Summary
A fact remaining unclear as to its truth must be distinguished from a dispute over the legal perspective to be applied, and a gap in legal explanation alone does not determine the nonexistence of a requisite fact.
3.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
법의 뜻을 아직 정하지 못했다는 이유로 사건에서 일어난 일까지 사라지는 것은 아니다. 증명책임의 귀속은 증명의 정도와 다르며 해당 판례는 발화 원인이 회사 직원들의 과실에 있음을 증명할 책임이 원고에게 있다고 보았지만, 앞선 논증의 요지는 그 귀속이 밝혀진 방향대로 놓인다는 것이었다. 이제 남는 물음은 그 구제가 작동하는 조건이다. 즉 요건사실의 증명 여부와 그 불명의 위험을 부담할 사람이 정확히 연결된 경우라는 조건이 실제로 성립하는지, 아니면 어긋나는지가 판단의 자리에 놓인다.
이 물음에 답하려면 먼저 해당 문언의 자리로 돌아가야 한다. 민사소송법 제202조(자유심증주의)는 "법원은 변론 전체의 취지와 증거조사의 결과를 참작하여" 사실주장의 진실 여부를 판단한다고 정한다(민사소송법 제202조). 이 문언이 직접 가리키는 주체는 법원이고, 행위는 변론 전체의 취지와 증거조사 결과에 대한 참작이며, 조건은 자유로운 심증과 논리·경험의 법칙에 따른 판단이다. 이 조문이 다루는 것은 사실주장의 진위이며, 적용할 규범을 정하는 문제는 이 문언만으로 결정되지 않는다.
이 근거는 소정의 결론과 이어진다. 사실의 진위불명과 적용할 법률상 관점의 다툼은 구분해야 하며 법률상 설명의 공백만으로 요건사실의 부존재를 정하지 않는다. 요건사실이 무엇인지를 특정하는 단계와, 특정된 요건사실의 증명이 끝났는지를 판단하는 단계는 서로 다른 판단을 요구한다. 전자가 먼저 열리지 않으면 후자가 판단할 대상이 없고, 후자의 불명이 곧 전자의 공백을 메우지도 않는다. 두 단계를 이어 놓는 연결점이 바로 요건사실의 증명 여부와 그 불명의 위험을 부담할 사람의 대응이며, 이 대응이 정확히 맞물린 자리에서만 이 구제는 작동한다.
그러나 요건의 뜻이 정해지지 않으면 무엇을 증명할지도 알기 어렵다는 반론은 사라지지 않는다. 반론은 법률상 관점이 불확정한 상태가 증명의 표적을 흐리고, 결과적으로 청구가 실질적인 어려움에 빠지는 손실을 겨냥한다. 그 불편을 무시하면 요건의 특정은 사라지고 증명책임은 허공에 매달리는 셈이 된다. 그래도 법률 해석의 미확정을 사실의 부존재 증명으로 바꿀 수는 없다. 해석의 미확정은 규범의 뜻이 아직 정해지지 않은 상태이고, 부존재의 증명은 확인할 사실이 없다는 판단이며, 둘은 서로 다른 종류의 결론이다.
합성 장면에 놓인 사실은 이 구분을 시험한다. 원고 A의 원인 설명은 충분히 뒷받침되지 않았지만 피고 B의 대체 설명도 증명되지는 않았다. 이 장면에서 확인되는 것은 양쪽 설명 모두 끝내 뒷받침되지 않았다는 불명이며, 이 불명이 어느 쪽 설명의 부존재까지 정하는 것은 아니다. 따라서 이 장면으로 확정되는 것은 요건사실의 증명 여부와 그 불명의 위험을 부담할 사람이 연결된 상태가 요구된다는 조건이며, 요건의 뜻이 실제로 어떻게 정해졌는지, 어떤 사실이 최종적으로 인정되는지는 이 장면만으로 밝혀지지 않는다. 같은 불명이라도 적용되는 증명책임 규칙이 달라지면 패소 위험의 귀속을 바꾸는 검사 기준은 이 범위 안에서만 놓인다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 사실의 진위불명과 적용할 법률상 관점의 다툼을 구분하고 요건사실의 증명 여부와 그 불명의 위험을 부담할 사람이 정확히 연결된 경우에 이 구제가 작동한다는 것이다. 법률상 다툼은 확인할 사실에 적용할 규범과 해석에 관한 다툼을 뜻하며, 이 뜻을 정하지 못한 상태를 사실의 부존재로 바꾸어 읽는 것은 이 절이 허용하지 않는다. 반대로 요건사실이 끝내 증명되지 않았고 그 불명의 위험을 해당 청구자가 부담하는 경우의 판정은 유보한다.
3.2The Conditions That Block Relief
요건사실의 증명 여부와 그 불명의 위험을 부담할 사람이 정확히 연결된 경우에는 이 구제가 작동한다고 앞 절에서 밝혔다. 그런데 확인할 사실에 적용할 규범과 해석을 두고 법률상 다툼이 남아 있으면, 그 미확정이 곧바로 사건에서 일어난 일의 부정으로 이어지는지 물어야 한다. 이번 물음은 법률상 해석이 다투어지는 상태를 사실의 미증명으로 처리할 수 있는가에 맞춰진다.
이 물음에 해당하는 원문은 두 가지 법률상 절차의 문언이다. 민사소송법 제136조는 「법원은 당사자가 간과하였음이 분명하다고 인정되는 법률상 사항에 관하여 당사자에게 의견을 진술할 기회를 주어야 한다」라고 정하면서(민사소송법 제136조), 확인할 사실에 적용할 규범과 해석을 다루는 법률상 사항이 당사자의 사실 주장과는 다른 층위에 있음을 보여 준다. 한편 민사소송법 제202조는 「법원은 변론 전체의 취지와 증거조사의 결과를 참작하여 … 사실주장이 진실한지 아닌지를 판단한다」라고 정하고(민사소송법 제202조), 사실주장의 진위 판단 대상을 분명히 가리킨다. 여기서 법률상 다툼은 확인할 사실에 적용할 규범과 해석에 관한 다툼을 뜻하며, 이는 진위를 판단할 사실주장과 구별된다.
이 두 문언을 이으면 이 절의 결론이 나온다. 법원이 변론 전체의 취지와 증거조사의 결과로 판단하는 대상은 사실주장의 진실 여부이고(민사소송법 제202조), 그 판단에 적용할 규범과 해석은 별도의 법률상 사항으로 남는다. 이 구별이 필요한 까닭은, 사실의 진위불명은 증거로 뒷받침된 사실 주장이 진실한지 확정되지 않은 상태인 반면 법률상 다툼은 확인된 사실에 어떤 규범을 적용할지가 정해지지 않은 상태이기 때문이다. 전자가 후자로 대체되지 않는 한, 핵심 요건사실이 끝내 증명되지 않았고 그 불명의 위험을 해당 청구자가 부담하는 경우에만 이 구제가 막힌다. 요건사실의 증명 여부와 그 불명의 위험을 부담할 사람이 정확히 연결되는 경우와 구분되는 지점이 바로 여기에 있다.
이 구별에 반대하는 가장 강한 물음은 요건의 뜻이 정해지지 않으면 무엇을 증명할지도 알기 어렵다는 점을 겨눈다. 청구자가 어떤 사실을 어떻게 모아야 하는지 그 지도선부터 흔들리면, 실제로는 자료를 가진 쪽이 침묵하는 상황에서 통상적 증명책임이 실질적 불평등을 고착한다는 손실이 생긴다. 이 불이익은 지워지지 않는다. 그래도 요건의 의미 해석이 미확정인 상태와 요건사실이 진실임이 증명되지 않은 상태는 놓이는 자리가 다르다. 전자의 경우 법원은 당사자에게 의견을 진술할 기회를 줄 법률상 사항의 문제로 남기고(민사소송법 제136조), 후자의 경우에 한하여 증명 여부와 그 불명의 위험을 부담할 사람을 연결하여 판단한다.
합성 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 하나다. 원고 A가 제시한 원인 설명이 뒷받침되지 않았다는 점은, 핵심 요건사실이 끝내 증명되지 않았다는 차단 조건의 사실 쪽에 대응한다. 그러나 그 불명의 위험을 원고 A가 부담하는지는 이 장면만으로 확정되지 않았다. 적용할 규범과 해석이 법률상 다툼으로 남아 있는 범위에서, 요건의 뜻에 관한 미확정을 원고 A 쪽의 사실 부존재로 돌려 판단할 수는 없다. 따라서 이 장면이 가리키는 것은 차단 조건의 사실 요소가 채워졌다는 점이지, 그 불명의 위험 귀속까지 판정된 것은 아니다. 요건사실의 증명 여부와 그 불명의 위험을 부담할 사람이 정확히 연결되지 않은 한 미확정이 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 핵심 요건사실이 끝내 증명되지 않았고 그 불명의 위험을 해당 청구자가 부담하는 경우에, 이 구제가 막힌다고 말할 수 있다. 반대로 요건의 뜻을 두고 법률상 다툼이 남았다는 사정만으로 그 구제가 막혔다고 말할 수는 없다. 어떤 사실이 불명인지, 또 그 위험을 누가 부담하는지가 특정되지 않은 경우에도 확정된 판단은 미루어진다. 만약 적용되는 증명책임 규칙이 달라지는 것이 확인되면 패소 위험의 귀속이 달라지는데, 이는 바로 이 경계를 표시한다. 남은 자료의 경계는 자료가 없어 판정할 수 없는 경계는 어디인가?라는 물음으로 넘겨진다.
3.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
증명책임의 귀속은 증명의 정도와 다르며 해당 판례는 발화 원인이 회사 직원들의 과실에 있음을 증명할 책임이 원고에게 있다고 보았다. 이제 법의 뜻을 정하지 못한 상태에서 사건의 기록을 어떻게 다룰지가 남는다. 여기서 문제는 무엇이 실제로 일어났는지가 아니라, 확인할 사실에 어떤 규범을 적용할 것인지가 먼저 정해지지 않았다는 점이다. 두 가지 상태를 함께 묶어 판단하면, 아직 정해지지 않은 법률상 기준 때문에 사실의 부존재까지 확정한 결과가 된다. 그러므로 법률상 해석이 다투어지는 상태를 사실의 미증명으로 처리할 수 있는가를 묻는다.
여기서 법률상 다툼은 확인할 사실에 적용할 규범과 해석에 관한 다툼을 뜻한다. 이 다툼은 이미 확인된 사실에 어떤 법적 의미를 부여할지가 정해지지 않았음을 말하며, 사실 자체가 기록에 없음을 뜻하지는 않는다. 그러므로 판단할 대상이 어느 쪽에서 불확실한지 먼저 가려야 하고, 그 결과는 남은 판단 단계에도 영향을 미친다. 같은 표면상의 공백이라도 무엇이 미정인지에 따라 처리 방법이 달라진다.
그 구별이 필요한 까닭은 사실의 부존재와 판단 기준의 미정이 각각 다른 판단 단계에 속하기 때문이다. 전자가 기록에 남은 사실 주장을 뒷받침하는 자료가 충분한지의 문제라면, 후자는 그 사실에 적용할 규범을 어떻게 읽을지의 문제다. 따라서 어떤 사실이 불명인지 또는 누가 그 위험을 부담하는지 특정되지 않은 경우, 판단 재료가 특정되지 않은 사항은 불능과 구별해 미확정으로 남긴다. 여기서 미확정으로 남긴다는 것은 판단을 보류해 두는 것이지, 그 사항이 없다고 확정하는 것이 아니다.
가장 강한 반론은 요건의 뜻이 정해지지 않으면 무엇을 증명할지도 알기 어렵다는 점을 겨눈다. 어떤 사실이 요건에 해당하는지 알 수 없으면 당사자는 반박할 대상을 찾지 못하고, 자료를 가진 쪽이 침묵하면 통상적 증명책임이 실질적 불평등을 고착할 수 있다. 요건의 의미가 흔들리는 동안 증명의 방향과 범위가 함께 흔들리므로, 사실 문제를 먼저 매듭짓지 않고는 절차가 굴러가지 않는다는 걱정이다. 이 불편을 지우지 않은 채 결론을 유지할 수 있는지는, 그 불확실성이 사실의 부존재로 기록되는지를 가르는 문제다. 요건의 해석이 미정이라는 이유만으로 사실의 부존재를 인정하면, 반론이 지적한 불평등은 오히려 법률 해석을 유보한 채 당사자의 손실로 확정되는 형태가 된다.
이 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 것은 두 설명의 뒷받침 정도가 모두 기준에 이르지 못했다는 것뿐이며, 어느 설명이 실제로 사건을 일으켰는지는 여기서 정해지지 않았다. 따라서 어떤 사실이 불명인지 또는 누가 그 위험을 부담하는지 특정되지 않은 범위는 미확정으로 남는다. 같은 불명이라도 적용되는 증명책임 규칙이 달라지면 패소 위험의 귀속을 바꾼다. 이는 발생한 사건이 아니라 판정 조건을 바꾸는 검사이며, 자료 부족은 미확정일 뿐 곧바로 구제 불능을 뜻하지 않는다. 이 절에서 확정할 수 없는 사항으로 남는 범위를 실제 승패·이행 결과까지 넓히지 않는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은, 확인할 사실에 적용할 규범과 해석에 관한 다툼이 남은 상태에서 사실의 부존재까지 확정하지 않는 처리다. 허용되지 않는 것은, 요건의 뜻이 정해지지 않았다는 이유로 요건사실이 없다고 기록하거나, 미확정으로 남은 사항을 이미 판정이 끝난 것으로 다루는 처리다. 요건사실의 증명 여부와 그 불명의 위험을 부담할 사람이 정확히 연결되는 경우에 한해 패소 위험의 귀속을 말할 수 있고, 반대의 경우는 여기서 확정하지 않는다. 요건사실이 끝내 증명되지 않았고 그 불명의 위험을 해당 청구자가 부담하는 경우에 이르는지는 별도의 판단에 맡긴다.
3.4The Records Needed for Determination
증명책임의 귀속은 증명의 정도와 구별되며 발화 원인의 입증 책임이 누구에게 있는지는 앞서 다루었다. 같은 사정을 두고도 판정 단계가 달라지면 빈칸의 의미가 달라진다. 어떤 기록이 있어야 법률상 해석이 다투어지는 상태와 사실의 미증명 상태를 구별할 수 있는가. 이 물음은 이 절에서 유일하게 다루는 것이다.
민사소송법 제202조는 “법원은 변론 전체의 취지와 증거조사의 결과를 참작하여 자유로운 심증으로 사회정의와 형평의 이념에 입각하여 논리와 경험의 법칙에 따라 사실주장이 진실한지 아닌지를 판단한다”라고 정한다. 이 문언의 주체는 법원이고, 판단할 대상은 “사실주장”이며, 판단의 재료는 변론 전체의 취지와 증거조사의 결과다. 즉 제202조가 다루는 것은 사실의 진실성이고, 적용할 규범이 무엇인지에 관한 것은 그 판단 대상이 아니다.
그리고 민사소송법 제136조 제4항은 “법원은 당사자가 간과하였음이 분명하다고 인정되는 법률상 사항에 관하여 당사자에게 의견을 진술할 기회를 주어야 한다”라고 정한다. 두 조문의 자리를 나란히 놓으면 구분의 근거가 나온다. 이 절의 결론은 이 구분에 기초한다. 요건별 주장·증거·법정 추정·사실인정과 증명책임 판단에 대해서는 기록된 자료만으로 단계를 판정한다. 단계 판정은 정해진 기록으로만 한다. 없는 기록을 추정으로 메우지 않는다. 제202조의 사실 판단과 제136조 제4항의 법률상 사항은 그 대상이 다르므로, 한쪽의 공백을 다른 쪽의 기록으로 보충할 수 없다.
이 구분에는 반론이 뒤따른다. 요건의 뜻이 정해지지 않으면 무엇을 증명할지도 알기 어렵다는 것이다. 이 반론이 겨냥하는 불편은 실질적이다. 어느 사실이 요건에 해당하는지가 모호하면 당사자는 증거의 방향을 잡지 못하고, 자료를 가진 쪽이 침묵하면 통상적 증명책임 규칙이 자료의 불평등을 그대로 고착할 수 있다. 그런데 이 불편을 인정한다고 해서 구분 자체가 무너지지는 않는다. 반론이 지적한 문제는 기록이 남기 때문에 오히려 두텁게 남는다.
합성 장면에 놓고 보면, 원고 A의 원인 설명은 충분히 뒷받침되지 않았지만 피고 B의 대체 설명도 증명되지는 않았다. 여기서 확인할 것은 기록의 모양이다. A의 주장과 제출 증거는 요건별로 남고, B의 대체 설명도 별도의 주장·증거로 남는다. 다만 이 장면만으로는 어떤 사실이 끝내 불명인지, 그리고 그 불명이 어느 요건사실에 해당하는지 특정되지 않았으므로 이 시점의 판정은 미확정으로 둔다. 요건사실의 증명 여부와 그 불명의 위험을 부담할 사람이 정확히 연결된 경우에만 단계가 정해진다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론의 경계는 이렇다. 기록에 남은 주장·증거·법정 추정·사실인정과 증명책임 판단만으로 단계를 매길 수 있다. 법률 해석의 미확정을 요건사실의 부존재로 옮겨 적는 일은 허용되지 않는다.
3.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
Even while it is disputed which norm should be applied to the confirmed facts, the existence or nonexistence of those facts themselves remains a separate object of judgment. If the two uncertainties are handled together in this scene, the stages of adjudication become entangled. The question now is to distinguish and examine what has not been proved and to what that uncertainty is attributed.
Beginning with the text that governs the dispute, Article 202 of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "The court shall decide whether an assertion of fact is true or not by taking into consideration the tenor of the whole oral argument and the results of the evidence examination, by free evaluation of evidence, grounded on the ideals of social justice and equity, and in accordance with the rules of logic and experience." The subject regulated by this text is the court, the object of judgment is the truth or falsity of the assertion of fact, and the materials of judgment are the tenor of the whole oral argument and the results of the evidence examination. If the question of determining which norm to apply is inserted into this as well, the object of judgment changes.
Reaching a conclusion on the basis of that distinction, the inability to determine the truth or falsity of a fact and the dispute over the legal point of view to be applied must be distinguished, and the absence of a requisite fact is not determined on the sole basis of a gap in legal explanation. The former is the state in which one cannot discern whether the confirmed fact is true; the latter is a dispute over the norm and interpretation to be applied to the facts to be confirmed.
The counterargument to this distinction aims at substantive inequality. If the meaning of a requirement is not settled, it is difficult to know what is to be proved, and if the party holding the materials remains silent, the ordinary burden of proof entrenches substantive inequality. This concern points to the abuse by which the burden of proof falls on one side in cases where the records and the allocation of materials are uneven, and if the counterargument is accepted, the unfavorable part cannot be erased. This is because filling a gap in interpretation and proving the existence or nonexistence of a fact belong to separate stages.
Contrasting the conditions with this scene, in the records of the assertions and evidence for each requirement, legal presumptions, findings of fact, and the determination of the burden of proof, plaintiff A's explanation of the cause was not sufficiently supported, and defendant B's alternative explanation was not proved either. Here, where the key requisite fact was ultimately not proved and the risk of that uncertainty is borne by the relevant claimant, the blocking condition is satisfied; but where it is not specified which fact is uncertain or who bears that risk, the matter remains undetermined. The facts, service, and performance results of the actual case, and any judgment outcome not present in the scene, have not been confirmed, and therefore cannot be determined by this scene.
The conclusion permitted in this section is that the attribution of the risk of losing is determined only where the question whether the requisite fact has been proved is precisely connected to the person who bears the risk of that uncertainty; taking a gap in legal explanation as grounds for the nonexistence of a requisite fact is not permitted. Accordingly, the outcome of winning or losing, recovery, and on-site effects cannot be asserted, and unconfirmed values remain undetermined.
3.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
The question addressed now is whether a state in which legal interpretation is in dispute may be treated as non-proof of the fact. The counterargument that if the meaning of a requirement is not settled it is difficult to know what is to be proved arises at this point. The issue is how to determine the existence or nonexistence of a fact in the face of an unsettled legal norm.
The relevant text is Article 202 of the Civil Procedure Act, and its text provides that the court decides whether an assertion of fact is true or not by taking into consideration the tenor of the whole oral argument and the results of the evidence examination, by free evaluation of evidence, grounded on the ideals of social justice and equity, and in accordance with the rules of logic and experience. This Article sets the subject of judgment as the court, the object of judgment as the truth or falsity of the assertion of fact, and the basis of judgment as the tenor of the oral argument and the results of the evidence examination. The question of fixing the meaning of the norm lies in a dimension separate from the truth or falsity of the fact that this judgment handles. Whether this Article prescribes other adjudicative procedures as well is not addressed in this chapter.
Therefore, the inability to determine the truth or falsity of a fact and the dispute over the legal point of view to be applied must be distinguished, and the nonexistence of a requisite fact cannot be determined on the sole basis of a gap in legal explanation. The object of the formation of conviction required by Article 202 of the Civil Procedure Act is the assertion of fact, and the indeterminacy of norm interpretation is not an entity that disappears within that object but a state in which the premises of application have not been filled. This is why the two stages are separated in this adjudication. One asks whether what occurred exists; the other asks what norm attaches to what has been confirmed. Filling the deficiency of the former with the gap of the latter, or moving it the other way, means substituting the object of judgment.
The strongest counterargument to this distinction aims at the point that if the party holding the materials remains silent, the ordinary burden of proof entrenches substantive inequality. That is, a party who does not know what to produce because the meaning of the requirement is unsettled is already disadvantaged at the stage of gathering evidence. The loss identified by the counterargument is the informational disadvantage borne by the side that does not know the scope of what must be explained within the procedure, and that disadvantage risks hardening the gap in legal knowledge into the risk of losing. Protecting the right to be asked questions and determining the nonexistence of a fact are not the same measure. What the former seeks to remedy is the opportunity to speak and the direction of explanation; what the latter determines is the failure of proof and the attribution of that risk. Efforts may be made to resolve the inequality identified by the counterargument, but the former cannot be moved into the place of the latter. Article 136, paragraph (4) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that the court shall give the parties an opportunity to state their opinions with respect to legal matters which appear to have been clearly overlooked by the parties. This provision only prescribes the duty to arrange a place to speak; the nonexistence of a fact is not determined at that place.
What is confirmed in this scene is that plaintiff A's explanation of the cause was not supported and that defendant B's alternative explanation was not proved either, and which explanation is true is not determined by the scene alone. If a legal dispute remains over the meaning of the requirement, that dispute remains as an item separate from how plaintiff A and defendant B each showed what occurred in the case. If it is confirmed that the applicable burden-of-proof rule differs, the attribution of the risk of losing differs as well; this means that the conditions for first distinguishing whether the cause of the uncertainty lies in statutory interpretation or in the evidence of the fact change. The year, amount, accrual date, and judgment outcome for which the scene fixes no value are not adjudicated here.
What this section permits as a conclusion is not to substitute the state in which the interpretation of the meaning of the requirement is undetermined with proof that the requisite fact does not exist. The dispute over the norm and interpretation to be applied to the facts to be confirmed remains as it is, and if that gap is read as the nonexistence of the fact, the object of judgment changes. Conversely, the evaluation of the facts already gathered does not change merely because the legal explanation is insufficient. The attribution of the risk of losing is determined only where the question whether the requisite fact has been proved is precisely connected to the person who bears the risk of that uncertainty, and so long as it is not specified which fact is uncertain or who bears that risk, that attribution also remains undetermined.
3.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
Be that as it may with confirmed facts, if the state in which the application of a norm is disputed is immediately mixed up with the state in which the fact is not proved, the appearance of the confirmed case is erased from the documents. The question that follows is a single one. Can a state in which legal interpretation is disputed be treated as non-proof of the fact? In the preceding section it was settled that the indeterminacy of legal interpretation cannot be converted into proof of the nonexistence of the fact, and the analysis now turns to what that distinction rests upon.
The relevant text for this question concerns the principle of free evaluation of evidence. Article 202 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that the court "decides whether an assertion of fact is true or not by taking into consideration the tenor of the whole oral argument and the results of the evidence examination, by free evaluation of evidence, …" (Article 202 of the Civil Procedure Act). What the court takes as the object of judgment here is the truth or falsity of the assertion of fact. That is, it is the question of what occurred; what norm to apply to that fact and what meaning to give it stands in a separate place immediately before this judgment.
Accordingly, only after what facts are to be confirmed is settled first can the conviction judgment asking truth or falsity be constituted. If these two are not distinguished here, the boundary between them collapses. The uncertainty as to truth or falsity means that an object remains to be filled by conviction; the dispute over the applicable norm means that the task of making the list of those objects has not yet been completed. If the latter is returned to the former, the court is charged with a nonexistent task of proof, and the procedural record of adjudication is consumed.
The strongest counterargument aims squarely at this point. While the meaning of the requirement is in flux, the standard for evaluating the materials presented is itself provisional, so the loss arising from that provisionality must not immediately be written down as the non-proof of fact of either side. The inequality identified by the counterargument must be handled as a gap in materials to be filled once interpretation has been fixed.
A synthetic scene is contrasted here with this question. This scene is a case in which the truth of a requisite fact is ultimately not ascertained; it does not address a case in which the legal provision to be applied to the requisite fact is disputed. So long as it is not specified which fact is uncertain and who bears the risk of that uncertainty, the attribution of the risk cannot be determined by this scene alone.
What this section permits is as follows. The inability to determine the truth of the facts to be confirmed is the place handled by the conviction judgment of Article 202 of the Civil Procedure Act, and the dispute over the legal point of view to be applied is the place that remains before asking the truth or falsity of the assertion of fact. One must not determine the nonexistence of a requisite fact on the ground that there is a gap in legal explanation, nor record the indeterminacy of interpretation as though it had been treated as non-proof of fact. Conversely, one must not pass the matter on with the choice of the legal provision to be applied itself deferred on the ground that the truth of the fact is uncertain.
3.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
The analysis thus far distinguishes the attribution of the burden of proof from the degree of proof, and takes over from that precedent only the single sentence that it placed upon the plaintiff the burden of proving that the cause of the fire lay in the negligence of the company's employees. That determination addressed the attribution of "what must be proved," but the question to be handled now is different. Can a state in which not the facts to be confirmed but the meaning of the law to be applied itself is still disputed be treated as identical to the state in which the requisite fact was ultimately not proved? This question does not repeat the attribution discussion of the neighboring section; it specifies that uncertainty of fact and uncertainty of law occupy different places.
As one of the Articles responding to this question, Article 202 of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "The court shall decide whether an assertion of fact is true or not by taking into consideration the tenor of the whole oral argument and the results of the evidence examination, by free evaluation of evidence, grounded on the ideals of social justice and equity, and in accordance with the rules of logic and experience." The subject of the judgment entrusted by this text is the court, the object of judgment is "whether an assertion of fact is true or not," and the materials of judgment are the tenor of the whole oral argument and the results of the evidence examination. Thus this Article deals with the truth of facts, and does not determine at once which norm and interpretation are to be applied as well. The only range in which this Article is adduced in this section is limited to drawing the line that distinguishes whether the object of judgment is fact or law (Article 202 of the Civil Procedure Act).
Another Article supporting the same question, Article 136 of the Civil Procedure Act, provides: "The court shall give the parties an opportunity to state their opinions with respect to legal matters which appear to have been clearly overlooked by the parties" (Article 136 of the Civil Procedure Act). This text treats "legal matters" separately from facts, and has the court give an opportunity to state opinions with respect to legal matters that appear to have been overlooked by a party. It is no accident that "the truth of assertions of fact" and "legal matters" are written separately in this way. If the preceding Article sets the framework for judging the truth of facts, the following Article ensures that a legal dispute over the norm and interpretation to be applied is not decided without passing through the parties' opportunity to state their views. Not mixing these two places is the starting point for ensuring that, merely because the meaning of the law is undetermined, what occurred in the case is not erased as well.
Even so, the counterargument that if the meaning of a requirement is not settled it is difficult to know what is to be proved carries real force. So long as the meaning of the requisite fact is not closed, a party cannot grasp which facts to support and how, and if the party holding the materials remains silent, the ordinary burden of proof entrenches substantive inequality. This inconvenience and loss are not light. But the force of this counterargument lies closer to a question of the order in which what is to be proved is determined, and it does not go so far as to determine, on the ground that the requisite fact was ultimately not proved, even the indeterminacy of the legal point of view to be applied as the nonexistence of fact. For that reason the answer given is that "the indeterminacy of legal interpretation cannot be converted into proof of the nonexistence of the fact." Here the object of defense is the line of not rewriting the gap in explanation as the nonexistence of the requisite fact, while leaving the unfavorable points of the counterargument in place.
One fact can be confirmed in the synthetic scene. "Plaintiff A's explanation of the cause was not sufficiently supported, but defendant B's alternative explanation was not proved either." This scene places together the side that plaintiff A's explanation was not supported and the side that defendant B's alternative explanation was not proved. The point where it touches the premise received earlier is that the determination that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving that the cause of the ignition lay in the negligence of the company's employees is given as the framework for evaluating the insufficient explanations in this scene. However, the scene does not go so far as to say whether the norm and interpretation to be applied were still unsettled. Therefore, whether a legal dispute actually existed in this scene remains undetermined. If, even though some norm and interpretation have been settled, facts to be confirmed remain, that empty place remains as a question of the truth of the fact.
The conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. It is not permitted to bind together the place where it is judged whether the facts to be confirmed are true and the place where the norm and interpretation to be applied to that fact are disputed, and to harden them into a single determination of nonexistence. Nor is the nonexistence of the requisite fact immediately determined merely because a gap in legal explanation has appeared; a lack of materials is an undetermined state, not immediately incurable. This section does not, however, determine which requisite fact is actually nonexistent, or upon whom the risk of that uncertainty should be placed. This leaves "the attribution of the risk of losing arising from uncertain facts" as a question to be confirmed at another stage.
3.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
The meaning of the law spoken of here is the meaning of the norm to be applied, while what happened in the case is a fact subject to verification. Where the two become blurred together, what the court asks and what the court establishes diverge. The dispute over the norm and the interpretation to be applied to the facts to be verified, that is, a legal dispute, is set aside separately. The present question is whether, merely because this legal dispute is in progress, the matter may be treated as failure of proof of the fact.
The first clause of the relevant source text indicates the materials and method of judgment. Civil Procedure Act Article 202 provides: "The court shall determine whether a factual allegation is true or not by taking into consideration the tenor of the entire oral argument and the results of the examination of evidence, forming its free conviction, on the basis of the ideals of social justice and equity, and in accordance with the rules of logic and experience." The subject of this clause is the court, the act is the determination of whether a factual allegation is true, and the condition for taking into consideration is the tenor of the entire oral argument and the results of the examination of evidence. As the standard of judgment, the rules of logic and the rules of experience are placed together. What is handled here is whether the factual allegation is true, not the question of fixing the meaning of the norm to be applied.
Civil Procedure Act Article 136, paragraph (4) takes charge of a different stage. Its clause provides: "The court shall give the parties an opportunity to state their opinions on legal matters that it finds clearly to have been overlooked by the parties." Here the subject is again the court, the object is a legal matter, and the condition is the case in which it is found clearly that the parties have overlooked it. The act of the parties is the statement of opinions, and the duty of the court is the granting of that opportunity. The reason these two clauses must be placed side by side is that their objects of judgment differ. Article 202 deals with the truth or falsity of factual allegations, and Article 136, paragraph (4) deals with the opportunity surrounding the legal matter to be applied. In adjudicating the attribution of the risk of losing that follows from an unclear fact, this distinction is maintained. If the former clause is the framework for determining the truth or falsity of facts, the latter clause is a device that opens an opportunity to speak to the legal point of view. That the gap of a legal explanation alone does not establish the nonexistence of a fact requisite for a claim also derives from this distinction.
The strongest of the counterarguments aims at the point that the very starting point of the judgment is shaken. If the meaning of a requirement is not settled, it is difficult even to know what is to be proved, and if the ordinary burden of proof is applied as it stands in that state, substantive inequality becomes entrenched when the party possessing the materials remains silent. The loss that the counterargument points out is the litigation disadvantage borne by the party that has lost the direction of proof; the inconvenience is the situation in which the court must pronounce the nonexistence of facts in advance before fixing the meaning of the norm; and the value that is feared is the equity of the allocation of responsibility. Even without concealing these points, the conclusion is maintained. The gap surrounding the meaning of a requirement remains as indeterminacy of norm interpretation, and by that alone no fact is established to be absent.
In the synthetic scene, Plaintiff A's explanation of the cause was not sufficiently supported, but Defendant B's alternative explanation was also not proved. What is verified in this scene is only the state of fact that neither explanation has been established. In this state, in which which explanation is true has ultimately not been revealed, one cannot say that the meaning of the norm to be applied has been settled as well. That the same indeterminacy changes the attribution of the risk of losing if the applicable burden-of-proof rule differs shows that boundary. Accordingly, what is established by this scene is the condition that the attribution of the risk of losing is determined only when whether the facts requisite for a claim are proved and the person who bears the risk of that indeterminacy are precisely connected. Conversely, the part left in which which fact is indeterminate, or who bears that risk, remains unspecified and thus undetermined. The mere circumstance that materials are insufficient does not warrant the categorical assertion that relief is impossible. This adjudication takes place only within the extent that records remain in the form of allegations, evidence, statutory presumptions, findings of fact, and determinations of the burden of proof for each requirement.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Only the clauses of the relevant source text are used as the basis for adjudicating the attribution of the risk of losing that follows from an unclear fact, and only the clauses within that scope are applied. The clause of Article 202 deals with the determination of the truth of factual allegations, and the clause of Article 136, paragraph (4) deals with the opportunity to state opinions on overlooked legal matters. Relying on these clauses, one does not extend to the reasons for judgment or to other paragraphs, nor does one convert the indeterminacy of legal interpretation into proof of the nonexistence of fact. Reading a scene in which two unestablished explanations remain as an absence of established facts is also not permitted. Conversely, the conclusion that the determination of the truth of facts must stop merely because a legal dispute exists does not derive from these clauses either.
3.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
A legal dispute over the norm and the interpretation to be applied to the verified facts, in which views diverge, is a separate problem. In the state of leaving the records unrevised without resolving that dispute, it asks what the portion is that must be divided anew and adjudicated within the attribution of the risk of losing that follows from an unclear fact.
To this question, the relevant clause fixes the manner of judgment. Civil Procedure Act Article 202 provides that the court shall determine the truth of factual allegations by taking into consideration the tenor of the entire oral argument and the results of the examination of evidence. This provision fixes how the court shall adjudicate the truth or falsity of facts by what conviction, upon combining evidence and oral argument. Accordingly, that clause deals with the process by which judgment is made between the truth of a factual allegation and its contrary. That clause contains no rule that converts a state in which the law to be applied has not yet been determined into a denial of fact.
Further, Civil Procedure Act Article 136, paragraph (4) has the court give the parties an opportunity to state opinions on overlooked legal matters. The two clauses keep the stages of adjudication separate. One is the stage of determining whether facts are true; the other is the stage of giving an opportunity to hear views on the law to be applied. The reason for separating the two stages is that the former's remaining undetermined does not mean the nonexistence of facts requisite for a claim. In the previous stage, it was confirmed that the attribution of the burden of proof differs from the degree of proof. The detailed distinctions within a stage are limited to: the case in which whether the facts requisite for a claim are proved and the person who bears the risk of that indeterminacy are precisely connected; the case in which the core fact requisite for a claim has ultimately not been proved and the risk of that indeterminacy is borne by the claimant concerned; and the case in which which fact is indeterminate, or who bears that risk, is unspecified.
Then the counterargument remains that if the meaning of a requirement is not settled, it is difficult even to determine what is to be proved. The counterargument at issue aims at the loss that, if the party possessing the materials remains silent in the lawsuit, the ordinary burden of proof entrenches substantive inequality. If the procedure advances while it is undetermined which side is to prove, the burden of substantiation may unintentionally remain on one side alone. Such disadvantage cannot be ignored. The difficulty the counterargument points out arises in the state in which the procedure for fixing the meaning of the requirement has not yet been completed. If that state is treated as a denial of fact, contrary to the intent of the counterargument, the gap of interpretation is converted into a defect of proof.
Contrasting this with the present scene reveals the concrete use of the distinction. What is verified in this scene is the indeterminacy of fact that Plaintiff A's cause was ultimately not proved. However, as to what the meaning of the norm to be applied to the verified facts is, a separate interpretive dispute remains. The two items are not treated as the same. The results of service and performance in the actual case have not been verified. What this section fixes is the explicit conditional distinction.
Accordingly, if the proof status of the facts requisite for a claim and the person who bears the risk of that indeterminacy are precisely connected, the detailed distinction within the stage holds. If the core fact requisite for a claim has ultimately not been proved and the risk of that indeterminacy is borne by the claimant concerned, that claim is blocked. The state in which it is unspecified which fact is indeterminate, or who bears that risk, remains undetermined. The state of insufficient materials is not converted directly into impossibility of relief. What is permitted here is the explicit conditional adjudication, and determining the nonexistence of facts before fixing the meaning of the requirement is not permitted.
3.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
The attribution of the burden of proof differs from the degree of proof, and the preceding stage took the view that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the cause of the fire lay in the negligence of the company's employees. The question here is when the attribution of the risk of losing that follows from an unclear fact opens, when it is blocked, and when it remains undetermined. This division departs from separating a legal dispute—that is, a dispute over the norm and the interpretation to be applied to the facts to be verified—from the indeterminacy of the truth of the facts themselves.
The basis clause of this distinction is Civil Procedure Act Article 202. The subject this clause indicates is the court, the object of judgment is "whether a factual allegation is true or not", and the condition of judgment is the taking into consideration of the tenor of the entire oral argument and the results of the examination of evidence. The clause lays down no rule that reads a gap in legal interpretation as the nonexistence of fact.
Connecting that clause with the conclusion of this section, the condition that opens is the case in which the proof status of the facts requisite for a claim and the person who bears the risk of that indeterminacy are precisely connected. Here two concepts must be distinguished. One is what the facts requisite for a claim are and which side bears the responsibility of proving them—that is, the attribution of the burden of proof; the other is to what degree the evidence presented actually supports that requirement—that is, the degree of proof. Just as the former is not a product of the latter, so a deficiency in the latter does not change the allocation of the former. The condition that blocks is the case in which the core fact requisite for a claim has ultimately not been proved and the risk of that indeterminacy is borne by the claimant concerned.
The strongest of the counterarguments points out that if the meaning of a requirement is not settled, it is difficult even to know what is to be proved. The loss this counterargument aims at is substantive. If the extension of the requirement is vague, the parties cannot fix the target of substantiation, and if the party possessing the materials remains silent, the ordinary burden of proof entrenches such inequality. However, acknowledging that loss does not change the conclusion. Civil Procedure Act Article 136, paragraph (4) (Civil Procedure Act Article 136), which has the court give the parties an opportunity to state opinions on legal matters that the parties have overlooked, is a procedural channel for filling a gap of interpretation, not a ground for establishing the nonexistence of fact. Therefore the preceding answer is that the indeterminacy of legal interpretation cannot be converted into proof of the nonexistence of fact. The disadvantage the counterargument points out remains as it is.
The facts set in the synthetic scene are that Plaintiff A's explanation of the cause was not sufficiently supported, but Defendant B's alternative explanation was also not proved. Contrasting this scene with the foregoing conditions, while the deficiency of proof of the facts requisite for a claim on the plaintiff's side is verified, which side bears the risk of that indeterminacy is not specified by the scene alone, because what the applicable burden-of-proof rule is has not been determined. Accordingly, from the scene alone one cannot categorically assert that the risk of losing is definitively attributed to the plaintiff merely because of the deficiency of the plaintiff's explanation, and the unproven alternative explanation does not shift that risk to the defendant. This point remains undetermined.
What this section permits is as follows. Only in the case in which the proof status of the facts requisite for a claim and the person who bears the risk of that indeterminacy are precisely connected can effectiveness be spoken of, and in the case in which the core fact requisite for a claim has ultimately not been proved and the risk of that indeterminacy is borne by the claimant concerned can blockage be spoken of. Drawing the case in which it is unspecified which fact is indeterminate, or who bears that risk, into the foregoing two is not permitted. The Records of judgment remain in the form of allegations, evidence, statutory presumptions, findings of fact, and burden-of-proof determinations for each requirement.
3.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
The preceding section operates where the proof of the facts comprising the requirements and the person who must bear the risk of their non-establishment are precisely connected; it is foreclosed where the key requirement facts were ultimately left unproved and the claimant in question bears the risk of that non-establishment; and it remains undetermined where it is not specified which fact is undetermined or who bears that risk. Taking up from there, the question here is whether a state in which the legal interpretation is contested can be treated as non-proof of fact. The mere circumstance that the meaning of the requirement has not been fixed cannot be taken to mean that the existence of what occurred in the case is extinguished along with it. The fact to be ascertained and the norm to be applied to that fact are placed in different positions. The former is a matter of what appears in the records; the latter is a matter of by what legal yardstick that fact is to be read.
The textual provisions needed to answer this question are two. First, Article 202 of the Civil Procedure Act declares: "The court shall judge whether a party's assertion of fact is true or not by considering the tenor of the whole oral argument and the result of the examination of evidence, forming free conviction, on the basis of the ideals of social justice and equity, and in accordance with the rules of logic and experience." (Article 202 of the Civil Procedure Act) The subject designated by this text is the court, and its act is that of judging the truth or falsity of an assertion of fact by considering the tenor of the whole oral argument and the result of the examination of evidence. The rules of logic and experience presented as the standard of judgment are a framework for the finding of fact, not a device that substitutes for and settles the interpretation of the norm to be applied. Next, Article 136(4) of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "Where the court recognizes that a party has clearly overlooked a matter of law, the court shall give the party an opportunity to state an opinion thereon." (Article 136 of the Civil Procedure Act) This provision merely opens the procedure by which the court addresses a matter of law overlooked by a party, that is, a matter concerning the norm to be applied and its interpretation.
If these two texts are connected to the judgment of this section, the non-existence of fact and the gap in legal explanation are not placed side by side. The former is a state that the records bearing on the truth or falsity ultimately fail to support; the latter is a state in which the author has failed to sort out which statute should be attached to and read with the ascertained fact. The conclusion of this section is that the latter alone cannot produce the former. The reason the author deliberately keeps these two definitions apart is that, if the completion of the finding of fact is declared first while the norm to be applied is in flux, what was a reservation of legal judgment becomes fixed as a failure of the burden of proof, rather than an undetermined fact. The object of the free-evaluation judgment required by Article 202 of the Civil Procedure Act is the truth or falsity of an assertion of fact, not the pendency of a choice of norm. Accordingly, the task of fixing the meaning of the requirement and the task of demanding proof of the requirement facts must proceed separately.
The strongest counterargument targets the practical difficulty of proof. If the meaning of the requirement is not settled, it is difficult, from the party's position, to gauge what to assert and what to prove; and if the side holding the materials remains silent on the question of legal principle, the ordinary burden of proof, it is pointed out, solidifies that inequality as it stands. This point remains to the end. This section does not deny that the gap can be filled through the procedure of Article 136(4) of the Civil Procedure Act, under which the court must give an opportunity to state an opinion on a matter of law. The fact that the procedure is open and the fact that the requirement facts were ultimately left unproved can, however, be true at the same time. The practical inconvenience drawn out by the counterargument is not resolved by converting the indeterminacy of legal interpretation into proof of the non-existence of fact. That method, instead of filling the gap, produces in advance the conclusion that an unascertained fact does not exist.
In the synthetic scene of this section, the fact bearing on this question is brief. The scene shows only a state in which the lack of basis on the plaintiff's side and the lack of an alternative explanation on the defendant's side are placed together. Even assuming that the circumstance of the interpretation of the norm to be applied not yet being settled is superimposed upon this, that circumstance does not newly create the fact that the requirement facts of plaintiff A were ultimately left unproved. Conversely, the circumstance that plaintiff A's explanation was unsupported does not mean that the norm to be applied has already been determined. Where it is not specified which fact is undetermined or who bears that risk, the matter remains undetermined; and even with the same non-establishment, if the applicable burden-of-proof rule differs, the attribution of the risk of losing the action changes. The scene alone cannot decide the outcome or a settled attribution.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. One must not mix the case where the truth or falsity of the fact to be ascertained is ultimately undetermined with the case where the norm and interpretation to be applied to that fact are contested, and the non-existence of requirement facts is not determined on the basis of a gap in legal explanation alone. The conclusion this section does not permit is the treatment that converts the indeterminacy of legal interpretation into proof of the non-existence of fact. So long as the meaning of the requirement remains unfixed, the non-establishment of fact and the attribution of the burden of proof must each be judged in their own place, and the pendency of one is not substituted by the non-existence of the other. If the proof of the requirement facts and the person who must bear the risk of their non-establishment are left without being precisely connected, the attribution of the risk of losing the action likewise remains undetermined. This section, however, concludes here and does not take up the questions that follow. Is ordinary burden of proof also applied to confessed facts?