Summary
The path to an application for inquiry opens where a statutory ground linked to property disclosure exists.
3.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
알고 싶다는 필요가 모든 재산정보에 즉시 접근할 권한은 아니다. 앞 절에서 불출석·제출 거부·선서 거부의 제재는 정당한 사유와 법정 절차를 따르며 무자력의 증명과 같지 않다는 구별을 받았다. 앞에서 확인한 구별은 여전히 흔들리지 않는다. 채권자 A는 돈을 지급하라는 권원을 갖고 있지만 채무자 B의 집행 가능한 재산을 알지 못한다. 이런 사정에서도 A가 B의 모든 재산을 원한다고 해서 곧바로 열람하거나 뽑아 볼 수 있는지가 문제이다. 그렇다면 이 구제의 통로가 열리는 기준은 무엇인가?
민사집행법 제74조는 조회의 문턱을 법정 사유에 묶는다. 제74조 제1항의 문언에 따르면 “재산명시절차의 관할 법원은 다음 각호의 어느 하나에 해당하는 경우에는 그 재산명시를 신청한 채권자의 신청에 따라 개인의 재산 및 신용에 관한 전산망을 관리하는 공공기관·금융기관·단체 등에 채무자명의의 재산에 관하여 조회할 수 있다.” 여기서 말하는 주체는 재산명시절차의 관할 법원이고, 행위는 채권자의 신청에 따른 조회이며, 대상은 공공기관·금융기관·단체 등이 관리하는 채무자명의의 재산 정보이다. 이 문언에 열거된 다음 각호의 어느 하나에 해당하는 사유는 조회 신청이 들어간 조건이다.
이 문언과 이 절의 결론은 같은 방향을 가리킨다. 법원이 조회할 수 있다고 정한 것은 신청권자와 법정 사유가 함께 성립하는 경우이지, 권원을 손에 쥔 사실 하나로 열리는 문이 아니다. 그래서 이번 판단은 두 단계를 나누어 본다. 조회 사유·대상 기관을 특정하여 신청할 수 있을 때 정보 절차의 문이 뒤따른다. 여기서 재산조회 사유는 명시절차의 한계 등 법이 정한 정보 조회 조건을 뜻한다. 뒤의 사유 없이 앞의 권원만으로는 이 구제의 입구가 열리지 않는다.
가장 강한 반론은 단계적 요건이 은닉할 시간을 줄 수 있다는 걱정에서 나온다. 채무자의 정보 보호가 재산 은닉을 돕고 채권자에게 탐색 비용을 전가할 수 있다는 비판이 그 모습이다. 채권자가 이미 권원을 확정했고 채무자가 재산을 감출 여지가 보이는 데도 조회의 사유를 따로 확인하라는 요구는, 그 기간 동안의 손실과 답답함을 채권자에게 남긴다. 그렇다고 하여 결론이 바뀌지는 않는다. 집행권원 보유만으로 조회의 추가 요건을 생략할 수는 없다. 법이 정한 사유와 대상 기관의 특정을 묻는 까닭은 조회의 범위와 근거를 통제하려는 데 있으며, 반론이 지적한 불리함을 감추더라도 그 요구를 빼는 근거는 되지 못한다.
합성 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 사실은 A가 돈을 지급하라는 권원을 가지고 있고 B의 집행 가능한 재산을 모른다는 것에 그친다. 이 사실만으로는 집행권원의 종류와 그에 따른 재산명시 경과, 재산목록, 조회 사유, 대상 기관과 회신이 어떤 상태인지 밝혀지지 않는다. 앞의 조건과 대조하면 권원의 존재만으로 조회의 추가 요건이 채워졌다고 볼 수 없고, 조회 사유·대상 기관의 특정 여부도 이 장면으로는 확인되지 않는다. 그 밖의 회신 범위와 조회 대상 누락 여부는 미확정으로 남는다. 가집행만 있는 상태에서 명시 가능한 확정 권원으로 바뀌면 정보 절차의 문턱을 다시 판단한다. 다만 장면에는 연도·금액·기산일이 정해져 있지 않으므로 어느 금액이 부족한지, 어떤 기관을 빠뜨렸는지는 이 장면으로 확정할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 재산명시를 신청할 수 있는 금전 권원과 개시 요건을 갖추고 조회 사유·대상 기관을 특정한 경우 이 구제의 입구가 열린다. 반대로 집행권원 보유 그 자체를 조회 신청의 충분한 조건으로 삼거나, 법정 사유 없이 모든 기관에 대한 조회를 요구하는 것은 이 절이 허락하지 않는다. 정보 절차의 문이 열렸다는 것은 회신을 받거나 재산을 회수했다는 뜻이 아니라, 그 법정 통로를 밟아 들어갈 수 있다는 데 그친다.
3.2The Conditions That Block Relief
앞 절에서는 재산명시를 신청할 수 있는 금전 권원과 개시 요건을 갖추고 조회 사유·대상 기관을 특정한 경우에는 이 구제가 작동한다는 절차의 열린 쪽을 확인했다. 그렇다면 같은 통로가 닫히는 쪽은 무엇인가. 채권자가 원하면 모든 재산을 바로 조회할 수 있는가? 아니면 조회의 문턱은 그 앞에 놓인 절차와 법정 사유를 따로 요구하는가. 지금 확인할 것은 이 절차의 접근 권한을 제한하는 조건이다.
이 물음에 답하는 문언은 민사집행법 제74조 제1항이다. 이 항은 재산명시절차의 관할 법원이 "다음 각호의 어느 하나에 해당하는 경우에는" 채권자의 신청에 따라 공공기관·금융기관·단체 등에 채무자명의의 재산을 조회할 수 있다고 정한다. 여기서 조회의 주체는 법원이고, 행위는 채권자의 신청을 받은 조회이며, 조건은 각 호의 사유 가운데 하나가 충족된 경우로 한정된다. 각 호의 사유는 재산명시절차의 경과와 연결된 것으로서, 앞 단계의 명시 절차 없이 조회로 바로 넘어가는 경로는 이 항의 문언에 열려 있지 않다.
이 문언과 이 절의 결론이 만나는 지점은 바로 이 조건의 양쪽이다. 한쪽으로는 재산명시를 신청할 수 있는 금전 권원과 개시 요건이 있어야 하고, 다른 쪽으로는 조회의 사유와 대상 기관이 특정되어야 한다. 두 요건은 같은 단계의 같은 검사가 아니라 서로 다른 문턱이다. 앞의 요건이 명시 절차를 열 수 있는지를 가르고, 뒤의 요건이 그 절차 안에서 정보를 꺼낼 수 있는지를 가르기 때문이다. 이 둘을 하나로 합치면, 재산명시에서 제외되는 가집행 권원만 있거나 조회의 추가 법정 사유가 없어 해당 정보 절차를 사용할 수 없는 경우에는 이 구제가 막힌다는 구별이 사라진다.
단계적 요건이 은닉할 시간을 줄 수 있다는 비판은 이 구별이 채권자에게 가하는 손실을 겨눈다. 채무자의 정보를 보호하느라 채권자가 탐색 비용을 떠안고, 그 사이에 재산이 옮겨질 수 있다는 것이다. 그래서 집행권원을 이미 확보한 채권자에게까지 명시 절차와 조회 사유라는 추가 관문을 요구하는 것은 과한 제한이라는 반론이 나온다. 반론이 지적한 탐색 비용은 그대로 인정하되, 조회 신청의 통로는 재산명시와 연결된 법정 사유가 있는 경우에만 열린다는 조건은 유지된다.
합성 장면에서 이 물음과 관련된 사실은 한정되어 있다. A가 확정 권원인지 가집행 선고만 있는 권원인지는 장면에 특정되어 있지 않으므로, 재산명시 신청 가능 여부도 이 장면만으로는 정해지지 않는다. 명시 절차의 경과나 재산목록의 제출 여부, 조회 사유의 구체적 내용과 대상 기관·회신 범위 역시 자료가 없다. 기록으로 남겨야 할 항목은 집행권원 종류·재산명시 경과·재산목록·조회 사유·대상 기관과 회신이며, 이 가운데 확인되지 않은 것은 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 재산명시에서 제외되는 가집행 권원만 있거나 조회의 추가 법정 사유가 없어 해당 정보 절차를 사용할 수 없는 경우에는 이 구제가 막힌다. 반대로 집행권원만 제시했다는 사정 하나로 조회의 문턱이 사라진다고 보는 것은 이 절이 허용하지 않는 결론이다. 다만 회신의 범위와 조회 대상의 누락 여부를 확인할 수 없으면 판정은 미확정에 머무르며, 이는 곧바로 구제 불능을 뜻하지 않는다.
3.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
이전 단계에서는 불출석이나 제출 거부, 선서 거부에 따른 제재가 정당한 사유와 법정 절차를 따르며 무자력의 증명과 같지 않다고 보았다. 이 장면에서 채권자는 B의 재산을 곧바로 알고 싶어 한다. 그러나 그 필요만으로 모든 재산정보에 접근할 권한이 생기는 것은 아니다. 지금의 물음은 채권자가 원하면 모든 재산을 바로 조회할 수 있는가이며, 자료가 없어 확정할 수 없는 경계는 어디인가이다.
이 물음에 답하는 원문은 민사집행법 제74조 제1항이다. 그 문언은 재산명시절차의 관할 법원이 각호의 어느 하나에 해당하는 경우에, 그 재산명시를 신청한 채권자의 신청에 따라 개인의 재산 및 신용에 관한 전산망을 관리하는 공공기관·금융기관·단체 등에 채무자명의의 재산에 관하여 조회할 수 있다고 정한다(민사집행법 제74조). 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 재산명시절차의 관할 법원이며, 행위는 채무자명의의 재산에 관한 조회이고, 조건은 각호의 사유 중 하나와 채권자의 신청이다. 각호의 사유는 주소보정명령 이행 불능, 제출 재산목록의 부족, 제68조상 사유의 존재로 나뉜다.
이 문언과 이 절의 결론을 이으면, 조회는 채권자의 요구만으로 열리지 않고 재산명시와 연결된 법정 사유가 있는 경우에 신청의 통로가 열린다는 점이 분명해진다. 이 정의는 조회의 문턱을 이루는 조건을 가리키며, 채권자가 원한다는 심리적 필요와 구별된다. 나아가 회신 범위와 조회 대상 누락 여부를 알 수 없는 경우는, 판단할 재료가 아예 특정되지 않은 상태이다. 그 상태는 조회가 법적으로 불가능하다는 불능과 같은 것이 아니다. 재료가 특정되지 않은 사항은 불능과 구별해 미확정으로 남겨야 한다.
단계적 요건이 은닉할 시간을 줄 수 있다는 반론은 실질적인 손실을 겨냥한다. 채무자의 정보 보호가 재산 은닉을 돕고 채권자에게 탐색 비용을 전가할 수 있다는 점에서, 채권자는 권리가 있으면서도 정보를 얻지 못하는 불편을 감수하게 된다. 그러나 그렇더라도 집행권원 보유만으로 조회의 추가 요건을 생략할 수는 없다. 조문이 신청과 각호의 사유를 요구하는 이상, 집행권원만으로 그 요건을 건너뛸 수는 없다. 반론이 지적한 은닉의 틈은 남지만, 그렇다고 요건이 사라지는 것은 아니다.
이 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 사실은 채권자 A가 금전의 지급을 구하는 권원을 가졌다는 것과, 채무자 B의 집행 가능한 재산을 알지 못한다는 것뿐이다. 이 사실을 조문의 조건과 대조하면, 재산명시 절차가 어떠한 경과를 밟았는지, 재산목록이 어떻게 제출되었는지, 조회 사유와 대상 기관이 특정되었는지는 장면에 없다. 회신이 어떤 범위로 왔는지, 조회 대상에서 누락된 기관이 있는지도 알 수 없다. 그러므로 회신 범위와 조회 대상 누락 여부를 알 수 없는 이 부분은 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 재산명시와 연결된 법정 사유가 있는 경우에 조회 신청의 통로가 열린다는 것이고, 회신 범위와 조회 대상 누락 여부가 특정되지 않은 사항은 불능이 아니라 미확정으로 남긴다는 것이다. 이 절이 허용하지 않는 것은, 집행권원 보유만으로 조회의 추가 요건을 생략하거나, 조회의 통로가 열렸다는 사실만으로 모든 기관의 자료가 회수되었으리라 단정하는 것이다. 판단 기록으로 삼을 항목은 집행권원 종류·재산명시 경과·재산목록·조회 사유·대상 기관과 회신이다.
3.4The Records Needed for Determination
불출석·제출 거부·선서 거부의 제재는 정당한 사유와 법정 절차를 따르며 무자력의 증명과 같지 않다. 채권자가 원하면 모든 재산을 바로 조회할 수 있는가, 그리고 그 단계를 판단하려면 어떤 기록이 필요한가.
해당 문제에 답하기 위해 해당 문언을 먼저 살핀다. 민사집행법 제74조는 “①재산명시절차의 관할 법원은 다음 각호의 어느 하나에 해당하는 경우에는 그 재산명시를 신청한 채권자의 신청에 따라 개인의 재산 및 신용에 관한 전산망을 관리하는 공공기관·금융기관·단체 등에 채무자명의의 재산에 관하여 조회할 수 있다”고 정한다. 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 재산명시절차의 관할 법원이며, 행위는 채무자명의의 재산에 대한 조회이고, 조건은 신청과 각호 사유의 충족이다. 조문의 다른 항이나 다른 요건까지 여기서 해설하지 않는다.
위 문언에 따르면 조회의 통로는 재산명시와 연결된 법정 사유가 있는 경우에 열린다. 소유권과 분리된 이 개념은 왜 구별되어야 하는가. 집행권원을 보유한 상태와, 그 권원을 바탕으로 법이 정한 조회 조건이 충족된 상태는 서로 다른 단계에 있다. 전자만으로는 후자를 판단할 수 없으므로, 집행권원 종류·재산명시 경과·재산목록·조회 사유·대상 기관과 회신에 기록된 자료만으로 단계를 판정한다. 없는 기록을 추정으로 메우지 않는다.
가장 강한 반론은 단계적 요건이 채무자에게 은닉할 시간을 줄 수 있다는 점이다. 채무자의 정보 보호가 재산 은닉을 돕고, 채권자에게 탐색 비용을 전가할 수 있다는 비판은 사라지지 않는다. 그러나 이 손실과 불편에도 불구하고 앞의 답은 유지된다. 반론이 지적한 정보 보호와 은닉의 긴장은 제거된 것이 아니라, 그 긴장 위에서 법이 정한 조건을 따르는 방식으로 다루어질 뿐이다.
이 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 제한적이다. 채권자 A는 금전 지급 권원을 갖고 있고, 채무자 B의 집행 가능한 재산은 아직 알려지지 않았다. 이 사실만으로 조회 사유나 대상 기관이 특정되었다고 볼 수 없다. 장면만으로 회신의 범위나 조회 대상의 누락 여부는 판정할 수 없으므로, 해당 항목은 미확정으로 남는다.
그러므로 허용되는 결론은 정해진 기록으로만 단계를 판정하고, 없는 기록은 추정으로 메우지 않는다는 범위에 머문다. 조회 신청의 통로가 열렸다는 법적 상태를 곧바로 회수의 성과로 바꾸어서는 안 된다. 자료가 부족한 상태는 미확정이며, 그 자체로 조회가 영구히 불가능하다는 뜻은 아니다.
3.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
Carrying forward the conclusion that the sanctions for nonappearance, refusal to submit, and refusal to take an oath follow just cause and statutory procedure and are not the same as proof of inability to pay, it stays with the question whether, whenever the creditor wishes, all property can be inquired into immediately. Adding to this what change would overturn the preceding determination, it examines whether, if it is confirmed that the situation has changed from one in which only provisional execution is available to a final enforceable title for which disclosure is possible, the threshold of the information procedure is to be assessed anew.
Civil Execution Act Article 74(1) provides that the court having jurisdiction over the property disclosure procedure may, in any of the following cases, upon application of the creditor who applied for that property disclosure, make inquiries with public institutions, financial institutions, associations, etc. that manage computerized networks concerning an individual's property and credit as to property in the name of the debtor. The confirmed text is as follows. "① Where any of the following cases applies, the court having jurisdiction over the property disclosure procedure may, upon application of the creditor who applied for that property disclosure, make inquiries with public institutions, financial institutions, associations, etc. that manage computerized networks concerning an individual's property and credit as to property in the name of the debtor. <Amended January 27, 2005> 1. Where, in the property disclosure procedure, the creditor received an order to correct the address under Article 62(6) but was unable to comply with it for a reason under Article 194(1) of the Civil Procedure Act 2. Where, in the property disclosure procedure, the property in the property list submitted by the debtor is insufficient to obtain satisfaction of the enforcement claim 3. Where, in the property disclosure procedure, there is a ground under each subparagraph of Article 68(1) or a ground under paragraph (9) of the same Article" (Civil Execution Act Article 74). In terms of its wording, the subject of the inquiry is the court having jurisdiction; the act is an inquiry directed to public institutions, financial institutions, and the like; and the condition is one of the grounds set out in the subparagraphs, connected with the property disclosure procedure.
The key that links this wording with the conclusion of this section is the point at which the channel for an inquiry application opens. The channel for an inquiry application opens where there is a statutory ground connected with the property disclosure, and here a ground for property inquiry means the conditions for information inquiry prescribed by law, such as the limits of the disclosure procedure. Accordingly, the need to know and the statutory ground permitting inquiry are separate stages of judgment. If it is confirmed that the situation has changed from one in which only provisional execution is available to a final enforceable title for which disclosure is possible, the threshold of the information procedure is assessed anew, and the preceding determination is reconsidered.
The counterargument that the staged requirements may give time to conceal is aimed at the loss that protecting the debtor's information may assist the concealment of property and shift the cost of search onto the creditor. Even if this inconvenience is not erased, the mere holding of an enforceable title cannot dispense with the additional requirements for inquiry. The grounds for inquiry set out in the confirmed wording are joined to the property disclosure procedure, and the use of an information procedure without a ground is not opened by the title alone. This answer preserves the statutory conditions of the inquiry channel and, if it is confirmed that the situation has changed from one in which only provisional execution is available to a final enforceable title for which disclosure is possible, reassesses the threshold of the information procedure.
The fact confirmed in the synthetic scene is only that Creditor A holds a monetary enforceable title and does not know what executable property Debtor B has. On this scene alone, the type of the enforceable title, the course of the property disclosure, whether a property list has been submitted, the specification of a ground for inquiry, the target institutions, and the scope of replies are not determined. If it is confirmed that the situation has changed from one in which only provisional execution is available to a final enforceable title for which disclosure is possible, the threshold of the information procedure is assessed anew, but whether that change is confirmed and whether a ground for inquiry is satisfied are not settled by the scene. Accordingly, the discarding of the existing blocking and effectiveness determination and the re-adjudication remain a conditional judgment to be made when the specified change is confirmed, and the scope of replies and whether any target is omitted are undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is this: when a statutory ground for inquiry is confirmed, the threshold of the information procedure is reassessed; and when the specified change is confirmed, the existing blocking and effectiveness determination is discarded and the stages are judged afresh from the beginning. The conclusions it does not permit are that the mere holding of an enforceable title dispenses with the additional requirements for inquiry, or that the mere need to know gives rise to a right of immediate access to all property information.
3.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
The need to know all property does not immediately become a right of access to all property information. In this scene, the mere fact that A wishes to obtain information does not lower the threshold for inquiry. On the premise that the sanctions for nonappearance, refusal to submit, and refusal to take an oath follow just cause and statutory procedure and are not the same as proof of inability to pay, the question is how to answer the strongest counterargument, even if the staged requirements may give time to conceal. Here, staged requirements means a structure in which the statutory conditions to be passed through before inquiry are laid out in sequence.
To answer this question, the relevant wording is set out first. Civil Execution Act Article 74 provides that "where any of the following cases applies, the court having jurisdiction over the property disclosure procedure may, upon application of the creditor who applied for that property disclosure, make inquiries with public institutions, financial institutions, associations, etc. that manage computerized networks concerning an individual's property and credit as to property in the name of the debtor" (Civil Execution Act Article 74). The subject indicated by this wording is the court having jurisdiction over the property disclosure procedure; the act is an inquiry as to property in the name of the debtor; and the conditions are that one of the following subparagraphs applies and that the creditor applies. The grounds in the subparagraphs are limited to the case where an order to correct the address was received but could not be complied with, the case where the property in the property list submitted is insufficient to obtain satisfaction of the enforcement claim, and the case where there is a ground under each subparagraph of Article 68(1) or a ground under paragraph (9) of the same Article (Civil Execution Act Article 74).
Linking this wording with the earlier conclusion, the channel for inquiry does not open by the mere holding of an enforceable title; it opens where there is a statutory ground connected with the property disclosure. The reason these two stages must be distinguished is that, whereas the first stage is the question whether an enforceable title exists, the second stage is the question what statutory conditions must be satisfied upon that title before the information procedure can be used. Holding an enforceable title means only that the first stage has been passed; it does not substitute for the requirements of the second stage. Accordingly, the conclusion that the mere holding of an enforceable title cannot dispense with the additional requirements for inquiry stands unchanged. Which ground falls within the subparagraphs is a matter to be judged in light of the confirmed records, and this paragraph does not create any new requirement.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the loss that occurs in the meantime: the criticism that, in seeking to protect the debtor's information, the law assists the concealment of property and may shift the cost of search onto the creditor. If, while the staged requirements are being satisfied one by one, Debtor B moves or conceals property, then A, though holding that title, ends up missing the very target of recovery. That inconvenience must not be erased. Yet this criticism does not lead to the conclusion that the conditions for information inquiry prescribed by law can themselves be replaced by the mere holding of a title. The mere holding of a title cannot dispense with the additional requirements for inquiry; the burden of time and cost pointed out by the counterargument remains, but that burden does not eliminate the existence of the conditions prescribed by law.
Returning to the facts set in the synthetic scene, A holds a title to demand payment of money and does not know what executable property B has. This fact alone does not determine which among the type of enforceable title, the course of the property disclosure, the property list, the ground for inquiry, and the target institutions and replies has been settled. Whether it is a final enforceable title for which disclosure is possible, whether a property list has been submitted and the property therein is insufficient for satisfaction, and with which institution the inquiry application was filed are not stated by the scene. While these items remain unconfirmed, it cannot be asserted that the channel for the inquiry application has already opened.
Dividing the conclusions this section permits from those it does not, the permitted conclusion is that the mere fact of holding an enforceable title cannot dispense with the additional requirements for inquiry, while the impermissible conclusion is that the mere holding of a title allows property information of any institution to be demanded. Conversely, the creditor's very need for access to information is not denied on the ground that the threshold for inquiry is high. What records should remain are the type of enforceable title, the course of the property disclosure, the property list, the ground for inquiry, and the target institutions and replies.
3.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
In such a scene, the demand to obtain information is strong, but whether it immediately becomes the basis for inquiry is a separate question. As already confirmed in the preceding section, the mere holding of an enforceable title cannot dispense with the additional requirements for inquiry. The remaining question, then, may be framed as follows.
To answer this question, the wording of the inquiry procedure must first be examined. Here the subject of the inquiry is the court having jurisdiction; the applicant is the creditor who applied for that property disclosure; and the object of the inquiry is information on property in the name of the debtor. The act is an inquiry directed to public institutions, financial institutions, associations, etc. that manage computerized networks, and it is bound by the condition that one of the grounds in the subparagraphs applies.
What is confirmed from the structure of the provision is that an inquiry is an act performed by the court upon a separate application. The subject of the application is already limited to the creditor who has applied for the property disclosure, and the court may make inquiries only where a ground in the subparagraphs is recognized. That is to say, an inquiry is an additional stage opened when the conditions prescribed by law are met within the disclosure procedure, and not a channel opened merely because the creditor wants information. This distinction is precisely what connects to the conclusion of this question. The channel for an inquiry application opens where there is a statutory ground connected with the property disclosure; all property cannot be inquired into immediately whenever the creditor so wishes.
Such staged requirements entail real costs. While the grounds for inquiry are assembled one by one and the application made, the debtor may gain time to move property elsewhere, and the creditor must bear the labor of searching for that information. The criticism that the device protecting the debtor's information instead assists the concealment of property and shifts the cost of search onto the creditor is aimed precisely at this point. As already confirmed in the preceding section, the division of stages is a device that clarifies under what conditions an inquiry opens, and if those conditions are dispensed with, the very basis of the inquiry itself can no longer be explained.
The discussion returns to this scene. Creditor A holds a title seeking payment, but on this scene the type of title is not further specified. Whether it is a monetary enforceable title for which a property disclosure can be applied for, whether the property disclosure procedure has already proceeded and a property list has been submitted, and whether the ground for inquiry and the target institutions have been specified cannot be confirmed from this scene alone. Accordingly, whether Debtor B's property can be inquired into remains undetermined. The standard of judgment, however, is clear in case one condition is changed.
The conclusion this section permits is limited as follows. The channel for an inquiry application opens where there is a statutory ground connected with the property disclosure; it does not mean that all property information the creditor desires is provided at once. The impermissible conclusion is the judgment that the existence of an enforceable title alone allows one to go beyond the additional requirements. That the legal channel of access to information has opened and that a reply has actually been received and property secured are different matters, and the latter is not dealt with in this section.
3.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
In this scene, because the creditor does not know where the property is located, the creditor comes to wish to inspect at once all information in the name of the debtor accumulated at every institution. What the basis of the necessary authority is constitutes the question of this section.
Civil Execution Act Article 74 sets out the conditions that open the door to inquiry as follows. "Where any of the following cases applies, the court having jurisdiction over the property disclosure procedure may, upon application of the creditor who applied for that property disclosure, make inquiries with public institutions, financial institutions, associations, etc. that manage computerized networks concerning an individual's property and credit as to property in the name of the debtor." Here, the subject that may make the inquiry is the court having jurisdiction over the property disclosure procedure; the subject of the application is the creditor who applied for that property disclosure; and the object is the computerized networks managed by public institutions, financial institutions, associations, and the like. This application can be filed only if it falls under one of the grounds in the subparagraphs.
One of those grounds is the case where, in the property disclosure procedure, the property in the property list submitted by the debtor is insufficient to obtain satisfaction of the enforcement claim. This phrase means that the inquiry does not open automatically merely because the list has been submitted; a judgment that the property in the list is insufficient for satisfaction of the claim must precede it. The same provision places, in another subparagraph, inability to comply with an order to correct the address and a ground under each subparagraph of Article 68(1) or paragraph (9) of the same Article together. This is why the law has bound the threshold for information inquiry to circumstances confirmed within the procedure. Thus the inquiry functions as the statutory channel for accessing property information for the purpose of execution, but that channel opens only after eligibility to apply for property disclosure and the requirements for commencement are met and the ground for inquiry and the target institutions are specified.
Such staged requirements may give time to conceal. If property is moved while the debtor is given leeway to organize and supplement the list, the creditor must bear the search costs all over again. Here lies the inconvenience that the value of information protection may, in substance, produce the result of assisting the concealment of property. The fact that the creditor holds an enforceable title does not itself take the place of a ground for inquiry, and a ground for inquiry must be separately confirmed as a condition for information inquiry prescribed by law, such as the limits of the disclosure procedure.
Placing the synthetic scene against these conditions makes clear the facts that must be separated. Only the circumstances that A holds a title to demand payment of money and does not know what executable property B has are confirmed. Yet on this scene there is no setting of the course in which the application for property disclosure was received, whether a property list has been submitted, the judgment that the property in the submitted list is insufficient for satisfaction of the enforcement claim, the specification of a ground for inquiry, the institutions targeted for inquiry, or the replies. Accordingly, whether A can use this channel right now cannot be settled from this scene alone. The fact that unconfirmed items remain does not mean that the channel is closed forever, and the records needed for adjudication are the type of enforceable title, the course of the property disclosure, the property list, the ground for inquiry, and the target institutions and replies.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Not all property information is opened up immediately because the creditor so wishes; the channel for an inquiry application opens only where there is a statutory ground connected with the property disclosure. The conclusions this section does not permit lie outside that. To read it as allowing the additional requirements to be skipped by the enforceable title alone, or to read the inquiry application as immediately meaning actual recovery results, are matters outside this judgment.
3.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
In this scene, the creditor holds an enforcement title but knows nothing at all about where any property is or what it consists of, and thus proceeds to a procedure for gathering information. The starting point confirmed earlier is that, where a statutory ground connected to the property statement procedure exists, the channel of an inquiry application opens. This question is a matter of setting the threshold of the statutory channel of access to information, going beyond the question of ownership.
The relevant provision is Article 74 (1) of the Civil Execution Act. The text of this paragraph provides that, where the court with jurisdiction over the property statement procedure has been determined, the court may, upon application by the creditor who filed for the property statement, inquire of public institutions, financial institutions, associations, and the like as to property held in the debtor's name. Here the actor is the court with jurisdiction, the act is an inquiry into property held in the debtor's name, and the applicant is the creditor who filed for the property statement. The grounds for inquiry are specified as three: cases in which the person received an order to correct address but was unable to comply with it for a statutory reason, cases in which the property in the submitted list of property is insufficient to obtain satisfaction of the enforcement claim, and cases in which a ground under the subparagraphs of Article 68 (1) or paragraph (9) of the same Article exists.
The point at which this text meets the conclusion of the preceding section is the relation between statutory grounds and the channel. The creditor's mere desire to conduct an inquiry does not satisfy this condition; the channel of an inquiry application opens only where one of the grounds prescribed in the provision applies. Two determinations must therefore be distinguished. One is whether an enforcement title exists; the other is whether a statutory ground for an inquiry into information exists. Possession of the former cannot substitute for the latter, and each is confirmed under its own conditions. This distinction means that only the presence or absence of a ground is taken as the basis of determination, while the questions of up to which institutions and to what extent an inquiry must be made are left as matters outside the text of this paragraph.
The strongest counterargument targets the point that the staged requirements may afford time to conceal property. Even after the creditor obtains the title, while the creditor confirms the satisfaction of the grounds for inquiry and makes the application, if the debtor moves the property, the device for information protection ends up assisting concealment and shifting the cost of search onto the creditor. The disadvantages of time and cost pointed out by the counterargument remain as they are, but those disadvantages alone furnish no ground for disregarding the grounds prescribed in the provision. Rather, this distinction is the choice to hold the point set by law between the creditor's need and the debtor's protection of information.
The facts that can be confirmed in the synthetic scene are only the existence of the title and the absence of property information. Creditor A holds a monetary payment title and does not know the executable property of debtor B. However, in this scene it is not determined what specific kind of title is held, how the property statement has proceeded, whether a list of property has been submitted, whether a ground for inquiry applies, which institutions are the targets of inquiry, or what the replies contain. Therefore, on the basis of this scene alone it can be asserted neither that the grounds prescribed in Article 74 (1) have been satisfied nor that they have not been satisfied. The unverified portions are left unverified.
The conclusion permitted by this section is clear. Only the text of the relevant provision is used as the basis for determining the statutory channel of access to property information. Here, 'effectiveness' means a stage in the statutory channel of access to property information, and it operates where the creditor holds a monetary title enabling a filing for the property statement, satisfies the initiation requirements, and specifies the grounds for inquiry and the target institutions. It is blocked where the creditor holds only a provisional execution title, or where the additional statutory grounds for inquiry are absent so that the relevant information procedure cannot be used. An expansive interpretation that omits the additional requirements for inquiry merely upon holding an enforcement title is not permitted by this section.
3.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
As to this question, the creditor's need to obtain information cannot by itself cross the threshold of the statutory channel. The preceding section passed on leaving only the point that access to information is not immediately permitted. What remains now is to subdivide again the parts to be determined within such a channel.
The channel prescribed by law is drawn in these specific terms. Article 74 (1) of the Civil Execution Act provides that "the court with jurisdiction over the property statement procedure may, where any of the following subparagraphs applies, upon application by the creditor who filed for the property statement, inquire of public institutions, financial institutions, associations, and the like that manage computerized networks concerning an individual's property and credit as to property held in the debtor's name." This text specifies the actor of the inquiry as the court with jurisdiction over the property statement procedure, the act as an inquiry made upon the creditor's application, and the condition as falling within one of the subparagraphs. Here the grounds for inquiry mean the statutory conditions for inquiry into information, such as the limits of the statement procedure.
This text distinguishes an inquiry that opens by application alone from the channel set by statutory grounds. Where grounds are furnished, the door to an inquiry application opens, and the requirements of those grounds are limited by the preceding provision to the subparagraphs. The kind of enforcement title held by the creditor, the course of the property statement, and the submitted list of property become the materials that determine whether a ground for inquiry applies. Accordingly, the detailed distinctions within the stage are limited to cases where it operates, cases where it is blocked, and cases where it is undetermined, and no new stages are added beyond these. This distinction arises from the fact that the provision separates the requirements for inquiry into application and grounds.
The counterargument is that the time consumed in linking up an inquiry may give the debtor room to conceal property. It cannot be denied that the staged requirements raise the creditor's cost of search and that meanwhile the property may be moved elsewhere. The loss that information protection may in substance operate to the debtor's advantage also remains. So long as the provision requires both application and grounds, the concern of concealment cannot serve as a ground for abolishing those requirements.
In the synthetic scene, creditor A holds a title ordering the payment of money and does not know the executable property of debtor B. On the basis of this fact alone, it cannot be asserted that the door to inquiry has opened. The case where it operates is where the creditor holds a monetary title, satisfies the initiation requirements, and specifies the grounds for inquiry and the target institutions; the case where it is blocked is where the creditor holds only a provisional execution title, or where the additional statutory grounds for inquiry are absent so that the relevant information procedure cannot be used. The contents of records absent from this scene cannot serve as a basis for determination.
What is permitted in this section is to determine the threshold of the channel by dividing it into the above three conditions; what is not permitted is to skip the requirements for inquiry merely upon holding an enforcement title.
3.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
The preceding section, taking the grounds for a property inquiry to mean statutory conditions for inquiry into information such as the limits of the statement procedure, held that where a statutory ground connected to the property statement exists, the channel of an inquiry application opens. Receiving this conclusion, the question that follows is where the operation, blockage, and undetermined state of that channel diverge.
Article 74 (1) of the Civil Execution Act enumerates the specific initiation conditions for an inquiry. "(1) The court with jurisdiction over the property statement procedure may, where any of the following subparagraphs applies, upon application by the creditor who filed for the property statement, inquire of public institutions, financial institutions, associations, and the like that manage computerized networks concerning an individual's property and credit as to property held in the debtor's name." This text provides that the actor of the inquiry is the court with jurisdiction over the property statement procedure, that the act is an inquiry directed to institutions managing computerized networks, and that the initiation condition is "any of the following subparagraphs."
Among the grounds addressed by this text are cases of failure to comply with an order to correct address (Article 62 (6); see also Article 194 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act), cases in which satisfaction of the enforcement claim is insufficient with the submitted list of property (subparagraph 2), and cases in which a ground under the subparagraphs of Article 68 (1) or under paragraph (9) of the same Article exists (subparagraph 3) (Civil Execution Act Article 74). The distinction to be noted here is between two stages. The grounds for a property inquiry defined in the preceding section deal with whether such statutory grounds are satisfied, while the specification of the target institutions deals with whether the scope of the inquiry is fixed. These two are not the same determination. The grounds being furnished does not automatically specify the institutions to be inquired of; conversely, if no ground exists at all, the channel does not open even if institutions are enumerated.
The staged requirements may afford time for concealment. Seen from the creditor's side, at the time when the inquiry should be conducted the creditor waits before the threshold of the procedure, and meanwhile there is room for the debtor's property condition to change. The loss that information protection may instead assist the concealment of property and shift the cost of search onto the creditor is clear. It operates only where the creditor holds a monetary title enabling a filing for the property statement, satisfies the initiation requirements, and specifies the grounds for inquiry and the target institutions; it is blocked where the creditor holds only a provisional execution title, which is excluded from the property statement, or where the additional statutory grounds for inquiry are absent so that the relevant information procedure cannot be used.
In the synthetic scene, the facts corresponding to this question are narrow. A holds a monetary payment title and merely does not know the executable property of B. If it is not confirmed from the records whether this is a title enabling a filing for the property statement, whether the initiation requirements are satisfied, and whether the grounds for inquiry and the target institutions have been specified, the determination halts. The records of determination are the type of enforcement title, the course of the property statement, the list of property, the grounds for inquiry, the target institutions, and the replies. Where the scope of the replies and whether any target of inquiry was omitted cannot be known, the matter remains undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is a conditional distinction. Where the grounds for inquiry are specified and those grounds correspond to statutory requirements, the channel of application operates; a provisional execution title alone gives rise to no inquiry beyond the property statement; and where the scope of the replies or the omission of any target institution is not confirmed, judgment is reserved. The time cost of the staged requirements remains, but that cost alone does not eliminate the additional requirements. However, what value that channel actually returns is not determined in this section.
3.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
The preceding section held that the sanctions for non-appearance, refusal to submit, and refusal to take the oath follow justifiable grounds and statutory procedure and are not the same as proof of insolvency. If that sanction cannot serve as a means of proving insolvency, creditor A still does not know the executable property of debtor B. It is precisely at that point that the question of this section arises: what can A demand without receiving any information? Proceeding on the premise that the need to know and the right of access are different matters, it asks whether A may immediately inquire of all property simply by wishing to do so.
The relevant provision prescribes the threshold for an inquiry application. Article 74 (1) of the Civil Execution Act provides that, where any of the following subparagraphs applies, the court with jurisdiction over the property statement procedure may, upon application by the creditor who filed for the property statement, inquire of public institutions, financial institutions, associations, and the like that manage computerized networks concerning an individual's property and credit as to property held in the debtor's name (Civil Execution Act Article 74). The grounds in the subparagraphs are divided into inability to comply with an order to correct address, insufficiency of the submitted list of property, and existence of grounds under Article 68, all of which are conditions formed within the property statement procedure (Civil Execution Act Article 74). By its text, the actor of the inquiry is the court with jurisdiction, the act is an inquiry into property held in the debtor's name, and the conditions are the creditor's application and falling within a ground in the subparagraphs (Civil Execution Act Article 74).
The conclusion of this section, connected to this text, is that where a statutory ground connected to the property statement exists, the channel of an inquiry application opens. Here two stages must be distinguished. The first stage is whether one may proceed to the property statement procedure, and the second stage is whether, within it, the separate condition called the grounds for inquiry has been met. Article 74 of the Civil Execution Act is the provision that opens and closes the door of the second stage; it does not substitute for the first stage. The grounds for a property inquiry mean statutory conditions for inquiry into information, such as the limits of the statement procedure, and this is a standard of determination separated from the existence of an enforcement title. Since the mere fact of holding a title cannot be regarded as satisfying the conditions of the second stage, the additional requirements for inquiry cannot be omitted.
The counterargument that the staged requirements may afford time for concealment points specifically to the aspects of loss and inconvenience. The debtor's protection of information may assist the concealment of property and shift the cost of search onto the creditor. If, while A specifies the grounds for inquiry and awaits the replies of each institution, room arises for B to move property, the protection of the procedure returns as a decrease in the opportunity for recovery. Yet though this disadvantage is acknowledged, the conclusion does not change. This is because the additional requirements for inquiry cannot be omitted merely upon holding an enforcement title. What the confirmed text requires is application and falling within a ground in the subparagraphs, and to disregard this would be to set up a determination different from the text confirmed in the paragraph.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only that A holds a monetary payment title and does not know the executable property of B. On the basis of this scene alone, it cannot be determined whether the property statement procedure has already been conducted, whether a list of property has been submitted, or whether a ground under the subparagraphs corresponding to a ground for inquiry has been formed. Accordingly, whether the channel prescribed in Article 74 of the Civil Execution Act has opened remains undetermined. In the opposite direction, that is, the mere fact of holding a definitive title does not bring with it the grounds for inquiry.
The conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. The mere fact that the creditor wishes it does not cause all property to be inquired of immediately; the statutory channel of an inquiry application opens only where a statutory ground connected to the property statement is confirmed. This channel means only that the state of access permission has opened; it does not mean that an actual inquiry has been made or that property has been recovered. Conversely, the mere fact that the channel is not confirmed cannot be taken to establish at once that enforcement is impossible or that relief is unavailable. If there is material from which the scope of the replies and whether any target of inquiry was omitted cannot be known, it remains a matter of undetermination. Does the court on its own initiative look for all institutions?