Summary
Permissibility according to the nature of the obligation, and an order of compensation based on the performance period and non-performance, are distinguished from the realization of the original performance.
5.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
앞 절에서는 채권자가 필요한 비용의 선지급 결정을 신청할 수 있는지와 초과비용의 후속 청구 가능성을 구분한다. 이 결론을 전제로 이번 물음은 금전 부담이 커도 채무자가 행동으로 옮기지 않는다면 판결에서 정한 원래 이행이 이미 완료된 것인지, 그리고 이 구제의 통로가 열리는 기준이 무엇인지 묻는다. 압박할 수 있다는 사실이 실제로 행동했다는 증거가 되지는 않는다. 채권자 A는 특정한 물건의 인도와 피고 B의 의사표시를 요구하는 판결을 받았으나 같은 방식으로 집행할 수 있는지 묻는다. 이 장면에서 요구하는 급부는 물건의 인도와 의사표시라는 두 가지 성질의 행위다. 두 행위를 한 방식으로 강제할 수 있는지부터 정해야 한다. A와 B 사이에서 무대의 입구가 열리는 기준을 아래에서 살핀다.
해당 원문은 민사집행법 제261조 제1항이다. 이 조문은 “①채무의 성질이 간접강제를 할 수 있는 경우에 제1심 법원은 채권자의 신청에 따라 간접강제를 명하는 결정을 한다.”(민사집행법 제261조)고 먼저 선을 긋는다. 여기서 말하는 주체는 제1심 법원이고, 행위는 간접강제를 명하는 결정이며, 조건은 채무의 성질이 간접강제를 할 수 있다는 점이다. 뒤이어 조문은 “그 결정에는 채무의 이행의무 및 상당한 이행기간을 밝히고, 채무자가 그 기간 이내에 이행을 하지 아니하는 때에는 늦어진 기간에 따라 일정한 배상을 하도록 명하거나 즉시 손해배상을 하도록 명할 수 있다.”(민사집행법 제261조)고 정한다. 문언은 이행의무와 상당한 이행기간을 결정에 밝히고, 그 기간 안에 이행하지 아니하는 때의 배상을 명한다고만 할 뿐이다.
위 문언에서 요구하는 급부의 성질에 맞는 인도·대체집행·간접강제·의사표시 집행의 요건과 결정이 갖추어진 경우 이 구제의 입구가 열린다. 두 개념은 여기서 구분된다. 간접강제는 불이행에 대한 금전 부담으로 이행을 유도하는 방식이며, 이는 채무의 성질이 그 방식을 허용하는지, 이행의무와 이행기간이 결정에 밝혀졌는지, 불이행 시 배상이 명해졌는지를 묻는 단계다. 그와 달리 원래 급부의 실현은 판결이 정한 인도나 의사표시가 실제로 이루어졌는지를 묻는 단계다. 금전 부담이 커지는 결과는 후자의 완료를 앞당기지 못한다. 앞 문단의 문언이 이행을 유도한다는 표현을 쓴 것도 같은 이치에서다.
그렇다면 가장 강한 반론은 이런 불편을 겨냥한다. 금전 부담이 커도 고집스러운 채무자는 이행하지 않을 수 있고, 채무자만 할 수 있는 행위를 강제하는 방식은 인격과 자유를 침해할 수 있다. 이 손실을 가볍게 볼 수 없다. 강제로 징수한 금전은 채권자의 예상을 충족시킬지언정 판결이 지정한 행위가 수행됐다는 기록을 대신 세워주지 못하고, 채무자 개인에게 얹힌 부담은 그 사람이 몸으로 무언가를 하도록 밀어붙이는 경계선에 닿는다. 그렇다고 간접강제금 지급을 원래 비금전 급부의 이행 완료로 바꿀 수는 없다. 반론이 드러낸 피해는 간접강제라는 수단의 선택이 남긴 비용이고, 그 비용을 치르더라도 급부 성질에 맞는 방식의 요건과 결정이 갖추어진 경우에 한해 이 구제의 통로가 열리는 범위는 변하지 않는다. 다만 조건부 의사표시의 반대의무 등 요건이 남아 있는 경우는 이 입구에 들어가지 못한다.
합성 장면으로 돌아와 보자. A가 받은 판결은 특정한 물건의 인도와 B의 의사표시라는 두 급부를 요구한다. 앞서 정한 기준에 따르면 물건의 인도에 대해서는 급부 내용·목적물 현황·대체 가능성·집행결정·반대의무 이행·수령 기록을 통해, B의 의사표시에 대해서는 의사표시 집행의 요건과 결정이 갖추어졌는지를 통해 각각 판단한다. 대체 가능한 행위가 일신전속 행위로 확인되면 대체집행이라는 선택을 중단한다. 이 조건이 충족되는지는 실제 판정이 따로 필요하다. 두 급부가 같은 방식으로 강제되는지도 이 장면만으로는 확정할 수 없고, 목적물이 존재하는지, 누가 수행할 수 있는 행위인지가 확인되지 않은 경우에는 미확정으로 남는다. 판결을 받았다는 사실만으로 어느 한쪽의 통로가 열린 것으로 단정할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론과 그렇지 않은 결론의 경계는 이렇게 정리된다. 급부 성질에 맞는 인도·대체집행·간접강제·의사표시 집행의 요건과 결정이 갖추어진 경우, 이 구제의 입구는 열린다. 이는 금전 부담이 무겁다는 사실만으로 간접강제금 지급이 원래 비금전 급부의 이행 완료로 전환된다는 뜻은 아니며, 채무자가 이행하지 않을 가능성이라는 반론의 불리함도 지워지지 않는다. 이 문단은 입구의 기준을 확인했을 뿐이고, B의 서명이 없는 상태에서 권리변동의 가능성을 논하지 않는다.
5.2The Conditions That Block Relief
금전 압박이 가해졌다는 사실만으로 채무자가 실제로 원래의 이행을 마쳤다는 뜻은 되지 않는다. 앞 절에서 급부 성질에 맞는 인도·대체집행·간접강제·의사표시 집행의 요건과 결정이 갖추어진 경우에는 이 구제가 작동한다는 결론을 확인했으므로, 이제 그 구제가 막히는 조건은 무엇인가를 묻는다.
민사집행법 제261조 제1항은 이렇게 정한다. "채무의 성질이 간접강제를 할 수 있는 경우에 제1심 법원은 채권자의 신청에 따라 간접강제를 명하는 결정을 한다. 그 결정에는 채무의 이행의무 및 상당한 이행기간을 밝히고, 채무자가 그 기간 이내에 이행을 하지 아니하는 때에는 늦어진 기간에 따라 일정한 배상을 하도록 명하거나 즉시 손해배상을 하도록 명할 수 있다."(민사집행법 제261조) 이 문언에서 '채무의 성질이 간접강제를 할 수 있는 경우'는 간접강제를 명할 수 있는지의 첫 관문이며, '제1심 법원'은 결정의 주체이고, '채권자의 신청'은 개시 조건이다. 나머지 부분은 이행의무·이행기간·불이행에 따른 배상 명령을 규정한다.
위 문언의 요구와 이 절의 결론을 이어 보면, 간접강제는 불이행에 대한 금전 부담으로 이행을 유도하는 방식으로서 두 단계가 구별된다. 먼저 선택한 강제방식으로 수행할 수 없는 성질의 채무라면 관문을 넘지 못해 이 구제가 막힌다. 나아가 조건부 의사표시의 반대의무 등 요건이 남아 있는 경우에도 같은 막힘이 성립한다. 그리고 이행기간 경과 후의 배상 명령은 원래 급부의 실현이 아니라 별도의 금전 부담이므로, 두 판단을 하나로 합칠 수 없다.
가장 강한 반론은 이 지점을 겨냥한다. 이 불이익은 지우지 않은 채 두어야 한다. 그러나 간접강제금 지급을 원래 비금전 급부의 이행 완료로 바꿀 수는 없다. 금전 부담의 크기가 커져도 그것은 이행을 유도하는 압박일 뿐, 물건의 인도나 의사표시라는 원래 급부가 실현된 것은 아니기 때문이다.
합성 장면에서 이 물음에 해당하는 사실은 한정되어 있다. A가 받은 판결은 특정한 물건의 인도와 B의 의사표시를 요구하는데, 이 두 급부가 각각 어떤 강제방식으로 수행될 수 있는 성질인지, 그리고 의사표시에 조건부 의사표시의 반대의무 등 남은 요건이 있는지는 장면에 정해져 있지 않다. 급부 내용·목적물 현황·대체 가능성·집행결정·반대의무 이행·수령 기록이 필요한데, 대체 가능한 행위가 일신전속 행위로 확인되면 대체집행이라는 선택을 중단한다. 따라서 장면만으로는 판정할 수 없는 부분이 남는다.
정리하면, 이 절이 허용하는 것은 선택한 강제방식으로 수행할 수 없는 성질의 채무이거나 조건부 의사표시의 반대의무 등 요건이 남아 있는 경우 이 구제가 막힌다는 판단이며, 간접강제의 금전 부담을 원래 급부의 이행 완료로 바꾸는 결론은 허용하지 않는다.
5.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
금전 압박이 있으면 원래 이행도 완료되는가? 채무 성질에 따른 허용 여부와 이행기간 및 불이행에 따른 배상 명령을 원래 급부의 실현과 구별해야 하는 경계에서, 판단 재료가 특정되지 않은 사항을 어디에 두어야 하는지가 이 물음이다.
민사집행법 제261조 제1항은 "채무의 성질이 간접강제를 할 수 있는 경우에 제1심 법원은 채권자의 신청에 따라 간접강제를 명하는 결정을 한다. 그 결정에는 채무의 이행의무 및 상당한 이행기간을 밝히고, 채무자가 그 기간 이내에 이행을 하지 아니하는 때에는 늦어진 기간에 따라 일정한 배상을 하도록 명하거나 즉시 손해배상을 하도록 명할 수 있다."라고 정한다. 이 문언은 이행을 유도할 수 있는 대상이 되는 채무인지, 그리고 법원이 이행의무와 이행기간을 밝힌 뒤 불이행에 따른 배상을 함께 명할 수 있는지를 정한다.
간접강제란 불이행에 대한 금전 부담으로 이행을 유도하는 방식이며, 채무 성질에 따른 허용 여부와 이행기간 및 불이행에 따른 배상 명령을 원래 급부의 실현과 구별해야 한다. 이 둘을 나누는 까닭은 앞의 요소가 법원이 압박의 근거와 시점을 정하는 조건이라면, 뒤의 것은 채무자가 원래 급부를 실제로 이행했는지에 관한 문제이기 때문이다. 따라서 배상의 명령이 가능해진다고 해서 원래 급부의 실현이 이미 완료되었다고 단정할 수는 없다.
금전 부담이 커도 고집스러운 채무자는 이행하지 않을 수 있고, 채무자만 할 수 있는 행위를 강제하는 방식은 인격과 자유를 침해할 수 있다는 반론은 그 불이익을 지우지 않은 채 남는다. 그럼에도 간접강제금 지급을 원래 비금전 급부의 이행 완료로 바꿀 수는 없다. 여기서는 채무 성질에 따른 허용 여부를 판단 근거로 삼으면서도, 원래 급부가 실현되었는지는 별도의 문제로 놓아 두어야 한다.
채권자 A는 특정한 물건의 인도와 피고 B의 의사표시를 요구하는 판결을 받았으나 같은 방식으로 집행할 수 있는지 묻는 장면에서, 확인할 사항은 급부 내용과 목적물 현황, 대체 가능성, 집행결정, 반대의무 이행, 수령 기록의 유형뿐이다. 여기에 목적물이 존재하는지, 또 어떤 행위를 수행할 수 있는지가 드러나지 않았다면, 그 사항은 판단 재료가 특정되지 않은 채로 남는다. 만약 대체 가능한 행위가 일신전속 행위인 것으로 확인되면 대체집행이라는 선택은 중단된다.
따라서 이 절이 허용하는 결론은 원래 급부의 실현과 간접강제의 근거를 구별하고, 확인되지 않은 사항을 불능이 아니라 미확정으로 남기는 데까지다. 목적물의 존재 여부나 수행 주체가 확정되기 전에 그 사항을 불능으로 단정하거나 원래 이행의 완료로 돌리는 것은 이 절이 허용하지 않는다.
5.4The Records Needed for Determination
앞 절의 결론은 자료가 없어 판정할 수 없는 경계를 미확정으로 남기고 구제가 막힌 경우와 구별한다. 판결문이 특정한 인도와 특정한 의사표시를 함께 요구하는 장면에서, 그 판정에는 어떤 기록이 필요한가? 이제 급부의 성격과 현실의 사정을 가르는 기록의 목록을 정해야 한다.
이 문언에서 '채무의 성질'은 간접강제를 허용할 수 있는지의 첫 문턱이고, '신청'은 채권자의 청구, '결정'은 법원의 처분, '이행의무'와 '이행기간'은 그 결정에 밝히는 사항이다. 여기서 간접강제는 불이행에 대한 금전 부담으로 이행을 유도하는 방식을 뜻하며, 늦어진 기간의 배상이나 즉시 손해배상은 불이행을 둘러싼 명령이다.
이 문언은 이 판정을 허용하는 근거와 정확히 맞닿는다. 판정은 급부 내용·목적물 현황·대체 가능성·집행결정·반대의무 이행·수령 기록을 근거로 한다. 판정은 한 덩어리로 내리지 않고, 어떤 급부를 요구하는지 읽어내는 단계, 목적물이 실제로 남아 있는지와 채무자 밖의 손이 그 일을 대신할 수 있는지 대조하는 단계, 법원이 강제 방식을 정한 결정을 내렸는지와 조건부 의사표시에 붙은 반대의무가 이행되었는지 확인하는 단계, 그리고 급부가 수령되었는지의 기록을 놓고 판단하는 단계로 나뉜다. 앞의 두 단계를 건너뛰고 세 번째 단계의 결과만 보면 원래 급부의 실현과 금전 압박의 효과가 뒤섞인다. 그래서 두 단계를 반드시 구별해 판정한다.
그러나 금전 부담이 커도 고집스러운 채무자는 이행하지 않을 수 있다. 이 반론은 손실과 불편을 직접 겨냥한다. 채무자의 의지만 남아 있으면 인도와 의사표시는 끝내 도달하지 않고, 채권자는 간접강제금의 징수에 그치는 수밖에 없다는 점이다. 채무자만 할 수 있는 행위를 강제하는 방식은 인격과 자유를 침해할 수 있다는 우려도 함께 놓인다. 그래도 이 반론이 스스로 강제 방식을 포기하게 만들지는 못한다. 반론이 보여주는 한계를 숨기지 않은 채, 급부의 실현을 금전의 수령으로 대신 읽는 선택만을 배제한다.
이 장면에서 확인할 사실은 이미 놓여 있다. 특정한 물건의 인도와 의사표시라는 급부 내용은 분명하고, 목적물 현황과 대체 가능성은 판정에 따라 달라지는 남은 확인 사항이다. 집행결정과 반대의무 이행, 수령 기록도 같은 방식으로 대조한다. 누가 수행할 수 있는 행위인지 또는 목적물이 존재하는지 확인되지 않은 경우에는 판정을 미확정으로 남기며, 이를 구제가 막힌 경우와 구별한다. 여기서 확인되지 않은 기록은 자료가 모자란 상태이고, 자료가 없어 판정할 수 없는 것은 곧 구제가 불가능하다는 뜻이 아니다. 이 장면에서는 연도·금액·기산일을 정하지 않았으므로 금전 압박의 크기나 이행 기간의 길이는 판단하지 않는다.
이 판정이 허용하는 결론은, 채무 성질에 맞는 강제 방식과 그 요건이 갖추어진 뒤에만 급부의 실현이 논의된다는 점, 그리고 급부 내용·목적물 현황·대체 가능성·집행결정·반대의무 이행·수령 기록이 그 판단의 근거라는 점이다. 이 판정이 허용하지 않는 결론은, 간접강제금이 징수되었다는 사실만으로 인도와 의사표시가 실제로 이루어졌다고 보는 것, 그리고 기록이 없는 상태를 구제 불능으로 단정하는 것이다. 기록이 없으면 결론은 미확정으로 남는다.
5.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
To answer this question, the mere fact that financial pressure was applied is not enough; one must determine whether the non-monetary performance originally borne by the obligor has already been realized. That is, it must be settled what counts as the operation of indirect enforcement as a means of inducement and what counts as completion of the performance of the original obligation, respectively.
The provision relevant to this question is Article 261 paragraph (1) of the Civil Execution Act. That provision states: "① Where the nature of the obligation is such that indirect enforcement is possible, the court of first instance shall, upon application of the creditor, render a decision ordering indirect enforcement." It then sets out the matters that the decision shall contain (Civil Execution Act Article 261). This text provides that only where the nature of the obligation permits indirect enforcement does the court of first instance render a decision upon the creditor's application. The actors spoken of here are the court of first instance and the creditor; the act is a decision ordering indirect enforcement; and the condition is a case where the nature of the obligation admits of that method. Other issues under this paragraph are not addressed here.
The same provision specifies, as the content of the decision, the obligor's duty to perform the obligation and a reasonable period for performance, and adds that where the obligor fails to perform within that period, the court may order payment of a certain amount of compensation for each period of delay, or may order payment of damages immediately (Civil Execution Act Article 261). This order of compensation is a monetary burden arising from non-performance; it is not the realization of the original performance. Accordingly, this text and the author's conclusion are divided into two stages. The first stage is to see whether the nature of the obligation permits indirect enforcement, and the second stage is to see what effect the lapse of the period for performance and the ensuing order of compensation produce. If the two stages are mixed, the existence of the means of inducement is mistakenly read as completion of performance.
The strongest counterargument is directed at the loss. Even if the monetary burden grows, an obstinate obligor may ultimately refuse to perform, and meanwhile the creditor can only wait without obtaining the original performance. The burden also remains that forcibly eliciting an act only the obligor can perform may infringe the personality and freedom of both obligor and creditor. These inconveniences and risks must be left in place, not erased. The reach of the pressure lies in inducement, not in the realization of the performance.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are that Creditor A's demand consists of the delivery of a specific thing and a declaration of intention by Defendant B. This demand falls under the content of the performance, while the status of the subject matter, the possibility of substitution, the presence or absence of an enforcement decision, performance of the counter-obligation, and the record of receipt were not determined in this scene. An obligation as to which it is unconfirmed who can perform the act and whether the subject matter exists remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Indirect enforcement is a method of inducing performance by imposing a monetary burden for non-performance, and that payment cannot be re-read as performance of the original obligation. The judgment ends at distinguishing whether the nature of the obligation permits indirect enforcement, and what the order of compensation rendered upon failure to perform within the period for performance determines. Years, amounts, and commencement dates not found here cannot be added so as to make anything certain, and service of process or performance outcomes in actual cases are not discussed in this scene either.
5.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
The question asked here is: if even an obstinate obligor may fail to perform however heavy the monetary burden, what does the compulsory measure achieve, leaving that non-performance as it stands? The fact that compelling an act that only the obligor can perform may infringe personality and freedom is taken as the premise of this question. The problem is how far the point reachable by the method of indirect enforcement extends.
In this text, the actor who renders the decision is the court of first instance, the applicant is the creditor, and the premise is a case where the nature of the obligation is such that indirect enforcement is possible. The content of the decision is the specification of the duty to perform and of a reasonable period for performance, and the order of compensation arising from non-performance within that period.
What the above provision makes the object of an order of compensation is a certain amount of compensation for each period of delay, or immediate damages. This is a monetary burden upon the obligor's failure to perform within the period, and it points in the same direction as the definition that indirect enforcement is a method of inducing performance by imposing a monetary burden for non-performance. Accordingly, the monetary burden remains only a means of urging performance, and it does not establish, in substitution, completion of the performance of the non-monetary performance that the obligor ought to render. Only by distinguishing the two can it be judged whether the actual delivery or declaration of intention has been completed.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the point that however heavily indirect enforcement operates, an obstinate obligor may ultimately refuse to perform, with the result that the creditor is left with burdens but no realization of the right. That compelling an act only the obligor can perform may infringe personality and freedom is the background of this counterargument. Yet even if the harm pointed out by the counterargument is great, converting payment of a monetary burden into completion of the performance of the original non-monetary performance is a separate matter.
To answer this question, one must examine whether the content of the performance, the status of the subject matter, the possibility of substitution, the enforcement decision, performance of the counter-obligation, and the record of receipt remain. Whether the nature of the obligation admits of indirect enforcement, and whether the period for performance and the order of compensation for non-performance have been put in place, can be cross-checked against these records. However, so long as it is unconfirmed who can perform the act and whether the subject matter exists, the very judgment of selecting the method remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow: however heavy the monetary burden, its payment cannot substitute for completion of the performance of the original non-monetary performance, and indirect enforcement must fit the nature of the obligation and operates by way of an order of compensation for non-performance.
5.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The preceding section confirmed that payment of the indirect enforcement money cannot be converted into completion of the performance of the original non-monetary performance. In this question, indirect enforcement means the method of inducing performance by imposing a monetary burden for non-performance. Whether the mere fact that a means of pressure has been prepared can make it appear that either one of the two performances has been concluded is examined according to the distinction already established.
Article 261 paragraph (1) of the Civil Execution Act provides that "where the nature of the obligation is such that indirect enforcement is possible, the court of first instance shall, upon application of the creditor, render a decision ordering indirect enforcement." This text sets the party who may order indirect enforcement as the court of first instance, sets the starting point as the creditor's application, and places the gateway of permissibility in the nature of the obligation. It means that indirect enforcement, as defined above, is selected only for obligations whose nature fits it, and the decision itself is not the result of enforcing the performance.
The same Article goes on to state that the decision shall specify the obligor's duty to perform the obligation and a reasonable period for performance, and that where the obligor fails to perform within that period, the court may order a certain amount of compensation for each period of delay, or may order immediate damages (Civil Execution Act Article 261). This passage reveals that the content of the decision is divided into an instruction of performance and an order of compensation. That is, only after the two stages of the period for performance and non-performance have been set does the question of compensation open up, and this compensation is a monetary burden for non-performance. If one adds to this whether permissibility turns on the nature of the performance, the reason why the requirements of indirect enforcement and its incidental effects must be distinguished from the realization of the original performance becomes clear.
The strongest counterargument lies in that, however heavy the monetary burden, an obstinate obligor may fail to perform. The magnitude of the pressure cannot be said necessarily to move the will to perform, and even if the obligor pays money, the loss remains that payment is not delivery or a declaration of intention itself. Moreover, the method of compelling an act only the obligor can perform may infringe personality and freedom, and it is acknowledged that expanding the monetary burden is not the answer. Yet the foregoing answer is that payment of the indirect enforcement money cannot be converted into completion of the performance of the original non-monetary performance. Even if the intensity of the means of inducing performance rises, the character of that means does not change, so the limitation pointed out by the counterargument does not topple the conclusion but remains as a condition of the conclusion.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are that the performance demanded by A consisted of delivery of a specific thing and a declaration of intention by B, and that it remained a question whether the two performances could be enforced by the same method. Compared with the foregoing conditions, the judgment records establish only the content of the performance, the status of the subject matter, the possibility of substitution, the enforcement decision, performance of the counter-obligation, and the record of receipt. Whether the nature of the obligation permits indirect enforcement, whether a period for performance has been set, and whether non-performance has been confirmed after that period expired are not revealed in the scene. The condition that, if the substitutable act is confirmed to be an act strictly personal to the obligor, the choice of execution by substitution is set aside is placed only as a test within the scope of responsibility for distinguishing the permissibility of the method of enforcement. All other facts remain undetermined.
Accordingly, what can be concluded in this section is that permissibility depending on the nature of the obligation, and the order of compensation arising from the period for performance and non-performance, are distinguished from the realization of the original performance. Even if a decision ordering indirect enforcement has been rendered and the obligor has paid the corresponding money, the original performance—delivery of a specific thing or B's declaration of intention—cannot be regarded as having been rendered. The meaning of this is to hold to the boundary that whether a means of pressure has been prepared and whether the original performance has been realized are separate stages, and that the success of the former is not read as the completion of the latter. Actual execution opens up only where the requirements and decisions for delivery, execution by substitution, indirect enforcement, and enforcement of a declaration of intention fitting the nature of the performance are in place, and the scope achieved by that execution must be confirmed separately.
5.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
The preceding section distinguishes permissibility depending on the nature of the obligation, and the order of compensation arising from the period for performance and non-performance, from the realization of the original performance. On this premise, the question opens up whether, where financial pressure exists, the original performance is also completed. Indirect enforcement here means the method of inducing performance by imposing a monetary burden for non-performance. Precisely where this method reaches must be determined beforehand, so as not to misunderstand what Creditor A obtains.
The text that grounds that distinction is found in Article 261 paragraph (1) of the Civil Execution Act. The provision states that "where the nature of the obligation is such that indirect enforcement is possible, the court of first instance shall, upon application of the creditor, render a decision ordering indirect enforcement," and then adds that "in the decision, the court shall specify the obligor's duty to perform the obligation and a reasonable period for performance, and where the obligor fails to perform within that period, may order payment of a certain amount of compensation for each period of delay, or may order payment of damages immediately" (Civil Execution Act Article 261). Here the actor is the court of first instance receiving the creditor's application, the act is a decision ordering indirect enforcement, and the condition is a case where the nature of the obligation is such that indirect enforcement is possible.
The reason the text places the order of compensation alongside the duty to perform is that the two stages answer different questions. The earlier stage is a judgment of nature as to which obligations may permit indirect enforcement; the later stage is the determination of what monetary burden to impose after the period for performance has elapsed and performance has been delayed. Creditor A may apply for a decision on advance payment of necessary expenses, and the possibility of a subsequent claim for excess expenses is a separate matter. The mere fact that the court has issued an order of compensation does not mean that the content of the performance—delivery of a specific thing or Defendant B's declaration of intention—has been achieved in reality.
The strongest counterargument here is aimed at the weight of the costs. However heavy the monetary burden, an obstinate obligor may fail to perform, and meanwhile the realization of Creditor A's right is continually delayed. Moreover, the counterargument broadens the harm to the obligor's side as well, in that the method of compelling an act only Obligor B can perform may infringe personality and freedom. Even so, the foregoing answer does not change. The more real the delay and inconvenience pointed out by the counterargument are, the more, if the monetary burden is confused with the performance itself, Creditor A will be treated as having obtained what was not obtained.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are that Creditor A obtained a judgment requiring delivery of a specific thing and a declaration of intention by Defendant B, and that the section asks whether the two performances can be enforced by the same method. The content of the performance required by the judgment is delivery of a thing and a declaration of intention; both are non-monetary performances, and their respective natures differ. Whether the content of the performance, the status of the subject matter, the possibility of substitution, the enforcement decision, performance of the counter-obligation, and the record of receipt have been secured is unconfirmed. Whether the subject matter exists, and who can perform which act, are also unverified; accordingly, which method of compulsion fits these two performances cannot be determined from this scene alone.
The conclusion this section permits is the narrow judgment that the introduction of the monetary burden called indirect enforcement is a matter separate from the realization of the original performance. Whether the nature of the obligation permits indirect enforcement, and what compensation to order for non-performance after setting a reasonable period for performance, must each be examined separately, and even if that judgment stands, completion of the performance of the non-monetary performance does not automatically follow. The impermissible conclusion is the treatment of regarding delivery of the thing and the declaration of intention as accomplished by nothing more than an order of compensation or payment of the indirect enforcement money. How does the text of Article 261 of the Civil Execution Act support this conclusion?
5.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
This question is posed in a scene where Creditor A has obtained a judgment ordering the delivery of a specific thing and a declaration of intent by Defendant B, and asks whether it can be enforced in the same manner. The thing to be delivered and the declaration of intent to be made between A and B differ in their nature, and whether they can be compelled in the same way likewise turns on that nature. This section asks only, within the scope of application of the text of the provision in question, whether the performance of the original non-monetary obligation can be regarded as completed even after a monetary burden has actually been imposed.
The basis for deciding this question is the text of Article 261 (1) of the Civil Execution Act. Here, the actor indicated by the text is the court of first instance that decides upon the creditor's application; the act is a decision ordering indirect compulsory enforcement; and the condition is a case in which the nature of the obligation permits indirect compulsory enforcement. The content of the decision specifies the obligation to perform and a reasonable period for performance, and if performance is not made within that period, a fixed compensation corresponding to the period of delay or immediate damages is added.
Applying this text to the actual execution of a non-monetary obligation, two stages must be distinguished. The first stage is a permissibility determination that examines whether the nature of the obligation permits indirect compulsory enforcement—that is, whether the method of inducing performance through a monetary burden for non-performance can be used for that obligation. The second stage is the determination of an award of compensation responding to non-performance within the period, after the obligation to perform and the period for performance have been specified. The reason these two must be distinguished is that the former concerns the realization of the original performance sought to be achieved through a monetary burden, whereas the latter concerns the additional burden imposed when that realization is delayed or refused. Accordingly, the text of the provision in question leads one to view the permissibility based on the nature of the obligation, and the award of compensation for the period for performance and for non-performance, as distinct from the realization of the original performance.
The strongest counterargument targets the loss and inconvenience actually aimed at by this method. However large the monetary burden becomes, an obstinate debtor may refuse to perform, and meanwhile the creditor's waiting time and expense continue to grow. Moreover, since a method that compels an act that only the debtor can perform may infringe personality and liberty, the cost of the compulsion itself is not small. Even so, payment of an indirect enforcement fine cannot be converted into completion of performance of the original non-monetary obligation. Indirect compulsory enforcement is merely a method of inducing performance through a monetary burden for non-performance, and the fact that the means of inducement has been paid cannot be regarded as realization of the original performance, namely A's demanded delivery of the thing or B's declaration of intent. The possibility that non-performance will persist and the risk of infringement of liberty pointed out by the counterargument remain as they are, but those circumstances do not serve as grounds for merging the monetary burden with the realization of the original performance.
Within the synthetic scene, the facts relevant to this question are that the performance content of the judgment A obtained is divided into delivery of a thing and a declaration of intent, and that A asks whether it can be enforced in the same manner. Contrasting these facts with the foregoing conditions, the performance content and the status of the subject matter, substitutability, the enforcement decision, performance of the counter-obligation, and the type of receipt records may all be at issue, but the actual records are unverified and remain undetermined. Whether the subject matter still exists, and which of delivery of the thing or a declaration of intent may be regarded as an act capable of being performed by whom, cannot be determined from the scene alone. If a substitutable act is confirmed to be an act strictly personal to the obligor, the option of execution by a substitute is foreclosed, but since there is no such confirmation in this scene, that item remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. It takes only the text of the provision in question as the basis for deciding the actual execution of a non-monetary obligation; distinguishes the permissibility based on the nature of the obligation and the award of compensation for the period for performance and for non-performance from the realization of the original performance; and does not convert payment of an indirect enforcement fine into completion of performance. By contrast, this section does not permit a conclusion that broadens the reasoning by relying on the grounds of the judgment, or that treats delivery or a declaration of intent as having been made merely by the imposition of a monetary burden. Matters for which materials remain and which are unverified are left undetermined, but that deficiency alone is not taken to mean that the legal route is blocked.
5.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
Before this question, the preceding section laid down two premises. The creditor may apply for a decision to advance the necessary expenses, and the possibility of a subsequent claim for excess expenses is handled separately from the advance payment. What remains is how to ascertain the state in which the original non-monetary obligation has not been realized even after monetary pressure has arisen.
The provision states: "(1) Where the nature of the obligation permits indirect compulsory enforcement, the court of first instance shall, upon the creditor's application, render a decision ordering indirect compulsory enforcement." In this sentence, the actor is the court of first instance, and the act is the decision on indirect compulsory enforcement upon application. The condition is a case in which the nature of the obligation permits indirect compulsory enforcement, and that very condition is the starting point of the distinction of stages below.
The same paragraph goes on to provide that the decision shall specify the debtor's obligation to perform and a reasonable period for performance. It also includes the point that, if performance is not made, the court may order payment of fixed compensation corresponding to the period of delay or order immediate damages. These two aspects are distinct. The foregoing decision and setting of the period form the framework of inducement toward the original performance, while the later award of compensation is a monetary burden for failure to observe that period. Accordingly, the fact that inducement has begun, or that a monetary burden has arisen, cannot by itself be taken to mean that the performance of delivering a specific thing or making a declaration of intent has been realized.
The strongest counterargument targets both layers together. The foregoing loss is the possibility that inducement will miss its mark, and the ensuing inconvenience is the pressure that the method of compulsion itself exerts on human choice. The conclusion cannot be stated while erasing these two. The point at which pressure arrives and the realization of the performance are different states, and the former cannot take the place of the latter.
In the synthetic scene, the actual records have not been obtained, but the kinds of items to be determined are settled: performance content, status of the subject matter, substitutability, the enforcement decision, performance of the counter-obligation, and receipt records. Whether the performance content is delivery or a declaration of intent, whether the subject matter still exists, whether substitutability remains, whether an enforcement decision has been rendered, and whether the counter-obligation and receipt have been dealt with—the same non-monetary obligation assumes a different aspect according to these. Values not confirmed by the scene remain undetermined.
The determination this section permits is a narrow distinction bound by conditions. If the requirements and decision for delivery, execution by a substitute, indirect compulsory enforcement, or enforcement of a declaration of intent, suited to the nature of the performance, are in place, that method operates. If the obligation is of a nature that cannot be performed by the chosen method of compulsion, or if requirements remain outstanding, such as the counter-obligation accompanying a conditional declaration of intent, that choice is barred. If it is unconfirmed whose act may be performed or whether the subject matter exists, the matter is undetermined. No additional stages are created beyond these conditions, and payment of an indirect enforcement fine is not read as completion of performance.
5.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
This question requires separating whether the means opened by the execution law have actually produced the debtor's conduct, whether those means could be used in the first place, and whether it cannot yet even be known if they can be used. This section does not lump these three into one nature but sets out each condition separately. It distinguishes the permissibility based on the nature of the obligation and the award of compensation for the period for performance and for non-performance from the realization of the original performance.
Article 261 of the Civil Execution Act provides that, where the nature of the obligation permits indirect compulsory enforcement, the court of first instance shall, upon the creditor's application, render a decision ordering indirect compulsory enforcement. It adds that the decision shall specify the debtor's obligation to perform and a reasonable period for performance, and that, where the debtor fails to perform within that period, the court may order payment of fixed compensation corresponding to the period of delay or order immediate damages (Article 261 of the Civil Execution Act). In this text, the actor is the court of first instance; the act is the decision ordering indirect compulsory enforcement; and the conditions are that the nature of the obligation permits indirect compulsory enforcement and that there is an application by the creditor. The content of the decision is the specification of the obligation to perform and the period for performance, and after non-performance there follows compensation corresponding to the period of delay or immediate damages. The issue of the provision addressed here remains within the scope corresponding to this single paragraph.
Connecting the above text to this section's distinction shows that the two stages do not overlap. The first stage asks whether the court may order indirect compulsory enforcement—that is, whether the nature of the obligation permits that method and whether the application and decision are in place. The second stage asks whether that decision has actually brought about performance—in other words, whether the performance has been realized in fact. If the conditions for the former are open, the latter is a separate matter for confirmation. Indirect compulsory enforcement is merely a method of inducing performance through a monetary burden for non-performance, and only where the requirements and decision for delivery, execution by a substitute, indirect compulsory enforcement, or enforcement of a declaration of intent, suited to the nature of the performance, are in place does the door to actual execution open. Where the obligation is of a nature that cannot be performed by the chosen method of compulsion, or where requirements remain outstanding, such as the counter-obligation accompanying a conditional declaration of intent, the way is barred. The essence of this distinction is not to convert the state in which the legal route is open into actual results of payment, delivery, or recovery.
The strongest counterargument lies in the question of cost. This observation is correct. However heavily indirect compulsory enforcement is set, if the debtor holds out, willing to bear that burden, the original performance may never arrive, and the creditor may end up holding only compensation money in place of the thing received under the judgment. The counterargument goes a step further and points out that a method compelling an act that only the debtor may perform can infringe personality and liberty. Without erasing these adverse aspects, the foregoing answer is nonetheless maintained. The circumstance that a monetary burden has actually been collected does not, in itself, mean the realization of the non-monetary obligation, and functions only as a means of inducement to draw out the debtor's performance.
The discussion returns to the synthetic scene. Creditor A has obtained a judgment ordering the delivery of a specific thing and a declaration of intent by Defendant B. The performance content is the delivery of a specific thing and B's declaration of intent, and the status of the subject matter, substitutability, the enforcement decision, performance of the counter-obligation, and receipt records are items to be confirmed. As to the delivery of the thing, whether the subject matter exists and is substitutable stands apart from the enforcement of a declaration of intent, where the question is whether performance of the counter-obligation satisfies the requirement. On the scene as it stands, it is unconfirmed whose act may be performed, whether the subject matter exists, and whether the counter-obligation has been performed. Accordingly, this issue remains undetermined, and the fact that it is unconfirmed should not be read straightaway as a bar to relief.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Only where the requirements and decision for a method of compulsion suited to the nature of the performance are in place does the door to actual execution open; where the obligation is of a nature that cannot be performed by the chosen method, or where requirements remain outstanding, such as the counter-obligation accompanying a conditional declaration of intent, that way is barred. Where the performing party or the existence of the subject matter is unconfirmed, the matter is recorded as undetermined, neither open nor barred. Payment of an indirect enforcement fine shows only that the means of inducement has operated, and cannot take the place of completion of performance of the original non-monetary obligation. The decision to advance necessary expenses and the possibility of a subsequent claim for excess expenses, addressed in the preceding section, are accepted as conditions of this distinction but are not reargued here.
5.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
Following the question whether the original performance is also completed once there is monetary pressure, it now remains to settle what determinations are to be handed to the next section. Indirect compulsory enforcement is a method of inducing performance through a monetary burden for non-performance, and the present question is how long that inducement remains confined to the realization of the original performance and when it leads on to a new problem.
The text provides: "(1) Where the nature of the obligation permits indirect compulsory enforcement, the court of first instance shall, upon the creditor's application, render a decision ordering indirect compulsory enforcement," and then goes on: "the decision shall specify the debtor's obligation to perform and a reasonable period for performance." The actor this text addresses is the court of first instance that received the application; the act is the decision ordering indirect compulsory enforcement; and the condition is that the nature of the obligation permits indirect compulsory enforcement. The award of compensation for non-performance is placed within the content of that decision.
Although this text addresses the monetary burden for non-performance, it provides only that, where the debtor fails to perform within that period, the court may order payment of fixed compensation corresponding to the period of delay or order immediate damages. This is why the requirements and effects of an award of compensation are distinct from the requirements and decision for delivery, execution by a substitute, indirect compulsory enforcement, or enforcement of a declaration of intent, suited to the nature of the performance. The former imposes a monetary burden for non-performance, whereas the latter actually realizes the content of the performance; payment of an indirect enforcement fine therefore cannot be converted into completion of performance of the original non-monetary obligation.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the point that, however great the monetary burden becomes, an obstinate debtor may fail to perform. Because this counterargument also raises the discomfort that a method compelling an act only the debtor may perform can infringe personality and liberty, the point that indirect compulsory enforcement fails to reach must be explained without erasing it. The foregoing answer acknowledges the possibility of such loss and infringement, yet maintains that payment of an indirect enforcement fine cannot be converted into completion of performance of the original non-monetary obligation. The nature of the performance does not change because the weight of the monetary burden grows.
On this scene alone, it is unconfirmed which of the performance content, status of the subject matter, substitutability, the enforcement decision, performance of the counter-obligation, and receipt records is in place. Even if a condition is laid down that the option of execution by a substitute is foreclosed once a substitutable act is confirmed to be an act strictly personal to the obligor, cases in which the obligation is of a nature that cannot be performed by the chosen method of compulsion, or in which requirements remain outstanding, such as the counter-obligation accompanying a conditional declaration of intent, cannot be settled in this section.
The conclusion this section permits extends only so far as distinguishing the permissibility based on the nature of the obligation and the award of compensation for the period for performance and for non-performance from the realization of the original performance. Even though indirect compulsory enforcement stands open as one among the methods of compulsion suited to the nature of the performance, this section does not permit the conclusion that payment of that monetary burden completes the original performance in its stead. If the debtor refuses to sign to the end, is a change of the substantive right also impossible?