Summary
This chapter adopts the interpretation that the status of a document as having the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment and the specificity of the performance to be enforced must be considered separately.
5.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
A mere promise to negotiate in good faith does not get the desired object delivered. The preceding section accepted the premise that, under statutory requirements, a decision may be made without agreement, but that the conditions of objection and of taking effect must be maintained. Yet it remains in question whether, merely because final effect has been secured, any wording set out in the settlement agreement can be executed as written. To set the criterion by which the gateway to this remedy opens, the analysis first examines separately the final effect the document possesses and the content of the performance that the document addresses. Without re-arguing the conclusion of the preceding section, the present question takes as its starting point the condition of taking effect that the conclusion presupposed.
The source text governing this question is examined first. Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "Where a settlement, or a waiver or admission of a claim, is entered in a record of oral argument or a record of preparation for oral argument, that record shall have the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment." The subject addressed here is the party who makes a settlement or a waiver or admission of a claim; the act is the entering of such an agreement or disposition in an official record; and the condition is its entry in a record of prescribed form, namely a record of oral argument or a record of preparation for oral argument. This provision confers upon the document entered in the record the status of a final and conclusive judgment, but it does not of itself specify the content of the performance entered in the record.
In the same direction, Article 56 of the Civil Execution Act lists, among the other enforcement titles on which compulsory execution may be founded, "litigation settlements, admissions of a claim, and other matters having the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment." Reading the two provisions together reveals that the judgment determining a document's status and the judgment discerning the performance to be executed are distinct stages. The former asks whether the document has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment; the latter asks whether the performance required by the document has been specified. Even on the premise of final effect, the specification of the performance—that is, a state in which it is revealed who is to perform what and how—must be satisfied separately. If these two stages are conflated, the mere fact that the document is effective makes the content of the performance appear to have been fixed as well.
The strongest counterargument to this distinction is aimed at the point that the burdens of form and procedure deprive settlement of its advantage of speed. Overly minute promises make the agreement itself difficult to reach in the first place, and if the requirement of confirming objections and grounds for taking effect is added, the parties may fall into procedural attrition instead of swift closure. The loss that this counterargument identifies is real, and it also burdens the purpose that enabled a decision to be made without agreement in the preceding section. Even so, the mere existence of the record cannot confirm the actual performance of an ambiguous promise. While acknowledging the value of swiftness in settlement, one must leave as a separate judgment what the document entered in the record requires to be performed. Without erasing the inconvenience stressed by the counterargument, that inconvenience alone cannot abolish the requirement of specificity.
The discussion now returns to this scene. Plaintiff A and Defendant B exchanged drafts of a settlement, but whether the settlement was entered in the conciliation record and whether objection was made to the decision recommending settlement differ between them. This scene, in which the presence or absence of entry in a record and the presence or absence of objection appear differently, shows that the exchange of settlement drafts alone does not discern which document acquired final effect. If a settlement that bore only signatures upon negotiation is confirmed to have been entered in a court record, the classification of that document's effect changes. Even when that condition is satisfied, it does not follow that the specification of the performance entered in the record has been confirmed along with it. Since the scene fixes no year, amount, or period, the scope or timing of actual performance cannot be determined here.
The boundary dividing the conclusions this section permits from those it does not is this. Where a settlement is entered in a court record, or where the grounds for taking effect of a recommendation or substitute decision are satisfied and the subject of performance has been specified, the entrance to this remedy opens. By contrast, where the matter remains a private promise, or where a valid objection precludes relief by the final effect of that decision, the gateway is closed. If entry in a record or the state of objection and taking effect remains unconfirmed, the judgment is left undetermined, but that indeterminacy does not mean an absence of remedy. When the case ends, is the harm restored as well?
5.2The Conditions That Block Relief
On the premise that, under statutory requirements, a decision may be made without agreement while the conditions of objection and taking effect must be maintained, the question opens whether any wording can be executed merely upon final effect, and what conditions block it. This question must be examined by separating the status of the document from the content of what that document orders to be performed.
The first source text for the present question is Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act. Its provision states that where a settlement, or a waiver or admission of a claim, is entered in a record of oral argument or a record of preparation for oral argument, that record shall have the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment. Here the subject is the party making a settlement or a waiver or admission of a claim, the act is the entering of such content in an official record, and the condition is that the content be inscribed in the particular place of record, namely a record of oral argument or a record of preparation for oral argument.
Article 56 of the Civil Execution Act enumerates that compulsory execution may also be carried out on the basis of other enforcement titles, and in its fifth item it lists litigation settlements, admissions of a claim, and other matters having the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment. Joining these two provisions, a settlement entered in a record acquires the status of a final and conclusive judgment and falls within one type of enforcement title. However, apart from the effect of that provision, the author interprets the status of a document as having the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment and the specificity of the performance to be executed as matters to be viewed separately. Specification of the performance means a state in which it is revealed who is to perform what and how, and this specification must be satisfied alongside the form of the record in order to pass as a distinct stage of judgment. This is why the requirement of final effect and the requirement of specification of the subject of performance must be considered together.
The strongest counterargument is that the burdens of form and time limits may swallow the advantage of swift settlement: overly minute promises make the agreement itself difficult, and while the parties go through procedures such as entry in a record and the filing of an objection, they may lose the very mediation they desired. Such loss is real, and the counterargument does not disappear. Even so, the statutory requirements determine only the status of the promise entered in the record; they do not, in its stead, disclose what that wording means to require be performed. Since the mere existence of a record cannot confirm the actual performance of an ambiguous promise, the conclusion is maintained that, for the gateway to this remedy to open, a specified performance and the statutory requirements must both be in place.
This fact alone does not jointly confirm whether each draft was entered in a court record and whether the objection was valid. Accordingly, a draft that remains a mere private promise is not classified as a document bearing the effect of a final and conclusive judgment, and where a valid objection is raised against a decision recommending settlement so that the decision does not reach final effect, the gateway to this remedy is likewise closed. However, since the status of A and B is not confirmed in any of the settlement agreement, the settlement or record of mediation, service, objection, grounds for finality, or record of performance, it cannot be determined from this scene alone whether the subject of performance has been specified.
What is permitted in this section is the narrow judgment that, where the performance to be executed is specified in a document that has acquired the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment, such as a settlement entered in a record, the gateway to relief opens. What is not permitted here is the conclusion that the form of the record alone guarantees the performance even of an ambiguous promise, nor does it open the way to taking a private promise or a decision recommending settlement that has not reached final effect as an enforcement title as it stands. Nor is it the conclusion of this section to convert matters left undetermined into an absence of remedy on account of insufficient data.
5.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
The preceding section held that this remedy is blocked where the matter remains a private promise, or where a valid objection is raised against a recommendation or substitute decision so that relief by the final effect of that decision cannot be obtained. But where lies the boundary at which no adjudication is possible for want of data? Plaintiff A and Defendant B exchanged settlement drafts, but whether the settlement was entered in the conciliation record and whether objection was made to the decision recommending settlement differ between them; thus the status of the document cannot be discerned from this scene alone. This question connects with the question whether, merely upon final effect, any wording can be executed.
Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act declares: "Where a settlement, or a waiver or admission of a claim, is entered in a record of oral argument or a record of preparation for oral argument, that record shall have the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment." This provision addresses a settlement or a waiver or admission of a claim, and takes as its condition the time when such content is entered in a record of oral argument or a record of preparation for oral argument. What is addressed here is the status of the document, namely that the record has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment. Article 56 of the Civil Execution Act likewise lists, among the matters on which compulsory execution may be founded, "litigation settlements, admissions of a claim, and other matters having the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment."
This section adopts the interpretation that the status of a document as having the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment and the specificity of the performance to be executed must be viewed separately. The former is a judgment of status placing that document alongside a final and conclusive judgment; the latter is a judgment inquiring into the specification of the performance—that is, a state in which it is revealed who is to perform what and how. The two judgments are distinct. For the fact that the status of a document entered in a record has been settled does not lead directly to the proposition that the subject of performance has been specified. Accordingly, where entry in a record or the state of objection and taking effect remains unconfirmed, the adjudication is left undetermined, and this is distinguished from the case where relief is blocked.
The counterargument that overly minute promises make the settlement itself difficult is aimed at the loss that the advantage of swift settlement may vanish under the burdens of form and the period for appeal. The boundary at which no adjudication is possible for want of data is set here. The judgment that the status of a document entered in a record has been settled and the judgment what the ambiguous wording causes to be performed in reality each demand their own data. This answer, without erasing the burden identified by the counterargument, chooses not to replace the unconfirmed state with a settled conclusion.
In the synthetic scene, Plaintiff A and Defendant B exchanged settlement drafts, but whether the record of mediation was entered and whether objection was made to the decision recommending settlement differ between them. From this fact alone it cannot be discerned what has been done with, or how things stand among, the settlement agreement, the settlement or record of mediation, service, objection, grounds for finality, or record of performance. The contrast—that a settlement bearing only signatures upon negotiation, once entered in an official record, changes the classification of that document's effect—confirms only that the condition of entry in a record changes the status of the document. The specificity of the subject of performance and the actual performance, which cannot be adjudicated from the scene, remain undetermined.
What this section permits is the judgment that, where entry in a record or the state of objection and taking effect remains unconfirmed, the adjudication is left undetermined, and that this is distinguished from the case where relief is blocked. What this section does not permit is the judgment that converts the unconfirmed state into an absence of remedy, or that confirms the actual performance of an ambiguous promise by the mere existence of a record. Even though the status of having the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment stands, the specificity of the performance to be executed remains separate.
5.4The Records Needed for Determination
In the preceding section, where entry in a record or the state of objection and taking effect remained unconfirmed, the adjudication was left undetermined, and this was distinguished from the case where relief is blocked. This section confirms the place of the indeterminacy left earlier and takes up the question whether, merely upon final effect, any wording can be executed.
Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "Article 220 (Effect of a Record of Settlement, Waiver and Admission of a Claim) Where a settlement, or a waiver or admission of a claim, is entered in a record of oral argument or a record of preparation for oral argument, that record shall have the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment." What this provision determines is in what record a settlement and a waiver or admission of a claim are entered, and whether that record has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment. The subject spoken of here is the party to the settlement, the act is the entry in the record, and the condition is that the content be inscribed in the record of oral argument or the record of preparation for oral argument. This provision determines only the status of the document entered in the record; it does not determine the specificity of the performance to be executed.
To connect this basis with the conclusion of this section, the judgment asking the status of the document must be distinguished from the judgment asking the content of the performance. The former inquires whether a settlement is entered in a record and has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment, whereas the latter inquires into the state in which it is revealed who is to perform what and how—that is, the specification of the performance. That the former is satisfied does not mean that the latter is established as well. Accordingly, this adjudication rests on the settlement agreement, the settlement or record of mediation, service, objection, grounds for finality, and record of performance. If that record is absent, the conclusion remains undetermined. The fact that Article 56 of the Civil Execution Act places litigation settlements and the like among the enforcement titles having the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment is likewise read within the same distinction.
Yet the counterargument remains that overly minute promises make the settlement itself difficult. If one tries to specify and write down every item in the course of settlement, negotiations lengthen, and there is the inconvenience that the advantage of swift settlement may vanish under the burdens of form and the period for appeal. The loss and the value that this counterargument targets are real. That a record has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment does not mean that the performance within it is automatically specified, and an unspecified performance does not reveal what is to be performed.
Contrasting this fact with the foregoing conditions, the exchange of settlement drafts alone does not confirm whether the settlement in question was entered in an official record, nor whether, no objection having been made to the decision recommending settlement, it took effect. The record requirement comprises the settlement agreement, the settlement or record of mediation, service, objection, grounds for finality, and record of performance, but the scene does not designate the actual content of those records. Therefore the final effect and the specification of the performance cannot be adjudicated from this scene, and that state remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is that the status of a document as having the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment and the specificity of the performance to be executed must be viewed separately. It does not go so far as to say that, merely upon final effect, no wording can be executed; conversely, neither can the mere fact of entry in a record be taken to mean that the ambiguous promise within it has been performed. What is not permitted is the judgment that treats as the same thing the confirmation of a document's status and the specification of the performance within it carried through to a record of performance. Thereupon the following question remains.
5.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
If final effect alone suffices, can any wording be enforced? Building on the conclusion that a decision can be made under statutory requirements even without a settlement, this section now examines what the wording of a finalized document actually causes to be performed. In this scene, the signatures on the settlement agreement itself and the entry in the court record are the starting point that distinguishes the status of the document, and the fact that these two remain in different states is the starting condition of this question.
Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that where a settlement, or the abandonment or admission of a claim, is entered in a hearing record or a record of a preliminary hearing date, that record has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment (Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act). Here, 'that record,' stipulated to have the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment, means the hearing record or the record of a preliminary hearing date in which the settlement, or the abandonment or admission of a claim, has been entered; the act is the entry in the record, and the condition is that the entry is made in a hearing record or a record of a preliminary hearing date. Article 56 of the Civil Execution Act likewise lists litigation settlement and admission of a claim as one of the enforceable titles having the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment (Article 56 of the Civil Execution Act). These two provisions merely determine the route by which a document reaches a status equivalent to a final and conclusive judgment, and leave as a separate question what the expressions written in that document actually cause to be performed.
Accordingly, final effect and specification of the performance due are two stages that must be considered together. This section adopts the interpretation that the status of a document as having the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment and the specificity of the performance due to be enforced must be viewed separately (Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act; Article 56 of the Civil Execution Act). Here, specification of the performance due means a state in which it is revealed who is to perform what and how. That the former has been reached means that the document is no longer a mere private promise but has become the basis of a determined performance due; that the latter is in place means that the performance due can be pushed forward as an object of performance. When a settlement that had only a negotiated signature is entered in a court record, that entry changes the classification of the document's effect.
The counterargument targets the disappearance of the flexibility of a settled promise. Promises that are too detailed make the settlement itself difficult. There is the concern that the advantage of a swift settlement may be lost to the burdens of form and the period for objection. In a matter where the two sides could have joined hands within a few days, the losses are the possibility that negotiations will be halted because of the requirement to record in detail the timing and method of performance of the performance due, and the inconvenience of having to wait through the objection period even after signature; these are the costs the counterargument points out. Even where a finalized document exists, its wording does not itself bring about the delivery of the desired object, and this answer does not erase the disadvantage of the counterargument, being maintained on the line of not elevating an ambiguous promise into finalized wording.
The facts confirmed in this scene are the exchange of settlement wording, and the fact that the presence or absence of entry in a conciliation record and the presence or absence of objection to a decision recommending settlement are different from each other. These two facts alone do not suffice to determine which of the two the matter falls under, between a private promise and an entry in a court record, nor whether a lawful objection was raised to the decision recommending settlement. It is also unconfirmed which records have been secured among the settlement agreement, the settlement or conciliation record, service, objection, grounds for finalization, and performance records. Accordingly, whether the settlement remains a mere private promise, whether an objection has been entered against a recommendation or substitute decision so that relief under final effect cannot be obtained, or whether the very state of record entry, objection, and effectuation remains unconfirmed, is left undetermined. Only within this boundary does specification of the performance due become the gateway of the adjudication.
The conclusion permitted by this section is that, when a settlement that had only a negotiated signature is entered in a court record, the classification of that document's effect changes, and that, once the specified change is confirmed, the existing judgment of blockage or effectiveness is discarded and the determination is redone from the stage itself. This conclusion does not mean that with final effect alone any wording can immediately be enforced, nor does it mean that the object of performance becomes specified only when specification of the performance due is also in place. Whether the synthesis has reached a route by which the performance due can be pushed forward as an object of performance must be assessed together with the specification of the object of performance and the satisfaction of final effect, and that judgment depends on what is written in the finalized document. A lack of data is undetermined and does not mean that relief is impossible.
5.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
If the preceding stage asked whether final effect alone allows any wording to be enforced, what remains now is the counterargument that the burden of recording the wording of a settlement in detail obstructs the settlement itself. In this scene the question is clear. Even if detailed entries make a settlement difficult, does an ambiguous promise written in a record thereby secure actual performance in reality?
The provision that answers this question is the article that determines the effect where a settlement, or the abandonment or admission of a claim, has been entered in a hearing record. Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act declares, "Where a settlement, or the abandonment or admission of a claim, is entered in a hearing record or a record of a preliminary hearing date, that record has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment." What this provision establishes is the status of the record as having the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment. The drafter of the record is the court, its subject matter is the settlement and the abandonment or admission of a claim, and the effect attaches not at the time of the act but at the time of the entry. This provision, however, does not address the extent to which the content of the performance due must be specified.
Accordingly, the existence of the record and the specification of the performance due to be enforced must be viewed separately. Article 56 of the Civil Execution Act lists, among the titles that form the basis of compulsory execution, "litigation settlement, admission of a claim, and others that have the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment." Here, specification of the performance due means a state in which it is revealed who is to perform what and how. If the effect of Article 220 determines the status of the record, the execution under Article 56 requires a specified performance due regardless of that status. The reason why the actual performance of an ambiguous promise cannot be confirmed from the existence of the record alone lies precisely in this distinction.
The strongest counterargument points out that the burden of form swallows up the practical benefit of settlement. A swift settlement is the benefit obtained when the parties wish to end a dispute without trial, and the procedure of refining the wording in detail, entering it in a record, and examining the presence or absence of objections slows that speed. This inconvenience is real and is not erased. Yet this counterargument does not suffice to confirm the actual performance of an ambiguous promise from the mere existence of a record. Since the cost of later contesting performance after a settlement has been concluded with ambiguous wording is rather greater, the burden of form that makes settlement difficult does not furnish grounds for omitting the specification of the performance due.
If the presence or absence of entry in a conciliation record and the presence or absence of objection are different from each other, it turns on whether one piece of wording remains a private promise or is entered in a court record and thereby acquires the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment. Since, however, the actual content of the records and the result of performance have not been confirmed, this scene alone cannot establish which side satisfies the specification of the performance due, nor whether actual performance took place.
The conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. The interpretation holds that the status of a document as having the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment and the specificity of the performance due to be enforced must be viewed separately, and the actual performance of an ambiguous promise cannot be confirmed from the mere existence of a record. Where the settlement agreement bears only signatures and there is no entry in a record, or where a lawful objection has been raised to a decision recommending settlement so that the decision does not reach final effect, performance cannot be secured by that document alone. That entry does not fill in the content of performance for ambiguous wording.
5.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
Accepting from the preceding section the premise that the actual performance of an ambiguous promise cannot be confirmed from the mere existence of a record, this section now opens the question: if final effect alone suffices, can any wording be enforced? What is to be determined here is whether, by the mere circumstance that the document has acquired the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment, every word written in that document immediately becomes an object of compulsory execution, or whether separate conditions remain to be assessed.
As the provision answering this question, Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that "where a settlement, or the abandonment or admission of a claim, is entered in a hearing record or a record of a preliminary hearing date, that record has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment." The actors addressed by this article are the court that drafted the record and the parties entered in that record; the act is the entry of a settlement or of the abandonment or admission of a claim in the record; and the condition is that such an entry is made in a hearing record or a record of a preliminary hearing date. This section, however, addresses only that provision concerning the effect of the record and does not examine other issues of the procedure for drafting the record.
Article 56 of the Civil Execution Act lists, as one of the bases on which compulsory execution may be carried out, "litigation settlement, admission of a claim, and others that have the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment." Connecting these two bases reveals that the determination that the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment has arisen for the record and the determination of what that record causes to be performed, to whom and how, are different stages. The former determines the status of the document, and the latter asks about the specification of the performance due to be enforced, that is, a state in which it is revealed who is to perform what and how. Since confirming the status of a document as having final effect cannot be regarded as satisfying the latter requirement as well, the two are distinguished and judged separately.
The counterargument that promises made too detailed make settlement itself difficult is itself well founded. Breaking down the wording item by item reduces the speed of negotiation and may increase the burdens of formal requirements and the period for objection, thereby making the parties hesitant to reach a settlement in the first place. The fact that a record has been drafted determines only the status of the document, and it is difficult to regard the content of actual performance as confirmed while what the wording within it causes to be performed remains unspecified. While leaving in place the difficulty of negotiation pointed out by the counterargument, the conclusion that final effect and specification of the performance due cannot be handled together is maintained.
Measured against the condition that the settlement is entered in a court or conciliation record, or that the grounds for the effectuation of a recommendation or substitute decision are satisfied and the object of performance is specified, the mere exchange of wording does not allow a determination of which status the document has been assigned. Insofar as record entry or the state of objection and effectuation is unconfirmed, the material is lacking, and this does not mean that relief is impossible but means that the present judgment is reserved. No year or amount absent from the synthetic scene is produced to fill that gap.
The conclusion that the status of a document as having the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment has been confirmed and the conclusion that the document can be enforced exactly as its wording reads are different. The former is a determination that holds only where a settlement or the abandonment or admission of a claim has been entered in the record; the latter separately requires that the wording satisfy the specification of the performance due by revealing who is to perform what and how. That the status is in place does not bring specificity along of its own accord, and where specificity is ambiguous, the performance due to be enforced cannot be identified even where a record exists.
5.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
After the preceding stage confirmed that a decision can be made without a settlement under statutory requirements but that the conditions of objection and effectuation must be maintained, this section now asks when the fact of settlement has an effect equivalent to a final and conclusive judgment. The earlier argument is not unfolded again; the conclusion of the previous stage is received only as a premise. In this scene it is not settled whether the exchange of wording means a settlement entered in a record.
Setting out first the relevant passage of the original text for this question, Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that where a settlement, or the abandonment or admission of a claim, is entered in a hearing record or a record of a preliminary hearing date, that record has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment. The actors addressed by this provision are the parties who make a settlement or abandon or admit a claim; the act is the entry of such a settlement or disposition in the record; and the condition is that the settlement is entered in a hearing record or a record of a preliminary hearing date. There is no need to read out of this provision other issues concerning the drafter of the record or the method of entry. Article 56 of the Civil Execution Act likewise lists, as other enforceable titles, litigation settlement, admission of a claim, and the like that have the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment. Article 56 of the Civil Execution Act.
Read together with the above provisions, one must ask whether the point at which an effect equivalent to a final and conclusive judgment arises and the object of performance contained in that effect are the same. The former is a question that determines which document possesses final effect; the latter is a question asking what that document has fixed as the performance due to be enforced. The reason the two stages must be distinguished is that the fact of having acquired final effect does not by itself make the object of execution clear. This distinction means separating the confirmation of the status of a document for which final effect has arisen from the examination of whether the performance due contained in that document is specified as to the party bound to perform, the content of performance, and the method of performance; it adds no new requirement or exception.
Those who view this distinction narrowly object that, if the substance of the settlement is emphasized, a review bound by form slows the pace of negotiation. Promises made too difficult in detail make the settlement itself hard to reach, they say, and formal requirements and the objection period offset the advantages of settlement. This counterargument accurately points out the inconvenience and cost experienced in the conciliation process. The answer to it, however, is that the actual performance of an ambiguous promise cannot be confirmed from the mere existence of a record. Even if the record has final effect, the object of performance of its wording does not thereby become clear, and the way to reduce the inconvenience the counterargument speaks of lies not in relaxing the specification of the performance due but in separately confirming the state of that specification.
Measured only against the facts of the synthetic scene, plaintiff A and defendant B exchanged settlement wording, but the presence or absence of entry in a conciliation record and the presence or absence of objection to a decision recommending settlement are different from each other. The bare fact of having exchanged wording does not reveal whether the settlement was entered in a hearing record or a record of a preliminary hearing date, or whether an objection was raised to the decision recommending settlement so that the decision's final effect is maintained. The condition of Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act is that a settlement or the abandonment or admission of a claim has been entered in a record, and the enforceable title under Article 56 of the Civil Execution Act likewise presupposes that it has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment. Accordingly, whether the arising of final effect and the specification of the performance due can be determined in this scene remains undetermined. The condition that a settlement that had only a negotiated signature changes the classification of the document's effect when entered in a court record can be judged only after the presence or absence of record entry in this scene has been confirmed.
The conclusion permitted by this section is limited to adopting the interpretation that the status of a document as having the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment and the specificity of the performance due to be enforced must be viewed separately, and that specification of the performance due means a state in which it is revealed who is to perform what and how. In the light of this, the conclusion not permitted is that with final effect alone any wording can be enforced, and the assertion that the actual performance of an ambiguous promise can be confirmed from the mere existence of a record is likewise excluded. The bare fact of the exchange of settlement wording must not be treated as having settled also the state of record entry and of objections to the decision recommending settlement.
5.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
법정 요건 아래 합의 없이 결정을 할 수 있지만 이의와 효력 발생 조건을 유지해야 한다. 이 장면에서 사적 약속과 법정 기록이 겹치지 않는 채로 남는다. 따라서 확정판결과 같은 효력을 가진 문서가 이미 존재하는지, 그리고 그 문서가 누가 무엇을 어떻게 이행할지 드러내는 급부의 특정을 담고 있는지를 각각 확인해야 한다. 해당 원문 문언은 합의를 확정 효력 있는 급부로 잇는 통로에 어떤 판정 근거가 되는가.
해당 원문 가운데 민사소송법 제220조는 “제220조(화해, 청구의 포기·인낙조서의 효력) 화해, 청구의 포기·인낙을 변론조서·변론준비기일조서에 적은 때에는 그 조서는 확정판결과 같은 효력을 가진다.”고 정한다. 이 문언이 지정하는 주체는 법원의 조서 작성자이고, 행위는 화해 또는 청구의 포기·인낙을 변론조서나 변론준비기일조서에 적는 것이며, 조건은 바로 그 적음의 완성이다. 조서에 적힌 사실은 문서의 지위를 만드는 요건으로만 다루어진다. 저자는 이 문언을 합의의 현실 이행 가능성까지 판단하는 근거로 넓게 읽지 않는다.
민사집행법 제56조는 “강제집행은 다음 가운데 어느 하나에 기초하여서도 실시할 수 있다.”고 선언한 뒤, “5. 소송상 화해, 청구의 인낙 등 그 밖에 확정판결과 같은 효력을 가지는 것”을 집행권원의 하나로 든다. 이 조문의 문언은 집행의 기초가 되는 문서의 지위를 정할 뿐, 집행할 급부의 내용을 특정하는 단계는 따로 두지 않는다. 이와 같은 문언의 배분을 전제로, 이 절의 확정된 결론은 해당 원문 문언만 합의를 확정 효력 있는 급부로 잇는 통로의 판정 근거로 삼고 판결이유나 다른 항으로 확장하지 않는다는 것이다. 앞의 지위 판단이 앞서면 뒤의 특정성 판단이 자동으로 채워지지 않으므로, 두 단계를 구별하지 않으면 조서의 문구가 무엇을 이행하게 하는지 없는 채로 집행 가능성이 열리는 문제가 생긴다.
신속한 합의의 장점이 형식 요건과 불복기간의 부담 앞에서 사라질 수 있다는 점은 이 반론이 겨누는 실제 손실이다. 양 당사자가 빠르게 타협점을 찾은 뒤에 문구를 다듬는 사이 협상이 무너지면, 조서라는 형식이 분쟁 종결을 지연시키는 셈이 된다. 이 점을 지운 채 결론을 말할 수는 없다. 그러나 조서의 존재만으로 모호한 약속의 현실 이행까지 확인할 수는 없다. 조서에 적힌 약속이 무엇을 인도하게 하는지 드러나지 않았다면, 그 문서의 확정 효력만으로 이행 대상이 특정되었다고 볼 수 없다. 그래서 형식의 부담을 줄이는 방향과 집행할 급부를 가리는 방향은 서로 다른 문제로 남는다.
이 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 것은 합의 문안의 교환 사실과, 조정조서 기재 여부 및 권고결정에 대한 이의 여부가 당사자 사이에서 다르다는 점이다. 앞의 조건에 비추어 보면, 합의 문안이 법정 조서에 기재되었는지는 미확정이고, 권고결정에 적법한 이의가 제기되어 그 결정의 확정 효력에 의한 구제를 받을 수 없는 상태인지도 미확정이다. 조서 기재 여부와 이의·효력 발생 상태가 확인되지 않는 한 이 장면으로 판정할 수 없다. 실사건의 송달이나 이행 기록, 승패와 회수 결과도 이 장면에 들어 있지 않으므로 확정할 수 없다.
결국 이 절이 허용하는 것은, 해당 원문의 문언이 정하는 조서 기재나 확정판결과 같은 효력이라는 지위 요건을 충족한 문서를 그 지위의 근거로 삼는 판단이다. 그 문언만으로 집행할 급부가 특정되었다거나 모호한 약속의 현실 이행이 확인되었다고 판단하는 것은 이 절이 허용하지 않는 방향이다. 법적 통로가 열렸다는 것은 지급·인도·회수가 실제로 이루어졌다는 뜻이 아니고, 자료가 부족한 상태는 미확정이지 곧바로 구제 불능을 의미하지도 않는다.
5.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
앞 단계에서 법정 요건 아래 합의 없이 결정을 할 수 있지만 이의와 효력 발생 조건을 유지해야 한다는 틀이 마련되었다. 그 틀을 확정 효과만 있으면 어떤 문구도 집행할 수 있는가?라는 물음으로 좁혀 놓았고, 이제 그 안에서 합의를 확정 효력 있는 급부로 잇는 통로 안에서 다시 나누어 판정할 부분은 무엇인가를 살핀다. 여기서 급부의 특정이 관건이 된다.
민사소송법 제220조는 화해, 청구의 포기·인낙을 변론조서·변론준비기일조서에 적은 때에는 그 조서가 "확정판결과 같은 효력을 가진다"고 규정한다. 이 문언이 정하는 것은 문서의 지위다. 즉 법정 조서에 화해 내용이 적혔다는 사실만으로 그 문서는 확정판결과 같은 위치에 놓인다. 다만 이 규정은 누구에게 무엇을 어떻게 이행하라는 급부 내용의 구체성까지 함께 정해주지 않는다.
같은 취지에서 민사집행법 제56조는 강제집행의 기초가 될 수 있는 집행권원을 열거하면서, 제5호에서 소송상 화해, 청구의 인낙 등 그 밖에 확정판결과 같은 효력을 가지는 것을 함께 둔다. 저자가 취하는 해석은 확정판결과 같은 효력이 있는 문서의 지위와 집행할 급부의 특정성은 별도로 보아야 한다는 것이다. 이 두 층위를 나누는 이유는 앞서 정의한 급부의 특정, 곧 누가 무엇을 어떻게 이행할지가 드러나는 상태가 문서의 효력 등급과는 다른 문제이기 때문이다. 문서의 지위가 확정되어 있어도 이행할 대상이 특정되지 않은 문구는 그대로 집행할 급부로 이어지지 않는다. 이 구분은 조건을 더하는 것이 아니라 이미 주어진 두 문언 사이의 관계를 정리한 것이다.
이 구분을 반대하는 쪽은 형식 요건이 늘어날수록 합의 자체가 어려워진다고 지적한다. 당사자가 성실히 협의해서 이른 시점에 맞잡은 합의가 문구 하나 때문에 집행 단계에서 막히면, 분쟁을 조기에 끝내려던 동기 자체가 꺾인다는 점에서 이 반론은 가볍지 않다. 그렇더라도 조서의 존재만으로 모호한 약속의 현실 이행까지 확인할 수는 없다는 답은 유지된다. 조서에 적힌 사실이 문서의 지위를 끌어올리는 것은 맞으나, 이행할 급부가 무엇인지 특정되지 않은 문구의 이행을 그 기록만으로 확정하는 것은 별개의 일이다.
이 사실과 명시한 조건을 대조하면 다음과 같이 갈린다. 합의가 법정 조서에 기재되거나 권고·대체 결정의 효력 발생 사유를 충족하고 이행 대상이 특정된 경우 그 문서는 확정 효력 있는 급부로 이어진다. 사적 약속에 그치거나 권고·대체 결정에 적법한 이의가 제기되어 그 결정의 확정 효력에 의한 구제를 받을 수 없는 경우에는 그 통로가 막힌다. 조서 기재 또는 이의·효력 발생 상태가 확인되지 않은 경우는 미확정으로 남는다. 다만 이 대조에서 무엇이 이행되어야 할 대상인지는 장면만으로 특정되지 않았으므로, 여기서는 미확정으로 두어야 한다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 명시한 조건 안의 구분뿐이다. 작동하는 경우·막히는 경우·미확정인 경우 세 가지 조건을 기준으로 현재 통로가 열렸는지 막혔는지 확인되지 않은지를 나눌 수 있고, 협상 서명만 있던 합의가 법정 조서에 기재되면 그 문서의 효력 분류를 바꾸는 것도 같은 조건의 변화로 설명된다. 허용하지 않는 것은 여기에 추가 단계를 발명하거나 조서의 존재만으로 모호한 약속의 현실 이행까지 확인하는 일이다. 실제 기록의 수집이나 이행 성과까지 이 자리에서 단정할 수 없다는 한계도 함께 남는다.
5.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
법정 요건 아래 합의 없이 결정을 할 수 있지만 이의와 효력 발생 조건을 유지해야 한다는 전제를 놓고, 이번에 물을 것은 합의가 확정 효력 있는 급부로 이어지는 통로가 실제로 열리는지, 막혀 있는지, 아니면 아직 정해지지 않았는지 가르는 기준이다. 두 가지 상태가 뒤섞인 이 장면에서 통로의 분류가 갈리는 지점을 밝히는 작업이다.
이 물음에 답하기 위하여 해당 문언을 먼저 두는데, 민사소송법 제220조는 「화해, 청구의 포기·인낙을 변론조서·변론준비기일조서에 적은 때에는 그 조서는 확정판결과 같은 효력을 가진다」라고 정하고 있다. 이 조문이 말하는 주체는 법정에서 조서를 작성하는 법원이며, 행위는 화해나 청구의 포기·인낙을 변론조서 또는 변론준비기일조서에 적는 일이고, 조건은 바로 그 적임이 발생한 때이다. 그때 조서는 확정판결과 같은 효력을 얻는다. 여기서 다루는 것은 조서에 적히는 형식과 그로 인한 효력뿐이며, 조문이 다루는 다른 쟁점은 이 자리에서 펼치지 않는다.
이 문언과 앞서 세운 결론을 이으면 열리는 조건이 드러난다. 합의가 법정 조서에 기재되거나 권고·대체 결정의 효력 발생 사유가 충족되고, 그 이행 대상이 급부의 특정, 즉 누가 무엇을 어떻게 이행할지 드러나는 상태에 이르렀을 때 비로소 확정 효력 있는 급부로 이어진다. 민사집행법 제56조 역시 「강제집행은 … 소송상 화해, 청구의 인낙 등 그 밖에 확정판결과 같은 효력을 가지는 것」에 기초하여 실시할 수 있다고 열거하면서, 집행권원이 되는 문서의 지위를 규정한다. 여기서 두 가지가 구별되어야 한다. 문서가 확정판결과 같은 효력을 갖는다는 판단과, 그 문서가 무엇을 어떻게 이행하라는 급부를 특정하고 있는다는 판단은 각기 다른 단계이며, 앞의 것으로 뒤의 것이 자동으로 충족되지는 않는다.
반론은 너무 세밀한 약속은 합의 자체를 어렵게 한다는 점을 겨눈다. 형식 요건과 불복기간의 부담이 커지면 신속한 합의의 장점이 사라지고, 당사자는 애써 이룬 절충을 문서화하는 문턱에서 물러설 수 있다는 것이다. 그러나 앞의 답은 이 불리한 점을 지우지 않는다. 조서가 확정 효력을 얻었는지, 그리고 그 안의 이행 대상이 특정되었는지는 별개로 살펴야 하며, 앞의 사실만으로 뒤의 사실을 대신할 수 없다. 그러므로 형식이 세밀해지는 부담을 인정하면서도, 막연한 약속이 그 부담을 이유로 현실 이행의 근거까지 얻게 되는 결과는 막는다.
합성 장면을 이 물음에 걸맞도록 대조해 보면, 원고 A와 피고 B는 합의 문안을 교환했지만 조정조서 기재 여부와 권고결정에 대한 이의 여부가 서로 다르다. 조서 기재와 이의 제기의 상태가 갈리는 두 가지 사실만으로는 어느 쪽 통로에 놓였는지 마저 단정할 수 없다. 조서 기재가 확인되고 이행 대상이 특정된 쪽은 열리는 조건을, 사적 약속에 그치거나 적법한 이의가 제기되어 확정 효력에 의한 구제를 받을 수 없는 쪽은 막히는 조건을 충족한다. 나머지는 조서 기재 또는 이의·효력 발생 상태가 확인되지 않은 미확정에 머무른다. 다만 장면에는 합의문·화해 또는 조정조서·송달·이의·확정 사유·이행 기록이 수집되었다는 사실이 없으므로, 어떤 기록이 실재하는지, 이행이 실제로 이루어졌는지는 이 장면으로 확정할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 앞서 가른 세 조건의 분리뿐이며, 그 밖의 판단은 허용하지 않는다. 즉, 법정 조서 기재나 효력 발생 사유 충족에 이행 대상의 특정까지 더해질 때만 통로가 열리고, 사적 약속에 머무르거나 적법한 이의로 확정 효력에 의한 구제가 막힐 때는 차단되며, 그 상태가 확인되지 않으면 미확정으로 남는다. 여기서 문장 하나에 유의해야 한다.
5.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
앞 절에서 법정 요건 아래 합의 없이 결정을 할 수 있지만 이의와 효력 발생 조건을 유지해야 한다는 결론만 이어받는다. 이제 확정 효과만 있으면 어떤 문구도 집행할 수 있는가라는 물음에, 다음 절에 무엇을 넘기는가라는 마지막 단계를 더해 따져본다. 이 물음은 사건이 끝났다는 문서상의 상태와 피해가 회복되었다는 현실 사이의 거리를 묻는다. 여기서 급부의 특정, 즉 누가 무엇을 어떻게 이행할지 드러나는 상태가 기준이 된다.
민사소송법 제220조는 "화해, 청구의 포기·인낙을 변론조서·변론준비기일조서에 적은 때에는" 그 조서가 "확정판결과 같은 효력을 가진다"고 규정한다. 이 문언은 화해나 청구의 포기·인낙을 변론조서나 변론준비기일조서에 적었다는 행위를 근거로, 그 조서의 문서적 지위를 정한다. 주체는 조서를 작성한 법원이며, 대상은 특정 소송사건에서 성립한 화해 등이다. 이 규정은 그 문언상으로 조서에 담긴 약속의 내용이 얼마나 구체적인지, 이행이 실제로 끝났는지까지 정하지 않는다.
따라서 조서의 존재와 그 조서가 담은 급부의 특정은 서로 다른 두 판단이다. 앞의 판단은 문서가 확정판결과 같은 지위를 얻었는지를 묻고, 뒤의 판단은 그 문서만으로 누가 무엇을 어떻게 이행할지 특정되어 집행 가능한 상태인지를 묻는다. 민사집행법 제56조는 강제집행을 "소송상 화해, 청구의 인낙 등 그 밖에 확정판결과 같은 효력을 가지는 것"에 기초하여서도 실시할 수 있다고 정하는데, 이는 확정 효력을 가진 문서를 집행권원의 하나로 열거한 것이다. 저자는 이 두 규정을 함께 놓고, 확정 효력의 부여와 이행 대상의 특정을 분리하여 보아야 한다는 해석을 취한다.
그러나 이런 구별이 가져오는 비용도 분명하다. 반론은 지나치게 세밀한 약속을 요구하면 협상 과정에서 합의 자체가 성립하기 어렵고, 형식 요건과 이의 기간의 부담이 신속한 합의의 장점을 앗아간다고 지적한다. 이 지적은 조정 절차가 추구하는 분쟁의 신속한 종결이라는 이익을 정면으로 겨냥하며, 문구의 모호성을 어느 정도 허용해야만 합의가 가능하다는 점을 강조한다. 그렇더라도 조서의 존재만으로 모호한 약속의 현실 이행까지 확인할 수는 없다는 점에서 결론은 유지된다. 조서의 확정 효력은 그 문구가 특정된 급부를 담을 때 집행으로 이어질 수 있다는 것이지, 이행이 끝났다는 뜻은 아니다.
이 사실을 위의 기준에 대조하면, 합의문이 교환되었다는 사정만으로는 법정 조서에 적힌 화해로 특정될 수 없다. 조서 기재 여부가 확인되지 않았고, 권고결정에 대한 이의 여부에 따라 그 결정의 효력 발생 사유가 충족되었는지도 정해지지 않았다. 따라서 현재 장면만으로는 확정 효력 있는 집행권원과 이행 대상의 특정성을 모두 확정할 수 없다. 이행 기록이 남아 있는지도 확인되지 않았으므로, 피해의 회복 여부는 이 장면의 판정 범위 밖에 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 확정판결과 같은 효력이라는 문서의 지위와 집행할 급부의 특정성이 별개로 판단된다는 것에 한정된다. 조서의 존재를 확인했다는 사정만으로 모호한 약속이 현실에서 이행되었다는 결론이나 특정된 급부가 집행 가능한 상태라는 결론에 이르는 것은 허용되지 않는다. 사적 약속에 그치거나 이의로 효력이 정지된 문서에 집행을 기대하는 것도 이 절의 범위 밖이다. 그러나 문서의 확정 효력이 급부의 특정과 별개라는 구별이 피해의 회복 여부까지 답을 주는 것은 아니다.