Summary
No assumption is made that a change in determination falling outside the statutory scope of correction can be resolved by correction alone.
2.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
The word 'correct' must not be allowed to expand into the power to redo a trial already held. The preceding section concluded that erroneous calculations and entries, and other obvious errors of a similar kind, are the subjects of rectification. Having defined that scope, the remaining question is whether a judgment can be corrected on the ground of a better legal principle, and what the standard is for opening this channel of relief. This question is placed at the point where one must decide whether the procedure for correcting errors of expression can be used as a means of changing the actual determination. For the path that opens differs according to what the party holding the certified copy of the judgment asks to have corrected.
The statutory subject of rectification can be read from the language set by the provision. Article 211 paragraph (1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "①When a judgment contains an erroneous calculation or entry, or other obvious error of a similar kind, the court may, ex officio or upon a party's application, issue a rectification order." The actor indicated by this language is the court, the act is a rectification order issued ex officio or upon an application, and the condition is that an error in the calculations or entries contained in the judgment, or a similar error, is obvious. The subject that the provision addresses by rectification is an error of expression left in the judgment.
If the conditions set by this language are connected to the present conclusion, one can say that its entrance opens. Here, the relief is the content of the performance sought by the claim, and identification means that the content and the opposing party can be discerned from the prayer for relief. This standard is the gatekeeper of the preceding stage, separating the rectification of errors of expression from a change in the determination of the merits. A change in the determination of the merits means an amendment of the conclusion as to the creation and scope of a right; amending a conclusion already given is a task different from the correction of expression presupposed by the language of rectification. For that reason, the two stages must not be bundled together.
That rectification is simpler and faster than an appeal is a matter of loss and convenience that cannot be overlooked in this choice. Where an obviously unjust conclusion can be corrected by a minor amendment, requiring a separate challenge may appear wasteful, and the burden of going through procedure twice falls on the party as it is. Still, the adoption of a new legal principle cannot be written up as an application for correction of an entry error. If, merely because the application's name and form are simple, the contested content is reclassified as a clerical error in the judgment's entry, the court's authority to adjudicate expands beyond the scope of the correction of expression defined by the provision. The way to reduce the procedural costs pointed out by the counterargument lies not in broadening the subject of rectification, but in first distinguishing what the contested content is.
In this scene, the certified copy of the judgment received by plaintiff A contains a clerical error in the designation of the parties, and part of a separate claim does not appear in the operative part. The clerical error in the party designation, being a case where the designation itself was wrongly entered, may correspond to a subject of rectification, but this determination is limited to the scope in which obviousness is confirmed. Whether the part of the claim missing from the operative part is an omission of determination or an omission of the adjudication of the claim itself is not determined by this scene alone, and until that distinction is settled it remains undetermined under which channel it should be classified. If, according to the stated conditions, the performance, party, and conditions are identified and a defense can be mounted, the entrance opens; but as to what the original judgment, statement of claim, rectification application, omitted operative part, and course of the appeal indicate, the parts not confirmed remain so for want of materials.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. What can be handled by rectification is where an erroneous calculation or entry, or other obvious error of a similar kind, is clear, and then that channel opens. The conclusion this section does not permit is drawing a change of determination that falls outside the statutory subject of rectification into an application for correction of an entry error. Even where it is not confirmed whether the error is one of expression or one of determination and the matter merely appears to be an omission of adjudication, no conclusion is asserted and it is left open.
2.2The Conditions That Block Relief
The preceding section took the view that this remedy operates where an obvious error of expression is handled by rectification and a claim omitted from trial is handled by a continued trial, respectively. This section then asks the opposite. The certified copy of the judgment received by plaintiff A contains a clerical error in the designation of the parties, and part of a separate claim does not appear in the operative part; one must ask which of these cannot be corrected. The question, then posed as though urging a settlement, is whether one can ask that the judgment be corrected on the ground of a better legal principle. This question deals with a demand to tinker with the conclusion after the trial already given has been concluded. In the end, holding fast to the definition that a change in the determination of the merits means an amendment of the conclusion as to the creation and scope of a right, one must set the condition that blocks the way at the door of rectification.
The subject of rectification is limited by the language the law has written down. Article 211 paragraph (1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that rectification may be made "when a judgment contains an erroneous calculation or entry, or other obvious error of a similar kind" (Article 211 of the Civil Procedure Act). What the court handles here is an erroneous calculation, an erroneous entry, and errors of a similar kind. The condition is that it be clear, and the court may, ex officio or upon a party's application, issue a rectification order. The actor is the court that rendered the judgment, and the act is a rectification order that corrects the error revealed in that judgment. The subjects the statute allows are limited to errors of expression of this kind, and newly defining the content of the conclusion lies outside the range this language addresses.
Accordingly, the language of this provision and the conclusion of this section meet on the same axis. Correcting an error in the calculations or entries in a judgment, and changing the creation or scope of the right recognized by that judgment, are distinct. The former is the task of matching what is written in the judgment to the actual determination; the latter is the task of overturning or re-settling a determination already rendered. If this difference is not preserved, rectification moves from the corrective means set by the provision into a channel replacing an appeal. The condition that blocks it then is simple. Where the contested content is not an error of expression but a change in the determination of the merits, and thus does not enter the statutory subject of rectification, this remedy is blocked. A claim omitted from trial remains the lot of a continued trial.
The strongest counterargument comes from efficiency. Rectification is simpler and faster than an appeal. It is said to be wasteful to require a separate challenge where an obviously unjust conclusion can be corrected by a small amendment. The loss this counterargument aims at is real. While Procedure drags on, the party spends money and time, and an error already apparent remains uncorrected. Even so, the limits of this remedy cannot be broadened. Adopting a new legal principle or changing the conclusion on the right as its result is an amendment of the conclusion, and not an error of expression that rectification should receive. The mere fact that there is a simple and fast path cannot broaden the scope that path is allowed so as to avoid the review of an appeal.
Returning to the synthetic scene, two things stand side by side. The certified copy of the judgment received by plaintiff A contains a clerical error in the designation of the parties, and part of a separate claim does not appear in the operative part. The clerical error in the party designation may amount to an erroneous entry and thus lies within the subject of rectification. By contrast, why part of the separate claim is missing from the operative part is not determined by this scene alone. Where it is not confirmed whether the error is one of expression or one of determination, it remains undetermined. If it is confirmed to be not an omission of determination but an omission of the adjudication of the claim itself, it is classified into the channel of an additional trial.
Therefore the conclusion this section allows is clear, and the conclusion it does not allow is equally clear. An application to correct errors of expression such as an erroneous calculation or entry enters through the door of rectification, but an application seeking an amendment of the conclusion as to the creation and scope of a right stops before that door. Wrapping a change in the determination of the merits in a small correction does not change its subject, and the statutory subject does not broaden merely because procedure is simple.
2.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
The certified copy of the judgment received by plaintiff A contains a clerical error in the designation of the parties and part of a separate claim does not appear in the operative part, but there is as yet no material as to which side that error belongs. The question now is therefore twofold: whether one can ask that the judgment be corrected on the ground of a better legal principle, and where the boundary lies that cannot be settled for want of materials.
For this question, the relevant language is but one paragraph of Article 211 of the Civil Procedure Act. "①When a judgment contains an erroneous calculation or entry, or other obvious error of a similar kind, the court may, ex officio or upon a party's application, issue a rectification order." The subject the court may rectify is bound by the actor, act, and condition written in that language. The court may issue a rectification order where an erroneous calculation or entry in the judgment, or an error of a similar kind, is clear, and its initiation is ex officio or upon a party's application. The reading here extends only as far as the error of expression indicated by that language and other similar errors. Other paragraphs of the provision or other issues are not the subject of the explanation at this point.
That language permits a rectification order when the kind of error is clear. Distinguished from this, a change in the determination of the merits means an amendment of the conclusion as to the creation and scope of a right. The reason for separating errors of expression from a change in the determination of the merits lies close at hand: what can be corrected by rectification is only an erroneous calculation or entry in the judgment, or an error of a similar kind, and amending the conclusion lies outside the range set by that language. When it is not confirmed which side the error falls on, the author's summary is as follows. A matter for which the materials of determination are not specified is left undetermined, distinct from impossibility. Undetermined, meaning that confirming materials are not yet available, must not be turned into impossibility, which conclusively decides that it does not enter the statutory subject of rectification.
That convenience is real. Where an obviously unjust conclusion can be corrected by a small amendment alone, requiring a separate challenge only increases time and cost. Even so, the adoption of a new legal principle cannot be written up as an application for correction of an entry error. This is because no premise is laid that a change in the determination of the merits falling outside the statutory subject of rectification can be resolved by rectification alone, and such an application takes the shape of demanding a change in the determination of the merits beyond the range the language of rectification allows. This answer does not erase the fact that rectification is fast and simple. It means only that, in exchange for that speed, the court is not permitted to redo a trial it has already completed.
In this scene, two facts now bear on this question: the fact that there is a clerical error in the party designation of the certified copy of the judgment, and the fact that part of a separate claim does not appear in the operative part. Whether this error is one of expression or one of determination—that is, whether it has been confirmed to either side by materials such as the original judgment, statement of claim, rectification application, omitted operative part, and course of the appeal—has not yet been settled. It is therefore left undetermined here. However, if one confirmed condition is changed in one's thinking, the classification changes. This is nothing more than a contrast with a changed condition; it does not mean that the scene actually turned out that way.
The conclusion this section permits is as follows. When it is not confirmed whether the error is one of expression or one of determination, a matter for which the materials of determination are not specified is not conclusively deemed impossible but is left undetermined. The conclusion the same section does not permit is as follows: refusing a rectification application on the sole ground that confirming materials are not yet available; conversely, conclusively deciding that it enters the subject of rectification on the sole circumstance that it is a clerical error; and making the adoption of a new legal principle the content of an application for correction of an entry error. Where an obvious error of expression is handled by rectification and a claim omitted from trial is handled by a continued trial, respectively, that channel opens. That channel must not be read as converted into actual results of payment, delivery, or recovery.
2.4The Records Needed for Determination
The conclusion of the preceding stage—that miscalculations, erroneous entries, and other manifest errors of a similar kind are the subject matter of rectification—is carried forward here. If the preceding section made clear what rectification is a means of correcting, the question that remains is what materials a person seeking to use that means must present in order to draw the distinction. In this scene, the misdesignation of a party is highly likely an error of designation, while a separate claim that does not appear in the dispositive portion remains a question of what is missing. To determine which route it is—rectification or some other supplementation—it must first be settled on what basis the determination is made. Thus the present question asks whether one may seek correction of the judgment on the basis of a better legal principle, while simultaneously asking about the scope of the records that will govern that answer.
The provision prescribing the statutory subject matter and procedure of rectification is laid down as follows. Article 211 of the Civil Procedure Act declares: "Where a judgment contains a miscalculation, an erroneous entry, or other manifest error of a similar kind, the court may, ex officio or upon a party's application, issue a rectification order." The subject this text designates is the court; the act is a rectification order issued ex officio or upon a party's application; and the condition is a case where the judgment plainly contains a miscalculation, an erroneous entry, or other error of a similar kind. In the author's view, while this text fixes the subject matter and the mode of activation of rectification, it does not undertake the further task of determining, case by case, what counts as an "entry" and what counts as "an error of a similar kind." The provision leaves open the door to the cases in which rectification is possible, but the determination of what may pass through that door must be filled in on separate grounds.
The link joining these grounds to the conclusion of this section is simple. Since the subject matter of rectification is confined to "miscalculations, erroneous entries, and other manifest errors of a similar kind," applying that limitation to an actual scene requires materials that reveal what has gone wrong. The Records the author has fixed are the original judgment, the claim and prayer for relief, the application for rectification order, the omitted dispositive portion, and the course of the appeal; and the stage determination is made solely on the basis of what is recorded in these five categories of materials. Two things must be distinguished here. One is the task of confirming an error of designation; the other is the task of examining whether the materials contain a change in the substantive determination—that is, a revision of a conclusion as to the existence and scope of a right. The former accords with the grammar of rectification; the latter lies in a place rectification cannot reach. If the two tasks are mixed, an application to correct a designation mutates into a demand to render the conclusion anew.
The counterargument that most sharply points out the discomfort this distinction occasions runs as follows. The criticism that a simple route exists yet the procedure turns parties away is felt, by those seeking to save cost and time, as a real loss. But the scope within which this criticism is answered is fixed. If, on the ground that rectification is fast, one thrusts into that door even a change in determination that does not fall within the statutory subject matter of rectification, rectification becomes a route that substitutes for an appeal. The advantage of the fast route is acknowledged, but the moment that route exceeds the bounds of correcting errors of designation, it returns to a separate problem.
In the synthetic scene, only two facts bear on this question: that there is a misdesignation of a party, and that part of a separate claim does not appear in the dispositive portion. If the misdesignation is a simple error of designation, it will be revealed by comparing the original judgment with the certified copy; and if the application for rectification order targets that error, it comes close to the statutory subject matter of rectification. By contrast, for a separate claim that does not appear in the dispositive portion, one must compare the claim and prayer for relief with the dispositive portion to confirm what is missing. Whether that omission is an omission of determination or an omission of the trial of the claim itself is not settled by this scene alone. The character of the unconfirmed error remains undetermined. The counterfactual comparison—if it is confirmed to be not an omission of determination but an omission of the trial of the claim itself, one changes the condition and classifies it into the route of an additional trial—is a sentence that checks the boundary of classification, not a fact that actually occurred.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow and clear. The stage is judged solely on the materials recorded in the original judgment, the claim and prayer for relief, the application for rectification order, the omitted dispositive portion, and the course of the appeal; no absent record is filled in by conjecture. If the error revealed in the records is an error of designation and does not go beyond that range, it goes to the route of rectification; if it contains a change in the substantive determination, it must be weighed separately, without the premise that rectification alone can resolve it. Nor does it assert that relief is impossible merely because these materials have not been assembled. If the materials are lacking, the matter remains undetermined, and it is to be distinguished anew by the same standard once the records are filled in. This standard, however, creates no new legal principle that would enlarge or shrink the subject matter of rectification; it remains confined to the task of distinguishing errors of designation from changes in the substantive determination upon the settled materials.
2.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
The starting point of this stage is that the word "correct" must not expand into the authority to hold a new trial. That conclusion was that miscalculations, erroneous entries, and other manifest errors of a similar kind are the subject matter of rectification. The question now narrows to two: whether one may ask that the judgment be corrected on the basis of a better legal principle, and what sort of change overturns the existing stage determination. Absent the premise that a change in determination beyond the statutory subject matter of rectification can be resolved by rectification alone, one must choose the route again according to the nature of the change.
The text applicable to this stage is Article 211, paragraph (1) of the Civil Procedure Act. The provision states: "① Where a judgment contains a miscalculation, an erroneous entry, or other manifest error of a similar kind, the court may, ex officio or upon a party's application, issue a rectification order." The subject designated by this text is the court; the act is a rectification order; and it may be made upon an application. The requirement is confined to cases where the judgment plainly contains a miscalculation, an erroneous entry, or other error of a similar kind. Accordingly, what the court can correct within that scope is manifest errors concerning the designation, and the text does not say that conclusions of determination beyond that may be altered (Civil Procedure Act, Article 211).
The point at which the requirements of the above provision and the conclusion of the present stage connect lies in the criterion for dividing the kinds of change. Here, a change in the substantive determination means a revision of the conclusion as to the existence and scope of a right. This revision is distinguished from the case where a judgment plainly contains a miscalculation or an erroneous entry. If the former re-determines the conclusion itself, the latter corrects an error of designation that arose in the course of transcribing a conclusion already determined. Therefore, if it is confirmed that the trial of the claim itself is missing, instead of calling it an omission of determination, one treats it as leaving an unfinished trial and handles it as a continued trial.
The counterargument confronting this distinction carries weight. That rectification is simpler and faster than an appeal is hard to deny, and the observation that requiring a separate challenge is a waste—when a manifestly unjust conclusion can be corrected by a small amendment without undergoing a complex procedure—accurately targets the practical inconvenience. In a case such as the misdesignation of a party appearing on the certified copy of the judgment received by plaintiff A, what reason is there to take the long way around? But what this counterargument demands goes beyond mere convenience. The inconvenience it points out is acknowledged; yet if, in seeking to relieve that inconvenience, one widens rectification into a route that even accepts revisions of conclusions as to the existence and scope of a right, the very boundary called the statutory subject matter of rectification disappears (Civil Procedure Act, Article 211).
Within this scene, the two facts each bear a different character. The misdesignation of a party may fall under a case of erroneous entry in the judgment and thus overlaps with the statutory subject matter of rectification. By contrast, the circumstance that part of a separate claim does not appear in the dispositive portion has not yet been confirmed to be an error of designation or an error of determination. From the scene alone it cannot be settled whether that claim fell outside the subject of trial, or whether a determination was rendered but not transcribed. Accordingly, the portion that remains unconfirmed as to which of the two it is must be left undetermined. Until that confirmation is complete, one cannot assert either that rectification alone suffices or that the matter has already terminated.
The conclusion of this section closes as follows. Handling diverges according to whether the omission of part of the claim is an omission of determination or an omission of the trial of the claim itself. If the former, it is handled as an error of designation falling within the statutory subject matter of rectification; if confirmed to be the latter, it is classified into the route of an additional trial and referred to a continued trial. Above all, one must not write in a way that makes an application for correction of an erroneous entry out of the adoption of a new legal principle, nor may one accept a demand that a change in the substantive determination be handled by rectification.
2.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
In this scene, that rectification is simpler and faster than an appeal is hard to deny. If the object to be corrected is small and the procedure short, there is no reason to choose the long route. But this claim of convenience is a matter separate from what can be corrected. The question handled here is whether one may ask that the judgment be corrected on the basis of a better legal principle.
Article 211 of the Civil Procedure Act fixes that boundary first by its text. The provision prescribes: "① Where a judgment contains a miscalculation, an erroneous entry, or other manifest error of a similar kind, the court may, ex officio or upon a party's application, issue a rectification order." Here the subject is the court, and the act is divided into one done ex officio and one upon a party's application. The condition is confined to cases where a miscalculation, an erroneous entry, or other manifest error of a similar kind plainly exists. The object designated by the text is errors of designation and calculation.
This text joins the conclusion of the preceding section. The premise that miscalculations, erroneous entries, and other manifest errors of a similar kind are the subject matter of rectification is maintained here as it stands. Yet changing the conclusion of a trial is distinguished from this category. Correcting a designation and revising a conclusion have different objects. The former is the work of accurately transcribing a determination already made; the latter is the work of re-rendering the determination itself. If this distinction wavers, the word "correct" expands into the authority to hold a new trial.
The strongest counterargument targets convenience. The inconvenience of a party compelled to take an appeal, which entails greater time and cost, is indeed substantial. No premise is entertained that a change in determination beyond the statutory subject matter of rectification can be resolved by rectification alone. The waste the counterargument points out remains, but the subject matter of rectification cannot be enlarged on the ground of that waste.
Returning to this scene, the misdesignation of a party falls under an error of designation. By contrast, the circumstance that part of a separate claim does not appear in the dispositive portion has a character that is not yet fixed. Where it is not confirmed whether the error is an error of designation or an error of determination, the route cannot be decided from this scene alone. The portion confirmed to be a change in the substantive determination does not fall within the subject matter of rectification.
In sum, rectification is the route for correcting manifest errors of designation, and the revision of a conclusion lies outside that door. However great the convenience, one must not write so as to direct that the adoption of a new legal principle be applied for as correction of an erroneous entry. A conclusion that crosses this boundary is not permitted by this section.
2.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
If, on the ground that an error in the document became visible only after the judgment was rendered, one could rewrite its conclusion, that would run squarely against the law that establishes finality. In the preceding section, it was confirmed that one may not write so as to have the adoption of a new legal principle applied for as correction of an erroneous entry. In such a case, is the permissible scope of rectification settled at the boundary between an actual error of designation and a change in determination? May one ask that the judgment be corrected on the basis of a better legal principle?
The text answering this question is Article 211, paragraph (1) of the Civil Procedure Act. The provision states: "Where a judgment contains a miscalculation, an erroneous entry, or other manifest error of a similar kind, the court may, ex officio or upon a party's application, issue a rectification order." (Civil Procedure Act, Article 211.) Here the act of the court is called a rectification order, and its object is miscalculations, erroneous entries, and other errors of a similar kind within the judgment. The applicant is a party, though the court may also act ex officio. The condition required is confined to cases where such an error plainly exists, and nowhere in the text is contained any meaning that a conclusion is to be freshly chosen.
This text does not pose the two determinations as an either-or; it resolves them separately. First it examines whether the error remaining in the written judgment is an error of designation; next, whether it amounts to a change in the substantive determination corresponding to a revision of the conclusion as to the existence and scope of a right. When the former is clear, rectification is possible; if it reaches the latter, it is premised that it does not fall within the statutory subject matter of rectification. Thus to hold that rectification can resolve every grievance goes beyond the text of this provision.
That rectification is simpler and faster than an appeal is a convenience that cannot be denied. If a manifestly unjust conclusion can be corrected by a small amendment without a lengthy hearing, requiring a separate challenge may appear to be a waste of time and cost. But the price of obtaining that convenience is that the grammar of the application collapses. A change in the substantive determination is a revision of the conclusion as to the existence and scope of a right, and the moment such a revision is accepted in the form of rectification, rectification becomes a route for re-doing a trial already concluded. The loss of convenience the counterargument targets is left as it is, while its answer is maintained.
What serves as material for the determination is the original judgment, the claim and prayer for relief, the application for rectification order, the omitted dispositive portion, and the course of the appeal. Laying these out, the misdesignation of a party is an error of designation placed on the route of rectification, whereas the reason why part of a separate claim does not appear in the dispositive portion is difficult to assert from these records alone. This is only a test with the condition altered, not a newly confirmed fact, and which route is chosen varies with the nature of the confirmed error.
Accordingly, rectification is placed at the seat for correcting manifest errors such as errors of designation or calculation, and a change in the substantive determination is not placed there. That said, one must not read this to mean the latter route is closed, nor may one simultaneously erect the premise that rectification alone resolves it. If this boundary is crossed, rectification expands into the authority to hold a new trial of a single case, and the meaning of the word "correct" changes. Neither can this boundary be narrowed or widened by adding years, amounts, or judgment outcomes not found in the synthetic scene, and the result of performance in the actual case is not fixed either. The remaining question is how this boundary connects to the actual stages; and how does this conclusion continue from the premises received in the preceding section?
2.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
이전 단계는 잘못된 계산·기재와 이와 비슷한 명백한 잘못이 경정의 대상이라는 데까지 미쳤다. 이제 남은 물음은 그 경계의 바깥쪽이다. 경정의 법정 대상 안에 들어가는 표시의 잘못과, 그 바깥에 머무는 판단의 잘못은 같은 성질의 것이 아니다. 두 가지를 한 절차로 끌어들일 수 있는지가 이번에 확인할 쟁점이다.
이 물음에 답하는 문언은 민사소송법 제211조 제1항에 놓여 있다. 그 조문은 "판결에 잘못된 계산이나 기재, 그 밖에 이와 비슷한 잘못이 있음이 분명한 때에 법원은 직권으로 또는 당사자의 신청에 따라 경정결정을 할 수 있다"고 정한다. 문언이 가리키는 주체는 법원이며, 행위는 경정결정이고, 조건은 잘못된 계산이나 기재, 그 밖에 이와 비슷한 잘못이 있음이 분명한 때이다. 경정을 신청할 수 있는 주체는 당사자이고, 법원은 직권으로도 같은 결정을 할 수 있다. 이 조문이 다루는 대상은 판결에 드러난 오류의 표시에 관한 것이지, 판결이 내린 판단의 내용을 다시 매기는 것은 아니다.
이 문언과 이 절의 결론은 이렇게 이어진다. 여기서는 두 개념을 구별해야 한다. 하나는 기재의 오류이고 다른 하나는 실체 판단의 변경이다. 전자가 판결문에 적힌 것을 바로잡는 일이라면, 후자는 판결이 권리에 대해 내린 결론 자체를 바꾸는 일이다. 경정이 전자를 위한 통로인 이상, 후자를 같은 통로에 넣는 것은 문언이 정한 조건을 벗어난다.
상소보다 경정이 간단하고 빠르다는 점은 이 경계를 무너뜨리지 않는다. 명백히 부당한 결론을 작은 수정으로 바로잡을 수 있는데도 별도 불복을 요구하는 것은 낭비처럼 보일 수 있다. 그 손실과 불편은 실제이다. 한 번 끝난 재판의 결론을 같은 법원이 다시 판단하는 권한을 경정이라는 절차에 싣는 것은, 절차가 담당하기로 한 범위를 넘어서는 일이다. 경정의 간편함은 그 범위 안에서만 값어치를 갖는다.
여기서 당사자 표시의 오기는 기재의 잘못에 해당하며, 경정의 법정 대상이 정한 조건에 견주어 볼 때 그 성격이 무엇인지 확인할 수 있는 사실이다. 반면 주문에 나타나지 않은 청구 일부가 판단의 누락인지, 청구에 대한 재판 자체의 누락인지에 대해서는 이 장면만으로 확정할 수 없다. 이 경우 오류가 표시의 잘못인지 판단의 잘못인지 확인되지 않았으므로 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론과 허용하지 않는 결론의 경계는 여기에 있다. 판결에 드러난 표시의 오류를 같은 법원이 바로잡는 것은 경정의 범위 안에 들어가지만, 더 나은 법리에 근거해 권리의 성립·범위에 대한 결론을 고치는 것은 같은 범위에 들어가지 않는다. 후자를 경정으로 담으려 하면 경정은 이미 한 재판을 새로 하는 권한으로 변하고 만다.
2.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
잘못된 계산·기재와 이와 비슷한 명백한 잘못이 경정의 대상이다. 더 나은 법리로 판결을 고쳐 달라고 할 수 있는가, 라는 물음 앞에서 그 한계를 분명히 해 둘 필요가 있다. 경정은 단순한 손질의 통로로 끝나는 제도가 아니지만 그렇다고 재판을 새로 여는 권한까지 품고 있는 것은 아니다.
민사소송법 제211조는 경정이 이루어지는 때를 이렇게 정한다. "판결에 잘못된 계산이나 기재, 그 밖에 이와 비슷한 잘못이 있음이 분명한 때에 법원은 직권으로 또는 당사자의 신청에 따라 경정결정을 할 수 있다."(민사소송법 제211조) 이 문언은 대상을 판결에 남은 잘못으로 지정하고, 주체를 법원으로 지목하며, 경로는 직권과 당사자의 신청으로 열어 둔다. 허용된 행위의 이름도 경정결정이다. 다른 판단 단계를 거쳐 판결의 결론을 바꾸는 절차가 아니라, 이미 쓰인 판결에 분명한 잘못이 남았을 때 그것을 걷어내는 절차다.
이 문언이 뒷받침하는 결론은 앞절에서 세워 둔 구별에 그대로 닿는다. 경정은 잘못된 계산·기재와 비슷한 명백한 오류를 걷어내는 절차이고, 경정의 법정 대상을 벗어난 판단 변경을 경정만으로 해결할 수 있다는 전제를 두지 않는다. 법원이 경정결정에서 할 수 있는 것이 판결에 남은 표시의 잘못을 바로잡는 행위로 정해지면, 그 문언 밖에서 권리의 성립·범위에 대한 결론을 새로 정하는 행위는 경정의 틀에 담기지 않는다고 읽는 것이 자연스럽다. 이 둘을 구별해야 고친다는 말이 갖고 있는 힘의 크기가 제자리를 찾는다.
상소보다 경정이 간단하고 빠르다는 점은 그대로 받아들여야 할 사실에 가깝다. 시간과 비용이 더 드는 길을 권해 둔 셈이니, 당사자에게는 굳이 돌아가라고 강요할 이유가 없는 불편처럼 보인다. 경정이 짧고 가벼운 통로라는 그 장점은, 문언이 정한 대상 안에서만 쓰는 한에서 효력을 발휘하는 성질이다.
당사자 표시의 오기는 경정의 법정 대상에 걸리는 잘못이고, 별도 청구 일부가 주문에 나타나지 않은 사정은 이 절이 아직 열어 두지 않은 판단이다. 다만 오류가 표시의 잘못인지 판단의 잘못인지 확인되지 않은 경우, 그 자료만으로 어느 쪽인지 확정할 수 없다. 장면에서 도출할 수 있는 것은 경정의 문언이 무엇을 허용하는지에 대한 대조일 뿐이고, 남은 사정은 미확정으로 남겨 둔다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 이렇게 정리된다. 경정의 문언은 잘못된 계산·기재와 비슷한 명백한 잘못을 고치는 통로를 정하고, 경정의 법정 대상을 벗어난 판단 변경이 경정만으로 해결될 수 있다는 전제를 두지 않는다. 허용되지 않는 결론은 이 문언을 새 법리의 채택을 뒷받침하는 근거로 쓰는 것이다. 실체 판단의 변경은 이 판단에서 무엇을 뜻하는가?
2.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
이 장면에서 표시의 오기와 주문의 누락은 성질이 다른 두 흔적이며, 둘을 한 통로로 묶어 처리하기 전에 어느 쪽에 속하는지 먼저 나누어야 한다. 그래서 이 절은 경정·추가재판으로 보완할 통로 안에서 다시 나누어 판정할 부분을 정하려 한다. 다만 이 물음은 더 나은 법리로 판결을 고쳐 달라고 할 수 있는가라는 앞선 물음의 한계 안에서 다뤄진다.
법령 문언은 경정의 대상을 이렇게 정한다. 민사소송법 제211조 제1항은 “판결에 잘못된 계산이나 기재, 그 밖에 이와 비슷한 잘못이 있음이 분명한 때에 법원은 직권으로 또는 당사자의 신청에 따라 경정결정을 할 수 있다”라고 정한다. 여기서 주체는 법원이고, 행위는 직권 또는 당사자 신청에 따른 경정결정이며, 조건은 잘못이 있음이 분명한 때이다. 그 잘못의 예시로 조문이 든 것은 잘못된 계산과 기재, 그 밖에 이와 비슷한 잘못이다. 이 문언은 표시와 기재에서 비롯한 명백한 잘못에 경정의 자리를 마련할 뿐, 권리의 성립·범위에 대한 결론을 다시 정하는 통로를 함께 열어두고 있지 않다.
이 문언과 연결되는 결론은 단계 안의 세부 구분을 명시한 조건에 한정한다는 것이다. 그 조건은 작동하는 경우, 막히는 경우, 미확정인 경우의 셋이다. 열리는 경우는 명백한 표시 오류는 경정으로, 재판이 빠진 청구는 계속 재판으로 각각 처리되는 경우이고, 막히는 경우는 다투는 내용이 표시 오류가 아니라 실체 판단의 변경이어서 경정의 법정 대상에 들어가지 않는 경우이며, 미확정인 경우는 오류가 표시의 잘못인지 판단의 잘못인지 확인되지 않은 경우이다. 표시의 잘못과 판단의 잘못을 이렇게 구별해야 하는 까닭은 전자가 경정의 법정 대상에 들어가고 후자는 그렇지 않기 때문이다. 이 구분은 이 세 가지 경우에 한정된다는 것이 이 절의 결론이다.
상소보다 경정이 간단하고 빠르다는 반론이 겨냥하는 점은 여기에 있다. 명백히 부당한 결론을 작은 수정으로 바로잡을 수 있는데도 별도 불복을 요구하는 것은 낭비이며, 절차의 길이를 줄이고자 하는 이익을 굳이 버려야 하느냐는 것이다. 이 불편과 손실은 무시할 수 없다. 다만 같은 비용을 따져도 새 법리 채택을 기재 오류 정정으로 신청하도록 쓸 수는 없다. 반론이 얻고자 하는 단순함과 속도를 지키는 길이, 기재 오류의 정정을 권리의 성립·범위에 대한 결론의 수정에까지 미끄러지게 두는 것이라면 그 가격은 그 반론의 편의를 넘어선다. 따라서 경정의 법정 대상을 벗어난 판단 변경은 경정만으로 해결할 수 있다는 전제를 두지 않는 결론을 유지한다.
판결 원본과 청구취지, 경정신청, 누락된 주문, 항소 경과가 이 판정에 놓이는 기록이다. 당사자 표시의 오기는 문언상 표시의 잘못에 가까워 보이며, 이에 대해서는 작동하는 경우에 해당하는 경정의 자리가 열릴 수 있다. 반면 별도 청구 일부가 주문에 나타나지 않은 채로 남았다는 사정만으로는 그것이 표시의 잘못인지 판단의 잘못인지 가려지지 않으므로 미확정인 경우에 머문다. 장면에 없는 연도·금액·기산일·판결 결과는 정해지지 않았으므로 이 절에서 확정하지 않는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 명백한 표시 오류는 경정으로, 실체 판단의 변경은 경정의 법정 대상 밖으로 두어 별도 불복의 문제로 남기는 것이다. 여기에서 자료가 모자라면 미확정으로 두는 것이지 곧바로 구제 불능으로 돌리는 것이 아니다. 허용하지 않는 결론은 명백한 표시 오류에 관한 신청 형식을 빌려 새 법리의 채택이나 결론의 수정을 요구하는 것이다. 경정의 통로가 열려 있음은 실제 지급·인도·회수의 성과와도 구별된다. 오류가 표시의 잘못인지 판단의 잘못인지 확인되지 않은 때는 추가 단계를 지어내지 말고 판정을 유보한다.
2.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
이 물음에 답하려면 판결문을 고치는 통로가 어느 조건에서 열리고 어느 조건에서 막히는지, 그리고 기록만으로는 어느 쪽인지 가릴 수 없는 경우를 남의 경우와 나누어 살펴보아야 한다. 이번에 다루는 것은 이 세 가지 상태를 서로 섞지 않고 구별하는 기준이다.
이 물음에 해당하는 법문은 민사소송법 제211조 제1항이다. 그 문언은 "①판결에 잘못된 계산이나 기재, 그 밖에 이와 비슷한 잘못이 있음이 분명한 때에" 법원이 경정결정을 할 수 있다고 정한다(민사소송법 제211조). 여기서 법원은 직권으로 또는 당사자의 신청에 따라 움직이고, 경정의 대상은 잘못된 계산이나 기재, 그 밖에 이와 비슷한 잘못이 있음이 분명한 경우에 한정된다. 이 문언은 판결문에 나타난 표시의 잘못을 고치는 통로를 열어 두되, 그 대상이 무엇인지에 대해서는 그 범위를 정해 둔다.
이 문언과 앞서 받은 전제를 이으면 판단 기준이 분명해진다. 잘못된 계산·기재와 이와 비슷한 명백한 잘못은 경정의 대상이고, 명백한 표시 오류는 경정으로 고친다. 반대로 재판이 빠진 청구는 계속 재판으로 처리한다. 여기서 표시의 잘못과 판단의 잘못을 나누어야 하는 이유는, 앞에서 정의한 실체 판단의 변경, 즉 권리의 성립·범위에 대한 결론의 수정은 표시를 고치는 것으로는 다루지 못하기 때문이다. 경정의 법정 대상에 들어가지 않는 판단 변경을 경정만으로 해결할 수 있다는 전제는 두지 않는다.
가장 강한 반론은 경정이 상소보다 간단하고 빠르다는 점을 겨눈다. 이 손실과 불편은 부정할 수 없으며, 절차가 덜 드는 통로가 있는데도 쓰지 못하게 하는 점은 당사자에게 실제로 부담이 된다. 경정의 간편함은 표시의 잘못을 고치는 데까지 미치고, 실체 판단의 변경을 그 통로로 끌어들이는 근거가 되지는 못한다.
당사자 표시의 오기는 문언상의 표시 오류에 해당하는지 검토할 대상이고, 이와 비슷한 명백한 잘못으로 확인되면 경정의 통로가 열린다. 주문에서 빠진 별도 청구 일부가 표시의 잘못인지 판단의 잘못인지, 혹은 재판 자체의 누락인지는 기록만으로 확정되어 있지 않다. 판결 원본·청구취지·경정신청·누락된 주문·항소 경과가 확인 자료가 되지만, 이 자료만으로 어느 쪽인지 단정할 수 없으므로 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 이와 같다. 명백한 표시 오류는 경정으로, 재판이 빠진 청구는 계속 재판으로 각각 처리되는 경우 통로가 열리고, 다투는 내용이 표시 오류가 아니라 실체 판단의 변경이어서 경정의 법정 대상에 들어가지 않는 경우 통로는 막힌다. 오류가 표시의 잘못인지 판단의 잘못인지 확인되지 않은 경우에는 미확정으로 남겨 두며, 자료가 부족하다는 사실만으로 구제가 불능이 되지는 않는다. 새 법리 채택을 기재 오류 정정으로 신청하는 경로는 허용되지 않는다.
2.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
이 장면에서 정정으로 고칠 오류와 별도로 다룰 누락이 한자리에 겹쳐 있다. 앞 절이 경정의 대상으로 삼은 잘못된 계산·기재와 유사한 명백한 잘못의 테두리를 넘어서는 문제가 여기서 생긴다. 이번 단계에서는 이 겹침이 어떤 구별을 요구하는지 묻는다.
이 물음에 답하는 자료는 민사소송법 제211조 제1항이다. 그 문언은 “①판결에 잘못된 계산이나 기재, 그 밖에 이와 비슷한 잘못이 있음이 분명한 때에 법원은 직권으로 또는 당사자의 신청에 따라 경정결정을 할 수 있다.”라고 정한다(민사소송법 제211조). 여기서 ‘법원’은 경정결정을 하는 주체이고, ‘당사자의 신청’은 직권과 나란히 놓인 개시 경로의 하나다. 문언이 열거한 계산·기재의 잘못과 그와 유사한 잘못은 경정의 대상을 정하는 조건이며, ‘있음이 분명한 때’는 대상의 성격이 명백함을 요구한다. 이 항은 경정의 개시와 대상에 관한 문언만 담고 있다.
이 문언과 앞 절의 결론을 이으면 경정의 대상은 표시에 관한 명백한 잘못으로 한정된다. 그런데 실체 판단의 변경, 곧 권리의 성립·범위에 대한 결론의 수정은 그 범위 밖에 있다. 두 가지를 구별해야 하는 까닭은 경정의 법정 대상을 벗어난 판단 변경은 경정만으로 해결할 수 있다는 전제를 두지 않기 때문이다. 고쳐 달라는 신청 하나에 표시 정정과 결론 변경을 함께 담을 수 없도록 문언의 조건이 갈라 놓은 셈이다.
상소보다 경정이 간단하고 빠르다는 점은 명백히 부당한 결론을 작은 수정으로 바로잡는 길이 따로 마련되지 않는 한 타당하게 들린다. 이 간편함과 속도를 아까워하는 입장에서는 별도의 불복 절차를 요구하는 것이 낭비로 보인다. 문언이 정한 대상의 조건을 바꾸어 신청의 용도를 확장하는 것은 신청 절차의 선택이 아니라 법정 대상의 무시이기 때문이다. 이 답은 반론이 지적한 불편을 제거하지는 않으며, 다만 그 불편을 경정의 대상 확장으로 해소하지 않을 뿐이다.
이 장면에서 당사자 표시의 오기는 표시의 잘못으로 볼 여지가 크지만, 별도 청구 일부가 주문에 나타나지 않은 것은 판단 누락인지 재판 자체의 누락인지 판결 원본·청구취지·경정신청·누락한 주문·항소 경과로 확인해야 한다. 어느 쪽으로 확인되든 앞의 구별은 그대로 적용되며, 확인 전에 경정의 대상에 넣어 판단할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 이러하다. 경정은 표시의 명백한 잘못에 머무르고, 실체 판단의 변경은 그 대상에 들지 않는다. 허용되지 않는 결론은 표시 정정의 신청 안에 새 법리 채택이나 결론 변경을 함께 담아 한 번에 처리하려는 것이다. 그러나 청구 일부를 전혀 재판하지 않았다면 끝난 것인가?