Summary
The objects and relief effects of actions for revocation, actions for confirmation of nullity, etc., and actions for confirmation of the illegality of an omission are divided according to the statutory types.
6.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
없애려는 행위와 하라고 요구하는 처분을 같은 이름으로 부르면 주문이 빗나간다. 재결취소소송은 재결 자체에 고유한 위법을 이유로 하는 경우로 제한된다. 대상이 정해진 뒤에 남는 물음은 이 구제의 통로가 어떤 기준에서 열리는가이다. 신청인 A는 기관 B의 회신을 처분으로 보지만 기관은 단순 안내라고 주장한다. 이 다툼을 두고 무엇을 없애 달라고 하는지, 무엇을 하라고 요구하는지가 먼저 갈린다. 요구하는 급부의 종류와 방어할 권리가 함께 서야 한다.
행정소송법 제4조는 항고소송을 세 유형으로 나눈다. 그 문언은 “1. 취소소송: 행정청의 위법한 처분등을 취소 또는 변경하는 소송 2. 무효등 확인소송: 행정청의 처분등의 효력 유무 또는 존재여부를 확인하는 소송 3. 부작위위법확인소송: 행정청의 부작위가 위법하다는 것을 확인하는 소송”이라고 적는다(행정소송법 제4조). 여기서 항고소송 유형은 취소·무효등 확인·부작위위법확인의 법정 구분을 뜻한다. 각 항목은 다루는 대상과 노리는 효과가 다르다.
위 문언에 따라 처분등에 해당하는 행정작용, 또는 신청과 법률상 처분 의무가 있는 부작위가 특정되면 대상이 정해진다. 그때 이 구제의 입구가 열린다. 대상의 특정과 소의 선택은 다른 단계이다. 전자는 무엇을 겨냥했는지를, 후자는 그 겨냥에 맞는 법정 통로를 고르는지를 각각 묻는다.
법정 유형 밖에서 생기는 권리침해가 남을 수 있다. 공권력이 비공식 방식으로 작동할수록 형식적 처분 개념이 구제를 비운다는 점이 이 반론의 핵심이다. 형식적 유형이 실질적 손해를 놓친다는 불리함은 그대로 둔다. 그렇더라도 부작위위법확인을 원하는 처분의 직접 발령으로 바꿀 수는 없다. 확인을 구하는 소와 급부를 명하는 요구는 법정 유형 안에서 서로 대체되지 않는다.
합성 장면에서 A가 문제 삼는 것은 B의 회신이라는 하나의 문서이고, 기관은 그 회신이 단순 안내에 불과하다고 주장한다. 회신이 처분등에 해당하는 행정작용인지, 아니면 신청에 대한 법률상 처분 의무가 있는 부작위가 있었는지가 이 물음의 대상이 된다. 회신의 법적 효과와 처분 의무의 근거는 기록으로 확인되어야 하며, 지금은 미확정이다. 안내가 실제로 법적 지위를 설정하는 등록처분으로 확인되면 대상성 판단을 고친다. 다만 장면만으로 회신의 등록처분성을 확정할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 대상이 특정되고 청구취지가 서고 선택한 소로 권리를 방어할 수 있으면 이 구제의 통로가 열린다는 판단까지이다. 기관의 회신이 처분성이 없는 단순 안내에 그치거나 처분할 법률상 의무가 없는 부작위라면 통로는 열리지 않지만, 미확인 상태를 곧바로 구제 불능으로 읽지 않는다. 소송 이름을 정했다는 사실만으로 권리를 방어할 수 있게 되는 것은 아니다.
6.2The Conditions That Block Relief
이제 대상이 정해진 뒤에 어떤 소송을 붙여야 하는지가 남는다. 같은 문서를 두고 당사자 사이에 성격에 대한 견해가 갈라지는 이 장면에서, 구제 통로가 닫히는 조건이 무엇인지가 물음이다.
해당 문언은 항고소송의 법정 구분을 적고 있다. 행정소송법 제4조는 항고소송은 다음과 같이 구분한다고 정한다. 1. 취소소송: 행정청의 위법한 처분등을 취소 또는 변경하는 소송 2. 무효등 확인소송: 행정청의 처분등의 효력 유무 또는 존재여부를 확인하는 소송 3. 부작위위법확인소송: 행정청의 부작위가 위법하다는 것을 확인하는 소송이라고 정한다. 여기서 처분등은 각 유형이 겨냥하는 행정작용을, 부작위는 행정청이 하여야 할 작위를 하지 않는 상태를 가리킨다. 취소·무효등 확인은 이미 존재하는 처분등의 효력을 목표로 삼는 반면, 부작위위법확인은 아직 없어진 적 없는 작위의 결여를 목표로 삼는다.
따라서 대상이 무엇으로 특정되는지에 따라 붙일 소송의 유형이 정해진다. 처분등에 해당하는 행정작용이 특정된 경우 취소소송 또는 무효등 확인소송의 대상이 되고, 신청과 법률상 처분 의무가 있는 부작위가 특정된 경우 부작위위법확인소송의 대상이 된다. 이 두 단계의 판정은 각각 다른 요건을 요구한다. 앞 단계에서 대상으로 특정된 사물이 어떤 유형의 법정 요건을 충족하는지가 뒤 단계의 문제이므로, 대상 특정과 요건 충족을 한 번에 묶어 판단하면 그 가운데 하나라도 충족되지 않은 경우에 구제 통로가 닫히는 이유가 설명되지 않는다.
이 구분이 빈자리를 만든다는 반론이 가장 강하게 겨냥하는 것은 형식 밖에서 남는 권리침해다. 공권력이 비공식 방식으로 작동할수록 형식적 처분 개념이 구제를 비운다는 지적이다. 사실상의 압력이나 문서상 단정된 안내가 신청인 A의 법적 지위를 뒤흔들어도 행정청이 이를 처분등이나 법정 부작위로 내놓지 않으면 법정 유형은 그 손해를 담아내지 못한다. 그러나 확인을 원하는 부작위위법확인을 처분의 직접 발령으로 바꿀 수는 없다. 소송의 이름을 바꾸어 아직 특정되지 않은 대상을 만들어 넣는 것은 이 유형이 정한 구제 효과를 넘어서는 일이며, 그러한 변경이 이루어진 순간 이 판단은 유지될 수 없다.
합성 장면에서 남는 미확정 사항은 이것이다. 기관 B의 회신이 단순 안내인지, 아니면 실제로 법적 지위를 설정하는 등록처분과 같은 처분 등인지가 확인되지 않았다. 처분 의무의 근거가 될 법률상 규정과 신청에서 회신에 이르는 경과도 아직 확인된 사실이 아니다. 기록은 신청과 회신과 법적 지위의 변동과 처분 의무 근거와 경과와 원처분과 재결로 정해졌다. 문서의 법적 효과 또는 처분 의무의 근거가 확인되지 않은 채로는 대상성이 무엇으로 특정되었는지조차 미확정이다. 다만 안내가 실제로 법적 지위를 설정하는 등록처분으로 확인되면 대상성 판단을 달리한다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론과 허용하지 않는 결론의 경계는 이러하다. 회신이 처분등이거나 법률상 처분 의무가 있는 부작위로 특정되면 법정 유형 가운데 하나의 문이 열리고, 반대로 단순 안내에 불과해 처분성이 없거나 처분할 법률상 의무가 없어 법정 부작위가 아닌 경우 법정 요건 중 하나라도 충족되지 않으면 구제 통로는 닫힌다. 반대로, 통로가 닫혔다는 사실만으로 회복이 불능하다거나 다른 구제 경로가 존재하지 않는다고 말할 수는 없다. 여기까지가 이 유형의 차단 조건이 다루는 범위다.
6.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
앞 단계가 재결 자체에 고유한 위법을 이유로 하는 경우라는 제한을 확인한 데서 출발해, 이제는 대상이 정해진 뒤에 어떤 소송을 붙일지가 남는다. 이 대립 속에서 대상이 정해지면 어떤 소송을 붙이는가?
행정소송법 제4조는 항고소송을 셋으로 구분한다. 같은 조문의 문언은 "취소소송: 행정청의 위법한 처분등을 취소 또는 변경하는 소송", "무효등 확인소송: 행정청의 처분등의 효력 유무 또는 존재여부를 확인하는 소송", "부작위위법확인소송: 행정청의 부작위가 위법하다는 것을 확인하는 소송"으로 적는다. 이 구분에서 취소소송의 주체는 행정청이고 행위는 위법한 처분등이며 목적은 취소 또는 변경이다. 무효등 확인소송은 처분등의 효력 유무 또는 존재여부를 대상으로 삼고, 부작위위법확인소송은 행정청의 부작위가 위법하다는 사실을 대상으로 한다.
이 문언에 따라 소송 유형과 구제 효과를 나누는 까닭은 대상으로 삼는 사물이 서로 다르기 때문이다. 하나는 처분등을 없애거나 바꾸고, 다른 하나는 그 효력의 유무나 존재여부를 확인하며, 또 다른 하나는 부작위의 위법을 확인한다. 문서의 법적 효과 또는 처분 의무의 근거가 확인되지 않은 경우, 판단 재료가 특정되지 않은 사항은 그 유형을 고를 수 없다. 그러한 사항은 불가능한 것으로 단정하지 않고, 판단 재료가 미비한 미확정의 상태로 남긴다.
공권력이 비공식 방식으로 작동할수록 형식적 처분 개념이 구제를 비운다는 비판이 그 점을 겨냥한다. 회신 문서가 실질적으로 상대방의 법적 지위를 움직이면서도 형식상 단순 안내로 분류되면, 세 유형 가운데 어느 것도 손해를 담아내지 못할 수 있다. 확인을 구하는 소송과 처분의 발령을 명하는 소송은 구제 효과가 다르므로, 미비한 구제 범위를 이유로 법정 유형을 뒤섞으면 오히려 주문이 빗나간다.
합성 장면의 기록에서 살펴볼 항목은 신청·회신·법적 지위의 변동·처분 의무 근거·경과·원처분과 재결로 정해졌다. 이 기록에서 회신이 법적 지위를 실제로 변동시켰는지, 그리고 처분 의무의 근거가 무엇인지가 확인되지 않는다. 그러므로 A의 회신을 처분으로 볼지, 단순 안내로 볼지를 지금 단정할 수 없다. 그 확인 전까지는 처분등에 해당하는지, 법률상 처분 의무가 있는 부작위인지, 양쪽 모두 아닌지를 미확정으로 두어야 한다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 대상이 확인된 범위 안에서 소송 유형을 나누는 것이고, 허용하지 않는 것은 자료가 없는 경계를 불능으로 단정하거나 법정 유형을 바꿔 채워 넣는 것이다. 확인되지 않은 것은 확인되지 않은 채로 두어도, 이미 정해진 구별 기준은 유지된다.
6.4The Records Needed for Determination
재결취소소송은 재결 자체에 고유한 위법을 이유로 하는 경우라는 제한을 따른다는 전제 아래에서, 대상이 정해지면 어떤 소송을 붙이는가라는 물음과 함께 그 단계를 판정하려면 어떤 기록이 필요한가라는 물음이 함께 놓인다. 신청인 A는 기관 B의 회신을 처분으로 보지만 기관은 단순 안내라고 주장하는 장면에서, 이 회신을 무엇으로 보아야 하는지에 따라 붙일 소송의 이름이 달라진다. 따라서 그 이름을 정하기 전에 무엇을 기록으로 삼아 판정할지가 먼저 문제된다.
이 물음에 해당하는 원문은 행정소송법 제4조이다. 이 조는 항고소송을 세 유형으로 구분한다. 이 조문은 첫째로 "취소소송: 행정청의 위법한 처분등을 취소 또는 변경하는 소송"을 두고, 둘째로 "무효등 확인소송: 행정청의 처분등의 효력 유무 또는 존재여부를 확인하는 소송"을, 셋째로 "부작위위법확인소송: 행정청의 부작위가 위법하다는 것을 확인하는 소송"을 둔다(행정소송법 제4조). 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 행정청이고, 행위는 처분등과 부작위이며, 각 유형은 그 대상에 따라 정해진다. 조문이 정하는 것은 이 세 구분뿐이며 다른 쟁점은 이 문언 밖에 있다.
이 문언을 근거로 이 절의 결론에 이른다. 단계 판정은 신청·회신·법적 지위의 변동·처분 의무 근거·경과·원처분과 재결에 기록된 자료만으로 하고, 없는 기록을 추정으로 메우지 않는다. 여기서 두 판단이 구별되어야 한다. 하나는 그 자료가 무엇을 가리키는지 읽는 것이고, 다른 하나는 읽은 결과 어느 법정 유형에 놓이는지 정하는 것이다. 전자 없이 후자를 정하면 유형의 이름이 기록의 내용을 대신하게 되고, 후자 없이 전자만 쌓으면 기록이 소송의 주문과 연결되지 않는다.
가장 강한 반론은 법정 유형 밖에서 생기는 권리침해가 남을 수 있다는 점을 겨눈다. 공권력이 비공식 방식으로 작동할수록 형식적 처분 개념이 구제를 비운다는 설명은, 형식적 요건에 맞지 않는 불이익이 기록으로 남지 않거나 유형의 문턱에 걸려 구제되지 않는 상황을 구체적으로 가리킨다. 그 손실을 지워서는 안 된다. 대상이 정해진 뒤 제기할 수 있는 소송은 법정 유형이 정한 대상과 구제 효과를 따르고, 그 한계는 기록이 아니라 유형의 몫으로 남는다.
합성 장면에서 이 물음에 관련된 사실은, 신청인 A가 기관 B의 회신을 처분으로 보고 기관 B가 단순 안내라고 주장하는 대립뿐이다. 앞의 조건인 신청·회신·법적 지위의 변동·처분 의무 근거·경과·원처분과 재결 가운데 이 장면이 확인해 주는 것은 신청과 회신이 있을 것으로 본 자리이며, 법적 지위의 변동이나 처분 의무의 근거는 장면에 드러나 있지 않다. 문서의 법적 효과 또는 처분 의무의 근거가 확인되지 않은 경우 그 항목은 미확정으로 남는다. 장면만으로 판정할 수 없는 사항을 추정으로 채우지 않는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 정해진 기록만으로 판정하고, 빈 자리를 추정으로 메우지 않은 채 어느 유형의 대상인지 가르는 일이다. 허용하지 않는 것은 기록에 없는 사실을 보태어 유형을 정하거나, 반론이 지적한 유형 밖의 손실을 이유로 부작위위법확인을 원하는 처분의 직접 발령으로 바꾸는 일이다. 자료가 부족하면 미확정으로 남을 뿐이며 곧바로 구제 불능이 되지 않는다.
6.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
앞 분석 단계까지 재결취소소송은 재결 자체에 고유한 위법을 이유로 하는 경우라는 제한을 따른다는 결론만 이어받는다. 신청인 A는 기관 B의 회신을 처분으로 보지만 기관은 단순 안내라고 주장하는 장면에서, 이 회신에 붙일 소송을 정하려면 먼저 무엇을 없애려 하는지와 무엇을 하라고 요구하는지가 갈린다. 대상이 정해지면 어떤 소송을 붙이는가?
이 물음에 붙인 법정 문언은 항고소송의 구분을 다음과 같이 둔다. "1. 취소소송: 행정청의 위법한 처분등을 취소 또는 변경하는 소송 2. 무효등 확인소송: 행정청의 처분등의 효력 유무 또는 존재여부를 확인하는 소송 3. 부작위위법확인소송: 행정청의 부작위가 위법하다는 것을 확인하는 소송"(행정소송법 제4조). 여기서 처분등은 취소·변경의 대상이 되는 행정작용을, 부작위는 할 의무가 있는 처분을 하지 않은 상태를 가리키고, 각 유형은 대상과 주문하는 효과가 서로 다르다.
이 문언이 가리키는 구별을 고정 결론과 잇는다. 회신이 처분등이면 취소소송은 그 회신 자체를 없애는 주문을, 무효등 확인소송은 그 효력의 유무를 확인하는 주문을 겨냥한다. 반면 회신이 단순 안내이고 그 자리에 법정 부작위가 있다면 부작위위법확인소송은 그 부작위가 위법하다는 확인만을 목표로 삼는다. 대상과 구제 효과를 법정 유형에 맞춰 나누는 까닭이 여기에 있다. 두 단계가 섞이면 무엇을 없애는지와 무엇을 하라 하는지가 같은 이름 뒤에 겹친다.
가장 강한 반론은 이 형식 구분이 빈틈을 남긴다는 데 있다. 공권력이 비공식 안내나 사실상의 조언 같은 방식으로 작동할수록, 형식적 처분 개념이 법정 유형 밖에서 생기는 권리침해를 구제에서 비운다는 것이다. 회신이 법적 효과를 명시적으로 내놓지 않으면서 신청인 A의 기대를 꺾는 경우가 그 예이다. 그렇더라도 저자의 답은 같다. 확인의 대상은 부작위의 위법이고, 원하는 처분을 내놓게 하는 효과는 그 유형에 있지 않다.
합성 장면으로 돌아와 이 절의 범위에 속한 사실만 놓는다. 신청인 A는 기관 B의 회신을 처분으로 보고, 기관은 단순 안내라고 주장하며, 그 밖의 신청·회신 내용과 처분 의무의 근거는 기록되지 않았다. 회신의 법적 효과와 처분 의무의 근거가 확인되지 않은 현재 상태에서 어느 유형이 맞는지 자료로 확정할 수 없으므로, 그 항목은 미확정으로 남는다. 만약 지정된 변경이 확인되면 기존 차단과 실효 판단을 폐기하고 단계부터 다시 판정한다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 법정 유형 사이의 대상과 효과의 구별이며, 특정 유형의 이름을 고르는 것만으로 실제 지급·인도·회수의 성과가 생긴다는 뜻은 아니다. 법적 통로가 열리는 단계와 실제 이행 결과는 구분되어 있고, 이 절은 앞의 단계만 다룬다. 어떤 유형이 맞는지 판정할 수 없을 때 자료가 부족한 것은 미확정이지 곧바로 구제 불능이 아니다. 다만 취소소송의 대상이 되는 처분등을 원하는 처분의 직접 발령으로 옮겨 적는 것은 이 절이 허락하지 않는 결론이다.
6.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
In line with the question of what lawsuit to attach once the target is determined, the analysis continues in the direction of dividing the targets and remedial effects of revocation, confirmation of invalidity, and confirmation of illegality of omission according to the statutory types. Yet the target of appeal litigation is screened at the threshold of the statutory types. The types of appeal litigation mean the statutory classification of revocation, confirmation of invalidity, and confirmation of illegality of omission; the question of the day is that infringements of rights arising outside this classification may remain. That is, even where pressure not captured within the formal concept of a disposition infringes a right, the issue is whether, while keeping the door to relief open in accordance with the statutory types, one may adopt a means of drawing that infringement into one of the types.
The provision corresponding to this question is Article 4 of the Administrative Litigation Act. The same Article divides appeal litigation into three. Subparagraph 1 defines the action for revocation as "a lawsuit to revoke or alter an unlawful disposition, etc. of an administrative agency," subparagraph 2 defines the action for confirmation of invalidity as "a lawsuit to confirm the existence or absence of effect, or the existence or nonexistence, of a disposition, etc. of an administrative agency," and subparagraph 3 defines the action for confirmation of illegality of omission as "a lawsuit to confirm that an omission of an administrative agency is unlawful" (Article 4 of the Administrative Litigation Act). The subject this text designates is the administrative agency, and the acts are the revocation or alteration of a disposition, etc., confirmation of the existence or absence of effect or existence, and confirmation of the illegality of an omission. Conditions are also attached to each type. Revocation and alteration take unlawful dispositions, etc. as their target, while confirmation takes the existence or absence of effect or existence, and the illegality of an omission, as its target. The range this text covers is the distinction among those targets and effects; it does not determine the requirements for disposition character or the requirements for the arising of a statutory duty to render a disposition.
The point at which this text and the conclusion of this section meet is that the target of each type is not separated from the relief claimed in that type. An action for confirmation of illegality of omission is a lawsuit to confirm that an omission of an administrative agency is unlawful, and so the point at which its requested relief ends is likewise confirmation. If this distinction is not maintained, the confirmation requested under subparagraph 3 is transformed into a direct issuance of the desired disposition. It is precisely at that point that the author's conclusion stands. Herein lies the reason why the two stages of judgment must be separated. Which lawsuit to attach is a question arising after the target has been determined, and how far the relief claimed in that lawsuit extends is a question determined by the type. Since the latter does not fill the place where the former leaves off, expanding confirmation into issuance crosses the line the text has drawn.
The most forceful counterargument aims at the gap in the statutory types. If an agency packages a reply as mere guidance, shakes up a legal status, and then says that it has issued no disposition, the applicant bears a loss that is not recovered by an order seeking confirmation alone. That inconvenience and loss are precisely what the counterargument points out, and they need not be erased. Even so, the author's conclusion does not change at that point. The gap in relief described by the counterargument remains a question of scope that must be addressed not by enlarging the order of confirmation into issuance, but by specifying, at the stage of determining whether the target qualifies, a disposition, etc., or an omission as to which a statutory duty to render a disposition exists.
The facts visible in the synthetic scene narrow that question of scope. That confrontation alone does not determine the target of appeal litigation. What must be determined is whether the reply constitutes a disposition, etc. that alters a legal status, and whether, with respect to Applicant A's application, Agency B bears a statutory duty to render a disposition. If the reply is no more than mere guidance and thus lacks disposition character, or if there is no statutory duty to render a disposition so that it is not a statutory omission, the channel for the determination of whether the target qualifies is closed. Since the legal effect of the reply and the basis for the duty to render a disposition are not confirmed from this scene, both items remain undetermined. The mere fact that they are undetermined, however, does not furnish a ground for changing the order of confirmation into issuance.
The conclusion this section permits is that an action for confirmation of illegality of omission cannot be converted into a direct issuance of the desired disposition. An order seeking confirmation and an order seeking issuance attach to targets and effects of different types, and so the former cannot be filled with the latter. The conclusion not permitted is to change the content of the relief of a type merely because infringements of rights remain outside the statutory types; whether that infringement can be accommodated within a type is determined at the separate thresholds of the determination of whether the target qualifies and the basis for the duty to render a disposition.
6.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The preceding section already took as settled that an action for confirmation of illegality of omission cannot be changed into a direct issuance of the desired disposition, and now the question remaining after the target has been determined is which lawsuit to attach once the target is determined. In the scene where Applicant A regards Agency B's reply as a disposition while the agency asserts that it is mere guidance, once the character of the reply has been fixed, the name of the type of lawsuit matching that target must be chosen. Here, the types of appeal litigation mean the statutory classification of revocation, confirmation of invalidity, and confirmation of illegality of omission, and that classification is exactly the criterion this section divides by.
The basis for this classification lies in Article 4 of the Administrative Litigation Act. That provision stipulates: "Appeal litigation is classified as follows: 1. Action for revocation: a lawsuit to revoke or alter an unlawful disposition, etc. of an administrative agency; 2. Action for confirmation of invalidity: a lawsuit to confirm the existence or absence of effect, or the existence or nonexistence, of a disposition, etc. of an administrative agency; 3. Action for confirmation of illegality of omission: a lawsuit to confirm that an omission of an administrative agency is unlawful" (Article 4 of the Administrative Litigation Act). The targets the text attaches to each type are clearly distinguished. The action for revocation aims at the revocation or alteration of an unlawful disposition, etc.; the action for confirmation of invalidity aims at confirmation of the existence or absence of effect, or the existence or nonexistence, of a disposition, etc.; and the action for confirmation of illegality of omission aims at confirmation of the illegality of an omission. Accordingly, the names of these three cannot be mixed and used in relation to the same administrative action.
This text and the conclusion of this section are joined by a single line. If Applicant A wishes to claim that Agency B's reply be taken away, then that reply must be identified as an unlawful disposition, etc. in order to become the target of an action for revocation; if the challenge is confined to contesting the existence or absence of effect, or the existence or nonexistence, of the reply, then an action for confirmation of invalidity takes its place. Conversely, an action for confirmation of illegality of omission is attached only where Applicant A specifies the disposition that Agency B is required to render—that is, an omission as to which a statutory duty to render a disposition exists. The reason for separating these two stages is that the remedial effects each lawsuit aims to realize differ from one another. The action for revocation seeks to realize the extinguishing effect of revocation or alteration of a disposition, etc.; the action for confirmation of invalidity seeks the declaratory effect of confirming the existence or absence of effect, or the existence or nonexistence; and the action for confirmation of illegality of omission seeks the effect of confirmation alone, namely confirmation of the illegality of an omission. If the target and the remedial effect are mismatched, the requested relief ends up bearing the wrong name.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the fact that these statutory types leave a gap. It cannot be denied that, in actuality, Agency B's reply may don the guise of mere guidance and shake up Applicant A's legal status, or that infringements of rights arising outside the statutory types may remain. Such adverse aspects must not be erased. The reason is that the text examined above separately prescribes the targets and remedial effects of each type. An action for confirmation of illegality of omission is a type aimed at confirming the illegality of an omission; it is not a type that makes the desired disposition be issued directly. The circumstance that infringements of rights remain outside the statutory types is left as a matter of finding a separate avenue of relief, but it does not furnish a ground for rewriting the boundaries of established types in this way.
Seen in light of the synthetic scene, the dispute between Applicant A and Agency B is organized by the records of the application, the reply, the change in legal status, the basis for the duty to render a disposition, the lapse of time, and the original disposition and ruling. The fact corresponding to this question is but one: whether Agency B's reply is to be regarded as a disposition or whether it stops at mere guidance; and the state in which Applicant A regards it as a disposition while the agency asserts that it is mere guidance has not yet been confirmed. While the legal effect of the reply and the basis for the duty to render a disposition remain unconfirmed, one cannot yet decide with certainty whether to attach an action for revocation or an action for confirmation of invalidity. The boundary that can be judged from the scene is nevertheless clear. If the reply lacks disposition character, or if there is no statutory duty to render a disposition so that it is not a statutory omission, then the channel to the target of appeal litigation is blocked. Conversely, if the guidance is confirmed to be in fact a registration disposition that establishes a legal status, then the determination of whether the target qualifies is revised, and the type is chosen anew to match the confirmed target.
The conclusion this section permits is that the remedial effects of revocation, confirmation of invalidity, and confirmation of illegality of omission are divided and applied to match the target of appeal litigation that has been confirmed; the conclusion it does not permit is placing the name of a lawsuit upon an unconfirmed target, or converting an action for confirmation of illegality of omission into a direct issuance of the desired disposition. To fix a type while the target has not been determined, or to seek an order demanding issuance through a type that goes no further than confirmation, runs contrary to what the statutory types prescribe. Accordingly, the choice of type presupposes the confirmation of the target and must simply follow the remedial effect attaching to the confirmed target.
6.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
The reason is that the name of the lawsuit is itself the conclusion of the claim asserted before the court. If, up to the preceding stage, the target has been identified as a particular act, the question remaining is now what lawsuit must be attached to that target. In this scene, how the reply is to be regarded and what name of lawsuit is to be attached to that reply are judgments of separate kinds.
The text underlying this distinction is found in Article 4 of the Administrative Litigation Act. It divides appeal litigation into three types: "Appeal litigation is classified as follows: 1. Action for revocation: a lawsuit to revoke or alter an unlawful disposition, etc. of an administrative agency; 2. Action for confirmation of invalidity: a lawsuit to confirm the existence or absence of effect, or the existence or nonexistence, of a disposition, etc. of an administrative agency; 3. Action for confirmation of illegality of omission: a lawsuit to confirm that an omission of an administrative agency is unlawful" (Article 4 of the Administrative Litigation Act). The first, the action for revocation, is a lawsuit to revoke or alter an unlawful disposition, etc. of an administrative agency; the second, the action for confirmation of invalidity, is a lawsuit to confirm the existence or absence of effect, or the existence or nonexistence, of a disposition, etc.; and the third, the action for confirmation of illegality of omission, is a lawsuit to confirm that an omission of an administrative agency is unlawful (Article 4 of the Administrative Litigation Act). Before each type stands as its target whether the act of the administrative agency is a disposition, etc., or an omission.
Since the text binds the target and the remedial effect together, it is important not to mix the two stages. Which type to choose is decided by looking at what the already determined target corresponds to. If the target is an unlawful disposition, etc. fit for revocation or alteration, one seeks the place of an action for revocation; if the target is a disposition, etc. as to which only confirmation of the existence or absence of effect is required, one seeks the place of an action for confirmation of invalidity; and if the target is an omission of an administrative agency, one seeks the place of an action for confirmation of illegality of omission. This distinction is not a matter of attaching a pretty name to a lawsuit, but a matter of determining what the content of the relief requested from the court is to be. Accordingly, the equation "types of appeal litigation = the statutory classification of revocation, confirmation of invalidity, and confirmation of illegality of omission" holds only after the target has been determined.
That said, the counterargument that infringements of rights arising outside the statutory types may remain does not disappear. The worry that the more public power operates through informal means, the more the formal concept of a disposition may empty relief of its content comes concretely home in a scene where it is unclear whether legal meaning is borne by the form of a single sheet of a reply. So long as the loss that A feels and the explanation of mere guidance that B advances are at odds with each other, the determination of the target that precedes the choice of type becomes the very threshold of relief. The way of answering this counterargument, however, does not lie in breaking down the classification of the three types. Since an action for confirmation of illegality of omission is, as its name states, a lawsuit seeking confirmation, loading into it a conclusion that directly orders the issuance of the desired disposition would go beyond the statutory classification.
Contrasting this distinction with the synthetic scene narrows the remaining question to two. One is whether Agency B's reply is an administrative act corresponding to a disposition, etc.; the other is whether, with respect to the application leading to that reply, an omission as to which a statutory duty to render a disposition exists can be identified. If the reply has brought about a change in legal status, the target is placed on the side of dispositions, etc.; if the application leading to the reply and the basis for the duty to render a disposition are confirmed, the target is placed on the side of omissions. Yet the scene alone cannot be said to have fixed the legal effect of the reply and the basis for the duty to render a disposition. Both items remain undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is a narrow one. Once the target has been identified as a disposition, etc., or as an omission as to which a statutory duty to render a disposition exists, it is enough to select, in accordance with the statutory classification, which of the targets and remedial effects of revocation, confirmation of invalidity, and confirmation of illegality of omission applies. The conclusion this section does not permit lies on either side of that. What the reply is to be regarded as; whether there is a basis for a duty to render a disposition; whether delayed handling is at once an unlawful omission; and whether, upon feeling a loss, an action for revocation may at once be brought—none of these is determined here.
6.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
The preceding stage of analysis left over the question of which lawsuit to attach once the target has been determined, and what must now be asked is on what basis such a classification holds. This limitation already shows that the judgment attaching a lawsuit must conform to the nature of the target. It then remains as the next question how far the range extends within which the text of the relevant source is used as the basis for that judgment.
The relevant source text declares that Article 4 of the Administrative Litigation Act divides appeal litigation into three types, namely: "1. Action for revocation: a lawsuit to revoke or alter an unlawful disposition, etc. of an administrative agency; 2. Action for confirmation of invalidity: a lawsuit to confirm the existence or absence of effect, or the existence or nonexistence, of a disposition, etc. of an administrative agency; 3. Action for confirmation of illegality of omission: a lawsuit to confirm that an omission of an administrative agency is unlawful." The text of each item identifies the subject as the administrative agency, the act as a disposition, etc., or an omission, and the effect as revocation or alteration, confirmation of the existence or absence of effect or existence, and confirmation of the illegality of an omission. What this text designates is the types of appeal litigation—that is, the statutory classification of revocation, confirmation of invalidity, and confirmation of illegality of omission.
The reason this text is made the basis for judging the channel to the target only within that range is that classification and issuance perform different tasks. The text merely prescribes the targets and remedial effects of the three types separately; it does not itself design a judgment ordering such relief. Accordingly, the task of distinguishing, in an action for confirmation of invalidity, whether the object as to which confirmation is sought is the existence or absence of effect or the existence or nonexistence, and the task of distinguishing, in an action for confirmation of illegality of omission, whether that omission is unlawful, are each judged in accordance with the text of the respective type. To expand by means of the reasons for the judgment or the content of other items would go beyond the range of subject, act, and effect specified by the text.
The counterargument that infringements of rights arising outside the statutory types may remain points out the gap here. The more public power operates through informal means, the more the formal concept of a disposition may empty relief of its content, and if an act that in fact touches upon a legal status takes the shape of mere guidance, the harm remains. Yet the circumstance that such a loss remains cannot change the classification. The reason is that an action for confirmation of illegality of omission cannot be converted into a direct issuance of the desired disposition. The text of the action for confirmation of illegality of omission goes no further than confirming that an omission of an administrative agency is unlawful, and no type ordering the issuance of the desired disposition is separately placed in this Article.
This confrontation means that the question is which statutory type the reply falls under, not that the legal effect of the reply has already been confirmed. Whether the reply brought about a change in legal status; whether there is a basis for a duty to render a disposition upon the application; and what state the original disposition and the ruling are in—these are matters to be confirmed from the records. If they remain unconfirmed, whether the target qualifies is undetermined; and if the guidance is confirmed to be in fact a registration disposition that establishes a legal status, the determination of whether the target qualifies is made differently.
The conclusion permitted in this section is of the narrow range that the text of the relevant source distinguishes revocation, confirmation of invalidity, and confirmation of illegality of omission, and that only the targets and effects matching that distinction are used as the basis for judgment. The creation of a type that the relevant text does not contain, expansion through the reasons for the judgment, and an order to issue the original disposition all lie outside this section.
6.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
In a scene where Applicant A regards Agency B's reply as a disposition while the agency contends that it is mere guidance, what part must be separately adjudicated within the channel leading to the subject matter of appeal litigation? Taking as already fixed the subject matter of the lawsuit established in the preceding section, it determines which distinction, among the types of appeal litigation to be attached to that subject matter, must be asked separately.
The statutory provision corresponding to this question is Article 4 of the Administrative Litigation Act, and its text reads as follows: "Article 4 (Appeal Litigation) Appeal litigation shall be classified as follows: 1. Action for revocation: An action to revoke or modify an unlawful disposition, etc. of an administrative agency; 2. Action for confirmation of invalidity: An action to confirm the existence or nonexistence of the effect, or the existence or nonexistence, of a disposition, etc. of an administrative agency; 3. Action for confirmation of illegality of omission: An action to confirm that an omission of an administrative agency is unlawful." This text fixes the subject of the action for revocation as an administrative agency and the act as the revocation or modification of an unlawful disposition, etc.; specifies the subject matter of the action for confirmation of invalidity as the existence or nonexistence of the effect, or the existence or nonexistence, of a disposition, etc.; and specifies the subject matter of the action for confirmation of illegality of omission as an omission of an administrative agency.
According to the subject, act, and conditions indicated in the preceding text, the detailed distinctions within the stage are adjudicated solely by three conditions: the case in which the channel operates, the case in which it is blocked, and the case that remains undetermined. The case in which it operates is one in which an administrative act falling within a disposition, etc., or an omission for which there is a legal duty to dispose upon an application, has been specified; the case in which it is blocked is one in which the agency's response is no more than mere guidance and thus lacks dispositive character, or in which there is no legal duty to dispose and hence no statutory omission; and the case that remains undetermined is one in which the legal effect of the document or the basis for the duty to dispose has not been confirmed. The reason this distinction must be made is that the remedial effect of an act to be abolished and of a disposition demanded to be taken is bound up, as a matter of wording, with different types, and the enumeration of the three conditions is merely a marker of that distinction, creating no new requirement or exception. What has not been confirmed is left unconfirmed.
As to the method of confining the detailed distinctions within the stage to the stated conditions, the counterargument that infringements of rights arising outside the statutory types may remain unaddressed aims at the greatest loss. The criticism that, the more public power operates through informal means, the more the formal concept of a disposition empties out relief, reveals that discomfort as it stands in the scene where a reply styled as mere guidance has in fact shaken Applicant A's legal position. Nevertheless, the author's answer is that an action for confirmation of illegality of omission cannot be converted into a direct issuance of the desired disposition. That is, even acknowledging the gap in relief that the counterargument points out, the concern revives that if the remedial effects of the statutory types are transferred from one to another in the name of filling that gap, the order will go awry.
Contrasting the facts of the synthetic scene with the foregoing conditions, while Applicant A seeks to treat Agency B's reply as a disposition and the agency contends that it is mere guidance, it is not determined what among the records of the application, the reply, the change in legal position, the basis for the duty to dispose, the lapse of time, and the original disposition and the ruling has been secured. The service, the result of compliance, or the success or failure of the parties in an actual case cannot be known.
What this section permits is that, once an administrative act falling within a disposition, etc., or an omission for which there is a legal duty to dispose upon an application is specified, the type of appeal litigation suited to that subject matter is attached and adjudication follows the statutory classification; what it does not permit is the invention of additional stages or the conversion of an action for confirmation of illegality of omission into a direct issuance of the desired disposition. What has not been confirmed remains undetermined, and undetermined does not itself mean that no relief is available.
6.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
If the preceding stage, having determined the subject matter, selected the lawsuit to be attached, what remains is to distinguish whether the channel leading to that subject matter itself is open, blocked, or not yet determined. This dispute does not end as a mere matter of naming, for depending on what this reply is taken to be, both which lawsuit may be attached and what the court may abolish or confirm change accordingly. This section, therefore, examines the conditions of targetability divided into the side that opens them, the side that blocks them, and the side that remains unconfirmed.
The statutory provision records the classification of appeal litigation as follows. The subject treated by this text is the administrative agency, what becomes the object is a disposition, etc. or an omission, and the effect sought differs from one lawsuit to another. The action for revocation and the action for confirmation of invalidity target dispositions, etc. that already exist, whereas the action for confirmation of illegality of omission confirms the place where an act that should have been performed was absent.
The reason this classification must interlock with the stage of targetability is that, if the two distinct judgments trade places, the conclusion goes astray. First, the opening condition is the case in which an administrative act falling within a disposition, etc., or an omission for which there is a legal duty to dispose upon an application, has been specified. Next, the blocking condition is the case in which the agency's response is no more than mere guidance and lacks dispositive character, or in which there is no legal duty to dispose and hence no statutory omission. The former, with the object specified, makes it possible for the first time to discuss which type of lawsuit to attach; the latter means that no such object was constituted in the first place. Since the two point in different directions in the conclusions they confirm, they are not mixed into a single bundle.
The strongest counterargument aims at the point that the formal classification leaves a gap: infringements of rights arising outside the statutory types may remain unaddressed. The criticism that the more public power operates through informal means, the more the formal concept of a disposition empties out relief, is of the same tenor. If, even though the substance of the reply affects rights, it is dismissed as guidance on the strength of the document's form alone, the disadvantage suffered by Applicant A is captured by none of the statutory types and remains. The author does not deny this loss. The moment guidance is replaced with a refusal disposition, and the confirmation of an omission with the issuance of that disposition, the object of confirmation and the effect prescribed by the statutory types are shaken together.
In this scene, the fact that bears on this question is a single dispute over the character of the reply. A seeks to treat this reply as a disposition, while Agency B contends that it is mere guidance. What must then be compared is whether the reply changed the legal position, and whether there was a legal duty for B to dispose with respect to the application made by A. If, among these, the legal effect of the reply and the basis for the duty to dispose are not confirmed at present, the judgment is left undetermined. Undetermined does not immediately mean blocked. Nor, however, can it be affirmed as open. Until the condition "if the guidance is confirmed to be in fact a registration disposition that establishes a legal position, the determination of targetability will be revised" is met, this spot remains unconfirmed.
The only conclusion this section permits is a conditional distinction. If an administrative act falling within a disposition, etc. is specified, the channel to the object opens; if the response amounts to no more than mere guidance and lacks dispositive character, or if there is no legal duty to dispose and hence no statutory omission, it is blocked. If the legal effect of the document or the basis for the duty to dispose is not confirmed, it is left undetermined. Neither by A's assertion that the reply is a disposition nor by the agency's answer that it is guidance alone can the opening and closing be fixed. In either case it must not be recorded as meaning that the requested relief has actually been obtained, and there is no assurance here that a disposition will in fact be issued.
6.12이 권의 결론과 남는 물음
Following the preceding stage's separation of the original disposition and the ruling, what remains is which appeal litigation to attach to the now-fixed object. In the scene where Applicant A regards Agency B's reply as a disposition while the agency contends that it is mere guidance, the starting point of the classification is what is claimed if the reply is a disposition, and what remains if it is no more than guidance.
Subparagraph 1 calls "an action to revoke or modify an unlawful disposition, etc. of an administrative agency" an action for revocation; subparagraph 2 calls "an action to confirm whether a disposition, etc. of an administrative agency is effective or exists" an action for confirmation of invalidity; and subparagraph 3 calls "an action to confirm that an omission of an administrative agency is unlawful" an action for confirmation of illegality of omission (Article 4 of the Administrative Litigation Act). This text separately fixes, for each lawsuit, the subject treated—the administrative agency—the act—a disposition, etc. or an omission—and the effect sought.
The reason this classification is observed is that it differs according to whether the target of the claim is an act subject to revocation or modification, a state in which the existence or nonexistence of effect is to be confirmed, or an attitude of failing to perform a duty. If Applicant A's reply falls within a disposition, etc., the door to an action for revocation that abolishes its effect opens; if it stops at contesting the effect itself, an action for confirmation of invalidity becomes the object. By contrast, if Agency B, having failed to issue a reply, has disregarded a legal duty to dispose, a statutory omission is specified, and the lawsuit seeking confirmation at that point is an action for confirmation of illegality of omission. If, without separating the two stages, the reply is called by a name such as that which "must be abolished" and at the same time "must be created," the order goes awry.
That is, the more public power operates through informal means, the more the formal concept of a disposition may empty out relief. The counterargument points to a situation in which, while Agency B's reply is treated as no more than guidance, Applicant A's legal position is substantively constrained and harm falling under none of the three types remains. Even so, the author's answer does not waver, because replacing confirmation with an order exceeds the scope that subparagraph 3 possesses.
Returning to the synthetic scene, the facts bearing on the adjudication are only the legal effect of the reply and the basis for the duty to dispose. The application, the reply, the change in legal position, the basis for the duty to dispose, the lapse of time, and the original disposition and the ruling are the kinds of things that should be left as records. Since, absent that confirmation, the legal effect of the document or the basis for the duty to dispose has not been confirmed, whether the reply is mere guidance or a disposition, etc., and whether a statutory omission exists, remain undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is that the types of appeal litigation are the statutory classification of revocation, confirmation of invalidity, and confirmation of illegality of omission, and that the lawsuit matching that classification is attached to the fixed object. What it does not permit is converting the claim, in an action for confirmation of illegality of omission that seeks confirmation, into a direct issuance of the disposition; this is an error of the same direction as renaming as a confirmation of invalidity because it is too late to seek revocation. Even if undetermined items remain, the boundaries of the three types are maintained. If one has suffered harm, may one bring an action for revocation?
Statutes referred to
Questions left open
- What relief is needed when an informal recommendation is in effect coerced?
- At which stage of a phased administrative act must the matter be open to challenge?
- How should the point at which administrative silence becomes an omission be explained?