면만으로 끝까지 가른 결론은 없고, 지정되지 않은 연도·금액·기한기산일과 실제 사건의 결과는 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 해당 법원의 심리 또는 적법한 이송 안에서 작동하는 경우·막히는 경우·미확정인 경우의 구분을 명시한 조건에 한정하여 판정하는 것에 그친다. 여기에 선택한 법원에 관할이 있거나 관할 위반을 적법한 이송으로 바로잡은 경우를 추가하거나, 그 법원에서 본안 재판을 받을 수 있다고 전제하는 경우를 빼는 일은 허용되지 않는다. 전속관할 예외를 새로 세우지도 않으며, 실제 지급, 인도, 회수의 성과로 확정하지도 않는다.
6.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
이 결론을 전제로 지금 묻는 것은 해당 법원의 심리 또는 적법한 이송이 실효를 열고, 차단되며, 미확정에 머무는 경우를 어떻게 나누는가이다. 이 장면 위에서 선택한 법원의 심리가 실제 본안 판단으로 이어지는 조건과 그 문이 닫히는 조건을 구별해야 한다. 미확정으로 남기는 조건 역시 같은 자리에서 정해진 기록 요소에 묶는다.
이 물음에 해당하는 문언은 민사소송법 제35조이다. "법원은 소송에 대하여 관할권이 있는 경우라도 현저한 손해 또는 지연을 피하기 위하여 필요하면 직권 또는 당사자의 신청에 따른 결정으로 소송의 전부 또는 일부를 다른 관할법원에 이송할 수 있다. 다만, 전속관할이 정하여진 소의 경우에는 그러하지 아니하다."(민사소송법 제35조)라고 정한다. 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 관할권을 이미 가진 법원이고, 행위는 현저한 손해 또는 지연을 피할 필요에 따른 이송 결정이다. 조건은 관할권의 보유와 이송 필요이며, 예외는 전속관할이 정하여진 소이다.
이 문언과 고정 결론을 잇는 핵심은 관할 보유와 이송 가능성을 서로 다른 판단 단계로 두는 데 있다. 관할이 있어도 이송할 수 있다는 전제가 성립하려면, 먼저 그 법원에 관할이 있어야 하고 그다음에 손해나 지연을 피할 필요가 있어야 한다. 반대로 선택한 법원에 관할이 없으면 이 문단의 이송 논의에 들어오기 전에 관할 위반의 문제가 남는다. 그 위반을 관할법원으로의 이송으로 바로잡은 경우에만 선택 법원에서 본안 재판을 받을 수 있다는 전제는 유지된다. 여기서 전속관할은 법이 특정 법원에만 맡긴 관할을 뜻하며, 이 정의는 예외 문언과 붙어 있다.
전속관할이 실제 접근을 지나치게 어렵게 만들 수 있다는 반론이 이 구별을 겨눈다. 이 반론은 원고가 계약서의 관할 조항을 근거로 내세운 곳에서 소를 제기하였으나, 그 곳이 법이 정한 전속관할의 범위 밖이라면 원고가 선택한 장소에서의 심리를 기대하기 어렵다는 손실을 가리킨다. 재판을 받기 위해 원고가 원하지 않는 장소를 찾아야 하는 불편과, 계약으로 정한 장소 선택의 가치가 함께 훼손된다는 점도 이 반론의 몫이다. 이 답은 반론이 지적한 접근의 어려움을 지우지 않은 채, 제35조의 다만 문언이 남긴 예외의 자리를 새로 파지 않는 방향으로 결론을 유지한다. 편의와 합의만으로는 전속관할이 정한 범위를 넘어서는 관할을 확정할 수 없다.
합성 장면에서 확인된 사실은 원고 A가 피고 B의 소재지와 다른 곳에 소를 제기하였고, 계약서의 관할 조항을 근거로 들었다는 점뿐이다. 이 사실을 앞의 조건과 대조하면, 선택한 법원에 관할이 있는지 없는지가 먼저 정해져야 하고, 관할이 없다면 관할권이 없다고 인정한 법원은 관할법원으로 이송하는 경로를 따른다. 관할합의서와 소재지 자료, 전속관할 근거, 이송결정이라는 기록이 무엇을 보여주는지에 따라 이 경로가 실제로 열리는지가 달라진다. 다만 관할합의의 범위가 이 계약 분쟁 전체를 덮는지, 그리고 피고 B의 소재지가 어느 법원의 관할을 정하는지는 장면만으로 확인되지 않는다. 이 대조만으로 승패나 실제 심리 진행을 확정할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 선택한 법원에 관할이 있거나 관할 위반을 적법한 이송으로 바로잡은 경우에, 그 법원의 심리가 실효를 열 수 있다는 구별이다. 허용하지 않는 결론은 선택 법원에 관할이 없는데도 그 법원에서 본안 재판을 받을 수 있다고 전제하는 방향이다. 미확정은 관할합의 범위나 피고 소재지가 확인되지 않은 경우에 머무르며, 자료가 없다는 이유로 곧바로 실효가 닫힌다고 보지 않는다. 편의 이송의 필요성만으로 전속관할이 정한 경계를 넘어설 수 없다는 한계가 이 구별의 끝이다.
6.12이 권의 결론과 남는 물음
앞 절에서는 관할권이 없다고 인정한 법원이 관할법원으로 송부하는 경로를 확인했다. 이제 합성 장면을 떠올려 보자. 이 장면에서 남는 물음은 관할을 가진 법원이라 할지라도 사건을 다른 법원으로 넘길 수 있는가라는 점이다. 특히 재판의 지연을 막는 편의의 이익이 관할을 정한 법의 경계와 맞서는 자리에서 이 물음은 다음 판단의 기준을 요구한다. 이 물음에 무엇이 전제이고 무엇이 결과인지를 가려내야 한다.
해당 원문은 민사소송법 제35조이다. 이 조문은 소송에 대하여 관할권이 있는 법원이라도 현저한 손해 또는 지연을 피하기 위하여 필요하면 결정으로 다른 관할법원에 소송의 전부 또는 일부를 이송할 수 있다고 정한다. 여기서 이송을 허용하는 주체는 사건을 계속 심리 중인 법원이며, 그 행위는 직권이나 당사자의 신청에 따른 결정이다. 그러나 같은 조문은 “다만, 전속관할이 정하여진 소의 경우에는 그러하지 아니하다.”라고 덧붙여 이송 허용의 조건을 한정한다. 이 문언이 다루는 쟁점은 손해나 지연을 막는 필요성이 있는 경우의 이송이며, 전속관할이 정해진 소의 예외가 어디까지 적용되는지를 판단하는 것으로 한정한다.
이 문언과 연결되는 결론은 명확하다. 편의 이송의 요건과 전속관할의 효과는 같은 단계의 판단이 아니다. 전자는 관할이 인정된 법원이 손해나 지연의 방지를 위해 다른 법원을 선택할 수 있는지를 묻고, 후자는 그 선택 자체를 조문이 허용하지 않는 범위를 정한다. 따라서 전속관할은 법이 특정 법원에만 맡긴 관할을 가리키는데, 이 경우 편의의 필요성을 따지기 전에 이미 조문이 정한 제한에 걸린다. 저자는 이 구별을 근거로 삼아, 현저한 손해나 지연을 피하기 위한 이송에는 전속관할에 관한 예외를 보존해야 한다고 본다. 즉 제한의 존재를 편의 이송 요건의 심사 안으로 접어들여 판단 대상에서 없애는 것은 이 문언이 정한 단계의 구별을 무너뜨리는 결과가 된다.
전속관할이 실제 접근을 지나치게 어렵게 만들 수 있다는 반론은 강한 설득력을 갖는다. 당사자가 멀리 떨어진 법원에 다녀야 하고 그로 인해 비용이나 시간의 부담이 커지며, 애초에 소를 제기하기도 어려워지는 손실이 생길 수 있다. 지연을 막는 데에 가장 가까운 법원에 사건을 맡기는 것이 절차의 편의에 부합한다는 가치도 놓칠 수 없다. 그러나 그러한 불리함이 인정되더라도 편의만을 이유로 전속관할 예외를 새로 만들 수는 없다. 조문이 예외의 장소를 열어 두지 않았으므로, 편의의 이익으로 법이 정한 관할의 경계를 재구성하는 것은 이 문언 밖의 판단이 된다. 반론의 불편을 지우지 않으면서도, 그 불편만으로 조문이 정한 한계를 넘어설 수는 없다고 결론은 유지된다.
합성 장면으로 돌아와 이 물음에 관련된 사실만을 대조해 보자. 원고 A가 피고 B의 소재지와 다른 곳에 소를 내고 계약서의 관할 조항을 근거로 들었다는 사실이 확인된 전부이다. 이 장면에서 전속관할이 실제로 설정되어 있는지, 계약서의 관할 조항이 전속관할을 지정하는 문구인지, 피고 B의 소재지가 어느 법원의 구역에 놓이는지는 확인되지 않았다. 따라서 전속관할이 확인되면 편의와 합의만으로 정한 관할 결론을 바꾼다는 조건의 검사만 가능하며, 이 장면만으로 이송 허용의 실체 판단을 확정할 수 없다.
이 절에서 허용되는 결론은 편의 이송의 요건이 갖추어졌더라도 전속관할이 정해진 소에서는 조문이 예외를 열어두지 않았다는 한정이며, 그 한정을 전속관할이란 법이 특정 법원에만 맡긴 관할을 뜻한다는 정의와 함께 둔다는 것이다. 허용되지 않는 결론은 편의만으로 전속관할 예외를 새로 만든다거나, 확인되지 않은 기록으로 장면의 승패를 확정한다는 쪽이다. 미확인 항목은 미확인 채로 남는다. 시효와 불변기간은 같은 계산으로 처리할 수 있는가?
Statutes referred to
Questions left open
- 이송으로 생긴 실제 지연은 어떤 자료로 비교할 것인가?
- 약한 당사자의 합의관할 동의는 어떻게 평가할 것인가?
- 관련사건을 모으는 이익은 방어비용과 어떻게 비교할 것인가?