Summary
Grounds for closing a hearing are distinguished from the disclosure of judgments, and closure for convenience without a ground prescribed by law is not justified.
1.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
재판을 볼 수 있는 길은 판단에 대한 사회의 질문을 가능하게 한다. 앞 절에서 대상 주장·주문의 관계·적용할 불복사유를 연결해야 단순한 재평가 요청과 법정 하자를 구분할 수 있다는 것을 확인했다면, 이제 물음은 구체적인 조건으로 옮겨간다. 원고 A는 공개된 재판을 이유로 기록 전체의 제공을 요구하고 피고 B는 주소 노출로 인한 위험을 주장하는 장면에서, 이 구제가 작동하는 조건은 무엇인가.
이 물음에 답하는 첫 문헌은 법원조직법 제57조 제1항이다. 해당 조문은 "① 재판의 심리와 판결은 공개한다. 다만, 심리는 국가의 안전보장, 안녕질서 또는 선량한 풍속을 해칠 우려가 있는 경우에는 결정으로 공개하지 아니할 수 있다."(법원조직법 제57조)라고 선언한다. 여기서 '심리'는 소송에서 당사자의 변론과 증거 조사를 받는 심리 절차를, '판결'은 그 심리를 거쳐 선고되는 판결을 각각 가리킨다. 비공개가 허용되는 대상은 문언상 '심리'로 한정되어 있고, 사유도 나열된 세 가지 우려로 정해져 있다.
그 문언과 이 절의 결론은 같은 방향을 가리킨다. 심리의 비공개 사유는 국가의 안전보장, 안녕질서 또는 선량한 풍속을 해칠 우려로 제한되고, 판결의 공개는 별도의 원칙으로 서 있다. 이 두 단계를 나누어야 하는 까닭은, 심리 비공개라는 예외를 판결 전반에 옮겨 싣는 순간 비공개 결정이 남발될 여지가 생기기 때문이다. 법이 정한 사유 없는 편의상 비공개를 정당화할 수 없다는 점도 같은 구별에서 나온다. 그리하여 심리·판결서·소송기록의 서로 다른 접근 요건을 갖추고 법정 제한 밖의 범위에서 접근하는 경우에는 이 구제가 작동한다.
반론은 공개 자체가 사생활 침해를 키울 수 있다는 점을 겨냥한다. 주소 노출로 인한 위험이 현실적이라면, 어떤 문서를 누가 볼 수 있는지를 가르는 일 자체가 피해를 넓힐 수 있다는 걱정이다. 이런 손실과 불편을 가볍게 볼 수는 없다. 그렇더라도 심리 비공개 사유를 판결의 전면 비공개 권한으로 넓힐 수는 없다. 조문이 심리에만 허용한 비공개 사유를 판결까지 확대하면, 오히려 공개 원칙이 예외에 삼켜지는 결과가 된다.
합성 장면에서 이 물음에 관련된 사실은 두 가지뿐이다. 원고 A는 공개된 재판을 이유로 기록 전체의 제공을 요구하고, 피고 B는 주소 노출로 인한 위험을 주장한다. 원고의 요구와 조문의 문언을 대조하면, 공개된 심리였다는 사정만으로 소송기록 전체가 자동 제공되는 것은 아니다. 피고의 위험 주장은 심리 비공개 사유의 하나로 다루어질 수 있지만, 그 자체로 판결 비공개까지 정당화하는지는 이 장면에서 확정되지 않는다. 생명·신체 위해 보호로 바뀌면 당사자도 포함될 수 있으므로 비밀보호와 같은 접근 범위로 처리하지 않는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 심리·판결서·소송기록의 접근 요건이 각각 다르다는 점을 전제로, 법정 제한이 걸리지 않은 범위에서의 접근 요청에는 이 구제가 작동한다. 공개된 재판이었다는 이유만으로 모든 기록이 제공된다고 단정할 수 없고, 심리 비공개 사유 하나가 판결 전체를 덮는 권한이 된다고 볼 수도 없다.
1.2The Conditions That Block Relief
앞 단계는 대상 주장과 주문의 관계, 적용할 불복사유를 연결해야 단순한 재평가 요청과 법정 하자를 가를 수 있다는 점을 확인해 두었다. 그 바탕에서 원고 A는 공개된 재판을 이유로 기록 전체의 제공을 요구하고 피고 B는 주소 노출로 인한 위험을 주장하는 장면으로 들어간다. 여기서 묻는 것은 같은 절의 앞 물음이 아니라, 재판이 언제 비공개로 될 수 있는가라는 절차상의 판단이 성립하는 조건과 함께, 그 판단을 가로막는 조건이 무엇인지이다. 심리를 닫을 수 있는 문턱과 그 문턱이 닫혀 접근이 막히는 시점을 함께 적어야 오늘의 물음에 답한 것이 된다.
이 물음에 해당하는 원문은 법원조직법 제57조 제1항이다. 그 문언은 “① 재판의 심리와 판결은 공개한다”고 선언한 뒤, “다만, 심리는 국가의 안전보장, 안녕질서 또는 선량한 풍속을 해칠 우려가 있는 경우에는 결정으로 공개하지 아니할 수 있다”고 단서를 단다(법원조직법 제57조). 이 문언에서 주체는 재판을 진행하는 법정이고, 행위는 심리와 판결의 공개이며, 예외의 조건은 국가의 안전보장이나 안녕질서·선량한 풍속을 해칠 우려이다. 결정으로만 닫을 수 있다는 점과, 예외의 문언이 심리에만 붙어 있다는 점이 여기서 다루는 전부이다. 판결 공개의 별도 요건이나 기록 열람의 조건까지 이 항에서 읽어내지는 않는다.
이 문언에서 가릴 점은 예외가 붙은 자리가 심리인지 판결인지이다. 심리는 비공개 결정으로 닫을 수 있으나, 판결은 그 예외의 문언이 직접 닿지 않으므로 같은 권한으로 옮길 수 없다. 그리고 해당 비밀 또는 위해 보호나 법정 제외 사유가 인정되어 지정 부분의 접근이 제한된 경우, 법정 요건 중 하나라도 충족되지 않으면 구제 통로는 닫힌다. 두 판단은 서로 다른 단계를 가리킨다. 하나는 비공개로 할 수 있는가를 가르는 문턱이고, 다른 하나는 접근이 이미 제한된 뒤 구제가 열리는가를 확인하는 조건이다. 문턱의 판단과 구제 통로의 개폐를 하나로 겹쳐 읽으면, 비공개로 할 수 있다는 사실만으로 열람이나 제공의 길까지 닫혔다고 서두르게 된다.
가장 강한 반론은 공개 자체가 사생활 침해를 키울 수 있다는 점을 겨눈다. 주소 노출로 인한 위험이 실제로 작용하는 사건이라면, 공개된 심리와 그 과정에서 드러나는 정보가 당사자의 사생활을 넓혀 갈 수 있고, 그래서 부분 제한을 거듭하는 편이 낫다는 주장도 힘을 얻는다. 이러한 손실과 불편을 인정하지 않는 것은 아니다. 비공개의 문턱을 넘는 사유가 심리에 붙어 있는 한, 그 사유로 판결 전체를 감출 수 있다는 권한으로 확장하는 것은 문언이 허용하지 않는 단계를 더하는 일이다. 반론이 지적한 사생활 침해의 가능성은 남기면서도, 그 가능성 때문에 판결의 전면 비공개가 정당화되지는 않는다는 선을 유지한다.
합성 장면에서 오늘의 물음과 맞닿는 사실은 두 가지뿐이다. 여기서 피고의 주장은 국가의 안전보장, 안녕질서, 선량한 풍속 중 어느 사유에 해당하는지가 정해져 있지 않고, 심리를 비공개로 하자는 신청이나 그에 대한 결정이 있었던 사실도 장면에 없다. 따라서 이 장면만으로는 심리 비공개의 문턱을 넘었는지, 혹은 해당 비밀·위해 보호 또는 법정 제외 사유가 인정되어 지정 부분의 접근이 제한된 상태인지가 확정되지 않는다. 만약 보호 사유가 생명과 신체에 대한 위해 보호로 확인되면 당사자 포함 여부와 접근 범위를 달리 정해야 한다. 대상 문서나 제한 결정의 근거·범위를 확인할 수 없는 때에는 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 심리의 비공개 사유와 판결 공개를 구별하고, 법이 정한 사유 없는 편의상 비공개를 정당화하지 않는다는 선까지이다. 문언이 예외를 심리에 붙인 이상, 심리 비공개 사유만으로 판결 전면을 비공개할 권한이 생기지 않는다는 구별도 같은 선 안에 있다. 그 바깥에서, 공개 법정에서 이미 진행된 심리가 곧 기록 전체의 열람을 뜻하는지, 사생활 보호의 요구가 어떤 범위의 접근 제한으로 이어지는지, 비밀이 사건 전체의 숨김으로 확장되는지는 이 절이 판정하지 않는다.
1.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
앞 절에서 해당 비밀·위해 보호 또는 법정 제외 사유가 인정되어 지정 부분의 접근이 제한된 경우에는 이 구제가 막힌다고 살펴보았다. 이 장면에서 바로 확인할 수 없는 것은 대상 문서의 종류와 제한 결정의 근거·범위이다.
법원조직법 제57조는 "① 재판의 심리와 판결은 공개한다. 다만, 심리는 국가의 안전보장, 안녕질서 또는 선량한 풍속을 해칠 우려가 있는 경우에는 결정으로 공개하지 아니할 수 있다."라고 정한다. 이 문언은 주어진 대상이 심리인지 판결인지에 따라 다른 판단을 요구한다. 심리에 대해서는 나열된 사유의 우려가 있을 때 결정으로 비공개할 수 있다고 말한다. 반면 판결에 대해서는 공개가 원칙임을 선언할 뿐 비공개 사유를 따로 두지 않는다.
그 문언과 이 절의 판단을 연결하면, 심리의 비공개 사유와 판결의 공개 원칙은 별개의 단계로 다뤄야 한다. 앞 단계에서 확인한 제한 사유가 인정되었다고 해서 그 효과가 판결까지 자동으로 미치는 것은 아니다. 따라서 대상 문서가 심리에 관한 기록인지 판결서인지, 나아가 제한 결정이 어느 부분에 대해 어떤 근거로 내려졌는지 확인할 수 없으면 판단의 재료 자체가 갖추어지지 않았다. 이 경우 판정을 미확정으로 남긴다. 미확정은 판단하지 못한 상태이지, 접근이 법적으로 막힌 상태와 같지 않다.
공개 자체가 사생활 침해를 키울 수 있다는 반론은, 주소 노출로 인한 위험이 실제 피해가 될 수 있다는 점을 가볍게 보지 않는다. 기록에 담긴 정보가 그대로 알려지면 당사자가 입을 불이익을 막을 길이 줄어든다. 조문이 심리에만 붙인 사유를 판결까지 옮겨 쓰면, 공개 원칙이 선언에 그치고 제한 예외가 원칙을 대신하게 된다. 반론의 불편은 남기되, 확정된 답변의 범위를 넓히지 않는다.
합성 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 사실은 원고 A의 요구가 기록 전체에 관한 것이고 피고 B의 주장이 주소 노출 위험에 관한 것이라는 점이다. 그러나 어느 문서를 요구하는지, 어떤 부분이 보호 대상으로 지정되었는지, 제한 결정의 근거가 무엇인지 자료로 정해져 있지 않다. 공개재판은 심리와 판결을 공개하는 법정 원칙을 뜻한다. 이 정의만으로는 장면의 특정 문서에 적용할 접근 요건을 확정할 수 없다. 다만 이 조건을 바꾼 대조는 판정의 근거가 되지 않으며, 장면에서 확인되지 않은 사항은 미확정으로 둔다.
이 절에서 허용되는 결론은 대상 문서나 제한 결정의 근거·범위를 확인할 수 없는 경우에 판정을 미확정으로 남기고, 이를 구제가 막힌 경우와 구별하는 것이다. 같은 자료의 부족만으로 구제가 불능하다고 결론 내리거나, 반대로 미확인 상태를 곧바로 열람 가능으로 돌릴 수 없다. 편집상의 확인 기준을 법정 의무처럼 말하는 것도 피한다.
1.4The Records Needed for Determination
대상 주장과 주문의 관계, 적용할 불복사유를 연결해야 단순한 재평가 요청과 법정 하자를 구분할 수 있다는 전제가 그 한 줄이다. 이 전제 위에서 지금 물어야 할 것은 절차를 열고 닫는 판단에 어떤 기록이 필요한지이다. 합성 장면에서 원고 A는 공개된 재판을 이유로 기록 전체의 제공을 요구하고 피고 B는 주소 노출로 인한 위험을 주장한다. 이 대립만으로는 비공개 판단의 근거가 무엇이었는지 드러나지 않는다. 따라서 이 절은 재판의 비공개가 언제 허용되는지, 그리고 그 판단을 뒷받침하려면 어떤 기록이 확보되어야 하는지를 함께 묻는다.
법원조직법 제57조 제1항은 “① 재판의 심리와 판결은 공개한다. 다만, 심리는 국가의 안전보장, 안녕질서 또는 선량한 풍속을 해칠 우려가 있는 경우에는 결정으로 공개하지 아니할 수 있다.” 이 문언은 주체를 법원으로, 행위를 심리와 판결의 공개로, 비공개의 조건을 국가의 안전보장이나 안녕질서·선량한 풍속을 해칠 우려가 있는 경우와 법원의 결정으로 잡는다. 공개재판은 여기서 심리와 판결을 공개하는 법정 원칙을 뜻한다. 문언상 비공개가 허용되는 대상은 심리에 한정되고, 그 사유도 나열된 우려에 묶인다.
이 근거와 이 절의 결론은 다음과 같이 이어진다. 심리의 비공개 사유와 판결의 공개를 구별해야 하는 이유는 두 가지가 서로 다른 문언의 지배를 받기 때문이다. 조문은 심리에 대해서만 사유 있는 비공개를 허용하면서, 판결은 원칙적으로 공개한다. 법이 정한 사유 없는 편의상 비공개는 이 구별 밖에서 정당화되지 않는다. 따라서 판정은 열람신청과 자격, 공개 제한 결정, 보호 지정 부분, 판결서 종류에 기록된 자료만을 놓고 내린다. 단계 판정은 정해진 기록으로만 하고, 없는 기록을 추정으로 메우지 않는다. 이 기록 범위는 판단의 재료를 한정할 뿐, 새로운 비공개 요건을 만들어내지 않는다.
공개 자체가 사생활 침해를 키울 수 있다는 반론은 주소 노출로 인한 위험 같은 구체적 손실을 겨냥한다. 공개된 법정에서 진행 내용이 알려질수록 당사자나 관계인의 신상이 노출되고, 그 노출이 다시 불안이나 위해로 이어질 수 있다는 점이 반론의 핵심이다. 이 불이익을 가볍게 볼 수는 없다. 반론이 들어설 자리는 심리 단계에서 법이 정한 사유에 따른 제한이고, 그 사유를 넘어 판결의 공개 자체를 막는 권한으로 확장되는 것은 아니다. 이 답은 반론이 지적한 위해 가능성을 지우지 않은 채, 사유와 대상의 구별을 유지한다.
그런데 장면에는 열람신청의 내용, 자격·공개 제한 결정의 유무와 범위, 보호 지정 부분이 있었는지, 어떤 종류의 판결서를 상정하는지가 담겨 있지 않다. 따라서 이 장면만으로는 어떤 문서를 얼마만큼 열 수 있는지 확정할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 심리의 비공개 사유와 판결의 공개를 구별한 채 정해진 기록만으로 단계를 판정하는 것에 한정된다. 그 기록 안에서 판단을 내릴 수 있으면 내리고, 대상 문서나 제한 결정의 근거·범위를 확인할 수 없으면 미확정으로 남긴다. 미확정은 곧바로 구제 불능이나 전면 비공개의 근거가 되지 않는다. 반대로, 사유 없는 편의나 사생활 보호의 일반론만으로 판결의 공개를 막는 결론은 이 절이 허용하지 않는다.
1.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
The preceding section established that this adjudication rests on the request for inspection, the decisions limiting eligibility and disclosure, the designated protected portions, and the types of judgment documents, and held that, absent that record, the conclusion remains undetermined. Within the same procedure, what must now be asked is the direction in which the adjudication is overturned when the conditions change. In this scene, the question is which circumstance, if changed, would reverse the adjudication on the scope of access.
The relevant text comes first. It provides: "(1) The hearing and judgment of a trial shall be open to the public. Provided, however, that where a hearing is likely to endanger national security, public safety and order, or public morals, it may be closed to the public by a decision." (Court Organization Act Article 57). This text declares the principle of open trials—that is, the legal principle that hearings and judgments are made public. The proviso takes the court as the actor and limits the act to a decision closing the hearing to the public. The condition required by the text is the risk of endangering national security, public safety and order, or public morals; there is no room to insert other reasons of convenience.
This text is linked to the adjudication of the present question. A hearing is the process in which the court hears the parties' arguments and examines evidence, and a judgment is the determination that pronounces and preserves its result in the record. The reason why the grounds for closing a hearing to the public cannot be applied as they are to the judgment lies precisely in this distinction. What the preceding section established is that, once the ground shifts to protection against danger to life or person, the parties themselves may also be included, and therefore it is not handled within the same scope of access as the protection of secrets. Here, protection against danger to life or person concerns the risk arising from disclosure of an address, whereas protection of secrets refers to the statutory grounds for protecting secrets. Because the two grounds protect different objects, the scope of access is divided and assessed.
The strongest counterargument starts from the point that disclosure itself may aggravate invasions of privacy. According to the counterargument, the anxiety and risk arising when defendant B's address is disclosed are a real loss, and the more the occasions of expanding disclosure increase, the greater that loss grows. The concern that repeated partial restrictions may in effect dismantle the principle of openness arises in the same direction. Without erasing that concern, it still cannot be expanded into an authority to close the judgment in its entirety on the grounds for closing a hearing. Since the grounds for closure are limited to those prescribed by law, those grounds are merely the requirements that determine whether a hearing is open, and do not become an authority to conceal the judgment itself in its entirety.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only plaintiff A's demand and defendant B's contention. Plaintiff A demands the production of the entire record, invoking the fact that the trial is public, while defendant B argues for restrictions on access, invoking the risk arising from disclosure of an address. The adjudication is set as follows: against this contrast, inasmuch as the hearing, the judgment document, and the litigation record each have distinct access requirements, access is opened where access is sought outside the scope of the statutory restrictions. Conversely, where the relevant protection of secrets or against danger, or a statutory exclusion ground, is recognized, access to the designated portions is restricted. However, the scene alone does not confirm to which documents and to what extent the risk attaches, or what the basis and scope of the restrictive decision are. These items remain undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Separating the grounds for closing a hearing from the disclosure of the judgment, refusing to bind protection against danger to life or person into the same scope as the protection of secrets when the ground changes so as to bring it in, and not justifying closure on grounds of convenience without a statutory reason—these are the extent of this section. What it does not permit is also made clear. Holding that the entire record becomes free merely on the strength of the principle of open trials, and holding that an entire judgment may be concealed merely out of concern for inconvenience in daily life or apprehension of loss, lie outside this section.
1.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
The question confronted here is this: if the disclosure of the trial itself may aggravate invasions of privacy, how far should that disclosure be curtailed?
Article 57(1) of the Court Organization Act sets out together the principle of the openness of the hearing and judgment of a trial and its exception. Its text provides that "a hearing may be closed to the public by a decision where there is a risk that it may endanger national security, public safety and order, or public morals." The actor designated by this text is the court that decides to close the hearing to the public; the condition is the risk of the enumerated grounds; and the act is the decision closing the hearing to the public. What deserves attention is that the exception opens only with respect to the hearing.
The above text sets out the grounds for closing a hearing and the disclosure of the judgment as distinct matters. On the basis of this distinction, the author takes the view that the grounds for closing a hearing cannot be expanded into an authority to close the judgment in its entirety. If the two were bundled together, a gap would arise in which closure on grounds of convenience without a statutory reason is justified, and the framework of open trials, which keeps society's questions about adjudication open, would be weakened.
If the risk arising from disclosure of an address actually grows, there is the concern that the inconvenience and anxiety suffered by the parties may outweigh the benefits brought by the openness of the trial. Such losses must not be treated lightly. But the author limits the scope that this concern can overturn. Even if disclosure itself may aggravate invasions of privacy, the grounds for closing a hearing cannot be expanded into an authority to close the judgment in its entirety.
Only two facts are confirmed in this scene. The distinct access requirements of the hearing, the judgment document, and the litigation record lie outside the relevant scope of this question. Accordingly, how great the risk of address disclosure is, and which portions ought to be protected, cannot be determined from this scene alone.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. The existence of grounds for closing a hearing does not by itself confer an authority to close even the judgment in its entirety, and closure on grounds of convenience without a statutory reason is likewise unjustified. What this conclusion does not permit is also clear. A determination that the apprehension of invasion of privacy is not serious, a determination that the risk of address disclosure does not call for protective measures, and further a determination that the production of the entire record must be allowed, are not within the scope of this section.
1.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
How far the hearing and the judgment must be made accessible is directly connected to when the door is opened. The preceding section received the answer that the grounds for closing a hearing cannot be expanded into an authority to close the judgment in its entirety. In this scene, when may a trial be closed to the public?
The text that answers this question is Article 57(1) of the Court Organization Act. That text provides: "(1) The hearing and judgment of a trial shall be open to the public. Provided, however, that where a hearing is likely to endanger national security, public safety and order, or public morals, it may be closed to the public by a decision." This text divides the subject between the hearing and the judgment, and limits the object of closure to the hearing. It then enumerates, as grounds for closure, the risk of endangering national security, public safety and order, or public morals, and prescribes the method solely as a decision.
The axis that connects this text with the conclusion is the distinction between the grounds for closing a hearing and the disclosure of the judgment. That the law attaches the exception only to the hearing means that it has not opened an exception extending to the disclosure of the judgment as well. Accordingly, closure on grounds of convenience without a statutory reason is not justified in itself. An authority to close the judgment in its entirety is nowhere in this provision.
That said, the counterargument does not disappear. The observation that disclosure itself may aggravate invasions of privacy is substantive from the position of defendant B, who asserts the risk arising from disclosure of an address. The wider the scope of disclosure, the more information is exposed, and the harm is difficult to reverse. Without denying such losses and inconvenience, the author maintains the answer that the grounds for closing a hearing cannot be expanded into an authority to close the judgment in its entirety. Interests requiring protection must be handled within the prescribed modes of protection.
To maintain the scope of this section, what must be left undetermined must also be identified. Whether plaintiff A's demand for the production of the entire record falls under which item among the request for inspection, the decisions limiting eligibility and disclosure, the designated protected portions, and the types of judgment documents, and which condition of the relevant protection of secrets or against danger the risk asserted by defendant B touches upon, are not determined from this scene alone. However, these conditions cannot alter the distinction between the closure of hearings and the disclosure of judgments that this section addresses.
What can be determined in this section is narrow. Where there is a risk enumerated as a ground for closing a hearing, the hearing may be closed to the public by a decision, but the same ground alone does not create an authority to close even the judgment. Closure on grounds of convenience without a statutory reason is not justified in light of this text. However, what actual scope the portion designated as closed covers, and with which protective measures it is to be handled, are not determined in this section.
1.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Yet when that door may be locked, and how far the reach of that lock extends, is the problem now set. In other words, when may a trial be closed to the public? This problem requires first clearing away the ambiguity that arises when the trial process is taken as a single whole. Depending on whether the object of openness is the progress of the hearing or the judgment given as its result, the place where the door closes is entirely different. If the two places are conflated, the result is that a reason that cannot serve as a ground for closure extends even to the judgment.
The statutory text makes the starting point of this distinction plain. Article 57(1) of the Court Organization Act declares that "(1) the hearing and judgment of a trial shall be open to the public," and then immediately places the exception of closure, limited to the hearing (Court Organization Act Article 57). The subject of the sentence to which the exception is attached is the hearing; the reason is the risk of endangering national security, public safety and order, or public morals; and the method is that it may be closed to the public by a decision. That, in terms of the text, the requirements, the actor, and the act of the exception are bound to the hearing is the structure of this paragraph. No separate ground for closure is attached to the judgment in the same paragraph.
Read together with the conclusion of this section, the definition of open trials as the legal principle of making hearings and judgments public is explained just as it stands. That the hearing is open and the judgment is pronounced along with it is the principle, and the exception of closing a hearing on a statutory ground is limited to that hearing. Here the reason why the two stages must be separated becomes apparent. The first stage is whether there is a ground for closing the hearing to the public; the second stage is whether that determination may also erase the disclosure of the judgment. Closure on grounds of convenience without a statutory reason cannot even clear the threshold of the first stage, and even if it did clear that threshold, no authority at the second stage would arise.
The strongest counterargument lies in the point that disclosure itself may aggravate invasions of privacy. If information such as an address is revealed in the courtroom, it leaves the parties with a risk that is hard to reverse, and there is the concern that unless the entire case is concealed, the protection is to no avail. The loss the counterargument targets is substantive. Yet the answer to that loss does not shake the conclusion. The protection of secrets and safety is a matter to be handled on the statutory grounds and within the designated scope, and creating, on the basis of that protection, an authority to conceal the entire judgment is a separate determination. Leaving the adverse reality as it is while holding the line of distinction is this section's answer.
Contrasting this distinction against only the facts placed in this scene gives the following. A's demand departs from the premise of a public courtroom, but that premise does not immediately mean the access requirements for the entire record. B's concern about disclosure of his address is raised as a matter of the protection of secrets, and this separates the two questions of whether there is a ground for closing the hearing and whether even the judgment may be concealed. Which documents were actually the subject of a request for inspection in the scene, and what scope of restrictive decision was made, are not settled. Accordingly, that part remains undetermined.
What is not permitted is the interpretation that ignores this distinction and expands the grounds for closing a hearing into an authority to close the judgment in its entirety. Nor does the conclusion that the entire record becomes free merely because the courtroom is public belong to this section. What lies next is the question: if the courtroom is public, can all records also be viewed freely?
1.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
On the premise that only by linking the relationship between the claim and the order at issue with the grounds for appeal to be applied can a simple request for reassessment be distinguished from a statutory defect, this stage asks how far the text in question can adjudicate statutory openness and inspection, and protective measures.
That text reads as follows: "(1) The hearing and judgment of a trial shall be open to the public. Provided, however, that where a hearing is likely to endanger national security, public safety and order, or public morals, it may be closed to the public by a decision." The actor prescribed by this text is the court; the act is the openness of the hearing and the judgment; and the closure of a hearing is permitted only by a decision where the enumerated risks exist.
What this definition and the preceding text show together is that the weight of the determination of closure rests differently on the hearing and on the judgment. For the hearing, an exception is open whereby it may be closed by a decision where there is a statutory reason, whereas no such proviso is attached to the judgment. Hence closure on grounds of convenience without a statutory reason cannot be justified, and the grounds for closing a hearing must be distinguished from the disclosure of the judgment. In adjudicating statutory openness and inspection, and protective measures as well, this text alone is taken as the basis, without extending to the reasons for judgment or to other clauses.
The counterargument that disclosure itself may aggravate invasions of privacy points out that the risk arising from disclosure of an address may become concrete harm. This answer, without erasing the disadvantage of invasion of privacy, blocks the expansion that drags the proviso attached only to the hearing into the judgment. The need for protective measures remains a separate matter, but that need cannot serve as a ground for creating an authority of full closure that the text does not contain.
What can be adjudicated in this scene is how the text in question places the grounds for closing a hearing, and whether the same proviso is attached to the judgment. However, as to the demand for the production of the entire record, the scope cannot be fixed on the strength of this text alone. Because the target documents and the basis and scope of the restrictive decision are not confirmed, that part remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is that the closure of a hearing is limited to cases satisfying the statutory grounds and the requirements for a decision, and that expanding this into an authority to close the judgment in its entirety is not permitted. Conversely, neither does the conclusion that free inspection of all records follows merely because the courtroom is public issue from this text. What is determined here is only the scope of application of the text, while the requirements for inspection and the details of protected designations remain in a state of being undetermined.
1.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
The previous stage confirmed that the target claim, the relationship of the requested relief, and the applicable grounds for appeal must be linked before a simple request for re-evaluation can be distinguished from a statutory defect. Within court publicity and inspection, and protective measures, this section examines what parts are to be adjudicated separately. The open trial is the legal principle that hearings and judgments are made public, and under this principle the range that is actually opened is examined separately, stage by stage.
This provision first sets out hearings and judgments together as subjects of publicity, while in the proviso that follows it states, for hearings alone, the risk of harm to national security, public safety and order, or good morals as grounds for non-disclosure. Accordingly, the subject of non-disclosure that the text permits is the hearing, and the reasons for a decision to close a hearing are limited to those three risks. On the basis of this provision, the author distinguishes the grounds for closing a hearing from the publicity of the judgment, and takes the view that a convenience-based closure without the reasons prescribed by law cannot be justified.
The reason for preserving this distinction bears directly on where the fine divisions within a stage are placed. The requirements for closing a hearing demand both a reason in the risk of harm to national security, public safety and order, or good morals and the method of a non-disclosure decision, while the publicity of the judgment remains a separate principle. When it further overlaps whether the document in question is a hearing or a written judgment or litigation records, and whether the mode of access is attendance in the gallery or inspection, the adjudication divides three ways. Where one possesses the respective access requirements for hearings, written judgments, and litigation records and seeks access in a range outside the statutory restrictions, access is permitted. Conversely, where the protection of the relevant secret or harm, or a statutory ground for exclusion, is recognized and access to the designated portion is restricted, that portion is blocked. Where the document in question or the grounds and scope of the restriction decision cannot be confirmed, the determination remains undetermined. The author has set up no separate stage beyond these three conditions.
The strongest counterargument begins from the point that publicity itself may aggravate infringements of privacy. If the hearing is open and the judgment is announced, the parties' personal details and the context of the dispute are exposed as they stand, and the ramifications do not remain confined to a single proceeding, so the need for protection is great. Incidentally, the worry follows that repeated partial restrictions may in fact break down the principle of publicity. But if the protection this counterargument demands extends the grounds for closing a hearing into an authority to withhold judgments in their entirety, it goes beyond the text, which attaches the proviso to hearings alone. While acknowledging the need to protect privacy, the author is emphatic that the grounds for closing a hearing cannot be extended into an authority to withhold judgments in their entirety. The difficulty posed by the counterargument is left in place, but the position of the adjudication is left where it was.
Returning to this scene, what Plaintiff A demands is the provision of the entire records, and what Defendant B fears is the risk arising from the disclosure of an address. The two claims do not attach to the same issue. The plaintiff's demand concerns the inspection of litigation records, while the defendant's claim of harm overlaps with the protection of life and body. The conclusion that the grounds for closing a hearing automatically extend to grounds for blocking the entire records does not follow. However, from the scene alone the nature of each document and the scope of the restriction decision cannot be confirmed, so it remains undetermined how far the plaintiff's demand is permitted as to each designated portion.
The permissible conclusion is therefore narrow. Where the access requirements for hearings, written judgments, and litigation records are each satisfied and the range lies outside the statutory limits, access is opened; designated portions for which a statutory ground of exclusion or a ground of protection is recognized are closed; and where the grounds and scope cannot be confirmed, judgment is reserved. If a different stage is inserted here, or the grounds for closing a hearing are extended to the complete closure of judgments, the conclusion collapses.
1.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
What remains is the question of how to distinguish court publicity and inspection, and the efficacy, blocking, and undetermined status of protective measures. Amid these opposing claims, one must clarify the range of materials to which the principle of the open trial extends.
Article 57, paragraph (1) of the Court Organization Act together provides the principle and exceptions of the publicity of hearings and judgments of trials. The same paragraph states: "(1) The hearings and judgments of trials shall be public. However, a hearing may be closed by decision where there is a risk of harm to national security, public safety and order, or good morals." (Article 57 of the Court Organization Act) This provision sets the subject, act, and conditions that distinguish hearings from judgments. That is, a hearing may be closed by decision where there are prescribed reasons such as national security, whereas a judgment is in principle an object of publicity.
The distinction drawn by this Article cannot be extended into an authority to withhold judgments in their entirety. The grounds for closing a hearing cannot serve as a basis for blocking the publicity of the judgment as well. Accordingly, the condition under which access is opened corresponds to the case where one possesses the respective access requirements for hearings, written judgments, and litigation records and seeks access in a range beyond the statutory limits. The condition under which access is blocked is limited to the case where the protection of the relevant secret or harm, or a statutory ground for exclusion, is recognized and access to the designated portion is restricted. Undetermined status corresponds to the case where the document in question or the grounds and scope of the restriction decision cannot be confirmed.
The counterargument that publicity itself may aggravate infringements of privacy points concretely to the losses and inconvenience caused by the exposure of individual information. Yet the grounds for closing a hearing cannot be extended into an authority to withhold judgments in their entirety. The risk the counterargument fears must be addressed by restricting access to the designated portion on the basis of protection of secrets or protection from harm.
In the scene where Plaintiff A demands the provision of the entire records on the ground of the open trial and Defendant B asserts the risk arising from the disclosure of an address, the criterion of decision is clear. The open trial is the legal principle that hearings and judgments are public; it does not mean unrestricted inspection of the entire litigation records. Accordingly, if the defendant's assertion is recognized as a statutory ground of exclusion and access to the designated portion is restricted, access is blocked within that scope. However, if the specific grounds and scope of the restriction decision cannot be confirmed, that scope remains undetermined.
The conclusion permitted in this section is to adjudicate by separating the principle of publicity from the conditions of restriction, while the conclusion not permitted is to conceal the entire judgment on the basis of the grounds for closing a hearing. The three distinctions—conditions of opening, conditions of blocking, and conditions of undetermined status—are applied in accordance with the criteria defined above.
1.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
It operates where one possesses the respective access requirements for hearings, written judgments, and litigation records and seeks access in a range beyond the statutory limits; it is blocked where the protection of the relevant secret or harm, or a statutory ground of exclusion, is recognized and access to the designated portion is restricted; and it remains undetermined where the document in question or the grounds and scope of the restriction decision cannot be confirmed. Taking up this conclusion, the final question of this section is to determine whether the grounds for closing a hearing extend to the publicity of the judgment within the principle of the publicity of trials. That is, what remains is whether the grounds for closing a hearing and the authority to close a judgment may be regarded as the same. What is to be decided here is whether a convenience-based closure can be justified as a closure without reasons prescribed by law.
To answer this question, the statute provides as follows. This provision first sets the two subjects—hearings and judgments of trials—together, and in the proviso that follows attaches the reasons for the exception to hearings alone. The three reasons—the risk of harm to national security, public safety and order, or good morals—are designated as the grounds for closing a hearing, and even where such risk exists, a decision is required. On the face of the text, the publicity of the judgment is not enumerated as an object of the proviso's exception.
Connecting this provision to the conclusion of this section, the grounds for closing a hearing and the publicity of the judgment must be distinguished. Since the earlier stage already confirmed that the access requirements for hearings, written judgments, and litigation records differ from one another, extending the grounds for non-disclosure to the judgment would break down that distinction. A convenience-based closure without reasons prescribed by law cannot enter as an exception to the principle of publicity established by the first sentence. Insofar as the open trial is the legal principle that hearings and judgments are public, closure is limited to hearings that bear the reasons designated by law and take the form of a decision. Adding to this an authority to withhold judgments in their entirety would result in creating an authority the text does not confer.
The concern that publicity may produce practical inconvenience or harm, as with the risk arising from the disclosure of an address, does not disappear. The worry that, if the practice of narrowing publicity little by little accumulates, the principle of publicity itself may in fact break down arises in the same direction. The answer of this section is that, even so, the grounds for closing a hearing cannot be extended into an authority to withhold judgments in their entirety. Creating, merely on the ground that privacy protection is needed, an exception that the text does not confer on judgments is a conclusion this section does not accept. The losses pointed to by the counterargument are acknowledged, but the answer must not take the form of extending the grounds for closing a hearing to the closure of the judgment.
What can be confirmed in this scene is the premise of the open trial, the demand for the provision of the entire records, and the assertion of the risk arising from the disclosure of an address. That the principle of publicity covers both hearings and judgments stands in contrast to the above demand, and whether the demand for the provision of the entire records is a conclusion that follows directly from the principle of publicity is not settled by this scene alone. Whether the risk of disclosure of an address can fall within the grounds for closing a hearing, or is instead a circumstance to be handled by separate protective measures, is also not decided in this scene. This section therefore confirms only the boundary that the grounds for closing a hearing cannot be extended into an authority to withhold judgments in their entirety.
The conclusion this section permits is the distinction that binds the grounds for closing a hearing to the scope prescribed by law and places the publicity of the judgment under a separate principle of publicity. The conclusion it does not permit is the interpretation that, on grounds of infringement of privacy or convenience, extends the grounds for closing a hearing into an authority to withhold judgments in their entirety. This section does not settle which of the plaintiff's demand for the provision of the entire records or the defendant's assertion of the risk arising from the disclosure of an address is to be recognized. If the court is open to the public, can all records also be freely viewed?