Summary
The applicant must specify the institutions and organizations to be inquired of and pay the costs in advance.
4.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
A search in which places to look are omitted also narrows the conclusion that property could not be found. Following the conclusion of the preceding stage that the channel for a search application opens where a statutory ground connected with property disclosure exists, what is asked this time is the standard by which that channel actually opens. Does the court search out all agencies on its own? In the synthetic scene, Creditor A holds a title ordering the payment of money but does not know the executable property of Debtor B. In this scene, who must do what for the entrance of the information procedure on which A may rely to open?
Civil Execution Act Article 74, paragraph (2) plainly sets out the applicant's share. Under the same provision, "Where a creditor makes an application under paragraph (1), the creditor shall specify the agencies or organizations to be searched and shall pay in advance the costs incurred for the search" (Civil Execution Act Article 74). Here, specification of the search target means the designation of the agencies or organizations from which data are to be requested. The subject imposed by this text is the applicant creditor, the acts are the specification of the agencies or organizations to be searched and the advance payment of the search costs, and the condition is the case of making an application under paragraph (1).
This text and the determination that follows it distinguish two things required at the application stage. One is specifying the ground for the search and the target agencies; the other is paying the search costs in advance. Where one possesses the monetary title and the commencement requirements for applying for property disclosure and has specified the ground for the search and the target agencies, the entrance to this relief opens. It is not that the court finds the agencies on the applicant's behalf; rather, the structure is that the applicant specifies the target agencies and the court procedure proceeds within that scope.
Meanwhile, for a creditor who does not know the location of the property, the duty of specification is a clear burden. Since an applicant already placed in the position of not knowing the property must also find out where the data are located, information asymmetry produces the result of shifting the search costs onto the creditor. Nor is it excluded that the value of protecting the debtor's information may operate in a direction that assists the concealment of property. Even so, omission of a search target cannot be used as grounds for the nonexistence of the entire property. What lies outside the specified scope is not adjudicated by this procedure.
In the synthetic scene, A holds a monetary title, so the type of title does not fall within the stopping condition of this question. However, whether A has specified which agencies or organizations to apply to for a search, whether A is prepared to pay the costs in advance, and whether the commencement requirements for property disclosure have been met cannot be determined from the scene alone. Whether the search application was made without specifying agencies or organizations, and within what scope replies have come back, are likewise unverified. These undetermined matters do not change the standard at the entrance. If the state in which only provisional execution exists is converted into a final title capable of disclosure, the threshold of the information procedure is reassessed.
The permitted conclusion is limited. Judging that the entrance to the search application opens when the applicant specifies the agencies or organizations to be searched and pays the costs in advance, and when, possessing the monetary title and the commencement requirements, the applicant has also fixed the ground for the search, is the full extent of the scope of this question. That the court searches out all agencies on the applicant's behalf is not presupposed by this procedure, nor is it permitted to reach the conclusion that the debtor has no property on the single fact that search targets were omitted. Conversely, the concrete list of which agencies must be specified, and the effect of replies, have not been determined at this point.
4.2The Conditions That Block Relief
It was held that where a statutory ground connected with property disclosure exists, the channel for a search application opens. Yet the opening of that channel does not mean that the court searches every agency far and wide on the creditor's behalf. In this scene, if the court does not search out all agencies on its own, what is the condition that blocks the way?
The text answering this problem is found in Civil Execution Act Article 74. Its paragraph (2) provides: "(2) Where a creditor makes an application under paragraph (1), the creditor shall specify the agencies or organizations to be searched and shall pay in advance the costs incurred for the search." This text regards the party making the search application as the creditor and imposes two requirements on that creditor. One is to specify the agencies or organizations to be searched; the other is to pay in advance the costs incurred for the search. Here, specification of the search target means the designation of the agencies or organizations from which data are to be requested.
Connecting this basis with the preceding conclusion clarifies the character of the statutory requirements. It is not that the court finds all agencies on its own; the applicant must select and write down the agencies or organizations to be requested and must bear the search costs in advance. Therefore, where one has only a provisional execution title, which is excluded from property disclosure, or where there is no additional statutory ground for a search and the information procedure cannot be used, if even one of the statutory requirements is unmet, the channel of relief closes. The type of title and the requirement of a ground for the search are two distinct thresholds, and if either one is not crossed, the stage is not reached.
At this point the strongest counterargument is aimed at the fact that the duty of specification is a burden upon a creditor who does not know the location of the property. If a creditor who cannot know the whereabouts of concealed property must reckon and write down even which agencies hold data, then those search costs may be transferred in their entirety to the creditor under the name of protecting the debtor's information. This disadvantage is not erased but remains. The fact that a certain agency was not written down means that the search was not carried out; it does not mean that the debtor has no property.
Returning to the synthetic scene, Creditor A is in the state of considering a search application without knowing the location of executable property. Whether the conditions of specification of the search target and advance payment of costs are satisfied cannot be confirmed from the records alone within this scene. Only when the type of enforcement title, the course of the property disclosure, the property list, the ground for the search, the target agencies, and the replies are confirmed does the judgment on the two thresholds stand. Accordingly, at present, when the scope of replies and whether search targets were omitted cannot be known, that part remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. A search application is not replaced by the court's ex officio (by the court's own authority) search, and the channel opens only when an application furnished with specification and costs is made. At the same time, it cannot be summarily concluded that property does not exist merely because search targets were omitted, nor may undetermined records be filled in and used for judgment.
4.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Where a statutory ground connected with property disclosure exists, the channel for a search application opens. Then, after that door opens, does the court search out all agencies on its own? Where the scope of replies and whether search targets were omitted cannot be known, matters not fixed as materials of judgment are left undetermined, distinguished from impossibility. Undetermined means a state in which, because the scope of the materials to be used for judgment is not fixed, neither affirmation nor denial is possible. It is distinguished from impossibility, where even if all materials are gathered the requirements are not met.
The text of the statute corresponding to this question prescribes the duty of specification at the application stage. Civil Execution Act Article 74, paragraph (2) provides that the creditor "shall specify the agencies or organizations to be searched and shall pay in advance the costs incurred for the search" (Civil Execution Act Article 74). The subject of this provision is the creditor applying for the search, the acts are the specification of the agencies or organizations to be searched and the advance payment of costs, and the condition is the case of making an application under paragraph (1). This text does not mean that anyone may make the request, nor does it mean that the court prepares the list on the applicant's behalf. What is at issue in this paragraph is what the applicant specifies and with what the applicant bears the costs.
The reason the duty of specification is fixed is that the search itself is an act whose scope is set by the requester's choice. Because the applicant requests data only within the agencies or organizations specified, data from other agencies remain unused in the judgment. Even if a reply comes, that reply has come within the scope specified by the applicant and says nothing about the existence or nonexistence of property outside that scope. A non-response or an empty reply is a reply within the requested scope and does not serve as grounds for the nonexistence of the entire property, including scopes that were not requested.
For a creditor who does not know where the property is, the duty of specification is a burden. A structure in which the debtor's concealment of property leaves the search costs and search effort to be borne may narrow the creditor's opportunity for recovery. To reduce this disadvantage, one may say that the court should find the agencies on the applicant's behalf, or that the applicant should be able to demand the inclusion even of agencies omitted through the applicant's lack of knowledge. Yet that demand does not accord with the manner fixed by the provision. Article 74, paragraph (2) makes the applicant's specification and advance payment of costs conditions, and does not make the expansion of the targets or the court's substitution a condition. Therefore, omission of a search target cannot be used as grounds for the nonexistence of the entire property. The burden of search costs pointed out by the counterargument remains as it is, but a demand to reduce that burden cannot serve as grounds for narrowing the undetermined scope.
The facts placed in this scene are only that title and the ignorance of the property's whereabouts; which agencies were specified as search targets and what replies came have not been fixed. If the type of enforcement title, the course of the property disclosure, the property list, the ground for the search, the target agencies, and the replies remain in the records, then from those records one can read the scope of the replies and whether search targets were omitted. But if such records are absent or incomplete, one cannot determine which agencies were omitted and with respect to what scope the replies were given. In that case it remains undetermined. Neither the nonexistence of the entire property nor the impossibility of execution has been established. The fact that there are no materials is a suspension of judgment, not a reversal of the conclusion.
The conclusion this section permits is to leave undetermined, distinguished from impossibility, matters not fixed as to the scope of replies and whether search targets were omitted. What it does not permit is establishing that there is no property on the single circumstance that search targets were omitted, or, conversely, establishing that there is property because a search was made. Even where the channel for a search application is open and the costs and targets are specified, the circumstances outside the scope within which replies came remain undetermined.
4.4The Records Needed for Determination
The preceding stage held that where a statutory ground connected with property disclosure exists, the channel for a search application opens. The judgment that the channel has opened is distinct from the scope and the records in which that channel was actually used. The question here is narrow. Does the court search out all agencies on its own, and which records are needed?
The source text corresponding to this question is Civil Execution Act Article 74, paragraph (2). Its text provides that the applicant shall specify the agencies or organizations to be searched and shall pay in advance the costs incurred for the search (Civil Execution Act Article 74). This provision places the party of the search application as the creditor, the required acts as the specification of agencies or organizations and the advance deposit of costs, and the timing as the point of application. This paragraph alone determines neither a duty to search for other agencies in addition nor a method of fixing the scope of replies, and therefore that question is not addressed.
Joining this text with the preceding conclusion clarifies the standard of judgment. The search channel opens in the case where the party who must specify the search targets and pay the costs in advance makes the application. The conditions for the channel to open and what is recorded within the channel are separate issues. This distinction is necessary because the applicant's duty of specification does not immediately turn into the court's duty of search. Accordingly, the stage determination is made only upon the fixed records. The stage is judged only on the materials recorded in the type of enforcement title, the course of the property disclosure, the property list, the ground for the search, the target agencies, and the replies, and absent records are not filled in by presumption.
Demanding that a creditor who does not know where the property is specify agencies or organizations is a substantial burden. Asking a person who does not know where to look to write down the sources of the search first produces the result of leaving the search costs and the gaps in information to that person. Even without denying this inconvenience and loss, the conclusion does not change. For one cannot establish that Debtor B has no property at all merely from the circumstance that no reply came from unspecified agencies. What that omission leaves is unverified status, not a determination of absence.
What is confirmed in this scene is only the fact that Creditor A holds a monetary title and does not know the executable property of Debtor B. The course of the property disclosure, whether a property list was submitted, the type of ground for the search, the specified target agencies, and the contents of each agency's replies are not fixed in this scene. Since every item of the fixed records is empty, this scene alone cannot determine the stage in either direction. The contrast condition, whereby the state in which only a provisional execution title exists changes into a final title capable of disclosure, merely causes the threshold of judgment to be viewed again within the question of this section concerning the specification of search targets, and adds no fact to this scene.
The conclusion permitted in this section is that the specification of search targets is a requirement placed on the applicant's side, and that the materials left by that specification and by the replies become the material for the stage determination. The conclusions not permitted are to declare summarily that the debtor has no property on the ground that the searched agencies are partial or unconfirmed, or to determine that the court must search through all remaining agencies. Where the scope of replies and whether search targets were omitted cannot be known, the matter remains undetermined.
4.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
It was concluded that the channel for filing an application for inquiry opens when there is a statutory ground connected to property disclosure. In this scene the question opens whether the court finds all institutions on its own. The judgment that the channel is open and what can be obtained through that channel are separate matters. The former does not substitute for the latter.
Civil Execution Act Article 74 paragraph (2) prescribes the requirements at the application stage as follows. "② Where a creditor makes an application under paragraph (1), the creditor shall specify the institutions or organizations to be inquired of and shall pay in advance the costs incurred for the inquiry" (Civil Execution Act Article 74). Here the applicant is the creditor claiming the inquiry. What he must do is to specify the institutions or organizations to be inquired of and to pay the costs of inquiry in advance. What this text says is what the applicant must do, not which institutions the court must find on its own.
Connecting the above text with the conclusion of this section, the threshold of the information procedure is crossed by the applicant, not crossed by the court in the applicant's stead. Inquiry is conducted only as to the institutions and organizations specified by the applicant, and the procedure advances to the extent that costs have been prepaid. At this point two stages must be distinguished. One is the stage at which the channel opens by satisfying the eligibility and requirements for application; the other is the stage of actually operating that channel against specifically identified targets. If the two are conflated, the success of opening the channel is mistaken for the completion of specification. Since the specification of the targets of inquiry is a condition of the latter stage, the determination of the preceding stage cannot be carried over as it is.
The strongest counterargument aims at the distribution of the burden. In that a person who does not know where the debtor's property is located must designate institutions and organizations one by one, information protection may result in driving the creditor into search costs and aiding the debtor's concealment. This loss must not be treated lightly. The fact that no material has come from an institution that was not specified means only that the institution was not looked for, not that no property exists. The disadvantage pointed out by the counterargument remains, but the direction of the conclusion is maintained.
In the synthetic scene, when creditor A's title, which has only provisional execution, changes into a confirmed title eligible for disclosure, the threshold of the information procedure is judged anew. This change is not an additional fact of an actual case but a test that alters a single adjudication condition. However, which institutions or organizations A specified, whether A paid the costs, and whether a reply came are not present in this scene. The items to be made into the record are the type of enforcement title, the progress of property disclosure, the property list, the grounds for inquiry, the target institutions, and the replies. Unless the scope of the replies and whether inquiry targets were omitted can be known, those parts remain undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. Since the applicant must specify the institutions or organizations to be inquired of and pay the costs in advance, the explanation that the court finds all institutions on its own is not supported by this text. Along with this, it is also clear that the omission of inquiry targets cannot be used as a ground for the non-existence of all property. Yet this judgment means neither that property is permanently absent nor that execution is impossible. The re-adjudication of the threshold means only the abandonment and re-examination of the stages; it does not promise the success of recovery. The next question remains.
4.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
Following the question, in this scene, whether the court finds all institutions on its own, the issues now are how heavy a burden the duty to determine the scope of inquiry imposes upon a creditor who does not know the location of the property, and where the limits of the conclusion that such burden leaves lie.
As to this question, Civil Execution Act Article 74 prescribes the requirements of the application procedure in its text. It provides that "② Where a creditor makes an application under paragraph (1), the creditor shall specify the institutions or organizations to be inquired of and shall pay in advance the costs incurred for the inquiry" (Civil Execution Act Article 74). This text makes clear that the applicant must write down concretely the institutions and organizations to be inquired of and must also pay in advance the costs incurred for the inquiry. It is the passage that shows this is not a structure in which the court arbitrarily broadens the scope and investigates, but a structure in which the applicant determines the scope and bears that cost.
The demand of this Article is not a mere formality of procedure; it determines the way in which the results of an inquiry are read. When the creditor requests inquiry of specified institutions or organizations and receives a reply, what that reply covers is limited to the scope designated by the applicant. Accordingly, the fact that no property was revealed within that scope and the judgment that there is no property even in areas that were not designated and hence did not enter the targets of inquiry are conclusions at different stages. The former means that no material emerged within the inquiry applied for; the latter is an inference beyond the scope of verification. Only when these two are distinguished does the conclusion stand that the omission of inquiry targets is not made the ground for the non-existence of all property.
The strongest counterargument is that here the protection of debtor information may assist the concealment of property and shift search costs onto the creditor. If the creditor must find institutions one by one and bear the costs in advance, the criticism is that the party who knows the location of the property retains its advantageous position as it is, while the creditor is left in an endless search. Yet the specification of inquiry targets is a burden imposed upon the applicant and, at the same time, a standard that limits the meaning of the inquiry results. Therefore, if one concludes that the property itself does not exist solely because there was no reply from the targets specified by the applicant, that becomes a conclusion exceeding the scope of inquiry set by the Article. Leaving the unfairness of the cost burden pointed out by the counterargument as it is, the conclusion that the omission of inquiry targets cannot be used as a ground for the non-existence of all property is maintained.
In this scene, if A applied for inquiry by specifying the institutions or organizations to be inquired of and paying the costs in advance, the scope of the reply is bound to the targets A specified. The fact that no material emerged from the specified institutions means that property was not confirmed within the scope of the inquiry targets; it cannot judge the existence or absence of property even in areas that were not specified and therefore not inquired into. However, in this scene the type of enforcement title, the progress of the property disclosure, the property list, the grounds for inquiry, the target institutions, and the actual content of the replies are not fixed, so which institutions were omitted and the parts beyond the scope of the replies remain undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is that, where the applicant specified the institutions or organizations to be inquired of and paid the costs in advance, the results of that inquiry must be read within the specified scope. The fact that no property was revealed within that scope is a limited result as to the inquiry targets and cannot serve as a ground for the absence of property even as to targets that were not specified and not inquired into. Contrary to this, treating the omission of inquiry targets as a ground for the non-existence of all property is a conclusion this section does not permit.
4.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The preceding section concluded that the omission of inquiry targets cannot be used as a ground for the non-existence of all property. Yet if the applicant knows not a single item of the debtor's property, the next issue becomes whether the court will find all institutions in the applicant's stead. This question asks whose action the procedure of inquiry presupposes. It is precisely in that state that the subject bearing the responsibility for filing an application for inquiry must be determined.
Civil Execution Act Article 74 clearly determines on whom this duty of specification is imposed. Article 74 paragraph (2) declares that one "shall specify the institutions or organizations to be inquired of and shall pay in advance the costs incurred for the inquiry." The subject of the text is the creditor who makes the application under paragraph (1), and the acts are the specification and the advance payment of costs. Accordingly, at the stage of application, the selection of targets and the burden of costs lie with the applicant, not with the court. What this Article addresses in this paragraph is only the formal requirements of that application.
The link that connects that text with the foregoing conclusion is the division between the scope of the claim and the scope of the search. The total amount of money the creditor is to receive is determined by the title, but the title does not determine where the property is. Hence the form was devised in which the applicant writes out the target institutions directly, and the court does not fill in what that selection leaves out. Therefore, the failure to find property outside the institutions and organizations selected by the applicant does not mean that the inquiry never took place. It means that the scope of the inquiry was narrow, and this distinction supports the narrow conclusion of the preceding section.
Yet the duty of specification operates upon the creditor as a genuine burden. A creditor who does not know the location of the property finds it difficult even to gauge where to make a request, and must pay the costs in advance for each institution that emerges as a candidate. For a small claim, the costs may exceed the amount recovered, and that burden itself becomes a wall to information access. The author maintains the conclusion without erasing this disadvantage. Because if one concludes that B's property does not exist solely on the ground that no reply came, the result may be that the concealment of information is turned to account by the very purpose of protecting creditors. The omission of targets remains only as a limitation of scope.
Returning to the synthetic scene, it is confirmed that A does not know of B's executable property. However, which institutions or organizations A specified as targets of inquiry, whether A paid the costs in advance, and what replies A received are not set in this scene. Thus, from this scene alone it cannot be determined whether the application requirements were met, or how broad the scope of the specification was. However, where the statutory ground and the monetary title are in place and the channel of inquiry is open, and where the targets have been specified, the conditional distinction is maintained that the inquiry proceeds only within that limited scope. Where whether targets were omitted cannot be known, that determination is left undetermined.
What this section permits is the judgment that the specification of inquiry targets and the advance payment of costs are required of the applicant, and the limitation of scope that the court does not find all institutions for the applicant. What this section does not permit is the judgment that uses the omission of inquiry targets as a ground for the non-existence of all property, and an interpretation that abolishes the duty of specification itself on the ground of the cost burden.
4.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
In this situation, what the person holding the enforcement title faces is not the absence of actually existing property, but an information void in that one cannot know where the property is. Whether the State performs in the applicant's stead the attempt to fill this void, or whether it is a procedure accessible to the person who first decides where to make requests, is the question to be settled here. This is the point that divides the scope of the court's duty to investigate materials.
The basis for answering that question lies in Civil Execution Act Article 74 paragraph (2). That Article provides: "② Where a creditor makes an application under paragraph (1), the creditor shall specify the institutions or organizations to be inquired of and shall pay in advance the costs incurred for the inquiry." (Civil Execution Act Article 74). Here the subject of the application is the creditor, and the acts he must perform are two. The condition of specification is not limited to a passive selection designating a target; it requires the identification of the institutions or organizations from which to request materials. That is, one must first determine who can produce what materials.
What this text indicates is the requirements for the establishment of the application. The specification and cost prepayment that the Article imposes upon the creditor reveal that this is not a system in which the court canvasses all institutions in the applicant's stead. The words "specification" and "advance payment of costs" go together, and the design is such that the person who first sets the targets of inquiry bears the costs needed for that inquiry. The reason these two stages must be distinguished is that, as set out in the preceding section, the channel for an application for inquiry opens where there is a statutory ground connected to property disclosure, yet even after that channel opens, against which institutions it shall be opened is a separate matter that the applicant must make clear. The opening of the channel and the designation of targets are not the same; the latter takes its place only after the conditions of the former have been met.
Then, for a creditor who does not know at all the location of the property, the duty to specify the inquiry targets may act as an excessive burden. The requirement that the person without information must know where to request information appears to give rise to the paradox of blocking access on the ground of not knowing, and the value of protecting debtor information shifts the cost of that concealment to the creditor. Even so, the conclusion of this section does not waver. It is true that the duty of specification is a burden upon the creditor, but the omission of inquiry targets cannot be used as a ground for the non-existence of all property. The circumstance that no material came from a place not requested does not carry the same weight as the conclusion that there is no material at the place requested. This distinction does not erase the creditor's disadvantage; it limits the breadth of the conclusion that the disadvantage can reach.
Returning to the synthetic scene, what A holds is only a title to payment of money, and A has no information on where B's executable property is. What can be confirmed in this scene is only the existence of the title and the absence of information, and no record is given as to whether the grounds for inquiry and the target institutions have already been specified, whether a reply came from the specified institutions, and how far the scope of the reply extends. Thus, from this scene alone it cannot be confirmed whether the channel for an application for inquiry actually opened or, if it did open, as to what scope that reply was given. Since the scope of the reply and whether inquiry targets were omitted cannot be known, whether that material means the non-existence of the debtor's property also remains undetermined. However, the condition is left in place that where a state of having only a provisional execution title changes into a confirmed title eligible for disclosure, the threshold of the information procedure is judged anew.
The conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. The applicant must specify the institutions or organizations to be inquired of and pay in advance the costs incurred for the inquiry, and the specification of inquiry targets means the identification of the institutions or organizations from which to request materials. Accordingly, the interpretation that reads the absence at the places omitted from the inquiry targets as the non-existence of all property is excluded here. What is not permitted is both the court arbitrarily filling in what lies outside the scope written by the applicant and, conversely, the applicant's determining the existence or absence of all property on the basis of only the scope the applicant set.
4.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
It has been set out that the channel for applying for an inquiry opens where there is a statutory ground connected to property disclosure. When a creditor who does not know the whereabouts of property applies for an inquiry in this way, the conditions attached to the application must serve as the basis for decision only within the bounds of the text. What those conditions require and what they do not require is the question posed by this material.
The relevant provision in the original text, the pertinent paragraph of Article 74 of the Civil Execution Act, provides: "(2) Where a creditor makes an application under paragraph (1), the creditor shall specify the agency or organization to be queried and shall pay in advance the expenses incurred for the inquiry." The subject fixed by this text is the creditor who makes the application under paragraph (1), and the acts are specifying the agency or organization to be queried and paying the inquiry expenses in advance. Because the scope covered by this section is limited to Article 74 (2), commentary on other paragraphs of the same Article is not addressed here.
In that the above text requires the applicant to take two actions, specification and advance payment, this material takes that text alone as the basis for decision regarding the statutory channel of access to property information. This definition points not to which materials the applicant claims, but to the condition of identifying the party from whom materials are to be requested. Accordingly, the text requiring the applicant to specify the agency or organization to be queried and to pay the expenses in advance, and the decision determining which channel opens on the basis of this text alone, are placed at different stages.
From the standpoint of a creditor who does not know the location of property, the demand to specify the agency to be queried may be felt as a real burden. The creditor may have to bear even the search costs arising from concealment of property under the protection of the debtor's information, and it is open to criticism that such costs raise the threshold of the information procedure. The circumstance that no reply comes from the inquiry into the agency or organization specified by the applicant does not lead to a determination that no property exists at other, unspecified agencies. That what the text requires is the identification of the party to be requested and not an assertion concerning the existence of property leaves the limit of this answer as it stands.
The facts that can be ascertained in the synthetic scene are that Creditor A holds a monetary title and does not know Debtor B's executable property, while the ground for inquiry, the target agency, and the specific content of the reply are not ascertained. Since the scope of the reply and whether any inquiry target was omitted cannot be known, the opening or closing of the channel cannot be determined on that circumstance alone. Where the creditor possesses the monetary title and the commencement requirements for applying for property disclosure and specifies the ground for inquiry and the target agency, the channel opens; where there is only a title subject to provisional execution, or where there is no additional statutory ground for inquiry so that the information procedure cannot be used, it is blocked.
The conclusion permitted by this material is narrow. On the basis of the text of the relevant provision alone, it takes as the conditions for decision the specification of the agencies and organizations to be queried and the advance payment of expenses, and does not extend them to the reasons for judgment or to other paragraphs. The fact that no property was ascertained within the scope specified by the applicant is a conclusion limited to that scope, and no determination whatever can be made as to agencies that were not specified. Conversely, it is not the office of this material to create anew obligations going beyond the specification of inquiry targets.
4.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
What the preceding stage established was that the channel for applying for an inquiry opens where there is a statutory ground connected to property disclosure. Even after that channel has opened, Creditor A holds a title to demand payment of money but does not know Debtor B's executable property. The question in this scene, whether the court finds all the agencies on its own, narrows down to the problem of whether the applicant must determine and present, within some scope, the agencies to be searched.
Article 74 of the Civil Execution Act prescribes one aspect of the application procedure. Article 74 (2) provides: "(2) Where a creditor makes an application under paragraph (1), the creditor shall specify the agency or organization to be queried and shall pay in advance the expenses incurred for the inquiry." The subject of this text is the creditor seeking to make the application; the acts are the specification of the agency or organization to be queried and the advance payment of the inquiry expenses; and the condition is the case of making an application under paragraph (1). It is not the manner prescribed by the text of this paragraph for the court, of its own accord, to search out agencies that the applicant has not specified and to request inquiries of them.
Connecting this text with the conclusion of the preceding stage, the statutory channel is again distinguished at the application stage. On the one hand, where there is a statutory ground connected to property disclosure, the application for inquiry itself can be commenced; on the other hand, the commenced application must take the form of specifying the agency or organization to be requested and paying the expenses in advance. These two determinations are not problems on the same plane. The former addresses whether the threshold of the channel opens; the latter addresses what the applicant who has crossed that threshold must present. The case in which it operates is where one holds a monetary title and the commencement requirements and specifies the ground for inquiry and the target agency; the case in which it is blocked is where there is only a title subject to provisional execution, or where there is no additional statutory ground so that the information procedure cannot be used.
The strongest counterarguments aim as follows: imposing the duty of specification on a creditor who does not know the whereabouts of property is unfair, and the protection of the debtor's information may aid the concealment of property and shift search costs onto the creditor. That is, the paradox that a person who cannot know what is to be found is required to specify where to search, together with the disadvantage that the search costs fall on the creditor, are raised together. Yet the preceding answer is maintained. Because one cannot know what lies outside the scope presented by the applicant, the circumstance that an inquiry target was omitted does not justify a determination that no property exists.
The facts established in this scene are only that Creditor A holds a monetary title and does not know Debtor B's property. The record items — the type of enforcement title, the progress of property disclosure, the property list, the ground for inquiry, the target agency, and the reply — are items fixed as the record of determination, but the actual contents of the record are not contained in the material given to this section. Accordingly, where the scope of the reply and whether inquiry targets were omitted cannot be known, the case remains one of non-determination. The contrast — that where only provisional execution is available and the matter is replaced by an established title for which disclosure can be made, the threshold of the information procedure is to be assessed anew — is likewise merely a sentence examining the matter by changing the conditions, not an additional fact of an actual case. Matters that cannot be determined from this scene alone are left within the range of non-determination.
The conclusion this section permits is clear. The distinctions required in an application for inquiry are limited to the three conditions of the case in which it operates, the case in which it is blocked, and the case of non-determination; each condition is determined only within the stated scope, and there is no need to create separate stages beyond them. Conclusions not permitted are treating the omission of an inquiry target as grounds for the non-existence of the entirety of the property, or converting the record of being unconfirmed at once into one of no remedy.
4.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
In a scene where Creditor A holds a title to demand payment of money but does not know Debtor B's executable property, a criterion is needed that can determine at once whether the channel for applying for an inquiry actually opens or is blocked, or whether no determination can be reached on the records alone. As to the question whether the court finds all the agencies on its own, what this stage addresses is distinguishing the state of the route of access to information within the scope the applicant has identified.
The relevant text prescribes the procedural burden borne by the applicant at the application stage of this procedure. Article 74 (2) of the Civil Execution Act provides: "Where a creditor makes an application under paragraph (1), the creditor shall specify the agency or organization to be queried," thereby setting the requirement that the applicant specify the agency or organization to be queried (Civil Execution Act, Article 74). The subject spoken of in this text is the creditor applying for the inquiry; the required act is the identification of the agency or organization from which materials are to be requested; and the condition is the case where that application falls under an application under paragraph (1). The specification of the inquiry target spoken of here means the identification of the agency or organization from which materials are to be requested.
Connecting this text with the criteria of distinction set out above, three stages are divided on different materials: that the opening of the channel is a matter of eligibility to apply and application requirements, that the closing of the channel is a matter of grounds rendering the procedure itself unusable, and that reservation of determination is a matter of replies and records. The specification of the inquiry target is a requirement to be filled in when filing the application, but the fact that the specification was not broad does not produce the conclusion that the property itself does not exist. If the former is a condition for the establishment of the application, the latter is a determination concerning the existence of the object of execution, and the two questions are read differently from the same records.
The counterarguments aim at the point that the duty of specification becomes a substantial burden on a creditor who does not know the location of property. The creditor cannot know in which agency the debtor's property is recorded, and the demand to specify the agency or organization in advance at the application stage imposes search costs on a person without information, so that the value of protection of the debtor's information may operate rather in the direction of aiding the concealment of property. Even without removing this disadvantage, the answer that the omission of an inquiry target cannot be used as grounds for the non-existence of the entirety of the property is maintained. For the fact that the scope of the application was narrow speaks only to the results within that scope and is silent as to property outside it.
In the synthetic scene, Creditor A holds a monetary title but does not know Debtor B's executable property, and the type of enforcement title, the progress of property disclosure, the property list, the ground for inquiry, the target agency, and the reply are fixed as the record of determination. In this record, the part where the title for applying for property disclosure and the commencement requirements are in place and the ground for inquiry and the target agency are specified is contrasted with the condition of opening, while the part where there is only a title subject to provisional execution, which is excluded from property disclosure, or where there is no additional statutory ground for inquiry so that the information procedure cannot be used, is contrasted with the condition of blocking. By contrast, how far the reply came, and whether there are other record-keeping offices outside the agencies identified in the application, are not determined from this scene alone and thus remain undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is confined to a threefold division by condition. Where a monetary title and the commencement requirements are in place and the ground for inquiry and the target agency are specified, the channel opens; where there is only a title subject to provisional execution or there is no additional statutory ground so that the information procedure cannot be used, it is blocked; and where the scope of the reply and whether inquiry targets were omitted cannot be known, determination is reserved. The same records do not serve as grounds for affirming or denying the existence of the property itself, and a state of insufficient material must not be read at once as one of no remedy.
4.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
Up through the preceding stage it was confirmed that the channel for applying for an inquiry opens where there is a statutory ground connected to property disclosure. Yet what shall fill the opened channel was not addressed by the earlier stage. The question in this scene is clear: whether the court itself, ex officio (by the court's own authority), finds all the agencies and makes the inquiries, or whether the applicant must pick out the places to be queried.
The relevant text for this question lies in Article 74 of the Civil Execution Act. Paragraph (2) of that Article sets out together the two burdens borne by the applicant when the application is made: the creditor shall specify the agency or organization to be queried and shall pay in advance the expenses incurred for the inquiry. Here the subject is the creditor applying for the inquiry; the acts are selecting and identifying the agency or organization from which materials are to be requested and the payment of the expenses; and the condition is the case accompanying an application under paragraph (1). A procedure by which the court, ex officio (by the court's own authority), tours all agencies to find property is not established by this text.
This text and the channel opened above point to different stages. That the channel opens means that the statutory grounds and requirements for making an application for inquiry are in place, and for the application to proceed validly the specification of the inquiry target must follow within that application. The reason the two stages must be distinguished is that the former sets the threshold of the application while the latter sets the content and scope of that application. The fact that one side is in place does not automatically fill the other, and it cannot be read as meaning that the court goes out and finds materials beyond the specified agencies in the applicant's stead.
Nevertheless, the duty of specification is a substantial burden on a creditor who does not know the location of property. From the standpoint of a creditor who does not know in which agency the concealed property lies, the demand to identify the agency or organization is a rule that leaves the task of search to the applicant, and the value of information protection forms one axis of that burden. The fact that there were agencies the applicant failed to point out or that fell outside the scope of the reply means no more than that, as a result of that inquiry, no property was ascertained within a limited scope, and does not extend to the conclusion that no property whatever exists for Debtor B.
The facts ascertainable in the scene of Creditor A and Debtor B are only the existence of a title and the absence of property information. The record items — the type of enforcement title, the progress of property disclosure, the property list, the ground for inquiry, the target agency, and the reply — fix the framework of determination, and no claim is made in this section that those records were actually filled in. Only one condition may be varied.
The conclusion this section permits is that even where the channel for applying for an inquiry opens, the applicant must specify the agency or organization to be queried and pay the expenses in advance, together with the boundary that the fact that nothing was ascertained within an unspecified scope cannot be taken as grounds for the non-existence of the entirety of the property. Conclusions not permitted are that the court finds all the agencies on its own, or that one asserts categorically that the debtor's property does not exist merely because the result of the inquiry was empty. Cases where no reply came, or where it cannot be known whether targets were omitted, are likewise instances of non-determination arising from insufficient material and not immediately cases of no remedy. This determination, however, remains at the stage of the statutory channel of access to property information, and does not address the effects after passing through that channel or the results of execution. Is a claim recovered once one is entered on the register of persons in default?