Summary
Duplicative filing of a suit concerning a pending case is prohibited.
1.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
Even if more courts are added, the same relief cannot be obtained twice over. Having accepted the conclusion of the preceding section that the right to conduct the lawsuit in subrogation and the substantive existence of the right subject to subrogation are separate questions, this passage addresses only whether an action identical to one already pending may be brought again. Plaintiff A again set down, in a separate complaint, the same demand as that sought in the action pending against Defendant B. In this scene, the questions are whether the second complaint can pass the threshold of the court, and what the standard is that opens that passage. The mere fact that a case has been received several times does not immediately determine whether a duplicate filing is permissible. Just as the judgment that one may conduct a lawsuit by subrogation was previously separated from the substantive existence of the right that is its object, so too must the judgment on the restriction on refiling be distinguished from the work of preparing the adjudication once that restriction is passed. This distinction continues in the paragraphs that follow.
To judge whether the same demand has been repeated, one first checks the scope of the text. The Civil Procedure Act provides that "No party may bring an action again with respect to a case pending before a court" (Article 259 of the Civil Procedure Act). The subject designated by this text is the parties to that case; the act is the bringing of an action again with respect to a case already pending; and the condition is that the case is pending before the court. A pending case means the state in which a case is placed before the court for judgment, and this definition is used in this section only in that same sense. Accordingly, the prohibition of the text is aimed at the act of bringing again an action identical to that case while the case remains placed before the court for judgment. Whether the provision separately lays down grounds for going beyond this prohibition of duplicate filings is a question that cannot be settled by the text in question alone, and so I go no further here.
This text connects directly with the conclusion confirmed above. Since refiling of the same case is prohibited while the case remains pending before the court, the entrance opens only if the object of the later action does not fall within this restriction. Only in cases not caught by that restriction, where the performance demanded, the parties, and the conditions are specified in the statement of the claim, and where the right underlying the chosen action can be defended, does the passage open. Here, the specification of the claim means that what is sought and to what extent appears in the complaint, and defensibility means the state in which one can assert and maintain the right supporting the claim. The reason these two are placed alongside the question of whether refiling is prohibited is that, whereas the former is a step of examining whether the same case remains before the court, the latter is a step of determining what the action that passed that examination will litigate. If the two steps are merged, it looks as though confirmation of a pending case immediately decides the question of the specification of the claim as well, but the settled conclusion is to the contrary: it requires these two judgments side by side.
If this standard is applied strictly, it may be objected that the way to remedy delay or error in the first lawsuit will be blocked. If the design of the first action was mistaken, or if the adjudication is delayed and one wishes to obtain the same relief by other means, the loss is that strict prevention of duplication makes separate attempts outside the first action irrecoverable. It is pointed out, in the same direction, that narrowing the door to refiling leaves the parties tied to the flaws or delay of the first action and dependent on a single route, and that this inconvenience impairs the value of relief of rights. This objection does not deny that the prohibition of duplicate filing operates in the direction of narrowing the door to refiling, and the conclusion the author fixes in this section does not change that direction. Only the scope of the answer remains as determined. Identity of lawsuits cannot be established by the case name alone. That is, the purpose of relieving the inconvenience targeted by the objection does not lead to a method of finding the identity of lawsuits only in the case name.
The facts that can be confirmed in this scene are that a lawsuit is pending between Plaintiff A and Defendant B, and that Plaintiff A again set down the same demand in a separate complaint. Setting this against the foregoing conditions, what remains is first whether the earlier action is in a pending state, and whether the object of the later action falls within that restriction on refiling. Whether the demand is specified in the statement of the claim and whether the right underlying the chosen action can be defended also remain subjects of confirmation, but the scene gives no further particulars of that wording. Moreover, when the prior action was withdrawn, and precisely what the object of the later action is, are facts outside the scene, and this material has not fixed those values. If it is confirmed whether the withdrawal came before or after a final judgment on the merits, the judgment on the restriction on refiling of the same action changes. Points that cannot be confirmed from the present scene remain undetermined.
What this section permits is the judgment that the entrance to this relief opens where the status of the prior action as pending, withdrawn, or subject to a final judgment, and the object of the later action, do not fall within the restriction on refiling. Conversely, where the same case is pending and one files again, or where one refiles the same action that was withdrawn after a final judgment on the merits, this passage does not open. A conclusion establishing the identity of lawsuits by the case name alone is not permitted. Nor does it mean that the mere difference of case names negates identity and automatically permits refiling, nor that the mere sameness of case names immediately fixes the prohibition. Where the material is insufficient, the point is left undetermined, and that insufficiency does not mean that relief is impossible. The right to conduct the lawsuit in subrogation and the substantive existence of the right subject to subrogation are separate judgments.
1.2The Conditions That Block Relief
I examine whether an action identical to one already pending may be brought again, and what conditions block that route. In this scene the question is whether the new complaint filed by A can be placed alongside the preceding action. The pendency of a lawsuit spoken of here means the state in which a case is placed before the court for judgment. That is, it is a situation in which the same demand is raised again while the prior action still awaits judgment. In this state, the later action must first pass the examination for the restriction on refiling.
The text corresponding to this question is found in Article 259 of the Civil Procedure Act. It provides: "No party may bring an action again with respect to a case pending before a court." Here the subject is the party, and the prohibited act is the bringing of an action again with respect to a pending case. The condition is that the case is pending before the court. If the pendency of a lawsuit means the state in which a case is placed before the court for judgment, then so long as the prior action is in that state, the later action falls within the scope of this text. I do not take up here as well the requirements demanded by other provisions. Only, this text makes clear just one point: that duplicate filing with respect to a pending case is prohibited.
Connecting this text with the preceding scene, the route of the later action is closed. Where the same case is pending and one files again, the route of relief is closed if even one of the statutory requirements is not met. Only, the stages of judgment here are divided in two. First it must be determined whether the prior action is in the state of pendency, in which the case is placed before the court for judgment; next, one must compare whether the later action is the same demand as that case. The reason for dividing these two stages is that the former is a status and the latter is a comparison of objects. Where the same action is refiled after having been withdrawn following a final judgment on the merits, the route of relief is likewise closed if even one of the statutory requirements is not met. Here, whether the point of withdrawal fell before or after the final judgment on the merits becomes a condition of the determination.
The objection that most strongly confronts this is that a detour is needed for delay or error in the first lawsuit. If the first action stalls or its design has a flaw, the concern is that, unless the parties may raise the same demand again in a new action, that loss will not be recovered. It means that, as the price of strictly preventing duplication, the inconvenience arises that the error of the first action hardens as it stands. However, for that detour to open, it must first be settled whether the later action is the same demand as the prior action. If duplication is blocked or permitted by looking only at the name of the case, without comparing whether the subject of the claim and the relief sought actually overlap, then, quite apart from the recovery of error that the objection fears, the determination itself is shaken. The disadvantage of the objection remains as it stands: the fact that the delay of the first action is not immediately remedied by a separate route.
If the synthetic scene is reset to fit this question, the demand set down in the new complaint filed by A is fixed as being the same as that in the pending action. Only the fact that the prior action is in a state of being placed before the court for judgment has been fixed; the time of its withdrawal or whether a final judgment has been rendered is not confirmed. Accordingly, if the later action is deemed to have been filed while the prior action was pending, the prohibition condition of Article 259 overlaps as it stands. On the other hand, whether there was a withdrawal, and if so, whether it came before or after a final judgment on the merits, is not confirmed in this scene. Service or the results of performance in the actual case also remain undetermined for want of material. There is no need to rewrite the whole scene.
The conclusion permitted in this section is narrow. Where the prior action is in a state of being placed before the court for judgment and the later action raises the same demand again, and where the same action withdrawn after a final judgment on the merits is refiled, the route of relief is closed if even one of the statutory requirements is not met. Conversely, establishing the identity of lawsuits by looking only at the case name, or deeming the route open on the strength of an unconfirmed assumption as to the time of withdrawal, are conclusions this section does not permit. Nor does it assert the fruits of actual payment or delivery.
1.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
If the same demand is adjudicated twice, the peace that the first judgment sought to achieve is torn apart, and the parties have difficulty deciding which judgment to follow. What is to be asked in this scene is simple: whether an action identical to one already pending may be brought again, and, when certain circumstances cannot be confirmed, where to place that boundary. One looks for a line that does not arbitrarily treat matters which cannot be confirmed for want of material as cases where the route is blocked. To draw this line, one must first examine, according to the text, what the prohibition of duplicate filing aims at.
The relevant text is short and categorical. Article 259 of the Civil Procedure Act declares: "No party may bring an action again with respect to a case pending before a court." The act prohibited by this sentence is the bringing of an action again with respect to the same case, and the subject of the prohibition is the parties to that case. Also, the prohibition operates while the case remains pending before the court. Here the pendency of a lawsuit means the state in which a case is placed before the court for judgment. Thus this provision closes the door to duplicate adjudication on the axis of the point of pendency. Since the provision itself does not set out how to determine the identity of lawsuits, the task of regarding cases as the same remains a separate judgment.
This text blocks duplicate filing once, but that blocking does not mean the impossibility of every later action. The condition the text puts forward is the existence of a pending case; the circumstances actually needed for execution are the specification of which case that is and of what the later action seeks. The identity of an action is a question examined by the standards of the parties and the claim, not a number filled in by the match of the case's name label. Only by making this distinction is the judgment that one may conduct a lawsuit kept from being confused with the judgment of whether that lawsuit is well founded. Only where the status of the prior action as pending, withdrawn, or subject to a final judgment, and the object of the later action, do not fall within the restriction on refiling does the route for filing the later action again open. This is a matter distinct from the success of relief: the state in which the legal route is open must not be read as if it were converted into the fruits of actual payment, delivery, or recovery.
If this boundary is set firmly, the complaint remains that the way to circumvent delay or error in the first lawsuit is blocked. Especially for one who, because the design of the first action was mistaken, wishes to correct the same mistake and throw it again, strictly preventing duplication may look like an irrecoverable loss. Yet to this complaint, too, the answer is given together that the identity of lawsuits cannot be established by the case name alone. If, without examining what the designation of the parties or the content of the statement of the claim was, one cuts the matter as the same case merely by comparing the names on the documents, one binds even different demands as having been adjudicated once. The error of the first action is a question separate from the confirmation of whether the later action is the same demand, and the need for a detour cannot serve as ground for skipping the procedure for confirming duplication.
What is confirmed in this scene is only the fact that Plaintiff A again set down, in a separate complaint, the demand against Defendant B. In what respect and to what extent the statement of the claim of the later action is the same as that of the prior action, and whether the prior action is still pending or has already been withdrawn, are not to be found in this scene. The time of the withdrawal of the action is not contained in it either, so whether it fell before or after a final judgment on the merits cannot be determined from this scene alone. The judgment requires the prior complaint, the written withdrawal, the final judgment on the merits, and the statement of the claim of the later action. Therefore this matter, which cannot be confirmed for want of material, must be left undetermined rather than ended as an impossibility with the route blocked.
The scope permitted by this section is narrow. Under the premise that duplicate filing with respect to a pending case is prohibited, where the time of withdrawal of the prior action or the object of the later action is not confirmed, the materials of judgment are not specified, and the point is therefore left undetermined, distinguished from impossibility. Conversely, where the same case is pending and one files again, or where the same action withdrawn after a final judgment on the merits is refiled, it falls within that restriction on refiling. Nor can one say unconditionally that the route is open or closed merely because there is no material. The judgment that follows next asks about the weight possessed by such a state.
1.4The Records Needed for Determination
이미 진행 중인 소와 같은 소를 다시 낼 수 있는가, 그리고 어떤 기록이 필요한가라는 물음이 앞에 놓여 있다. 이제는 소의 제기 자체가 반복될 때 어떤 기록으로 구분을 가를 것인지가 남는다.
이 물음에 해당하는 법령 문언은 민사소송법 제259조이다. 그 조문은 "법원에 계속되어 있는 사건에 대하여 당사자는 다시 소를 제기하지 못한다"라고 규정한다. 이 문언이 지시하는 주체는 당사자이고, 금지되는 행위는 계속되어 있는 사건에 대하여 다시 소를 제기하는 것이며, 그 조건은 해당 사건이 법원에 계속되어 있다는 것이다. 이 절은 이 조문이 정한 계속 중인 사건에 대한 중복 제소 금지에 관해서만 다룬다.
여기서 소송계속은 사건이 법원의 심판에 놓인 상태를 뜻한다. 이 상태에 관한 판정은 선행 소장·취하서·종국판결·후소 청구취지에 기록된 자료만으로 하고, 없는 기록을 추정으로 메우지 않는다. 기록의 유무로 단계를 나누는 것은 단계 판정과 실체 판단을 뒤섞지 않기 위해서다. 확정되지 않은 기록은 미확정으로 두고, 미확정을 곧바로 구제 불능으로 바꾸지 않는다.
반론은 첫 소송의 지연이나 오류에 대한 우회로가 필요할 수 있다는 점을 겨냥한다. 중복 제소를 엄격히 막으면 첫 소의 설계 오류가 회복 불가능해진다는 손실과 불편을 강조하는 셈이다. 그렇더라도 사건명만으로 소송의 동일성을 확정할 수는 없다. 사건명만을 동일성의 근거로 삼으면 청구의 대상이나 당사자의 기록을 건너뛰게 되어, 오히려 반론이 걱정하는 오류를 되풀이하게 된다. 따라서 이 절은 반론이 지적한 불편을 지우지 않으면서도, 정해진 기록으로 단계를 판정하는 범위를 벗어나지 않는다.
합성 장면에서 이 물음에 해당하는 사실은 하나로 좁혀진다. 이 장면의 요구가 선행 소의 청구취지와 같은지, 그리고 선행 소가 계속 중인지의 판단은 선행 소장과 후소 청구취지의 기록에 맡겨진다. 합성 장면으로 판정할 수 없는 취하의 시점이나 후소 대상의 확정은 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 정해진 기록으로 계속·취하·종국판결의 단계를 가리고, 그 단계에 따라 같은 소 재소의 제한을 판정하는 데까지이다. 기록이 충분하지 않다는 사정만으로 후소 제기의 통로가 닫힌다고 단정하지 않으며, 실제 지급·인도·회수의 성과도 이 절의 결론으로 바꾸어 쓰지 않는다.
1.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
이 장면에서 이미 진행 중인 소와 같은 소를 다시 낼 수 있는가, 그리고 어떤 변경이 기존 단계 판정을 뒤집는지가 물음으로 남는다. 앞 절까지의 결론은 따로 넘기고, 지금은 지정된 변경 하나가 기존 차단 판단을 어떻게 다시 여는지만 살핀다.
이 물음에 해당하는 문언은 민사소송법 제259조이다. 해당 조문은 「법원에 계속되어 있는 사건에 대하여 당사자는 다시 소를 제기하지 못한다.」고 정한다(민사소송법 제259조). 여기서 법원에 계속되어 있는 사건이란 사건이 법원의 심판에 놓인 상태, 즉 소송계속을 가리키고, 금지되는 행위는 그 사건에 대하여 당사자가 다시 소를 제기하는 것이다. 조문이 요구하는 것은 중복된 청구가 아니라 계속 중인 ‘사건’에 대한 다시 제소이며, 이 문언의 다른 쟁점은 지금 다루지 않는다.
이 문언에서 확인되는 중복 제소 금지와 함께, 저자의 결론은 같은 소의 재소 제한이 언제 다시 판정되는지를 나눈다. 만약 변경이 확인되면 기존 판단을 폐기하고 처음부터 다시 판정한다. 즉 계속 중인가라는 현재의 단계 판단과, 그 판단이 성립한 뒤 사건 상태에 어떤 변경이 생겼는가라는 재판정의 기회는 서로 다른 물음이다. 이를 구별해야 이미 주어진 차단 판단을 되돌릴 조건을 따로 적을 수 있다.
가장 강한 반론은 첫 소송의 지연이나 오류에 대한 우회로가 필요할 수 있다는 점이다. 중복을 엄격히 막으면 첫 소의 설계 오류가 회복 불가능해진다. 이 손실을 그대로 두더라도 저자가 정한 답은 사건명만으로 소송의 동일성을 확정할 수 없다는 것이다. 사건명이 같다는 사정만으로 두 소가 같은 사건인지, 따라서 재소 제한에 걸리는지 정할 수 없으므로, 반론이 지적한 불이익을 지우지 않은 채 사건명이라는 표지만으로 차단을 확정하지 않는 범위에서 결론을 유지한다.
합성 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 원고 A가 피고 B를 상대로 진행 중인 소와 같은 요구를 다른 소장에 다시 적었다는 것뿐이다. 이 사실은 계속 중인 사건에 대한 다시의 제소라는 판단과 맞닿지만, 선행 소의 취하 여부와 그 시점, 후소의 대상이 기존 제한에 걸리는지는 여기서 정해지지 않았다. 이 조건 하나가 확인되면 단계부터 다시 판정하지만, 취하 시점이나 후소 대상이 확인되지 않은 자료 범위에서는 그러한 변경을 확정할 수 없다. 미확정인 항목은 그대로 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 지정된 변경이 확인될 때 같은 소의 재소 제한을 다시 판정하고, 기존 차단·실효 판단을 폐기한 뒤 단계부터 다시 나아가는 것에 그친다. 사건명만으로 소송의 동일성을 확정하는 결론은 허용되지 않으며, 반론이 요구하는 첫 소의 설계 오류를 회복할 우회로가 열렸다고 단정하지도 않는다. 후소를 다시 제기할 통로가 실제로 열리는지도 이 장면에서 확정하지 못한 채 남는다.
1.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
즉 이미 진행 중인 소와 같은 소를 다시 낼 수 있는가라는 물음에는 중복 제소 금지라는 규율이 서 있었다. 그런데 첫 소송의 지연이나 설계 오류를 겪은 당사자에게는 그 규율이 곧 회복 불가능한 벽으로 느껴질 수 있다. 그래서 반대 주장을 정면으로 다룬다. 중복을 엄격히 막으면 첫 소의 오류가 치유되지 못한다는 반론에 어떤 형태로든 우회로가 필요한 것은 아닌지, 그리고 그 우회로가 제259조의 금지를 실제로 완화할 수 있는지를 묻는다.
이 물음에 답하기 위하여 해당 문언을 먼저 들여다본다. 민사소송법 제259조는 “법원에 계속되어 있는 사건에 대하여 당사자는 다시 소를 제기하지 못한다.”라고 규정한다. 여기서 법원에 계속되어 있는 사건은 앞서 정의한 대로 사건이 법원의 심판에 놓인 상태, 즉 소송계속을 말한다. 규율의 주체는 당사자이고, 금지되는 행위는 계속 중인 사건에 대한 다시 소의 제기이며, 적용의 조건은 그 후소의 대상이 선행 소의 사건과 같은 것으로 확인되는 것이다. 이 문언만으로는 사건명이나 서류 제목의 표기상 동일성이 곧 사건의 동일성을 의미한다고 읽을 수 없다.
이 문언과 이 절의 결론 사이의 연결은 분명하다. 계속 중인 사건에 대한 중복 제소는 금지되지만, 그 금지가 적용되려면 먼저 어떤 사건이 같은 사건인지가 가려져야 한다. 그런데 사건명만으로는 소송의 동일성을 확정할 수 없으므로, 사건명 표기의 일치와 후소 청구 대상의 실질적 일치는 별도의 판단 단계로 구별해야 한다. 이 구별은 두 단계가 아니라 같은 판단 안의 두 물음이다. 전자만으로 금지를 확정하면 반론이 지적하는 회복 불가능 문제가 생기고, 후자를 반드시 대조해야만 중복 제소 금지의 범위가 과도하게 넓어지지 않는다.
이 구별이 없을 때 가장 강한 반론은 그대로 설득력을 가진다. 첫 소의 소장 작성 오류나 지연 탓에 원고 A가 얻으려던 구제가 지체되고 있는데, 사건명 하나가 겹쳤다는 이유로 후소까지 막힌다면 원고 A는 설계 오류를 고칠 창구를 완전히 잃게 된다. 이 손실과 불편은 실제이다. 그러나 중복 제소 금지의 이유는 같은 구제를 두 번 받지 못하게 하려는 데 있지, 서류 표기가 조금이라도 겹치는 것을 막으려는 데 있지 않다. 따라서 사건명만으로 소송의 동일성을 확정할 수 없다는 범위 안에서 반론의 불리한 부분을 남긴 채로 결론을 유지한다. 회복 불가능 문제는 동일성 판단의 엄격성에서 생기지 않고, 그 판단을 생략한 데서 생긴다.
합성 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 다음과 같다. 이 장면은 선행 소의 계속과 후소의 요구 표기만을 정할 뿐이다. 그러므로 선행 소가 계속 중인 상태에서 같은 요구가 다시 제기되었는지는 이 장면으로 이미 확인되지만, 두 소의 사건명이 다르다는 점이나 서류 제출 시점이 얼마나 지났는지는 확인되지 않았다. 따라서 사건명만으로 소송의 동일성을 확정할 수는 없다는 결론 아래, 선행 소장·취하서·종국판결·후소 청구취지의 대조가 필요한지 없는지는 이 장면만으로 판단할 수 없다. 그 부분은 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 중복 제소 금지의 문언이 계속 중인 사건에 적용된다는 것과, 사건명만으로 소송의 동일성을 확정할 수 없다는 범위가 함께 성립한다는 것이다. 반대로 허용하지 않는 결론은 후소가 같은 사건인지 아닌지 정하지 않고도 중복 제소 금지를 확정하는 방식이다. 사건명 표기가 일치한다는 사실만으로 소의 동일성을 확정할 수 없다. 반대로 후소가 재소 제한에 걸리지 않는 경우임이 확인되면 후소를 다시 제기할 통로는 열릴 수 있다.
1.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
이른바 소송계속, 즉 사건이 법원의 심판에 놓인 상태를 전제로 한다면 이미 진행 중인 소와 같은 소를 다시 낼 수 있는가라는 물음이 그대로 남는다. 앞 절은 이 결론에 대한 반론으로 제기된 사건명만으로 소송의 동일성을 확정할 수는 없다는 경계를 확인했다. 이어서 원고 A가 피고 B를 상대로 진행 중인 소와 같은 요구를 다른 소장에 다시 적었다는 장면을 전제로 같은 구제의 중복이 가능할지를 묻는다.
민사소송법 제259조는 그 문언으로 "제259조(중복된 소제기의 금지) 법원에 계속되어 있는 사건에 대하여 당사자는 다시 소를 제기하지 못한다"고 정한다. 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 해당 사건의 당사자이고, 금지되는 행위는 법원에 계속되어 있는 사건과 같은 소의 다시 제기이며, 조건은 선행 사건이 그대로 계속되어 있는 상태이다. 문언은 그 밖의 요건이나 예외를 이 조항 안에서 더 내세우지 않는다.
이 조건과 결론이 맞물리는 지점은 사건이 계속 중이라는 상태 그 자체이다. 소를 제기한 사건이 심판에 놓인 이상 그 요구는 이미 한 번 법원에 맡겨진 것이어서, 같은 요구를 다시 적은 후소가 새로운 심판을 이중으로 청구하는 결과를 낳지 않도록 하는 것이 이 금지의 역할이다. 여기서 첫 소의 지연이나 설계 오류가 있더라도 선행 소의 계속이라는 조건 자체가 사라지지 않는 한 금지의 방향은 그대로 유지된다. 소의 동일성 판단이 사건명에 의존하지 않는다는 앞 절의 경계는 이 금지가 무엇을 기준으로 삼는지를 이해하는 데 필요한 구별이지, 계속 중인 사건에 대한 중복 제소는 금지된다는 결론을 흔드는 요건을 추가하는 것이 아니다.
가장 강한 반론은 첫 소송의 지연이나 오류를 직접 고칠 수 없을 때 우회로가 필요할 수 있다는 점, 그리고 중복을 엄격히 막으면 첫 소의 설계 오류가 회복 불가능해진다는 점을 겨냥한다. 이 반론이 말하는 손실은 첫 소가 잘못 짜인 채 남아 요구가 제때 정리되지 못하는 불편이다. 그러나 사건명만으로 소송의 동일성을 확정할 수는 없다는 답 아래에서 선행 소와 후소의 대상이 무엇인지가 확인되지 않은 채 사건명이 같다는 이유만으로 중복을 단정할 수는 없다. 반대로 후소 청구취지와 선행 소장이 같은 요구를 가리키는 것으로 확인되는 범위에서 선행 소가 계속 중인 사건에 해당한다면, 첫 소의 불편이 남는다 해도 다시 제기하는 통로가 열리는 것은 아니다.
원고 A가 피고 B를 상대로 진행 중인 소와 같은 요구를 다른 소장에 다시 적었다는 장면 안에서 확인되는 사실은 선행 소가 계속 중이고 후소의 요구가 그와 같은 것으로 적혔다는 것뿐이다. 이 사실은 선행 소장과 후소 청구취지의 대조를 전제로 계속 중인 사건에 대한 중복 제소라는 앞의 조건에 대응한다. 다만 장면은 취하서의 유무나 시점, 선행 소의 종국판결 여부를 정하지 않았고, 실제 기록의 수집도 주장되지 않았다. 그러므로 선행 소의 취하 시점 또는 후소의 대상이 확인되지 않은 경우 그 부분은 미확정으로 남는다. 취하가 본안 종국판결 전인지 뒤인지 바뀌면 같은 소의 재소 제한을 다시 판정한다.
따라서 선행 소가 계속 중인 사건이고 후소에서 그와 같은 요구를 다시 적은 것으로 확인되는 한 같은 소의 다시 제기는 허용되지 않는다. 사건명의 일치만으로 소송의 동일성을 단정하거나, 후소 대상이 무엇인지 확인되지 않은 채 금지를 확정하거나, 미확정인 취하 시점을 임의로 채워 넣는 결론까지 이 절에서 끌어낼 수는 없다.
1.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
The question remaining in this scene is simple in itself. Can the same action as one already in progress be filed again? The preceding section already received the conclusion that a duplicate filing of an action against a case already pending is prohibited, and this section examines how that conclusion meshes with the premises established earlier. The point that follows immediately is that the amenability of an action to being conducted and the substance of the right that is its object are different questions.
Article 259 of the Civil Procedure Act declares, “With respect to a case that is pending before a court, the parties may not file an action again.” In this language, the subject is the parties, the act is filing an action again, and the condition is that the case is pending before the court. Accordingly, what this Article prohibits is the act of a party, while the case is placed before the court for adjudication, of filing the same object again as an action; and no basis for reading any further expansion into this language falls within the scope of this section.
The way the prohibition indicated by this language and the premise received from the preceding section meet is as follows. Even where the right to conduct the litigation by subrogation is recognized and the action can be conducted, that does not confirm the substantive existence of the right that is the object of the subrogation. These two are separate determinations. If the question of the right to conduct and the question of the object right are jumbled into one, confusion arises whereby, at the very place of examining whether conduct is possible, the existence of the right is declared as well. By the same principle, the prohibition on duplicate filing of an action against a case already pending is likewise a restriction attaching to the procedural state of lis pendens, and not a determination that fixes the existence or nonexistence of the object right. On this premise, duplicate filing is prohibited.
That said, the rule against duplication is not one that can be accepted without any inconvenience. The strongest counterargument is that a detour may be needed around delay or error in the first lawsuit. Where the design of the first action was faulty or adjudication is slow, a party comes to want relief even by means of a new complaint. In that case, a strict prohibition on duplication may bring about the result that the design error of the first action becomes irreparable. This counterargument, however, is met with the answer that the identity of a lawsuit cannot be determined from the case name alone. If two actions are judged to be the same on the mere surface of the same case name, separate demands may in fact be bundled into one, or different demands may be mistaken as duplicates.
There is only one fact relating to the synthetic scene contrasted in this section: that Plaintiff A again set out, in a different complaint, the same demand as that in the lawsuit in progress against Defendant B, together with the state in which that earlier action is pending. If lis pendens is the state in which a case is placed before the court for adjudication, then while that state is maintained, a later action in which the same demand is again set out cannot be filed, in accordance with the premise received earlier. On this scene alone, however, the time of the withdrawal of the earlier action and the concrete scope of the object of the later action remain unconfirmed. In the records, the earlier complaint, the notice of withdrawal, the final judgment, and the statement of claim of the later action are merely designated as materials to be examined; their contents have not been fixed.
The conclusion permitted in this section is narrow. The determination that the action can be conducted and the substantive existence of the right that is the object of the subrogation are separate determinations, and on that premise a duplicate filing of an action against a case already pending is prohibited. This conclusion neither substitutes for determining the question of the agent's authority or the substance of the object right, nor does it treat the identity of the two actions as established merely because the case names are the same. While the actual state of the earlier action and the object of the later action remain unconfirmed, whether there is duplication cannot be determined. How does the language of Article 259 of the Civil Procedure Act support this conclusion?
1.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
Plaintiff A again set out, in a different complaint, the same demand as that in the lawsuit in progress against Defendant B, and what is now asked in this scene is whether the same action can be filed again. The circumstance that the former determination is already complete does not mean that the latter determination is also concluded, and the request to open a path for filing the later action again likewise starts from this distinction between the two. Whether the action in progress constitutes an obstacle to duplicate filing must be examined separately, irrespective of the preceding discussion of the establishment of the right.
The source text corresponding to this question is Article 259 of the Civil Procedure Act, whose language draws the line: “With respect to a case that is pending before a court, the parties may not file an action again.” The subject indicated by this language is the parties, the act is filing an action again, and the condition is that the case is pending before the court. The above source text, under the heading of the prohibition of duplicate filing of an action, touches on only these three elements; circumstances such as the reason the case was placed before the court for adjudication or the pace of progress of the earlier lawsuit are not dealt with within the language of this Article.
Under this language, the basis for adjudicating the path for filing the later action again is narrowed to the language within the scope of the source text. Once the determination that a duplicate filing of an action against a case already pending is prohibited stands, no basis for expanding that determination is sought further here. The reasons for the judgment and the content of objections not dealt with in this section are not used as the basis for adjudicating this path. The stage of confirming the requirements set by the language of the Article and the stage of drawing in circumstances outside that language so as to broaden the determination must be distinguished. Only the former decides whether the path for filing the later action again is open or closed; if the latter is mixed in, an exception not drawn by the language comes into being.
The counterargument starts from the point that a detour may be needed around delay or error in the first lawsuit. The worry is that even where the design of the first action was faulty or progress is slow, if duplicate filing is blocked with strictness alone, that error becomes irreparable. Time lost through delay and the narrowed scope of relief caused by an erroneous claim are substantive losses, and an application of the provision that turns a blind eye to such inconvenience appears cold. Even so, this request for a detour stands before the question that the identity of a lawsuit cannot be determined from the case name alone. The single circumstance that the names of the cases are similar cannot establish that the same action has been repeated, and without that determination, taking the defect of the first action as a ground for incorporating it into the later action likewise goes beyond the scope of the earlier answer.
In the scene where Plaintiff A again set out, in a different complaint, the same demand as that in the lawsuit in progress against Defendant B, what can be confirmed is only the complaint. Whether that demand is the same as the demand in the earlier case, and whether the earlier case is pending before the court, must be seen by placing the earlier complaint and the statement of claim of the later action side by side. If a notice of withdrawal or a final judgment is confirmed, and it is ascertained whether the withdrawal came before or after the final judgment on the merits, the determination on the restriction against refiling of the same action changes. The scene, however, does not disclose that point in time or the actual contents of the relevant records. Whether the object of the later action falls under the restriction against refiling, and whether the earlier action is pending, are not determined by this scene alone.
The conclusion permitted in this section is narrow. If the elements of the parties, filing again, and pending, required by the language of the source text, all hold, the path for filing the later action again closes, and only the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of those elements becomes the criterion of adjudication. What this section does not permit is reopening that path by circumstances outside the language; nor is substituting identity at the level of case names for identity of the case, on the mere inconvenience of delay or error in the first action, any different. If the designation of the complaint and actual identity diverge, that determination must be made through separate materials.
1.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
In the question of the preceding section—whether the same action as one already in progress can be filed again—the objective extended no further than singling out the later action in which the same demand was again set out. The question now is which parts within that path must be separately divided out for adjudication. In this scene, the court must first confirm whether the objects of the two actions are the same, and whether the earlier case is still pending before the court. This confirmation is the first step in opening the path for filing the later action again, and the right to conduct the litigation by subrogation and the substantive existence of the right that is the object of the subrogation are separate determinations.
The language corresponding to this question is found in Article 259 of the Civil Procedure Act. This Article provides: “With respect to a case that is pending before a court, the parties may not file an action again.” Here, being pending before the court means the state in which a case is placed before the court for adjudication, that is, lis pendens, and the act of a party to a case in that state filing an action again is the object of prohibition. Accordingly, what this language points to is not the name or appearance of a particular case, but the case in which a party to a case placed before the court for adjudication files again. Examining whether the statement of claim of the later action is the same as the demand of the earlier action is a preliminary determination for fixing the application of this language. What the Article deals with is the prohibition of duplicate filing of an action against a case already pending, and no other issues are explained here.
Connecting this language with the conclusion of this section makes it clear that the detailed distinctions within the step are limited to the operating case, the blocked case, and the undetermined case. The operating case is where the earlier action is in a state of pendency, withdrawal, or final judgment and the object of the later action does not fall under the relevant restriction against refiling; the blocked case is where, while the same case is pending, one files again, or files again the same action that was withdrawn after the final judgment on the merits. The undetermined case is where the time of withdrawal of the earlier action or the object of the later action is not confirmed. These three point to different states respectively, and a determination on one cannot be applied directly to another. Here lies the reason that the determination asking about the pendency of the earlier action and the determination asking whether the object of the later action is the same are distinguished. This distinction is no more than a detailed division within the step; it adds no new step and produces no result outside the conditions stated.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the need for a detour around delay or error in the first lawsuit. Strictly blocking duplicate filing brings loss and inconvenience in that, when the design of the first action is wrong or delay becomes long, the means of remedy disappears. The value pointed out by this counterargument is the way to correct the error of the first action, and its unfavorable aspect is left unerased. Yet the answer is that the identity of a lawsuit cannot be determined from the case name alone. If the identity of the two actions is settled by looking only at the case names, conditions are omitted, such as whether the case is placed before the court for adjudication, whether the demands are the same, and when the withdrawal occurred. Thus, while accepting the request that a detour is needed, the determination of identity cannot be entrusted to the case names.
In the synthetic scene, the fact belonging to this question is only one: that Plaintiff A again set out, in a different complaint, the same demand as that in the lawsuit in progress against Defendant B. Contrasted with the foregoing conditions, the pivots of adjudication become whether the object of the later action is the same as the demand of the earlier action, whether the earlier case is pending, and, if there was a withdrawal, whether its point in time was before or after the final judgment on the merits. The scene, however, sets no year, amount, accrual date, or judgment result, and contains no facts, service, or performance results of an actual case. Accordingly, items that cannot be determined from the synthetic scene are left undetermined.
The conclusion permitted in this section is that a duplicate filing of an action against a case already pending is prohibited, and that the adjudication within the path for filing the later action again is bound to the operating case, the blocked case, and the undetermined case. A conclusion that determines the identity of the lawsuit from the case name alone is not permitted, nor is an additional step that produces results outside the conditions stated. When the time of withdrawal or the object of the later action is not confirmed, neither prohibition nor exemption is determined, and the matter is left undetermined. A state of insufficient materials is not immediately converted into an inability to obtain relief.
1.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
Whether the same action as one already in progress can be filed again must be examined, and further, it must be divided and considered in which cases the path opens, in which cases it is blocked, and in which cases judgment must be reserved. Separate from the question of the right to conduct the litigation that the foregoing analysis dealt with, what remains here is to fix the point in time and the conditions for judging the path of refiling.
The current Civil Procedure Act provides: “With respect to a case that is pending before a court, the parties may not file an action again” (Article 259 of the Civil Procedure Act). This language first takes as its premise the state of “a case that is pending before a court.” Pendency means the state in which a case is placed before the court for adjudication; accordingly, while the action remains pending before the court and continues to be an object of adjudication, the requirements of the prohibition prescribed by this Article are met. The object of the prohibition is the act of a party to that case filing an action again, and this is a different axis of determination from the presence or absence of the right to conduct the litigation carried over earlier.
The prohibition prescribed by this language operates correctly only when two steps are distinguished. The first is the determination whether that case is currently pending; the second is the determination whether the newly filed action is the same as that pending case. Duplicate filing of an action against a case already pending is prohibited, but where the object of the later action does not correspond to the same case, or where the pendency of the earlier action has already ended, the same prohibition does not attach. Whether the path opens or closes diverges according to whether the earlier action is pending, whether its pendency ended by withdrawal, or whether a final judgment on the merits was pronounced; and where the object of the later action does not fall under the relevant restriction against refiling, the road to filing again is open.
It may be argued that if matters are blocked this strictly, the detour for correcting delay or design error in the first lawsuit disappears and recovery becomes impossible. In actual lawsuits, the damage caused by delay or error is concrete, and it is hard to justify blocking mere formal duplication while turning a blind eye to that inconvenience. Yet in order to answer this counterargument, the identity of a lawsuit cannot be determined from the case name alone. Only when the parties to the two actions, the statements of claim, and what the causes of action refer to are compared together is it settled whether they are the same case; and one can neither determine duplication by name alone while omitting this judgment, nor conversely leave the path open merely because the names differ. The losses from delay and error pointed out by the counterargument are acknowledged, but the answer is not given in a way that weakens the criteria for determining identity.
The facts confirmed here are only that the earlier action is pending and that the demand of the later action is the same. Whether the case falls under that of filing again while the same case is pending can be judged only after comparing whether the earlier complaint and the statement of claim of the later action point to the same object. By contrast, the presence or absence of a notice of withdrawal and a final judgment, and the records concerning when the withdrawal of the earlier action occurred, do not appear in the scene; accordingly, judgment is reserved.
Accordingly, the conclusion on this issue divides into three cases. Where the state of pendency, withdrawal, or final judgment of the earlier action and the object of the later action do not fall under the relevant restriction against refiling, the path for filing again is open; where one files again while the same case is pending, or files again the same action that was withdrawn after the final judgment on the merits, that path is blocked. Where the time of withdrawal of the earlier action or the object of the later action is not confirmed, the matter is left undetermined. Since lis pendens means the state in which a case is placed before the court for adjudication, how long that state continued decides whether the path opens or closes.
1.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
대한민국 민사소송절차에서 같은 요구를 다투는 소가 여러 법원에 오면 같은 구제를 이중으로 받는 문제가 생긴다. 이 장면에서 먼저 물을 것은 새로 낸 소가 허용되는지이다.
이 문언은 그 주체를 당사자로, 금지되는 행위를 다시 하는 소의 제기로, 그 전제를 법원에 계속되어 있는 사건으로 잡는다. 조문은 이 셋이 겹치는 한에서 중복 제소를 막는다.
이 문언과 계속 중인 사건에 대한 중복 제소는 금지된다는 결론은 같은 방향을 가리킨다. 금지되는 것은 소를 제기하는 행위이며, 사건이 심판에 놓여 있는 동안의 재기이다. 따라서 소가 취하되면 무엇이 남고 무엇이 없어지는지는 이 금지의 시간적 경계와 분리하여 판단한다. 소를 취하하면 무엇이 없어지는지는 별도의 물음이다.
첫 소송의 지연이나 오류에 대한 우회로가 필요할 수 있다. 그렇다면 중복 금지를 엄격히 막으면 첫 소의 설계 오류가 회복 불가능해진다. 재소의 동일성은 사건 표지만으로 정해지지 않으며, 소장에 적힌 당사자와 청구의 대상이 겹치는지를 보아야 한다. 후소의 대상이 걸리는지 여부는 확인 전에 단정할 수 없다.
이 절에서 정한 판정 기준은 선행 소의 계속·취하·종국판결 상태와 후소 대상이 해당 재소 제한에 걸리지 않는지이다. 장면만으로는 선행 소장·취하서·종국판결·후소 청구취지 가운데 무엇이 확인되었는지 정해져 있지 않다. 선행 소의 취하 시점 또는 후소의 대상이 확인되지 않은 경우 판단을 미확정으로 남긴다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 계속 중인 사건에 대한 중복 제소 금지의 확인과, 사건명만으로는 소송의 동일성을 확정할 수 없다는 한정이다. 허용하지 않는 것은 사유가 있어도 같은 요구의 재소가 자동으로 가능하다는 결론이다. 소를 취하하면 무엇이 없어지는가?