Summary
This chapter distinguishes the types of exemption from attachment from the adjustment of its scope upon application, and reflects the current provisions on living-expense accounts.
5.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
채권 회복의 필요가 채무자의 법정 생계 보호를 지우지는 못한다. 앞서 전부명령의 확정과 경합 시 무효력 규칙을 채권 이전 효과와 함께 보아야 한다는 결론을 받아, 여기서는 그러한 현금화가 실제로 작동하기 위한 관문의 기준을 살핀다. 채권자 A는 채무자 B의 예금을 압류했지만 금융기관 C는 경합과 보호되는 예금 부분을 문제 삼는다. 이 장면에서 채무자의 모든 채권을 한 덩어리로 묶어 곧바로 회수할 수 있는지가 쟁점이 된다. 이 물음은 현금화의 출발 조건인 압류의 범위를 묻는 것으로, 여기서는 그 관문의 기준만을 검토한다.
민사집행법 제246조 제1항은 “①다음 각호의 채권은 압류하지 못한다”고 선언한 뒤, 그 각호에서 보호되는 채권의 종류를 일련으로 열거한다. 여기서의 압류금지채권은 법이 집행에서 보호하는 특정 채권을 뜻한다. 조문은 제8호에서 “제246조의2에 따른 생계비계좌에 예치된 예금”을, 제9호에서 “제8호에 따른 예금 외에 채무자의 1월간 생계유지에 필요한 예금”을 따로 구분하여 보호한다. 각호는 보호의 대상을 채권의 성격에 따라 정하므로, 채무자의 예금 채권 전체가 예외 없이 압류의 대상이 되는 것은 아니다.
위 문언에 따르면 채무자의 모든 채권을 묶을 수 있다는 전제는 애초에 성립하기 어렵다. 그런데도 그 구제는 완전히 막힌 것은 아니다. 민사집행법 제246조 제3항은 “법원은 당사자가 신청하면 채권자와 채무자의 생활형편, 그 밖의 사정을 고려하여 압류명령의 전부 또는 일부를 취소하거나 제1항의 압류금지채권에 대하여 압류명령을 할 수 있다”고 정한다. 제1항의 종류의 보호와 제3항의 신청에 따른 범위 조정은 별개의 판단 단계다. 전자가 어떤 채권이 원칙적으로 집행에서 빠지는지를 정한다면, 후자는 당사자의 신청과 생활형편을 고려한 법원의 재량적 조정을 여는 문언이다.
보호 범위가 넓으면 정당한 채권의 회복이 줄어든다는 반론은 실질적인 손실을 겨냥한다. 채권자 A가 회수하지 못한 액수는 그대로 남고, 작은 채권의 경우 회수 비용에 비해 남는 이익이 없어질 수 있다. 그렇더라도 현행 보호 종류를 옛 목록으로 대체하거나 시행령 금액을 추정할 수는 없다. 반론이 지적한 불이익을 부정하지 않으면서도, 그 불이익을 이유로 조문이 현재 정한 보호의 종류를 다른 목록으로 바꾸거나 대통령령이 정할 금액을 임의로 만들어 적용하는 것은 이 판단이 허용하지 않는다. 현행 종류의 보호와 신청에 따른 조정은 정해진 문언의 테두리 안에서만 다룬다.
위 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 A가 B의 예금을 압류했고, C가 경합과 보호되는 예금 부분을 문제 삼는다는 것에 그친다. 이 사실을 위 기준과 대조하면, 보호되는 예금 부분은 제1항 각호의 문언이 가리키는 범위 안에 있는지에 따라 정해진다. 다만 합성 장면은 B의 예금의 성격, 경합의 구체적 내용, 법원에 신청이 있었는지 여부를 정하지 않았다. 따라서 어떤 부분이 확실히 보호되는지, 제3항의 조정이 가능한지는 이 장면만으로 확정할 수 없다. 확인된 자료가 없는 사항은 미확정으로 남기며, 그 미확정이 곧 보호 자체가 없다는 뜻은 아니다.
이 구제가 작동하려면 압류의 송달 효력과 현금화 명령의 조건을 갖추고 보호·경합의 제한을 반영한 뒤 실제 지급 자료까지 확인되어야 한다. 여기서 허용되는 결론은, 보호되는 예금 부분이 법이 정한 압류금지채권에 해당하면 그 범위에서 모든 채권을 묶어 현금화할 수 없다는 것이다. 허용되지 않는 결론은, 회복이 줄어든다는 사정만으로 보호 종류를 옛 목록으로 대체하거나 시행령 금액을 추정하는 방식으로 그 범위를 넓히는 해석이다. 장면에 없는 사실과 수치로 판단을 보충하지 않은 채, 이 구제가 막히는 조건은 무엇인가?
5.2The Conditions That Block Relief
앞 절에서는 압류의 송달 효력과 현금화 명령의 조건을 갖추고 보호·경합의 제한을 반영한 뒤 실제 지급 자료까지 확인한 경우에는 이 구제가 작동한다고 보았다. 같은 장면에서 지금 물어야 할 것은 반대편이다. 어떤 사정에 놓이면 이 구제가 막히는가.
민사집행법 제246조 제1항은 앞부분에서 “다음 각호의 채권은 압류하지 못한다”고 선언한 뒤 그 목록을 둔다. 이 문언은 각 호의 채권을 압류의 대상에서 빼는 것으로, 채권자 A의 신청이나 집행기관의 선택으로 넓힐 수 없는 보호를 말한다(민사집행법 제246조). 목록 안에는 법령에 규정된 부양료 및 유족부조료, 구호사업이나 제3자의 도움으로 계속 받는 수입, 병사의 급료가 놓이고, 급료·연금·봉급·상여금·퇴직연금 등 급여채권의 2분의 1에 해당하는 금액이 이어진다(민사집행법 제246조). 다만 그 금액이 최저생계비를 고려한 대통령령 금액에 미치지 못하거나 표준적인 가구의 생계비를 고려한 대통령령 금액을 초과하면 각각 당해 대통령령이 정하는 금액으로 한다는 단서가 붙는다(민사집행법 제246조). 퇴직금과 같은 성질의 급여채권의 2분의 1, 주택임대차보호법상 우선변제 금액, 보장성 보험금, 제246조의2에 따른 생계비계좌에 예치된 예금, 그리고 1월간 생계유지에 필요한 예금이 뒤를 잇는다(민사집행법 제246조). 이 목록에 오른 채권은 압류금지채권, 즉 법이 집행에서 보호하는 특정 채권이다.
제1항의 보호와 제3항의 조정은 서로 다른 판단 단계에 놓인다. 제1항이 보호할 채권의 종류를 정한다면, 제3항은 당사자의 신청과 생활형편·그 밖의 사정을 요건으로 법원이 개별적으로 범위를 조정한다. 두 가지를 한 덩어리로 보면, 보호의 원칙과 신청에 따른 조정을 서로 다른 조건에서 판단하지 못한다. 이 절의 결론은 이 구별 위에 놓인다. 압류만 있고 추심·전부의 법정 조건이나 실제 지급이 없거나 압류금지·경합으로 해당 현금화가 제한된 경우에는 이 구제가 막힌다. 제3항의 조정이 있었다는 사정만으로 그 현금화가 이루어졌다고 볼 수는 없다.
보호 범위가 넓으면 정당한 채권의 회복이 줄어든다. 채무자 보호와 경합절차가 작은 채권의 회수를 사실상 무의미하게 할 수 있다는 점에서, 이 반론은 회복이 줄어드는 손실과 회수 비용에 결과가 못 따르는 불편을 함께 겨냥한다. 다만 그 손실을 줄이는 길을 현행 보호 종류를 옛 목록으로 대체하거나 시행령 금액을 추정하는 데서 찾을 수는 없다. 현행 목록에는 제246조의2에 따른 생계비계좌에 예치된 예금이 들어 있고, 급여채권과 생계유지 예금의 단서는 각각 대통령령이 정하는 금액을 참조한다(민사집행법 제246조). 이 기준을 확정되지 않은 값으로 메우지 않는 한, 회복이 줄어드는 불이익은 남지만 그 불이익을 이유로 보호 종류를 바꾸지는 않는다.
합성 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 두 가지뿐이다. 이를 앞의 조건과 대조하면, B의 예금 중 어떤 부분이 제1항 각 호의 어느 항목에 닿는지, 금융기관 C가 제기한 경합이 해당 현금화를 어떻게 제한하는지는 이 장면만으로 정해지지 않는다. 제3항의 신청이 있었는지, 법원이 생활형편과 그 밖의 사정을 고려해 압류명령을 취소했거나 제1항의 채권에 대해 압류명령을 했는지도 확인되지 않는다. 따라서 압류가 있었다는 사실만으로 실제 지급이 있었다고 단정할 수 없고, 현금화가 제한된다는 점도 미확인 사유를 넘겨 짚지 않은 채 남겨 둔다. 이 절이 말하는 것은 조건부 구별이며, 자료가 없어 판정할 수 없는 경계는 별도로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 좁다. 반대로 압류의 송달 효력과 현금화 명령의 조건을 갖추고 보호·경합의 제한을 반영한 뒤 실제 지급 자료까지 확인한 경우에는 이 구제가 작동한다는 앞 절의 결론을 다시 세우는 것도 이 범위 안이다. 그러나 제1항 각 호의 종류를 옛 목록으로 바꾸거나 대통령령이 정하는 금액을 추정해 넣는 결론은 이 절이 허용하지 않으며, 어떤 채권이 압류금지채권인지의 확정이나 경합의 최종 판정도 이 문단이 대신하지 않는다. 만약 전부명령이 송달될 때 법정 경합이 확인되면 유효한 채권 이전이라는 결론은 달라진다는 점은 조건을 바꾼 대조로만 읽는다.
5.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
채무자의 모든 채권을 묶을 수 있는가? 이 장면에서 판단할 수 없는 경계가 어디인지 물어야 한다.
해당 문언은 민사집행법 제246조 제1항이다. 그 문언은 “①다음 각호의 채권은 압류하지 못한다”고 정하고 각호가 보호되는 채권의 종류를 나열한다. 이 조문이 말하는 주체는 집행으로 예금을 묶으려는 채권자이고, 금지되는 행위는 압류이며, 조건은 그 예금채권이 열거된 종류에 속하는 것이다. 나머지 각호의 쟁점은 여기서 다루지 않는다.
앞의 제1항이 보호되는 종류를 정하는 기준이라면, 이 제3항은 신청에 따른 범위 조정의 기준이다. 이 둘은 구별되어야 한다. 종류의 열거는 법이 집행에서 보호하는 특정 채권, 곧 압류금지채권을 무엇으로 볼지 정하고, 신청에 따른 조정은 그 범위를 넓히거나 줄이는 절차적 여지를 정하기 때문이다. 이를 나란히 놓아야 현행 생계비계좌 규정이 어느 기준에 놓이는지 보인다.
가장 강한 반론은 보호 범위가 넓으면 정당한 채권의 회복이 줄어든다는 점을 겨냥한다. 채무자 보호와 경합절차가 작은 채권의 회수를 사실상 무의미하게 할 수 있다는 불리함도 지워서는 안 된다. 그러나 이 불리함에도 현행 보호 종류를 옛 목록으로 대체하거나 시행령 금액을 추정할 수는 없다. 열거된 종류의 확인은 문언에 맡기고, 금액이 걸린 부분은 문언이 가리키는 대통령령의 정함에 맡겨야 한다.
이 장면에서 금융기관 C는 경합과 보호되는 예금 부분을 문제 삼는다. 현행 종류에 생계비계좌에 예치된 예금과 1월간 생계유지에 필요한 예금이 놓이는지, 그리고 제3항의 신청에 따른 조정이 있었는지는 자료가 확인되지 않았다. 채권의 존재와 보호 범위, 실제 지급에 필요한 사실이 이 가운데 무엇인지도 장면만으로는 특정되지 않았다. 따라서 이 사항은 불능이 아니라 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 압류금지의 종류와 신청에 따른 범위 조정을 구별하고 현행 생계비계좌 규정을 반영하며, 확인되지 않은 사항은 불능과 구별해 미확정으로 남긴다는 것이다. 보호 범위나 금액을 옛 목록과 추정치로 확정한 결론은 이 절이 허용하지 않는다.
5.4The Records Needed for Determination
앞 절에서 필요한 사실이 확인되지 않으면 판정을 미확정으로 남기고 이를 구제가 막힌 경우와 구별하기로 한 흐름을 받아, 이번에는 그 판정에 어떤 기록이 필요한가를 묻는다. 이 장면에서 A의 회복 요구와 B의 생계 보호가 겹치는 자리를 기록으로 가릴 수 있는지 살펴야 한다.
이 판정의 근거가 되는 문언으로 민사집행법 제246조 제1항은 “다음 각호의 채권은 압류하지 못한다”고 선언한 뒤 그 목록을 둔다. 여기서 말하는 주체는 집행법원과 채권자이고, 금지되는 행위는 각호의 채권에 대한 압류이며, 조건은 해당 채권이 열거된 유형에 속하는 것이다. 같은 항 제8호는 “제246조의2에 따른 생계비계좌에 예치된 예금”을, 제9호는 “제8호에 따른 예금 외에 채무자의 1월간 생계유지에 필요한 예금”을 각각 압류하지 못하는 것으로 든다(민사집행법 제246조).
이 문언과 이 절의 결론을 이으면, 이 판정은 제삼채무자 송달·추심 또는 전부명령·확정·경합 자료·공탁·지급 영수를 근거로 한다. 근거의 목록과 결론의 단정은 서로 다른 두 단계다. 앞의 단계는 어떤 기록이 모여야 그 판정의 전제가 갖추어지는지를, 뒤의 단계는 전제가 갖추어진 뒤에만 서술할 수 있는 판단을 각각 맡는다. 이 둘을 나누지 않으면 자료가 덜 모인 상태를 확정된 결론으로 잘못 읽거나, 반대로 이미 갖추어진 전제를 미확정으로 미루게 된다. 압류금지의 종류를 다루는 문언과 신청에 따른 범위 조정을 다루는 문언을 함께 두면서도 따로 보아야 하는 까닭이 여기에 있다.
보호 범위가 넓으면 정당한 채권의 회복이 줄어든다는 반론은 A가 마땅히 받아야 할 돈의 회수가 줄어든다는 손실을 겨눈다. 민사집행법 제246조 제3항은 “법원은 당사자가 신청하면 채권자와 채무자의 생활형편, 그 밖의 사정을 고려하여 압류명령의 전부 또는 일부를 취소하거나 제1항의 압류금지채권에 대하여 압류명령을 할 수 있다”고 하여(민사집행법 제246조), 신청에 따른 조정 통로를 열어 두고 있음에도, 이 통로가 A의 회복을 보장하는 것은 아니다. 반론이 지적한 불이익을 지우지 않은 채로, 확정된 결론은 그대로 유지한다.
합성 장면에서 이 물음에 걸치는 사실은 금융기관 C가 경합과 보호되는 예금 부분을 문제 삼는다는 것 하나다. 이 사실을 제246조 제1항 제8호의 생계비계좌 예치 예금이나 제9호의 1월간 생계유지에 필요한 예금과 견주어, 어떤 유형이 문제인지는 그 자체로 확정되지 않는다. 제3항의 신청에 따른 조정이 있었는지도 장면에 없다. 제삼채무자 송달·추심 또는 전부명령 확정·경합 자료·공탁·지급 영수 가운데 어느 것이 모였는지 역시 장면으로는 알 수 없으므로, 그 기록이 없으면 결론은 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 필요한 근거가 무엇인지 밝히고 그중 일부가 빠지면 결론을 미확정으로 두는 것까지다. 압류금지의 현행 종류를 옛 목록으로 바꾸거나 시행령이 정하는 금액을 추정하는 해석은 이 절이 허용하지 않는다. 채권의 존재·보호 범위·실제 지급 중 필요한 사실이 확인되지 않은 경우에는 판정을 미확정으로 남기며, 이를 구제가 막힌 경우와 구별한다.
5.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
At that stage, it left behind the standard that the finality of the assignment order and the rule of invalidity in case of concurrence must be viewed together with the effect of transfer of the claim, and what must now be asked is what change in this scene overturns such a stage determination. It must be determined what confirmation in this scene reopens the preceding determination.
With respect to the present question, the relevant text treats the kinds of claims exempt from attachment and the adjustment of scope upon application as two different things. First, paragraph (1) declares "①The following claims shall not be attached," and lists as its subjects "8. Deposits placed in a livelihood maintenance account under Article 246-2" and "9. Deposits, other than those under subparagraph 8, necessary for the debtor's maintenance of livelihood for one month (including installment savings, mutual-aid payments, entrusted funds, and postal transfers)" (Civil Execution Act, Article 246). This language enumerates the kinds of protected claims, referring to claims exempt from attachment, that is, the specific claims that the law protects from enforcement. The scope of the text is that the subject it addresses is the claim subjected to enforcement, the act is the prohibition of attachment, and the condition is falling within the enumerated kinds.
Paragraph (3) of the same Article takes charge of a determination at a different stage. "③The court may, upon application by a party, in consideration of the living circumstances of the creditor and the debtor and other circumstances, revoke the attachment order in whole or in part, or issue an attachment order against the claims exempt from attachment under paragraph (1)" (Civil Execution Act, Article 246). That is, if paragraph (1) determines the kinds of claims to be protected, paragraph (3) determines the court's adjustment of scope in light of a party's application, living circumstances, and other circumstances. The reason the two must be distinguished is that the former means claims that fall outside the subject of enforcement, while the latter asks whether the court may issue or revoke an attachment order even with respect to such claims. This distinction leads directly to the standard that, when statutory concurrence is confirmed, it changes the conclusion of a valid transfer of the claim under the assignment order, and that, once the specified change is confirmed, the existing blocking and effectiveness determinations must be discarded and the determination redone from the stage onward.
The counterargument that a broad scope of protection reduces the recovery of legitimate claims squarely targets the loss. The greater the portion of the money Creditor A seeks to recover that is blocked as exempt from attachment, the smaller the remaining share, and recovery of small claims may become virtually meaningless. Even without erasing such inconvenience and value, the current protected kinds cannot be replaced with an old list, nor can the amount set by the Enforcement Decree be estimated. While acknowledging the costs the counterargument points to, the boundary is maintained that the answer cannot be padded by importing kinds or amounts not found in the text.
The relevant facts in the synthetic scene are that Creditor A attached the deposits of Debtor B, and that Financial Institution C raises issues as to the concurrence and the protected portion of deposits. Whether the protected portion of deposits falls within the kinds enumerated in paragraph (1), and whether an adjustment of scope in light of living circumstances and other circumstances is necessary, is not determined by this scene alone. The assumption that "if statutory concurrence is confirmed at the time of service of the assignment order, it changes the conclusion of a valid transfer of the claim under that order" is merely a case in which one condition of determination is changed; it does not mean that such a fact has actually been confirmed in the scene. Nor is it revealed in this scene which of service on the third-party debtor, collection, or materials on the assignment order, its finality, concurrence, deposit (payment into court), or receipt of payment are present.
The conclusion permitted by this section goes no further than distinguishing the kinds of claims exempt from attachment as fixed by the text from the adjustment of scope upon application by a party, and includes that the distinction reflects the current livelihood maintenance account provisions. Conclusions that broaden or narrow the scope of protection by replacing the current protected kinds with an old list or by estimating the amount set by the Enforcement Decree are not permitted. A conclusion that asserts recovery results without confirmation of actual payment materials also exceeds this scope.
5.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
Bearing in mind the point that, if statutory concurrence is confirmed at the time of service of the assignment order, it changes the conclusion of a valid transfer of the claim under that order, this section now examines the counterargument raised against that conclusion. In such a scene, the counterargument that a broad scope of protection reduces the recovery of legitimate claims gains persuasive force. However, to the question whether all of the debtor's claims can be bundled, the author answers that the current protected kinds cannot be replaced with an old list, nor can the amount set by the Enforcement Decree be estimated. The analysis begins by confirming the text of the provision as to what this judgment presupposes.
Article 246, paragraph (1) of the Civil Execution Act declares "①The following claims shall not be attached," and then states the subjects of protection in its enumerated form (Civil Execution Act, Article 246). This language refers to the claims listed in each subparagraph; the subject of each subparagraph is the debtor, the act is attachment, and the condition is the case where the enforcement authority takes the claim as an object of attachment. The subparagraphs include alimony and survivor's relief benefits provided by statutes and regulations, income that the debtor continues to receive from relief work or the assistance of third parties, and soldiers' pay, and an amount corresponding to one-half of wage claims such as salaries, pensions, wages, bonuses, and retirement pensions is also protected (Civil Execution Act, Article 246). The point the author notes here concerns deposits: the fact that deposits placed in a livelihood maintenance account under subparagraph 8 and, separately, deposits necessary for the debtor's maintenance of livelihood for one month are written out (Civil Execution Act, Article 246). This paragraph only prevents attachment of the kinds of claims written in the provision; it does not bundle other claims together as well.
Because the language of paragraph (1) limits the subjects of protection to the subparagraphs, the author fits to it the definition of claims exempt from attachment, that is, the specific claims the law protects from enforcement. As a result, the question whether all of the debtor's claims can be bundled must be read, on paragraph (1) alone, as limited to the enumerated kinds. The author separates the two stages because the determination of the protected kinds and the adjustment of their scope require different judgments. Paragraph (1) states which claims fall outside the objects of attachment, while how far to protect them within those subparagraphs is left as a separate question. The fact that the current livelihood maintenance account provisions are placed in subparagraph 8 belongs to the former determination of kinds, and the amount prescribed by the Enforcement Decree belongs to the latter adjustment of scope. The author regards it as more faithful to the text not to mix the two stages by replacing the former list with an old list or by estimating the latter amount at present.
The strongest counterargument to this distinction aims at the point that a broad scope of protection reduces the recovery of legitimate claims, and further that debtor protection and the concurrence procedure may render the recovery of small claims virtually meaningless. In the scene where Financial Institution C raises issues as to the concurrence and the protected portion of deposits, the disadvantage that the share recoverable by Creditor A diminishes is real. The counterargument contends that this disadvantage can hardly be justified in the name of protecting the debtor's livelihood. However, the answer the author maintains is that, without denying that disadvantage, the current protected kinds cannot be replaced with an old list, nor can the amount set by the Enforcement Decree be estimated. The fact that recovery may diminish points only to the need for an adjustment of scope; it does not furnish grounds for substituting for that adjustment replacement and estimation not found in the text.
Article 246, paragraph (3) of the Civil Execution Act provides: "The court may, upon application by a party, in consideration of the living circumstances of the creditor and the debtor and other circumstances, revoke the attachment order in whole or in part, or issue an attachment order against the claims exempt from attachment under paragraph (1)." (Civil Execution Act, Article 246). This paragraph takes a party's application as a condition and shows that the court may adjust the scope with respect to the kinds under paragraph (1) in consideration of living circumstances and other circumstances. The protected portion of deposits raised as an issue by Financial Institution C may become the object of such adjustment, but which amount is protected is not fixed by the language of this paragraph alone. The finality of the assignment order, the effect of concurrence, and the presence or absence of actual payment are likewise not questions answered by the language of this paragraph, and are not confirmed by the synthetic scene alone. Accordingly, if materials on living circumstances are lacking, that part remains undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section remains at the judgment that the current protected kinds cannot be replaced with an old list, nor can the amount set by the Enforcement Decree be estimated, together with the explanation that the kinds under paragraph (1) and the adjustment of scope upon application under paragraph (3) must be distinguished and that the current livelihood maintenance account provisions must be reflected. The disadvantage urged by the counterargument, that a broad scope of protection reduces recovery, remains as it is, but that disadvantage cannot be a reason for accepting replacement and estimation not found in the text. In light of the definition that claims exempt from attachment are the specific claims the law protects from enforcement, a reading that bundles all of the debtor's claims at once does not accord with the language of the subparagraphs of paragraph (1). However, within what scope the adjustment under paragraph (3) is made, and whether that adjustment led to actual payment, cannot be determined by this section.
5.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The preceding section received the conclusion that the current protected kinds cannot be replaced with an old list, nor can the amount set by the Enforcement Decree be estimated. If so, what is asked from the outset is simple.
Article 246, paragraph (1) of the Civil Execution Act provides as follows. "①The following claims shall not be attached." (Civil Execution Act, Article 246) This language as written leaves in place claims that fall outside the objects of attachment, that is, claims exempt from attachment. The subparagraphs list the kinds of those subjects of protection, and this section deals only with the scope of that language.
The structure of the provision divides into two layers. Paragraph (1) determines the kinds of protected claims, and paragraph (3) provides for adjustment upon application by a party. Article 246, paragraph (3) of the Civil Execution Act provides as follows. "③The court may, upon application by a party, in consideration of the living circumstances of the creditor and the debtor and other circumstances, revoke the attachment order in whole or in part, or issue an attachment order against the claims exempt from attachment under paragraph (1)." (Civil Execution Act, Article 246) Accordingly, the language "shall not be attached" and the adjustment of scope upon application must be distinguished. Paragraph (1) prohibits in principle the attachment of certain claims, while paragraph (3) permits an exceptional adjustment in light of a party's application, living circumstances, and other circumstances. The former determines the kinds of protection and the latter is an adjustment of scope upon application, so neither one alone can determine whether all claims are subject to attachment. Deposits placed in a livelihood maintenance account are also protected through Article 246-2 pursuant to paragraph (1), subparagraph 8, and the enumeration from subparagraph 1 through subparagraph 9 must be read as the current language stands.
However, the counterargument that a broad scope of protection reduces the recovery of legitimate claims is not a small one. From Creditor A's standpoint, the routes for recovering a confirmed claim are reduced, and the broader the scope of claims exempt from attachment, the more the recovery of small claims may become virtually meaningless. Financial Institution C's objection concerning the deposits subject to concurrence points in the same direction. The broader the protected portion of deposits, the smaller the recoverable amount. Even so, this counterargument cannot itself set the scope of protection. That is because the current protected kinds cannot be replaced with an old list, nor can the amount set by the Enforcement Decree be estimated. The loss the counterargument points to is real, but changing the enumeration of protected kinds on account of that loss is beyond the scope of this section.
The facts corresponding to this question in the synthetic scene are limited. Creditor A attached the deposits of Debtor B, and Financial Institution C raises issues as to the concurrence and the protected portion of deposits. This scene alone does not determine which deposits are livelihood maintenance account deposits, which portion is deposits necessary for the debtor's maintenance of livelihood for one month, and whether the amount meets the standard prescribed by Presidential Decree. Since the scene sets no year, amount, or starting date, it cannot be fixed by calculation either. Accordingly, the scope of protected deposits remains undetermined. What is clear, however, is that the language prescribing the kinds of claims exempt from attachment must be distinguished from the adjustment of scope upon application by a party, and that the determination must be made under the language reflecting the current livelihood maintenance account provisions.
The conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. Not all of the debtor's claims can be bundled; the kinds of claims exempt from attachment are determined according to the enumeration in the current language, and the adjustment of scope upon application by a party must be placed as a separate stage of determination. Here, the protection of deposits placed in a livelihood maintenance account is also handled according to the current language. However, this section does not determine the specific amount of protected deposits, the confirmation of the standard set by the Enforcement Decree, replacement with an old list, or actual recovery results. Parts for which materials are absent remain undetermined.
5.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
This section revisits the point where the creditor's need for recovery meets the debtor's statutory protection of livelihood. Once an account has been frozen, what conditions must be met before the money can be received? Before this question is answered, it must first be examined whether all of the debtor's claims can be frozen at once. The scope of the assignment of claims discussed in the preceding section and the scope of protection discussed in this section interlock with one another yet remain distinct. Keeping intact the premise that the finality of the assignment order and the rule of nullity in the event of concurrence, confirmed in the earlier stage, must be considered together with the effect of the assignment of claims, this section addresses only the scope of claims that cannot be frozen.
The types of claims exempt from attachment are prescribed in paragraph (1) of Article 246 of the Civil Execution Act. Its text declares, "(1) The following claims shall not be attached," and then places first, in order, alimony and survivor's assistance benefits provided by statute, income continuously received from relief work or with the assistance of a third party, and a soldier's pay. It then enumerates one-half of wage claims such as salary, pension, wages, bonuses, and retirement pensions; one-half of wage claims of a nature similar to retirement pay; the amount for which preferential payment may be received under the Housing Lease Protection Act; and insurance proceeds under protection-type insurance. The current provisions further protect, in subparagraph 8, money deposited in a livelihood maintenance account under Article 246-2, and, in subparagraph 9, other deposits necessary for the maintenance of livelihood for one month. The subject referred to here is the debtor, the object protected is the specific claim received by that debtor, and the act prohibited is attachment by the court.
Connecting this text with the conclusion confirmed above shows that paragraph (1), which prescribes the types of claims exempt from attachment, and paragraph (3), which prescribes the adjustment of scope upon application, are situated at different stages. Paragraph (3) provides: "The court may, upon application by a party, in consideration of the living circumstances of the creditor and the debtor and other circumstances, revoke an attachment order in whole or in part, or issue an attachment order with respect to claims exempt from attachment under paragraph (1)." That is, paragraph (1) prescribes the types of specific claims that the law protects in enforcement, namely claims exempt from attachment, while paragraph (3) enables the court, on the requirement of a party's application, to adjust that scope in consideration of living circumstances and other circumstances. The two stages must be distinguished because the judgment determining the types of protection and the judgment adjusting the scope pass through different requirements and examinations. In addition, because the current livelihood maintenance account provisions protect deposits by distinguishing their nature in subparagraphs 8 and 9, these must be reflected as the current text stands rather than replaced with an old list.
As the protected portion of the deposits of debtor B expands, the share creditor A can recover diminishes accordingly, and recovery of small claims may become practically meaningless. Concurrence proceedings may compound this problem. If financial institution C raises an issue as to concurrence with the protected portion of deposits, the range that creditor A can actually obtain from the frozen account narrows further. This disadvantage must not be erased. The amount prescribed by the Enforcement Decree is a matter delegated by the statutory text, and this section therefore does not estimate that amount. Accordingly, this counterargument cannot serve as a ground for demanding a reduction of the scope of protection.
In the synthetic scene, the facts relevant to this question are limited. What can be confirmed in this scene is only that the protected portion of deposits bears upon the scope of attachment. Contrasting the types of deposits protected by paragraph (1) with the scope adjusted upon application by paragraph (3), whether the protected portion raised by financial institution C falls on the one side or the other is not determined by that fact alone. Whether the deposits of debtor B are a livelihood maintenance account, whether they are deposits necessary for the maintenance of livelihood for one month under subparagraph 9, and what amount is assumed are likewise not fixed in the scene. The amount prescribed by the Enforcement Decree is undetermined, and this does not mean that relief is impossible. Nor have the actual records—materials on service upon and collection from the third-party debtor, or on the assignment order, finality, concurrence, deposit (payment into court), or payment receipt—been secured, so whether recovery has been completed cannot be adjudged on the basis of this scene.
The conclusion this section permits stops at the distinction that claims exempt from attachment are specific claims that the law protects in enforcement, that their types are prescribed in paragraph (1) of Article 246 of the Civil Execution Act, and that the adjustment of scope upon application is prescribed in paragraph (3) of the same Article. The current livelihood maintenance account provisions must be reflected rather than replaced with an old list, and the amount under the Enforcement Decree cannot be estimated. Going beyond this to assert categorically that money can be received immediately from an attached account, or to conclude that the scope of protection must be narrowed, is not permitted by this section. Adjudging actual payment or the completion of recovery is likewise not within the remit here.
5.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
From the premise that the finality of the assignment order and the rule of nullity in the event of concurrence must be considered together with the effect of the assignment of claims, the question is how the text of the relevant provision is situated within the process running from attachment to collection, assignment, and receipt. In this scene, it must be examined which of B's claims fall outside enforcement, and whether the process can proceed to monetization only after that scope has been fixed.
Article 246 of the Civil Execution Act first declares, "(1) The following claims shall not be attached," and enumerates in each subparagraph the types of objects protected. Here the subject is the debtor, the act is attachment by the creditor, and the condition is that the claim falls under one of the enumerated types (Civil Execution Act, Article 246). This text places in separate positions the judgment determining the types of prohibition and the judgment by which the court adjusts the scope upon a party's application.
These two texts point in the same direction in that they fix the scope of protection at the attachment stage, but they address different judgments. Paragraph (1) prescribes a limitation of type, namely that the enumerated claims are excluded from the objects of attachment, while paragraph (3) prescribes a procedural adjustment, namely that when a party applies, the court may widen or narrow that limitation in consideration of living circumstances and other circumstances (Civil Execution Act, Article 246). Accordingly, when judging the transition from attachment to collection, assignment, and receipt, one must first fix the scope of claims that may be regarded as attached, and only then discuss the conditions for a collection order or an assignment order. Here, too, are placed the current provisions on the livelihood maintenance account in subparagraph 8 of paragraph (1) and on deposits necessary for the maintenance of livelihood for one month in subparagraph 9 (Civil Execution Act, Article 246). Because only that text is taken as the basis, its scope cannot be enlarged by drawing in the reasons for a judgment.
Even so, the counterargument does not disappear that, if the scope of protection widens, the recovery of legitimate claims diminishes. The concern that debtor protection and concurrence proceedings may render the recovery of small claims practically meaningless targets directly the loss on the side that needs recovery. Yet the path to answering this concern does not open toward replacing the current types of protection with an old list or estimating the amount under the Enforcement Decree. The text confirmed above merely provides the current types in each subparagraph of paragraph (1) and the adjustment upon application in paragraph (3), and permits neither substitution with an old list nor estimation of the amount to be prescribed by Presidential Decree (Civil Execution Act, Article 246). Therefore, with the disadvantage of reduced recovery left in place, the judgment is made only within the scope of the text as fixed.
Returning to the synthetic scene, the concurrence and the protected portion of deposits raised by financial institution C become the question of whether the deposited amount in the livelihood maintenance account under paragraph (1), subparagraph 8, and the deposits necessary for the maintenance of livelihood for one month under subparagraph 9 are implicated (Civil Execution Act, Article 246). If those deposits of B's fall within the enumerated types, they are excluded from the objects of attachment; and if adjustment of scope is at issue, a party's application under paragraph (3) and the court's consideration of living circumstances are separately required (Civil Execution Act, Article 246). However, because no year or amount is fixed in the scene, how much of which deposits is protected, and how far the concurrence has actually proceeded, cannot be determined from this scene alone. The necessary facts remain unverified.
The conclusion this section permits is this: to distinguish paragraph (1), which prescribes the types of claims exempt from attachment, from paragraph (3), which prescribes the adjustment of scope upon a party's application; to reflect the current provisions on livelihood maintenance accounts and deposits for maintenance of livelihood as they stand; and thus to judge the transition from attachment to collection, assignment, and receipt. Conversely, what it does not permit is a judgment that draws in the reasons for a judgment from outside that text to newly define the scope of protection, or that replaces the current types of protection with an old list and invents the amount under the Enforcement Decree.
5.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
From the premise that the finality of the assignment order and the rule of nullity in the event of concurrence must be considered together with the effect of the assignment of claims, the question remaining within the transition from attachment to collection, assignment, and receipt is where the detailed distinctions should stop. Yet what are the parts within this transition that must be divided and adjudged again?
Article 246 of the Civil Execution Act declares in paragraph (1), "(1) The following claims shall not be attached," and lists in its subparagraphs alimony and survivor's assistance benefits, income continuously received from relief work or with the assistance of a third party, a soldier's pay, one-half of wage claims, one-half of retirement pay, the amount of preferential payment, insurance proceeds under protection-type insurance, deposits placed in a livelihood maintenance account, and deposits necessary for the maintenance of livelihood for one month. Here the claims protected are claims exempt from attachment, that is, specific claims that the law protects in enforcement. Paragraph (3) of the same Article provides that "the court may, upon application by a party, in consideration of the living circumstances of the creditor and the debtor and other circumstances, revoke an attachment order in whole or in part, or issue an attachment order with respect to claims exempt from attachment under paragraph (1)"; accordingly, the types of protection and the adjustment of scope upon application are situated in different positions as a matter of text.
Connecting these two distinctions to the conclusion of this section, the detailed distinctions within the stage are limited to cases where it operates, cases where it is blocked, and cases that are undetermined. A case where it operates is one in which the service effect of attachment and the conditions of the monetization order have been met, the limitations of protection and concurrence have been reflected, and the actual payment materials have been confirmed; a case where it is blocked is one in which there is only attachment and no statutory conditions for collection or assignment, or no actual payment, or in which the monetization in question is restricted by exemption from attachment or concurrence; and an undetermined case is one in which, among the existence of the claim, the scope of protection, and actual payment, the necessary facts have not been confirmed. That is to say, the scope is not adjusted by the enumeration of types, nor does protection vanish merely upon application.
On this point the strongest counterargument is that if the scope of protection is broad, the recovery of legitimate claims diminishes. The counterargument points to the loss and inconvenience that debtor protection and concurrence proceedings may make recovery of small claims practically meaningless, and demands that protection be narrowed by placing the value of the claims to be recovered ahead of livelihood protection. Even without erasing those adverse aspects, the current types of protection cannot be replaced with an old list, nor can the amount under the Enforcement Decree be estimated. The narrowing demanded by the counterargument would result in absorbing one side into the other while leaving aside the current subparagraphs of paragraph (1) and the consideration of application and circumstances under paragraph (3), and a narrowing outside those conditions is not the conclusion of this section.
In the synthetic scene, the only fact related to this question is that financial institution C raises concurrence and the protected portion of deposits as issues. This fact can be contrasted with the deposits protected under paragraph (1), and further with the consideration of living circumstances and circumstances under paragraph (3), but which subparagraph applies and how much is protected are not determined by the scene. Since the amount to be prescribed by the Enforcement Decree cannot be established from outside the scene, the fixing of the scope of protection remains undetermined. If statutory concurrence is confirmed at the time the assignment order is served, the conclusion of a valid assignment of claims changes.
Accordingly, the conclusion this section permits stops at distinguishing the types of claims exempt from attachment from the adjustment of scope upon application and reflecting the current livelihood maintenance account provisions. It is not permitted to hasten to assert which subparagraph reaches the deposits in this scene, what the amount is, or whether actual payment has been made.
5.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
Up to the preceding stage, the view has been taken that not all of the debtor's claims can be frozen at once. The question now is at what point to hold the transition running from attachment to collection, assignment, and receipt as open, at what point as blocked, and at what point as still unknown. In this scene, effectiveness does not mean the outcome of actually receiving money, but the state in which the legal route has been opened once its conditions are met.
In answering this question, the text of Article 246 of the Civil Execution Act is placed first. Paragraph (1) declares, "(1) The following claims shall not be attached," and its subparagraphs list in turn alimony and survivor's assistance benefits, income continuously received from relief work or with the assistance of a third party, a soldier's pay, one-half of wage claims, one-half of wage claims of a nature similar to retirement pay, the amount of preferential payment under the Housing Lease Protection Act, protection-type insurance proceeds, deposits placed in a livelihood maintenance account, and deposits necessary for the maintenance of livelihood for one month. Here the subject protected is the debtor, the objects protected are the enumerated claims, and the act protected against is attachment. The provisos of the same paragraph leave the scope to an amount prescribed by Presidential Decree.
The same provision also contains the content that the scope of protection may be adjusted. This text separates the task of determining the types of claims exempt from attachment from the task of adjusting the scope, even within those types, through application and consideration of living circumstances. The former distinction of type draws the line of claims to be protected, while the latter adjustment entrusts the court with the power to enable or undo attachment of those claims. The two are distinct stages of judgment.
If the portion corresponding to deposits in a livelihood maintenance account or to deposits for one month's maintenance of livelihood is excluded from the amount creditor A seeks to recover, then B's performance and A's recovery are reduced by that much. If concurrence proceedings are added on top of that, the recovery of small claims may become meaningless relative to the effort involved. Filling with an arbitrary figure the place that paragraph (1) leaves to consideration of the livelihood maintenance account and the amount under Article 195, subparagraph 3, amounts to shifting the decision-maker fixed by the text.
In the synthetic scene, the facts related to this question are only the attachment of deposits and the assertion of concurrence and protection by financial institution C. Creditor A has effected attachment, but the conditions for a collection order or an assignment order, whether such orders have become final, and actual payment materials such as a payment receipt or a deposit (payment into court) are not specified. Accordingly, the transition remains at the attachment stage, neither yet open nor blocked. However, if the protected portion of deposits and concurrence are confirmed, the claims fall under those for which paragraph (1) of Article 246 of the Civil Execution Act prohibits attachment, and the monetization in question is thus blocked. Whether adjustment upon application under paragraph (3) took place, and how living circumstances were considered, are absent from the scene and are left undetermined. If statutory concurrence is confirmed at the time the assignment order is served, this changes the conclusion that the order effected a valid assignment of claims.
The conclusion this section permits is that the transition opens where the service effect of attachment and the conditions of the monetization order have been met, the limitations of protection and concurrence have been reflected, and the actual payment materials have been confirmed. It is blocked where there is only attachment and no statutory conditions for collection or assignment, or no actual payment, or where the monetization in question is restricted by exemption from attachment or concurrence. Where, among the existence of the claim, the scope of protection, and actual payment, the necessary facts have not been confirmed, the matter is undetermined, and insufficient materials are not converted at once into impossibility of relief. Conversely, this section does not permit arbitrarily reducing the types that the text protects, such as deposits placed in a livelihood maintenance account, or inventing the amount to be prescribed by Presidential Decree and adding it to recovery.
5.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
The preceding section found that the mechanism operates where the service effect of the attachment and the conditions for a monetization order are satisfied, the restrictions of protection and concurrent claims are reflected, and the actual payment data are confirmed as well; that it is blocked where there is only an attachment but the statutory conditions for collection or assignment, or an actual payment, are absent, or where the monetization in question is restricted by exemptions from attachment or by concurrent claims; and that it remains undetermined where necessary facts among the existence of the claim, the scope of protection, and the actual payment have not been confirmed. Now, within that remaining range, the question is this: can all of the debtor's claims be seized as a single bundle?
To answer this question, the text of Article 246 (1) of the Civil Execution Act must first be read. After declaring that "(1) The following claims in each subparagraph shall not be attached," that provision goes on to enumerate, in order, maintenance allowances and survivors' relief benefits, income continuously received from relief work or the assistance of a third party, a soldier's salary, one-half of wage claims, one-half of retirement pay, preferential payment money under the Housing Lease Protection Act, insurance proceeds of protection-type insurance, "deposits placed in a livelihood expense account under Article 246-2," and, further, deposits necessary for the maintenance of livelihood for one month (Civil Execution Act, Article 246). The subjects whom the law says here "shall not attach" are the execution court and the attaching creditor, and the objects protected are claims bearing the enumerated characteristics.
The distinction that this text creates forms the framework of the present determination. Exempt claims are the specific claims that the law protects from execution; independent of whether a claim against the debtor exists, they constitute a limitation upon whether the execution procedure may lay hands on that claim. Paragraph (3) opens a further dimension. If the enumeration of types in paragraph (1) is the principal axis of protection, then the adjustment upon application under paragraph (3) is a separate device that widens or narrows the scope to fit individual circumstances. If the two are conflated, one can easily overlook the deposits placed in a livelihood expense account that appear on the current list.
The counterargument that, where the scope of protection is broad, the recovery of legitimate claims is diminished carries real weight. If the recoverable portion of a small claim is narrowed, the collection sought by Creditor A itself may become virtually meaningless. The provision takes as its standard the amount prescribed by Presidential Decree in consideration of the minimum cost of living and the standard household cost of living, and does not itself stipulate that sum. The disadvantage of the counterargument stands as it is, but the task of supplying the value directed by the law is not a part of this determination.
In the synthetic scene, Creditor A has attached the deposits of Debtor B, and Financial Institution C raises issues of concurrent claims and the protected portion of deposits. What is confirmed in this scene is nothing more than the fact that an attachment exists and that the scope of protection has become a contested issue. Which item among the subparagraphs of paragraph (1) corresponds to which of B's deposits, whether an application under paragraph (3) was made, what the amount prescribed by the Enforcement Decree is, and whether an assignment order became final and an actual payment was made — on all of these there are no data. Accordingly, what can be asserted in this section is a limited distinction: the current categories of protection must be separated from the adjustment of scope upon application, and the current list, including the livelihood expense account provision, must be left as it is.
What this section permits is the conclusion that distinguishes the categories of exemption from attachment from the adjustment of scope upon application and that reflects the current livelihood expense account provision. What this section does not permit is substitution by the former list, estimation of the amount under the Enforcement Decree, and assertion of an unconfirmed recovery effect. The remaining question is passed to the next section: does the reply of a third-party debtor, or a deposit (payment into court), constitute completion of recovery?