Summary
Premised on the public-welfare limitation on stays of enforcement in administrative cases, this chapter keeps both the individual's urgency and the serious impact on others in view together.
5.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
There are times when one person's recovery shifts into another's serious harm. Is it always desirable to widen urgent individual relief? This question already presupposes the judgment that, depending on whether an uncompensated item falls outside the statutory scope of ordinary and special damages or is merely insufficiently proved, the reason for non-recovery must be explained differently. What is the criterion that opens the channel of this relief?
The relevant text is the two paragraphs of Article 23 of the Administrative Litigation Act. Paragraph (2) provides that "where an action for revocation has been filed … when there is recognized to be an urgent need to prevent damage that would be difficult to recover from, the court in which the principal action is pending may … decide … a stay in whole or in part," while adding the proviso that a suspension of effect is not permitted where the purpose can be achieved by staying the execution of the disposition, etc. or the continuation of the procedure (Administrative Litigation Act, Article 23). Paragraph (3) draws the line, providing that "a stay of execution shall not be permitted where there is a risk of a serious impact on the public interest." The subject indicated by the text is the court in which the principal action is pending; the act is a stay in whole or in part of the effect of the disposition, etc., its execution, or the continuation of the procedure; and the conditions are an urgent need to prevent damage that would be difficult to recover from and the risk of a serious impact on the public interest (Administrative Litigation Act, Article 23).
If the conclusion of this section on the present question is placed upon this text, the criterion at the entrance becomes visible at last. The channel of this relief opens where the blocking norm, the applicable facts, and the protected opposing interest connect so as to explain the reason for non-recovery. The reason for dividing the analysis into two judgment stages here is that, depending on whether the cause of non-recovery is damage outside the statutory scope or a lack of proof, even the same amount calls for a different explanation. If the reason changes, the object of protection and the grounds for restriction change as well, and accordingly so does the examination at the entrance.
The strongest counterargument against this criterion is that the abstract term public interest can serve as a pretext for blocking individual relief. If the protection of other rights is put forward first, the non-recovery of a person already infringed can be rationalized, and that disadvantage cannot be erased by words. Yet one cannot write that a serious impact has been confirmed on the strength of the name public interest alone. What paragraph (3) requires is a ground for the concern, and a basis for the impact that will be felt, not a name. The conclusion is maintained to the extent that it does not accept a confirmation resting on the name alone, without erasing the weight of the counterargument.
In the synthetic scene, A asserts that all non-recovery is procedural failure, and B answers that it is due to statutory protection. Some of the applicable facts were not submitted. Confronting these facts with the foregoing conditions, it cannot be confirmed on the present materials what the blocking norm is, what applicable facts attach to it, and what opposing interest is protected. Accordingly, which way the matter should be classified in the distinction between a justified restriction and a failure of relief also remains undetermined. However, if the applicable facts concerning the opposing interest are negated, the conclusion that classified the non-recovery as a justified restriction is withdrawn.
What this section permits is therefore a narrow, conditional judgment. The entrance to this relief opens where the blocking norm, the applicable facts, and the protected opposing interest connect so as to explain the reason for non-recovery, where the subject matter, the parties, and the conditions are specified in the claim, and where the right underlying the chosen form of action can be defended. Conversely, this section does not accept a description that simply invokes the name public interest and writes that a serious impact has been confirmed. Confirming the justification of a restriction without applicable facts concerning the opposing interest likewise falls outside this criterion.
5.2The Conditions That Block Relief
Continuing from the preceding section, which held that this relief operates where the blocking norm, the applicable facts, and the protected opposing interest connect so as to explain the reason for non-recovery, this section now asks about the condition in the opposite direction, namely the point at which this relief is blocked. Conflicting relief denotes a state in which individual recovery and another protected interest are engaged by the same measure, and the question of this section is to determine whether the desired remedy is blocked by the counterparty's legal protection in that state.
Article 23, paragraph (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act provides that "where an action for revocation has been filed, when there is recognized to be an urgent need to prevent damage that would be difficult to recover from, arising from a disposition, etc. or its execution or the continuation of the procedure, the court in which the principal action is pending may, upon the application of a party or ex officio (by the court's own authority), decide a stay in whole or in part of the effect of the disposition, etc. or of its execution or the continuation of the procedure," and provides that "provided, however, that a suspension of effect of a disposition shall not be permitted where the purpose can be achieved by staying the execution of the disposition, etc. or the continuation of the procedure" (Administrative Litigation Act, Article 23). The subject indicated by this text is the court in which the principal action is pending; the act is the decision to stay upon the application of a party or ex officio (by the court's own authority); and the conditions are the recognition of an urgent need to prevent damage that would be difficult to recover from and the limitation on the choice of the means of stay.
Article 23, paragraph (3), which follows, draws the line that "a stay of execution shall not be permitted where there is a risk of a serious impact on the public interest" (Administrative Litigation Act, Article 23). Here the two judgment stages must be distinguished. The foregoing urgency assessment addresses the applicant's damage that would be difficult to recover from, while the subsequent public interest assessment addresses the serious impact that the stay itself may have on other protected interests. That is to say, in a state of conflicting relief, the recognition of an individual's urgency does not mean that a stay is at once permitted; where another statutory right is actually applied so that a remedy such as a stay cannot be allowed, this relief is blocked.
The counterargument aims precisely at this point: the abstract term public interest can serve as a pretext for blocking individual relief, and if the protection of other rights is put forward first, the non-recovery of a person already infringed can be rationalized. This disadvantage is not erased. Non-recovery remains as such. What Article 23, paragraph (3) requires is a risk of serious impact, and the applicable facts that ground that risk must be presented together. A single abstract name does not establish the blocking condition.
In the synthetic scene, rights holder A asserts that all non-recovery is procedural failure, and counterparty B answers that it is due to statutory protection. Confronting these facts with the foregoing conditions, B's defense must fall under the blocking ground that another statutory right is actually applied so that a remedy such as a stay cannot be allowed; and on that determination there are placed the records of the scope of the application, the grounds for protection against attachment, the personal scope of the judgment, the items of damage, and the substantiation of the public interest. However, the parts where the opposing interest has only a name and no applicable facts cannot confirm the justification of the restriction and remain undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Where another statutory right is actually applied so that the desired remedies—expansion of enforcement, the binding of non-parties, a stay, and the like—cannot be allowed, this relief is blocked. Conversely, non-recovery does not mean procedural failure at once, nor can it be determined that a stay was refused merely because the name public interest was attached. What remains is to explain the reason for non-recovery differently depending on whether an uncompensated item falls outside the statutory scope of ordinary and special damages or is insufficiently proved, and that matter belongs to another question.
5.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
The judgment left by the foregoing stage—that the reason for non-recovery must be explained differently depending on whether an uncompensated item falls outside the statutory scope of ordinary and special damages or is merely insufficiently proved—lies directly against the boundary of the insufficiency of materials that this stage addresses. The present question is how to deal with matters that cannot be confirmed for want of materials.
The text corresponding to this question is Article 23, paragraph (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act. That Article provides that "where an action for revocation has been filed, when there is recognized to be an urgent need to prevent damage that would be difficult to recover from, arising from a disposition, etc. or its execution or the continuation of the procedure, the court in which the principal action is pending may, upon the application of a party or ex officio (by the court's own authority), decide a stay in whole or in part of the effect of the disposition, etc. or of its execution or the continuation of the procedure (hereinafter referred to as a 'stay of execution')", and adds the proviso that "provided, however, that a suspension of effect of a disposition shall not be permitted where the purpose can be achieved by staying the execution of the disposition, etc. or the continuation of the procedure" (Administrative Litigation Act, Article 23). Here the court denotes the court in which the principal action is pending, the act is a decision halting in whole or in part the effect of the disposition, etc., its execution, or the continuation of the procedure, and its conditions are the prevention of damage that would be difficult to recover from and the recognition of an urgent need.
Paragraph (3) of the same Article provides that "a stay of execution shall not be permitted where there is a risk of a serious impact on the public interest" (Administrative Litigation Act, Article 23). Placing the two texts together, a stay of execution opens upon the condition of an urgent need, yet closes upon the condition of a risk of impact on the public interest. The two must be distinguished within the same determination. The former deals with whether a request for an individual's recovery is established; the latter deals with whether that request closes in a situation where it conflicts with other protected interests. Here, conflicting relief denotes a state in which individual recovery and another protected interest are engaged by the same measure. Where individual recovery and another protected interest are both engaged in one measure, whether the request opens and whether it closes are adjudicated at different stages.
In that, if the protection of other rights is put forward first, the non-recovery of a person already infringed can be rationalized, this counterargument aims directly at the unrecovered loss and the inconvenience of delay. The moment the name public interest is attached, the individual's urgent harm is pushed back, and the path of recovery may remain closed. Even so, the confirmed answer is no different: the mere fact that the name public interest is attached cannot be taken as showing that the name actually met the requirement of serious impact. However, the risk of non-recovery and rationalization pointed out by the counterargument is not erased and remains.
The facts handled in this scene are limited to the structure of that assertion and answer, and to the point that some of the applicable facts are missing. If the statutory protection urged by counterparty B is an opposing interest connected to the public interest under Article 23, paragraph (3) of the Administrative Litigation Act, the crux is what applicable facts lie behind that name. Where the opposing interest has only a name and no applicable facts, so that the justification of the restriction cannot be confirmed, that matter is not settled as impossibility. Whether an uncompensated item falls outside the statutory scope or is due to insufficient proof is likewise not determined on these materials alone.
Accordingly, the permitted conclusion is narrow. Where the opposing interest has only a name and no applicable facts, so that the justification of the restriction cannot be confirmed, a matter for which the materials of adjudication are not specified is left undetermined, distinguished from impossibility. Here undetermined does not mean that relief is impossible; it denotes a state in which there are not yet materials to confirm that the restriction is justified. By contrast, the impermissible conclusion is the mode of writing that a serious impact has been confirmed merely because the name public interest was attached. If the applicable facts concerning the opposing interest are confirmed to be negated, the conclusion that viewed the non-recovery as a justified restriction changes.
5.4The Records Needed for Determination
Where the opposing interest has only a name and no applicable facts, so that the justification of the restriction cannot be confirmed, the adjudication is left undetermined, and this is distinguished from the case in which relief is blocked. Premising the public interest restriction on an administrative stay of execution, it leaves both the individual's urgency and the serious impact that will arise for others, and asks what kinds of records are needed for the adjudication. Rights holder A asserts that all non-recovery is procedural failure, and counterparty B answers that it is due to statutory protection; some of the applicable facts were not submitted. In this scene, on what must the adjudication be grounded?
The texts corresponding to this question are two paragraphs. Article 23, paragraph (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act provides that, where an action for revocation has been filed and there is recognized to be an urgent need to prevent damage that would be difficult to recover from, the court may decide a stay in whole or in part of the effect of the disposition or of its execution or the continuation of the procedure, upon the application of a party or ex officio (by the court's own authority). The subject this paragraph indicates is the court in which the principal action is pending, the act is the decision to stay, and the condition is an urgent need. Article 23, paragraph (3) of the Administrative Litigation Act declares that a stay of execution shall not be permitted where there is a risk of a serious impact on the public interest. The textual requirement of this paragraph is the existence of the concern.
Connecting that text with the conclusion of this section, the ground of the adjudication is tied to specified items of records. The author designates as the grounds of this adjudication the scope of the application, the grounds for protection against attachment, the personal scope of the judgment, the items of damage, and the substantiation of the public interest. Here the scope of the application is the boundary of which stay is sought; the grounds for protection against attachment and the personal scope of the judgment are materials distinguishing what the non-recovery arises from; and the items of damage reveal the object of recovery item by item. The substantiation of the public interest denotes the ground for the concern required by paragraph (3). The reason for reading these items in two stages is that how far the request for individual recovery extends and what the concern for the opposing interest rests upon are different questions. Neither alone can be said to have addressed the urgency of paragraph (2) and the concern of paragraph (3) together. Without those records, the conclusion remains undetermined.
The strongest counterargument aims at the point that the abstract term public interest can serve as a pretext for blocking individual relief. The disadvantage is clear that, if the protection of other rights is put forward first, the non-recovery of a person already infringed can be rationalized. Even so, the author's answer does not change. What the text of paragraph (3) requires is that the concern be connected to a serious impact on the public interest, and there must be applicable facts supporting that connection. If the public interest is no more than a name, that favors only the side pressing non-recovery, and it is not favorable to the side that would establish the opposing interest on an actual basis either.
On the facts submitted in the synthetic scene alone, the adjudication does not conclude. A asserts that all non-recovery is procedural failure, and B answers that it is due to statutory protection, but some of the applicable facts were not submitted. How far the scope of the application extends, what the grounds for protection against attachment are, whom the personal scope of the judgment binds, and what the items of damage are—none of this is confirmed on actual materials. The substantiation of the public interest is the same: if only the object of the concern is mentioned and the applicable facts are empty, the serious impact of paragraph (3) is not confirmed.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. As to whether the cause of non-recovery is procedural failure or statutory protection, the adjudication can be rendered when the scope of the application, the grounds for protection against attachment, the personal scope of the judgment, the items of damage, and the substantiation of the public interest are in place. Without those records, the conclusion is left undetermined, and undetermined is not read as converting immediately into impossibility of relief. Conversely, it is likewise impermissible to write that a justified restriction has been confirmed on the name of public interest alone.
5.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
Leaving in place the distinction that the reasons for non-recovery must be explained differently depending on whether the uncompensated items fall outside the statutory scope of ordinary and special damages or whether proof is lacking, this time it asks about the conditions under which that distinction is overturned. Alongside the question of whether broadening urgent individual relief is always desirable, the question of what change overturns the existing adjudication constitutes the content of this place. The preceding place's adjudication, which classified the reasons for non-recovery, is carried over as it is, but a new dimension opens up that asks whether that adjudication is maintained.
The provisions corresponding to this question are two in number. Article 23(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act provides that, where an urgent need is recognized in order to prevent damage that is difficult to restore, the court in which the principal action is pending may decide to suspend, in whole or in part, the effect of the disposition, etc., or its execution or the continuation of the proceedings, and adds that, where the purpose can be achieved by suspending execution or the continuation of proceedings, a suspension of effect shall not be permitted (Administrative Litigation Act, Article 23, Article 23(2)). Article 23(3) of the Administrative Litigation Act provides that a stay of execution shall not be permitted where there is a concern that it will have a serious impact on the public welfare (Administrative Litigation Act, Article 23, Article 23(3)). The subject addressed by paragraph (2) is the court in which the principal action is pending, the act is the decision to suspend, and the conditions are the recognition of an urgent need and the subsidiarity of the suspension of effect. Paragraph (3) places the impact that the suspension will have on the public welfare as a separate ground for restriction.
The structure in which paragraphs (2) and (3) are placed together reveals that the two stages of judgment are separated. First, at the stage of determining the need for suspension and the means thereof, the individual's need for restoration is evaluated, and then there follows a stage that evaluates the serious impact that the suspension itself will have on the public welfare. This definition merely indicates that the two interests are simultaneously at stake in the same suspension decision; it does not predetermine which one prevails. If the specified change is confirmed, the existing blocking and effectiveness judgment changes. This condition is a condition that reverses the previously classified adjudication; it is not the creation of a new criterion that modifies the adjudication.
The strongest counterargument that this condition targets is that the abstract term 'public interest' can serve as a pretext for blocking individual relief. This criticism—that putting the protection of other rights forward can rationalize the non-recovery of a person already injured—points to the risk that the public welfare language of paragraph (3) is used in a way that readily offsets the individual's need for restoration. The answer to this remains as it is. What paragraph (3) requires is a concern that a serious impact will occur, and the confirmation of that concern must be supported by applicable facts. The disadvantage pointed out by the counterargument—that is, that the non-recovery of a person already injured remains—does not disappear; yet whether that non-recovery remains as the result of a restriction or whether the grounds for the adjudication are lacking is determined by the presence or absence of applicable facts.
In this scene, the only fact relevant to this question is that some of the applicable facts concerning the opposing interest are missing. The scene does not determine under what conditions and upon what subject the statutory protection referred to in B's answer actually operates, and accordingly whether that fact constitutes the serious impact under paragraph (3) has not been determined either. Where no applicable facts have been submitted and only the name of the opposing interest remains, the justification for the restriction cannot be confirmed, and in that case the non-recovery remains unclassified as a justified restriction. However, this indeterminacy is a state of insufficient materials, and does not in itself amount to an impossibility of relief.
The conclusion this place permits is narrow. If the applicable facts concerning the opposing interest are denied, the conclusion that had classified the non-recovery as a justified restriction on the strength of that opposing interest is withdrawn, and if the specified change is confirmed, the existing blocking and effectiveness judgment is discarded and the adjudication is redone from the stage itself. What is not permitted is writing that a serious impact has been confirmed on the strength of the name of public interest alone, nor is it confirming the justification of the restriction while applicable facts remain unconfirmed. The conclusion is not broadened by facts or figures that the scene has not determined. Whether one can still say that a restriction of relief is justified even when there is no material is not addressed here.
5.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
The immediately preceding step leaves only the point that the reasons for non-recovery must be explained differently depending on whether the uncompensated items fall outside the statutory scope of ordinary and special damages or whether proof is lacking. The question to be addressed now is an answer to the criticism that the abstract term 'public interest' can serve as a pretext for blocking individual relief. On the premise of the public welfare restriction on an administrative stay of execution, the individual's urgency and the serious impact that will arise for others must be left in place together.
The provision corresponding to this question is Article 23 of the Administrative Litigation Act. Article 23(3) provides that "a stay of execution shall not be permitted where there is a concern that it will have a serious impact on the public welfare" (Administrative Litigation Act, Article 23). The subject of this provision is the court that decides whether a stay of execution is permitted, and the object is the stay of execution requested by a party's application. The condition is that there must be a concern that a serious impact will be caused to the public welfare, and the effect is the exclusion of permission for a stay of execution. Article 23(2) is the preceding paragraph of the same Article, and provides that, where there is an urgent need to prevent damage that is difficult to restore, the court may decide to suspend, in whole or in part, the effect or execution (Administrative Litigation Act, Article 23). Here, however, paragraph (2) is read only in its relation to paragraph (3), and the other requirements for a suspension decision are not addressed.
The above provision reveals that the urgency assessment and the public welfare restriction are placed at different stages. The damage that is difficult to restore and the urgent need required by paragraph (2) are positive requirements for permitting the suspension, whereas the concern about a serious impact spoken of in paragraph (3) is a ground for restriction that blocks that permission. Thus, if the two are mashed into a single lump, however great the individual's urgency may be, one provision concerning another interest takes the place of the preceding judgment. The conclusion of this section, that one cannot write that a serious impact has been confirmed on the strength of the name of public interest alone, derives precisely from this distinction. The fact that the words 'public welfare' are recorded and the fact that there is a concern that a serious impact will occur are different things, and the former cannot take the place of the confirmation of the latter.
The strongest counterargument aims at the point that putting the protection of other rights forward can rationalize the non-recovery of a person already injured. The loss this counterargument fears is clear: the damage that has already occurred remains uncompensated, and the stay applied for by the party is also refused, closing the path to recovery. From the standpoint of the side asserting the right, the result of a failed procedure and the result of being blocked by statutory protection are indistinguishable, and both remain as non-recovery. The counterargument points out that the moment that boundary becomes blurred, the public welfare can serve as a pretext for blocking individual relief. Even so, the answer of this section is maintained. Nevertheless, the disadvantage pointed out by the counterargument—that is, that the burden of recovery being delayed or refused remains—does not disappear.
In this scene, the fact corresponding to this question is that some of the applicable facts concerning the opposing interest are missing. The items required by the adjudication records are the scope of the application, the grounds for attachment protection, the personal scope of the judgment, the items of damage, and the showing of public welfare. So long as the item of showing of public welfare is missing, one cannot write that a serious impact has been confirmed on the strength of the name of public interest alone, and accordingly the ground for restriction under paragraph (3) is not confirmed. Conversely, what the other items—for example, the grounds for attachment protection or the personal scope of the judgment—refer to cannot be adjudicated from this scene alone.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. That a judgment that there is a concern about a serious impact on the public welfare must rest not on that name but on applicable facts, and that one must not let the name stand in for confirmation—these are the limits that are permitted. Beyond that, this section does not permit newly defining the substance of public interest, drawing up a list of which facts are serious, or determining what the opposing interest actually consists in. Nor does the mere fact that some materials are missing make the restriction immediately justified, or immediately unjustified. Indeterminacy remains indeterminacy. The question that remains next is how far one can say that a restriction of relief is justified when there are no applicable facts concerning the opposing interest.
5.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The preceding section left the point that one cannot write that a serious impact has been confirmed on the strength of the name of public interest alone. This question does not ask whether a single measure of restoration immediately benefits everyone. It asks what other protective interests must survive alongside when the door of urgent relief is widened, and on what actual basis those interests constitute a restriction.
The relevant provision sets out both the establishment and the limits of an administrative stay of execution. Where an action for revocation is pending and an urgent need to prevent damage that is difficult to restore is recognized, the court may decide to suspend, in whole or in part, the effect of the disposition, etc., or its execution or the continuation of the proceedings. However, a suspension of effect shall not be permitted where the purpose can be achieved merely by stopping the execution or the continuation of the proceedings (Administrative Litigation Act, Article 23, Article 23(2)). It continues: a stay of execution shall not be permitted where there is a concern that it will have a serious impact on the public welfare (Administrative Litigation Act, Article 23, Article 23(3)). The subject indicated by this provision is the court in which the principal action is pending, the act is the suspension, in whole or in part, of the effect, execution, or continuation of proceedings, and the conditions are the urgent need to prevent damage that is difficult to restore together with the possibility of achieving the purpose by the method of suspension. The public welfare restriction is the wall of permission directly set by this provision, and thus it is read together even when the individual urgency is read broadly.
The way in which this ground and the conclusion are joined is to place the two judgments side by side. The individual's urgency asks about the possibility of restoring the damage and the need for prevention. The serious impact that will arise for others asks whether the concern about the public welfare disallows the suspension. The former judgment enlarges the need for individual restoration, but the latter judgment cannot turn that need into an unlimited one. The meaning of keeping both together is that the outcome of the adjustment is not fixed in one direction; it is not to create anew the requirements of one judgment or to change the statutory effect of the suspension.
As with the position of the rights holder A, for a person who has not yet been restored, whatever name of interest is attached, only the time of non-recovery grows longer, and a restriction that puts another right forward can be read in a way that rationalizes that loss. However, the confirmed answer is narrow. What paragraph (3) requires is a confirmation as to the degree of the concern that it will occur, not the appearance of a name; accordingly, the possibility of the pretext pointed out by the counterargument cannot become the ground for deciding whether to permit the suspension. At the same time, this answer does not eliminate the weight of the non-recovery spoken of by the counterargument.
Contrasted with the preceding condition, the state in which individual restoration and other protective interests are attached to the same suspension measure is a conflicting relief, and in this situation the records of the scope of the application and the explanation of public welfare become the kinds of materials that confirm the serious impact under paragraph (3). Since it is not confirmed which side the remaining records belong to, the final classification of whether the cause of the non-recovery is procedural failure or a statutory restriction cannot be determined from this scene alone.
Accordingly, the permitted conclusion is that broadening urgent individual relief is not always desirable, and that the individual's urgency and the serious impact that will arise for others must be left in place together. Writing that a serious impact has been confirmed on the strength of the name of public interest alone is not permitted. Conversely, a conclusion that disregards the public welfare restriction on the strength of individual urgency alone cannot be drawn from this provision either.
5.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Conflicting relief means a state in which individual restoration and other protective interests are attached to the same measure. When placed in such a state, is it always desirable to broaden urgent individual relief? Judgments in two directions—whether it is better to postpone restoration because the other party suffers a serious impact, or whether it is better to hasten restoration—confront each other within the same application. Here, limited to this question, the determination concerns which judgment is to be accepted.
The relevant provision is the article that stipulates an administrative stay of execution. The object on which the court may decide is the suspension, in whole or in part, of the effect of the disposition, etc., its execution, or the continuation of the proceedings, and this is what Article 23(2) calls a "stay of execution". For this application to be accepted, an action for revocation must be filed and the principal action must be pending, and an urgent need to prevent damage that is difficult to restore must be recognized. However, a suspension of the effect of a disposition shall not be permitted where the purpose can be achieved by suspending execution or the continuation of proceedings (Administrative Litigation Act, Article 23). Paragraph (3) of the same article provides that a stay of execution shall not be permitted where there is a concern that it will have a serious impact on the public welfare (Administrative Litigation Act, Article 23).
When these two paragraphs are placed together, the judgment does not harden into one. Even where an urgent need is recognized, a stay of execution remains subject to the public welfare restriction, and at the point where that restriction attaches, the individual's urgency and the serious impact that will arise for others are left in place together. This is the conflicting relief this section maintains—that is, a state in which individual restoration and other protective interests are attached to the same measure. If this state is treated in advance as one thing, the result is that one side is fixed first—whether the side holding that broadening individual relief is always desirable, or the side holding that where there is a serious impact one can never suspend. Therefore, confirming the two elements at the same procedural stage is the method of judgment of this section.
Nevertheless, the abstract term 'public interest' can serve as a pretext for blocking individual relief. If public interest is used in a way that demands, from the side that has already suffered serious harm, that restoration be postponed under the name of protecting the other party, what remains afterwards is the explanation that that non-recovery is not a procedural failure but the result of protection. This explanation does not erase the discomfort aimed at by the counterargument; it remains alongside it. Even if the name of the opposing interest has been presented, it must be connected to the applicable facts on which that interest becomes a serious impact on the same measure, and the restriction does not become justified by the name alone.
This fact alone cannot confirm which side is right. Conversely, if those applicable facts are confirmed and the non-recovery is explained as the result that another statutory right actually applies and makes it impossible to permit the desired remedy, that non-recovery is closer to a justified restriction than to a procedural failure. The extent to which no materials have been submitted remains indeterminate.
What this section permits is the judgment that divides the reasons for non-recovery into two categories and applies that distinction at the place where the creditor's assertion and the opposing party's rebuttal confront each other. What it does not permit is the conclusion that non-recovery itself is immediately counted as a failure of relief, or that every instance of non-recovery is classified as a justified restriction merely because another protective interest existed. So long as the serious impact on the public welfare and the individual's urgency are confirmed together upon the same application, this section leaves that distinction unconfirmed.
5.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
미배상 항목이 통상·특별손해의 법정 범위 밖인지 증명이 부족한 것인지에 따라 미회복의 이유를 달리 설명해야 한다는 전제를 받아, 이번 단계는 앞 단계의 논증을 다시 세우지 않고 이 물음만 붙잡는다. 여기서 다루는 것은 회복의 양이 아니라 회복을 가로막는 이유가 제한에 해당하는지의 문제이다. 바로 이 지점에서 개인의 긴급성과 다른 사람에게 생길 중대한 영향을 함께 남겨 두어야 한다.
그 문언은 “②취소소송이 제기된 경우에 처분등이나 그 집행 또는 절차의 속행으로 인하여 생길 회복하기 어려운 손해를 예방하기 위하여 긴급한 필요가 있다고 인정할 때에는 본안이 계속되고 있는 법원은 당사자의 신청 또는 직권에 의하여 처분등의 효력이나 그 집행 또는 절차의 속행의 전부 또는 일부의 정지(이하 “집행정지”라 한다)를 결정할 수 있다”고 정하고, 이어서 “다만, 처분의 효력정지는 처분등의 집행 또는 절차의 속행을 정지함으로써 목적을 달성할 수 있는 경우에는 허용되지 아니한다”(행정소송법 제23조)고 단서를 둔다. 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 본안이 계속되고 있는 법원이고, 행위는 효력·집행·절차의 속행의 전부 또는 일부 정지이며, 조건은 회복하기 어려운 손해의 예방과 긴급한 필요의 인정이다.
제23조 제3항은 “③집행정지는 공공복리에 중대한 영향을 미칠 우려가 있을 때에는 허용되지 아니한다”(행정소송법 제23조)고 선을 긋는다. 제2항과 제3항의 문언을 나란히 놓으면 판정 근거의 양쪽이 드러난다. 제2항은 정지로 보호할 개인 측의 긴급성을 묻고, 제3항은 그 정지가 공공복리에 미칠 중대한 우려를 묻는다. 이 둘을 한 물음으로 섞지 않는 까닭은 판정의 방향이 서로 다르기 때문이다. 하나는 허용의 조건이고 다른 하나는 허용하지 않는 조건이다. 그러므로 개인이 겪는 미회복이 절차 실패인지 정당한 제한인지는 이 두 문언의 조건을 각각 대조해 보아야 갈린다. 해당 원문 문언만 정당한 제한과 구제 실패를 구별하는 판정 근거로 쓴다.
이미 침해받은 사람의 미회복을 다른 권리의 보호라는 이름으로 합리화해 버리면, 회복이 막힌 손실 자체는 설명에서 사라지고 제한만 남는다. 반론은 그 점을 겨냥한다. 사람마다 입는 불편과 회복되지 않은 채 남는 가치를 지워서는 안 된다. 그러더라도 공익의 명칭만으로 중대한 영향을 확인했다고 쓸 수는 없다. 제23조 제3항의 문언은 중대한 영향을 미칠 우려라는 조건을 요구할 뿐, 그 우려를 단지 공익이라 불렀다는 사실만으로 확정한 것은 아니다. 따라서 반론이 지적한 미회복의 무게는 그대로 두되, 공공복리에 중대한 영향이 있다는 확인은 적용 사실이 뒷받침하는 한에서만 남는다.
이 장면에서 권리자 A는 미회복이 모두 절차 실패라고 주장하고 상대방 B는 법정 보호 때문에라고 답하며, 적용 사실의 일부는 제출되지 않았다. 충돌하는 구제, 곧 개인 회복과 다른 보호 이익이 같은 조치에 걸린 상태가 이 장면의 형편이다. 이 사실만으로는 제23조 제2항의 긴급한 필요와 제23조 제3항의 중대한 우려 중 어느 쪽이 확인되었다고 단정할 수 없다. 공공복리 소명을 비롯한 적용 사실이 아직 비어 있기 때문이다. 이 조건을 확인하는 검사는 사실의 유무에 따라 판정이 뒤바뀔 수 있음을 보여 주며, 확정되지 않은 사항은 미확정의 자리에 그대로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은, 제23조 제2항·제3항의 문언을 조건으로 삼아 미회복의 이유를 정당한 제한과 구제 실패로 나누어 읽는 것이다. 이 절이 허용하지 않는 것은 공익의 명칭만으로 중대한 영향을 확인했다고 쓰는 것이다. 미확정인 사실은 미확정으로 남기되, 그 공백 자체를 구제 불능의 근거로 삼지 않는다.
5.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
이렇게 두 주장이 얽힌 상태를 본 절에서는 충돌하는 구제라 부른다. 즉 개인 회복과 다른 보호 이익이 같은 조치에 걸려 서로 양립하기 어려운 상태다. 이 물음 앞에서 정당한 제한과 구제 실패를 구별할 때, 그 안에서 다시 나누어 판정할 부분은 무엇인가.
행정소송법 제23조는 취소소송의 계속 중 법원이 정지를 결정할 수 있는 요건과 그 한계를 함께 규정한다. 동 조문 제2항은 “회복하기 어려운 손해를 예방하기 위하여 긴급한 필요가 있다고 인정할 때에는” 본안 법원이 “처분등의 효력이나 그 집행 또는 절차의 속행의 전부 또는 일부의 정지”를 결정할 수 있다고 정한다(행정소송법 제23조). 여기서 정지란 회복하기 어려운 손해를 예방하기 위한 긴급한 필요 아래 처분등의 효력이나 그 집행, 또는 절차의 속행을 멈추는 결정을 뜻한다. 이 문언이 다루는 주체는 본안이 계속되고 있는 법원이고, 대상은 처분등의 효력·집행·절차의 속행이다.
같은 조문 제3항은 “집행정지는 공공복리에 중대한 영향을 미칠 우려가 있을 때에는 허용되지 아니한다”고 선을 긋는다(행정소송법 제23조). 긴급한 필요가 있다고 인정되는 경우에도 공공복리에 미칠 중대한 영향이라는 반대 이익이 막으면 정지는 허용되지 않는다는 점이다. 이 두 판단 단계를 나누는 까닭은 무엇인가. 회복하기 어려운 손해와 긴급한 필요는 개인 쪽의 사정이고, 중대한 영향의 우려는 다른 보호 이익 쪽의 사정이다. 전자가 인정되어도 후자가 막을 수 있고, 후자의 우려가 사라지면 전자가 그대로 살아난다. 이 사정들을 각각 확인하지 않고 하나로 묶어 버리면 어느 쪽 판단이 어떤 근거로 정해졌는지 알 수 없게 된다.
이 구별을 거치면 공익이라는 추상어가 개인 구제를 막는 구실이 될 수 있다는 반론에 맞선다. 긴급한 개인 구제를 넓히면 항상 바람직한가라는 물음 뒤에, 다른 권리의 보호를 앞세우면 이미 침해받은 사람의 미회복을 합리화할 수 있다는 손실이 남는다. 실제로 집행이나 절차의 속행으로 손해를 입은 사람에게 그 손해가 회복되지 않은 채 묶여 있으면, 그 사람 입장에서 제한은 곧 미회복이다. 그럼에도 공익의 명칭만으로 중대한 영향을 확인했다고 쓸 수는 없다. 제3항이 요구하는 것은 중대한 영향을 미칠 우려라는 요건이지, 보호 이익에 붙은 이름이 아니다. 이름만으로 요건을 확인한 것으로 쓰면 이 구별은 무너진다.
합성 장면으로 돌아가면, B의 방어는 법정 보호 때문이라는 것이고 그 근거가 되는 적용 사실의 일부는 제출되지 않았다. 나머지 기록으로는 신청 범위·압류 보호 사유·판결의 인적 범위·손해 항목·공공복리 소명 가운데 무엇이 채워졌는지 정할 수 없다. 미배상 항목이 통상·특별손해의 법정 범위 밖인지, 아니면 증명이 부족한 것인지에 따라 미회복의 이유를 달리 설명해야 한다. 차단 규범·적용 사실·보호되는 반대 이익이 연결되어 미회복의 이유를 설명할 수 있는 경우 정당한 제한 쪽에 둔다. 다른 법정 권리가 실제로 적용되어 원하는 집행 확대·비당사자 구속·정지 등 구제수단을 허용할 수 없는 경우 구제 실패가 아니라 차단된 구제로 남긴다. 반대 이익의 이름만 있고 적용 사실이 없어 제한의 정당성을 확정할 수 없는 경우 미확정으로 둔다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 명시한 조건 안의 세부 구분뿐이다. 작동하는 경우·막히는 경우·미확정인 경우 셋 가운데 어느 하나에 걸리는지를 묻는 것으로 충분하며, 그 밖에 단계를 새로 만들 필요는 없다. 허용되지 않는 것은 공공복리라는 명칭을 통로로 삼아 요건 확인 없이 구제를 막는 해석과, 확인되지 않은 적용 사실을 채워 넣어 결론을 앞당기는 처리다. 미확정으로 남은 항목은 곧 구제 불능이 아니다.
5.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
그 결론을 전제로 이 물음은 긴급한 개인 구제를 넓히면 항상 바람직한가라는 점에 머문다. 여기서 말하는 충돌하는 구제는 개인 회복과 다른 보호 이익이 같은 조치에 걸린 상태이며, 이는 개인 회복만 들여다보는 경우에는 드러나지 않는 측면이다. 따라서 한 사람의 미회복이 절차 실패인지 다른 보호 이익 때문에 남겨진 것인지 가리는 작업이 필요하다.
해당 문언은 행정소송법 제23조 제2항에서 처분등의 효력이나 그 집행 또는 절차의 속행의 전부 또는 일부의 정지를 법원이 결정할 수 있다고 정한다. 그 문언은 회복하기 어려운 손해를 예방하기 위하여 긴급한 필요가 있다고 인정할 때라는 조건을 함께 두고, 이하 “집행정지”라는 용어를 사용한다. 다만의 단서는 처분의 효력정지가 집행 또는 절차의 속행 정지만으로 목적을 달성할 수 있는 경우 허용되지 아니한다고 못 박는다. 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 본안이 계속되고 있는 법원이고, 행위는 정지의 결정이며, 조건은 긴급한 필요와 목적 달성 수단의 선택이다.
이 두 문언을 함께 놓으면 미회복의 이유를 설명하는 절차에는 차단 규범·적용 사실·보호되는 반대 이익의 연결이 요구된다. 차단 규범은 다른 법정 권리가 구제수단을 허용하지 않는다는 규칙이고, 적용 사실은 그 규범이 이 사건에 실제로 걸린다는 근거이며, 보호되는 반대 이익은 그 규범이 지키려는 이익을 말한다. 이 셋이 연결될 때 미회복은 정당한 제한으로 설명되고, 막히는 조건은 다른 법정 권리가 실제로 적용되어 원하는 집행 확대·비당사자 구속·정지 등 구제수단을 허용할 수 없는 경우에 해당한다.
공익이라는 추상어가 개인 구제를 막는 구실이 될 수 있다는 반론은 이 구별이 가질 손실을 정면으로 겨냥한다. 이미 침해받은 사람이 자신의 미회복을 그대로 감수해야 하고, 다른 권리를 앞세운 설명이 그 불이익을 합리화하는 자리로 쓰일 수 있다. 공공복리에 관한 우려라는 표현이 구체적 근거 없이 꺼내진다면 회복의 문이 추상적 명분에 닫히는 결과가 생긴다. 반론이 지적한 불이익은 그대로 남기되, 공공복리 소명과 같은 적용 사실이 채워졌을 때만 정당한 제한이 된다는 경계는 유지된다.
이 장면에서는 신청 범위·압류 보호 사유·판결의 인적 범위·손해 항목·공공복리 소명의 내용이 확정되지 않았다. 기록에서 공공복리 소명이 비어 있고 다른 법정 권리가 걸렸다는 사정만으로는 반대 이익의 이름이 있을 뿐 적용 사실이 없는 상태다. 따라서 장면만으로는 제한의 정당성을 확정할 수 없고, 미확정으로 남긴다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 차단 규범·적용 사실·보호되는 반대 이익이 연결된 때의 정당한 제한, 그리고 다른 법정 권리가 실제로 적용되어 구제수단이 막히는 때의 차단이며, 반대 이익의 이름만 있고 적용 사실이 없는 때는 미확정이다. 이를 넘어 공익의 명칭만으로 중대한 영향을 확인했다고 쓰거나, 미회복이 있으면 곧 절차 실패로 단정하는 것은 허용되지 않는다. 자료가 없을 때도 구제의 제한이 정당하다고 말할 수 있는가?
5.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
이렇게 개인 회복과 다른 보호 이익이 같은 조치에 함께 걸린 상태를 충돌하는 구제라고 부른다. 회복되지 않은 손해 항목을 논할 때 미배상이 통상·특별손해의 법정 범위 때문인지 아니면 당사자의 증명이 부족한 탓인지에 따라 그 이유를 달리 설명해야 한다는 점이다. 이제 긴급한 개인 구제를 넓히는 일이 언제나 바람직한지, 그리고 자료가 없을 때도 구제의 제한을 정당하다고 말할 수 있는지를 다음에 남긴다.
이 물음 앞에 놓인 법문은 행정소송법 제23조 제2항이다. 그 문언은 “②취소소송이 제기된 경우에 처분등이나 그 집행 또는 절차의 속행으로 인하여 생길 회복하기 어려운 손해를 예방하기 위하여 긴급한 필요가 있다고 인정할 때에는 본안이 계속되고 있는 법원은 당사자의 신청 또는 직권에 의하여 처분등의 효력이나 그 집행 또는 절차의 속행의 전부 또는 일부의 정지(이하 “집행정지”라 한다)를 결정할 수 있다. 다만, 처분의 효력정지는 처분등의 집행 또는 절차의 속행을 정지함으로써 목적을 달성할 수 있는 경우에는 허용되지 아니한다.”고 정한다(행정소송법 제23조 제2항). 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 본안이 계속되고 있는 법원이고, 행위는 처분등의 효력이나 그 집행 또는 절차의 속행의 전부 또는 일부 정지이며, 조건은 회복하기 어려운 손해를 예방할 긴급한 필요의 인정과 집행정지로 목적을 달성할 수 있을 때의 효력정지 배제다.
이 문언과 뒤이은 조항은 구제의 확대와 그 한계를 한 줄로 묶지 않는다. 행정소송법 제23조 제3항은 “③집행정지는 공공복리에 중대한 영향을 미칠 우려가 있을 때에는 허용되지 아니한다.”고 선언한다(행정소송법 제23조 제3항). 제2항이 긴급한 필요가 인정될 때 정지를 허용할 수 있다고 열어 두었다면, 제3항은 공공복리에 미칠 중대한 영향의 우려가 있을 때 그 허용을 막는다. 두 단계가 갈라지는 지점은 공공복리라는 이름이 아니라 중대한 영향의 우려를 확인할 수 있는지다. 그래서 긴급한 개인 구제를 넓히는 판단은 반대 이익에 관한 적용 사실과 분리하여 진행해야 한다. 미회복을 보면서 곧 절차 실패로 적는 대신, 다른 법정 권리가 실제로 적용되어 집행 확대·비당사자 구속·정지 등 구제수단을 허용할 수 없는 경우에 이르렀는지를 따져 정당한 제한과 구제 실패를 구별한다.
다른 권리의 보호를 앞세우면 이미 침해받은 사람의 미회복을 합리화할 수 있으며, 그 손실은 말로 정리되지 않은 채 그대로 남는다. 권리자 A는 자신이 겪은 미회복이 모두 절차 실패라고 주장하고, 상대방 B는 법정 보호 때문이라 답한다. 법정 보호라는 이유가 제시되었어도 그 이유에 연결된 적용 사실이 무엇인지, 그 사실이 제23조 제3항이 요구하는 우려에 해당하는지가 확인되지 않았다면 반론은 정리되지 않은 채로 남는다. 이때 반론이 겨냥한 손실과 불편을 덮어 두어서는 안 되며, 확인할 수 없는 범위는 그대로 확인할 수 없는 상태로 둔다.
장면에서 남아 있는 것은 적용 사실의 일부가 제출되지 않았다는 점뿐이다. 판결의 인적 범위나 손해 항목, 신청 범위, 압류 보호 사유, 공공복리 소명의 어떤 내용이 제출되었는지는 정해지지 않았다. 따라서 어떤 집행 확대나 비당사자 구속, 정지가 실제로 요구되었는지도, 다른 보호 이익이 어느 행위에 걸렸는지도 이 장면만으로는 판단할 수 없다. 다만 앞의 조건은 있다. 반대 이익의 이름만 있고 적용 사실이 없어 제한의 정당성을 확정할 수 없는 경우에는 미확정으로 남는다. 이러한 조건의 변경은 실제로 일어난 사실이 아니라 판단 조건을 바꾸어 보는 가정으로만 읽는다.
이 절이 그어 놓은 경계는 분명하다. 긴급한 개인 구제를 넓히는 일이 언제나 바람직하다고 말할 수 없으며, 그렇다고 공공복리라는 이름만으로 구제를 막을 수도 없다. 회복되지 않은 부분이 절차 실패인지 정당한 제한인지는 차단 규범·적용 사실·보호되는 반대 이익이 연결되어 미회복의 이유를 설명할 수 있는지에 따라 달라진다. 자료가 부족한 상태는 구제 불능이 아니라 미확인이다.