Summary
In necessary co-litigation, the rules prescribing the effect on the whole of acts by the opposing party against some co-litigants and of grounds for interruption or suspension concerning some co-litigants are distinguished.
4.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
The procedure that produces a joint result must not proceed leaving only some persons' opportunity to defend. The special rule applies that a unilateral act of a necessary co-litigant is effective only for the benefit of all. Co-plaintiffs A and B stood in the same courtroom, and only A accepted Defendant C's explanation. The type of co-litigation is in dispute. At issue in co-litigation are to whom an act is directed and whose impediment affects the whole, and what the criterion is for recognizing this channel of relief. In short, the question is when an act done by each party and a procedural impediment arising for each party become those of the co-litigation as a whole, and under what conditions the case may proceed to hearing.
The provision that answers this question is found in Article 67 of the Civil Procedure Act. Its paragraph (2) provides that "an act of litigation by the opposing party against one of the co-litigants is effective against all of the co-litigants." Here the actor is one of the co-litigants, the act is an act of litigation by the opposing party against that one person, and the condition is that the act was performed in the co-litigation of paragraph (1). This provision states a rule that attributes an act the opposing party directed at some to the whole, and it must be read distinctly from the author's application and evaluation.
Paragraph (3) of the same Article provides that "where there is a reason to interrupt or stay the litigation proceedings as to one person, that interruption or stay is effective against all." This is a separate step that extends one person's procedural impediment to the whole. The author separates the two rules. Attributing an act of the opposing party directed at some to the whole, and making the grounds for interruption or stay of some the grounds for the whole, proceed from different reasons. In necessary co-litigation this distinction must be preserved, and the statutory effects of uniform determination or of change of selected parties must be respected.
One person's impediment may delay everyone's relief. If a ground for interruption arises for one co-litigant, the proceedings stop to protect that person's opportunity to defend, and the other co-litigants must await relief in the meantime. The criticism is also raised at this point that preserving the parties' independence may produce contradictory judgments and delay joint relief. Yet the author answers that the same interruption effect cannot be applied automatically even to ordinary co-litigation. Since the provision fixing the effect on all of interruption or stay concerns necessary co-litigation, extending that effect before the type has been confirmed is itself a connection the provision does not supply.
Co-plaintiffs A and B stood in the same courtroom, only A accepted Defendant C's explanation, and the type of co-litigation is in dispute. Whether something A accepted is attributed to B, and whether a procedural impediment arising for A stops B's proceedings, differ according to the type of co-litigation. Accordingly, one confirms the nature of the joint right, the party list, the individual acts of litigation, the change of selected parties, and the orders by claim. However, since the type of co-litigation has not been fixed from the scene alone, the relevant application remains undetermined until that confirmation.
What this section permits is treating, in necessary co-litigation, an act of the opposing party against some and the grounds for interruption or stay of some as effective against all, each under its own provision. By contrast, it does not permit applying that interruption effect automatically to ordinary co-litigation, nor does it permit a disposition that closes another person's contest through the admission of an ordinary co-litigant. If the type is confirmed to be ordinary co-litigation, the conclusion that attributed another plaintiff's admission to that plaintiff changes.
4.2The Conditions That Block Relief
This is because, where a legal relationship exists among co-litigants that must be resolved by a single judgment, that determination must stand in the same form for all. The question that remains even after accepting this special rule is narrow. The remaining question is when relief is not permitted.
The relevant provision places two rules side by side. First, Article 67 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that it "is effective against all of the co-litigants" (Civil Procedure Act, Article 67). The actor indicated by this provision is the co-litigant of paragraph (1), the act is an act of litigation by the opposing party against one of them, and the condition is that the co-litigation belongs to the type of paragraph (1). The effect on all spoken of here is an extension of procedural effect, meaning that a specific statutory ground affects the entire co-litigation.
If the two extensions set by the same provision are mixed into one, the distinction collapses. One is the scope reached by the opposing party's act of litigation; the other is the scope reached by the grounds for interruption or stay. As to the latter, Article 67 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that "that interruption or stay is effective against all" (Civil Procedure Act, Article 67). Since the objects being extended differ, their respective statutory requirements must be confirmed separately. Relying on this distinction, the author takes the view that where the requirements for extension are not met, the channel of relief is closed.
The strongest counterargument aims at the cost. One person's impediment may delay everyone's relief. Preserving the parties' independence may produce contradictory judgments and delay joint relief. Indeed, if the proceedings stop for only one person, the rest must wait, or the separate determinations may diverge so that a single legal relationship takes on two different conclusions. Even so, the same interruption effect cannot be applied automatically to ordinary co-litigation. Since the extension is a statutory rule concerning the co-litigation of paragraph (1), if the type differs, its basis of application changes along with it.
Returning to the synthetic scene, the facts that can be confirmed are limited. In this scene, whether A and B belong to the co-litigation of paragraph (1) is not settled. Accordingly, whether a procedural ground as to B reaches A, or whether A's admission closes B's contest, cannot be determined from this scene alone. The Records to be confirmed are the nature of the joint right, the party list, the individual acts of litigation, the change of selected parties, and the orders by claim.
The conclusion this section permits is that an extension of procedural effect is established only after the statutory requirements have been confirmed one by one. Conversely, what it does not permit is recognizing an effect on all without confirming the requirements and without distinguishing the type. Where another person's contest is closed through the admission of an ordinary co-litigant, or where, among claims requiring statutory uniform determination, the matter is disposed of leaving some behind, if even one statutory requirement is unmet, the channel of relief is closed. The circumstance that it remains unconfirmed whether the joint right must be uniformly determined is left undetermined. One does not assert that relief is impossible merely because materials are lacking.
4.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Taking this special rule as a premise, the question of whose act and whose impediment in co-litigation affects the whole can be answered only within a confirmed type. If the need for uniform determination has not been confirmed in this scene, the manner of handling matters on which the adjudicative materials are not specified becomes a separate question.
For this question, the relevant provisions are the two paragraphs of Article 67 of the Civil Procedure Act. Paragraph (2) of the same provision states: "In the co-litigation of paragraph (1), an act of litigation by the opposing party against one of the co-litigants is effective against all of the co-litigants." This provision addresses the attribution of the effect of an act the opposing party directed against one of the co-litigants. The actor is the opposing party, the target is one co-litigant, and the scope of the effect reaches all. This provision does not also fix the treatment of grounds for interruption or stay.
The extension of the effect of acts set by paragraph (2) and the extension of procedural impediments set by paragraph (3) must be viewed separately. Article 67, paragraph (3) of the Civil Procedure Act states: "In the co-litigation of paragraph (1), where there is a reason to interrupt or stay the litigation proceedings as to one of the co-litigants, that interruption or stay is effective against all." The author makes clear that these two provisions are rules of effect on all that operate only on the premise of necessary co-litigation. Accordingly, where it is not confirmed whether the joint right must be uniformly determined, matters on which the adjudicative materials are not specified are left undetermined, distinguished from impossibility. Here, the extension of procedural effect means that a specific statutory ground affects the entire co-litigation.
Maintaining this distinction leaves intact the counterargument that one person's impediment may delay everyone's relief. In necessary co-litigation, if a ground for interruption arises for one person, everyone's proceedings stop and joint relief is delayed. This delay may be the price of preserving the independence by which each party has the opportunity to contest. The counterargument aims at the point that this price weakens the need to obtain a joint result swiftly. Closing another person's contest through the admission of an ordinary co-litigant, and disposing of the matter while leaving behind some of the claims requiring statutory uniform determination, fall outside the scope of this question.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are that co-plaintiffs A and B stood in the same courtroom, that A accepted Defendant C's explanation, and that the type of co-litigation is in dispute. What effect A's acceptance has can be determined according to the nature of the joint right, the party list, and the records of the individual acts of litigation. Yet this scene contains no confirmation that the joint right must be uniformly determined. Therefore, whether to apply the effect on all of paragraphs (2) and (3) as it stands cannot be determined from this scene alone. If it is confirmed to be ordinary co-litigation, the determination that attributed another plaintiff's admission to that plaintiff is corrected. This is not an additional fact of an actual case but merely a contrast that changes the conditions of adjudication.
The conclusion this section permits is leaving matters for which the need for uniform determination has not been confirmed as undetermined for lack of materials. Undetermined denotes not an inability to grant relief but a state in which determination is deferred, and it does not weaken the narrow conclusion already fixed. The conclusion this section does not permit is either importing the interruption effect of necessary co-litigation into ordinary co-litigation without confirming the type, or asserting that an unconfirmed matter is impossible.
4.4The Records Needed for Determination
On the premise of the special rule that a unilateral act of a necessary co-litigant is effective only for the benefit of all, the question is on what basis the determination must be made as to whose act and whose impediment in co-litigation affects the whole. In the synthetic scene, co-plaintiffs A and B stood in the same courtroom, A alone accepted Defendant C's explanation, and the type of co-litigation itself is in dispute. Under these conditions, whether a joint result can be fixed without passing through one person's opportunity to defend depends on how the wording of the provision is read.
Article 67 of the Civil Procedure Act separately sets out the rules fixing the effect on all in necessary co-litigation as to the opposing party's acts against some and the grounds for interruption or stay of some. Paragraph (2) provides that an act of litigation by the opposing party against one of the co-litigants is effective against all of the co-litigants, and paragraph (3) provides that where there is a reason to interrupt or stay the litigation proceedings as to one person, that interruption or stay is effective against all. Here the subject is one of the co-litigants, the act is an act of litigation performed by the opposing party, and the grounds for interruption or stay are the statutory grounds surrounding that one person. The wording directly states that the scope of the effect reaches all of the co-litigants.
Having confirmed the object fixed by the wording of this provision, one must now distinguish the materials for making that determination. An extension of procedural effect means that a specific statutory ground affects the entire co-litigation; for this to be established, it must first be confirmed whether the conditions surrounding that ground are met. The determination is made only on materials recorded in the nature of the joint right, the party list, the individual acts of litigation, the change of selected parties, and the orders by claim. That the statutory wording fixes an effect on all, and whether the materials for making that determination have actually been secured, are different questions. Filling an absent record by conjecture is not a confirmation of whether the conditions fixed by the wording are met, but a skipping over of those conditions.
The fact that one person's impediment may delay everyone's relief is the most substantial inconvenience this criterion imposes. The more persons there are who must have an opportunity to defend, the more the adjudication is delayed; the side already prepared must wait upon the other party's delay, and everyone awaiting the joint result bears the cost of the interval. The observation is also made in the same vein that preserving the parties' independence may produce contradictory judgments and delay joint relief. This is because the object for which the statutory wording fixes an effect on all rests on the premise of necessary co-litigation, and whether materials recording the establishment of that premise remain in the records is a separate question.
In the synthetic scene, co-plaintiffs A and B stood in the same courtroom and A alone accepted Defendant C's explanation, but from that scene alone it is not confirmed whether the legal relationship between A and B falls under necessary co-litigation, nor whether the joint right must be uniformly determined. In this state, to whom among the opposing parties A's defensive posture or B's admission should be attributed, or to what scope a procedural impediment spreads, cannot be adjudicated on the facts of the scene alone. If it is confirmed to be ordinary co-litigation, the conclusion that attributed another plaintiff's admission to that plaintiff changes. Since it has not been fixed whether the records necessary for adjudication have been sufficiently gathered, this matter remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits goes no further than to determine on the materials recorded in the nature of the joint right, the party list, the individual acts of litigation, the change of selected parties, and the orders by claim, and to leave as undetermined the matters not confirmed by the records. On the other hand, what this section does not permit is a determination that, before the records are secured, fits the special rule of necessary co-litigation onto ordinary co-litigation as well and automatically spreads the interruption effect. Closing another person's contest through the admission of an ordinary co-litigant, or disposing of the matter while leaving behind some of the claims requiring statutory uniform determination, is excluded for the same reason.
4.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
The reason such a concern arises is that, even when parties stand together, one person's procedural situation does not immediately become another person's share. Under that special rule, what is asked here is whether an act directed at one person and one person's impediment affect the co-litigation as a whole, and what must change before the stage determination rendered earlier can no longer stand as it is.
The provisions corresponding to this question come in two parts, and the object each part governs differs. Article 67 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that "in the co-litigation under paragraph (1), an act of litigation by the opposing party against one of the co-litigants has effect on all of the co-litigants." Here the actor is the opposing party moving among the co-litigants, the act is an act of litigation directed at one of them, and the condition is the co-litigation under paragraph (1), that is, a situation of necessary co-litigants. Article 67 (3) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that "in the co-litigation under paragraph (1), where there is a reason to suspend or stay the litigation proceedings as to one of the co-litigants, such suspension or stay has effect on all of them." Here the cause is a ground for suspension or stay arising as to one person, and the result is to halt the proceedings.
What these two provisions jointly indicate is the 'extension of procedural effect,' that is, the phenomenon of a particular statutory ground affecting the co-litigation as a whole. However, the determination that an act of the opposing party affects all and the determination that the proceedings stop on one person's ground are not confirmations at the same stage. The former fixes who receives the effect of an act done, while the latter fixes what ground halts the progression. If the two are bundled together and confirmed as one, a situation arises in which the effect of one follows as a matter of course even though the other has not been confirmed. Therefore, the nature of the joint right, the roster of parties, individual acts of litigation, change of selection, and the disposition by claim are placed in turn, and the effect of these provisions is applied only within the range confirmed as necessary co-litigation.
That one person's impediment can delay relief for all is a real inconvenience, and the counterargument aims squarely at that point: if independence is preserved and each is given an opportunity to defend, judgments will diverge, and a case that would end quickly if handled together is prolonged. Yet the same suspension effect cannot be automatically applied to ordinary co-litigation as well. If the same suspension effect were applied automatically, it would, just like a determination attributing another plaintiff's admission to that plaintiff, place a person who has closed the contest over his own share in a position where the other person's proceedings are also halted. The inconvenience of delay remains, but that inconvenience alone cannot bring ordinary co-litigation within the rules of necessary co-litigation.
Looking again at the scene where A and B stood together, the fact that A accepted Defendant C's explanation is settled, while whether that acceptance extends as far as B is undetermined. The synthetic scene merely established that the type of co-litigation is disputed; whether the joint right must be determined on a unitary basis has not been confirmed either. Turning to the assumed contrary fact, if it is confirmed as ordinary co-litigation, the determination attributing another plaintiff's admission to that plaintiff is corrected. In that case, the stage determination previously made, to the effect that bar or effectiveness was confirmed, is discarded, and after the effects of acts are attributed in accordance with the type of co-litigation, the determination is redone from the stage onward. Matters that cannot be settled on the scene alone remain undetermined.
What this section permits is the determination that, within the range confirmed as necessary co-litigation, an act of litigation by the opposing party against one person and one person's ground for suspension or stay affect the co-litigation as a whole. What it does not permit is the determination that the same suspension effect follows as a matter of course even in ordinary co-litigation, or a determination disposing of a matter while leaving untouched part of the claims requiring statutory unitary determination. The determination of lapse of effect is bound to the stage of the co-litigants' independence or unitary relief, and it stands only where effects of acts are attributed in accordance with the type of co-litigation and the statutory effects of unitary determination or change of selection are maintained. What remains unconfirmed is not an impossibility of relief but an undetermined state.
4.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
From the preceding stage onward, the decision has been carried forward to apply the special rule that a necessary co-litigant's unilateral act has effect only for the benefit of all. Now, facing the inconvenience that a procedural impediment arising as to one person can halt the progress of the co-litigation as a whole, the question remains whether that suspension effect can be made to extend automatically to ordinary co-litigation as well. This question concerns not the cause or weight of the impediment but the scope of the extension of procedural effect.
Article 67 (3) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that "where there is a reason to suspend or stay the litigation proceedings as to one of the co-litigants, such suspension or stay has effect on all of them." The subject of this provision is one of the necessary co-litigants, the act is the suspension or stay of the litigation proceedings as to that person, and the condition is that a ground for suspension or stay has arisen as to that person. This differs in object from paragraph (2) of the same Article, which fixes the effect of an act of litigation by the opposing party against one person (Article 67 of the Civil Procedure Act). Accordingly, the extension of procedural effect discussed here means that a particular statutory ground affects the co-litigation as a whole.
Article 67 (3) declares the effect on all while limiting the person to whom the ground has arisen to necessary co-litigants. The reason the author applies this special rule only to necessary co-litigation is that the provision linking statutory grounds for suspension or stay with effect on all presupposes the co-litigation under paragraph (1) and does not point to other types. The reason one must here separate the question of attribution of the opposing party's act toward one person from the question of extension of one person's procedural impediment is that the former fixes whom the act binds, while the latter fixes whose halting stops the proceedings as a whole. If this distinction is not observed, the effect of the act and the suspension of the progress of the proceedings are lumped together, and the conclusion that the same suspension effect cannot be automatically applied to ordinary co-litigation collapses.
The counterargument that preserving the parties' independence may produce contradictory judgments and delay joint relief targets the loss that, if the trial stops on one person's impediment, the realization of the remaining plaintiffs' rights is delayed along with it, and the inconvenience that judgments on the same case may diverge. The worry that, if the independence of necessary co-litigants is established, different conclusions may emerge even on the seats of A and B, who joined together, is likewise part of this counterargument. That disadvantage is left to the counterargument, but so long as the statutory provision fixing the suspension effect on all presupposes necessary co-litigation, there is no basis for automatically extending that effect in the present matter, where the type is disputed.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are that co-plaintiffs A and B stood in the same court, that only A accepted Defendant C's explanation, and that the type of co-litigation remains disputed. These facts alone cannot establish that the overall suspension effect of Article 67 (3) extends to both A and B. If the type is confirmed as necessary co-litigation, it meets the condition set by the provision; if it is ordinary co-litigation, it cannot serve as a basis for automatic application. Whether A's ground of impediment actually arose, as to which claim suspension is needed, and at what point relief for the remaining plaintiffs is reached are not recorded in the records and therefore remain undetermined. The present scene goes no further than reaching the contrast that, if it is confirmed as ordinary co-litigation, the determination attributing another plaintiff's admission to that plaintiff is corrected.
What this section permits is the explanation that in necessary co-litigation, when a ground for suspension or stay arises as to one person, its effect reaches the co-litigation as a whole, together with the distinction that the provision does not automatically extend to other types. Conversely, it is not permitted to assert, on the strength of that provision alone, that in ordinary co-litigation one person's impediment stops the proceedings of every participant, or to fix a suspension on all while the type remains unconfirmed. Matters not recorded in the nature of the right or the roster of parties must be left unconfirmed, and the mere absence of material does not mean that relief is impossible. The standard that proceedings producing a joint outcome must not proceed leaving defense opportunities to only some persons is maintained within this distinction.
4.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
Although the preceding section adopted the conclusion that the same suspension effect cannot be automatically applied to ordinary co-litigation, this section returns to a question prior to that. In the scene where the type of co-litigation is disputed, the question is whose act done in the co-litigation and whose impediment reach the whole. This question applies where a fact arising only as to a particular party shakes the standing of the remaining persons who produce the joint outcome.
Article 67 of the Civil Procedure Act provides in two paragraphs, respectively, effects in different directions as to that question. Article 67 (2) declares: "(2) In the co-litigation under paragraph (1), an act of litigation by the opposing party against one of the co-litigants has effect on all of the co-litigants." The act of litigation referred to here means a lawful procedural act by the opposing party directed at one of the co-litigants, and having effect on all means that the same procedural standing arises not only for the person who received that act but for the entire co-litigation under paragraph (1). What this provision directly addresses is the opposing party's act; acts done by the co-litigants themselves, or circumstances arising as to them, remain a separate question.
In necessary co-litigation, the rules fixing effect on all must be distinguished as between an act against some of the opposing parties and a ground of suspension or stay affecting some of them. Whereas Article 67 (2) makes the opposing party's act of litigation reach the whole, Article 67 (3) states: "(3) In the co-litigation under paragraph (1), where there is a reason to suspend or stay the litigation proceedings as to one of the co-litigants, such suspension or stay has effect on all of them," and thus addresses not the opposing party's act but a procedural impediment on the co-litigants' side. In extending procedural effect, that is, in a particular statutory ground reaching the co-litigation as a whole, one must determine from which side it came in order to select the rule correctly. If the two cases are lumped into one, confusion arises: either the defense opportunities of co-litigants having no ground for suspension are also halted, or conversely only the person who received the opposing party's act has his standing changed.
The inconvenience that one person's impediment may delay relief for all shows that this distinction imposes real costs. Even if only one of the co-litigants has a ground for suspension such as succession or bankruptcy, by the terms of Article 67 (3) that suspension has effect on all, so the remaining co-litigants must wait with the proceedings halted through no fault of their own. A person whose financial circumstances are urgent suffers the harm of receiving a recovery judgment later because of another person's ground, and the very goal of joint relief may be delayed. This is the point where the value of preserving each party's independence and the value of reducing the risk of contradictory judgments collide. This is not an answer that erases the inconvenience of the counterargument, but a limitation that a rule set only for necessary co-litigation cannot be extended to other types. In ordinary co-litigation, only the party as to whom the ground for suspension has arisen has his proceedings halted, and the lawsuits of the remaining parties may proceed as they are.
What is confirmed in the synthetic scene is the fact that co-plaintiffs A and B stood in the same court and only A accepted Defendant C's explanation, and the point that the type of co-litigation is disputed. On this scene alone, one cannot determine whether the effect of Article 67 (2) reaches B as well, or whether A's ground of suspension halts B's proceedings. Whether A's acceptance of C's explanation constitutes an act of litigation by the opposing party, or an admission made by a co-litigant, is not even clear; accordingly, until the type is fixed as necessary co-litigation, one cannot decide which of the two rules to apply. One must judge by cross-checking the records of the nature of the joint right, the roster of parties, individual acts of litigation, change of selection, and the disposition by claim. This is a contrast examining only the consequence of changing the type, not any change in the facts that actually occurred.
The conclusion this section permits is that, within the scope of necessary co-litigation, the two rules — that an act by the opposing party against some of the co-litigants reaches the whole, and that a ground of suspension or stay affecting some of them reaches the whole — are distinguished and applied separately. What it does not permit is mingling the two rules so as to attribute even acts done by co-litigants to all, or conversely closing another person's contest by means of an ordinary co-litigant's admission. A determination that bundles the overall effect of the opposing party's act and the overall effect of a co-litigant's procedural impediment under the same treatment likewise falls outside this scope. A determination disposing of a matter while leaving untouched part of the claims requiring statutory unitary determination must also be prevented. Since the service or performance results in the actual case have not been confirmed, they remain undetermined, and the determination is confined to the expressly stated conditional distinction.
4.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
In this scene, the question remains of whose act done in the co-litigation and whose impediment reach the whole. Adopting from the preceding section's conclusion the premise that in necessary co-litigation the rules fixing effect on all are distinguished as between an act against some of the opposing parties and a ground of suspension or stay affecting some of them, this section now examines how that conclusion connects with the premise of the preceding section.
The provision supporting this premise is Article 67 of the Civil Procedure Act. Its paragraph (2) provides: "(2) In the co-litigation under paragraph (1), an act of litigation by the opposing party against one of the co-litigants has effect on all of the co-litigants" (Article 67 of the Civil Procedure Act). The subject of this provision is one of the co-litigants under paragraph (1), the act is the opposing party's act of litigation against that person, and the condition is the case falling within the co-litigation under paragraph (1). Its effect is defined as reaching all of the co-litigants.
What connects this provision with the conclusion of this section is the special rule to be applied. On this premise, in necessary co-litigation the rules fixing effect on all are distinguished as between an act against some of the opposing parties and a ground of suspension or stay affecting some of them. The first rule fixes to whom in the whole the opposing party's act is to be attributed, while the second rule fixes whose impediment halts the proceedings as a whole. Only by separating the two stages can the attribution of acts and the suspension of proceedings be kept from blurring into each other.
If a ground for suspension arises as to only one person, the deliberation and judgment on the joint claims may be delayed together, leaving inconvenience for the other co-litigants who wait. Between the worry that preserving the parties' independence may produce contradictory judgments and delay joint relief, and the inconvenience arising when each is left to defend for itself, the boundary is maintained that in ordinary co-litigation an admission or a ground of suspension does not automatically bind others. This answer does not erase the foregoing inconvenience, but that inconvenience alone cannot serve as grounds for extending the same effect to other types.
The fact that only A accepted C's explanation in the synthetic scene is treated as confirmed while the type of co-litigation remains disputed. This fact cannot be directly contrasted with the unilateral act of a necessary co-litigant. In which person there exists a reason to suspend or stay the litigation proceedings, and whether that person is a necessary co-litigant, are likewise undetermined on this scene. If it is confirmed as ordinary co-litigation, the condition remains of correcting the determination attributing another plaintiff's admission to that plaintiff. What can be fixed in this section is only the conditional distinction; the service and performance results of the actual case are not adjudicated here.
The conclusion this section permits is to apply the special rule that a necessary co-litigant's unilateral act has effect only for the benefit of all, and on that basis to distinguish the rules fixing effect on all as between an act against some of the opposing parties and a ground of suspension or stay affecting some of them. The conclusions it does not permit are to apply automatically to ordinary co-litigation the overall effect fixed for necessary co-litigation, to close another plaintiff's contest by means of an admission, or to dispose of a matter while leaving only part of the claims requiring unitary determination. How the source provisions fixing whose act reaches the whole support this conclusion is passed to the next question: How do the terms of Article 67 of the Civil Procedure Act support this conclusion?
4.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
공동 결과를 만드는 절차가 일부 사람의 방어 기회만 두고 진행되어서는 안 된다는 점이 이 장면에서 우선 확인된다. 그 배경에서 이번 단계가 다루는 물음은 공동소송에서 누구에게 한 행위와 누구의 장애가 전체에 미치는가 하는 것이다. 필수적 공동소송인의 단독 행위는 모두의 이익을 위해서만 효력이 있다는 특칙을 전제로, 문언이 그러한 전체 효과의 판정 근거로 어디까지 쓰일 수 있는지를 살핀다.
해당 문언 가운데 하나는 민사소송법 제67조 제2항이다. 그 문언은 “②제1항의 공동소송에서 공동소송인 가운데 한 사람에 대한 상대방의 소송행위는 공동소송인 모두에게 효력이 미친다.”라고 정한다. 여기서 주체는 공동소송인 가운데 한 사람이고, 행위는 그에 대한 상대방의 소송행위이며, 조건은 제1항의 공동소송에 해당하는 경우다. 효과는 공동소송인 모두에게 효력이 미친다는 것이며, 이 문언은 행위가 누구를 겨냥했는지와 그 효력이 누구에게 미치는지를 함께 규정한다. 다른 항이 정하는 중단·중지에 관한 사유나 해석 논쟁은 이 문언의 범위에 속하지 않는다.
이 문언과 앞서 전제한 특칙을 잇는 것은 행위의 귀속과 장애의 처리를 서로 다른 단계로 보기 때문이다. 한 사람에 대한 상대방의 행위가 모두에게 미친다고 정한 것과, 한 사람의 단독 행위가 모두를 묶는지 여부를 정한 것은 같은 판단이 아니다. 저자는 이 구별을 전제로, 문언만을 공동소송인의 독립 또는 합일적 구제의 판정 근거로 삼는다. 같은 민사소송법 제67조의 다른 문언 가운데 제3항은 “③제1항의 공동소송에서 공동소송인 가운데 한 사람에게 소송절차를 중단 또는 중지하여야 할 이유가 있는 경우 그 중단 또는 중지는 모두에게 효력이 미친다.”라고 정하는데, 이 역시 제1항의 공동소송이라는 같은 조건 아래에서 절차 효과의 확장을 정한 것이다.
가장 강한 반론은 한 사람의 장애가 모두의 구제를 늦출 수 있다는 점을 겨눈다. 공동소송인 한 사람에게 중단 사유가 생기면 그 사람만 멈추는 대신 모두가 멈춘다면, 나머지 사람들은 그 사람의 사유가 정리될 때까지 자기 구제를 기다려야 한다. 당사자의 독립성을 지키면 모순된 판단이 생기고 공동의 구제가 지연될 수 있다는 불편 역시 함께 제기된다. 그런데 이 반론에 답할 때에도, 통상공동소송에도 같은 중단 효과를 자동 적용할 수는 없다. 위 두 문언 모두 제1항의 공동소송이라는 조건을 전제하고 있고, 해당 문언 밖의 유형에까지 그 효과를 자동 확장하는 것은 이 절의 문언 적용 범위를 넘는다. 반론이 지적한 지연과 불편은 지워지지 않지만, 그 때문에 통상공동소송에 같은 효과가 자동으로 생긴다고 확정할 수는 없다.
이 사실들을 앞의 조건에 대조하면, 상대방의 소송행위에 관한 문언은 그 행위가 A를 겨냥했는지, A가 인정한 것이 상대방의 행위에 해당하는지에 따라 적용이 달라진다. 중단 사유에 관한 문언은 한 사람에게 그런 이유가 있는 경우라는 문언의 조건을 충족하는지에 걸린다. 그러나 공동소송의 유형이 다투어지고 있으므로, 위 문언이 적용되는 제1항의 공동소송에 해당하는지 여부는 이 장면만으로 확정되지 않는다. 공동 권리가 합일적으로 확정되어야 하는지 역시 확인되지 않았고, 장면에 없는 연도·금액·기산일·판결 결과는 설정되지 않았다. 실제 사건의 송달·이행 결과나 승패·회수 효과도 자료가 없어 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은, 제2항과 제3항의 문언이 정하는 주체·행위·조건·효과를 그대로 적용하여 공동소송인의 독립 또는 합일적 구제를 판정하는 것이다. 제2항의 문언에 부합하면 한 사람에 대한 상대방의 소송행위가 모두에게 미치고, 제3항의 문언에 부합하면 한 사람의 중단 또는 중지 사유가 모두에게 미친다. 이 절이 허용하지 않는 것은, 그 문언이 아닌 판결이유나 다른 항을 근거로 삼는 것, 그리고 통상공동소송에도 같은 중단 효과를 자동 적용하는 것이다.
4.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
필수적 공동소송인의 단독 행위는 모두의 이익을 위해서만 효력이 있다는 특칙을 적용한 뒤에도 남는 물음은, 공동소송인의 독립적 또는 합일적 구제 안에서 어느 부분을 따로 나누어 판정할 것인가이다. 이 장면에서 어떤 사람의 행위나 장애가 전체에 미치는지를 확정하려면, 먼저 판정할 단위를 어디까지 나눌지 정해야 한다.
이 물음에 해당하는 문언은 두 규칙을 나란히 둔다. 민사소송법 제67조 제2항은 "공동소송인 가운데 한 사람에 대한 상대방의 소송행위는 공동소송인 모두에게 효력이 미친다"고 정한다. 같은 조 제3항은 "공동소송인 가운데 한 사람에게 소송절차를 중단 또는 중지하여야 할 이유가 있는 경우 그 중단 또는 중지는 모두에게 효력이 미친다"고 정한다(민사소송법 제67조). 여기서 대상은 제1항의 공동소송이고, 행위 주체는 공동소송인에 대한 상대방이며, 중단·중지 사유는 공동소송인 가운데 한 사람에게 생긴 경우다.
두 항을 구분해 읽는 까닭은 대상이 서로 다르기 때문이다. 제2항은 상대방의 소송행위를, 제3항은 절차를 중단 또는 중지하여야 할 이유를 각각 다룬다. 저자는 이 구분에 따라 절차 효과의 확장, 즉 특정 법정 사유가 공동소송 전체에 미치는 것을 판정한다. 유형에 맞게 행위 효과를 귀속시키고 합일 확정이나 선정 변경의 법정 효과를 유지해야 하고, 통상공동소송인의 자백으로 다른 사람의 다툼을 닫거나 합일 확정이 필요한 청구 중 일부를 남긴 채 처리할 수 없다.
가장 강한 반론은 한 사람의 장애가 모두의 구제를 늦출 수 있다는 점이다. 제3항이 중단·중지를 모두에게 미치게 하면, 한 사람만 겪는 사유 때문에 다른 사람의 판단과 집행까지 함께 멈춘다. 소송이 길어지는 동안 다른 공동소송인은 스스로 다툴 기회를 잡지 못한 채 기다려야 하고, 반대편도 그 사람만의 사유를 이유로 전체 진행을 멈춰 세울 수 있다. 당사자의 독립성을 지키면 모순된 판단이 생기고 공동의 구제가 지연될 수 있다는 불리한 점은 그대로 남는다. 그래도 통상공동소송에도 같은 중단 효과를 자동 적용할 수는 없다. 앞에서 다룬 특칙은 필수적 공동소송의 단독 행위에 관한 것이고, 제2항과 제3항의 문언도 제1항의 공동소송을 전제로 한다.
이 장면에서 이 물음에 관련된 사실은 공동원고 A와 B가 같은 법정에 섰고 A만 피고 C의 설명을 인정했다는 것, 그리고 공동소송의 유형이 다투어지고 있다는 점이다. 판정은 공동 권리의 성질, 당사자 명부, 개별 소송행위, 선정 변경, 청구별 주문을 기준으로 한다. 유형이 확인되지 않은 지금은 누가 어떤 사람의 자백에 묶이는지 확정할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 명시한 조건에 따른 구별뿐이다. 유형에 맞는 귀속과 합일 확정이나 선정 변경의 법정 효과 유지인 경우와, 자백으로 다른 사람의 다툼을 닫거나 합일 확정이 필요한 청구 일부를 남기는 처리인 경우와, 공동 권리가 합일적으로 확정되어야 하는지 확인되지 않은 경우를 구별해야 한다. 조건을 넘어서는 판단은 이 절의 범위 밖이다.
4.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
이 장면에서 공동 결과가 어떻게 갈릴지 묻기 전에, 공동소송인의 독립 또는 합일적 구제가 인정되는지를 먼저 가려야 한다.
그 구별을 위해 해당 문언부터 확인한다. 이 문언의 주체는 공동소송인을 상대로 한 상대방이고, 행위는 상대방의 소송행위이며, 조건은 제1항의 공동소송에서 그 한 사람에 대한 것이라는 점이다. 같은 조 제3항은 한 사람에게 중단 또는 중지 사유가 있을 때 "그 중단 또는 중지는 모두에게 효력이 미친다"고 정한다.
이 구별은 절차 효과의 확장 자체를 두 갈래로 나누는 것이다. 하나는 한 사람에게 한 행위가 전체에 미치는 것이고, 다른 하나는 한 사람의 장애가 절차를 멈추는 것이 전체에 미치는 것이다. 이 둘을 합쳐 어떤 결론이든 함께 얻는다고 보면, 공동소송 유형에 맞게 행위 효과를 귀속시키고 합일 확정이나 선정 변경의 법정 효과를 유지해야 구제가 가능하다. 반대로 통상공동소송인의 자백으로 다른 사람의 다툼을 닫거나, 법정 합일 확정이 필요한 청구 중 일부를 남긴 채 처리할 수 없다.
가장 강한 반론은 지체가 가져오는 손실을 겨냥한다. 공동 결과를 함께 얻어야 하는데 한 사람의 사유로 절차가 멈추면, 그동안 다른 사람의 구제가 함께 묶인다. 모순된 판단이 생길 위험을 피하려다 공동의 회수가 늦어지는 불편과 가치의 손해가 커진다. 이 답은 지체의 불이익을 지우지 않는다. 다만 그 불이익을 이유로 통상공동소송에까지 같은 확장을 넓히지는 않는다는 뜻이다.
합성 장면에 들어 있는 사실만 가지고 이 물음을 대조하면, A와 B가 같은 법정에 섰고 A가 C의 설명을 인정한 사실만 확정되어 있다. 이 사실이 통상공동소송인의 자백에 해당하는지, 그리고 그 자백이 B의 다툼까지 닫는지 판단하려면 공동 권리의 성질·당사자 명부·개별 소송행위·선정 변경·청구별 주문이 기록으로 확인되어야 한다. 그런데 공동소송의 유형 자체가 다투어지고 있으므로, 공동 권리가 합일적으로 확정되어야 하는지조차 확인되지 않았다. 따라서 이 장면만으로는 결론에 이르렀다고 단정할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 공동소송 유형에 맞게 행위 효과를 귀속시키고 합일 확정이나 선정 변경의 법정 효과를 유지한 경우의 구제이고, 허용하지 않는 것은 통상공동소송인의 자백으로 다른 사람의 다툼을 닫거나 법정 합일 확정이 필요한 청구 중 일부를 남긴 채 처리한 경우의 구제다. 그 사이에서 공동 권리가 합일적으로 확정되어야 하는지 확인되지 않은 경우는 미확정으로 남는다. 자료가 모자란다는 사실은 곧 구제 불능이 아니라 확인이 필요한 상태를 뜻한다.
4.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
공동소송인의 독립 또는 합일적 구제가 작동하든 막히든 미확정으로 남든, 그 귀속과 확정의 문제는 조문이 정한 효과와 맞물려 있었다. 여기서 확인한 것은 그 효과의 양쪽 면이다. 한쪽은 공동소송인 한 사람에 대한 상대방의 행위이고, 다른 쪽은 그 한 사람에게 생긴 절차상 장애다. 이 구별이 다음 절에 무엇을 남기는지가 이번 물음이다.
이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 공동소송인 가운데 한 사람이고, 행위자는 그 공동소송인의 상대방이며, 적용 조건은 같은 조 제1항의 공동소송이다. 효과는 그 한 사람이 아니라 공동소송인 모두에 미친다. 다만 이 효과는 같은 조 제1항의 공동소송에서만 인정된다.
제2항과 제3항을 구분한 것은 규칙의 두 얼굴이 서로 다른 사건을 가리키기 때문이다. 제3항은 "③제1항의 공동소송에서 공동소송인 가운데 한 사람에게 소송절차를 중단 또는 중지하여야 할 이유가 있는 경우 그 중단 또는 중지는 모두에게 효력이 미친다."(민사소송법 제67조)고 정한다. 이에 따라 필수적 공동소송에서는 상대방의 일부에 대한 행위와 일부의 중단·중지 사유에 관해 전체 효과를 정한 규칙이 구분된다. 한쪽은 상대방이 한 행위의 파급이고, 다른 쪽은 공동소송인 자신의 사유로 절차가 멈추는 파급이다. 방어 기회라는 동일한 우려가 두 경로에서 다른 방식으로 작용하는 까닭에, 이 둘을 한 규칙으로 합쳐 읽으면 어느 쪽이 왜 전체에 미치는지 설명되지 않는다.
한 공동소송인에게 중단 사유가 생기면 그 사람만 멈추는 것으로 두면 나머지는 선결 문제 없이 나아가 공동 결과가 어긋날 수 있지만, 모두를 멈추면 나머지 당사자는 그 사람의 회복을 기다려야 한다. 이 지연과 불편을 부정할 수 없다. 제3항은 제1항의 공동소송, 즉 필수적 공동소송을 전제로 하며, 저자가 적용한 구별도 그 범위에 있다. 통상공동소송인의 자백으로 다른 사람의 다툼을 닫거나 법정 합일 확정이 필요한 청구 중 일부를 남긴 채 처리하는 경우에는 그 독립성을 침해하는 귀속이 막힌다.
이 장면에서 확인된 것은 A의 인정이 있었고, 두 공동원고의 관계가 무엇인지 정해지지 않았다는 점이다. 유형이 확정되지 않았으므로 제2항·제3항의 전체 효과가 여기에 적용되는지, A의 인정이 B에게까지 묶는지는 판정되지 않는다. 저자가 정한 기록인 공동 권리의 성질·당사자 명부·개별 소송행위·선정 변경·청구별 주문 가운데 이 장면은 유형 확정에 필요한 것만을 남겨 두었다. 따라서 미확정은 미완료가 아니라 확정 전 단계이며, 공동 권리가 합일적으로 확정되어야 하는지 확인되지 않은 경우에는 그 상태가 유지된다.
이 절이 남기는 것은 두 규칙의 구별과 그 구별의 조건부 성격이다. 필수적 공동소송에서 상대방의 일부 행위는 제2항에 따라 전체에 미치고, 일부의 중단·중지 사유는 제3항에 따라 전체를 멈추지만, 이 효과는 그 유형 안에서만 인정된다. 같은 효과를 통상공동소송에 자동으로 옮기면 이 절의 구별은 무너진다. 판정의 기록으로 남는 것은 공동 권리의 성질·당사자 명부·개별 소송행위·선정 변경·청구별 주문이다. 다음은 당사자 지위의 문제다. 소송 중 선정당사자로 바꾸면 원래 사람도 계속 당사자인가?