Summary
An expansion of performance beyond the scope of the application and defense set by the parties is not assessed as an improvement in effectiveness.
1.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
The proper scope of relief means the range of recovery permitted within the boundaries of the claim and the defense. This range does not mean the determination of the subject matter of suit; it refers to the limit of recovery that the court may permit within the issues the parties have chosen to contest. The reason this distinction is needed is that the breadth of recovery and the permissibility of recovery are different questions. The preceding section confirmed that, because a foreign arbitral award to which the Convention applies and an award to which it does not apply rest on different grounds of recognition and enforcement, if the applicability of the Convention remains undetermined, the system of grounds for refusal to be applied cannot be determined either; and this stage asks after the criterion for determining whether performance outside the claim may be permitted.
The provision corresponding to this question is the principle of party disposition in Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act. Its text provides: “The court shall not render a judgment on a matter for which the parties have made no claim.” This text sets the court as the subject of judgment, a judgment on a matter for which no claim has been made as the prohibited act, and the absence of a claim by the parties as the condition. Accordingly, to determine the meaning of the text, it must be settled together what the parties specified as their claim and what right they advanced as the object of their defense. This provision is not a text that separately determines the scope of the final and binding force or the enforceability of a judgment.
This text connects with this section’s conclusion that the gateway to this relief opens. Here two things must be distinguished. One is the question whether the claim is specified; the other is the question whether, within the claimed range, the reason for non-recovery is explained. The former question is what the principle of party disposition directly addresses; the latter is the question whether the blocking norm, the applicable facts, and the protected countervailing interest are connected in an explanation. Combining the two, it is determined that the gateway to this relief opens only after passing the thresholds of the specification of the prayer for relief and the possibility of defense.
The strongest objection to this criterion is that a formal claim may excessively curtail substantive recovery. Contained in this objection are the loss that, if one advances the reason of protecting another right, the non-recovery of a person already injured may be rationalized, and the disadvantage that the inconvenience of the person who wishes recovery must be left as it is. If the claim is handled strictly, cases will also arise in which a person whose right has been recognized is left without receiving performance. Even so, the addition of performance outside the claim cannot be evaluated, without grounds, as an improvement of relief. It means that the loss pointed out by the objection is acknowledged, but that the loss does not become a reason to break down the boundaries of the claim.
In this scene, A asserts that all non-recovery is procedural failure, and B answers that it is due to statutory protection. Part of the applicable facts was not submitted. The point where the contentions of A and B meet is how to view non-recovery arising outside the claimed range. The scope of the claim, the grounds for protection against attachment, the personal scope of the judgment, the items of damage, and the showing of public welfare are matters to be examined in connection with this scene. However, where there is only the name of a countervailing interest and no applicable facts, so that the justification of the restriction cannot be confirmed, whether the non-recovery is a justified restriction or not is not determined by this scene alone. If the applicable facts concerning the countervailing interest are confirmed to be negated, the conclusion that viewed the non-recovery as a justified restriction changes.
Accordingly, what can be confirmed is not the judgment that the greater the amount of performance, the more effective the relief always is, but the judgment that, when the performance demanded within the boundaries of the claim and the defense is specified, recovery may be permitted within those boundaries. Adding, without grounds, performance that exceeds this range is not an improvement of relief. At the same time, one cannot summarily characterize as procedural failure a matter in which the reason for non-recovery remains unconnected. How far this judgment reaches depends on the specification of performance, parties, and conditions, and on the possibility of defense.
1.2The Conditions That Block Relief
There are cases in which giving more to one person creates a burden that another person could not contest. The earlier determination that, if the applicability of the Convention remains undetermined, the system of grounds for refusal cannot be determined either, remains confined to the question of the grounds for recognition of foreign arbitral awards. Now the question is a different one. If the court gives more performance, is the relief always more effective? What is asked particularly in this question is the conditions under which the channel of relief is blocked. Whether performance exceeding the scope of the claim is an improvement in effectiveness, or a transgression of the boundary that ought to be blocked, is at issue.
The original text corresponding to this question is Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act. Its text reads: "The court shall not render a judgment on a matter for which the parties have made no claim." The subject of which this article speaks is the court, and the prohibited act is a judgment on a matter outside the claim that was made. The condition is simple. The single fact that it is a matter for which the parties have made no claim is sufficient. This text is the basis of the principle of party disposition, and establishes the distinction that the parties determine the subject and scope of adjudication and the court is bound within them.
The way this text connects with this section’s conclusion is as follows. An expansion of performance beyond the range of the claim and the defense set by the parties is not evaluated as an improvement in effectiveness. Here two concepts must be distinguished. One is the proper scope of relief; the other is additional performance outside that range. The former means the range of recovery permitted within the boundaries of the claim and the defense. As for the latter, when, going beyond those boundaries, another statutory right actually applies but does not permit remedies such as expansion of enforcement, binding of non-parties, or a stay, if even one of the statutory requirements is unmet, the channel of this relief closes. This is why the very fact of crossing the boundary constitutes the blocking condition.
Nevertheless, the objection that a formal claim may excessively curtail substantive recovery carries real weight. If a right-holder already injured cannot obtain recovery because of the boundaries of form, the protection of statutory rights ends up rationalizing the victim’s non-recovery. This loss gives concrete form to the inconvenience left behind by adjudication that leans toward form. Yet the earlier answer does not shake. Without denying the gap in recovery pointed out by the objection, it maintains the judgment that the gap does not immediately justify performance by the court outside its scope.
In this scene, only the facts corresponding to this question are drawn out. Right-holder A asserts that all non-recovery is procedural failure, and counterparty B answers that it is due to statutory protection. This contention and this answer stand opposed to each other over the cause of non-recovery. What among the records concerning the countervailing interest — the scope of the claim, the grounds for protection against attachment, the personal scope of the judgment, the items of damage, and the showing of public welfare — was actually submitted is not confirmed. Accordingly, where there is only the name of a countervailing interest and no applicable facts, the justification of the restriction remains unconfirmed.
The conclusion this section permits lies within a clear boundary. It is the judgment that, when another statutory right actually applies but does not permit remedies such as the desired expansion of enforcement, binding of non-parties, or a stay, and if even one of the statutory requirements is unmet, the channel of relief closes. What is not permitted is calling performance outside the claim an improvement of relief without grounds. One cannot summarily characterize as procedural failure the mere fact that non-recovery remains, and conversely one cannot justify a restriction by the name of statutory protection alone. If the applicable facts are confirmed to be negated, the conclusion that viewed the non-recovery as a justified restriction changes.
1.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
The question remains whether, if the court gives more performance, the relief is always more effective. On the premise that a foreign arbitral award to which the Convention applies and an award to which it does not apply rest on different grounds of recognition and enforcement, so that if the applicability of the Convention remains undetermined the system of grounds for refusal to be applied cannot be determined either, this stage asks where the boundary lies that cannot be confirmed for want of materials. If the criterion that separates determinable determinations from indeterminable ones is not set, the meaning of the words about widening relief is shaken as well.
The pertinent text is Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act. Its original text declares: "The court shall not render a judgment on a matter for which the parties have made no claim." The subject to which this text refers is the court; the prohibited act is a judgment on a matter for which the parties have made no claim; and the condition under which such prohibition is triggered is when that matter lies outside the scope of the claim. This section calls the range of recovery permitted within the boundaries of the claim and the defense set by the parties the proper scope of relief.
The limitation that the above text imposes on the court and this section’s conclusion lie on the same axis. Performance lying outside the claim is not recovery that the court can further grant, but the point at which a burden that the parties could not contest is created. Accordingly, an expansion of performance crossing the boundaries of the claim and the defense is not evaluated as an improvement in effectiveness. However, here the stages of judgment divide in two. One is the question whether performance outside the claim can be given; the other is the question of explaining why the recovery afforded was not more fully achieved. Where there is only the name of a countervailing interest and no applicable facts, so that the justification of the restriction cannot be confirmed, a matter for which the materials of judgment are not specified is left undetermined, distinguished from impossibility.
The objection that a formal claim may excessively curtail substantive recovery aims at the loss that the non-recovery of a person already injured can be rationalized in the name of protecting another right. The person whose recovery is blocked bears that burden in reality, and the protective logic hiding behind the formal boundary can push that person away once more. Even without erasing the disadvantage pointed out by the objection, the conclusion is maintained that performance going outside the claim cannot be received as a proven improvement merely because it makes recovery larger.
In the synthetic scene, the party asserting the right argues that all non-recovery is procedural failure, and the opposing party answers that it is due to statutory protection. Comparing this arrangement of facts with the foregoing conditions, the restriction can be classified as justified only when the blocking norm, the applicable facts, and the protected countervailing interest are connected so as to explain the reason for non-recovery. The name of the countervailing interest was invoked, but the fact that the interest is actually applied did not arrive, so the justification of the restriction remains unconfirmed. Items not confirmed by the scene remain undetermined as they are.
The conclusion this section permits extends no further than regarding recovery within the boundaries of the claim and the defense as the proper scope of relief and not hastily counting the expansion of performance outside it as an improvement in effectiveness. Conversely, it is not permitted to confirm the justification of a restriction merely because the name of a countervailing interest has appeared, or to summarily declare that relief is impossible merely because the materials are empty. A matter for which the materials of judgment are not specified remains in the realm of the undetermined, not of the impossible.
1.4The Records Needed for Determination
Once the premise is accepted that a foreign arbitral award to which the Convention applies and an award to which it does not apply rest on different grounds of recognition and enforcement, so that if the applicability of the Convention remains undetermined the system of grounds for refusal to be applied cannot be determined either, what must next be examined is whether the amount of performance the court hands down is the same as the effectiveness of relief. In the scene where right-holder A asserts that all non-recovery is procedural failure and counterparty B answers that it is due to statutory protection, the decision-maker determines whether that answer is persuasive.
The framework for answering that question lies in Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act. This article declares that "on a matter for which the parties have made no claim," the court shall not render a judgment. Here ‘the court’ is the subject of judgment, ‘a matter for which the parties have made no claim’ refers to what lies outside the boundaries set by the claim and the defense, and ‘shall not render a judgment’ means that the court lacks the power to determine matters outside those boundaries. This text is devoted only to what the scope of the claim and the defense is, and what judgment is possible outside that boundary.
The path connecting the text of the article with this section’s conclusion is simple. If the court cannot give more performance outside the claim, then the emergence of more performance outside the claim cannot be counted as an improvement in the effectiveness of relief. At that point the proper scope of relief means the range of recovery permitted within the boundaries of the claim and the defense, and this definition overlaps with the realm of judgment that the foregoing article prohibits. The reason the two items must be kept separate is that the recovery recognized within the claim and the performance that could be further given outside the claim differ in their nature. This section’s determination is made solely on the materials recorded in the scope of the claim, the grounds for protection against attachment, the personal scope of the judgment, the items of damage, and the showing of public welfare, and it does not fill absent records with presumptions.
The strongest objection aims at the point that a formal claim may excessively curtail substantive recovery. It is the criticism that advancing another statutory right merely rationalizes the phenomenon whereby a person already injured remains unrecovered. The author, without erasing that adverse aspect, responds that the addition of performance outside the claim cannot be evaluated without grounds as an improvement of relief. The meaning that performance outside the claim bears is a matter to be judged only by the materials the records show, and substituting that performance for an improvement by records that do not exist lies outside the object of judgment.
Returning to the scene, to determine whether all the non-recovery asserted by A is procedural failure, the reason for that non-recovery must first be recorded, and part of the applicable facts concerning that reason has not been submitted at this time. The countervailing interest of statutory protection asserted by B has only had its name presented, and whether items such as the grounds for protection against attachment, the personal scope of the judgment, the items of damage, and the showing of public welfare were actually confirmed in the record is not confirmed here. If the applicable facts concerning the countervailing interest are confirmed to be negated, the conclusion that viewed the non-recovery as a justified restriction changes, but from the scene alone one cannot know whether that condition is met. This item remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits remains within a narrow range: it does not count the expansion of performance lying outside the boundaries of the claim and the defense as an improvement in the effectiveness of relief. Beyond that range, classifying performance outside the claim as an improvement of relief, or filling materials absent from the record with conjecture in order to push forward the stage determination, is the side this section does not permit. Nor is an attempt to confirm the justification of a restriction in a state where only the name of a countervailing interest exists permitted.
1.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
What is being asked now is whether a court that grants more performance always affords more effective relief, and behind that question lies the subsidiary question of under what circumstances a change that broadens performance overturns the existing stage determination. At the point where the demand for the maximization of relief collides with the restriction known as the boundary of the request, it is decided whether non-recovery is to be called a procedure failure or a lawful restriction.
The source text corresponding to this question is Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act. The provision declares: "A court may not render a judgment on a matter for which a party has not made a request" (Civil Procedure Act, Article 203). Here the subject is the court, the act is the judgment, and the condition is a matter for which a party has not made a request. The text does not ask whether the court may add a just performance that the court itself defines; it makes plain that no judgment may be rendered outside the matters a party has presented through a request. The author reads this text as the ground on which an expansion of performance crossing the boundary woven of request and defense cannot be evaluated as an improvement in effectiveness.
The reason for distinguishing what lies inside and outside the range set by the request is that the way non-recovery is explained changes accordingly. If recovery was blocked within the boundary, room remains to treat that non-recovery as a failure of procedure; but a gap arising because the performance outside the boundary was not wanted is a different matter. Only if this distinction stands can one determine whether a restriction bearing the name of a counter-interest actually operated or whether only the name remained. If the boundary is erased and only the quantity of performance is increased, one cannot explain which recovery was permitted and which was not.
The strongest of the counterarguments to this distinction is that a formal request may excessively reduce substantive recovery. An unease is raised alongside it: that placing the protection of other rights in the foreground may rationalize the non-recovery of a person already injured. In the eyes of the right-holder A, all damage left unrecovered is a failure of procedure, and the statutory protection asserted by the opposing party B may appear to be a device that conceals that failure. The author answers, however, that the addition of performance outside the request cannot be evaluated as an improvement of relief without a ground. Even as it does not erase the loss the counterargument points to, it does not permit the very act of adding unrequested performance to be called an improvement in effectiveness.
In the synthetic scene, the facts are only A's assertion, B's answer, and the non-submission of part of the applicable facts. Whether the statutory protection B asserted is some counter-interest, and whether that interest was actually applied so as to block an expansion of enforcement or the binding of non-parties, is not determined on the record. If the specified change is confirmed, the existing assessment of blocking and effectiveness changes. Yet, in the present state where the applicable facts have only a name and their content has not been submitted, the lawfulness of the restriction remains undetermined. Undetermined does not immediately mean that relief is impossible.
The conclusion this section permits is a narrow one. An expansion of performance exceeding the range of request and defense fixed by the parties is not evaluated as an improvement in effectiveness, and whether non-recovery is a lawful restriction or not can be determined only when the applicable facts of the counter-interest are linked. The conclusion not permitted is the case in which giving more performance outside the request is justified in the name of a more complete relief. Even though the materials remain insufficient, this narrow conclusion, already fixed, stands.
1.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
Following the question whether a court that grants more performance always affords more effective relief, what remains as this question is how the criticism that a formal request may excessively reduce substantive recovery should be received in this scene.
Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act addresses the principle of party disposition, and its text provides as follows: "A court may not render a judgment on a matter for which a party has not made a request." The subject indicated by this text is the court that pronounces the judgment, the prohibited act is a determination concerning a matter outside the requested matters, and the condition is the case in which the party has made no request. A request means the range of performance a party seeks from the court, and a defense means the resistance the opposing party submits within that range. The provision bars the court from itself defining the performance outside this boundary.
The prohibition set by this text and the conclusion to the present question meet in the same direction. Here two stages must be distinguished. One is the range of recovery the court may permit; the other is whether recovery was actually achieved within that range. Adding performance outside the request merely widens the boundary of the former, and there is no ground anywhere for calling that expansion an improvement in the effectiveness of the latter.
The counterargument that a formal request may excessively reduce substantive recovery is weighty in itself. In a scene where a person already injured omitted part of the desired performance from the request, or where the opposing party invokes a counter-interest to block recovery, clinging to the text alone makes the remaining non-recovery appear to be left wholly unaddressed. The observation that placing the protection of other rights in the foreground may rationalize the non-recovery of a person already injured also comes from the same place. The answer, however, stands: that the addition of performance outside the request cannot be evaluated as an improvement of relief without a ground. Even as it does not erase the inconvenience the counterargument indicates, what remains is only the judgment that, absent a ground explaining why the expanded performance is better recovery, it is not counted as an improvement.
In the synthetic scene, the facts relevant to this question are narrow. A asserts that all non-recovery is a failure of procedure, B answers that it is due to statutory protection, and part of the applicable facts has not been submitted. Contrasting this with the lawful scope of relief—that is, the range of recovery permitted within the boundary of request and defense—what can be seen on the record is the scope of the request, the grounds for attachment protection, the personal scope of the judgment, items of damage, and the showing of public welfare. However, since only the name of the counter-interest exists and there are no applicable facts, the lawfulness of the restriction cannot be confirmed; hence it is difficult to classify the non-recovery as a lawful restriction on the strength of this scene alone. Conversely, there is no ground in the scene for regarding the expanded performance as an improvement.
The conclusion this section permits is a single one: the judgment that, when it cannot be explained why adding performance outside the request is better recovery, that addition is not recorded as an improvement in effectiveness. The conclusions not permitted are the equation that the addition is itself an improvement of relief, and the judgment that a failure of procedure is established by the mere fact that non-recovery remains. If the applicable facts concerning the counter-interest are denied, the conclusion that classified the non-recovery as a lawful restriction is withdrawn. Yet, merely because that denial has not been confirmed, one cannot hold that the counter-interest is established.
1.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
Although the preceding section supplied the answer that the addition of performance outside the request cannot be evaluated as an improvement of relief without a ground, that alone does not make clear the direction indicated by the question whether a court that grants more performance always affords more effective relief. If an increase in the quantity of performance broadens the right-holder's recovery, it looks like a good thing in itself; but the matter is otherwise if the person who must bear that increase was from the outset in no position to contest the burden. This section asks whether, in such a case, the increased performance can be called an improvement in effectiveness.
The text serving as the standard for this question is found in the Civil Procedure Act. The provision laying down the principle of party disposition makes clear that, "on a matter for which a party has not made a request," no other performance or burden may be fixed (Civil Procedure Act, Article 203), and it limits the matters that may be fixed by judgment to the range requested by the party. Here a request denotes the content and limits of the relief a party, as claimant, demands of the court, and the words that no judgment may be rendered are read to mean that no performance or burden beyond that demand may be fixed. The text takes only the matters requested by the party as its standard and leaves no room for determinations on other matters.
Where the court adds performance beyond the request, the added portion lies outside the limit set by this text and is therefore different in kind from an increase in the performance within the request. In accordance with the premise received from the preceding section, the addition of performance outside the request cannot be evaluated as an improvement of relief without a ground, and the text points in the direction of not permitting such an addition. Here the lawful scope of relief means the range of recovery permitted within the boundary of request and defense, and this definition leads one to ask first, before enlarging the magnitude of recovery, within what boundary that recovery is permitted. The boundary of request and defense must be read not as a passive procedure requirement but as the standard marking the range within which recovery may be justified; accordingly, an expansion of performance outside the request and a case in which recovery is enlarged within the request cannot be bundled together and called an improvement in effectiveness.
Nevertheless, the counterargument that a formal request may excessively reduce substantive recovery aims at a point not easily overlooked. The gap between the relief demanded by the person in need of recovery and the relief the court can ultimately give remains as that person's non-recovery, and that non-recovery is felt as an actual loss. Just as with the concern that placing the protection of other rights in the foreground may rationalize the non-recovery of a person already injured, there is also a risk that holding to the boundary may operate in a way that conceals the disadvantage falling upon the person who needs recovery. Yet, so long as one does not depart from the scope of the position that the addition of performance outside the request cannot be evaluated as an improvement of relief without a ground, performance outside the boundary cannot be newly created on the strength of the mere fact that non-recovery is felt, and the task of narrowing the gap between form and substance must be handled by reexamining the range of recovery possible within the request.
This question corresponds directly to the dispute between A and B. What is needed to distinguish whether the cause of non-recovery is a failure of procedure or a lawful restriction is the linking of the blocking norm and the applicable facts, and here that link can be examined by taking the range of request and defense as the text. Since part of the applicable facts has not been submitted, however, neither the assertion that all non-recovery is a failure of procedure nor the contrary justification can be confirmed on the strength of the scene alone. Within the range that remains undetermined, applying the limit indicated by the text must be distinguished from classifying all remaining non-recovery for the same reason.
A court's granting more performance does not always lead to more effective relief; only where the range of recovery permitted within the boundary of request and defense is enlarged can it be discussed as a change in effectiveness. What this section leaves behind is therefore not a refusal of attempts to increase the quantity of performance, but something closer to an instruction to confirm first outside what boundary the increased performance arose. How the remaining non-recovery is to be handled, however, is not settled by the judgment of this section.
1.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
In the synthetic scene, the right-holder A asserts that all non-recovery is a failure of procedure, the opposing party B answers that it is due to statutory protection, and part of the applicable facts has not been submitted. In this scene there emerges the problem of distinguishing when non-recovery is a failure of procedure and when it is the result of protecting another right.
The relevant provision provides that a court may not render a judgment on a matter for which a party has not made a request (Civil Procedure Act, Article 203). The subject indicated by this text is the court that pronounces the judgment, the prohibited act is the pronouncement of a judgment on a matter not requested, and the condition is that the party has made no request. The range of request and defense means the limits the parties have made the subject of dispute.
That is not so. The reason this distinction is needed is that, if enlargement of the range of recovery and compliance with the limits of procedure are placed on the same axis, enlarging the one immediately becomes an infringement upon the other.
The counterargument aims at the point that a formal request may excessively reduce substantive recovery. The discomfort also remains that the non-recovery left by a person already injured may be rationalized in the name of protecting another right. Even without erasing such a loss, the addition of performance outside the request cannot be evaluated as an improvement of relief without a ground. The magnitude of non-recovery alone gives rise to no ground for justifying performance outside the boundary of the request.
Among the facts of this scene, those corresponding to this question are A's assertion of non-recovery and B's answer of statutory protection, and part of the applicable facts has not been submitted. Since only the name of the counter-interest exists without its applicable facts, the lawfulness of the restriction cannot be confirmed and remains undetermined. Outcomes of judgments or recovery results that cannot be confirmed from the scene alone are not treated here.
The conclusion this section permits is the judgment that an expansion of performance crossing the boundary of request and defense is not called an improvement in effectiveness. Conversely, the conclusion that every recovery was a failure of relief merely because non-recovery exists is not supported by this section. Applicable facts that cannot be confirmed are left in the place of the undetermined, and the interest bearing that name is not used as if it were an actually existing ground of blocking.
1.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
On the basis that the preceding stage confirmed that, owing to the undetermined question of whether the convention applies, the system of grounds for refusal remains unfixed, this stage distinguishes the question whether a court that grants more performance always affords more effective relief by the text of the relevant source alone.
The relevant provision declares: "A court may not render a judgment on a matter for which a party has not made a request." The subject indicated by this text is the court, the prohibited act is a judgment on a matter not requested, and the condition is that the matter is one for which the party has made no request. Here a request is the range of performance a party seeks from the court, and a matter means the object included within what is sought.
Because the text prohibits a judgment on a matter not requested, the court can render a judgment only within the range of request and defense fixed by the parties. The reason an expansion of performance exceeding the range of request and defense fixed by the parties is not evaluated as an improvement in effectiveness lies here. The range of the request is a matter of how broadly recovery is sought, and how far recovery was actually achieved is a separate matter; on the text, the two judgments cannot be substituted for one another.
The counterargument that a formal request may excessively reduce substantive recovery is directed at the possibility that the loss remaining as non-recovery and the inconvenience it causes may be left unaddressed because of formal requirements. It is a fact that non-recovery remains where another statutory right is actually applied so that the desired remedies—an expansion of enforcement, the binding of non-parties, suspension, and the like—cannot be permitted, and this does not erase the weight of that fact. Only where the blocking norm, the applicable facts, and the protected counter-interest are linked so as to explain the reason for the non-recovery can the non-recovery be classified as a lawful restriction.
The facts relevant in this scene are only the assertions of the two parties and the non-submission of part of the applicable facts. Since only the name of the counter-interest exists without applicable facts, the lawfulness of the restriction cannot be confirmed; and so long as the unsubmitted applicable facts remain unfilled, non-recovery cannot be drawn out as a lawful restriction. Which among the scope of the request, the grounds for attachment protection, the personal scope of the judgment, items of damage, and the showing of public welfare was actually submitted cannot be determined from this scene alone; accordingly, the answer of the opposing party B that the non-recovery arose from statutory protection remains undetermined.
What is permitted in this section is, first, the judgment that non-recovery cannot be summarily pronounced a failure of relief on the sole ground of the procedural boundary that no performance beyond the range of the request was requested; and, second, the judgment that an enlargement exceeding the range of recovery permitted within that boundary is not counted as an improvement in effectiveness. What is not permitted is the judgment that the restriction on formal requests is always unreasonable or that all non-recovery is a failure of procedure, and the attitude of mixing the author's application and evaluation into the confirmed text and transcribing it as the holding of a court. Nor may the outcome of an actual case or the results of recovery be described as if they were facts of this scene.
1.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
At the point where such costs arise, the question is whether granting more performance is always a more effective remedy. The preceding section concluded that an expansion of performance beyond the scope of the claim and defense set by the parties is not to be evaluated as an improvement in effectiveness. The question that remains from this judgment is what the legitimate scope of the remedy means. Within this confrontation, the question narrows toward confirming within what boundary the remedy is permitted.
That text reads: "The court shall not render a judgment on matters not claimed by the parties" (Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act). Here the court is the subject that renders the judgment, matters not claimed by the parties are objects that cannot be fixed by judgment, and the inability to render a judgment is a limitation on the scope of the judgment. This text is placed under the heading of the principle of party disposition and binds the matters a judgment may address to those claimed by the parties. Thus, what the text directly states is not the amount of performance or the degree of restoration, but the boundary of the matters that can be fixed by judgment. This text does not address the issues of other provisions as well.
The link joining the text and the conclusion is found here. If the matters on which the court may render judgment are limited to the parties' claims, granting broader performance beyond the claim becomes a matter outside the boundary that a judgment can fix. Accordingly, the scope of restoration permitted within the boundary of claim and defense may be defined as the legitimate scope of the remedy (Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act). This definition matters because it separates the measure that gauges the magnitude of restoration from the boundary that delimits the judgment. If the former speaks to the size of the desired outcome, the latter speaks to whether the court can fix that outcome. If these two are not separated, one will say that the remedy has improved merely because the restoration is large.
The strongest counterargument lies in that a formal claim may excessively reduce substantive restoration. The loss targeted by the counterargument is clear. A person who has suffered harm may not receive all of the desired restoration even though the statutory requirements are met, and the longer that lack of restoration remains, the inconvenience arises that the dispute does not end. If the protection of other rights is placed first, the result may be to rationalize the lack of restoration of the person already infringed. Yet the answer given above is that the addition of performance outside the claim cannot be evaluated as an improvement of the remedy without grounds. There is no ground here to justify a judgment that adds performance beyond the boundary merely because the lack of restoration is regrettable.
If the synthetic scene is contrasted to this question, the confrontation between A and B concerns whether the reason for the lack of restoration lies in a limitation of procedure or in the application of statutory protection. The items that must be recorded are the scope of the claim, the grounds for attachment protection, the personal scope of the judgment, the heads of damage, and the showing of public welfare. Yet since part of the applicable facts has not been submitted, where an opposing interest is mentioned only by name, the legitimacy of the restriction cannot be confirmed. From this scene alone, one cannot confirm which of A's or B's assertion of procedural failure should be adopted.
The conclusion this section permits is that the legitimate scope of the remedy means the scope of restoration permitted within the boundary of claim and defense, and that an expansion of performance beyond the scope of the claim and defense set by the parties is not evaluated as an improvement in effectiveness. This judgment does not permit reading the matter so that increasing performance beyond the claim is tantamount to improving the remedy. Conversely, it does not permit declaring as a failure of remedy the scope of restoration legitimately restricted within the claim. An attitude that hastily regards an expansion of performance beyond the boundary of claim and defense as an improvement of the remedy exceeds the boundary of this judgment. How are a legitimate restriction and a failure of remedy distinguished?
1.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act, National Law Information Center, establishes a norm that binds the scope of the court's judgment to the parties' claims. Article 203 (Principle of Party Disposition) The court shall not render a judgment on matters not claimed by the parties. The subject indicated by this text is the court, the prohibited act is a judgment on matters outside the claim, and the condition under which such an expansion of performance is not permitted is the case where the party has not claimed that matter. This text states only that performance outside the claim cannot be added at the court's discretion, and does not directly prescribe the criteria for widening or narrowing the scope of restoration within the claim. Here, the legitimate scope of the remedy means the scope of restoration permitted within the boundary of claim and defense. Restoration beyond that scope, though it may be more performance, is not in itself a more effective remedy. Accordingly, this text becomes the starting point for judging an improvement in effectiveness.
The way this text and the foregoing conclusion are joined is simple. The moment the court gives more performance, it is a benefit to someone, yet a burden that could not be contested may be imposed on another person. If the performance creating that burden crossed the boundary of the claim, that performance is not evaluated as having raised the effectiveness of the remedy. Here two distinctions must be kept apart. One is the widening of the scope of restoration; the other is the addition of performance outside the claim. The former is a matter of the magnitude permitted within the claim and defense; the latter is a matter of crossing that boundary itself. If one says that an addition beyond the boundary automatically increases restoration, that becomes an evaluation that has removed the disadvantage borne by the party who could not contest it. Therefore, the addition of performance outside the claim cannot be evaluated as an improvement of the remedy without grounds. This judgment is compatible with the fact that a claim may reduce substantive restoration. That fact is a matter of how the scope of restoration within the claim should be set; it is not a matter of whether to permit performance outside the boundary.
Then what loss does the counterargument that a formal claim may excessively reduce substantive restoration target? A person who has been recognized as having a right yet, bound by the form of the claim, does not receive the performance actually owed bears that lack of restoration solely as a cost of procedure. The counterargument points out that that person's lack of restoration may be a failure of remedy, and states that an answer placing statutory protection first cannot rationalize the lack of restoration of the person already infringed. Yet, insofar as this counterargument is answered, the conclusion is maintained. This is because the addition of performance outside the claim cannot be evaluated as an improvement of the remedy without grounds. Here, grounds means the case where there is a blocking norm, there are facts to which that norm applies, and the opposing interest protected by that norm is confirmed. Only when these three elements are connected so that the reason for the lack of restoration can be explained can the lack of restoration be explained as a legitimate restriction. Even then, the lack of restoration spoken of by the counterargument is not erased. The state of not having been restored remains as it is; only the judgment remains that this state cannot be called a failure of procedure alone.
In distinguishing a legitimate restriction from a failure of remedy, these three conditions are confirmed in turn. First, there must be a blocking norm. If there is no norm preventing performance outside the claim and yet the lack of restoration is called a legitimate restriction, that fails to present the reason for the restriction. Second, there must be facts to which that norm applies. If only the name of the norm is present and it is not stated which norm applies to which party's which situation, the lack of restoration is still at the stage of seeking its cause. Third, there must be an opposing interest protected by that norm. Such things as the interest in preventing a burden that could not be contested, the interest in not binding non-parties to a judgment, and the interest in upholding the personal scope of a finalized judgment are of that kind. Only in the case where all three are connected and the reason for the lack of restoration is explained is the lack of restoration classified not as a failure of remedy but as a legitimate restriction. Conversely, the same standard operates when another statutory right is actually applied and remedies such as the desired expansion of enforcement, binding of non-parties, or a stay cannot be permitted. In that case it is a condition that closes, not a condition that opens.
The foregoing analysis carries forward at the point of not regarding an expansion of performance outside the claim as an improvement in effectiveness. In a scene where the person whose right has been recognized still remains without restoration and the opposing party answers that the lack of restoration is due to statutory protection, what remains is how that lack of restoration is to be named. The lack of restoration is a single factual state, and whether that state is to be regarded as a legitimate restriction or as a failure of remedy depends on the criteria set out above. Part of the applicable facts remains unsubmitted. In the interval where it is not confirmed which norm actually applies to which party and what interest that norm protects, judgment stops. The case where only the name of the opposing interest is present and, absent applicable facts, the legitimacy of the restriction cannot be confirmed is precisely that interval. That interval is a state of insufficient material, not a state in which the remedy is impossible. Leaving the matter undetermined is the reservation permitted on this question.
When only the name of the opposing interest is present and there are no applicable facts, that name alone cannot make the lack of restoration a legitimate restriction. According to the foregoing criteria, only when the blocking norm, the applicable facts, and the protected opposing interest are connected is the reason for the lack of restoration explained. If any one of these three is missing, the matter remains undetermined. However, undetermined does not mean that no conclusion has been reached at all. The judgment that the addition of performance outside the claim cannot be evaluated as an improvement of the remedy without grounds remains as it is. That judgment is maintained irrespective of whether the applicable facts are confirmed. Meanwhile, there is a condition that can reverse this classification. At that point the lack of restoration again becomes a candidate for a failure of remedy. Therefore, undetermined is not a state with the door closed, but a state that may be closed or may be opened. That material is lacking means only a deficiency of material, and does not signify a blocking of the remedy.
The conclusions this section permits and those it does not permit are divided as follows. What is permitted is to call that lack of restoration a legitimate restriction when the blocking norm, the applicable facts, and the protected opposing interest are connected and the reason for the lack of restoration is explained. When another statutory right is actually applied and remedies such as the desired expansion of enforcement, binding of non-parties, or a stay cannot be permitted, the judgment that those remedies are blocked is also permitted. What is not permitted is to declare that state a failure of procedure on the sole basis of the fact of non-restoration. Another thing not permitted is to confirm the legitimacy of the restriction on the strength of the name of the opposing interest alone. In the interval that remains undetermined, judgment is deferred, but the standard of not evaluating the addition of performance outside the claim as an improvement of the remedy without grounds is maintained. Here, the legitimate scope of the remedy means the scope of restoration permitted within the boundary of claim and defense, and performance beyond that boundary does not count as an improvement in effectiveness.
1.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
The judgment left by the preceding step was that, if the applicability of the convention remains undetermined, the system of grounds for refusal to be used cannot be determined either. This section asks about the relationship between increasing the amount of the remedy and remaining within the scope of the claim. In particular, this section addresses whether that expansion can be evaluated as an improvement of the remedy without taking into account the burden it creates for others, and whether the remaining lack of restoration can be called a procedural failure.
The subject designated by this provision is the court, the act it prohibits is a judgment on matters not claimed by the parties, and its condition is the absence of a claim. Accordingly, the court's adjudicatory power is bound to the matters the parties have presented by claim. This text states only that matters for which there is no claim cannot be fixed by judgment; it does not address how the remedy should be designed within the scope of that claim.
The text of Article 203 and the legitimate scope of the remedy defined above form a single direction. The reason these two judgments must be separated is that the prohibition on judgment concerning matters outside the claim is a matter of the court's power, whereas the evaluation of the effectiveness of the remedy is a matter of the magnitude of restoration. Accordingly, an expansion of performance beyond the scope of the claim and defense set by the parties is not evaluated as an improvement in effectiveness, no matter how great the restoration becomes. That expansion is performance outside the legitimate scope and therefore cannot be included among the indicators of an improvement of the remedy.
The counterargument, however, squarely targets this judgment: the boundary of the formal claim may excessively reduce substantive restoration. If the person already infringed is prevented from being restored because of that scope, the criticism runs, a procedural principle placing the protection of other rights first ends up rationalizing the victim's lack of restoration as it stands. The loss is the reduction in actual restoration, the inconvenience is the divergence between the fact of infringement and the possibility of restoration, and the value is the demand for substantive relief. Even without erasing these disadvantages, the addition of performance outside the claim cannot be evaluated as an improvement of the remedy without grounds. The judgment that an expansion beyond the limits of the claim is not in itself an improvement in effectiveness is maintained.
In the synthetic scene, the rights correspond to this point. Only when the blocking norm, the applicable facts, and the protected opposing interest needed to explain the reason for the lack of restoration are connected is it distinguished whether the case is a legitimate restriction or a failure of remedy. Yet in this scene part of the applicable facts of the opposing interest is missing, so the content of the statutory protection supporting B's answer cannot be confirmed. Accordingly, whether B's defense has been confirmed by applicable facts cannot be judged from this scene alone, and A's assertions, too, are not all accepted.
The conclusion this section permits is limited. Its judgment is that an expansion of performance beyond the boundary of claim and defense does not count as an improvement in effectiveness, and that, if the remaining lack of restoration arises from the scope of the claim, it is not classified as a procedural failure on that account. Yet neither can the lack of restoration be definitively treated as a legitimate restriction on the strength of the name of an opposing interest that lacks applicable facts. Having set these boundaries and moving on: is money that could not be received because of exemption from attachment a failure of enforcement?