Summary
Premised on the statutory personal scope of a judgment's effect, an expansion that binds persons who did not participate without any basis is not regarded as legitimate recovery.
3.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
For the convenience of the prevailing party, one cannot eliminate another person's opportunity for a first trial. I consider that non-recovery arising from statutory attachment protection must be distinguished from errors of the enforcement agency or the non-existence of the claim. After accepting this distinction from the preceding stage, what must now be asked is this: when the scope of recovery is broadened on the ground of such non-recovery, what is the criterion by which the entrance to this remedy is opened. A, who asserts rights, claims that all of his non-recovery is a failure of procedure, while the opposing B answers that it is due to statutory protection, and part of the applicable facts has not been submitted. Against this confrontation, the threshold of recovery is asked.
The relevant provision defines the personal scope of the effect of a judgment as follows. Article 218(1) of the Civil Procedure Act declares that "a final and conclusive judgment is effective against the parties, successors after the close of oral argument..." (Civil Procedure Act, Article 218). The subjects indicated by this provision are the parties and their successors, and persons possessing the object of the claim. Paragraph (3) of the same Article adds that "a final and conclusive judgment against a person who became plaintiff or defendant for another person is effective also against that other person" (Civil Procedure Act, Article 218). If a third party who did not participate falls outside this scope, no ground for a final and conclusive judgment to bind him directly can be found in this provision.
The point at which the above provision and the conclusion of this section meet lies in the concept of the justification of the personal limitation, that is, the reason for observing the statutory scope of persons to be bound by a judgment. The author considers the entrance to this remedy to be opened. This determination divides into two steps. The first step is whether the blocking norm, the applicable facts, and the protected countervailing interests are linked so that the reason for the non-recovery can be explained; the second is whether the binding can be justified within the personal scope of the above provision. If the former is the task of ascertaining the cause of the non-recovery, the latter is the task of asking whether that cause can serve as a ground for binding even persons outside the statutory scope. Combining the two steps, recovery can no longer be viewed merely as an expansion of remedies.
Nevertheless, the strongest counterargument targets the position that bears the burden. If a third party repeatedly contests the same issue before a prevailing party seeking to enforce an already recognized right, recovery is delayed and the efficacy of the right loses its luster. The anxiety is that, unless all economically entangled non-parties are bound together by a single judgment, A may never achieve recovery. The author's answer here is resolute. All non-parties cannot be included in the effect of a judgment on the basis of economic relevance alone. While acknowledging the loss that non-recovery may be rationalized under the banner of protecting other rights, an expansion that binds persons who did not participate without ground is not regarded as legitimate recovery.
Confronting the facts of the synthetic scene with the foregoing conditions, the claim of non-recovery submitted by A and the defense of statutory protection raised by B stand opposed. However, because part of the applicable facts has not been submitted, whether the countervailing interests are actually applied so as to justify the limitation cannot be determined from this scene alone. This point left undetermined does not mean that the legal route is closed. It merely shows that the materials needed to judge whether the blocking norm, the applicable facts, and the protected countervailing interests are linked to explain the reason for the non-recovery have come in only insufficiently. Whether the non-recovery can be classified as a legitimate limitation turns on whether the applicable facts concerning the countervailing interests are substantiated.
The boundary between the conclusions this section permits and those it does not is as follows. What is permitted is the determination that the route of this remedy opens when the blocking norm, the applicable facts, and the protected countervailing interests are linked to explain the reason for the non-recovery, when the required performance, parties, and conditions are specified in the statement of claim, and when the right of the chosen form of action can be defended. What is not permitted is an expansion binding all non-parties to the effect of a judgment on the basis of economic relevance alone.
3.2The Conditions That Block Relief
At the point where a third party's repeated contestation may prevent the enforcement of an already recognized right, one cannot eliminate another person's opportunity for a first trial for the convenience of the prevailing party. In a situation where the right has been recognized but recovery has not been reached, the question remains whether that non-recovery is to be viewed only as a failure of procedure or as the result of a limitation prescribed by law. This distinction goes directly to the question whether all related persons may be bound to the judgment for the sake of the prevailing party's recovery, and to the question what the conditions are under which the route of remedy is blocked.
The statutory provision answering this question lies in Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act. The persons to whom the effect of a final and conclusive judgment extends are prescribed as follows: "① A final and conclusive judgment is effective against the parties, successors after the close of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, successors after the pronouncement of the judgment), or persons possessing the object of the claim for their benefit." (Civil Procedure Act, Article 218). This provision limits the subjects receiving the effect to the parties, successors at a certain point in time, and persons possessing the object of the claim for their benefit. An expansion that binds persons who did not participate without ground is a matter outside this list.
Linking this provision with the conclusion of this section reveals the reason for observing the statutory scope of persons to be bound by a judgment. Here, the justification of the personal limitation means the reason for observing the statutory scope of persons to be bound by a judgment. On the premise of the statutory personal scope of the effect of a judgment, an expansion that binds persons who did not participate without ground is not regarded as legitimate recovery. Broadening the width of recovery and possessing a ground for that expansion are distinct stages, and the former alone does not establish the latter.
The position opposing this distinction most strongly points out that a third party's repeated contestation may prevent the enforcement of an already recognized right. The disadvantage also remains that, if the protection of other rights is put forward, the non-recovery of a person already infringed can be rationalized. If the statutory requirements are not actually met, the desired remedies—expanded enforcement, binding of non-parties, stay, and the like—are not allowed, and the route of remedy is closed.
In the synthetic scene, A, the right-holder, claims that all non-recovery is a failure of procedure, and B, the opposing party, answers that it is due to statutory protection. Part of the applicable facts has not been submitted. Where only the name of the countervailing interest exists and there are no applicable facts, so that the legitimacy of the limitation cannot be confirmed, that non-recovery cannot be classified as a legitimate limitation. Conversely, if another statutory right is actually applied so that the desired remedy cannot be allowed, and even one of the statutory requirements is not met, the route of this remedy is closed. If the applicable facts concerning the countervailing interests are confirmed to be negated, the conclusion that viewed the non-recovery as a legitimate limitation changes.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. As to subjects falling within the statutory personal scope, the effect of a final and conclusive judgment extends; an expansion binding others without their participation is not a ground for legitimate recovery. Along with this, including all non-parties in the effect of a judgment on the basis of economic relevance alone is not permitted. Yet a matter left undetermined because the applicable facts of the countervailing interests remain cannot be summarily declared beyond remedy.
3.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
The question whether all related persons may be bound to the judgment for the sake of the prevailing party's recovery narrows down to the problem of determining the statutory scope of persons to be bound by a judgment. This question requires a judgment separate from the errors of the enforcement agency or the non-existence of the claim examined earlier.
As the standard provision answering this question, Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act enumerates the persons to whom the effect of a final and conclusive judgment extends. Article 218(1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides: ① A final and conclusive judgment is effective against the parties, successors after the close of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, successors after the pronouncement of the judgment), or persons possessing the object of the claim for their benefit. This provision limits the subjects of the effect to the parties, certain successors, and possessors of the object. So long as a person who did not participate does not fall within that scope, it is difficult to say that he is bound without the requirement of possession for him.
The case of becoming plaintiff or defendant for another person is dealt with by a separate paragraph. Article 218(3) of the Civil Procedure Act declares: ③ A final and conclusive judgment against a person who became plaintiff or defendant for another person is effective also against that other person. Here there must be a relationship such as the lending of one's name, and the mere fact of having an economic interest does not reach that other person. The two paragraphs show together the fact that the route binding a person who did not participate is provided by statute, and the fact that that route operates only within the express limitation.
Then, may the personal scope of the effect be broadened merely because the prevailing party's need for recovery is acute? The strongest counterargument targets the point that a third party's repeated contestation may prevent the enforcement of an already recognized right. If the protection of other rights is put forward, the criticism follows that the non-recovery of a person already infringed can be rationalized. But this criticism fails to distinguish inquiring into the cause that obstructed recovery from determining the range of persons to be bound to the judgment. The conclusion that all non-parties cannot be included in the effect of a judgment on the basis of economic relevance alone is maintained. The weight of the non-recovery pointed out by the counterargument does not disappear; it merely moves to a different stage, namely the personal scope of the judgment.
The passage in the synthetic scene where B, the opposing party, answered that it is due to statutory protection leaves an important clue here. However, because part of the applicable facts has not been submitted, it cannot be determined on which statutory right that protection is actually founded, and whether that right actually falls under the conditions that prevent expanded enforcement. Where only the name of the countervailing interest exists and there are no applicable facts, so that the legitimacy of the limitation cannot be confirmed, matters on which the materials for judgment are not specified are left undetermined, distinguished from impossibility. Impossibility refers to cases where the legal route is closed, whereas undetermined refers to cases where judgment is deferred for lack of supporting materials. If these two states are conflated, a lack of materials is read immediately as a bar to remedy.
Accordingly, what this section permits is a determination that observes the limits of the statutory personal scope, and what it does not permit is a determination that broadens the scope on the ground of the need for recovery alone. Even if some of the prevailing party's non-recovery remains, boundaries that cannot be confirmed for want of materials must be left undetermined. If the applicable facts concerning the countervailing interests are negated, the conclusion classifying the non-recovery as a legitimate limitation is withdrawn. Is a remedy complete once all disadvantages are compensated?
3.4The Records Needed for Determination
In the preceding section, where only the name of the countervailing interest exists and there are no applicable facts, so that the legitimacy of the limitation cannot be confirmed, the determination was left undetermined and distinguished from cases where remedy is blocked. Yet may all related persons be bound to the judgment for the sake of the prevailing party's recovery? This question comes squarely into conflict when the convenience of broadening the scope of recovery and the demand to protect the opportunity of a person who did not participate to receive a first hearing point in different directions. This section asks what the record is that supports that determination.
The provision concerning the personal scope of a judgment lies in Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act. Article 218(1) provides that a final and conclusive judgment is effective against the parties, successors after the close of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, successors after the pronouncement of the judgment), or persons possessing the object of the claim for their benefit (Civil Procedure Act, Article 218). Article 218(3) adds that a final and conclusive judgment against a person who became plaintiff or defendant for another person is effective also against that other person (Civil Procedure Act, Article 218). This provision limits, by type, the subjects to be bound, and does not automatically draw in other economically related persons.
Linking this provision with the conclusion of this section clarifies what the basis of the determination is. This determination rests on the scope of application, the grounds for attachment protection, the personal scope of the judgment, the heads of damage, and the substantiation of public welfare, and without that record the conclusion remains undetermined. Here two steps must be examined separately. First, whether, on the premise of the statutory personal scope of the effect of a judgment, an expansion binding persons who did not participate without ground is legitimate recovery; and thereafter, whether the remaining non-recovery is a failure of procedure or a legitimate limitation. Since the record is the bridge connecting these two judgments, it must be material that explains the justification of the personal limitation, that is, the reason for observing the statutory scope of persons to be bound by a judgment.
The strongest counterargument targets the loss that enforcement of an already recognized right is delayed. If a third party contests repeatedly, the prevailing party must again defend an already established right, recovery is pushed back, and the inconvenience at the enforcement site grows. The criticism also invariably follows that, if the protection of other rights is put forward, the non-recovery of a person already infringed remains as it is. For a request to reduce non-recovery does not supply in its stead a ground for binding persons who did not participate.
From this scene alone it cannot be determined whether the scope of application, the grounds for attachment protection, the personal scope of the judgment, the heads of damage, and the substantiation of public welfare are all in place, and whether the protected countervailing interests were actually applied. Accordingly, where only the name of the countervailing interest exists and there are no applicable facts, so that the legitimacy of the limitation cannot be confirmed, the determination is left undetermined and distinguished from cases where remedy is blocked. Undetermined means only a state of insufficient materials and does not immediately mean a bar to remedy.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. On the premise of the statutory personal scope of the effect of a judgment, an expansion binding persons who did not participate without ground is not regarded as legitimate recovery, and it can be said that this determination rests on the scope of application, the grounds for attachment protection, the personal scope of the judgment, the heads of damage, and the substantiation of public welfare, and remains undetermined without that record. Conversely, this section does not permit fixing all related persons to the judgment merely because the prevailing party's non-recovery is substantial, or describing the undetermined as a bar to remedy.
3.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
On this premise, it asks together whether, for the recovery of the prevailing party, all related persons may be bound to the judgment, and what kind of change overturns an existing stage determination. In this scene, to decide where to place non-recovery—between procedural failure and legitimate restriction—it must first be settled to whom the judgment has effect.
The provision corresponding to this question is Article 218, paragraph (1) of the Civil Procedure Act. Its text states the persons on whom a final and conclusive judgment has effect as "the parties, a successor after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, a successor after the pronouncement of the judgment), or a person who possesses the object of the claim for that person." Article 218, paragraph (3) of the same Article provides: "A final and conclusive judgment against a person who became a plaintiff or defendant for another person also has effect on that other person." Here, a successor refers to a person who has taken over that status on the basis of the point in time in the course of the lawsuit, and possession refers to a person who holds that object in place of the party. What this text prescribes is the personal scope of persons on whom the judgment has effect, not the breadth of expansion for the sake of recovery.
If the above text and the conclusion of this section are joined, one arrives at the judgment that, premised on the statutory personal scope of the judgment's effect, an expansion that binds a person who did not participate without ground is not regarded as legitimate recovery. This judgment is maintained only when the two stages of confirming participation and fixing the scope of recovery are distinguished. Participation asks whether a person falls among those opened up by the above text; the scope of recovery asks how far to recover once that confirmation is complete. If the two stages are merged and one passes beyond participation merely because the amount of non-recovery is large, the reason for upholding the legitimacy of the personal limit—that is, the reason for preserving the statutory scope of persons to be bound by the judgment—is overrun along with it. If it is confirmed that the applicable facts regarding the countervailing interest are negated, the conclusion that viewed non-recovery as a legitimate restriction changes; but what changes is the classification of non-recovery, not the text defining the personal scope of the judgment itself.
The counterargument that third parties' repeated disputes may obstruct the exercise of an already recognized right targets the loss signified by this gap. If, though already holding a right recognized by judgment, the right holder cannot continue enforcement in the face of the opposing party's renewed attempts to contest it, the right holder loses the meaning of having that right confirmed and bears the same dispute again and again. Attached to this is also the value that prioritizing the protection of other rights may rationalize the non-recovery of a person already infringed. This loss and inconvenience should not be erased. Even so, the answer that all non-parties cannot be included in the judgment's effect on the basis of economic relatedness alone remains. Depriving a non-participating person of a first opportunity for trial is not the completion of recovery but yet another instance of non-recovery with respect to that person. It is also not established that the reason for non-recovery lies solely in the third party's repeated disputes.
What is confirmed in the synthetic scene is the assertion of right holder A and the answer of counterparty B, together with the fact that part of the applicable facts was not submitted. Contrasting this scene with the foregoing conditions, the ground on which the statutory protection offered in the name of the countervailing interest is a reason for non-recovery is left empty. If it is confirmed that the applicable facts regarding the countervailing interest are negated, the conclusion that viewed non-recovery as a legitimate restriction changes and is judged anew. When the existing blocking and effectiveness determination is discarded and judgment is rendered anew, what is newly fixed at that time is the classification of non-recovery and whether relief follows accordingly, not whether to expand the binding of non-parties. Which applicable facts were negated, and how far that negation reaches, cannot be determined from this scene alone.
This section permits two conclusions. One is that upholding the statutory personal scope of the judgment's effect is not a limit on recovery but a condition for protecting non-participating persons; the other is that if the applicable facts of the countervailing interest collapse, the determination that placed non-recovery as a legitimate restriction is withdrawn and determination is redone from the stages onward. What is not permitted is an interpretation that places non-participating persons within the judgment's effect merely because the amount of non-recovery is large. Whether the whole amount of non-recovery can be filled by damages is not addressed by this question.
3.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
Yet in the place where non-recovery is contested, the prevailing party may say that, in order to reverse his own loss, more persons must be bound to the judgment that has already ended. How far to accommodate that demand—that is, whether all related persons may be bound to the judgment for the recovery of the prevailing party—is the question addressed here. This question targets the point at which the exercise of rights by a person who has already obtained a judgment and the status of a person who did not participate in that judgment collide with one another.
Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act sets down by statute the persons on whom the effect of a final and conclusive judgment reaches. Article 218, paragraph (1) provides: "(1) A final and conclusive judgment has effect on the parties, a successor after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, a successor after the pronouncement of the judgment), or a person who possesses the object of the claim for that person." (Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act) This text limits the persons subject to effect to the parties, a successor at a specified point in time, and a person who possesses the object of the claim for the party. Third parties not enumerated by the text are, in principle, placed outside the personal scope of that judgment. The combination of the subject and the act prescribed by the Article—that is, the event of a final and conclusive judgment and the satisfaction of the enumerated qualifications—constitutes the ground for effect.
That text bears directly on the conclusion of this section to this question. For an expansion that binds a non-participating person without ground is not regarded as legitimate recovery. Here two stages must be distinguished. First, whether a person falls within the statutory personal scope of the judgment's effect is examined under the requirement of the judgment's personal scope. Second, the question is not whether a person outside that scope may be drawn in for the convenience of recovery, but whether that expansion is legitimate recovery. Circumstances of substantial economic relatedness cannot pass beyond this distinction. The fact that the need for recovery is great cannot substitute for the reason of upholding the statutory scope of persons to be bound by the judgment—that is, the legitimacy of the personal limit.
The strongest counterargument targets the loss that the exercise of an already recognized right is blocked. If a third party repeatedly raises the same dispute, the prevailing party must defend again at every point of enforcing the confirmed right, and in the meantime the exercise of the right may be delayed or unsettled. This inconvenience connects with the point emphasized by counterparty B. If the protection of other rights is placed first, the non-recovery of a person already infringed may appear to be rationalized. Yet the author's answer, without denying this loss, attaches a condition. While recognizing the delay in recovery pointed out by the counterargument, an expansion that binds persons outside the statutory personal scope on the ground of that delay is not permitted.
The facts confirmed in this scene are only the adversarial structure of the two parties and the partial non-submission of materials. The scene does not fix who the non-participating person is, the degree of economic relatedness, or in what form the repeated dispute was actually raised. Accordingly, whether the reason for non-recovery is statutory attachment protection, distinguished from error by the enforcement authority or non-existence of the claim, or some other circumstance, remains undetermined. Article 218, paragraph (3) provides: "(3) A final and conclusive judgment against a person who became a plaintiff or defendant for another person also has effect on that other person." (Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act), so whether the qualifications enumerated in that text are established requires a determination of fact.
This section permits one conclusion. The same judgment also makes clear the conclusion it does not permit. Including all non-parties within the judgment's effect on the basis of economic relatedness alone lies outside the scope of this judgment. However great the need for recovery, binding a third party without the qualifications prescribed by the text is a binding that expands without a separate ground.
3.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The relationship between the relief applied for and the dispositive part of the judgment, in distinguishing procedural failure from legitimate restriction, asks at what stage one stands with only the dispositive part of the judgment now secured. It asks at what stage one stands with only the dispositive part of the judgment now secured.
The provision corresponding to this question is Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act. This text specifies the subjects on whom a final and conclusive judgment reaches as the parties, a successor at a specified point in time, and a person who possesses the object of the claim.
Article 218, paragraph (3) adds: "(3) A final and conclusive judgment against a person who became a plaintiff or defendant for another person also has effect on that other person." (Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act) Within the personal scope drawn by the two paragraphs, if the performance applied for falls within the claim's statement, the court adjudicates that performance in the dispositive part; performance not so included is not added to the dispositive part. The reason for separating these two is that the performance subject to adjudication and the scope of persons the judgment binds are different questions. The former is limited by the application, and the latter is limited by the statutory personal scope.
The counterargument that third parties' repeated disputes may obstruct the exercise of an already recognized right targets an actual loss. Whenever one seeks to enforce the performance secured by judgment, if those called related persons repeat their disputes, the prevailing party may have to postpone recovery while holding a favorable judgment. The concern that prioritizing the protection of other rights may rationalize the non-recovery of a person already infringed also connects with this. An expansion that binds non-participating persons is not the form of legitimate recovery.
In the synthetic scene, the non-recovery advanced by A can be written down as an item of damages. However, whether that non-recovery is a procedural failure or the result of another statutory right, such as statutory attachment protection, actually applying is determined by the records. The scope of the application, the grounds for attachment protection, the personal scope of the judgment, the items of damages, and the showing of public welfare constitute those records. As the years and amounts not present in the scene are undetermined, they cannot be fixed numerically. Since part of the applicable facts was not submitted, the legitimacy of the restriction cannot be established on the name of the countervailing interest alone.
What this section permits is clear. Performance within the claim's statement is adjudicated by dispositive part, and the dispositive part secured serves in itself as a measure of what stage has been reached. What is not permitted is to add to the dispositive part a performance that was not applied for, or to bind non-parties on economic relatedness alone. Nor is a failure of relief established merely by the fact that non-recovery remains.
3.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
In the midst of this, right holder A asserts that all non-recovery is procedural failure, and counterparty B answers that it is due to statutory protection. How far to widen the scope of recovery is at stake here. How is a creditor's non-recovery as a failure of relief to be distinguished from the case in which it is the result of protecting another right?
The text needed to answer this question is set out in Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act. Its paragraph (1) states as follows: "(1) A final and conclusive judgment has effect on the parties, a successor after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, a successor after the pronouncement of the judgment), or a person who possesses the object of the claim for that person." This text limits the subjects on whom effect reaches to the parties, a successor at a specified point in time, and a person who possesses the object of the claim for that person. And paragraph (3) provides: "(3) A final and conclusive judgment against a person who became a plaintiff or defendant for another person also has effect on that other person." Where the person who conducted the lawsuit became a plaintiff or defendant for another person, an exception is made, extending the effect to that other person as well (Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act).
On the basis of these two texts, the author's conclusion connects as follows. The magnitude of recovery and the scope of binding are separate stages of judgment. The scope of persons to be bound to that judgment does not increase merely because recovery is large. It is judged within a fixed framework—whether the person is a party, a successor at a specified point in time, a person who possesses the object of the claim for that person, or a case of having litigated for another person (Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act). Economic interests outside that framework remain a separate question.
Nevertheless, the counterargument most strongly raised is clear. Third parties' repeated disputes may obstruct the exercise of an already recognized right. Prioritizing the protection of other rights may rationalize the non-recovery of a person already infringed. That is, the loss suffered by the prevailing party and the inconvenience of relitigation remain as they are, and the cost of the delayed exercise of a confirmed right falls entirely on the one awaiting recovery. Without erasing this disadvantage, what the author answers does not change. That a non-participating person's first opportunity for trial cannot be handed over as the price of the prevailing party's convenience is the legitimacy of the personal limit. The non-recovery indicated by the counterargument is not established as a failure of relief in itself.
Returning to this scene reveals the place of this distinction. Accordingly, since there is only the name of the countervailing interest and no fact that the interest was actually applied, the legitimacy of the restriction cannot yet be established. In this case it remains undetermined. The criterion distinguishing legitimate restriction from failure of relief is nonetheless maintained. If a blocking norm, applicable facts, and a protected countervailing interest connect so as to explain the reason for non-recovery, it is a legitimate restriction; if another statutory right is actually applied such that the desired binding of non-parties cannot be allowed, it is not a failure of relief (Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act). The scope of the application, the grounds for attachment protection, the personal scope of the judgment, the items of damages, and the showing of public welfare are required in the records.
The boundary between the conclusions this section permits and those it does not permit is as follows. Whether non-recovery is a procedural failure or the result of protecting another right depends on whether the blocking norm and the applicable facts connect, and the legitimacy of a restriction cannot be established on the name of the countervailing interest alone. In addition, an expansion that binds a non-participating person to the judgment goes beyond the statutory scope of persons to be bound by that judgment, and is therefore not legitimate recovery. The question of the legitimacy of attachment protection itself is an issue handled by the sections before and after, while this section decides on the personal limit that distinguishes the scope of recovery from the scope of binding.
3.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
The previous step held that non-recovery arising from statutory attachment protection must be distinguished from error by the enforcement authority or nonexistence of the claim. Within the same section, it now asks how far the text of the provision in question supports that distinction. Under the question whether all persons concerned may be bound by the judgment for the sake of the successful party's recovery, right-holder A asserts that all non-recovery is procedural failure, and the opposing party B replies that it is due to statutory protection.
The source text corresponding to this question is Article 218, paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Civil Procedure Act. Paragraph (1) provides: "①A final and conclusive judgment has effect against the parties, a successor after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, a successor after the pronouncement of the judgment), or a person who possesses the object of the claim on behalf of such person." (Civil Procedure Act, Article 218) Here the subject is the final and conclusive judgment, and the persons against whom its effect extends are limited to the parties, a successor at a specified point in time, and a person who possesses the object on behalf of such a person. Paragraph (3) adds: "③A final and conclusive judgment rendered against a person who became a plaintiff or defendant on behalf of another person has effect also against that other person." (Civil Procedure Act, Article 218) This is a provision that determines to whom the effect accrues where the form of a representative lawsuit has been taken.
Connecting this text to the conclusion of this section, the distinction between legitimate restriction and failure of relief divides into two stages. The first is to see whether the reason for non-recovery is explained by a blocking norm, applied facts, or a protected countervailing interest; the second is to confirm whether that explanation falls within the personal scope of the text in question. The judgment that an expansion which binds a person who did not participate without any ground is not regarded as legitimate recovery comes precisely at this second stage. The reason paragraph (3) treats separately the case of a lawsuit brought on behalf of another person is also that that person comes within the scope of effect by the text, not that the opportunity to be adjudicated has been denied.
If the protection of another person's rights is placed first, the non-recovery of the person already infringed remains as it is. The inconvenience is also great that repeated lawsuits delay the time of recovery and unsettle the determination already fixed. The author, while keeping to this answer, does not erase the loss from delayed recovery that the counterargument pointed out. That loss, however, is a matter to be dealt with along a separate route of recovery, and is not a matter to be eliminated by widening the personal scope of the judgment's effect.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only A's assertion, the opposing party B's answer, and the partial non-submission of the applied facts. The name of the countervailing interest of statutory protection that B invokes is clear, but what facts satisfy the requirements for the application of that protection was not submitted. The items to be entered in the record are the scope of the application, the grounds for attachment protection, the personal scope of the judgment, the items of damage, and the showing of public welfare. However, which items were actually submitted was not settled by the scene, and therefore remains undetermined.
The conclusion that this section permits is the judgment that an expansion of binding beyond the personal scope of the text in question cannot be explained as a reason for non-recovery. The conclusions it does not permit are the judgment that failure of relief is recognized at once on the mere fact of non-recovery, or, conversely, the judgment that a legitimate restriction is recognized at once on the mere name of statutory protection. The state of insufficient materials is undetermined and does not mean that no relief is available. The legitimacy of the personal limitation is understood as the reason for upholding the statutory scope of the persons who may be bound by the judgment.
3.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
Without re-unfolding the argument of the previous step, this time it narrows the place left by that distinction. Within this dispute, what part is to be adjudicated by further dividing it within the distinction between legitimate restriction and failure of relief?
To answer this question, one must first confirm the statutory scope of the persons against whom the judgment's effect extends. Article 218, paragraph (1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "①A final and conclusive judgment has effect against the parties, a successor after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, a successor after the pronouncement of the judgment), or a person who possesses the object of the claim on behalf of such person." This text limits the subjects who receive the effect to the parties and other specified persons. Here the parties refer to those who participated in the lawsuit and received the judgment, the successor refers to the person who took over that position, and the possessor of the object refers to the person who has that object on behalf of such a person.
This judgment is limited to the conditions of the cases where the fine distinctions within the stage operate, where they are blocked, and where they remain undetermined. The operating case is where the blocking norm, the applied facts, and the protected countervailing interest are connected so that the reason for non-recovery can be explained. The blocked case is where another statutory right is actually applied so that the desired remedies, such as expansion of enforcement, binding of non-parties, or a stay, cannot be allowed. The undetermined case is where there is only the name of a countervailing interest and no applied facts, so the legitimacy of the restriction cannot be confirmed. These three are merely conditional distinctions within one and the same stage. The provision that "③A final and conclusive judgment rendered against a person who became a plaintiff or defendant on behalf of another person has effect also against that other person" opens only in the case of a lawsuit brought for the aforementioned person (Civil Procedure Act, Article 218).
The strongest reason for drawing this distinction lies in the loss the counterargument targets. Repeated disputes by third parties may block the enforcement of a right already recognized, and each time the right-holder must postpone recovery. The more persons are economically entangled, the greater that delay becomes, and it cannot be denied that the non-recovery of the person already infringed is prolonged. The criticism that placing the protection of other rights first may rationalize the non-recovery of the person already infringed also comes from this point. However urgent the successful party's need for recovery may be, recovery is not called legitimate recovery in a manner that eliminates the first trial opportunity of a person who did not participate.
In the synthetic scene, part of the applied facts was not submitted. While the opposing party B answers that non-recovery arose because of statutory protection, B did not show in full which statutory right is applied to which facts. On this record alone, it cannot be confirmed whether the matter is to be placed in the operating case or the undetermined case. It is also not settled which of the items among the scope of the application, the grounds for attachment protection, the personal scope of the judgment, the items of damage, and the showing of public welfare has been filled in. The remaining items are left undetermined, and that lack is not read at once as unavailability of relief.
The conclusion that this section permits is only the narrow distinction tailored to the foregoing conditions. It adjudicates within the expressly stated conditions of the operating case, the blocked case, and the undetermined case, and does not create a new stage by changing the conditions. The judgment that binds all non-parties to the effect of the judgment on the sole ground that the economic connection is large lies outside the scope of this section. Nor does it drive everything into procedural failure merely because non-recovery remains, nor fix it as a legitimate restriction on the basis of the name of protection alone.
3.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
Earlier, in fixing the scope of recovery, the problem of widening the persons to be bound by the judgment was dealt with, but now a standard must be established for dividing the reason for non-recovery into legitimate restriction and procedural failure. Since one cannot eliminate another person's first trial opportunity for the convenience of the successful party, the mere fact that there was non-recovery cannot be recorded in its entirety as failure of relief. In this question, the distinction between legitimate restriction and failure of relief is examined by clarifying how the blocking norm, the applied facts, and the protected countervailing interest are connected.
The starting point of that distinction is the statutory scope of the persons against whom a final and conclusive judgment extends. This text limits the subjects to whom the judgment's effect extends to the parties, a successor at a specified point in time, and a person who possesses the object of the claim. If a person who did not participate falls outside this scope, the expansion of enforcement seeking to bind that person is confirmed as going beyond the statutory personal scope.
This text requires three elements together. The subject must be a person to be bound by the judgment, the act is a statutory relationship such as possession of the object of the claim, and the point in time is tied to the condition of succession after the conclusion of oral argument. In the case of a lawsuit brought on behalf of another person, Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "③A final and conclusive judgment rendered against a person who became a plaintiff or defendant on behalf of another person has effect also against that other person." (Civil Procedure Act, Article 218) However, this text itself does not serve as the ground for an expansion that binds a person who did not participate without any basis.
On the basis of this text, one can distinguish opening conditions from blocking conditions. Where the blocking norm, the applied facts, and the protected countervailing interest are connected so that the reason for non-recovery can be explained, non-recovery opens as a legitimate restriction; where another statutory right is actually applied so that the desired remedies, such as expansion of enforcement, binding of non-parties, or a stay, cannot be allowed, the route of relief is blocked. The two judgments differ not in order but in the axis of explanation. One is to reveal the cause of non-recovery; the other is to confirm whether that cause possesses a legal ground. The legitimacy of the personal limitation means the reason for upholding the statutory scope of the persons who may be bound by the judgment, and the judgment that upholds that scope and the question whether the route of relief is open do not move together.
The counterargument, however, speaks differently: repeated disputes by third parties may block the enforcement of a right already recognized. The concern that placing the protection of other rights first may rationalize the non-recovery of the person already infringed is acknowledged without erasing the loss from delayed recovery and the inconvenience of repeated disputes. Yet the scope within which a person who did not participate is bound by the judgment is set by statute, and binding all non-parties beyond that scope is not permitted on the basis of economic connection alone.
In the confrontation between A and B, the facts relevant to today's question are the grounds for attachment protection, the personal scope of the judgment, and whether the items of damage were submitted. B's assertion of statutory protection invoked the name of a blocking norm, but a portion remains for which no applied facts were submitted. Accordingly, the connection of grounds for placing non-recovery as a legitimate restriction has not been confirmed. Among the records of the scope of the application, the grounds for attachment protection, the personal scope of the judgment, the items of damage, and the showing of public welfare, what is confirmed at present leads to neither judgment.
Therefore, non-recovery is not justified by its name alone; only when the blocking norm and the applied facts are connected does it become a legitimate restriction. Where there is only the name of a countervailing interest and no applied facts, so that the legitimacy of the restriction cannot be confirmed, the matter remains undetermined. Where another statutory right is actually applied so that expansion of enforcement is blocked, the matter is recorded not as failure of relief but as a blocked state. An expansion that binds a person who did not participate to the judgment lies outside the boundary of legitimate recovery.
3.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
From the fact that one cannot eliminate another person's first trial opportunity for the convenience of the successful party, the question that now remains is whether, for the sake of the successful party's recovery, all persons may be bound by the judgment regardless of who is related to that recovery. Whether the interest that recovery points to and the position of the person subjected to being bound present the same problem must be confirmed separately.
According to the provision in question, "①A final and conclusive judgment has effect against the parties, a successor after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, a successor after the pronouncement of the judgment), or a person who possesses the object of the claim on behalf of such person." (Civil Procedure Act, Article 218) Here the subjects are the parties, a successor at a specified point in time, and a person who possesses the object of the claim on behalf of such a person. The act is the arising of the effect of the final and conclusive judgment against that person, and the condition is the establishment of the relationship prescribed by law.
This text provides for a separate case, stating: "③A final and conclusive judgment rendered against a person who became a plaintiff or defendant on behalf of another person has effect also against that other person." (Civil Procedure Act, Article 218) The judgment that an expansion binding a person who did not participate without any ground is not regarded as legitimate recovery rests on the distinction that the reason for fixing the range of persons against whom the effect extends and the reason for fixing the range of measures needed for recovery are different from each other. The former is against whom the effect of the judgment may be applied; the latter is what means may be used for recovery.
If repeated disputes by third parties may block the enforcement of a right already recognized, the successful party is forced to respond repeatedly to those who re-contest the right fixed by the judgment, and meanwhile bears the inconvenience that recovery is delayed. The criticism that placing the protection of other rights first may rationalize the non-recovery of the person already infringed also comes from the same place. The circumstance that recovery is needed does not serve as a ground for expanding the statutory scope that determines the persons to be bound by the judgment.
In this scene, right-holder A asserts that all non-recovery is procedural failure, and the opposing party B answers that it is so because of statutory protection. The record items relevant to this dispute are the scope of the application, the grounds for attachment protection, the personal scope of the judgment, the items of damage, and the showing of public welfare. However, part of the applied facts was not submitted, so in a state where there is only the name of a countervailing interest and no facts showing that the interest was actually applied, the legitimacy of the restriction cannot be confirmed. Matters that cannot be confirmed from the scene remain undetermined.
The legitimacy of the personal limitation means the reason for upholding the statutory scope of the persons who may be bound by the judgment. When recovery is discussed while upholding this scope, the conclusion that is permitted is that means of recovery can be discussed without an expansion that binds a person who did not participate without any ground, and the conclusion that is not permitted is placing all non-parties within the effect of the judgment on the sole ground that they are related to the recovery.