Summary
The mere fact that the prohibition on duplication has been avoided does not give rise to an interest in declaratory relief.
5.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
Duplicate litigation, the bar against refiling, and res judicata correspond to different states of the prior action. What remains where that distinction ends is what is not guaranteed merely by the form of a new claim. The form of a new claim does not guarantee the capacity to dispel the present unease. Plaintiff A again wrote the same demand as the pending lawsuit against Defendant B in a different complaint. In this scenario, the question posed is whether the need for confirmation must exist even where the object of the new action differs—that is, what the standard is for opening this channel of relief.
The precedent begins with the wording of the action for confirmation as follows. "[1] An action for confirmation requires an interest in confirmation as a requirement for the protection of rights, and an interest in confirmation is recognized when obtaining a declaratory judgment is the most effective and appropriate means of removing the existing unease or risk in the plaintiff's right or legal status." (Supreme Court Decision 2016Da275679 decided March 15, 2018). Here the interest in confirmation is a requirement for the protection of rights, and its determination is tied to whether the means of a declaratory judgment is the most effective and appropriate for removing the existing unease or risk. The wording sets the subject as the plaintiff, the object as the plaintiff's right or legal status, and the condition as the removal of existing unease or risk.
The reason the judgment step indicated by this wording must not be mixed with the restrictions on refiling according to the state of the prior action is that the two answer different questions. In the foregoing distinction, duplicate litigation, the bar against refiling, and res judicata corresponded to whichever state the prior action was in—pending, withdrawn, or after a final judgment. Only where those restrictions do not apply can the form of a new action come into question, and only then does the entrance to this relief open. The mere fact that the prohibition on duplication has been avoided does not generate an interest in confirmation. Passing the restriction on refiling and the establishment of an interest in confirmation remain separate thresholds.
The strongest counterargument comes from counting the number of those thresholds. If requirements for judicial protection are piled up repeatedly, reaching the merits becomes difficult. It is said that if a plaintiff who framed the claim incorrectly when filing the first action is barred, condition by condition, even from rewriting the same demand, there remains no way of recovery. The loss the counterargument targets is clear: that an error in the design of the lawsuit hardens into a result whereby the party can never receive a judgment on the merits. Even so, the absence of duplication cannot be substituted for the interest in confirmation. The requirement, demanded of an action for confirmation, of the removal of existing unease or risk is not satisfied by the single fact that no restriction on refiling applied.
What is recorded in the synthetic scenario is only the fact that the demand was the same as the pending lawsuit and was written again in a different complaint. Accordingly, whether the prior action is pending, whether the point of withdrawal came before or after the final judgment on the merits, and whether the object of the subsequent action falls under the same lawsuit are not determined by this scenario alone. If it is confirmed whether the withdrawal came before or after the final judgment on the merits, the determination as to the restriction on refiling of the same lawsuit changes. What is confirmed is only the narrow distinction that the very fact of having avoided duplication does not produce an interest in confirmation.
The conclusion this section permits is that the two steps are decided separately; what it does not permit is converting the passing of the earlier step into the establishment of the later step. The interest in immediate finality here means the need to remove the present legal unease by a declaratory judgment, and only if this need stands does the channel of the new action open. The fact that the demand has been specified and can be defended does not yet prove the removal of the unease.
5.2The Conditions That Block Relief
The conclusion that non-duplication must not be substituted for the interest in confirmation shows that the fact of having avoided duplicate litigation and the interest in confirmation must be treated as separate requirements. If even one of the statutory requirements is not met, the condition for closing the channel of relief is bound up not with the form of a new claim but with whether requirements for judicial protection such as the interest in confirmation are satisfied.
The point that an interest in confirmation is required even where the object differs is stated by the wording of Supreme Court Decision 2016Da275679 decided March 15, 2018. Summary of Decision [1] states that "an action for confirmation requires an interest in confirmation as a standing requirement, and an interest in confirmation is recognized when obtaining a declaratory judgment is the most effective and appropriate means of removing the existing unease or risk in the plaintiff's right or legal status." This wording treats the interest in confirmation as a requirement for judicial protection and sets its constitutive requirement as the declaratory judgment being the most effective and appropriate means of removing existing unease or risk.
What links this wording to the conclusion of this section is that the interest in confirmation is required irrespective of the object of the lawsuit. Duplicate litigation and the bar against refiling respectively correspond to different states according to whether the prior action is pending, has been withdrawn, or has a final judgment on the merits, but the interest in confirmation remains a requirement for judicial protection of the declaratory action in any of those states. The interest in immediate finality means the need to remove the present legal unease by a declaratory judgment, and this is a determination separate from the fact that the prohibition on duplication has been avoided. Therefore, even if the object of the new action differs, if there is no interest in confirmation the channel of relief does not open.
The disadvantage targeted by the counterargument that, if requirements for judicial protection are piled up repeatedly, reaching the merits becomes difficult and an error in the design of the first action becomes irreparable, is the loss of the plaintiff's opportunity to realize rights. The interest in confirmation is a separate requirement that asks whether a declaratory judgment is the most effective and appropriate means of removing the existing unease or risk in the plaintiff's right or legal status, and the mere circumstance that there is no duplication does not satisfy that requirement. The difficulty of recovery pointed out by the counterargument does not change this conclusion.
What can be confirmed here is only the situation of duplication appearing in the earlier complaint and the prayer for relief of the subsequent action, and the existing unease or risk needed for the interest in confirmation and the appropriateness of the declaratory judgment as the means of removing it are not determined by this scenario alone. Accordingly, whether the interest in confirmation is established remains undetermined. Yet it is clear that the mere fact of having avoided the prohibition on duplication does not generate an interest in confirmation.
What this section permits is the conclusion, distinguishing non-duplication from the interest in confirmation, that an interest in confirmation is required even where the object of the new action differs. What is not permitted is substituting non-duplication for the interest in confirmation; a determination that the channel of relief opens by such substitution is not established.
5.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Then, must the need for confirmation exist even where the object of the new action differs? And where is the boundary that cannot be determined for want of materials? The interest in immediate finality means the need to remove the present legal unease by a declaratory judgment. These two questions, when posed together, require different judgment steps.
On this issue the Supreme Court set out the requirements of an action for confirmation as follows. Here the subject is the plaintiff seeking confirmation, and the condition is when the existing unease can be removed most effectively and appropriately by the method of a declaratory judgment.
According to this wording, the fact that the object of the new action has changed and the judgment that an interest in confirmation exists are placed at different stages. Even if the form of a new claim has avoided the obstacle of duplicate litigation, whether that claim is an effective and appropriate means of removing the present legal unease must be confirmed separately. Thus this section examines two things. One is whether the need for confirmation exists even where the object of the new action has changed; the other is where the boundary lies that cannot be determined for want of materials.
The strongest counterargument is that if requirements for judicial protection are piled up repeatedly, reaching the merits becomes difficult. That counterargument points to the loss that, if duplication is strictly barred, an error in the design of the first action becomes irreparable. It is said that if a plaintiff, in designing the claim, states the object incorrectly or misses the timing, even a refiled action is stopped before formal requirements and cannot reach the substance of the dispute. But even if that disadvantage is confirmed, non-duplication cannot be substituted for the interest in confirmation. The interest in confirmation does not arise from the absence of duplication; it derives from its character as an effective and appropriate means of removing existing unease.
What can be confirmed in this scenario is only the fact that Plaintiff A again wrote the same demand as the pending lawsuit in a different complaint. The determination requires the prior complaint, the written withdrawal, the final judgment, and the prayer for relief of the subsequent action. Accordingly, the point in time of the withdrawal of the prior action and the object of the subsequent action are not confirmed. Here, matters on which the materials for decision are not specified are left undetermined, distinguished from impossibility. What remains is the question whether the channel for filing the subsequent action again is open, and the answer depends on whether the prior action is pending, withdrawn, or finally judged, and whether the object of the subsequent action does not fall within the corresponding restriction on refiling.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Even where the object of the new action differs, the interest in confirmation is separately required, and the fact of having avoided the prohibition on duplication alone does not generate that interest. Yet matters that cannot be determined for want of materials cannot be concluded as impossibility.
5.4The Records Needed for Determination
Proceeding from the premise that duplicate litigation, the bar against refiling, and res judicata correspond to different states of the prior action, the analysis reaches the question whether the need for confirmation must exist even where the object of the new action differs. In the scenario where Plaintiff A again wrote the same demand as the pending lawsuit against Defendant B in a different complaint, what remains is what must be confirmed if the plaintiff's present unease persists even though the new complaint passes the requirements for judicial protection. Since a mere formal separation does not change the state of the rights, this question asks not about the outward appearance of the new claim but whether a declaratory judgment can remove the present unease.
The wording of the precedent corresponding to this question defines it as follows: “An action for confirmation requires an interest in confirmation as a requirement for judicial protection, and an interest in confirmation is recognized when obtaining a declaratory judgment is the most effective and appropriate means of removing the existing unease or risk in the plaintiff's right or legal status” (Supreme Court Decision 2016Da275679 decided March 15, 2018). Here the interest in confirmation is a requirement for judicial protection, and its standard lies in whether a declaratory judgment is the most effective and appropriate means of removing the existing unease or risk in the plaintiff's right or legal status. The subject the wording requires is the plaintiff, the object is the plaintiff's right or legal status, and the time point is existing unease or risk. This wording answers a question separate from whether the new claim satisfies the requirements for admissibility.
Linking this wording with the stage of the need for confirmation, one must regard the interest in confirmation as not arising merely from the circumstance that the object of the new action has changed. Put differently, non-duplication is a question of whether the lawsuit can be filed again, and the interest in confirmation is a question of whether a declaratory judgment can remove the present unease; the two are not the same judgment stage. If the former is a question of opening the door in front of the restriction on refiling, the latter asks, after passing through the door, whether the judgment the plaintiff will receive can actually remove the unease. If these two are merged, a requirement that does not exist is created or an existing requirement is erased; therefore, the stage determination is made only on the materials recorded in the prior complaint, the written withdrawal, the final judgment, and the prayer for relief of the subsequent action.
The counterargument with which this standard collides most strongly is that, if requirements for judicial protection are piled up repeatedly, reaching the merits becomes difficult. If duplication is strictly barred, an error in the design of the first action becomes irreparable. That is, if a plaintiff who misstated the designation of the claim cannot pass, in turn, the two thresholds of the restriction on refiling and the interest in confirmation, the loss arises that the opportunity to contest the right on the merits is lost and substantive resolution is put further away. However, this counterargument is not resolved by widening the place of the interest in confirmation. The difficulty of access to the merits pointed out by the counterargument does not disappear, but since, on the ground of that disadvantage, the judicial-protection requirement of the interest in confirmation cannot be replaced by the question of duplication, the two requirements each keep their place.
In this scenario, only the fact is confirmed that Plaintiff A again wrote the same demand as the pending lawsuit against Defendant B in a different complaint. Contrasting this circumstance with the foregoing conditions, whether the subsequent action is for the same demand or a different object, whether the prior action is pending or has been withdrawn, and, if there was a withdrawal, when it occurred, remain unconfirmed in the records. Accordingly, while the object of the subsequent action or the point of withdrawal of the prior action is not confirmed in the records, the stage determination remains undetermined, and missing records are not filled in by conjecture.
What this section permits is the judgment that, even where the object of the new action differs, the judicial-protection requirement of an interest in confirmation is required, and the judgment that the materials needed for that determination are limited to the specified records. What it does not permit is a conclusion that an interest in confirmation arises merely from the fact of having avoided the prohibition on duplication, or a conclusion that fixes the stage by guessing facts not in the records. The interest in immediate determination means the need to remove the present legal unease by a declaratory judgment, and this definition operates only within the scope of determination on the records. Whether the channel for filing the subsequent action again is open depends on the state of the prior action as pending, withdrawn, or finally judged and on the object of the subsequent action not falling within the corresponding restriction on refiling; and if the materials are wanting, it remains undetermined.
5.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
The place left by that single sentence is that duplicate filing, the bar on refiling, and res judicata correspond to different states of the preceding action. With this judgment as the background, the question of whether there must be a need for confirmation even when the subject matter of the new action differs is now set apart and examined together with the question of what change overturns the existing stage-based determination. In the scene, plaintiff A has written the same demand, in a lawsuit already pending against defendant B, again in a different complaint. Whether this formal separation immediately produces a need for confirmation has not been settled.
The relevant source text for this question addresses the requirements for judicial protection of a declaratory action. Summary of Decision [1] of Supreme Court Decision 2016Da275679 decided March 15, 2018 drew the line as follows: "A declaratory action requires an interest in confirmation as a requirement for judicial protection, and the interest in confirmation is recognized when obtaining a declaratory judgment is the most effective and appropriate means of removing the anxiety or risk presently existing in the plaintiff's right or legal status." What this language prescribes is that the subject is the plaintiff seeking confirmation, the act is claiming a declaratory judgment, and the condition is that the judgment must be the most effective and appropriate means of removing the presently existing anxiety or risk. Here, the interest in immediate determination means the need to remove the current legal anxiety by a declaratory judgment.
This basis and the conclusion reached earlier meet on the side that requires the interest in confirmation. While the interest in confirmation is required as a requirement for judicial protection in a declaratory action, whether the later action falls within the restrictions of duplicate filing or the bar on refiling is a stage-based determination that varies according to the state of the pendency, withdrawal, or final judgment of the action. Since these two answer different questions, the fact that the former determination has been passed must not be taken to mean that the latter requirement is also satisfied. From here follows the distinction that the mere fact of having avoided the bar on duplication does not create an interest in confirmation. The fact that the same action is not subject to the restriction on refiling does not thereby secure the interest in confirmation as well.
The strongest counterargument arises from the concern that the procedure is excessively steep. If each admissibility requirement must be passed through again one by one, the plaintiff is filtered out at the threshold before reaching the point of contesting the substance of the merits, and if there was an error in the design of the first action, the opportunity to correct that error is barred from the source and an irreparable state results. This loss lies not in nominal procedural order but in the time and cost borne by the parties and the delay in resolution of the dispute. Even so, the fact of non-duplication cannot be substituted for the interest in confirmation. While the disadvantage pointed out by the counterargument is acknowledged, it cannot be resolved by relaxing the standard, which the interest in confirmation requires, that the judgment be the most effective and appropriate means of removing the presently existing anxiety or risk.
Returning to the synthetic scene, what is confirmed goes no further than the fact that plaintiff A wrote the same demand, in a lawsuit pending against defendant B, again in a different complaint. This fact alone does not determine how the pendency state of the preceding action meshes with the subject matter of the later action, nor what the presently existing anxiety required for the interest in confirmation is. The records necessary for the determination are merely designated as the preceding complaint, the withdrawal instrument, the final judgment, and the claim statement of the later action, and it has not been settled whether there was a withdrawal, and if so, whether before or after the final judgment on the merits, or how far the subject matter of the later action extends. Accordingly, what can be settled at the present stage is only the conditional distinction, and any judgment beyond that remains undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. Even if the subject matter of the new action appears to differ, the interest in confirmation is separately required, and the interest does not arise merely from the fact of having escaped the restrictions of the bar on duplication; and if whether the withdrawal came before or after the final judgment on the merits changes, the restriction on refiling of the same action must be determined anew. This much is confirmed within this material. If the designated change reflected here is confirmed, the existing blocking and effectuation judgments must be discarded and the determination redone from the stage onward. Meanwhile, this judgment must not be taken to fix the scope of the subject matter of the new action or the parts that may be newly contested, and an interpretation in the direction of substituting the fact of non-duplication for the interest in confirmation does not accord with this conclusion. The next question turns to the scope of the subject matter of the action.
5.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
Does the circumstance that the claims do not formally overlap determine whether the legal anxiety concerning the demand handled by that complaint can be removed? Here what opens is not a question of the freedom to bring a new action but a question of the requirements for judicial protection that action may be subject to.
Supreme Court Decision 2016Da275679 decided March 15, 2018 prescribes in Summary of Decision [1] the language corresponding to this question as follows: "A declaratory action requires an interest in confirmation as a requirement for judicial protection, and the interest in confirmation is recognized when obtaining a declaratory judgment is the most effective and appropriate means of removing the anxiety or risk presently existing in the plaintiff's right or legal status." What this language first prescribes is that the subject is the plaintiff who filed the declaratory action, and that plaintiff's act is claiming a declaratory judgment. The condition required by the language is that the anxiety or risk presently existing in the plaintiff's right or legal status be removed by a declaratory judgment in a manner that is the most effective and appropriate means. The scope handled here is limited to the language of this requirement for judicial protection.
This language and the conclusion of the foregoing section are bound together into one strand of judgment. The reason for dividing the two judgments is that falling outside duplicate filing points to the fact that the form of the new action does not overlap with the preceding action, whereas the interest in confirmation asks whether that declaratory judgment can remove the anxiety now suffered. The circumstance that one side is open does not satisfy the condition of the other. The interest in immediate determination, in other words the need to remove the current legal anxiety by a declaratory judgment, remains separately.
The counterargument clearly points out what is lost if this distinction is drawn narrowly. If, even when the action is amended and refiled, the requirements of the preceding stage are again placed in the way and the interest in confirmation must also be examined anew, the design error of the first action becomes irreparable. That means that whoever wrongly framed the claim at the outset is turned back only at the threshold of the procedure, without receiving a judgment on the merits, no matter in what form the amendment is filed. The author does not deny this loss. The value of the recoverability of a design error is not preserved by forcing a declaratory judgment when that means of recovery cannot remove the present anxiety.
There is one fact that can be confirmed in the synthetic scene. The circumstance that the pending action continues is a condition used to determine whether the later action, which again writes the same demand, constitutes duplicate filing. However, this scene does not tell whether the claim statement of the later action is the most effective and appropriate means of removing the presently existing anxiety. It cannot be asserted from this scene alone that a change in this condition also alters the interest in confirmation.
Thus what is permitted is narrow. The conclusion holds that even if the subject matter of the new action differs, there must be a need for confirmation, and the fact of not falling within the bar on duplication does not itself create the interest in confirmation. Contrary to this, a determination that treats the interest in confirmation as satisfied merely on the ground of non-duplication is not accepted. Whether there is an interest in confirmation is decided by weighing the anxiety remaining in the plaintiff's right or legal status against the aptness of the declaratory judgment.
5.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
In this scene, what is at issue is whether the interest in confirmation attaches even when the subject matter of the new action appears to differ. The circumstance that the form differs speaks only to the shape of the action having been written anew, and does not speak as far as whether the anxiety remaining in the plaintiff's legal status should be calmed by a declaratory judgment. Whether the court must inquire into admissibility requirements also turns on this point.
The language of the requirements the court demands in a declaratory action is as follows: "A declaratory action requires an interest in confirmation as a requirement for judicial protection, and the interest in confirmation is recognized when obtaining a declaratory judgment is the most effective and appropriate means of removing the anxiety or risk presently existing in the plaintiff's right or legal status." (Supreme Court Decision 2016Da275679 decided March 15, 2018) Here the subject is the plaintiff who filed the declaratory action, the act is claiming a declaratory judgment, and the condition is the case where that judgment is the most effective and appropriate means of removing the presently existing anxiety.
This language and the conclusion of this section meet upon one distinction. The fact that the action has been structured so as not to duplicate, and the judgment that there is a need to remove the present anxiety by that action, ask about different stages. The former belongs to the domain of restrictions on refiling, concerning whether the subject matters of the preceding and later actions are the same; the latter belongs to the domain of requirements for judicial protection, concerning whether the newly filed declaratory action is in fact a means of putting the plaintiff's right or legal status at ease. Herein lies the reason that the mere fact of having avoided the bar on duplication does not create an interest in confirmation. Since passing one stage cannot fill the other, the interest in confirmation is separately required even if the subject matter of the new action differs.
The strongest counterargument arises from this worry: if admissibility requirements are set up one after another, the plaintiff will find it hard to reach the merits, and if duplication is strictly barred and the interest in confirmation is required on top of that, an error made in designing the first action becomes irretrievable. The inconvenience pointed out by this counterargument is real. If a dismissal is suffered at a point where the stage of re-examination is hard to undo, the plaintiff loses the chance of relieving the current anxiety through a new action. That is because the circumstance of non-duplication does not by itself produce the separate need of anxiety removal as well.
In the synthetic scene, only the fact is confirmed that plaintiff A wrote the same demand, in a lawsuit pending against defendant B, again in a different complaint. Whether the subject matter of the new action differs from that of the preceding action, and if it does, whether that difference bears differently on the need to remove the anxiety remaining in the plaintiff's legal status by a declaratory judgment, cannot be judged from this scene alone. Since the interest in immediate finality means the need to remove the current legal anxiety by a declaratory judgment, what remains is the work of comparing the preceding complaint and the claim statement of the later action to confirm what subject matter and what anxiety each action targets. This item is left undetermined.
The conclusion of this section is narrow. The mere fact of having avoided the bar on duplication does not create an interest in confirmation, and that fact does not take the place of the judgment that it is the most effective and appropriate means of removing the presently existing anxiety. The form of the new claim does not itself prove the need for confirmation, and having passed one admissibility requirement does not lead to satisfaction of another requirement. In its place, only this much is confirmed at this point: it must be examined separately which action is a means of removing the plaintiff's present anxiety by a declaratory judgment.
5.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Must there be a need for confirmation even when the subject matter of the new action differs? The interest in immediate finality must be understood as one criterion constituting the interest in confirmation.
To answer this question, the relevant basis is the following language. Supreme Court Decision 2016Da275679 decided March 15, 2018 states that "a declaratory action requires an interest in confirmation as a requirement for judicial protection, and the interest in confirmation is recognized when obtaining a declaratory judgment is the most effective and appropriate means of removing the anxiety or risk presently existing in the plaintiff's right or legal status." The subject spoken of here is the plaintiff who filed the declaratory action, the act is the claim seeking a declaratory judgment, and the condition is the case where the declaratory judgment is the most effective and appropriate means of removing the presently existing anxiety or risk. The court records this condition as a requirement for judicial protection.
This language leads to the conclusion that even if the subject matter of the new action differs, there must be a need for confirmation. The interest in confirmation and the avoidance of the bar on duplication are determinations at different stages. The bar on duplication is a device preventing the repeated filing of the same demand in the same state, while the interest in confirmation is a device asking whether the confirmation claimed can itself remove the present anxiety. Passing the former does not automatically satisfy the latter. The interest in immediate finality means the need to remove the current legal anxiety by a declaratory judgment, and this need remains as the substantive yardstick for judging the interest in confirmation.
Nor is it denied that a loss remains if duplication is strictly barred, namely that the design error of the first action becomes irreparable. If a plaintiff intending to design a new action is blocked at the filing itself, the channel for asserting rights narrows, and a burden arises of having to bundle together demands not covered by the action already in progress. The author's refusal of such a substitution is not because he disregards the inconvenience of a design error, but in order to preserve the point that the requirements opening up the channel of the declaratory action itself are separately demanded.
What is confirmed in the scene is only the fact that the demand was written again in a different complaint, and whether the subject matter of the newly filed action is the same as or different from that of the preceding action is not recorded. Accordingly, it cannot be settled whether the subject matter of the later action is identical and thus falls within the bar on duplication, or whether, the subject matter differing, the restriction is avoided while the interest in confirmation can nonetheless be obtained. Unless the subject matter of the later action and the state of the preceding action are confirmed, this section judges only conditionally.
Adding a new lawsuit to the same dispute does not guarantee satisfaction of the need for confirmation. Even if the subject matter of the new action differs, the interest in confirmation is required, that interest does not arise merely from the fact of having avoided the bar on duplication, and the interest in immediate finality means the need to remove the current legal anxiety by a declaratory judgment. Conversely, leaving unconfirmed conditions as undetermined has not fixed in what state the channel for filing the later action actually opens.
5.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
The problem is by what language the channel for filing the later action again is to be determined. Summary of Decision [1] of Supreme Court Decision 2016Da275679 decided March 15, 2018 prescribes as follows: "A declaratory action requires an interest in confirmation as a requirement for judicial protection, and the interest in confirmation is recognized when obtaining a declaratory judgment is the most effective and appropriate means of removing the anxiety or risk presently existing in the plaintiff's right or legal status." (Supreme Court Decision 2016Da275679 decided March 15, 2018) Here the subject is the plaintiff seeking confirmation, the act is filing a declaratory action, and the condition is that the declaratory judgment must be the most effective and appropriate means of removing the presently existing anxiety or risk. Only this language serves as the basis for determining the present question.
Connecting this language with the conclusion of this section reveals what the channel for filing the later action again requires. The fact of non-duplication and the interest in confirmation are two stages that must stand side by side. The former is the external form distinguishing whether it is the same action; the latter is the requirement for judicial protection asking whether there is a need to remove the present anxiety by a declaratory judgment. Even if the former is established, if the latter does not follow, the channel does not open. It is not extended to the reasons for the judgment or items not addressed.
The counterargument that difficulty arises in reaching the merits when admissibility requirements are set up repeatedly targets a loss. It amounts to erecting an insurmountable wall before a plaintiff who wrongly designed the first action, and the inconvenience remains that the dispute is ultimately closed at the procedural threshold without receiving a judgment on the merits. Since the question of duplication is a matter of procedural status and the interest in confirmation is a requirement for judicial protection, filling the latter with the former omits the condition set by that language. Since the difficulty pointed out by the counterargument does not disappear, the disadvantageous part is left as it is.
What is confirmed in the synthetic scene is only the one fact stated above. Contrasting it with the foregoing condition, it falls under the case where the same demand was refiled while the preceding action was still pending, and such a case is blocked at the channel for filing the later action again. However, since the scene does not fix the year, amount, accrual date, or outcome of the judgment, the timing of the withdrawal of the preceding action or the fixed scope of the claim statement of the later action remains undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. The mere fact of having avoided the bar on duplication does not create an interest in confirmation, and the interest in confirmation prescribed by the language of Summary of Decision [1] is recognized only when the declaratory judgment is the most effective and appropriate means of removing the presently existing anxiety or risk. The conclusion not permitted is also clear. The form of a new claim does not itself guarantee the capacity to remove the present anxiety, and an interpretation that substitutes the fact of non-duplication for the interest in confirmation in order to open the channel does not reach this language.
5.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
The question in this scene is whether the need for confirmation should persist even though the object of the new action differs. In an action for declaratory judgment, the language the court examines is as follows. The subject prescribed by this language is the plaintiff who filed the action for declaratory judgment, the act is claiming a declaratory judgment, and the condition is that such judgment serves as the most effective and appropriate means of eliminating the existing unease or risk.
Connecting that language to the conclusion of this section, the fact alone that the prohibition against duplication has been avoided does not give rise to an interest in confirmation. Here two determinations must be distinguished. One is the determination whether the later action falls within the restriction on re-filing, that is, whether the pathway is open; the other is the determination whether an interest in confirmation remains within the open pathway. That the pathway is open means that the action may be raised in legal procedure, and does not in itself mean that it has the capacity to eliminate the present unease.
The strongest counterargument is that if procedural requirements are imposed again and again, it becomes difficult to reach the merits. If duplication is strictly barred, the design error of the first action becomes irreparable, and the loss consisting in the plaintiff's losing the chance to litigate even on a different object is concrete. The author neither erases the difficulty of recovery pointed out by the counterargument nor alters the condition requiring an interest in confirmation, leaving it exactly where it stands.
The detailed distinctions within the step are limited to the operating case, the blocked case, and the undetermined case. The operating case is where the status of the prior action is pending, withdrawn, or final judgment, and the object of the later action does not fall within the relevant restriction on re-filing; the blocked case is where the same action is re-filed while the same case is pending, or where the same action, having been withdrawn after a final judgment on the merits, is filed again. The undetermined case is where the time of withdrawal of the prior action or the object of the later action is unconfirmed, and from the synthetic scene alone that item cannot be determined. The records to be confirmed are the prior complaint, the written withdrawal, the final judgment, and the prayer for relief of the later action.
All this section permits is the distinction within the stated conditions. The interest in immediate determination means the need to eliminate the present legal unease by a declaratory judgment, and this requirement does not disappear even though the object of the new action differs.
5.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
The interest in immediate determination, as set out in the preceding section, means the need to eliminate the present legal unease by a declaratory judgment, and the fact alone that the prohibition against duplication has been avoided does not give rise to an interest in confirmation. On this premise, plaintiff A again wrote in a different complaint the same demand as the action pending against defendant B. What this section undertakes is the distinction of when the pathway to file the later action again opens, when it is blocked, and when judgment must be deferred. The fact alone that the new complaint assumes a new form does not resolve the unease created by the existing action.
The relevant ground defines the language of the requirements for judicial protection demanded of an action for declaratory judgment as follows. "An action for declaratory judgment must have, as a requirement for judicial protection, an interest in confirmation, and the interest in confirmation is recognized when obtaining a declaratory judgment is the most effective and appropriate means of removing the existing unease or risk in the plaintiff's right or legal status." (Supreme Court Decision 2016Da275679 decided March 15, 2018) The subject indicated by this language is the plaintiff who brought the action for declaratory judgment, the act is the claim for a declaratory judgment that removes the existing unease or risk, and the condition is that the claim must be the most effective and appropriate means. This language does not go so far as to prescribe what the object of the new action may be, and fixes only the gateway of the need for confirmation.
This ground and the conclusion of this section are connected in two stages. At the first stage, the status of the prior action as pending, withdrawn, or final judgment is compared with the object of the later action to determine whether it falls within the relevant restriction on re-filing, and if it does not, the pathway to file the later action again operates. At the succeeding stage, it is blocked where the same action is re-filed while the same case is pending, or where the same action withdrawn after a final judgment on the merits is filed again. The reason the two stages must be distinguished is that the fact that the path to file an action is open and the determination that the action can actually eliminate the unease are different questions. Even where the prohibition against duplication has been avoided, the interest in confirmation is separately required.
The counterargument is aimed at the inconvenience this distinction creates. If procedural requirements are imposed again and again, the plaintiff has difficulty reaching the merits, and the loss is great that, if duplication is strictly barred, the design error of the first action becomes irreparable. Even if the plaintiff framed the first action badly, if the same claim cannot be raised again, the very door to contesting the right is closed. Even so, non-duplication cannot be substituted for an interest in confirmation. What an action for declaratory judgment requires is whether a declaratory judgment is the most effective and appropriate means of removing the existing unease or risk, and the circumstance that it is not a duplicate does not prove that need.
The facts that can be confirmed in the synthetic scene are only that plaintiff A again wrote in a different complaint the same demand as the action pending against defendant B. Since the same demand was again written in a case that is pending, this falls within the case of re-filing the same action while the same case is pending, and thus it falls within the relevant restriction on re-filing, so the later action is blocked. However, the scene does not state the time of withdrawal of the prior action or the scope of determination of the prayer for relief of the later action. Accordingly, the part where the time of withdrawal of the prior action is unconfirmed remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. It operates only where the status of the prior action as pending, withdrawn, or final judgment and the object of the later action do not fall within the relevant restriction on re-filing, and it is blocked where the same action is re-filed while the same case is pending, or where the same action withdrawn after a final judgment on the merits is filed again. Conversely, what this section does not permit is the conclusion that an interest in confirmation arises merely because there was no duplication. Where circumstances remain unconfirmed, they are left undetermined, and are not immediately converted into absence of relief.
5.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
The question of what must be handed over to the next section must be asked. Precedent defines the requirements of an action for declaratory judgment as follows. "An action for declaratory judgment must have, as a requirement for judicial protection, an interest in confirmation, and the interest in confirmation is recognized when obtaining a declaratory judgment is the most effective and appropriate means of removing the existing unease or risk in the plaintiff's right or legal status." (Supreme Court Decision 2016Da275679 decided March 15, 2018) Here the interest in confirmation is a requirement for judicial protection, the object is the plaintiff's right or legal status, and the condition is that it be the most effective and appropriate means of removing the existing unease or risk. In terms of its language, the interest in confirmation must be separately satisfied irrespective of the form of the claim.
Connecting that language with the conclusion of this section, the fact alone that the prohibition against duplication has been avoided does not give rise to an interest in confirmation. If the action may be filed again, the admissibility of the later action is restored, but the interest in confirmation remains as a separate stage of determination. The former is the freedom to file an action matched to the status of the prior action, and the latter is the need to eliminate the present unease. These two must not be overlaid and erected as the same requirement. Even if the pathway to file an action is open, without an interest in confirmation one cannot reach a determination on the merits. Even though the object of the new action differs, this determination must be passed through.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at precisely this inconvenience. If procedural requirements are imposed again and again, the room to correct a design error disappears. If duplication is strictly barred, the design error of the first action becomes irreparable, and plaintiff A loses the pathway to resolve the present unease. The fact that the design of the later action went astray becomes an irreparable loss. The risk of delayed relief pointed out by the counterargument is left as it is, yet it cannot be resolved by removing the interest in confirmation from the requirements.
All that can be confirmed from the scene is the fact that plaintiff A again wrote in a different complaint the same demand as the action pending against defendant B. Whether the prior action is pending, whether there was a withdrawal, and what the object of the later action is, are all undetermined. Therefore it cannot be determined whether the later action falls within a restriction on re-filing. What can be determined is only the narrow conclusion that the avoidance of the prohibition against duplication cannot substitute for the interest in confirmation.
The conclusion that can be drawn in this section is limited to the point that, even though the object of the new action differs, the interest in confirmation must be satisfied. Substituting non-duplication for the interest in confirmation is not permitted. At the same time, this section has not determined the status of the prior action, what restriction on re-filing the object of the later action falls under, or what remains in that record.