Summary
An action for revocation of an administrative appeal ruling is subject to the limitation that it is available where the grounds are an illegality inherent in the ruling itself.
5.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
Applicant A regards Agency B's reply as a disposition, while the agency maintains that it is mere guidance. What the last document is and what the object to be revoked is are different matters. In the precedent concerning the establishment of newspaper business operator status, the registration-disposition character of that case was earlier distinguished from the confirmation of the right to use a private name. On the premise of that distinction, the question that follows concerns whether one can always ask for revocation of an adjudication whenever one has gone through a review procedure. Whether it is always the right answer to challenge only that decision document merely because an unfavorable decision was rendered after going through a review procedure such as administrative adjudication must be examined separately.
Article 19 of the Administrative Litigation Act specifies the object of an action for revocation in its text. "An action for revocation is directed against dispositions, etc." The provision, however, immediately places a limitation with respect to an action for revocation of adjudication. "In the case of an action for revocation of adjudication, it is limited to cases based on the ground that the adjudication itself has an illegality inherent to it." This text sets side by side the types of acts that may serve as the object and the limits of the grounds for attacking the adjudication. The former sentence speaks of the scope of objects that may be contested in a lawsuit, and the latter draws the boundary of the scope of defects that may be invoked as grounds in an action for revocation of adjudication.
Under the above text, one can set the standard by which the gateway to this remedy opens. The premise is either that an administrative act falling within dispositions, etc. is specified, or that, along with the application, an omission for which there is a legal duty to render a disposition is specified. In addition to this, when the performance, parties, and conditions demanded are specified in the purport of claim, and when the right of action chosen by the claimant can be defended, the entrance to this remedy opens. The specification of the object and the limitation of the grounds are separate stages of judgment. The former asks what is made the target of the action; the latter asks to what extent the defects of that target may be contested. If the two questions are merged into one, the limitation that the provision places upon an action for revocation of adjudication disappears.
The strongest counterargument lies in the difficulty of distinguishing the illegality of the original disposition from that of the adjudication. Its foundation is the point that the more public power operates in informal ways, the more the formal concept of disposition empties out remedies. In actual disputes, where the adjudication adopts and confirms the defects of the original disposition as they stand, or where the two underwent the procedure together, the boundary between the two defects may blur. As a claimant, one wishes to obtain relief against a single final document, but if one must separately identify whether the defect attached to that document derives from the original disposition or is inherent to the adjudication itself, response becomes difficult. Even so, one cannot convert all defects of the original disposition into defects inherent to the adjudication merely on the ground of dismissal of the adjudication request. The attribution of a defect does not change merely by the circumstance that it was dealt with at the adjudication stage, and while the gap in relief pointed out by the counterargument is left unfilled, the distinction prescribed by the provision is maintained.
Looking at this scene here, what Applicant A takes issue with is Agency B's reply. A regards that reply as a disposition, while the agency side counters that it is nothing more than mere guidance. What can be confirmed from this record is the application and the reply, and the change in legal status asserted by A. Whether the reply is an administrative act corresponding to a disposition, etc., or whether an omission for which there is a legal duty to render a disposition is specified with respect to the matter A applied for, has not yet been determined. The basis and course of the duty to render a disposition, and the relationship between the original disposition and the adjudication, are also not settled by this scene alone. Accordingly, the parts that cannot be adjudicated from the scene remain undetermined. If, however, the guidance is confirmed to be a registration disposition that actually sets legal status, the determination of objecthood is revised.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Where the object to be made the target of the lawsuit is specified, where the demanded performance, parties, and conditions are organized in the claim statement, and where the right of action chosen can be defended, the entrance to this remedy is deemed open. Accordingly, the mere fact that a review procedure has been undergone does not always permit a claim seeking revocation of the adjudication. An action for revocation of adjudication is limited to cases based on grounds of illegality inherent to the adjudication itself, and an illegality inherent to the adjudication means a defect of the adjudication itself, distinct from the original disposition. Conversely, where the agency's document is nothing more than mere guidance and lacks the character of a disposition, or where there is no legal duty to render a disposition and it is not a statutory omission, the gateway to this remedy is closed. If the legal effect of the document or the basis of the duty to render a disposition remains unconfirmed, that part is undetermined, and it is not a matter to be hastily concluded as unavailability of relief.
5.2The Conditions That Block Relief
After distinguishing, in the precedent concerning the establishment of newspaper business operator status, the registration-disposition character from the confirmation of the right to use a private name, the question posed this time is whether one can always seek revocation of an adjudication when a review has been undergone with respect to that reply. If the document goes no further than mere guidance, whether it is itself an object capable of contest must also be determined together. Whether the door to an action for revocation of adjudication can be opened when the object to be revoked has not been settled is the question here.
The source text corresponding to this question is Article 19 of the Administrative Litigation Act, which provides that an action for revocation is directed against dispositions, etc. and limits it: "In the case of an action for revocation of adjudication, it is limited to cases based on the ground that the adjudication itself has an illegality inherent to it" (Article 19 of the Administrative Litigation Act). This text determines two things. First, the object must be an administrative act falling within dispositions, etc., and, of these, when it comes to an action for revocation of adjudication, the reasons are narrowed as well. Here, an illegality inherent to the adjudication means a defect of the adjudication itself, distinct from the original disposition. The provision restricts both object and reasons, and other issues are not dealt with at this point.
This limitation is understood in the same vein as the distinction of registration-disposition character set out earlier. Just as the precedent concerning the establishment of newspaper business operator status separated it from the confirmation of the right to use a private name, discerning what the agency's document is doing is the first step in determining the object. Where it is nothing more than mere guidance and lacks the character of a disposition, or where there is no legal duty to render a disposition and it is not a statutory omission, the object requirement is not first satisfied, and so the gateway to relief is closed. Even after the object stands, the limitation of reasons remains. The mere circumstance that a review was undergone does not move the defect of the original disposition into an illegality inherent to the adjudication. Since the objects of judgment at the two stages differ, they must be examined separately.
The strongest counterargument lies in the difficulty of separating the illegality of the original disposition from that of the adjudication. Connected to this is the criticism that the more public power operates in informal ways, the more the formal concept of disposition empties remedies. Where a single sheet of reply moves legal status in substance while being called mere guidance, if one follows only this form, the place for contesting the loss actually suffered and the pain endured may vanish. That disadvantage is not erased. Even acknowledging the difficulty of informal action, the object requirement and the limitation of reasons are each examined in their own place.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are that what legal effect Agency B's reply had and what the basis of the legal duty to render a disposition was have not been settled. The items to be taken as the judgment record are the application, the reply, the change in legal status, the basis and course of the duty to render a disposition, and the original disposition and adjudication. Unless the legal effect of the reply and the basis of the duty to render a disposition are confirmed, the determination remains undetermined. If, however, the condition that "the guidance is confirmed to be a registration disposition that actually sets legal status, the determination of objecthood is revised" is met, the determination of the object may differ.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Where the agency's document is nothing more than mere guidance and lacks the character of a disposition, or where there is no legal duty to render a disposition and it is not a statutory omission, if any one of the statutory requirements is not met, the gateway to relief is closed. The record on which this judgment can be established is the application, the reply, the change in legal status, the basis and course of the duty to render a disposition, and the original disposition and adjudication. Even so, one cannot groundlessly sublimate all the defects of the original disposition into illegality inherent to the adjudication, and such a description is not permitted by this section. Nor is the narrow conclusion above shaken by the mere fact that unverified items remain. Once the object is settled, what lawsuit is to be attached?
5.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
The questions remain whether one can always seek revocation of an adjudication whenever a review has been undergone, and where the boundary lies that cannot be determined for lack of materials. In the scene where Applicant A regards Agency B's reply as a disposition while the agency contends that it is mere guidance, the character of the document and the object of the relief aimed at that document stand as different issues.
The text corresponding to this question is Article 19 of the Administrative Litigation Act. That text, after providing that an action for revocation is directed against dispositions, etc., limits the action for revocation of adjudication to cases based on the ground that the adjudication itself has an illegality inherent to it. This limitation means that, while the separate type of action known as the action for revocation of adjudication is situated within the action for revocation, its grounds are narrowed to illegality inherent to the adjudication itself.
Linking that text with the conclusion of this section, the criterion for deciding whether an action for revocation of adjudication opens lies in whether an illegality inherent to the adjudication is confirmed. Here, an illegality inherent to the adjudication means a defect of the adjudication itself, distinct from the original disposition. The reason the defect of the original disposition and the defect of the adjudication itself must be distinguished is that, the moment the former is transcribed into the latter, the limitation of this type of action becomes an empty declaration. For a matter whose judgment materials are not specified, there is no basis at all for deciding whether this distinction holds; such a matter is left undetermined, distinguished from impossibility.
The strongest counterargument is that the formal concept of disposition may empty out remedies. The more public power operates in informal ways, the harder it becomes to separate the illegality of the original disposition from that of the adjudication, and if the door to relief is closed on that ground, substantive protection of rights is impaired. Without concealing such disadvantages, one still cannot change all the defects of the original disposition into defects inherent to the adjudication merely on the ground of dismissal of the adjudication request. Terminating the state of having no judgment materials by labeling it impossibility is not a way of heeding the demand of this counterargument.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only the application of Applicant A and the reply of Agency B, and the opposition that A regards the reply as a disposition while B maintains that it is mere guidance. Whether the reply is an administrative act corresponding to a disposition, etc., or whether B was in a state of omission with a legal duty to render a disposition toward A's application, is not confirmed from this scene. Accordingly, this issue, whose judgment materials are not specified, remains undetermined, and a lack of materials cannot be read at once as unavailability of relief. If the guidance is confirmed to be a registration disposition that actually sets legal status, the determination of objecthood is made differently.
The conclusion this section permits is limited to the scope of leaving matters whose judgment materials are not specified—where the legal effect of the document or the basis of the duty to render a disposition is unconfirmed—undetermined, distinguished from impossibility. Conversely, a conclusion that transcribes the defects of the original disposition into illegality inherent to the adjudication under the name of undetermined, or that terminates unverified facts as impossibility, is not permitted by this section.
5.4The Records Needed for Determination
Although the question was earlier posed whether one can always seek revocation of an adjudication whenever a review has been undergone, the present inquiry concerns what records are needed for the stage determination aimed at settling that object. The stage determination means the work of deciding whether the gateway to the object of appeal litigation (administrative litigation) opens, and this remains an issue separate from what the reply is called. Accordingly, this question has a scope that can be answered only with the materials recorded in the application, the reply, the change in legal status, the basis and course of the duty to render a disposition, and the original disposition and adjudication.
That text first establishes the rule that an action for revocation is directed against dispositions, etc., and then limits it: provided, that in the case of an action for revocation of adjudication, it is limited to cases based on the ground that the adjudication itself has an illegality inherent to it (Article 19 of the Administrative Litigation Act). The subject indicated by this text is the claimant intending to bring an action for revocation of adjudication; the act is contesting the adjudication on the ground of illegality inherent to the adjudication itself; and the condition is that such inherent illegality remains in the adjudication, distinguished from the illegality of the original disposition. This limitation is a provision that determines the types of administrative acts that may be taken as the object; it does not mean that the entire content of that administrative act is to be judged anew.
The stage determination is made only with the materials recorded in the application, the reply, the change in legal status, the basis and course of the duty to render a disposition, and the original disposition and adjudication, and does not fill missing records with presumptions. The reason the two judgments are separated here is that the requirement of illegality inherent to the adjudication and the scope of the record for judging that requirement do different work. The former sets the character of the grounds for contesting the adjudication, and the latter sets what materials are to confirm that character. Where an administrative act falling within dispositions, etc., or an omission for which there is a legal duty to render a disposition upon application, is specified, the gateway to the object of appeal litigation (administrative litigation) opens; but this is a judgment attached to the materials specified by the record, not a judgment premised on other circumstances.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the difficulty of separating the illegality of the original disposition from that of the adjudication. Behind it lies the concern that the more public power operates in informal ways, the more the formal concept of disposition empties remedies. If the wording of the reply repeats or mixes the defects of the original disposition, the claimant becomes confused as to which illegality to contest, and meanwhile remains unable to cross the threshold of relief, losing time and expense. The difficulty of separation pointed out by the counterargument is acknowledged, but the answer is given only in a way that does not shake the limitation that the defect of the adjudication itself is distinguished from the original disposition.
The only facts belonging to this question in this scene are that Applicant A regards Agency B's reply as a disposition and Agency B contends that it is mere guidance. Whether the record of the application, the reply, the change in legal status, the basis and course of the duty to render a disposition, and the original disposition and adjudication supports Applicant A's assertion or Agency B's assertion cannot be discerned from the scene alone. Nor can it be determined from this scene alone that Agency B's reply is nothing more than mere guidance and lacks the character of a disposition, or that there is no legal duty to render a disposition and thus it is not a statutory omission, so that the legal gateway is blocked. The state in which the legal effect of the document or the basis of the duty to render a disposition is unconfirmed remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is to keep the stage determination as a narrow judgment attached to the established record; the conclusion it does not permit is to fill missing records with presumptions so as to settle the opening and closing of the gateway, or to change all the defects of the original disposition into defects inherent to the adjudication merely on the ground of dismissal of the adjudication request. An unconfirmed lack of materials is undetermined and is not immediately unavailability of relief. Finally, the premise that distinguishes, in the precedent concerning the establishment of newspaper business operator status, the registration-disposition character from the confirmation of the right to use a private name does not serve as a ground for creating a new object that goes beyond the record determination.
5.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
In this scene, if the agency's reply newly created a legal status, the document is no longer mere guidance and comes closer to a disposition, etc. that becomes the object of a lawsuit. By contrast, if the reply changed no legal status and was confined to explanation, the object to be revoked is not that document. Asking what the last document is and asking what the object to be revoked is are distinct determinations. Does one always request revocation of the adjudication once adjudication proceedings have been completed?
This provision first fixes the object of the action for revocation, and then places a limitation on the action for revocation of adjudication. Article 19 of the Administrative Litigation Act provides that "an action for revocation takes dispositions, etc. as its object," and adds that "in the case of an action for revocation of adjudication, it is limited to cases based on the ground that the adjudication itself has an illegality inherent in it" (Article 19 of the Administrative Litigation Act). The subject indicated by this wording is the party bringing the action for revocation, the act is the filing of an action for revocation directed at the adjudication, and the condition is narrowed to the case where the adjudication itself has an illegality inherent in it. Here, what becomes the object of the lawsuit is the disposition, etc., and in an action for revocation of adjudication a defect in the adjudication itself is required as the ground.
Linking this basis to the conclusion, the reason becomes apparent only if two stages of determination are distinguished. At the first stage one fixes whether the document corresponds to a disposition, etc., that is, whether it qualifies as an object, and at the second stage, if an action for revocation of adjudication is attached, one examines whether there is an illegality inherent in the adjudication. Once this change is confirmed, the assessment of object qualification at the preceding stage changes, and conclusions on blocking or effectiveness reached on the premise of that assessment cannot stand.
The strongest counterargument targets the difficulty of separating the illegality of the original disposition from that of the adjudication. The more public power operates through informal means, the more the formal concept of a disposition can empty out relief; this counterargument points out that, in cases where the two illegalities are in fact intermingled, the two separated stages risk omitting relief. Yet the defects of the original disposition cannot all be converted into defects inherent in the adjudication merely on the ground of dismissal in the adjudication proceedings. The mere course of such dismissal does not shift defects already present in the original disposition into defects of the adjudication itself, and for each defect one must separately examine to which disposition it is attributable.
In the synthetic scene, the facts falling under this question are that applicant A treats agency B's reply as a disposition, while the agency asserts that it was mere guidance. These facts alone do not determine whether the reply brought about a change in legal status, or whether there is a basis for a duty to render a disposition. Unless the legal effect of the document and the basis for the duty to render a disposition are confirmed, the assessment as to blocking or effectiveness remains undetermined. The record, however, has been set to examine the application, the reply, the change in legal status, the basis for the duty to render a disposition, what transpired, the original disposition, and the adjudication. Even if a defect inherent in the adjudication is confirmed here, the boundary remains that the fact alone neither extinguishes the defect in the original disposition nor converts it into a new defect.
The conclusion permitted in this section is that, once the specified change is confirmed, the assessment of object qualification is corrected and the determination is redone from the stage itself. By contrast, treating the mere fact that the adjudication ended in dismissal as causing the limitation on the action for revocation of adjudication to disappear, or as transferring the defect of the original disposition into an illegality inherent in the adjudication, is a conclusion this section does not permit. After correcting the assessment of object qualification, what action to attach to the newly fixed object is left open.
5.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
In this scene, where the legal character of the reply is contested, which document one must ultimately seek revocation of after the adjudication proceedings remains a separate question. The conclusion followed that one does not always request revocation of the adjudication merely because adjudication proceedings have been completed; here the question is the distinction that comes after. The defect in the original disposition already passed through during the adjudication process and the defect the adjudication itself possesses are placed at different stages. The mere course of dismissal in the adjudication proceedings does not render the distinction between the two defects meaningless.
As the provision corresponding to this problem, Article 19 of the Administrative Litigation Act stipulates: "An action for revocation takes dispositions, etc. as its object. Provided, however, that in the case of an action for revocation of adjudication, it is limited to cases based on the ground that the adjudication itself has an illegality inherent in it" (Article 19 of the Administrative Litigation Act). In this wording, 'object' denotes what the action for revocation takes as the subject matter of its suit, and 'dispositions, etc.' indicates the range of administrative acts that can become that object. The proviso that follows, however, narrows the ground for the action for revocation of adjudication by adding an exception to the preceding sentence. The cases in which an action for revocation of adjudication may be brought are limited to those where there is 'an illegality inherent in the adjudication itself.' Here the provision does not reach the issues of other provisions; through this phrase it makes clear only what the ground is on which an action for revocation of adjudication rests.
The reason the proviso to Article 19 confines the ground in this way is that the defect of the original disposition and the defect inherent in the adjudication require different legal responses at the stage of seeking revocation. Put differently, an illegality at the original-disposition stage that already existed before the adjudication was rendered is not, by that fact alone, an illegality inherent in the adjudication. Within the same procedure, the circumstance that the adjudication passed over the original disposition and was dismissed does not erase this distinction. Dismissal in the adjudication proceedings is merely one item in the course the procedure has taken; it has no effect of transplanting defects at the original-disposition stage into defects inherent in the adjudication.
The strongest counterargument demands the following: the more public power operates through informal means, the more the formal concept of a disposition empties out relief. If one focuses on the form of documents such as the reply issued by agency B, there is the concern that the public act that actually moved applicant A's legal status may be left out of relief. This counterargument squarely aims at the point that formal distinctions risk disregarding substantive harm. Whether there are cases in which the emptying of relief pointed to by the counterargument actually occurs, and whether to fill that void by nullifying the distinction between the two defects, are separate matters.
Looking only at the facts ascertainable in the synthetic scene, applicant A treats agency B's reply as a disposition, the agency asserts that it was mere guidance, and the items to be compared against the record are set as the application, the reply, the change in legal status, the basis for the duty to render a disposition, what transpired, the original disposition, and the adjudication. Among these records, whether the reply actually establishes a legal status, and where the basis for the duty to render a disposition lies, are not determined by the scene alone. Accordingly, at the present point, when neither the legal effect of the reply nor the basis for the duty to render a disposition has been confirmed, the starting point of the determination on the illegality inherent in the adjudication remains open. Yet this section does not permit abandoning the distinction between the two defects merely because confirmed facts are lacking.
The conclusion this section permits is that, on the ground that the matter went through adjudication proceedings, one cannot convert all the defects of the original disposition into illegalities inherent in the adjudication and take them as grounds for an action for revocation of adjudication. What is not permitted is the treatment of regarding the two as the same merely because the illegalities of the original disposition and the adjudication are difficult to separate. Whether the reply is a disposition or not, and whether the reply has the force to move a legal status, remain matters to be confirmed separately, and the assessment of object qualification may vary accordingly. Yet irrespective of the direction of that confirmation, the standard that the grounds for an action for revocation of adjudication are limited to cases where there is an illegality inherent in the adjudication itself is maintained.
5.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
Although the preceding section already received the conclusion that the defects of the original disposition cannot all be converted into defects inherent in the adjudication merely on the ground of dismissal in the adjudication proceedings, that conclusion did not turn the matter upside down. The question remains: does one always request revocation of the adjudication once adjudication proceedings have been completed? In the scene where applicant A treats agency B's reply as a disposition but the agency asserts that it was mere guidance, whether the document containing the outcome of those adjudication proceedings immediately becomes the object of revocation merely because applicant A went through adjudication proceedings after the reply must be examined separately. For the outward appearance of the document and the scope of the object to be revoked may not coincide.
The basis for answering this question lies in Article 19 of the Administrative Litigation Act. That provision states: "An action for revocation takes dispositions, etc. as its object. Provided, however, that in the case of an action for revocation of adjudication, it is limited to cases based on the ground that the adjudication itself has an illegality inherent in it." If the preceding sentence broadly defines the object of the action for revocation, the sentence that follows again opens a narrow passage applicable only to the action for revocation of adjudication. An action for revocation of adjudication does not stand alongside other actions for revocation directed at dispositions, etc.; it opens only within the condition of being based on an illegality inherent in the adjudication itself.
This distinction touches on the point that an action for revocation of adjudication is not a passage for contesting the original disposition. The action for revocation of adjudication is limited to cases based on an illegality inherent in the adjudication itself. Therefore, even if a defect already contained in the original disposition remains in the document together with the outcome of the dismissal in the adjudication proceedings, that fact alone does not convert the defect into a defect of the adjudication itself. The reason for separating the two determinations is that the source of the defect differs. A defect coming from the original disposition and a defect newly arising in the course of forming the adjudication each differ in the object and the grounds on which revocation may be claimed.
The loss this distinction most sharply targets is the procedural inconvenience faced by a person like applicant A, who has gone so far as the adjudication proceedings. The criticism that the more public power operates through informal means, the more the formal concept of a disposition empties out relief, presses on the point that the illegalities of the original disposition and the adjudication may be difficult to separate. Yet on the ground of that difficulty, the defects of the original disposition cannot all be converted into defects inherent in the adjudication merely because of the dismissal in the adjudication proceedings. Such a conversion bundles together the two defects that the limitation on the action for revocation of adjudication has kept apart.
What is confirmed in the synthetic scene is only the fact that applicant A treats agency B's reply as a disposition, while the agency asserts that it was mere guidance. Whether this reply is an administrative act corresponding to a disposition, etc., or whether it amounts to no more than mere guidance and lacks the character of a disposition, has not yet been determined. Nor is it recorded what was determined in the adjudication proceedings and how, or whether the document containing that outcome has a defect in the adjudication itself. Accordingly, on this scene alone one cannot determine which document should be taken as the object of revocation, and whether it falls under an illegality inherent in the adjudication also remains undetermined.
What this section permits is the determination that limits the action for revocation of adjudication to cases based on an illegality inherent in the adjudication itself, and it fixes, as a narrow conclusion, the work of distinguishing the defect of the original disposition from the defect of the adjudication. What it does not permit is the determination that treats the adjudication as immediately becoming the object of revocation merely because adjudication proceedings were completed, and the determination that converts all the defects of the original disposition into defects inherent in the adjudication merely on the ground of dismissal in the adjudication proceedings. What remains is to examine how this narrow conclusion meshes with the premise received in the preceding section.
5.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
In the scene where applicant A treats agency B's reply as a disposition while the agency asserts that it was mere guidance, which side is right and what determination was later rendered are different questions. The preceding section received the premise that an action for revocation of adjudication follows the limitation of being in cases based on an illegality inherent in the adjudication itself. On that premise, what is asked now is whether one can always request revocation of the adjudication once adjudication proceedings have been completed. This question bears directly on what is to be taken as the object of the lawsuit.
The relevant statute, while defining the object of the action for revocation, draws the line that, however, in the case of an action for revocation of adjudication, it is limited to cases based on the ground that the adjudication itself has an illegality inherent in it (Article 19 of the Administrative Litigation Act). In this wording, the action for revocation is defined as taking dispositions, etc. as its object, and the action for revocation of adjudication is narrowed among them to cases based on an illegality inherent in the adjudication itself. The provision does not reach other procedural requirements; it addresses this wording alone.
This wording and the premise received in the preceding section continue in the same direction. If the limitation of the preceding section is a rule confining the cases of an action for revocation of adjudication, the distinction in this section becomes the standard for placing that limitation in actual determination. The same context applies to the precedent on the establishment of newspaper publisher status, which distinguished the character of a registration disposition from the confirmation of a private right to use a name. Only after separating the character of an administrative act that establishes a legal status from the question of the use of a name between private parties can one ask whether it is a defect of the original disposition or a defect of the adjudication itself. If the two determinations are mixed into one, the limitation on the action for revocation of adjudication becomes an empty space.
The observation that the more public power operates through informal means, the more the formal concept of a disposition empties out relief, attaches here as well. If, although the reply is dismissed as mere guidance and legal status has substantively changed, the object of the lawsuit disappears solely because the reply lacks the character of a disposition, the path of relief is blocked by form. This answer, without erasing the inconvenience pointed out by the counterargument, maintains the conclusion in the direction of not mixing the attribution of defects.
In the synthetic scene, the facts belonging to this question are that applicant A treats agency B's reply as a disposition, while the agency asserts that it was mere guidance. On the record, the items taken for comparison are the application, the reply, the change in legal status, the basis for the duty to render a disposition, what transpired, the original disposition, and the adjudication. However, whether the reply actually established a legal status, what the basis for the duty to render a disposition is, and what the outcome of the adjudication proceedings was, are not determined in this scene. Hence the assessment of object qualification remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is that, on the premise that the precedent on the establishment of newspaper publisher status distinguished the character of a registration disposition from the confirmation of a private right to use a name, the action for revocation of adjudication follows the limitation of being in cases based on an illegality inherent in the adjudication itself. What it does not permit is the direction of converting all the defects of the original disposition into defects inherent in the adjudication merely on the ground of dismissal in the adjudication proceedings. An illegality inherent in the adjudication denotes a defect in the adjudication itself, distinct from the original disposition, and before the character of the reply is fixed, the object of the lawsuit cannot be determined categorically. How does the wording of Article 19 of the Administrative Litigation Act support this conclusion?
5.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
At the preceding stage, I borrow the premise that the case law on establishing the status of a newspaper business operator distinguished the disposition nature of the registration act from the confirmation of the right to use a private name. This premise indicates only that a registration act must be viewed separately as to whether it fixes a private right or possesses disposition character as an exercise of public authority. Now, aligned with the point that what the last document is and what is to be revoked are different matters, I open the question: whenever an adjudication procedure has been gone through, must one always ask that the adjudication be revoked? This question arises at the point where the task of delimiting the scope of administrative acts subject to the lawsuit is separated from the task of requesting which of them be set aside.
The relevant source text that answers this question is Article 19 of the Administrative Litigation Act. The text of that Article reads: "Article 19 (Objects of an Action for Revocation) An action for revocation shall be filed against dispositions, etc. However, in the case of an action for revocation of adjudication, it shall be limited to cases where the claim is based on an illegality inherent in the adjudication itself." This text first limits the object of an action for revocation to dispositions, etc. The term dispositions, etc. refers to the exercise or refusal of public authority and other administrative acts equivalent thereto which are subject to appeal litigation; this section does not separately address the details of that definition. The following sentence, however, groups the case of an action for revocation of adjudication separately and fixes the limitation to cases based on an illegality inherent in the adjudication itself.
This text divides the pathway for cases that have undergone an adjudication. At the first stage, it determines which administrative acts fall within dispositions, etc. that are objects of an action for revocation, that is, whether the pathway leading to the objects of appeal litigation is open. At that point, an administrative act falling within dispositions, etc., or an omission for which there is a legal duty to make a disposition upon application, must be specified; where the matter is a mere guidance by the agency, without disposition character, or where there is no legal duty to make a disposition and thus no statutory omission, the pathway is closed. At the second stage, within the open pathway, it is determined which is taken as the object of revocation. Here, an illegality inherent in the adjudication means a defect in the adjudication itself that is distinct from the original disposition, and only by distinguishing these two stages does it become clear whether the limiting condition of an action for revocation of adjudication operates solely in the following sentence of Article 19.
The strongest counterargument targets the point that it may be difficult to separate the illegality of the original disposition from that of the adjudication. Where, in the adjudication process, the defect of the original disposition carried over as it stood into the request for adjudication, and the adjudication merely dismissed it, the line becomes blurred as to whether that defect is truly inherent in the adjudication or belongs to the original disposition. Even accepting such circumstances, one cannot convert all defects of the original disposition into defects inherent in the adjudication merely because of the dismissal of the adjudication. The gap in relief pointed out by the counterargument is left as it stands, but the conclusion is maintained in that the limitation placed by the text of Article 19 on an action for revocation of adjudication cannot be overcome merely by the circumstance of dismissal of the adjudication.
Returning to this scene, Applicant A regards Agency B's reply as a disposition, while the agency asserts that it is mere guidance. This opposition belongs to the first stage of determining object eligibility. If the reply is specified as an administrative act falling within dispositions, etc., the pathway opens; if it is mere guidance without disposition character, or if there is no legal duty to make a disposition and thus no statutory omission, the pathway is closed. As the legal effect of the reply and the basis of the duty to make a disposition are not yet confirmed, object eligibility remains undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is that the mere fact that an adjudication was undergone does not always permit taking the adjudication as the object of revocation, and that only the text of the relevant source is used as the ground for determining the pathway to the objects of appeal litigation. Only the text within the scope of the relevant source is applied, without extension to the reasons for the judgment or other clauses. A distinct conclusion also remains: whether the reply is mere guidance or a disposition cannot be determined from the scene of this section alone, and even if it is shown to be a disposition, what distinguishes its object eligibility from an illegality inherent in the adjudication is not automatically determined by the text alone.
5.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
Asking what is to be contested after a disposition is made again following an adjudication, and asking the name of the last document, are different tasks. In this scene, the question that remains now is which part, within the determination of whether Applicant A can take Agency B's reply as the object, must be examined separately. That transitional phrase merely delimits the scope to be examined this time, without re-deploying the argument of the preceding stage. This distinction is the starting point of the present analysis.
The relevant source for this question is the following single phrase: "An action for revocation shall be filed against dispositions, etc." (Article 19 of the Administrative Litigation Act). What is designated as the object of an action for revocation in this text is dispositions, etc., and the actor of the act constituting that object is the administrative agency that made the disposition, etc. The proviso that follows, however, deals separately with the case of an action for revocation of adjudication. What can serve as the ground of the lawsuit in that case follows the limitation of cases where the claim is based on "an illegality inherent in the adjudication itself" (Article 19 of the Administrative Litigation Act). The fact that the Article places dispositions, etc. and adjudications side by side and then narrows the ground for the latter is the subject treated by this phrase.
The text of the preceding phrase separately defines the object of the lawsuit and the ground of the lawsuit. The former is a judgment concerning the specification of the object called dispositions, etc.; the latter is a judgment concerning the range of defects that may serve as grounds in an action for revocation of adjudication. These two are parts to be determined again within the pathway leading to the objects of appeal litigation, and are not settled at once in the same stage of judgment. Determining first whether the document that the applicant asserts to be a disposition is an administrative act falling within dispositions, etc., or whether an omission for which there is a legal duty to make a disposition upon application is specified, is the share of the former. The detailed subdivisions of that stage are limited to the blocking condition for cases without disposition character or without a duty to make a disposition and thus not constituting a statutory omission, and the non-confirmation condition for cases where the legal effect or the basis of the duty is unconfirmed.
Beneath all this lies the point that the more public authority operates by informal means, the more the formal concept of disposition empties relief of substance. If one examines only formal documents, the change in legal status concealed behind guidance escapes notice, and that loss is borne by the applicants who actually need relief. The author's conclusion is to acknowledge the gap in relief pointed out by the counterargument, while not collapsing the limitation of the grounds set by the proviso to Article 19. Without confirming from which source a defect originates, one cannot place it under illegality inherent in the adjudication merely by changing its name.
In the synthetic scene, what Applicant A contests is Agency B's reply; A regards that reply as a disposition, while the agency asserts that it is mere guidance. This opposition concerns what the legal effect of the reply is, and the record of the determination designates the application, the reply, the change in legal status, the basis of the duty to make a disposition, the lapse of time, and the original disposition and adjudication. If the reply is actually confirmed to be a registration disposition that establishes legal status, the determination of object eligibility is made differently. However, since the legal effect of the reply and the basis of the duty to make a disposition are not confirmed by the scene alone, that determination remains undetermined. This non-confirmation is not immediately an impossibility of relief; the narrow confirmed conclusion is limited to the point that the distinction of conditions for specifying the object remains. No year, amount, or date of commencement, or judgment result, is set for the synthetic scene.
What this section permits is to determine the specification of the object and the limitation of grounds separately, to confine the detailed subdivisions to cases where they operate, cases where they are blocked, and cases of non-confirmation, and to add no further step. What it does not permit is transferring all defects of the original disposition into illegality inherent in the adjudication on the sole ground of dismissal of the adjudication. Even when the object is determined, the name of the lawsuit to be attached to that object remains a separate question.
5.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
It is confirmed that what the last document is and what is to be revoked are different problems. Procedural history alone, such as whether an adjudication was undergone, does not automatically determine the object of the lawsuit. Rather, the pathway opens, is blocked, or remains as it is when unconfirmed, depending on what the legal effect of that document and the basis of the duty to make a disposition are confirmed to be. This question examines separately three cases of reaching the objects of appeal litigation.
The relevant text is as follows: "An action for revocation shall be filed against dispositions, etc. However, in the case of an action for revocation of adjudication, it shall be limited to cases where the claim is based on an illegality inherent in the adjudication itself." While this Article limits the object of an action for revocation to dispositions, etc., it also narrows the grounds, for an action for revocation of adjudication, to an illegality inherent in the adjudication itself. The actor in the text is the person filing the action, the act is specifying the object and seeking revocation, and the condition is that the relevant act falls within dispositions, etc. and, in the case of revocation of an adjudication, that the claim is based on the point that the defect is inherent in the adjudication. Other procedural issues are not treated here.
Connecting this text with the conditions separated earlier, one can see that the opening, blocking, and non-confirmation of the pathway are different stages of judgment. First, where an administrative act falling within dispositions, etc., or an omission for which there is a legal duty to make a disposition upon application is specified, the object of the lawsuit opens. Second, where the agency's response is mere guidance without disposition character, or where there is no legal duty to make a disposition and thus no statutory omission is reached, the pathway is blocked. Third, where the legal effect of the document or the basis of the duty to make a disposition is unconfirmed, it is not regarded as established and is left undetermined. The reason for separating these three is that each of the object sought to be revoked and the case based on an illegality inherent in the adjudication must be capable of being separately specified.
It is also pointed out together that the more public authority operates by informal means, the more the formal concept of disposition empties relief of substance. Applicant A seeks to regard Agency B's reply as a disposition, and the agency asserts that it is mere guidance; thus the issue becomes what the substance, rather than the form of the document, determines. Even so, one cannot convert all defects of the original disposition into defects inherent in the adjudication merely because of the dismissal of the adjudication. An illegality inherent in the adjudication means a defect in the adjudication itself distinct from the original disposition, and the difficulty of separation raised by the counterargument leaves that distinction unfinished but cannot serve as a ground for merging the two categories.
In the synthetic scene, the facts relevant to this question are that Applicant A regards Agency B's reply as a disposition and that the agency asserts it to be mere guidance. The application, the reply, the change in legal status, the basis of the duty to make a disposition, the lapse of time, and the original disposition and adjudication were designated as the subject of the record, but the service of process or the result of performance in an actual case is not settled. Accordingly, whether the reply actually establishes legal status, or whether it is based on a legal duty to make a disposition, cannot be determined on the present materials and is left undetermined. However, if the condition that "if the guidance is confirmed to be a registration disposition that actually establishes legal status, the determination of object eligibility is corrected" is satisfied, the determination changes in the direction of opening object eligibility. The premise that distinguishes the disposition nature of registration in the case law on establishing the status of a newspaper business operator from the confirmation of the right to use a private name also supports this distinction.
The conclusion permitted by this section is that, where an administrative act falling within dispositions, etc., or an omission for which there is a legal duty to make a disposition upon application is specified, the pathway to the object opens; where it is mere guidance or there is no legal duty to make a disposition, it is blocked; and where it remains unconfirmed, it is treated as undetermined. The conclusion not permitted is that one can always claim that the adjudication be revoked merely because an adjudication was undergone, and likewise, transferring all defects of the original disposition into illegality inherent in the adjudication merely because of the dismissal of the adjudication. Finally, once the object is determined, what lawsuit is to be attached to it?
5.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
In the scene where Applicant A regards Agency B's reply as a disposition while the agency asserts that it is mere guidance, the preceding section organized matters as follows: the pathway to the objects of appeal litigation opens when a specified administrative act or statutory omission is confirmed, is blocked when the matter is mere guidance or a groundless assertion of omission, and remains undetermined when the legal effect of the document is unconfirmed. Then, after an adjudication has been undergone, must one always ask that the adjudication be revoked? Here, an adjudication means a decision rendered in adjudication of an objection to the original disposition.
The relevant text for this question is Article 19 of the Administrative Litigation Act. Its text first states, "An action for revocation shall be filed against dispositions, etc.," and then adds the proviso, "However, in the case of an action for revocation of adjudication, it shall be limited to cases where the claim is based on an illegality inherent in the adjudication itself" (Article 19 of the Administrative Litigation Act). The actor under this proviso is the person who intends to file an action for revocation of adjudication, the act is filing an action based on an illegality inherent in the adjudication itself, and the condition is limited to cases where the claim is based on the point that the illegality is inherent in the adjudication itself.
The reason the preceding and following sentences of the same Article separate the two stages is that, even though the object of an action for revocation is in principle broadly open, an action for revocation of adjudication alone must pass through a separate door. What the preceding section examined is the pathway before that door, namely whether an administrative act falling within dispositions, etc. or a statutory omission has been specified; what this section addresses is the narrow gap of that door, namely whether the case is one based on an illegality inherent in the adjudication itself. Combining the two determinations yields the conclusion that an action for revocation of adjudication follows the limitation of being limited to cases where the claim is based on an illegality inherent in the adjudication itself.
However, it may be difficult to separate the illegality of the original disposition from that of the adjudication. Because the adjudication was rendered in the process of contesting the defects of the original disposition, one can hardly exclude cases where the boundary becomes blurred as to which defect belongs to the original disposition and which belongs to the adjudication itself. In particular, the more public authority operates informally outside the formal concept of disposition, the more there follows the discomfort that the method of dividing relief pathways according to form may miss substantive losses. Merely because the defects of the original disposition were not accepted in the adjudication, attributing those defects to an illegality inherent in the adjudication itself exceeds the scope of the limitation set by the proviso.
Returning to the synthetic scene, in the state where A regards B's reply as a disposition and B asserts that it is mere guidance, it must first be confirmed whether the original disposition and the adjudication are separately recorded. Whether the original disposition and the adjudication have each been specified touches upon the determination of this section. The scene, however, merely set the conditions for this comparison and did not settle whether that reply is actually a registration disposition, or in what manner the original disposition and the adjudication are separated. Accordingly, on this scene alone it cannot be determined whether an illegality inherent in the adjudication has been specified, and that part remains undetermined.
What this section permits is recognizing, as the limited pathway of an action for revocation of adjudication, cases based on an illegality inherent in the adjudication itself; what it does not permit is transferring all defects of the original disposition into defects inherent in the adjudication merely on the circumstance of dismissal of the adjudication. This determination, however, ends at delimiting the pathway that constitutes the object of the lawsuit, and does not settle whether that lawsuit was actually pursued or what the relief outcome was.