Summary
A suit contesting the enforceability arising from the fulfillment of a condition or from succession is distinguished from an objection to the claim itself.
2.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
The assertion that the debt has been paid and the assertion that there is no reason to be subjected to enforcement against this person point toward different doors. Debtor B contests on the ground of payment, while third party C asserts that the attached object is her own property, yet enforcement continues. Within this scene, B's contest targets the existence or nonexistence of the confirmed claim itself, whereas the error in the succession recognized by the certificate of execution targets the force of enforcement attached as a result of that recognition. Taking up the conclusion of the previous stage—that a substantive objection to a confirmed claim is raised in conformity with the subject matter and temporal requirements of objection to the enforcement of a claim—what remains at issue here is in which procedure a wrong succession recognized by the certificate of execution is contested, and what the standard is for opening the channel of this relief. At precisely the point where the doors diverge, whether the demanded performance, the parties, and the conditions have been specified in the prayer for relief is placed at the gate as the criterion of entry.
The source text corresponding to this question is Article 45 of the Civil Execution Act, which provides: "In the cases of Article 30 (2) and Article 31, where the debtor contests the enforceability of the judgment based on facts proved with respect to the granting of the certificate of execution, or contests the enforceability of the judgment based on a recognized succession, the provisions of Article 44 shall apply mutatis mutandis." Here, "debtor" refers to the person placed in the position of bearing the enforceability of that judgment in the procedure for granting the certificate of execution, and "recognized succession" means the basis of the enforceability attached to a fact of succession already proved at the time the certificate of execution was granted. The act is specified as "contests", and the object is not the claim itself but the enforceability of the judgment based on facts proved with respect to the granting of the certificate of execution or on a recognized succession. The provision opens the path of applying the provisions of Article 44 mutatis mutandis to that contest, while the proviso of the same provision makes clear that the right to file an objection (application raising objection) to the granting of a certificate of execution under Article 34 is not affected.
The thread connecting this wording with the conclusion of this section lies in that the channel diverges according to which side is the object of the contest. The action raising objection by which the provisions of Article 44 are applied mutatis mutandis is placed where the application of the enforceability attached through that fact is put in issue, and not the fact that formed the ground of the enforceability itself. Accordingly, what the demanded performance is, against which party it is directed, and the fulfillment of what condition it presupposes are specified in the prayer for relief, and when the right can be defended by the chosen action, the entrance to this relief opens. This is the place where the denial of succession is dealt with. In the same context as the distinction drawn earlier, even if the enforceability of the judgment based on facts proved with respect to the granting of the certificate of execution and the enforceability of the judgment based on a recognized succession are placed together, the respective grounds must be separately specified for the two paths to operate apart from one another.
The strongest counterargument targets the point that the procedure becomes complicated. Faced with urgent enforcement, when the means of objection are subdivided into objection to the enforcement of a claim, an action raising objection to the granting of the certificate of execution, third-party objection, and the like, it becomes difficult for the right holder to gauge which door to choose, and the concrete loss that time and money leak away if the wrong choice is made comes vividly to mind. In addition, an inconvenience remains that whenever two grounds overlap in a single contest, a separate action and a stay ruling must be gone through. Even so, this counterargument does not lead to recasting the denial of succession into the fact of payment of the debt. That B asserts payment belongs to the realm of substantive objection to a confirmed claim itself, whereas the contest that the succession was mistaken rests on a separate ground. The moment the two are mixed into a single sentence, what action's right is being defended cannot be specified, and the criterion of entry accordingly collapses instead.
The discussion now returns to this scene. The point at which B contests on the ground of payment accords with the premise set out earlier of a substantive objection to a confirmed claim. By contrast, the point at which C asserts that the attached object is her own property lies in the question of blocking enforcement from the status of an owner who is not a debtor, and falls outside the scope of this section. The contest that the succession recognized by the certificate of execution is wrong must be examined in a third position, separate from B's assertion of payment and C's assertion of ownership. However, since no year, amount, accrual date, or judgment outcome is set in this scene, it cannot be determined which party filed which action at what point in time, or whether there was a stay ruling. Leaving these undetermined accords with the conditional distinctions of this section.
The conclusion permitted in this section is that, when contesting the denial of succession, one selects the specific channel of an action raising objection to which Article 44 is applied mutatis mutandis, and where, in that action, the demanded performance, the parties, and the conditions are specified in the prayer for relief and the right of the chosen action can be defended, the entrance to this relief opens. Conversely, the manner of recasting the denial of succession into the fact of payment of the debt, or the manner of opening the door without specifying what kind of contest it is, lies outside this conclusion.
2.2The Conditions That Block Relief
Where only an action raising objection is filed and there is no ruling serving as the basis for a stay of enforcement, so that no effect arises to halt the current enforcement, if any one of the statutory requirements is not met, the channel of relief is closed. The previous stage set out that a substantive objection to a confirmed claim is raised in conformity with the subject matter and temporal requirements of objection to the enforcement of a claim. In the same scene, what remains is which door to knock on if the succession recognized by the certificate of execution is wrong, and what the conditions are under which that door closes. Here, the door refers to the channel of relief of rights, and the closing of the channel is a matter of a different dimension from the refusal of adjudication itself.
Article 45 of the Civil Execution Act provides: "In the cases of Article 30 (2) and Article 31, where the debtor contests the enforceability of the judgment based on facts proved with respect to the granting of the certificate of execution, or contests the enforceability of the judgment based on a recognized succession, the provisions of Article 44 shall apply mutatis mutandis." This wording presupposes two actors and acts. The debtor who contests the enforceability based on facts proved with respect to the granting of the certificate of execution and on a recognized succession is precisely that party. Here, an action raising objection to the granting of the certificate of execution means a contest over enforceability based on conditions and succession. The wording merely designates that the provisions of Article 44 are to be applied mutatis mutandis as the manner of this contest, and does not settle together the question of the fulfillment of other conditions.
Between the wording of the preceding paragraph and the conclusion of this section there lies one step of adjudication. The object of the action indicated by the provision and the effect of that action in halting the current enforcement must be distinguished from each other. The author's conclusion is founded upon this distinction. The requirement spoken of here includes the condition that a separate ruling for a stay of enforcement is required. The moment one takes the mere fact of filing the action to mean that the current enforcement has been stayed, the two steps of filing the action and staying enforcement are crushed into one. Preserving that distinction becomes the standard by which the channel of relief opens and closes.
When both grounds overlap, the procedure becomes complicated. The point most strongly targeted by the counterargument that the subdivision of means of objection places an excessive burden of choice upon the right holder before urgent enforcement is precisely that inconvenience. Going further, in a phase where the objectives of excluding unlawful or improper enforcement and provisional suspension overlap, the burden of choosing which action the debtor should bring and which ruling the debtor should obtain may grow. This disadvantage cannot be erased. Even so, the denial of succession cannot be recast as the fact of payment of the debt. To assert that the succession is mistaken is to contest to whom the enforceability has devolved; to assert that the debt has disappeared through payment is to contest the claim itself; and the two assertions point toward different doors. Even at the cost of bearing the expense of complexity, blurring that distinction would rather cause the very standard of the channel of relief to collapse.
In the synthetic scene, Debtor B is contesting on the ground of payment, while third party C asserts that the attached object is her own property, but enforcement continues. In this scene, the only fact directly relevant to this question is that B's contest concerns the claim itself. B's assertion points toward a different door than the view that the enforceability of the judgment rests upon the basis of succession, and must therefore be distinguished when placed alongside an action contesting the succession recognized by the certificate of execution. The scene, however, determines nothing as to the presence or absence of a stay-of-enforcement ruling, nor as to the point in time of the filing of the action and its effect. Accordingly, whether an effect has arisen to halt the current enforcement, and whether a stay ruling necessary therefor exists, cannot be determined from the scene alone. These items remain undetermined.
The conclusion permitted in this section is narrow. After distinguishing an action contesting enforceability based on fulfillment of conditions or succession from an objection to the claim itself, only the former is taken up as the subject of that action. What is not permitted is blurring this distinction so as to recast the denial of succession as the fact of payment of the debt, and describing enforcement as having stopped merely upon the filing of the action without confirming the existence of a stay ruling. This determination only sets the conditions under which the action opens and closes, and does not reach the separate question of the relief of the rights of an owner who is not a debtor.
2.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
The conclusion carried over from the preceding stages of analysis is only the single sentence that a substantive objection to the claim itself is raised in conformity with the subject matter and temporal requirements of objection to the enforcement of a claim. Yet at times the path leading to each of those doors appears to diverge slightly. In this scene the author says that the two assertions target different windows. Even so, he now stands only on the question of where to contest if the succession recognized by the certificate of execution is wrong, and on the question of where the boundary lies that cannot be determined for lack of materials. Without rebuilding the argument of the preceding section, he addresses only the boundary of these two questions.
The term "action raising objection to the granting of the certificate of execution" is used to mean a contest over enforceability based on conditions and succession. Looking at the wording underlying this term, Article 45 of the Civil Execution Act provides: "In the cases of Article 30 (2) and Article 31, where the debtor contests the enforceability of the judgment based on facts proved with respect to the granting of the certificate of execution, or contests the enforceability of the judgment based on a recognized succession, the provisions of Article 44 shall apply mutatis mutandis." The actor indicated by this wording is the debtor, and the object contested is not the enforceability of the judgment itself but the enforceability based on facts proved with respect to the granting of the certificate of execution or on a recognized succession. Article 45 declares only that, within the scope relevant to this question, the provisions of Article 44 shall apply mutatis mutandis to these two contests. The answer as to what a person who is not a debtor blocks with a third-party object is not addressed by this provision.
The reason the wording of Article 45 places the two contests side by side is that the claim adjudicated by the judgment and the facts proved or recognized by the certificate of execution pass through different stages. A substantive objection to the judgment itself targets the content of the confirmed claim, whereas the denial of proved facts or of a recognized succession contained in the certificate of execution targets only the ground supporting the enforceability. The question addressed here is where to contest if the succession recognized by the certificate of execution is wrong. The denial of succession is not an objection to the judgment itself; it heads toward the position of contesting the enforceability of the judgment based on a recognized succession. That the author describes this distinction in two steps is because the location of the loss targeted by the two contests differs, and this distinction itself creates no new requirement or effect.
The counterargument that the subdivision of means of objection places an excessive burden of choice upon the right holder before urgent enforcement targets a practical inconvenience. The debtor and the third party must contest separately through their respective doors, and if time is taken to determine which door to enter, enforcement continues in the meantime. The observation that when both grounds overlap the procedure becomes complicated comes from the same context. As in the scene where Debtor B contests on the ground of payment and third party C asserts that the attached object is her own property, when two accounts are mixed in one place, it becomes blurred what is contested by which action. Even so, the author's answer is clear. The contest that the succession is mistaken and the contest that the right has been extinguished by payment target different grounds, and therefore cannot be folded into one merely because the procedure becomes complicated.
In the synthetic scene, Debtor B is contesting on the ground of payment, third party C asserts that the attached object is her own property, and enforcement continues. Setting these facts against the conditions of Article 45, B's assertion does not target the enforceability based on a recognized succession but speaks of the extinction of the confirmed claim itself. C, on the other hand, asserts ownership of the attached object rather than being the debtor of the judgment, and thus does not fall within the debtor's contest set out in this provision. However, in this scene it is not fixed which of the assertions actually corresponds to a denial of succession, nor what underlying materials B and C possess. Matters that cannot be determined for lack of materials remain as things that cannot be decided concretely. The synthetic scene provides materials closely related to the question of where to contest if the succession recognized by the certificate of execution is wrong, but it does not substitute for an answer to the question itself.
The conclusion permitted in this section is the distinction that the denial of succession goes to the position of contesting the enforceability of the judgment based on a recognized succession, and the boundary that it is not recast as the fact of payment of the debt. At the same time, because it cannot be determined whose materials B and C hold and of what kind, that part remains undetermined. By contrast, matters for which the materials of adjudication are not specified are left undetermined, distinguished from impossibility. One cannot categorically declare relief impossible on the ground that the materials are insufficient, nor can one read the denial of succession as payment merely because it cannot be determined.
2.4The Records Needed for Determination
확정 청구에 대한 실체상 이의는 청구이의의 대상과 시간적 요건에 맞춰 제기한다. 이 자리에서 물음은 두 갈래로 나뉜다. 집행문이 인정한 승계가 틀렸다면 어디를 다투는지, 그리고 그 단계를 판단하려면 어떤 기록이 필요한지이다. 앞 문단이 열어 둔 구별은 이 질문을 풀기 위한 첫 자료다.
그 문항에 관한 법문은 다음과 같다. 제45조는 제30조제2항과 제31조의 경우에 채무자가 "집행문부여에 관하여 증명된 사실에 의한 판결의 집행력을 다투거나, 인정된 승계에 의한 판결의 집행력을 다투는 때에는 제44조의 규정을 준용한다"고 규정하며, 이 경우에도 제34조에 따른 집행문부여에 대한 이의 신청 권한이 영향을 받지 아니한다고 덧붙인다 (민사집행법 제45조). 여기서 다투는 주체는 채무자이고, 다투는 대상은 집행문부여에 관하여 증명된 사실에 의한 집행력이나 인정된 승계에 따른 집행력이다. 문언이 가리키는 행위는 조문이 말하는 제44조 준용의 소를 제기하는 것이다.
제45조가 인정한 승계에 따른 집행력을 다투는 경우와 제34조의 이의 신청 권한을 함께 두는 것은 두 판단 단계가 서로 다른 기록을 요구하기 때문이다. 앞서 구별한 대로 조건 성취나 승계에 따른 집행력을 다투는 소는 집행문부여 이의의 소를 뜻하며, 이는 조건·승계에 근거한 집행력에 대한 다툼이다. 반면 청구 자체에 대한 이의는 확정 청구의 실체를 다루는 별도의 통로다. 그래서 이 물음의 단계 판정은 이의 소장·권리 소멸 또는 소유 자료·집행문·정지 또는 취소 재판에 기록된 자료만으로 한다. 없는 기록을 추정으로 메우지 않는다.
가장 강한 반론은 절차의 중첩이 낳는 선택의 부담을 겨냥한다. 채무자 B와 제삼자 C의 주장이 함께 걸려 있는 지금, 무엇을 써 내야 하는지 고르는 일 자체가 급박한 집행 앞에서 권리자에게 과도한 짐이 된다는 것이다. 두 사유가 겹치면 절차가 복잡해지고, 잘못된 문으로 서류를 내면 시간을 잃을 수 있다는 불편은 지워지지 않는다. 그러나 이 불편에도 불구하고 승계의 부정을 채무 변제 사실로 바꾸어 서술할 수는 없다. 이 사람에게 집행당할 이유가 없다는 주장은 갚았다는 사실 주장과 항변의 근거가 다르며, 그 구별을 무너뜨리면 어떤 기록을 확인해야 하는지도 함께 사라진다.
합성 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 B가 변제를 이유로 다투고 C가 압류 목적물의 소유를 주장한다는 것, 그리고 집행이 계속되고 있다는 사실까지다. 이 가운데 여기서 다루는 것은 이 사람에게 집행당할 이유가 없다는 주장의 성격이며, 이 주장이 변제 주장과 겹치지 않는다는 점만으로 판단의 출발점을 잡는다. B의 변제 사실이나 C의 소유가 실제 성립했는지, 송달이나 이행이 있었는지는 이 기록만으로 판단할 수 없다. 승계가 틀렸다는 다툼이 청구 자체인지 승계인지 특정되지 않았다면 그 항목은 미확정으로 남는다.
정해진 것은 그 자료만으로 단계를 판정한다는 선이며, 이 선 안에서 집행문부여 이의의 소란 조건·승계에 근거한 집행력에 대한 다툼을 뜻한다. 이 경계 밖에서 서술할 수 없는 것은, 기록에 없는 사실을 끼워 넣어 단계를 확정하거나 승계의 부정을 변제의 결여로 환원하는 일이다. 자료가 부족한 상태는 미확정일 뿐 곧바로 구제 불능으로 뒤집히지 않지만, 그렇다고 없는 기록이 생기지도 않는다.
2.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
앞서 확정된 청구에 대한 실체상 이의는 청구이의의 대상과 시간적 요건에 맞춰 제기하기로 정리했다. 그러나 집행문이 인정한 승계가 틀렸다면 어디를 다투는가 하는 물음은 그와 다른 출발점에 선다. B의 변제 주장은 청구 자체를 없앤다는 취지이지만, 집행 채권자가 그 승계인이 아닐 이유를 들어 다투는 경우는 원래 청구의 존부와 무관하게 집행문이 그 사람에게 집행력을 인정한 근거에 맞선다.
제45조는 “제30조제2항과 제31조의 경우에 채무자가 집행문부여에 관하여 증명된 사실에 의한 판결의 집행력을 다투거나, 인정된 승계에 의한 판결의 집행력을 다투는 때에는 제44조의 규정을 준용한다”고 정한다. 민사집행법 제45조. 이 문언은 다투는 주체를 집행문부여 절차에서 증명된 사실에 근거해 집행력을 받은 채무자로 특정하고, 다투는 대상을 그 사실에 의한 집행력 또는 인정된 승계에 의한 집행력으로 한정한다. 따라서 여기서 집행문부여 이의의 소는 조건·승계에 근거한 집행력에 대한 다툼을 뜻하며, 청구 자체의 존재를 다투는 통로와 나뉜다.
제45조가 제44조의 규정을 준용한다고 정한 까닭은 다투는 근거가 청구 자체에 있지 않고 집행문부여 과정에서 추가로 인정된 사실관계에 있기 때문이다. 그 문언은 다만 뒤이어 제34조에 따라 집행문부여에 대하여 이의를 신청할 수 있는 채무자의 권한은 영향을 받지 아니한다고 덧붙인다. 민사집행법 제45조. 즉 소와 신청이라는 두 경로 중 어느 하나가 다른 하나를 몰아내는 것이 아니라, 다투는 사유가 승계의 부정인지 청구 자체의 소멸인지에 따라 다른 문이 열린다. 저자의 판단도 여기에 묶인다. 승계의 부정은 인정된 승계에 의한 집행력을 겨냥하고, 변제에 의한 권리 소멸은 청구 자체에 대한 실체상 이의로 다룬다. 두 사유의 요건과 시간적 한계가 각각 다르므로 섞어 서술하면 어느 문을 두드렸는지 특정할 수 없다.
가장 강한 반론은 실무의 번거로움에 있다. 채무자 B는 변제를 주장하면서도 집행 채권자의 지위 자체를 부정하는 사유가 함께 떠오르는 경우가 있고, 양쪽 사유가 겹치면 절차가 복잡해진다. 급박한 집행 앞에서 이의 수단을 세분하면 권리자에게 과도한 선택 부담을 준다는 비판도 빠지지 않는다. 어느 소를 내야 할지 고르는 동안 압류가 진행되면 회복하기 어려운 손실이 남는다. 그렇다고 이 불편을 사유의 혼동으로 해결할 수는 없다. 저자의 답은 분명하다. 다투는 대상이 틀리면 정해진 요건에 맞춘 심리를 받을 수 없으므로, 복잡하다는 이유만으로 두 문을 잇는 편의를 택할 수 없다.
이 장면에서 이 물음과 겹치는 사실은 B의 변제 주장 하나이다. 그 주장은 승계의 부정이 아니라 청구 자체의 소멸을 가리키므로 지금 담당한 문과 맞지 않고, 제1·2총서에서 넘겨받은 전제대로 청구이의의 대상과 시간적 요건에 맞춰 제기할 사유로 남는다. 반면 집행 채권자의 지위가 인정된 승계에 근거한다는 점을 다투는 사유가 확인되면 제45조가 정한 소의 범위에 들어온다. 다만 장면만으로는 그런 다툼이 실제로 제기되었는지, 필요한 정지 재판이 있었는지 판단할 수 없고, 승계 자체의 존부 역시 미확인이다. 가정한 반대 사실인 진행 정지 결정만 확인되면 기존 압류 취소로 표시한 상태를 되돌린다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 조건·승계에 근거한 집행력에 대한 다툼과 청구 자체에 대한 이의를 구별하고, 그 구별에 맞는 문을 두드리게 한다는 것이다. 이 구별이 승계를 다투는 채무자에게 변제 항변을 대신 서술하게 하거나, 변제를 주장하는 채무자에게 승계 부정을 꾸며 넣게 하는 것은 허용하지 않는다. 확정된 청구의 실체상 이의에 관한 시간적 요건까지도 이 구별에서 벗어나 적용할 수 없다. 채무자가 아닌 소유자는 어떻게 막는가?
2.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
앞 단계는 집행문이 인정한 승계가 틀렸다면 그 인정 자체를 다투는 창구를 정해 두었다. 이제 양쪽 사유가 겹치는 장면에서 그 절차가 어떻게 견디는지가 물음이다. 변제 주장과 소유 주장은 서로 다른 근거에서 나온다. 두 가지가 한 자리에 겹치면 절차의 단계가 흔들리는 것처럼 보인다. 여기서 물음은 승계의 부정을 어느 자리에서 다루어야 하는가이다.
이 물음에 관하여 조문은 다투는 대상을 나누어 둔다. 민사집행법 제45조는 "채무자가 집행문부여에 관하여 증명된 사실에 의한 판결의 집행력을 다투거나, 인정된 승계에 의한 판결의 집행력을 다투는 때에는 제44조의 규정을 준용한다"고 정한다. 여기서 주체는 채무자이고, 행위는 집행력을 다투는 것이며, 조건은 증명된 사실이나 인정된 승계에 근거한 집행력이라는 문언의 구분이다. 이 조문은 조건 성취나 승계에 따른 집행력에 대한 다툼을 규정한다. 제45조만 읽는 이 범위에서 청구 자체를 다투는 이의와 이 다툼을 나누는 기준은 문언의 대상 구분이다.
제45조가 다투는 대상을 증명된 사실이나 승계에 근거한 집행력으로 한정한 까닭은 다투는 사실이 집행문부여에 관하여 증명된 것이기 때문이다. 이 정의를 이 절의 결론과 잇는다. 승계의 부정은 이 대상 안에 들어가며, 채무 변제는 청구 자체에 대한 이의로 갈라지는 사실이다. 저자는 두 서술을 섞을 수 없다고 보았고, 그 구별이 판정의 기준이다. 따라서 변제 사실로 승계의 부정을 대신 적으면 문언이 나눈 대상 구분을 지우는 일이 된다. 같은 문장에 두 근거를 함께 적어도 각각 다른 소가 다루는 사실로 남는다.
가장 강한 반론은 이 구별이 급박한 집행 앞에서 당사자에게 과도한 선택 부담을 준다고 겨눈다. 채무자 B는 변제를 이유로 다투고 제삼자 C는 압류 목적물이 자기 소유라고 주장하는데, 어느 문으로 가야 할지 판단할 여유가 없는 채 집행이 계속된다. 두 주장을 하나의 소에 묶어 처리하는 편이 절차가 단순하고 비용이 적다는 점은 반론이 얻는 이익이다. 그러나 그 이익을 좇아 승계의 부정을 채무 변제 사실로 바꾸어 서술할 수는 없다. 반론이 지적한 선택의 어려움은 그대로 두고, 서술을 바꾸어 대상 구분을 무너뜨리는 방식으로는 답하지 않는다. 저자의 답은 서술의 축약을 허용하지 않는 것이다.
합성 장면에서 이 물음에 닿는 사실은 근거가 겹쳐 있다는 점 하나이다. 채무자 B는 변제를 이유로 다투고, 제삼자 C는 압류 목적물이 자기 소유라고 주장한다. 변제는 채무자 쪽 근거이고, 목적물의 소유는 제삼자 쪽 근거이다. 제45조가 가리키는 인정된 승계에 대한 다툼과 채무 변제라는 청구 소멸 사유는 이 장면 안에서 서로 다른 위치에 놓인다. 반면 실제 이의의 소가 어떻게 제기되었고 정지 재판이 있었는지는 장면이 정하지 않았으므로 미확정으로 남는다. 이 대목만으로 어느 소가 성립하고 집행이 언제 멈추는지 확정할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 승계의 부정과 채무 변제를 각각 그 사실이 속한 자리에 두는 것이다. 허용하지 않는 것은 승계의 부정을 채무 변제 사실로 바꾸어 서술하여 하나로 접는 방식이다. 단계가 겹쳐 보여도 문언이 나눈 대상 구분은 유지되며, 서술의 편의가 그 구별을 대신하지 못한다. 남은 자료 부족은 미확정으로 표시될 뿐, 이 구별 자체를 무너뜨리지 못한다. 다음으로는 채무자가 아닌 소유자가 쓰는 수단이 따로 있는지가 열린다.
2.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
앞 절에서 승계의 부정을 채무 변제 사실로 바꾸어 서술할 수는 없다고 확인한 뒤에도, 합성 장면에서 집행은 계속되고 있다. 이 장면에서 집행문이 인정한 승계 자체가 틀렸다면 채무자는 어느 절차를 향해 다투어야 하는가. 물음은 변제 여부가 아니라, 조건 성취나 승계라는 집행문의 근거가 어긋났을 때 그 근거에 대한 다툼을 어느 소로 옮길 것인지에 관한 것이다.
해당 문언은 그 자리를 가리킨다. 여기서 주체는 채무자이고, 행위는 집행문부여에 관하여 증명된 사실 또는 인정된 승계에 의한 판결의 집행력을 다투는 것이다. 조건이 성취되었는지, 승계가 인정된 바와 같이 실제로 일어났는지가 집행력을 떠받치는 근거일 때 채무자는 이 소로 그 근거에 반박한다.
이 문언과 앞에서 정리한 결론은 하나의 구별 위에 서 있다. 집행력의 근거인 조건 성취나 승계에 대한 다툼은 집행문부여 이의의 소라는 별도 문으로 향한다. 반면 청구 자체, 즉 판결이 인정한 청구권의 존부나 범위를 다투는 이의는 그 문의 대상이 아니다. 두 단계가 섞이면 집행문의 근거가 틀렸다는 주장과 이미 확정된 청구가 변제로 소멸했다는 주장이 한 소 안에서 뒤섞인다. 그러므로 전자는 조건·승계의 어긋남을, 후자는 청구 자체에 대한 저항을 각각 담당하게 구분한다.
이 구별이 권장하는 절차 분화에 대한 반론은 실무적이다. 양쪽 사유가 겹치면 절차가 복잡해진다는 지적은, 급박한 집행 앞에서 권리자가 소의 종류까지 골라야 한다는 불편과 오선택 위험을 겨냥한다. 채무자 B가 변제로 이미 다투고 있는 마당에 승계의 부정까지 별도 문으로 옮기라고 하면 소장 정리와 심리 순서가 늘어나고, 어느 소에 넣었는지에 따라 결과가 갈릴 수 있다. 그렇더라도 앞 절이 확인한 답은 흔들리지 않는다. 앞 절이 확인한 이 결론은 불리함을 지우지 않은 채, 절차가 복잡해져도 다투는 대상을 바꿔 적을 수는 없다는 점을 분명히 한다.
합성 장면의 사실 가운데 이 물음에 닿는 것은 제한되어 있다. 채무자 B는 변제를 이유로 다투하고 있고, 제삼자 C는 압류 목적물이 자기 소유임을 주장하지만 집행은 계속되고 있다. 이 가운데 B의 변제 주장은 청구 자체에 대한 이의의 영역이고, C의 소유 주장은 채무자가 아닌 제삼자의 목적물 권리에 대한 다툼으로 남는다. 집행문이 인정한 승계가 틀렸다는 가정은 위 두 사실과 별개의 조건이며, 그때 채무자가 나아갈 문은 조건·승계에 근거한 집행력에 대한 다툼을 담당하는 소이다. 다만 장면에서 B가 실제로 이 소를 제기했는지, 어느 자료로 승계의 어긋남을 다투는지, 집행이 어느 단계인지 밝혀져 있지 않아 확정할 수 없다. 기록으로 상정된 이의 소장·권리 소멸 또는 소유 자료·집행문·정지 또는 취소 재판 가운데 무엇이 준비되었는지도 합성 장면만으로는 미확정이다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은, 조건 성취나 승계에 따른 집행력을 다투는 소와 청구 자체에 대한 이의를 구별하고 승계의 틀림을 청구 자체의 소멸 사유로 대체하지 않는 데까지이다. 집행문부여 이의의 소가 제기된다고 해서 현재 집행이 저절로 멈추는 것은 아니며, 정지의 근거가 되는 재판이 있는지에 따라 그 효과가 갈린다. 반대로 이 소를 청구이의의 소로 채워 넣거나, 변제 사실을 승계의 부정으로 둔갑시키는 것은 이 절이 허용하지 않는다.
2.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Debtor B opposes enforcement on the ground of payment, and third party C asserts that the object of attachment is his own property, yet enforcement continues. On the premise that substantive objections to a finalized claim are raised in conformity with the subject matter and temporal requirements of an objection to the enforcement of a claim, this time the question is by what procedure a wrongly directed enforcement should be stopped, and, within that question, from where to where the range of matters this section treats exclusively extends. B's assertion of payment and the error in the succession recognized by the enforcement clause target different mistakes, and that distinction governs the choice of procedure.
Article 45 of the Civil Execution Act provides that, in the cases under Article 30, paragraph (2) and Article 31, where the debtor contests the enforcement effect of a judgment on the basis of facts proved in connection with the grant of an enforcement clause, or contests the enforcement effect of a judgment on the basis of a recognized succession, the provisions of Article 44 apply mutatis mutandis. However, even in that case, the debtor's authority to file an objection to the grant of an enforcement clause under Article 34 is not affected (Article 45 of the Civil Execution Act). This wording confines the party contesting to the debtor, the object contested to the enforcement effect of a judgment based on facts proved in connection with the grant of an enforcement clause or on a recognized succession, and the act to a contest of that enforcement effect.
What the above wording covers is a contest of the enforcement effect arising upon fulfillment of a condition or succession, and this is called an action for objection to the grant of an enforcement clause. An action for objection to the grant of an enforcement clause means a contest of the enforcement effect based on a condition or succession. Here, the assertion that the succession recognized by the enforcement clause is wrong does not deny the existence or scope of the claim finalized by the judgment itself, but contests upon whom the enforcement effect of that judgment falls. Accordingly, an objection to the claim itself and this contest of enforcement effect lie at different stages of adjudication: if the former is raised in conformity with the subject matter and temporal requirements of an objection to the enforcement of a claim as a substantive objection to a finalized claim, the latter requires a separate channel fitted to the two grounds of condition and succession.
Such subdivision of the devices of objection is accompanied by the criticism that it imposes an excessive burden of choice upon the right holder before urgent enforcement. If the grounds overlap, choosing which door to enter is itself returned to the debtor as procedural risk, and a wrong choice may let time pass without stopping enforcement. This section, without removing that inconvenience, observes only one line. This is because the denial of succession cannot be recast and described as the fact of payment of the debt. If B's assertion of payment is an objection to the claim itself, it must be handled in conformity with the subject matter and temporal requirements of an objection to the enforcement of a claim, and the assertion that the succession recognized by the enforcement clause is wrong cannot be converted into the separate fact of payment.
In the synthetic scene, only the facts are designated that Debtor B opposes enforcement on the ground of payment and third party C asserts his own ownership of the object of attachment. While B's assertion may be seen as aiming at the door of the procedure of a substantive objection to a finalized claim, the case in which the succession recognized by the enforcement clause is wrong falls within the scope of this section, namely the enforcement effect based on a condition or succession. However, the ownership claim over the object advanced by C is raised by a person who is not the debtor, and therefore lies outside the scope of the parties covered by the wording of this section, and the fact that enforcement stops is also not confirmed in the scene. Other facts not present in the scene, such as the year, the amount, and the result of performance, cannot be ascertained and remain undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is the judgment that an action contesting the enforcement effect arising upon fulfillment of a condition or succession and an objection to the claim itself must be distinguished and sent to different doors, and that the former is defined as an action for objection to the grant of an enforcement clause. What this section does not permit is an interpretation that merges the two channels merely because the grounds overlap, and a description that substitutes the separate fact of payment for the denial of succession; nor does this section adjudicate an owner who is not the debtor or the attribution of an enforcement already carried out.
2.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
In such a scene, the debtor asserts that the right has disappeared through payment, and the third party asserts ownership of the object. The two assertions aim at different objects and grounds. Then, if the succession recognized by the enforcement clause is wrong, where is it contested? This question touches upon the work of distinguishing an action contesting the enforcement effect arising upon fulfillment of a condition or succession from an objection to the claim itself. That distinction operates as well when adjudicating the exclusion of unlawful or unjust enforcement and provisional suspension.
Read as it stands, the relevant source text reads as follows. The party handled here is the debtor, and the act is a contest of the enforcement effect based on proved facts or on a recognized succession. This wording targets the enforcement effect that has arisen from fulfillment of a condition or succession. It is also confirmed within the scope of this wording that cases contesting the existence of the claim itself are not placed within the same frame.
The link connecting this wording to the conclusion of this section is as follows. Only the wording of the relevant source text is used as the ground for adjudicating the exclusion of unlawful or unjust enforcement and provisional suspension, and only the wording within the scope of the relevant source text is applied. It is not extended to the reasons for the judgment or to items not treated in this section. The reason the enforcement effect arising upon fulfillment of a condition must be distinguished from an objection to the claim itself is that the former targets the accuracy of the facts and the succession recognized by the enforcement clause, whereas the latter targets the very existence of the finalized claim. Even within the same form of an action for objection, the object contested diverges. This distinction touches upon the definition of an action for objection to the grant of an enforcement clause as a contest of the enforcement effect based on a condition or succession.
The counterargument that pushes this distinction most strongly is the overlapping of procedures. When the devices of objection are subdivided, the burden upon the right holder before urgent enforcement of choosing which door to enter grows. When an assertion of payment and a denial of succession overlap in a single case, documents and hearings multiply, and while enforcement is already proceeding the right holder may wander in search of a detour. Yet for this inconvenience, the denial of succession cannot be recast and described as the fact of payment of the debt. Because the grounds and objects of the two assertions differ, the procedural inconvenience remains as a condition for maintaining the distinction rather than blurring it. The direction of reducing the burden borne by the right holder is not a ground for broadening the scope of the wording.
Taking out from this scene only the facts relevant to this question and setting them side by side yields the following. B's assertion of payment targets the direction of extinction of the right rather than the claim itself, and C's ownership claim targets the attribution of the object rather than the object of enforcement. Placing these two facts alongside the wording concerning contests over a condition or succession, B's fact of payment cannot substitute for the denial of succession. Since the scene contains no year, amount, or time limit, whether the requirements demanded by the wording are fulfilled cannot be determined from this scene alone. Therefore, whether the exclusion of unlawful or unjust enforcement and provisional suspension arise remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits extends only to reading the wording of the relevant source text as a contest of the enforcement effect based on a condition or succession, and it does not permit broadening that wording to an objection to the claim itself or to a third party's ownership claim. A conclusion that goes beyond the scope of the wording is not adopted as the judgment of this section.
2.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
Taking up the premise received in the previous stage, that substantive objections to a finalized claim are raised in conformity with the subject matter and temporal requirements of an objection to the enforcement of a claim, this time the question is what part must again be divided and adjudicated within the exclusion of unlawful or unjust enforcement and provisional suspension. Although the two assertions placed before the same enforcement aim in different directions, if their treatment within the procedure is bundled into a single lump, the rights and conditions each assertion targets are missed. This section clarifies how far the detailed subdivisions can be divided within the stage of the exclusion of unlawful or unjust enforcement and provisional suspension.
The relevant source text for this question is Article 45 of the Civil Execution Act. Article 45, while dealing with an action for objection to the grant of an enforcement clause, provides that in the cases under Article 30, paragraph (2) and Article 31, where the debtor contests the enforcement effect of a judgment on the basis of facts proved in connection with the grant of an enforcement clause, or contests the enforcement effect of a judgment on the basis of a recognized succession, the provisions of Article 44 apply mutatis mutandis. Here it appears that the party indicated by the wording is the debtor, that the act is the filing of an action contesting the enforcement effect itself, and that the condition is that the contest concerns the enforcement effect of a judgment based on facts proved in connection with the grant of an enforcement clause or the enforcement effect of a judgment based on a recognized succession. The same Article adds, however, in its proviso, that the debtor's authority to file an objection to the grant of an enforcement clause under Article 34 is not affected.
The scope of this wording and the author's distinction are connected but not identical. An action for objection to the grant of an enforcement clause means a contest of the enforcement effect based on a condition or succession, and its object is the enforcement effect arising upon fulfillment of a condition or succession. By contrast, an objection to the claim itself—that is, the debtor's contesting the substance of the finalized claim on the ground of payment—is raised in conformity with the subject matter and temporal requirements of an objection to the enforcement of a claim, as under the premise received earlier. If the two distinctions are combined into one sentence, the point is lost that the denial of succession and the fact of payment are placed under different requirements and time limits. The detailed subdivision within a stage is limited to the conditions of the cases in which it operates, the cases in which it is blocked, and the cases that are undetermined, and no new stage is added to it.
The strongest counterargument targets the cumbersomeness of the procedure. When the grounds on both sides overlap, for Debtor B the assertion that the right has disappeared through payment and the assertion that the succession recognized by the enforcement clause differs from the facts are mixed within a single case. Before urgent enforcement, if the devices of objection are subdivided, the burden of choice grows—which action to file first, and which documents to submit to which bench—while in the meantime the loss of enforcement continuing arises. Even so, for the reason of resolving this inconvenience, the denial of succession cannot be recast and described as the fact of payment of the debt. While acknowledging the complexity the counterargument points out, one does not answer it in a manner that mixes and erases the rights and requirements each objection targets.
The facts in this scene that bear upon this question are that B's assertion is payment, that C's assertion is ownership of the object of attachment, and that enforcement continues. B's assertion of payment falls under a substantive objection to the claim itself and is properly governed by the subject matter and temporal requirements of an objection to the enforcement of a claim, and it is distinguished from an action contesting the denial of succession. C's ownership claim is the question of a third party who is not the debtor preventing the attachment of his own thing, and therefore differs in party from the debtor's contest of succession treated in this section. Whether B's assertion is payment or succession or a third-party object also cannot be identified from this scene alone and remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is that the detailed subdivision within a stage is limited to the stated conditions. Where an action for objection fitted to the contested right, condition, succession, or third-party right has been filed and the necessary ruling on suspension has been obtained, the effect of excluding unlawful or unjust enforcement and of provisional suspension can be expected. Conversely, where only an action for objection has been filed and there is no ground ruling for a stay of execution, no effect of stopping the present enforcement arises. Where it is not identified whether the contest concerns the claim itself, succession, or a third-party object, one cannot assert either side. Whether the mere filing of an action for objection extinguishes an enforcement already carried out is not treated here, and the manner in which a third-party owner prevents attachment is also outside the present question.
2.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
The discussion continues from the point summarized in the preceding section, that an action for objection to the grant of an enforcement clause means a contest of the enforcement effect based on a condition or succession and is distinguished from an objection to the claim itself. The assertions of the two persons knock on different doors, yet are both placed in the state where enforcement has not yet stopped. On this point, by what standard are the operation, the blockage, and the undetermined status of an action for objection and of provisional suspension divided? According to the records, the specified kinds are the objection complaint, materials on the extinction of rights or on ownership, the enforcement clause, and rulings on suspension or cancellation.
Here the party is the debtor, and the act is the filing of an action contesting the enforcement effect of a judgment based on facts proved in connection with the grant of an enforcement clause or the enforcement effect of a judgment based on a recognized succession. If the object contested is the enforcement effect arising from succession, it is placed in the position indicated by the wording of this Article. An assertion contesting the existence of the claim itself is not an object of this wording. This very distinction is the limited scope drawn by Article 45.
Connecting this wording with the conclusion of this section reveals that having filed an action and having stopped enforcement lie at different stages. Where an action for objection targeting the enforcement effect based on a condition or succession, such as a denial of succession, has been filed, and the necessary ruling on suspension has also been obtained, it operates in this judgment. Conversely, where only an action for objection has been filed and there is no ground ruling for a stay of execution, so that no effect of stopping the present enforcement has arisen, it is blocked. The mere fact that the same action was filed does not produce the effect of suspension; the establishment of the filing and the stay of enforcement are each items to be verified. If one is read in place of the other, which side was opened and which side was blocked becomes mixed.
The strongest counterargument is that when the grounds on both sides overlap the procedure becomes complicated. If, before urgent enforcement, the right holder must gauge whether it is an objection to the claim itself, an objection to a condition or succession, or an assertion regarding a third-party object, and must select the corresponding action and suspension device as well, the criticism follows that the subdivision of the devices of objection imposes an excessive burden of choice. This inconvenience is not erased. The fact that B's right was extinguished through payment and the contest that the succession recognized by the enforcement clause is wrong target different grounds, so the distinction established earlier is maintained.
Taking out from the synthetic scene only the facts bearing on this question: since B contests on the ground of payment, he stands in the position of targeting the extinction of the claim itself, and since C asserts that the object of attachment is his own property, he stands in the position of targeting the attribution of a third-party object. Which of the two assertions precisely fits the action for objection of this section, and whether each has obtained the necessary ruling on suspension, is not determined from this scene alone. Since the mere fact that enforcement continues does not permit a definite conclusion as to the nature of the action or the presence or absence of an application for stay, that part remains undetermined. However, if only a decision to suspend proceedings is confirmed, it restores the state marked as cancellation of the existing attachment.
The conclusion this section permits is that an action for objection contesting the enforcement effect based on a condition or succession and an objection to the claim itself are distinguished; that where the former has been filed and the necessary ruling on suspension has been obtained, the exclusion of enforcement operates; and that where the action has been filed without a ground ruling for suspension, no effect of stopping the present enforcement arises. If one reads the effect of suspension out of the mere fact that an action for objection was filed, one crosses this boundary, and recasting the denial of succession as the fact of payment of the debt also collapses this distinction. Where it is not identified whether the contest concerns the claim itself, succession, or a third-party object, it must be left undetermined.
2.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
Where the succession recognized by the execution clause is wrong, what is contested? It must be distinguished from the defense that the debt has already been extinguished by payment.
Article 45 of the Civil Execution Act treats two cases together. Its text provides: "In the cases of Article 30 (2) and Article 31, where the debtor disputes the enforceability of the judgment based on a fact proven in connection with the grant of an execution clause, or disputes the enforceability of the judgment based on an accepted succession, the provisions of Article 44 shall apply mutatis mutandis." The actor indicated by this sentence is the debtor, the act is disputing the enforceability that arose on the basis of a proven fact or an accepted succession, and the condition is the situation of Article 30 (2) or Article 31.
An action brought under this Article is called an action for objection to the grant of an execution clause, and it means a contest over enforceability grounded in a condition or succession. The reason for separating such an action for objection from an objection to the claim itself lies in the different targets of the contest. One aims at the ground on which the enforceability arose; the other aims at whether the claim itself was extinguished after the judgment was pronounced, by a cause such as payment. If this distinction is erased, debtor B's assertion of payment and the assertion that the execution clause is wrong are mixed together in the same target.
When the means of objection are subdivided in this way, the point emerges that they impose an excessive burden of choice on the right holder in the face of imminent execution. Owner C, who is not the debtor, claims that the attached object is his own; the execution in progress continues, and it is unknown before which door he must stand. Article 45, however, provides only that "even in such a case, the debtor's authority to apply for an objection to the grant of an execution clause under Article 34 shall not be affected," thereby leaving both paths open.
The judgment in this section goes no further than a conditional distinction. The author adopts the stages of exclusion of unlawful or unjust execution and provisional stay; what reaches the present context is the case where the party has filed the action for objection suited to the character of the right contested and has also obtained the necessary stay disposition. If only an action for objection is filed without any disposition serving as the ground for a stay of execution, there is no basis for viewing the execution in progress as having stopped. This section has only determined the categories of an objection complaint, extinction of the right or ownership documents, the execution clause, and stay or revocation dispositions; it has not fixed the actual records or the results of service.
Where this section arrives is settled. A contest over the proposition that the succession recognized by the execution clause is wrong is not transferred into an objection to the claim itself, but is left as a contest over enforceability arising from fulfillment of a condition or succession. Beyond this, this section does not determine what the fact that debtor B has paid stops, nor what becomes of execution already carried out if execution is stopped.