Summary
Proof of facts in civil cases follows not the standard of natural-scientific certainty but the standard of a high degree of probability articulated in case law.
1.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
While recognizing the function of de facto questioning and the prompting of proof, it does not regard these as having substituted for the role of the party who is to plead the cause of action. If one were to require that all endless possibilities be eliminated, the fact-finding would never end. In such a situation, fact-finding in a civil action does not demand scientific certainty. On what standard, then, does the entrance to this remedy open? Must all possibilities be eliminated in order to find a civil fact?
The proof of facts in civil matters follows not scientific certainty but the standard of high probability stated in the precedents. Supreme Court Decision 2008Da6755 decided October 28, 2010 stated in Summary of Decision [1] that "the proof of facts in a civil action is not scientific proof, in which not even the slightest doubt may remain, but, absent special circumstances, is the proof of a high degree of probability, reached by comprehensively reviewing all the evidence in light of the rules of experience, whereby one can admit that a certain fact existed." This language speaks of the degree to which the fact that is the subject of proof can be admitted after it has been comprehensively reviewed in light of the rules of experience.
This standard does not go beyond the subject, act, and conditions that the language of the fact denotes. Here, the degree of proof means the standard of conviction by which a fact can be found. The entrance to this remedy opens where the question whether the requirement fact has been proved and the question who bears the risk of that non-ascertainment are precisely linked. The degree of proof and the person who bears the risk of non-ascertainment are distinct stages, and the former cannot be replaced by the latter issue. A determinate conclusion is reached only after the degree of probability required by the holding has been measured against the requirement facts.
The word probability can conceal subjective conviction. If the party holding the material remains silent, the ordinary burden of proof entrenches substantive inequality. Such loss and inequality cannot be ignored. Even so, the high degree of probability of the holding cannot be converted into an arbitrary percentage. The language of the holding speaks only of a degree distinguished from scientific proof; it does not translate it into a percentage or a probability score.
Plaintiff A's explanation of the cause was not sufficiently supported, but Defendant B's alternative explanation was not proved either. In this scene, if the question whether the requirement fact has been proved and the question who bears the risk of that non-ascertainment have not been precisely linked, then which fact is unascertained, or who bears that risk, is left unspecified, and the allocation of the risk of losing cannot be determined. Even for the same non-ascertainment, if the applicable burden-of-proof rule differs, the allocation of the risk of losing changes. This section deals only with the standard of the degree of proof, and does not determine whether, in the scene, the key requirement fact ultimately remained unproved and whether the risk of that non-ascertainment is borne by the claimant in question.
The conclusions this section permits are that the proof of facts in civil matters follows not scientific certainty but the standard of high probability, and that the entrance to this remedy opens when the degree of proof and the person bearing the risk of that non-ascertainment are specified. What it does not permit is a conclusion that converts that probability into an arbitrary percentage, or that asserts, in a synthetic scene, an outcome of victory or defeat or of performance that has not been determined.
1.2The Conditions That Block Relief
Leaving intact the premise of the preceding stage—that while the function of de facto questioning and the prompting of proof is recognized, it does not substitute for the role of the party who is to plead the cause of action—this stage asks what is now blocked at that boundary. The question whether all possibilities must be eliminated in order to find a civil fact, at the point of confirming the definition of the degree of proof as the standard of conviction by which a fact can be found, makes one judge for oneself whether a demand going beyond the level that can be verified can be set up. The moment one demands that all possibilities be eliminated one by one, fact-finding never ends, so one must examine at what point that demand stops execution. The blocking condition spoken of here is not an expression adding a new requirement, but a term pointing to the endpoint of the examination already contained in the standard of conviction.
The precedents summarize the level that the proof demanded in a civil action requires as follows. Supreme Court Decision 2008Da6755 decided October 28, 2010 held: "the proof of facts in a civil action is not scientific proof, in which not even the slightest doubt may remain, but, absent special circumstances, is the proof of a high degree of probability, reached by comprehensively reviewing all the evidence in light of the rules of experience, whereby one can admit that a certain fact existed, and that assessment requires the degree at which an ordinary person would harbor no doubt." The subject of which this language speaks is the court that finds the fact, the act is the comprehensive review of all the evidence and the admission that a certain fact existed, and the condition is that, viewed in light of the rules of experience, a high degree of probability is proved. De facto questioning and the prompting of proof merely perform a function that assists this review, and the premise of the preceding section—that this function does not substitute for the role of the party who is to plead the cause of action—is maintained here unchanged.
Read together with the distinction between this language and the preceding paragraph, it becomes clear that the term "degree of proof" refers to the standard of conviction by which a fact can be found. What scientific proof does not require and what high probability requires differ only in level, while the place of the standard is the same, and only by separating the two does it become visible where fact-finding stops. Because this standard does not take the elimination of all possibilities as its condition, it is distinguished from the stage that demands that not even the slightest doubt remain. If the key requirement fact ultimately remains unproved and the risk of that non-ascertainment is borne by the claimant in question, then, if even one of the statutory requirements is not satisfied, the avenue of relief is closed. That closure refers to the result of having failed to meet the standard of conviction, not to a sanction for the fault of having failed to erase all remaining possibilities.
The objection that the word probability can conceal subjective conviction aims at the point that, if probability is used as a term objectifying the conviction the judge harbors in mind, the basis of the judgment becomes obscured. The observation that, if the party holding the material remains silent, the ordinary burden of proof entrenches substantive inequality, likewise points out that a procedure that passes on to the other party, unchanged, the loss arising from the non-cooperation of the party holding the material is not just. To convert into figures a judgment reached through the rules of experience and the comprehensive review of the evidence would be to set up a new standard not found in the language, and to fix in advance as a failure the case in which those figures are not met goes beyond the range set by the language. The inequality the objection points out remains, but the standard of conviction cannot be changed into an arbitrary figure on the ground of resolving that inequality.
What can be confirmed in this scene is only that neither explanation surpassed the standard of conviction, and which explanation is true cannot be determined here. Contrasted with the preceding conditions, if the key requirement fact ultimately remains unproved and the risk of that non-ascertainment is borne by the claimant in question, then, because even one of the statutory requirements is not satisfied, the avenue of relief is closed; otherwise it is open. Where which fact is unascertained or who bears that risk is unspecified, this scene alone cannot determine whether blocking occurs.
The conclusions this section permits extend only to the point of not setting up the demand that a fact can be found only when not even the slightest doubt remains, and to the judgment that if the key requirement fact ultimately remains unproved and the risk of that non-ascertainment is borne by the claimant in question, then, if even one of the statutory requirements is not satisfied, the avenue of relief is closed. At the same time, the conclusions it does not permit are redefining the standard of conviction by measuring the size of remaining doubt in percentages, and abandoning the standard of the language on the ground that the word probability conceals subjective conviction. So long as the degree of proof means the standard of conviction by which a fact can be found, this standard serves to fix both the starting point and the end of the judgment. The question is not which possibilities remain, but what level of conviction is proved; what legal effect attaches to a fact that has not reached that level must be examined separately.
1.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Within the framework that recognizes the function of de facto questioning and the prompting of proof but does not regard it as having substituted for the role of the party who is to plead the cause of action, the question whether all possibilities must be eliminated in order to find a civil fact opens again. How far a judge must tolerate remaining doubt, and where the boundary should be drawn at which matters that can never be finally ascertained for want of material are set aside, is the issue of this stage.
Within the framework that recognizes the function of de facto questioning and the prompting of proof but does not regard it as having substituted for the role of the party who is to plead the cause of action, the precedents say that the proof of facts in civil matters follows not scientific certainty but the standard of high probability. Transferred as written, the language reads: "the proof of facts in a civil action is not scientific proof, in which not even the slightest doubt may remain, but, absent special circumstances, is the proof of a high degree of probability, reached by comprehensively reviewing all the evidence in light of the rules of experience, whereby one can admit that a certain fact existed," and it adds that the assessment "requires the degree at which an ordinary person would harbor no doubt" (Supreme Court Decision 2008Da6755 decided October 28, 2010). Here the subject is the court that finds the fact, the act is the comprehensive review of all the evidence, and the condition is the high degree of probability viewed in light of the rules of experience.
This standard does not require that no doubt whatsoever remain, as scientific proof does, but requires probability of a degree at which an ordinary person would harbor no doubt. The higher-order concept of the standard of conviction and the lower-order judgment fixing its level as high probability must be kept apart, because the former asks the measure by which a fact is to be found or not, and the latter is the stage of judging whether that measure has been met. Where which fact is unascertained or who bears that risk is unspecified, this section's conclusion—that a matter whose materials of determination are not specified is left undetermined, distinguished from impossibility—stands precisely upon this distinction.
The objection that the word probability can conceal subjective conviction is aimed at the substantive risk that a judge's personal feeling is justified in the name of the rules of experience. The observation that, if the party holding the material remains silent, the ordinary burden of proof entrenches substantive inequality, is likewise weighty. The standard the court set forth is a qualitative measure—the degree at which no doubt of an ordinary person remains—and not a numerical probability, and the moment this is turned into a number, the path of judgment of the rules of experience and the comprehensive review of the evidence required by the holding is erased. The inequality the objection points out remains as it is, and the conclusion is maintained within the range of this language.
In the synthetic scene, Plaintiff A's explanation of the cause was not sufficiently supported, and Defendant B's alternative explanation was not proved either. This scene shows a state in which neither explanation has been met, and which explanation is true cannot be determined from this scene alone. Taking as the standard the record of requirement-by-requirement assertions, evidence, statutory presumptions, fact-finding, and burden-of-proof determinations, if which fact is unascertained or who bears the risk of that non-ascertainment is unspecified, that matter is not a confirmed impossibility but remains undetermined. If it is confirmed that the applicable burden-of-proof rule differs, the allocation of the risk of losing differs; this merely reveals what the conditions for moving the boundary are, and is not an additional fact of an actual case.
The conclusions this section permits extend only to the point that the finding of civil facts does not require the elimination of all possibilities, and that the standard of high probability is distinguished from scientific certainty. That said, one may not convert probability into figures, may not declare at once that a matter for which there is no material is incapable of proof, and may not treat the risk allocation of the undetermined as already fixed. Establishing a standard of conviction and deciding how remaining doubt is to be handled under that standard are different tasks, and unverified items remain undetermined as they are.
1.4The Records Needed for Determination
In the preceding section, where which fact is unascertained or who bears that risk is unspecified, the determination was left undetermined, and this was distinguished from the case where relief is blocked. To answer this question, above all it must become clear on what that determination rests—that is, what records must remain. What is set out in this section is the degree of proof, or, in other words, the standard of conviction by which a fact can be found.
Supreme Court Decision 2008Da6755 decided October 28, 2010 stated in Summary of Decision [1] that the proof of facts in a civil action is "not scientific proof, but, absent special circumstances, ... the proof of a high degree of probability." The subject this language denotes is the court that is to determine the existence or non-existence of a fact, and the act is the work of comprehensively reviewing all the evidence submitted and determining whether one can admit that a certain fact existed. The condition is that, under the proviso "absent special circumstances," that assessment reaches the degree at which an ordinary person would harbor no doubt.
If one links this standard with this section's conclusion, the determination must rest not on vague conviction but on requirement-by-requirement assertions, evidence, statutory presumptions, fact-finding, and burden-of-proof determinations. Here the degree of proof and the determination of the burden of proof must be distinguished. The former sets the standard of what conviction must be reached before a fact can be found; the latter determines who bears the risk of the non-ascertainment where that conviction is not reached. If the two stages are mixed, the non-ascertainment that fails to meet the standard and the attribution of that non-ascertainment are not distinguished. Without this record, the conclusion remains undetermined.
To this, the objection is raised that the word probability can conceal subjective conviction. If the conviction the judge harbors in mind is wrapped in the name of probability, the basis of the judgment does not appear outwardly, and the disadvantage remains that, even if the party holding the material remains silent, the ordinary burden-of-proof rules entrench that inequality as it is. The disadvantage the objection points out is a matter to be handled through the disclosure of the record and the express statement of attribution, and it is not handled by converting the standard itself into a figure and abolishing it.
Contrasting this fact with the preceding conditions, neither explanation was supported by requirement-by-requirement assertions and evidentiary records, and neither reaches a finding of fact. Because which fact is unascertained is not specified and the bearer of that risk is not set, this scene alone cannot determine the allocation of the risk of losing. Since no year, amount, or judgment outcome exists in the scene and none has been set, that part remains undetermined.
Accordingly, what this section permits is a finding of fact that has reached a high degree of probability, upon the record of requirement-by-requirement assertions, evidence, statutory presumptions, fact-finding, and burden-of-proof determinations. What it does not permit is the demand that a fact can be found only when all possibilities have been eliminated, and the method of converting probability into an arbitrary percentage. A conclusion without a record is undetermined and is distinguished from the case where relief is blocked.
1.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
Even in the same scene of indeterminacy, which change overturns the existing stage determination is the question now at hand. The existing determination spoken of here means the judgment of blocking and effectiveness reached at the preceding stage, and that judgment stood on the premise of a finding as to which fact was never finally brought to light. The focus of the question therefore shifts from the degree to which several possibilities were left open to which rule applies to that remaining indeterminacy.
The text corresponding to this question is worded as follows. The precedent states as its premise that "proof of fact in a civil action is not natural-scientific proof in which not the slightest doubt may remain," and goes on to say that "it is proof of a high degree of probability sufficient to admit that a given fact existed, and that determination requires a degree such that an ordinary person would harbor no doubt" (Supreme Court Decision 2008Da6755 decided October 28, 2010). Here the subject of proof is the party asserting the fact in a civil action, the act is the comprehensive review of all evidence so as to make it possible to admit the existence of the fact, and the condition is that the high degree of probability reached in light of rules of experience attains a degree that removes the doubts of an ordinary person. This wording does not extend to the issues of other provisions.
The above wording is joined to the conclusion of this section. What the precedent requires is not natural-scientific certainty free from the slightest doubt, but a high degree of probability under rules of experience; the mere existence of a possibility remaining to the end therefore does not obstruct a finding of fact. Yet even with the same indeterminacy, if the applicable rule of burden of proof differs, the allocation of the risk of losing changes. The degree of proof prescribed by the preceding wording and the allocation of risk prescribed by the following sentence are distinct stages of judgment. The former is a standard that asks what conviction has been reached; the latter is a rule of allocation that asks who bears the indeterminacy that remains where no conviction has been reached. If the two are mixed together, a judgment arises to the effect that the side which failed in the degree of proof at once bears the risk, but the author's conclusion is that, once the designated change is confirmed, the existing blocking and effectiveness determinations are discarded and the stage is adjudicated anew from the beginning. That is, that judgment stands only where the question whether the fact constituting a requirement has been proved and the question who bears the risk of that indeterminacy are exactly linked; where it is not specified which fact is indeterminate, or who bears that risk, the matter remains undetermined.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the point that the word probability may conceal subjective conviction. If the court, while invoking probability, in fact admits a fact on its own conviction alone or dismisses it, the phrase "the standard of an ordinary person" becomes a mere formality, and where the party holding the materials remains silent, the ordinary burden of proof entrenches substantive inequality, leaving the resulting disadvantage in place. The loss that this counterargument points out is the inequality that arises where unverifiable judgment and information asymmetry combine. Yet the foregoing answer, without erasing the adverse aspect of the counterargument, draws the line by stating that the high degree of probability set out in the judgment cannot be converted into an arbitrary percentage. For the wording offered by the judgment is not something that can be transcribed into a numerical standard such as a percentage, but a standard mediated by rules of experience and the judgment of an ordinary person. The problem of inequality left by the counterargument remains as it is, but it cannot be resolved by conversion into figures.
In the synthetic scene there is one fact relevant to this question. In this scene, that the explanation of A was not supported can be contrasted as falling short of the high degree of probability spoken of in the above wording, and that the alternative explanation of B was likewise not proved is placed as that alternative explanation also failing to clear the same standard. Yet this fact alone does not specify which fact constituting a requirement is finally indeterminate, nor which of A and B bears the risk of that indeterminacy. Accordingly, all that can be established from the scene is that neither explanation cleared the degree of proof, and the allocation of the risk of losing remains undetermined. Unless the designated change, namely that the applicable rule of burden of proof differs, is confirmed, the fate of the existing blocking and effectiveness determinations is not yet decided.
The conclusion permitted in this section is that the degree of proof follows the standard of high degree of probability and that this standard does not require the removal of the slightest doubt; and that even with the same indeterminacy, if the rule of burden of proof differs, the allocation of risk changes, so that the existing stage determination may be discarded and adjudicated anew. The conclusions not permitted are to substitute for the high degree of probability a value converted into a percentage, or to fix the risk of losing of a particular party on the facts of the scene alone.
1.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
On the premise that the functions of de facto questioning and prompting proof are recognized, but that this is not regarded as having stood in for the role of the party who is to submit the grounds of the claim, there remains the question whether all possibilities must be eliminated in order to establish a civil fact. How to handle the level of doubt that remains in this question is the task of this stage.
Supreme Court Decision 2008Da6755 decided October 28, 2010 states in Summary of Decision [1] that proof of fact in a civil action is "not natural-scientific proof in which not the slightest doubt may remain, but, unless there are special circumstances, proof of a high degree of probability sufficient to admit that a given fact existed, made by way of a comprehensive review of all evidence in light of rules of experience." The subject indicated by this wording is the party charged with the proof of the fact, and the act is the work of comprehensively reviewing all evidence in light of rules of experience.
According to that wording, the determination "requires a degree such that an ordinary person would harbor no doubt" (Supreme Court Decision 2008Da6755 decided October 28, 2010). This standard is connected to the point that the proof of fact in civil matters follows not natural-scientific certainty but the standard of high degree of probability spoken of by the precedent. Here, the degree of proof means the standard of conviction at which a fact may be admitted. The reason for setting apart the requirement of natural-scientific proof and the requirement of a high degree of probability is that, if the former were adopted, no room would remain for allowing the level of residual doubt, and fact-finding would never come to an end.
The counterargument that the word probability may conceal subjective conviction is aimed at the loss that arises where that level is left to the impression of the adjudicator. So long as whether an ordinary person harbors doubt is not translated into a fixed number, room remains for judgments to diverge on the same evidence, and the disadvantage of that wavering falls according to the adjudicator's standard rather than the substance of the issue. So long as the object of the determination is whether an ordinary person harbors doubt and not the attainment of a number, conversion cannot take the place of the standard set by the judgment.
Both explanations remain in a state that leaves doubt to the end. Whether the question of the proof of the fact constituting a requirement and the question who bears the risk of that indeterminacy are exactly linked cannot be specified from the scene alone and therefore remains undetermined.
The conclusion permitted is the distinction that a high degree of probability does not require natural-scientific certainty free from the slightest doubt; the conclusion not permitted is the attempt to translate that probability into a number such as a percentage and thereby to substitute for the determination. The degree of proof remains as the standard of conviction at which a fact may be admitted, and how that standard applies to which fact constituting a requirement is a separate question.
1.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
In the work of establishing civil facts, the issue is whether, if other possibilities are endlessly arrayed and any one of them remains, the finding of fact must be refused. The preceding section confirmed that the high degree of probability set out in the judgment cannot be converted into an arbitrary percentage; this section turns to the question of setting the standard concerning the degree of proof. The degree of proof means the standard of conviction at which a fact may be admitted, and the analysis examines whether this standard requires the elimination of all possibilities.
The basis for answering this question is Summary of Decision [1] of (Supreme Court Decision 2008Da6755 decided October 28, 2010). Its wording states that proof of fact in a civil action is not natural-scientific proof in which not the slightest doubt may remain, but, unless there are special circumstances, proof of a high degree of probability sufficient to admit that a given fact existed, made by way of a comprehensive review of all evidence in light of rules of experience. The subject spoken of by this wording is the party to the civil action who contests the proof of the fact and the court that assesses that evidence, and the act is the work of comprehensively reviewing all evidence and admitting that the fact existed. The condition is that the judgment be made in light of rules of experience on the premise that there are no special circumstances.
The same wording adds that the determination requires a degree such that an ordinary person would harbor no doubt. What the precedent required is a high degree of probability sufficient to admit that a fact existed, and is distinguished from natural-scientific proof in which not the slightest doubt remains. The reason these two stages must be read apart is that the former is the actual standard for establishing civil facts, while the latter is a higher certainty that civil proceedings do not require. The concept of the degree of proof, standing on this distinction, denotes the standard of conviction at which a fact may be admitted, and does not require a state in which all possibilities have been eliminated.
The counterargument that the word probability may conceal subjective conviction points out the risk that this standard moves according to the court's impression. It is also pointed out in the same direction that, where the party holding the materials stays silent, the ordinary burden of proof entrenches substantive inequality. Even so, the high degree of probability set out in the judgment cannot be converted into an arbitrary percentage. The precedent took as its standard only the work of comprehensively reviewing all evidence in light of rules of experience and the judgment of an ordinary person; it did not translate them into figures. The risk of subjectivity pointed out by the counterargument is not erased, but manufacturing percentages in order to eliminate that risk goes beyond the confirmed wording.
Even where in this scene both explanations remain unestablished, what the precedent requires is a different matter from erasing every remaining possibility down to the last one. The degree of proof is judged, as the standard of conviction at which a fact may be admitted, by whether, after comprehensively reviewing all evidence in light of rules of experience, it reaches a degree at which an ordinary person would harbor no doubt. What indeterminacy remains, and who bears that risk, cannot be established from this scene alone and thus remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is that the proof of fact in civil matters follows the standard of high degree of probability spoken of by the precedent rather than natural-scientific certainty; conversely, the interpretation that a fact may be admitted only when all possibilities have been eliminated is not permitted. That said, translating that probability into figures, or establishing it by facts outside the scene, is likewise not permitted by this section.
1.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
If, in order to admit a fact in a civil trial, every remaining possibility must also be erased, fact-finding would be postponed without end. The preceding stage recognized the functions of de facto questioning and prompting proof, but did not regard this as having stood in for the role of the party who is to submit the grounds of the claim. That function only sets the starting line of proof; it does not go so far as to determine what level of conviction is required. If there is no standard to fill that gap, subjective impressions readily become the standard of judgment. The question now concerns the level of the remaining doubt.
Summary of Decision [1] of Supreme Court Decision 2008Da6755 decided October 28, 2010 addresses that question by stating that "proof of fact in a civil action is not natural-scientific proof in which not the slightest doubt may remain." The wording sets the subject of proof as the adjudicator who establishes facts in a civil action, and the object as the facts that must be supported by evidence. What the wording forbids is the demand that not the slightest doubt remain; what is required is proof, by comprehensively reviewing all evidence in light of rules of experience, of a high degree of probability sufficient to admit that a given fact existed. That determination must be of a degree at which an ordinary person would harbor no doubt. What is settled here is only the degree of proof; this wording does not also adjudicate other procedural requirements.
The reason for using the standard of high degree of probability is that the object of proof is, independently of whose claim is established, the question of which fact can be admitted as fact. The reason for distinguishing natural-scientific certainty from the probability set out in the judgment is that, whereas the former standard demands the elimination of all remaining possibilities, the latter standard looks to whether the fact can be admitted as having existed to a degree at which an ordinary person under rules of experience would harbor no doubt. This distinction places the degree of proof at the standard of conviction at which a fact may be admitted. Facts that pass this standard are regarded as capable of being admitted as fact. Accordingly, whether the fact constituting a requirement of a given claim falls short of this standard is a matter to be confirmed through, for each requirement, the assertion, the evidence, legal presumptions, findings of fact, and the determination of the burden of proof.
The counterargument that the word probability may conceal subjective conviction is aimed at the abuse whereby the adjudicator's impression becomes the de facto standard. The criticism that, where the party holding the factual materials stays silent, the ordinary burden of proof entrenches substantive inequality arises in the same direction. Those two losses are not erased. Only, the high degree of probability set out in the judgment cannot be converted into an arbitrary percentage. The work of comprehensively reviewing all evidence in light of rules of experience, and the wording "a degree at which an ordinary person would harbor no doubt," are not replaced by numbers, but are read as the standard of conviction at which a fact may be admitted. The risk of subjectivity pointed out by the counterargument must be resolved by changing the way this standard is derived.
What can be judged from this scene alone is that A's explanation of the cause did not reach the standard of high degree of probability. Since the fact that B's alternative explanation was not proved does not serve as grounds for holding that A's explanation stands, which of the two explanations is correct cannot be established from this scene. This is because there is the further condition that, even with the same indeterminacy, if the applicable rule of burden of proof differs, the allocation of the risk of losing changes. Which fact is indeterminate, and who bears the risk of that indeterminacy, remain matters for judgment outside this scene.
What can be established in this section is that what is required for the admission of civil facts is not the elimination of all possibilities but the standard of high degree of probability. This standard is distinguished from natural-scientific certainty and operates as the standard of conviction at which a fact may be admitted. A fact that does not reach this standard simply does not attain the admission of fact. That said, this section does not go so far as to draw a conclusion as to how any party's claim is handled.
1.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
그런 기준에서는 어떤 증거를 모아도 남은 가능성이 하나씩은 남으므로 재판은 끝나지 않는다. 사실상 질문과 증명 촉구의 기능을 인정하되 청구원인을 제출할 당사자의 역할을 대신했다고 보지 않는다는 전제에서 출발한다. 이와 같은 출발점에서 민사사실을 인정하려면 모든 가능성이 제거되어야 하는가 하는 물음이 다시 놓인다.
이 물음에 대해 대법원 2010. 10. 28. 선고 2008다6755 판결의 판결요지 [1]은 이렇게 말한다. "[1] 민사소송에서 사실의 증명은 추호의 의혹도 있어서는 아니 되는 자연과학적 증명은 아니나, 특별한 사정이 없는 한 경험칙에 비추어 모든 증거를 종합 검토하여 어떠한 사실이 있었다는 점을 시인할 수 있는 고도의 개연성을 증명하는 것이고, 그 판정은 통상인이라면 의심을 품지 않을 정도일 것을 필요로 한다." 이 문언은 민사소송에서의 사실 증명의 주체와 행위를 정하고, 특별한 사정이 없는 한이라는 조건 아래 어떤 기준으로 그 사실을 시인할 것인지를 밝힌다.
이 문언은 앞서 제기된 물음에 대해 자연과학적 증명이 요구되지 않는다는 점과, 증명의 정도라는 기준을 제시한다는 점을 함께 보여준다. 이 기준을 따로 둔 이유는 둘째 판단이 첫째 판단과 다른 차원의 문제이기 때문이다. 자연과학적 확실성의 유무는 가능성의 제거 여부를 묻는 데 대한 답변이라면, 고도의 개연성은 남은 의심을 통상인이라면 품지 않을 정도인지에 대한 판정 기준이다. 이를 구별해야 판시의 문언이 무엇을 정하고 무엇을 정하지 않는지 드러난다.
개연성이라는 말이 주관적 확신을 숨길 수 있다는 반론은 이 구별을 겨냥한다. 판사 한 사람의 내적 확신이 개연성이라는 이름 아래 사실상의 규칙이 되고, 이를테면 90% 같은 수치가 규범인 것처럼 쓰인다면 판단 기준은 사라진다. 문언은 그 판정이 통상인이라면 의심을 품지 않을 정도일 것을 필요로 한다고 하여 판단자를 통상인의 관점에 묶고 있을 뿐, 어떤 수치를 제시하지 않는다. 반론이 지적한 주관성의 위험은 지워지지 않지만, 문언에 없는 값을 만들어 넣는 방식으로 그 위험을 다루지는 않는다.
이 문언을 합성 장면에 적용할 때 고려되는 사실은 하나이다. 이 장면은 요건사실의 증명 여부와 그 불명의 위험을 부담할 사람이 정확히 연결될 때 판단할 수 있다. 어떤 사실이 불명인지, 그리고 그 불명의 위험을 누가 부담하는지 특정되지 않은 경우에는 적용할 규칙을 고를 수 없으므로 장면만으로는 판정이 미확정으로 남는다. 같은 불명이라도 적용되는 증명책임 규칙이 달라지면 패소 위험의 귀속을 바꾼다는 점이 이 경계를 보여준다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 해당 원문 문언만을 불명확한 사실에 따른 패소 위험 귀속 판정의 근거로 쓴다. 해당 원문 범위 안의 문언만 적용하며, 판결이유나 다른 항으로 확장하지 않는다. 문언이 고도의 개연성을 기준으로 삼는다는 점은 확인되지만, 그 기준을 어떤 백분율로 옮기거나 요건별로 어떻게 배분하는지는 정해지지 않았다.
1.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
사실상 질문과 증명 촉구의 기능을 인정하되 청구원인을 제출할 당사자의 역할을 대신했다고 보지 않는 가운데, 남은 물음은 어떤 사실에 관한 확신이 얼마만큼 모여야 판단이 끝나는가이다. 이 기준은 확신의 양을 새 단위로 나누지 않고 판단의 문턱만을 지정한다.
대법원 2010. 10. 28. 선고 2008다6755 판결은 판결요지 [1]에서 그 기준을 이렇게 서술한다. “[1] 민사소송에서 사실의 증명은 추호의 의혹도 있어서는 아니 되는 자연과학적 증명은 아니나, 특별한 사정이 없는 한 경험칙에 비추어 모든 증거를 종합 검토하여 어떠한 사실이 있었다는 점을 시인할 수 있는 고도의 개연성을 증명하는 것이고, 그 판정은 통상인이라면 의심을 품지 않을 정도일 것을 필요로 한다.” 여기서 증명의 주체는 요건사실을 주장하는 당사자이고, 증명의 대상은 그 사실이 있었다는 점이며, 판단의 조건은 모든 증거의 종합 검토와 경험칙에 따른 시인 가능성이다.
위 문언은 두 단계를 구별하게 한다. 첫째는 요건사실이 있었는지를 판단하는 증명의 정도이고, 둘째는 그 판단이 끝내 나지 않았을 때 불명의 위험을 누가 떠안는지 정하는 귀속의 문제이다. 전자가 민사사실을 인정하려면 모든 가능성이 제거되어야 하는가에 대한 답이라면, 후자는 남은 의심이 생긴 뒤의 분배이다. 증명의 정도를 사실을 인정할 수 있는 확신의 기준으로 둔 이유도 여기에 있다. 그 기준은 판단의 문턱을 정할 뿐이며, 문턱에 이르지 못한 경우의 부담까지 스스로 정하지 않는다.
통상인의 의심이 아니라 판사의 확신이라는 이름 아래 권위가 옮겨지고, 확신의 수준이 말로만 통제될 수 있다는 점이 문제로 지적된다. 판시는 경험칙과 증거의 종합을 말할 뿐 수치의 문턱을 제시하지 않았고, 수치로 바꾸는 순간 확인된 문언이 아닌 기준이 새로 생긴다. 반론이 지적한 손실은 그대로 남는다.
이 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 하나이다. 이 경우 증명의 정도는 요건사실의 인정에 이르렀는지를 묻는 데까지 작동하고, 남은 불명은 그 지점에서 멈춘다. 다만 어떤 사실이 불명인지, 그리고 그 불명의 위험을 누가 부담하는지가 특정되지 않았으므로, 이 장면만으로 패소 위험의 귀속을 확정할 수는 없다. 합성 장면에 설정된 연도나 금액, 판결 결과가 없으므로 이행이나 회수의 상태도 함께 정해지지 않는다. 만약 적용되는 증명책임 규칙이 달라지는 것이 확인되면 패소 위험의 귀속이 달라진다는 점도 남는다.
정리하면, 이 물음에 허용되는 답은 단계 안의 세부 구분을 작동하는 경우·막히는 경우·미확정인 경우 조건에 한정한다는 것이다. 작동하는 경우는 요건사실의 증명 여부와 그 불명의 위험을 부담할 사람이 정확히 연결된 경우이고, 막히는 경우는 핵심 요건사실이 끝내 증명되지 않았고 그 불명의 위험을 해당 청구자가 부담하는 경우이며, 미확정인 경우는 어떤 사실이 불명인지 또는 누가 그 위험을 부담하는지 특정되지 않은 경우이다. 여기에 추가 단계를 발명하거나 백분율 환산을 끼워 넣는 답은 허용되지 않는다.
1.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
여기서는 민사사실을 인정하려면 모든 가능성이 제거되어야 하는가라는 물음에 이어, 불명확한 사실에 따른 패소 위험의 귀속을 실효·차단·미확정으로 가르는 기준을 묻는다. 이 구별은 증명의 정도라는 문제와 증명책임의 귀속이라는 문제를 겹쳐 놓지 않아야만 성립한다.
이 물음에 해당하는 문언은 민사사실의 증명이 요구하는 정도를 직접 정한다. 판례는 "민사소송에서 사실의 증명은 추호의 의혹도 있어서는 아니 되는 자연과학적 증명은 아니나, 특별한 사정이 없는 한 경험칙에 비추어 모든 증거를 종합 검토하여 어떠한 사실이 있었다는 점을 시인할 수 있는 고도의 개연성을 증명하는 것이고, 그 판정은 통상인이라면 의심을 품지 않을 정도일 것을 필요로 한다"고 밝힌다(대법원 2010. 10. 28. 선고 2008다6755 판결). 이 문언은 증명의 주체인 소송에서 사실을 주장하는 당사자와 그 행위인 증명, 그리고 조건인 특별한 사정이 없는 한 경험칙에 비추어 모든 증거를 종합 검토한 뒤의 고도의 개연성을 가리킨다. 자연과학적 증명과 구별되는 사실 인정의 정도만을 정할 뿐이다.
이 문언이 정한 증명의 정도를 근거로 삼아 이번 물음의 결론이 선다. 판시는 민사사실의 증명은 자연과학적 확실성이 아니라 고도의 개연성의 기준을 따른다고 확인한다. 그런데 증명의 정도와 불명의 위험을 부담할 사람은 구별해야 한다. 전자는 어떤 정도로 확신하면 사실을 인정할 수 있는가의 문제이고, 후자는 그 확신에 이르지 못한 불명을 누가 짊어지는가의 문제다. 요건사실의 증명 여부와 그 불명의 위험을 부담할 사람이 정확히 연결되면 그 귀속은 열리고, 핵심 요건사실이 끝내 증명되지 않았는데 그 불명의 위험을 해당 청구자가 부담하면 닫힌다. 어떤 사실이 불명인지 또는 누가 그 위험을 부담하는지 특정되지 않으면 미확정으로 남는다.
가장 강한 반론은 개연성이라는 말이 주관적 확신을 숨길 수 있다는 데서 나온다. 더 나아가 자료를 가진 쪽이 침묵하면 통상적 증명책임이 실질적 불평등을 고착한다는 비판도 있다. 이 반론이 겨냥하는 손실은 검증 불가능한 심증이 사실 인정을 지배하고, 정보가 열세인 청구자가 상대방의 침묵까지 감당해야 하는 불이익이다. 그렇다고 이 불이익이 사라지는 것은 아니며, 반론이 지적한 정보의 불균형은 그대로 남는다. 다만 그 불평등의 해소가 증명의 정도 자체를 수치화하는 일로 이어진다고는 볼 수 없다.
여기서 양쪽 설명이 함께 놓이는 상태는 핵심 요건사실에 대한 불명을 만든다. 그런데 이 장면만으로는 어떤 사실이 끝내 불명인지, 또 그 불명의 위험을 원고 A와 피고 B 중 누가 부담할지 특정되지 않는다. 따라서 이 절이 범위하는 조건으로는 이 사안을 실효나 차단으로 판정할 수 없고 미확정으로 남겨야 한다. 판결 결과나 이행 여부는 이 장면에 설정되어 있지 않다.
따라서 이번 단계가 허용하는 결론은 조건부 구별에 한정된다. 요건사실의 증명 여부와 불명의 위험 부담자가 정확히 연결된 경우만 열린 것으로 보고, 핵심 요건사실이 끝내 증명되지 않았고 그 불명을 해당 청구자가 부담하는 경우만 막힌 것으로 본다. 어떤 사실이 불명인지 또는 누가 그 위험을 부담하는지 특정되지 않은 경우를 열림이나 닫힘으로 확정하는 것은 허용되지 않는다.
1.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
사실의 인정에 남는 의심을 어디까지 견딜 것인가의 문제는 끝없는 가능성을 모두 지우라고 하면 사실판단이 끝나지 않는다는 점에서 시작한다. 앞의 분석 단계까지 이어진 결론은 민사사실을 인정하려면 모든 가능성이 제거되어야 하는가라는 물음에 자연과학적 확실성의 기준은 요구되지 않는다는 한 문장으로만 이어받는다. 이제 남은 의심의 수준이 무엇을 결정하는지, 그리고 그 수준이 닿지 않을 때 어떤 요건이 실패로 남는지를 묻는다.
이 물음에 대답하는 문언은 (대법원 2010. 10. 28. 선고 2008다6755 판결) 판결요지 [1]에 있다. 그 문언은 민사소송에서 사실의 증명은 추호의 의혹도 있어서는 아니 되는 자연과학적 증명은 아니나, 특별한 사정이 없는 한 경험칙에 비추어 모든 증거를 종합 검토하여 어떠한 사실이 있었다는 점을 시인할 수 있는 고도의 개연성을 증명하는 것이고, 그 판정은 통상인이라면 의심을 품지 않을 정도일 것을 필요로 한다고 적는다. 여기서 다루는 주체는 사실을 인정할 법원이고, 행위는 모든 증거의 종합 검토이며, 조건은 경험칙에 비추어 본 고도의 개연성의 도달이다.
이 문언은 두 판단 단계를 나누어 둔다. 첫째는 증명의 정도, 곧 사실을 인정할 수 있는 확신의 기준이 무엇인지 정하는 것이고, 둘째는 이 사건의 증거가 그 기준에 닿았는지 대조하는 것이다. 판례가 요구한 고도의 개연성은 전자의 기준이며, 자연과학적 증명과 구별되는 것은 추호의 의혹까지 남김없이 지우라는 뜻이 아니라 통상인이 의심을 품지 않을 정도를 가리키는 것이다. 따라서 어떤 가능성이 상상으로 남아 있다는 이유만으로 사실의 인정이 무너지지 않는다는 결론이 이 기준에서 나온다.
개연성이라는 말이 주관적 확신을 숨길 수 있다는 반론은 이 구별이 불러일으키는 손실을 겨냥한다. 기준이 말로만 정해지고 평가자의 감에 맡겨지면, 자료를 가진 쪽이 침묵해도 통상적 증명책임이 그 불평등을 그대로 고착한다는 비판이 남는다. 판시가 정한 것은 확신의 정도에 관한 기준일 뿐, 그 기준을 수치 점수로 옮겨 자동으로 판정하라는 지시가 아니므로, 반론이 지적한 주관성의 위험은 기준의 구체화로 줄일 수 있을지언정 환산으로 없앨 수 없다.
이 장면에 놓인 사실을 이 기준과 대조하면 경계가 분명해진다. 전자는 고도의 개연성에 닿지 못한 것이고, 후자는 별도로 그 기준을 채운 것이 아니다. 한쪽의 미증명이 다른 쪽의 입증으로 자동 전환되지 않는 이상, 요건별 주장·증거·법정 추정·사실인정과 증명책임 판단의 기록은 어떤 사실이 끝내 불명으로 남았는지 그리고 그 불명의 위험을 누가 부담하는지를 가르는 데에 쓰인다. 어떤 사실이 불명인지, 또 누가 그 위험을 부담하는지가 특정되지 않은 상태에서는 이 절만으로 확정할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 민사상 사실 증명이 자연과학적 확실성이 아니라 판례가 말하는 고도의 개연성의 기준을 따르며, 그래서 모든 가능성이 제거되지 않았다는 이유만으로 사실의 인정이 부정되지 않는다는 것이다. 다만 이 결론은 증명의 정도를 정하는 데 그치고, 그 기준을 넘지 못한 불명의 결과를 누구에게 귀속할지까지는 정하지 않는다. 같은 불명이라도 적용되는 증명책임 규칙이 달라지면 패소 위험의 귀속을 바꾸기 때문이다. 사실이 끝내 불명일 때 어떤 요건이 실패하는가?