Summary
The cause of the failure to observe a peremptory period and the time at which that cause ceased must be connected to the requirements for subsequent completion.
5.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
An impediment that one could not control does not disappear merely from the result that one was late. The principle concerning the failure of a judicial claim and the exception afforded by statutory subsequent measures are applied together. In this scene, Plaintiff A states that it sought to exercise the right, and Defendant B asserts that it was late, but service and the time at which the right could be exercised are in dispute. When the outcome that ended in this way and the circumstances one sought to keep from producing that outcome diverge from each other, when does a cause not attributable to the party reopen the procedure? This question asks not about lateness itself but to whose share the cause of the lateness belongs.
The text in question provides: "Where a party has been unable to comply with an invariable period for a cause not attributable to such party, such party may cure the negligent act of litigation within 2 weeks from the date on which such cause ceases to exist: Provided, That such period shall be 30 days for a party who is in a foreign country at the time when such cause ceases to exist" (Article 173 of the Civil Procedure Act). Here, the subject is the party who failed to comply with the invariable period for a cause not attributable to the party, the act is the cure of the negligent act of litigation, and the condition is that the cure be made within the period running from the date on which that cause ceased to exist.
This language binds into one the cause—an impediment for which the party is not at fault—and the point in time at which that cause is resolved, and when that binding is established it opens the channel for cure. Accordingly, the standard may be set as follows: where the commencement fact and period of the applicable rule are connected with a ground for suspension or subsequent cure, so that the exercise of the right in question is permitted, the entrance to this relief opens. The commencement fact and the time of resolution are kept distinct because the starting point of the computation and the cause that moved that starting point are each confirmed from different materials.
The strongest counterargument aims at two points at once: that if claims of impediment are broadened, the finality of judgments becomes unstable, and that the strictness of periods can shift even impediments beyond the rights holder's control onto that holder. A final judgment and a period closed on time are values for bringing disputes to an end, and the concern remains that a single broad ground can shake that stability. Even so, mere regret or ignorance of the law cannot be fixed at once as a cause not attributable to the party. If the channel is hastily opened without confirmation as to when the cause ceased to exist, finality will rather be unsettled.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are that Plaintiff A asserts that it intended to exercise the right, that Defendant B asserts that it was late, and that service and the time at which the right could be exercised are in dispute. Where the commencement fact and the applicable special provision are disputed in this manner so that expiration cannot be confirmed, the materials are undetermined. The facts of an actual case or the outcome of performance have not been confirmed.
What this section permits is the possibility of a claim for cure where the cause of the impediment not attributable to the party and the time of its resolution are connected; what it does not permit is the attitude of treating the channel as opening on the basis of the result of lateness or of regret over it alone. If the date of service or the time when the impediment was resolved changes, the existing determination of expiration is discarded and the computation is confirmed anew from the beginning.
5.2The Conditions That Block Relief
The question here is when a cause not attributable to the party reopens the procedure. Before that, however, the conditions under which the channel closes must be made clear. In this scene, the mere assessment of lateness does not reveal what the impediment that could not be controlled was. Accordingly, the cause of the failure to comply with the invariable period and the time of its resolution must be connected to the requirements for subsequent cure.
Article 173 of the Civil Procedure Act provides as follows. "(1) Where a party has been unable to comply with an invariable period for a cause not attributable to such party, such party may cure the negligent act of litigation within 2 weeks from the date on which such cause ceases to exist: Provided, That such period shall be 30 days for a party who is in a foreign country at the time when such cause ceases to exist." Paragraph (2) of the same Article provides that the provisions of Article 172 shall not apply to that period. The subject this language denotes is the party, the act is the cure of the negligent act of litigation, and the conditions are that the party was unable to comply with the invariable period for a cause not attributable to the party, and that the cure be made within the prescribed period after that cause ceased to exist. This section does not address other issues of the statutory provision.
What connects this language with the determination is the conjunction of the requirements. Subsequent cure means a system by which an act of litigation that could not be performed because of an impediment for which the party is not at fault is cured belatedly. Accordingly, it does not open by the result of lateness itself, nor does it open merely upon an assertion that an impediment existed. First, whether a cause not attributable to the party prevented compliance with the invariable period must be determined; next, when that cause ceased to exist must be determined together. The reason these two stages of determination must be distinguished is that, in litigation procedure, compliance with an invariable period and the requirements for its restoration are entrusted to different language. Therefore, where the period in question has passed and the requirements for relief applicable to that procedure, such as suspension and subsequent cure, are also not satisfied, if any one of the statutory requirements is unmet, the channel of relief closes.
There is a counterargument to setting the requirements this narrowly. It is the concern that if assertions of impediment are broadly barred, the finality of judgments may become unstable. Further, the loss is also raised that the strictness of periods can shift even impediments beyond the rights holder's control onto that holder. The late party can say that the period was missed because of circumstances outside its own will, and if that account is not heard, a legitimate exercise of the right is pushed outside the procedure. Even so, the concluded determination is maintained. While not erasing the disadvantage the counterargument points out, loosening the connection of the requirements is not permitted.
Returning to the synthetic scene, the facts corresponding to this question fall within that scope. In this scene, no year, amount, or commencement date is set. Accordingly, expiration cannot be confirmed by the result of lateness alone, nor, conversely, can the impediment be confirmed. The records needed for the determination are set as proof of service, materials on the time at which the right could be exercised, materials on the claim and approval, and materials on the resolution of the impediment; however, the contents of those records themselves are not confirmed. Even under these conditions, materials that remain unconfirmed are left undetermined.
The boundary between the conclusions this section permits and those it does not is as follows. Where a party was unable to comply with the invariable period for a cause not attributable to the party and the cure is made within the prescribed period running from the date on which that cause ceased to exist, the channel of relief opens. Conversely, where the period in question has passed and the requirements for relief applicable to that procedure, such as suspension and subsequent cure, are also not satisfied, the channel is closed, on the view that any one of the statutory requirements is unmet. Fixing ignorance of the law or mere regret as an impediment at once lies outside this scope; conversely, deeming relief impossible merely because the records are still in dispute also lies outside this scope. A state of insufficient materials is merely undetermined and does not immediately mean that relief is impossible.
5.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Within the framework applying together the principle concerning the failure of a judicial claim and the exception afforded by statutory subsequent measures, when does a cause not attributable to the party reopen the procedure? The question now being addressed places one further boundary before it. Where there are no materials and nothing can be confirmed, should that undetermined state be read as impossibility, or left as a deferral of confirmation? Within this dispute, it addresses matters as to which expiration itself has not been confirmed.
The relevant language is Article 173 of the Civil Procedure Act. "Article 173 (Subsequent Cure of an Act of Litigation) (1) Where a party has been unable to comply with an invariable period for a cause not attributable to such party, such party may cure the negligent act of litigation within 2 weeks from the date on which such cause ceases to exist." This language singles out and designates three things. The subject is the party, the act is the cure of the negligent act of litigation, and the condition is that the cause of the inability to comply with the invariable period was a cause not attributable to the party. One further clause of commencement is added here. The period within which cure is possible runs from the date on which that cause ceased to exist.
Connecting this language to the conclusion of this section, whether cure is possible must be divided into two stages. First, the expiration date of the invariable period must be confirmed; next, the cause that went beyond that expiration and the time of resolution must be specified before they connect to the requirements for subsequent cure. Yet if the commencement fact—that is, the date of service or the time at which the right could be exercised—is in dispute, not even the first stage stands. In that case, matters whose materials for determination are not specified are left undetermined, distinguished from impossibility. Impossibility is a state in which the requirements are met but realization does not occur; undetermined is a state in which the very facts that would enter into the requirements have not yet been fixed. If these two are mixed, the error arises of reading a shortage of materials immediately as an impossibility of relief.
The point that most forcefully attacks this distinction is the finality of judgments. It is the worry that if assertions of impediment are broadened, the strictness of the invariable period is shaken, and even the point in time at which a judgment already rendered becomes final is rendered unstable. The invariable period is a device that fixes the terminus of the procedure and stabilizes the parties' predictions and the existence or nonexistence of the final judgment; if the scope of causes not attributable to the party expands, that fixed point may move further into the future. The conclusion is maintained without erasing this disadvantage. Leaving matters undetermined is not a judgment broadening the recognition of impediments; it is closer to an indication that the materials for deciding whether to recognize one are not yet there. When the materials are filled in, only then is the existence or nonexistence of the impediment asked.
Returning to the synthetic scene, only the facts belonging to this question are drawn out. Plaintiff A states that it sought to exercise the right, and Defendant B asserts that it was late. The date of service and the time at which the right could be exercised are in dispute, and which of the two is to be taken as the commencement has not been determined. The kinds of materials to be used for the expiration determination are set: proof of service, materials on the time at which the right could be exercised, materials on the claim and approval, and materials on the resolution of the impediment. However, this scene is not a reproduction of an actual case, and it makes no claim that the above materials have been collected. Accordingly, from this scene alone it cannot be judged which date is the expiration date, or whether what went beyond that expiration was a cause not attributable to the party. What cannot be confirmed remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Where the commencement fact or the applicable special provision is disputed so that expiration cannot be confirmed, it confirms only this distinction: matters whose materials for determination are not specified are left undetermined, distinguished from impossibility. Accordingly, taking a shortage of materials as grounds for the impossibility of relief is not permitted. Conversely, concluding first upon the recognition or non-recognition of an impediment when the expiration date has not been confirmed is also not permitted. It is a phase that goes beyond the presence or absence of an assertion of impediment, where the very standard for deciding that presence or absence is not prepared.
5.4The Records Needed for Determination
When does a cause not attributable to the party reopen the procedure? To answer this question, one must examine how the cause of the failure to comply with the invariable period and the time of its resolution connect to the requirements for subsequent cure. Leaving unchanged the premise settled at the preceding stage—that the principle concerning the failure of a judicial claim and the exception afforded by statutory subsequent measures are to be applied together—this stage asks what records support that application. Amid such disputes, the question of this writing is what must be confirmed, and at what point, before the stage can be judged.
Article 173 of the Civil Procedure Act provides for the subsequent cure of an act of litigation: "Where a party has been unable to comply with an invariable period for a cause not attributable to such party, such party may cure the negligent act of litigation within 2 weeks from the date on which such cause ceases to exist" (Article 173 of the Civil Procedure Act). The same Article adds in its proviso: "this period shall be 30 days for a party who is in a foreign country at the time when such cause ceases to exist" (Article 173 of the Civil Procedure Act). The subject this language denotes is the party who was unable to comply with the invariable period for a cause not attributable to the party, its act is the cure of the negligent act of litigation, and the condition is that the cure be made within the prescribed period running from the date on which that cause ceased to exist. In accordance with this definition, it confirms whether the occurrence and the resolution of the impediment constitute the requirements of the provision.
Connecting the language of the provision with the fixed conclusion of this section makes the materials for stage determination clear. The stages are judged solely on the basis of the materials recorded in the proof of service, the materials on the time at which the right could be exercised, the materials on the claim and approval, and the materials on the resolution of the impediment. Here, the proof of service shows the commencement fact of the invariable period; the materials on the time at which the right could be exercised show the time at which the party became able to exercise the right; the materials on the claim and approval show whether and when the exercise of the right actually took place; and the materials on the resolution of the impediment show when the impediment for which the party is not at fault disappeared. The occurrence of the impediment and the resolution of the impediment are distinct stages of determination, because the former indicates the character of the cause of the failure to comply with the invariable period, while the latter indicates the starting point of the period for subsequent cure. Stage determination is made only upon the designated records, and gaps in the records are not filled with presumptions.
The counterargument that, if assertions of impediment are broadened, the finality of judgments becomes unstable aims at a substantive loss. Legal relations formed in reliance upon a final judgment are shaken, the opposing party must again bear a procedure believed already concluded, and the worry is that the value of emphasizing legal stability may be weakened. This disadvantage must not be erased. Ignorance of the law is, as the language makes clear, not the same as the cause not attributable to the party that the requirements of the provision demand, and regret does not correspond to the resolution of an impediment, which can fix a point in time itself. The instability the counterargument fears is addressed by drawing the scope of impediments narrowly; in return, the boundary of not permitting presumptions without records is maintained as it stands.
Contrasting this question solely with the facts revealed in the synthetic scene, so long as service and the time at which the right could be exercised are disputed, the commencement fact has not been confirmed. If the proof of service is not confirmed, there is no starting point from which to compute the expiration of the invariable period; if the materials on the time at which the right could be exercised are not confirmed, the time at which the party could actually exercise the right cannot be specified. Both items being undetermined, the stages cannot be judged from this scene alone. If the point in time at which the materials on the resolution of the impediment are confirmed changes, the starting point of the period for subsequent cure changes along with it.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Where a party was unable to comply with the invariable period for a cause not attributable to the party, and the date on which that cause ceased to exist is specified by designated records, one can judge whether a cure within the prescribed period running from that point in time is permitted. By contrast, if the date of service or the time of resolution of the impediment remains in dispute, expiration cannot be confirmed; the very fact that materials are lacking does not immediately mean that relief is impossible; nor is an impediment for which the party is not at fault recognized on the basis of mere regret or ignorance of the law alone. The exercise of a right within a fixed time operates where the commencement fact and period of the applicable rule are connected with a ground for suspension or subsequent cure so that the exercise of the right in question is permitted, and where there are no materials showing that connection, the determination is deferred.
5.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
앞 절까지는 재판상 청구의 실패에 관한 원칙과 법정 후속 조치에 의한 예외를 함께 적용해 왔다. 이제 문제는 어떤 변경이 이미 내려진 만료 판정을 뒤집는가이다. 송달일과 권리행사 가능 시점이 다투어지는 장면에서, 단지 늦었다는 결과만을 가지고 그 시점을 확정할 수 없다.
"①당사자가 책임질 수 없는 사유로 말미암아 불변기간을 지킬 수 없었던 경우에는 그 사유가 없어진 날부터 2주 이내에 게을리 한 소송행위를 보완할 수 있다. 다만, 그 사유가 없어질 당시 외국에 있던 당사자에 대하여는 이 기간을 30일로 한다"라고 정하고, 이어 "제1항의 기간에 대하여는 제172조의 규정을 적용하지 아니한다"라고 덧붙인다(민사소송법 제173조). 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 책임질 수 없는 사유로 불변기간을 지키지 못한 당사자이고, 행위는 게을리 한 소송행위의 보완이며, 조건은 그 사유가 없어진 날부터 정해진 기간 안에 보완하는 것이다.
위 문언과 그 사유의 해소 시점을 연결하면, 기존 만료 판정을 확정한 계산의 기초가 달라지는 경우가 생긴다. 송달일은 불변기간의 기산사실을 이루고, 장애의 해소 시점은 추후보완 기간의 기산사실을 이루기 때문에, 두 사실은 서로 다른 판단 단계에 놓인다. 요건이 연결된 권리행사가 허용되는 경우와, 해당 기간을 넘겼고 중단·추후보완 등 구제 요건도 충족되지 않는 경우가 구별되는 이유가 여기에 있다.
장애 주장이 넓어지면 판결의 확정이 불안정해진다. 확정된 판결을 전제로 한 후속 관계가 흔들리고, 이미 지난 불변기간을 언제든 다시 열 수 있다는 불안이 남는다. 저자가 보기에 책임질 수 없는 사유는 당사자가 통제할 수 없었던 원인이어야 하고, 후회나 알지 못했다는 사정만으로는 그 요건에 이르지 못한다. 이 답은 반론이 지적한 확정성의 불안을 지우지 않으면서도, 장애의 원인과 해소 시점이 확인되는 경우에 한해 절차를 다시 여는 경로를 남겨 둔다.
이 자료들로 송달일이나 장애의 해소 시점이 달라지는 것이 확인되면, 기존 만료 판정은 폐기되고 계산표부터 다시 확정된다. 그러나 이 장면에는 연도·금액·기산일이 설정되어 있지 않아 실제 만료일이나 그 결과를 확정할 수 없다. 송달일과 권리행사 가능 시점이 계속 다투어지는 동안 만료의 확정은 미확정으로 남는다.
따라서 이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 송달일 또는 장애의 해소 시점이라는 지정된 변경이 확인되면 기존의 만료·차단·실효 판단을 폐기하고 해당 단계부터 다시 판정한다는 것이다. 허용되지 않는 것은, 늦었다는 결과만으로 그 시점을 확정하거나, 후회와 법률 무지를 곧바로 귀책 없는 장애로 확정하는 일이다. 재판상 청구의 실패에 관한 원칙과 법정 후속 조치에 의한 예외는 함께 적용되며, 어느 쪽이 적용되는지는 위의 조건에 달려 있다.
5.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
늦었다는 결과만으로 통제할 수 없었던 장애가 사라지지 않는다는 점은 이전 단계에서 이미 확인한 전제다. 이 전제 위에서 이번 단계는 장애 주장의 범위를 어디에서 끊을 것인가를 묻는다. 장애 주장이 넓어지면 판결의 확정이 불안정해진다고 우려하는 반론은 이 범위의 문제를 겨냥한다. 이 물음은 통제할 수 없었던 장애의 범위가 어디까지 열리는가에 관한 것이다.
그 제1항은 "당사자가 책임질 수 없는 사유로 말미암아 불변기간을 지킬 수 없었던 경우에는 그 사유가 없어진 날부터 2주 이내에 게을리 한 소송행위를 보완할 수 있다"고 정하고, 외국에 있던 당사자에 대해서는 그 기간을 30일로 둔다. 여기서 말하는 주체는 불변기간을 지키지 못한 당사자이고, 행위는 게을리 한 소송행위의 보완이며, 조건은 그 지체의 원인이 책임질 수 없는 사유인 경우다. 이 조문이 정하는 것은 사유의 해소와 그 시점으로부터의 짧은 보완 기간이다.
이 문언은 지체의 원인과 그 해소 시점을 보완 요건에 묶는다. 그 사유가 없어진 날부터의 기간이 정해져 있으므로, 원인을 알아야 시작할 날이 서고 시작할 날이 서야 그 기간 안의 보완인지 가를 수 있다. 이 연결이 없으면 불변기간을 지키지 못했다는 결과만으로는 추후보완을 판단할 수 없다. 그 정의는 곧 사유의 책임 불가능성을 보완의 관문으로 삼는다. 이 관문을 무턱대고 넓히지 않는 것이 이 절의 결론이다.
장애 주장이 넓어지면 판결의 확정이 불안정해진다는 반론은 실질적인 손실을 지적한다. 이미 판결로 정해진 법률관계가 다시 열리면, 그 판결에 의지해 후속 행위를 정리한 사람의 자리가 흔들린다. 기간의 엄격성이 권리자가 통제할 수 없었던 장애까지 떠넘길 수 있다는 반대 방향의 불편도 놓쳐서는 안 된다. 그렇다고 해서 반론이 제기한 불안정이 남는다고 해서 문언이 정한 관문을 없애는 것은 아니다. 후회와 법률 무지가 그 사유에 드는지 아닌지는 별도로 가려야 할 판단이며, 확정 없이 열어둘 수 없다.
합성 장면에서는 원고 A가 권리를 행사하려 했다고 말하고, 피고 B가 늦었다고 주장하지만, 송달과 권리행사 가능 시점이 다투어지고 있다. 이 장면에서 송달증명과 권리행사 가능 시점 자료는 지체의 원인과 그 해소 시점을 가리는 자료로 놓인다. 그러나 장면은 연도나 기산일을 정하지 않았으므로 그 사유의 발생과 해소를 특정할 수 없다. 미확정으로 남겨야 하는 것은 이 장면으로 판정할 수 없는 사실이다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 불변기간을 지키지 못한 원인이 책임질 수 없는 사유이고 그 해소 시점이 정해졌을 때, 그 시점으로부터 정해진 안에서 게을리 한 소송행위의 보완을 따지는 것이다. 허용하지 않는 것은, 늦었다는 결과만으로, 또는 단순한 후회와 법률 무지를 그 사유로 삼아 보완을 열어주는 것이다. 이 구별은 책임질 수 없는 사유가 언제 절차를 다시 여는가라는 물음에 속한다. 송달과 권리행사 가능 시점이 다투어져 만료를 확정할 수 없는 상태는 미확정이며 구제 불능이 아니다.
5.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
앞 절에서 단순한 후회나 법률 무지를 곧바로 귀책 없는 장애로 확정할 수 없다는 전제를 받아들이면, 질문은 그 장애라는 요소가 실제로 무엇을 가리키는지 그리고 언제까지 작동하는지로 옮겨간다. 이 제도를 통해 절차를 다시 여는지 판단하려면, 불변기간을 지키지 못한 원인과 그 해소 시점이 요건에 어떻게 연결되는지 먼저 살펴야 한다.
해당 문언은 그 연결을 다음과 같이 요구한다. 민사소송법 제173조는 "당사자가 책임질 수 없는 사유로 말미암아 불변기간을 지킬 수 없었던 경우에는 그 사유가 없어진 날부터 2주 이내에 게을리 한 소송행위를 보완할 수 있다"고 정하면서, 다만 "그 사유가 없어질 당시 외국에 있던 당사자에 대하여는 이 기간을 30일로 한다"고 덧붙인다. 민사소송법 제173조 제2항은 이 기간에 제172조의 규정을 적용하지 아니한다고 명시한다(민사소송법 제173조).
이 문언을 앞서 확인한 결론과 잇는다. 불변기간을 지키지 못한 원인은 ①항의 "책임질 수 없는 사유"라는 요건에, 그 해소 시점은 "그 사유가 없어진 날"이라는 기산점에 각각 대응한다. 두 가지를 구별해야 하는 까닭은, 전자는 절차를 다시 열 수 있는지의 자격을 판단하는 문제이고 후자는 그 자격이 인정된 뒤 보완이 정해진 시간 안에 이루어졌는지를 판단하는 문제이기 때문이다. 이 두 단계를 하나로 합치면, 자격이 있는 장애라 하더라도 보완의 시기를 정할 기준을 잃는다. 따라서 원인의 성격과 해소의 시점은 각각 자료로 다투고, 그 결과에 따라 적용 규칙의 기산사실이 확정된다.
그렇지만 장애 주장이 넓어지면 판결의 확정이 불안정해진다는 반론은 사라지지 않는다. 이미 확정된 판결 아래에서 권리자가 뒤늦게 절차를 다시 열 수 있다는 요청은, 상대방이 누리는 확정이라는 이익을 흔든다. 그러한 손실과 불편을 무시할 수 없다. 이는 앞 절에서 넘어온 답이다. 후회나 무지는 원인으로서의 무게를 바로 지지 못하며, 결국 자격 판단 단계에서 어떤 자료가 필요한지가 드러난다.
이와 관련한 사실만 꺼내 보면, 합성 장면은 "원고 A는 권리를 행사하려 했다고 말하고 피고 B는 늦었다고 주장하지만 송달과 권리행사 가능 시점은 다투어지고 있다"고 정해져 있다. 이 다툼은 추후보완 판단에 필요한 자료의 종류를 보여준다. 송달증명·권리행사 가능 시점 자료·청구·승인 자료·장애의 해소 자료가 그것이다. 다만 이 장면만으로 기산사실이나 적용 특별규정이 확정되었는지는 단정할 수 없으며, 그런 다툼이 남은 동안 만료 판정은 미확정으로 둔다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 불변기간을 지키지 못한 원인이 책임질 수 없는 사유에 해당하고 그 사유가 없어진 날부터 정해진 기간 안에 보완이 이루어진 경우에, 추후보완이 절차를 다시 여는 경로가 된다. 반면 단순한 후회나 법률 무지를 귀책 없는 장애로 확정하는 판단을 이 절이 허용하지 않는다. 기산사실이 확정되지 않아 만료를 판정할 수 없을 때의 처리 역시 이 절의 범위 밖에 남는다.
5.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
재판상 청구의 실패에 관한 원칙과 그 법정 후속 조치는 함께 놓고 보아야 한다는 결론을 전제로 하며, 늦었다는 결과만으로 통제할 수 없었던 장애가 사라지지는 않는다. 이 쟁점을 마주한 장면은 원고 A는 권리를 행사하려 했다고 말하고 피고 B는 늦었다고 주장하지만 송달과 권리행사 가능 시점은 다투어지고 있는 경우이다. 이 장면에서 권리의 존속과 늦음의 책임은 서로 다른 질문으로 남는다. 제173조의 문언은 그 구별의 출발점을 제시한다.
민사소송법 제173조는 “①당사자가 책임질 수 없는 사유로 말미암아 불변기간을 지킬 수 없었던 경우에는 그 사유가 없어진 날부터 2주 이내에 게을리 한 소송행위를 보완할 수 있다”라고 정한다. 이 문언은 주체를 당사자로, 행위를 게을리 한 소송행위의 보완으로, 조건을 책임질 수 없는 사유로 불변기간을 지키지 못한 경우로 한정한다. 또 그 사유가 없어진 날이 기산점임을 분명히 하며, 당사자가 그 사유가 없어진 당시 외국에 있던 경우에는 30일로 한다. 같은 조 제2항은 제1항 기간에 제172조를 적용하지 않는다고 덧붙인다.
이 문언이 불변기간을 지키지 못한 원인과 그 해소 시점을 나란히 요구하는 까닭은 추후보완이 귀책 없는 장애로 못 한 소송행위를 뒤늦게 보완하는 제도이기 때문이다. 단순히 늦었다는 결과만으로는 같은 요건에 이르지 못한다. 동시에 장애의 존재만으로도 부족하다. 그 장애가 책임질 수 없는 사유인지, 그리고 언제 없어졌는지가 함께 정해져야 비로소 위 문언의 기간 계산이 시작된다. 두 판단을 한꺼번에 처리하면 요건의 해소 시점이 빠져 나가게 된다.
장애의 인정을 넓히면 이미 확정된 판결과 종료된 절차가 다시 흔들릴 수 있다는 반론이 제기될 수 있다. 소송 종결 후의 안정과 상대방의 신뢰를 지키려는 요구는 분명한 불이익이다. 반면 기간의 엄격성이 권리자가 통제할 수 없었던 장애까지 떠넘길 수 있다는 점도 함께 둔다. 저자가 제안하는 답은 단순한 후회나 법률 무지를 곧바로 귀책 없는 장애로 확정할 수는 없다는 것이다. 다만 그 결론이 장애의 실재를 미리 부정하는 것은 아니다.
합성 장면에서는 원고 A의 권리를 행사하려 했다는 주장을 근거로 삼기 어렵다. 송달과 권리행사 가능 시점이 다투어지고 있는 한, 불변기간의 기산사실 자체가 확정되지 않았고, 따라서 책임질 수 없는 사유가 언제 없어졌는지도 함께 정해지지 않았다. 송달증명과 권리행사 가능 시점 자료가 확보되지 않는 한 제173조의 2주 또는 30일 기간이 어느 시점에서 시작되었는지를 장면만으로 판단할 수 없다. 현 시점에서 확정되는 것은 만료 여부가 아니라 요건의 미확정 상태이다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 귀책 없는 장애로 불변기간을 지키지 못했고 그 사유가 없어진 날부터 정해진 기간 안에 보완한 경우에, 게을리 한 소송행위의 뒤늦은 보완이 열리는 것이다. 늦었다는 사실만으로 장애를 부정하는 것도, 권리가 남아 있다는 사정만으로 그 문을 여는 것도 이 절의 답이 아니다. 다음으로는 만료일을 적으려면 무엇이 먼저 확정되어야 하는가의 물음이 남는다.
5.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
송달일과 권리행사 가능 시점이 확정되지 않았으므로 만료 여부도 단정할 수 없다. 이 장면에서 책임질 수 없는 사유는 언제 절차를 다시 여는가.
이 물음에 해당하는 원문은 민사소송법 제173조 하나이다. 그 제1항은 "당사자가 책임질 수 없는 사유로 말미암아 불변기간을 지킬 수 없었던 경우에는 그 사유가 없어진 날부터 2주 이내에 게을리 한 소송행위를 보완할 수 있다. 다만, 그 사유가 없어질 당시 외국에 있던 당사자에 대하여는 이 기간을 30일로 한다"고 정한다. 여기서 주체는 '당사자'이고, 행위는 '게을리 한 소송행위'이며, 조건은 불변기간을 지키지 못한 원인이 책임질 수 없는 사유라는 점과 그 사유가 없어진 날로부터 정해진 기간 안에 보완한다는 점이다. 이 조문의 다른 쟁점은 본 문단의 해설 범위에 넣지 않는다.
이 문언은 두 판정 단계를 구별하도록 요구한다. 그다음에 그 사유가 없어진 날부터 2주 또는 30일의 기간 안에 소송행위가 실제로 보완되었는지를 본다. 이 두 단계를 합치면 안 되는 까닭은, 장애의 존재는 보완의 기한을 열어 주지만 그 기한 안의 권리행사를 대신하지 않기 때문이다. 해당 원문 문언만 정해진 시간 안의 권리행사의 판정 근거로 쓴다. 판결이유·다른 항으로 확장하지 않는다.
이 구별이 가져오는 불편은 크다. 이미 끝난 절차가 다시 열리고, 상대방은 종국적으로 안정될 줄 알았던 지위를 다시 방어해야 한다. 기간의 엄격성이 권리자가 통제할 수 없었던 장애까지 떠넘길 수 있다는 점도 그에 못지않다. 질병이나 통신 장애처럼 권리자가 막을 수 없었던 사정을 기한의 지연으로만 평가하면, 정해진 시간 안의 권리행사가 사실상 불가능해지는 경우가 생긴다. 그러나 단순한 후회나 법률 무지를 곧바로 귀책 없는 장애로 확정할 수는 없다. 이 답은 확정의 불안정이라는 비용을 줄이면서도, 책임질 수 없는 사유라는 요건을 비워 두지는 않는다.
합성 장면에서 이 물음과 관련된 사실은 송달과 권리행사 가능 시점이 다투어지고 있다는 점뿐이다. 원고 A의 주장과 피고 B의 주장이 맞서 있지만, 장면은 기산사실을 정해 두지 않았다. 그 자료가 확정한 날짜는 지정되지 않았다. 따라서 적용 규칙의 기산사실·기간이 다투어져 만료를 확정할 수 없으므로, 이 장면만으로 허용과 거절을 판정할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 불변기간을 지키지 못한 원인이 책임질 수 없는 사유이고, 그 사유가 없어진 날부터 제173조가 정한 기간 안에 소송행위가 보완된 경우에만 추후보완이 열린다. 그 조건을 충족하지 못하면 이 조문으로 다시 열 수 없다. 장애가 있었는지, 언제 해소되었는지, 그때부터 기간이 지났는지가 미확인이면 판정은 미확정으로 남는다. 미확정은 곧 구제 불능이 아니다. 기록이 모이면 그때 다시 계산할 일이다.
5.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
It discusses when a reason for which one cannot be held responsible reopens the procedure. At issue in this scene is not what outcome was reached, but from which point the prescribed time was counted. If the time of service and the time when the right can be exercised are not fixed, the expiration itself is not determined either.
It provides: "(1) Where a party has been unable to observe an invariable period by reason of a cause for which the party cannot be held responsible, the party may supplement the act of litigation that was neglected within 2 weeks from the day on which that cause ceased to exist; Provided, That in the case of a party who was in a foreign country at the time the cause ceased to exist, such period shall be 30 days. (2) Article 172 shall not apply to the period under paragraph (1)" (Article 173 of the Civil Procedure Act). The subject this text addresses is the party, the act is the supplementation of the act of litigation that was not observed, and the conditions are the failure to observe the invariable period by reason of a cause for which the party cannot be held responsible, together with the disappearance of that cause.
The link joining the above text with the conclusion of this section is the connection between the cause and the time of its resolution. This definition contains two stages. First, whether the cause of the failure to observe the invariable period is one for which the party bears no responsibility; and second, where the day on which that cause ceased to exist falls. If only the later stage is discussed without the earlier one, no starting point can be set; if only the earlier stage is discussed without the later one, the time when supplementation is possible never opens up. The detailed distinctions are limited to the conditions of the cases that operate, the cases that are blocked, and the undetermined cases.
An objection may be raised that broadening the assertion of impediment unsettles the finality of judgments. The mere prospect that an already concluded procedure may be reopened renders established legal relationships unstable, and creates the inconvenience that the opposing party can hardly predict how long it must defend itself. The author answers without erasing these losses. The requirement of a reason for which one cannot be held responsible operates at that very point, preventing broad assertions of impediment from leading directly to grounds for reopening.
The only fact confirmed in the synthetic scene is that the time of service and the time when the right can be exercised are disputed. Because the start-of-period fact of the applicable rule has not been determined, this state remains an undetermined case. To determine the expiration, one must first decide which of the proof of service, the material on the time when the right can be exercised, the claim, the approval material, and the material on the resolution of the impediment decides the start-of-period fact. Whether actual records absent from the scene are collected, or what their content is, however, cannot be determined here.
What this section permits is the conclusion that, within the stage, the detailed distinctions are divided into three stated conditions and no other distinctions are drawn. Where the start-of-period fact and the period are linked with a ground for suspension or subsequent supplementation so that the exercise of the right is permitted, that is a case that operates; where that period has passed and the requirements for suspension and subsequent supplementation are not satisfied either, that is a case that is blocked; and where the start-of-period fact or the applicable special provision is disputed so that the expiration cannot be determined, that is an undetermined case.
5.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
The issue encountered in this scene is not the outcome itself but the starting point of the time that produced that outcome, and whether there is a cause that would change that starting point. This question is resolved by applying in turn two settled criteria of judgment.
The current Civil Procedure Act provides the wording of subsequent supplementation as follows. "(1) Where a party has been unable to observe an invariable period by reason of a cause for which the party cannot be held responsible, the party may supplement the act of litigation that was neglected within 2 weeks from the day on which that cause ceased to exist; Provided, That in the case of a party who was in a foreign country at the time the cause ceased to exist, such period shall be 30 days." (Article 173 of the Civil Procedure Act) Paragraph (2) of the same Article qualifies this by providing that Article 172 shall not apply to this supplementation period. This text defines the subject as 'the party', the act as 'the supplementation of the neglected act of litigation', and the conditions as 'the failure to observe the invariable period due to a cause for which one cannot be held responsible' and 'the day on which that cause ceased to exist', respectively. Accordingly, the point at which the door to supplementation opens is not the deadline for exercising the right itself, but the day the impediment was resolved.
The criterion of the day of resolution indicated by this text touches upon the tripartite division of operation, blocking, and undetermined status confirmed earlier. Where the start-of-period fact and period of the applicable rule are linked with a ground for suspension or subsequent supplementation so that the exercise of the relevant right is permitted, the procedure operates. Conversely, where that period has passed and the relief requirements applicable to that procedure, such as suspension and subsequent supplementation, are also unsatisfied, the procedure is blocked. The reason these two determinations must be distinguished here is that fixing the day of resolution and linking that day to the requirements are different checks. Whether the cause of the impediment and the time of its resolution are linked to the requirements for subsequent supplementation is decided by the latter check, while a dispute over the start-of-period fact itself leaves the former check incomplete.
An objection aimed at this judgment holds that broadly permitting assertions of impediment may unsettle the finality of judgments already rendered. The finality of a judgment carries the expectation that it is the terminus of a dispute, and if grounds for prying that expectation open again increase without limit, legal stability is impaired. Yet the conclusion of this section is maintained without dispelling this concern. So long as the burden of proof regarding the cause for which one cannot be held responsible and the strictness of the requirements remain intact, the unease over finality does not diminish, and the objection continues to exert strong pressure.
What is actually disputed in the synthetic scene is only the time of service and the time when the right can be exercised. Whether that material is actually collected has not been determined. Thus, depending on which material fixes the date of service, and on when the impediment was resolved, the determinations of the starting point and of the possibility of supplementation may differ. Until then, it is difficult to determine from this scene alone which of operation and blocking applies.
The case in which an exercise of the right within the prescribed time operates is one where the relief requirements are satisfied and the exercise of the right is permitted; the case in which it is blocked is one where that period has passed and the relief requirements are also unsatisfied. The case that becomes undetermined is where the start-of-period fact or the applicable special provision is disputed so that the expiration cannot be determined, and the mere shortage of material does not mean that relief is impossible. The distinction sorted out in this way connects with the meaning of subsequent supplementation defined in the preceding section.
5.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
That is the conclusion: an impediment beyond one's control is not erased by the mere result of lateness. The question of this section now is when a cause for which one cannot be held responsible reopens the procedure. Within this contest, it asks whether the impediment may be considered only after first looking at the consequences of the delay, or whether the evaluation of the delay becomes possible only after first fixing the cause of the impediment and the time of its resolution.
Article 173 of the Civil Procedure Act provides for the subsequent supplementation of an act of litigation. The text confirmed reads: "Where a party has been unable to observe an invariable period by reason of a cause for which the party cannot be held responsible, the party may supplement the act of litigation that was neglected within 2 weeks from the day on which that cause ceased to exist", and it adds a proviso that, for a party who was in a foreign country at the time the cause ceased to exist, this period shall be 30 days (Article 173 of the Civil Procedure Act). In this text the subject is the party, the act is the supplementation of the neglected act of litigation, and the conditions are that the cause of the failure to observe the invariable period be a cause for which the party cannot be held responsible, and that the supplementation be made within the prescribed period from the day on which that cause ceased to exist. Paragraph (2) of the same Article draws the line by providing that Article 172 shall not apply to the period under paragraph (1) (Article 173 of the Civil Procedure Act). What this paragraph addresses is only the exclusion of the application to that period; it does not determine the nature of that period itself or the computation in other procedures.
This text lies on the same axis as the conclusion handed down by the preceding section. The judgment that the cause of the failure to observe the invariable period and the time of its resolution must be linked to the requirements for subsequent supplementation is precisely that axis, and this means that the fact of delay alone cannot fix that cause as an impediment for which the party bears no responsibility, and that the mere assertion that an impediment existed cannot be taken to fix the time of its resolution as well. Here the two stages must be distinguished. The first stage is the judgment whether the cause of the failure to observe the invariable period is a cause for which one cannot be held responsible; the second stage is the judgment whether the supplementation was made within the prescribed period measured from the day on which that cause ceased to exist. Only if the former is established does a starting point for the latter arise, and only if the starting point of the former is fixed can the expiration date be written down. If this distinction is collapsed, the expiration date becomes not a calculated date but a marking that conceals an undetermined judgment.
The objection aimed most strongly at this point is that broadening assertions of impediment renders the finality of judgments unstable. If the defense of a cause for which one cannot be held responsible is continually raised against a determination that has already reached finality, it remains undecided until when and what procedure must be reopened, and the enforceability of a final and conclusive judgment and the predictability of subsequent procedures may even be shaken. This loss is not erased. Both the demand to preserve finality and the demand to exclude impediments for which one bears no responsibility are accepted, but the recognition of an impediment is bound by the settled requirements of a cause for which one cannot be held responsible and the time of its resolution. The instability spoken of by the objection arises not from relaxing those requirements but from a wavering judgment on the requirements.
The facts belonging to this question in this scene are only that Plaintiff A says it sought to exercise its right and Defendant B asserts that it was late, while the time of service and the time when the right can be exercised are disputed. Yet no actual records have been collected, and where the start-of-period fact or the applicable special provision is disputed so that the expiration cannot be determined, the determination remains undetermined. Since the scene alone cannot fix what the date of service and the time of resolution are, or which date is the expiration date, this section hands that determination over elsewhere and keeps the judgment up to then bound by conditions.
What this section permits is a judgment that, when a cause for which one cannot be held responsible and the time of its resolution are fixed, it opens up for consideration supplementation within the prescribed period from the day on which that cause ceased to exist. What this section does not permit is fixing an impediment from the consequences of delay alone, or setting the starting point while passing over the time of resolution on the mere fact that an impediment was asserted. Regret or ignorance of the law is likewise outside this scope in being immediately fixed as an impediment for which one bears no responsibility. The fact that material is still absent and the matter is undetermined does not mean relief is impossible but leaves the determination in a state of reserve. What must be fixed first in order to write down the expiration date?