Summary
The statutory duty to produce and its exceptions are determined in accordance with the nature of the document.
1.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
소지한 사람이 거부한다는 말만으로 자료에 이르는 길이 닫히지는 않는다. 상대방이 가진 문서는 모두 낼 의무가 있는가? 이 물음은 앞서 관련 민사판결의 이유 중 사실은 유력한 증거가 될 수 있으나 그 자체가 법원에 현저한 사실은 아니라는 점을 받아들이고 나서, 이번 단계의 통로가 열리는 기준을 찾는 일로 나아간다. 이 구제의 통로가 열리는 기준은 무엇인가? 이런 기준을 먼저 정해야 요구하는 급부와 당사자와 조건이 특정되고 선택한 소의 권리를 방어하는 자리에 이른다. 정해진 장면에서 원고 A는 피고 B가 가진 결재문서를 신청하고 피고 B는 내부문서라는 이유로 전부 거부한다. 여기서 보유자의 거절이 곧 제출 의무가 없다는 뜻은 아니다.
이 물음에 해당하는 문언은 민사소송법 제344조이다. 그 제344조는 "다음 각호의 경우에 문서를 가지고 있는 사람은 그 제출을 거부하지 못한다"고 하면서, 그 안에서 "당사자가 소송에서 인용한 문서를 가지고 있는 때"를 첫째 사유로 둔다. 이 사유는 문서를 가진 사람이 당사자인지 여부를 묻지 않고, 인용된 문서를 가진 사람이 그 제출을 거부하지 못하는 조건만 말한다. 그러므로 문언은 보유 사실이 아니라 그 사유에 해당하는 경우에만 제출 거부를 금지한다. 다른 각호의 사유를 함께 다루는 것은 이번 물음의 몫이 아니다.
이 문언은 문서제출의무, 즉 법정 사유에 따라 문서를 제출해야 할 의무를 정하고, 그 법정 사유가 있는 경우에만 제출을 거부하지 못하게 한다. 즉 소지 사실과 제출의무는 서로 다른 판단 단계이며, 소지 사실만으로는 후자를 확정할 수 없다. 요구하는 급부와 당사자와 조건이 청구취지에 특정되고 선택한 소의 권리를 방어할 수 있을 때 이 구제의 입구가 열리며, 이 구별은 문언이 사유를 둔 까닭과 맞닿는다. 법정 제출의무와 예외를 문서의 성격에 맞추어 판단하는 일은 바로 이 구별에서 출발한다. 여기에 법정 보호 사유에 따른 한계를 충족하는 경우가 함께 있어야 한다.
그렇다고 해서 손해와 불편이 사라지는 것은 아니다. 광범위한 제출이 비밀과 자율성을 해칠 수 있다. 영업비밀이 담긴 문서가 무차별로 넘어가면 회복하기 어려운 손실이 남고, 제삼자의 권리가 걸린 문서까지 함께 열리면 보호받아야 할 자리가 함께 상한다. 이 손실과 불편을 구체적으로 가늠하면서도 결론은 유지된다. 소지 사실만으로 예외 없는 제출의무를 확정할 수는 없다. 다시 말해 보호의 필요는 제출의무의 법정 사유를 좁게 가르는 역할을 할 뿐, 사유의 확인을 건너뛰고 소지 사실 자체로 의무를 끌어내는 통로가 되지 않는다.
정해진 장면에서 요구하는 급부는 피고 B가 가진 결재문서이고, 보유 관계는 피고 B의 보유이며, 신청 이유와 제출 거부 사유는 각각 원고 A의 신청과 피고 B의 내부문서라는 사유이다. 이 사정을 법정 사유에 대조하면, 어떤 사유에 해당하는지가 먼저 확인되어야 하고 그 확인이 아직 주어지지 않았으므로 이 장면만으로 제출의무가 확정되지는 않는다. 다만 회사 내부에서 만들었다는 사유만으로 거부가 정당화되는지도 이 대조만으로는 가려지지 않아 미확정으로 남는다. 실제 사건의 사실과 이행 결과는 설정되지 않았으므로 그 밖의 판단도 정하지 않는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 소지 사실만으로는 예외 없는 제출의무를 확정할 수 없고 문서제출의무·관련성·증거조사 필요가 인정되고 법정 보호 사유에 따른 한계를 충족한 경우에만 이 구제의 입구가 열린다는 것이다. 반면 제출의무가 인정되지 않거나 증거조사 필요가 없어 해당 문서제출신청이 받아들여지지 않는 경우에는 길이 닫힌다. 문서가 무엇인지 또는 어디에 보유되는지 특정되지 않은 경우에는 판단을 유보한다.
1.2The Conditions That Block Relief
상대방이 가진 문서를 모두 내야 한다고 넓게 잡으면 자료에 이르는 길이 먼저 열리지만, 막히는 조건을 정하지 않은 채 판단을 서두를 수 없다. 앞 절은 관련 민사판결의 이유 중 사실이 유력한 증거가 될 수는 있어도 그 자체가 법원에 현저한 사실은 아니라고만 넘겨주었다. 그 문장은 자료를 모으는 쪽의 기대를 눌러도 상대방이 가진 문서를 둘러싼 신청과 거부의 마찰을 걷어내 주지 못한다. 이 장면에서 물음은 한정되어 있다. 거부가 적법한지 여부가 아니라, 막히는 조건이 어디에서 생기는가를 묻는 것이다. 이 물음에 해당하는 문언은 「민사소송법 제344조」(제344조)이다.
제344조는 ‘문서의 제출의무’를 두고, “다음 각호의 경우에 문서를 가지고 있는 사람은 그 제출을 거부하지 못한다”고 정한다. 이 문언에서 그 제출을 거부하지 못하는 주체는 문서를 가지고 있는 사람이고, 거부할 수 없는 행위는 그 문서의 제출이며, 조건은 각호 가운데 하나에 해당하는 때이다. 각호는 당사자가 소송에서 인용한 문서를 가지고 있는 때, 신청자가 넘겨 달라거나 보겠다고 요구할 수 있는 사법상의 권리를 가진 때, 신청자의 이익을 위하여 작성되었거나 둘 사이의 법률관계에 관하여 작성된 때를 들고, 그중 마지막 경우에 다시 가목부터 다목의 사유를 예외로 둔다. 같은 조 제2항은 제1항의 경우 외에도 정한 문서가 정한 어느 호에도 해당하지 아니하는 경우에는 거부하지 못한다고 하는데, 공무원 문서를 제외한 문서로 한정한다. 이 절에서 확인할 문언은 여기까지이고, 조문의 다른 쟁점은 다루지 않는다.
이 문언은 소지 사실만으로 제출의무가 적법하게 발생한다고 적지 않았다. 문서를 가지고 있다는 사실은 출발점일 뿐이고, 그 사실이 어느 호의 요건에 닿아야 거부할 수 없는 지위가 생긴다. 그래서 제출의무를 확인하는 단계와 문서제출신청을 받아들일지 정하는 단계를 구별해야 한다. 앞 단계는 법정 사유에 따라 문서를 제출해야 할 의무를 뜻하는 문서제출의무를 확인하는 일이었고, 여기서는 그 의무와 증거조사 필요가 함께 확인되어야 구제 통로가 열리는지를 살피는 일이다. 두 단계는 자료에 이르는 길의 앞뒤를 이루지만 같은 판단이 아니다. 제출의무가 인정되지 않거나 증거조사 필요가 없어 해당 문서제출신청이 받아들여지지 않는 경우, 법정 요건 중 하나라도 충족되지 않으면 구제 통로는 닫힌다. 이 결론은 문언이 정한 주체·행위·조건을 빠짐없이 대조한 데서 나온다.
광범위한 제출이 비밀과 자율성을 해칠 수 있다는 반론은 손실과 불편을 함께 겨눈다. 회사가 내부 절차로만 쌓아 둔 결재문서가 무차별로 넘어가면 의사결정의 맥락이 빠져나가고, 문서에 적힌 내용이 제삼자의 권리를 회복 불가능하게 해칠 수도 있다. 반론은 이런 비용을 줄이려면 소지 사실만으로 문을 열지 말아야 한다고 말한다. 이 우려는 받아들이지만, 대답의 범위가 달라지지는 않는다. 반론이 지적한 불리한 부분은 지우지 않고 남겨 둔다. 문언이 각호의 요건과 예외로 나눈 틀 안에서 한 번 더 대조해야 하는 이유가 바로 거기에 있다.
원고 A는 피고 B가 가진 결재문서를 신청하고 피고 B는 내부문서라는 이유로 전부 거부한다는 장면에서, 이 절과 관련된 사실은 몇 가지로 좁혀진다. 신청된 대상은 결재문서이고, 보유한 쪽은 피고 B이며, 거부 사유는 내부문서라는 점이다. 이 사실만으로는 어느 호에 해당하는지 특정되지 않고, 제출의무와 증거조사 필요도 확인되지 않는다. 그래서 장면으로는 거부가 적법한지, 반대로 제출의무가 인정되는지까지 정할 수 없다. 만약 작성 목적과 외부 이용 사정이 바뀌는 것이 확인되면 같은 표지의 문서라도 자기이용문서 판단이 달라질 수 있다. 장면에 없는 연도·금액·기산일이나 실제 이행 결과는 확정되어 있지 않다. 이 항목들은 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 소지한 사람이 거부하는 것만으로 자료에 이르는 길이 닫힌다고 보지 않고, 법정 사유와 그 사유에 따른 한계를 대조하여 제출의무와 증거조사 필요를 확인한 뒤에야 구제 통로가 열리는지를 판단한다. 그렇다고 하여 상대방이 가진 문서를 모두 내야 한다는 결론으로 나아가지 않으며, 내부문서라는 거부 사유가 자동으로 적법하다는 결론도 이 절에서 내리지 않는다. 두 쪽 모두 현재 확인한 문언과 장면만으로는 확정할 수 없다.
1.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
이전 분석 단계의 결론을 그대로 받아 두면, 이제 남은 물음은 이전과 구별되는 경계 하나이다. 이 물음은 소지 사실만으로 제출 의무의 범위를 모두 정할 수 있는지 묻는다. 문제는 판단 근거로 삼을 자료가 무엇인지 특정되지 않은 경우다. 이 장면에서 자료에 이르는 길이 실제로 닫혔는지는 이로써는 정해지지 않는다.
이 물음에 답할 원문 기준은 민사소송법 제344조에 있다. 해당 조문은 "①다음 각호의 경우에 문서를 가지고 있는 사람은 그 제출을 거부하지 못한다."라고 선언하고, 제1항제3호에서 "문서가 신청자의 이익을 위하여 작성되었거나, 신청자와 문서를 가지고 있는 사람 사이의 법률관계에 관하여 작성된 것인 때"를 들며 예외 사유를 뒤에 단다. 조문이 요구하는 것은 문서가 무엇인지, 누가 가지고 있는지, 어떤 사유로 신청되었는지다. 여기서 문서제출의무는 법정 사유에 따라 문서를 제출해야 할 의무를 뜻한다. 소지 사실 하나로는 이 의무의 범위가 정해지지 않는다.
이 문언은 신청의 대상이 특정되어야 판단이 시작됨을 보여준다. 특정 문서·보유 관계·신청 이유·제출 거부 사유·결정이 기록되어야 각호 가운데 어느 것이 문제인지 가릴 수 있다. 따라서 판단 재료가 특정되지 않은 사항과, 판단 재료가 갖추어졌으나 법정 요건이 충족되지 않는 사항은 구별되어야 한다. 후자는 불능에 가깝게 판정되어 끝나지만 전자는 아직 판정 전의 상태로 남는다. 소지 사실만으로 예외 없는 제출의무를 확정할 수 없다는 점은 여기서 그대로 유지된다.
광범위한 제출이 비밀과 자율성을 해칠 수 있다는 반론은 실질적인 손실을 겨눈다. 회사 내부문서가 모두 노출되면 영업상 비밀이나 문서를 가진 사람의 자율적 판단 영역이 회복하기 어려운 침해를 입을 수 있다. 왜냐하면 제344조도 제출 거부를 막는 사유를 문서의 성격에 따라 제한하고, 예외 규정을 함께 두고 있기 때문이다. 반론이 지적한 손실은 인정되지만, 그 손실은 제출의무 성립 자체를 부정하기보다 성립 이후의 한계에서 검토할 문제로 남는다.
이 장면에서 확정되는 사실은 원고 A의 신청, 피고 B의 보유 주장, 내부문서라는 거부 사유뿐이다. 그런데 신청된 결재문서가 무엇인지, 어느 부서나 장소에 보유되는지는 장면이 정하지 않았다. 특정 문서·보유 관계·신청 이유·제출 거부 사유·결정 가운데 무엇이 기록되었는지도 자료가 없어 확정할 수 없다. 그 빈 자리는 곧 구제 불능의 판정이 아니라 미확정으로 남는다. 문서 표지가 같아도 작성 목적과 외부 이용 사정이 바뀌면 자기이용문서 판단을 다시 한다는 대조는 이 경계를 확인하는 조건일 뿐, 현재 장면을 채우는 사실이 아니다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 자료가 없어 무엇을 판단해야 할지 특정되지 않은 사항은 불능과 구별해 미확정으로 남기며, 소지 사실만으로 예외 없는 제출의무를 확정할 수 없다. 같은 문장이 이 빈 자리를 구제 불능으로 바꾸거나, 제출의무 성립을 미리 확정해 버리는 결론은 허용되지 않는다. 판정의 출발점인 문서제출의무의 성립 자체는 이 절의 범위를 넘는다.
1.4The Records Needed for Determination
문서가 무엇인지 또는 어디에 보유되는지 특정되지 않은 경우에는 판정을 미확정으로 남기며, 이를 구제가 막힌 경우와 구별한다. 여기서 기록 요건의 물음은, 그러한 제출의무의 인정을 뒷받침하는 자료가 무엇인지 가려내는 것이다.
민사소송법 제344조는 "문서를 가지고 있는 사람은 그 제출을 거부하지 못한다"고 정하면서, 그 문언은 소지 자체가 아니라 각 호의 사유에 해당하는 경우에 한한다. 제1항제1호는 "당사자가 소송에서 인용한 문서를 가지고 있는 때"를, 제2호는 신청자의 사법상 권리를, 제3호는 신청자의 이익을 위하여 작성되거나 양자 사이의 법률관계에 관하여 작성된 문서를 들되, 같은 호 단서의 가·나·다목 사유는 그 예외로 둔다. 제2항은 공무원이 직무와 관련하여 보관하거나 가지고 있는 문서를 제외하고는, 제1항제3호나목 및 다목의 문서와 "오로지 문서를 가진 사람이 이용하기 위한 문서"에 해당하지 아니하는 경우에는 역시 거부하지 못한다고 한다.
그 문언이 정하는 주체는 문서를 가지고 있는 사람이며, 행위는 그 제출의 거부이고, 조건은 신청된 문서가 각 호의 어느 하나에 해당하는 사유로 특정되는 것이다. 문언은 소지라는 사실 자체에 제출의무를 붙이지 않고, 문서의 작성 목적·이용 상황과 비밀 보호 사유의 존재를 따져 거부 가능 여부를 가른다. 소지 사실만으로 예외 없는 제출의무를 확정할 수는 없다는 이 절의 결론은, 각 호의 사유와 예외를 문언대로 확인해야 한다는 이 문언의 구조에서 나온다.
이 판정은 특정 문서·보유 관계·신청 이유·제출 거부 사유·결정을 근거로 한다. 그 기록이 없으면 결론은 미확정으로 남는다. 광범위한 제출이 비밀과 자율성을 해칠 수 있다는 반론은 문서 공개가 영업비밀과 제삼자의 권리를 회복 불가능하게 해칠 수 있다는 점을 가리킨다. 그러한 손실은 무시할 수 없고, 바로 그래서 문언이 비밀을 지킬 의무가 면제되지 아니한 문서와 오로지 보유자만을 위한 문서를 거부 사유로 남기는 것이다. 그렇다고 해서 소지 사실만으로 예외 없는 제출의무를 확정할 수는 없다. 반론이 겨냥한 보호는, 이미 정해진 결론을 무너뜨리기보다 각 호의 사유와 예외를 기록으로 확인해야 할 필요를 더 날카롭게 할 뿐이다.
이 절이 맡은 판정은 정해진 장면에 한정된다. 여기서 지정된 사실은 신청된 문서가 피고 B가 보유한 결재문서라는 점, 신청이 있었다는 점, 전부 거부되었다는 점, 그 사유가 내부문서라는 주장이라는 점뿐이다. 지정되지 않은 사정이 있으므로 이를 판정할 수 없는 것으로 남긴다. 다만 그 미확정은 구제가 막힌 경우와 구별된다. 장면만으로는 해당 문서의 작성 목적과 외부 이용 사정을 확정할 수 없고, 아울러 제1항 제3호의 사유와 예외의 해당 여부도 확정되지 않는다. 실제 사건의 사실·송달·이행 결과와 합성 장면에 없는 판결 결과는 이 절의 밖에 있다.
이 절에서 허용하는 결론은, 소지 사실만으로 예외 없는 제출의무를 확정할 수 없고, 그 판정이 특정 문서·보유 관계·신청 이유·제출 거부 사유·결정을 근거로 한다는 것, 그리하여 그 기록이 없으면 결론은 미확정으로 남는다는 좁은 판단이다. 이 절에서 허용하지 않는 결론은, 문서를 가지고 있다는 사실만으로 곧 제출의무가 있다는 판단이나, 특정 문서·보유 관계·신청 이유·제출 거부 사유·결정이 없이 제출의무를 확정하려는 판단이다.
1.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
The point judged earlier was this: among the reasons of the relevant civil judgment, a fact may serve as strong evidence, but it is not in itself a fact evident to the court. This section re-measures the step that passes beyond that conclusion and reaches the documents held by the opposing party. The question now is whether every document held by the opposing party must be produced, and it leads on to the further question of what change overturns the existing step determination. The starting point laid here is that a refusal, as a response, must not be taken to close the route to the material.
The provision corresponding to this question is Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act. That Article declares in paragraph (1) that "A person who possesses a document in any of the following cases may not refuse its production," and then provides subparagraph 1, "where a party possesses a document cited in the lawsuit," subparagraph 2, a private-law right, and subparagraph 3, "where the document was prepared for the benefit of the applicant or was prepared with respect to the legal relationship between the applicant and the person possessing the document" (Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act). The proviso to the same paragraph excludes the secret-related documents under items (b) and (c), while providing grounds of protection together. Paragraph (2) lists, as one of the cases in which refusal is permitted beyond those of paragraph (1), "a document intended solely for the use of the person possessing it" (Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act). The subject designated by this text is the person who possesses the document; the act is that such person may not refuse its production; and the condition is the ground under each subparagraph. The issue defined here is the duty of production under this text and the limits inherent in its character.
On the basis of this text, a settled conclusion follows. The duty of production is the duty to produce a document in accordance with statutory grounds, and its recognition is judged in conformity with the character of the document (Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act). Here two steps must be distinguished. The first is the document's cover, that is, the name shown on its exterior; the second is the basis of judgment, namely the purpose of preparation and the circumstances of external use. The two diverge because even if the cover is the same, once the purpose changes the earlier determination can no longer stand as it is. This is precisely why it is stated that, if the specified change is confirmed, the own-use document determination is to be redone. A determination redone in that way discards the existing blocking-and-effectiveness determination and judges anew from the step. That discarding and re-determination is not the addition of a new requirement, but a matter of re-reading the character under the same text.
Yet the strongest counterargument asks what is lost if this route is opened. That is the claim that broad production may impair confidentiality and autonomy. In that document disclosure may irreparably harm trade secrets and the rights of third parties, the loss is grave, because material once opened cannot be recalled. The more a document is prepared within a company, the more it may contain both the flow of internal judgments and content mentioning third parties. The loss of confidentiality and autonomy targeted by the counterargument is not erased; but one does not advance by invoking that loss to fix the very determination of the document's character.
Returning to the synthetic scene, only the facts belonging to this question are illuminated. Defendant B's ground of refusal is "the reason that it is an internal document," and the target of the application is "an approval document." This ground is but an explanation based on the cover and affiliation; it does not also disclose the purpose of preparation and the circumstances of external use. The posited contrary fact — namely the proposition that even if the document's cover is the same, if the purpose of preparation and the circumstances of external use change, the own-use document determination is redone — is, rather than a fact that actually occurred within the scene, a test that alters the conditions of this determination. Only where that change is confirmed are the existing blocking-and-effectiveness determination discarded and the step determination begun anew. Conversely, if no such change is specified, the scene alone does not permit a determination, and the records maintain the range of undetermined matters as to the specific document, the possession relationship, the reason for the application, the grounds for refusal of production, and the DECISION.
This section closes by separating the conclusions it permits from those it does not. What is permitted is to view the duty of production as resting on statutory grounds, to re-determine the character according to the purpose of preparation and the circumstances of external use rather than the cover, and, if the specified change is confirmed, to discard the existing blocking-and-effectiveness determination and to ask again from the step. What is not permitted is to settle an unconditional duty of production from the mere fact of possession. Here effectiveness is bound to the step of a production order for documents held by the opposing party, and it operates where the duty of production of documents, relevance, and the need for the examination of evidence are recognized and the limits under statutory grounds of protection are satisfied. Where the duty of production is not recognized, or where there is no need for the examination of evidence so that the relevant motion for document production is not accepted, it is blocked; and if the document is not specified as to what it is or where it is held, it remains undetermined.
1.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
The preceding step went no further than confirming that the demand that every document held by the opposing party be produced does not stand on its own. Now, going beyond that confirmation, the analysis meets head-on the counterargument that broad production may impair confidentiality and autonomy. This counterargument points out that the disclosure of documents may irreparably damage not only the trade secrets within the company but also the rights entrusted by the drafter and third parties. The core of the counterargument is a single question: in the scene where Plaintiff A applies for the approval document held by Defendant B and Defendant B refuses it in its entirety on the ground that it is an internal document, can an unconditional duty of production be settled from the mere fact of possession?
Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act prescribes the duty of production of documents — that is, the duty to produce a document in accordance with statutory grounds — and enumerates those grounds (Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act). Paragraph (1) lists as cases in which production may not be refused: where a party possesses a document cited in the lawsuit; where the applicant has a private-law right by which to demand that the document be handed over or inspected; and where the document was prepared for the benefit of the applicant or was prepared with respect to the legal relationship between the two parties (Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act). The proviso to the same paragraph, however, excludes documents in which matters set out in Articles 304 through 306 are stated and for which no consent has been obtained; documents stating matters prescribed in the same Article with respect to the person possessing the document or a person who stands in any one of the relationships listed in the subparagraphs of Article 314; and documents in which matters set out in each subparagraph of paragraph (1) of Article 315 are stated and for which the duty of confidentiality has not been exempted (Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act). This text specifies the subject as the person possessing the document, the act as the refusal of production, and the condition as the grounds under each subparagraph and the grounds for exception, respectively.
Interpreting this text, one sees that the fact of possession and the settlement of the duty of production are separate steps. The fact that a person possesses a document is merely the starting point of the judgment as to the duty of production; what decides whether the duty arises is the existence of the statutory grounds under the subparagraphs of paragraph (1), or the absence of an exception. Paragraph (2) provides that, in cases other than those of paragraph (1), and excluding documents relating to public officials, refusal is not permitted unless the document falls under the documents of items (b) and (c) of subparagraph 3 of paragraph (1) or is a document intended solely for the use of the person possessing it; so even its text classifies what kind of document it is before determining whether refusal is available (Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act). The impairment of confidentiality and autonomy is a problem to be handled in the procedure of confirming the grounds of protection prescribed in the proviso to paragraph (1) in conformity with the character of the document; the fact of possession itself cannot serve as a ground for omitting that confirmation.
The strongest counterargument begins from the point that broad production may irreparably bring down the trade secrets entrusted within the company and the rights of third parties. The loss targeted by this counterargument is no mere inconvenience. Once disclosed, information cannot be recalled; the scope of information use that the drafter and the company set for themselves collapses; and the rights of third parties contained in the document may be exposed as well. The counterargument holds that the value of preserving confidentiality and autonomy stands ahead of the convenience of proof. Even so, this counterargument of itself prevents an unconditional duty of production from being settled on the mere fact of possession. The risk of impairment emphasized by the counterargument is a demand for the confirmation of statutory grounds of protection, not a demand that an unconditional duty be added to the fact of possession. Therefore the conclusion holds even without effacing the disadvantage of the counterargument.
The facts relevant to this question in the synthetic scene are that the document applied for by Plaintiff A is the approval document held by Defendant B, and that Defendant B refused it in its entirety on the ground that it is an internal document. From this scene alone it is not specified whether the approval document was prepared for the benefit of the applicant, whether it was prepared with respect to the legal relationship between the parties, or whether it is a document intended solely for the use of Defendant B alone. Nor can it be confirmed from the scene whether the grounds under the subparagraphs of paragraph (1) of Article 344 are satisfied, or whether the grounds of protection under the proviso apply (Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act). Accordingly, whether the duty of production of documents is recognized remains undetermined. Meanwhile, the contrast condition — that even if the document's cover is the same, if the purpose of preparation and the circumstances of external use change, the own-use document determination is redone — indicates only that whether subparagraph 2 of paragraph (2) applies may vary according to the circumstances (Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act). The synthetic scene sets no year, amount, accrual date, or judgment outcome; hence these are not added to the judgment.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. It is the limited conclusion that the fact of possession alone cannot settle an unconditional duty of production, and that whether the statutory grounds are satisfied and whether grounds of exception exist must be examined in conformity with the character of the document. Conversely, it has not settled the conclusion that the duty of production arises from the fact of possession alone, the conclusion that refusal is justified merely because the document was made within the company, or the conclusion that the disclosure of any document whatsoever causes irreparable loss. Items not specified by the scene are left undetermined, and that undetermined status does not itself mean that no relief is available.
1.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
From the place left by the preceding section — that an unconditional duty of production cannot be settled from the fact of possession alone — what must be asked now is whether every document held by the opposing party must be produced. This question takes as its standard not the quantity of documents or the title of the possessor but the circumstances in which the document is placed. Here the conclusion that the statutory duty of production and the exceptions are judged in conformity with the character of the document shows its light. In the scene, Plaintiff A applies for the approval document held by Defendant B, and Defendant B refuses it in its entirety on the ground that it is an internal document. (Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act)
The text answering this question is Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act. Paragraph (1) of that Article provides that "A person who possesses a document in any of the following cases may not refuse its production," and among its subparagraphs lists: where a party possesses a document cited in the lawsuit; where the applicant has a private-law right by which to demand that the document be handed over or inspected; and where the document was prepared for the benefit of the applicant or was prepared with respect to the legal relationship between the two parties. (Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act) The subject indicated by the subparagraphs is the person possessing the document; the act is the refusal of its production; and the condition is that one of the grounds in those subparagraphs is established with respect to the document. The proviso to the same paragraph sets aside: even for documents under subparagraph 3, documents in which matters of Articles 304 through 306 are stated and for which no consent has been obtained; documents stating matters concerning persons in the relationships listed in the subparagraphs of Article 314; and documents in which matters of each subparagraph of paragraph (1) of Article 315 are stated and for which the duty of confidentiality has not been exempted. (Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act) The other issues of this text are not addressed here.
The above text attaches the duty of production not to the single fact of possession but to the point where the ground asserted by the applicant meets the character of the document. The duty of production of documents of which the author speaks means the duty to produce a document in accordance with statutory grounds, and possession outside the grounds limited by the subparagraphs does not of itself give rise to a duty. (Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act) This is why the documents set aside as exceptions by the proviso must be read separately from the foregoing grounds. One concerns the establishment of the grounds on which production may not be refused; the other concerns the limit that blocks production, even where those grounds are established, because of the secrets the law seeks to protect. If the two steps are mixed, either the exception text erases the establishment of the grounds, or, conversely, the establishment of the grounds covers over the exception. The conclusion that the statutory duty of production and the exceptions are judged in conformity with the character of the document presupposes this distinction. (Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act)
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the point that broad production may impair confidentiality and autonomy. The concern that document disclosure may irreparably harm trade secrets and the rights of third parties targets both the loss that a secret, once leaked, cannot be recovered and the discomfort that the autonomy of a company in leaving records of its internal judgments is chilled. The proviso of the Article reflects the same purport by treating documents stating the matters of Articles 304 through 306, Article 314, and Article 315 as subjects of protection. (Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act) That said, the counterargument does not lean toward the side whereby an unconditional duty of production could be settled from the fact of possession alone. The loss of confidentiality and autonomy indicated by the counterargument is, rather, a reason to examine the character of the document, and demands a determination that looks to the establishment of the grounds and the satisfaction of the exception together. (Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act)
Returning to the synthetic scene, Plaintiff A applies for the approval document held by Defendant B, and Defendant B refuses it in its entirety on the ground that it is an internal document. (Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act) Here the specific document, the possession relationship, the reason for the application, the grounds for refusal of production, and the DECISION become items in the records, yet it is not determined from the scene alone which document falls under the grounds of which subparagraph, or with respect to which item of the proviso matters are stated. From the cover "approval document" and the ground of refusal "internal document" alone, one cannot judge which of the subparagraphs and the proviso of the Article is established. If the document is not specified as to what it is or where it is held, that portion remains undetermined. If it is confirmed that the purpose of preparation and the circumstances of external use have changed, then even for the same approval document the character differs and the determination may differ.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. From the mere fact that the documents are held by the opposing party, one cannot say that there is a duty to produce them all; conversely, neither can one say that all may be refused merely under the name "internal document." A determination that examines, in conformity with the character of the document, the establishment of statutory grounds and the satisfaction of statutory exceptions, and thereby settles the duty of production and its limits together, is permitted. (Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act) The conclusions not permitted are the one that settles an unconditional duty of production from the fact of possession alone, and the one that blocks all production solely from the cover of the ground of refusal.
1.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Regardless of what the reason for refusal may be, the first question is whether possession itself gives rise to a duty to produce. What is addressed in this question is whether the duty to produce documents held by the opposing party is established without exception. The fact that a refusal blocks the path to the material does not immediately fix the duty. Only when the statutory grounds are met does the state arise in which production may not be refused.
Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "Article 344 (Duty to Produce Documents) (1) In each of the following cases, a person who possesses a document may not refuse its production. 1. Where the person possesses a document cited by a party in the lawsuit 2. Where the movant has a legal right to demand that the person possessing the document hand it over or to request to inspect it 3. Where the document was prepared for the benefit of the movant or was prepared with regard to the legal relationship between the movant and the person possessing the document. However, this shall not apply where any of the grounds in the following items applies." This provision takes the person possessing the document as its subject. It regulates that person's conduct of being unable to refuse production, and takes the preparation for a legal right or interest and the preparation with regard to a legal relationship as its grounds.
This distinction of grounds is not a basis for making the opposing party produce every document it holds; it means that a refusal is barred only where the statutory grounds are met. Here, the duty to produce documents means the duty to produce documents according to statutory grounds. The proviso to the same Article sets out as exceptions cases such as where a document stating the prescribed matters has not been consented to, showing that even where the grounds are recognized, not every document proceeds in the same way. Accordingly, the possession relationship and the existence of statutory grounds are separate stages of assessment, and only after examining whether exceptions overlap according to those grounds is it determined whether refusal is possible. On the fact of possession alone, the distinction between the two cannot be skipped over.
Yet the fact that broad production can impair confidentiality and autonomy does not go away. The concern that trade secrets and third-party rights may be irreparably harmed, interlocking with the grounds stated in the proviso above, reveals the weight this system bears. Indeed, the possibility of such harm is the very reason why the statutory grounds and the exceptions must be judged together. The answer the author gives in this section is that the duty to produce cannot be established without exception on the basis of the fact of possession, and that however clear the reason for refusal may appear, one cannot proceed in haste while leaving aside the conflict between statutory grounds and grounds of protection.
Defendant B's ground for refusal is an assertion concerning the character of the documents as internal documents, and is distinct from the assessment of whether statutory grounds exist. Whether the documents for which Plaintiff A applied are documents cited in the lawsuit, whether they are demanded on the basis of a legal right, whether they were prepared for the benefit of the movant, or whether they were prepared with regard to the legal relationship between the two persons, is not determined by this scene alone. Whether those grounds fall on the side of the ground or on the side of the ground of protection remains undetermined.
What this section permits is the assessment that the duty to produce is not established without exception on the fact of possession alone, and the distinction that the statutory duty to produce and the exceptions must be examined in light of the character of the document. What is not permitted is the converse leap that because there is a refusal the duty to produce is immediately recognized, or the leap that the exception is established by the ground for refusal alone. Whether one may refuse merely on the ground that the document was made within the company is the next question, outside this scope.
1.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
The statutory duty to produce and the exceptions are judged in light of the character of the document. Facts among the reasons of the relevant civil judgment may become compelling evidence, yet they are not themselves facts manifest to the court. What this transition addresses is the status of a fact as evidence, whereas the present question is different: it asks whether the possessor's refusal blocks access to the material, or whether the confirmation of statutory grounds divides that path. Can one refuse merely on the ground that the document was made within the company? To answer this question, the concept of the duty to produce documents must first be settled.
The text of the source provision is as follows. Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act, paragraph (1), declares: "In each of the following cases, a person who possesses a document may not refuse its production," and then lists in subparagraph 1 "where the person possesses a document cited by a party in the lawsuit," in subparagraph 2 "where the movant has a legal right to demand that the person possessing the document hand it over or to request to inspect it," and in subparagraph 3 "where the document was prepared for the benefit of the movant or was prepared with regard to the legal relationship between the movant and the person possessing the document," respectively (Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act). The subject this provision indicates is the person possessing the document, the act is its production, and the condition is falling under any one of the subparagraphs. Here, 'duty to produce documents' means the duty to produce documents according to statutory grounds. This definition merely designates the situation in which the provision says one 'may not refuse,' and creates no further requirements beyond it.
This provision and the conclusion of this section point in the same direction. What may be used as the basis for adjudicating a production order for the opposing party's documents must be the text of the source provision, and only the text within the scope of that source provision may be applied. If the basis is extended through the reasons for the judgment or other paragraphs, what has been confirmed is mixed with what has not been confirmed. This point is important. Taking the subject, act, and condition of the text in its wording as the standard of adjudication is one stage, and drawing the circumstances written in the reasons for the judgment into the same standard is another. The former is an application of the relevant basis, while the latter is an extension of the basis; if the two are not distinguished, it will appear that the duty to produce follows from the mere fact of ownership.
Even so, the counterargument that broad production may impair confidentiality and autonomy remains. Even where an approval document prepared by the company after internal review appears to have been made for the benefit of the movant or with regard to the legal relationship between the two parties, if the matters provided in Articles 304 through 306 are stated in that document and consent under those provisions has not been obtained, room remains to refuse production (Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act). The point that disclosure of documents may irreparably harm trade secrets and third-party rights is the real loss lying behind this distinction. Yet the existence of this loss does not mean that one can, in the direction urged by the counterargument, establish the duty to produce without exception on the fact of possession alone. Rather, because the provision sets out the duty to produce together with its limits, confirming what those limits are is the only way to answer the counterargument.
Contrasting this with the synthetic scene makes several points clear. The label 'internal document' does not indicate under the wording of Article 344 which subparagraph's condition it falls under, so it cannot be said that the ground for refusal is established by that alone. Under the same provision, in addition to the cases of paragraph (1), where a document — excluding documents kept or held by a public official or a former public official in connection with their duties — falls under neither the documents provided in items na and da of paragraph (1), subparagraph 3, nor documents intended solely for the use of the person possessing the document, the person possessing the document may not refuse its production. However, even if the document cover is the same, if the purpose of preparation and the circumstances of external use change, the determination of a document for one's own use must be redone. If a change in the conditions is confirmed, the adjudication may change, but in this scene the character of the document is not fixed. As the kind of document has not been specified, and the possession relationship, the reason for the request, the specific content of the ground for refusal, and the decision are also undetermined, the existence or non-existence of an actual duty to produce remains undetermined.
Accordingly, the conclusion this section permits is narrow. The basis for adjudicating a production order for the opposing party's documents is the text of Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act, and only the subject, the act, and the condition within that text are applied. An assessment that goes beyond that text and broadens the basis through the reasons for the judgment or other paragraphs is not permitted by this section. However, the proposition that the path to the material is not closed merely because the person possessing the document refuses, and the converse proposition that the duty to produce is established without exception on the fact of possession alone, are separate matters. Care must be taken to keep the boundary so that confirming the former does not amount to confirming the latter as well. The definition of the duty to produce documents as the duty to produce documents according to statutory grounds becomes the reference point of that boundary.
1.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
If earlier the question was whether there is a duty to produce every document held by the opposing party, what remains now is which part is to be adjudicated separately within a production order. It appears clear that the ground for refusal relates to the character of the document. Yet the existence and scope of a duty to produce are not fixed by the assertion of a ground for refusal alone. This essay therefore seeks to specify the part to be adjudicated anew within a production order.
Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act provides in its wording that "in each of the following cases, a person who possesses a document may not refuse its production," and lists as grounds therefor a document cited by a party in the lawsuit, a document in respect of which the movant has a legal right to make a demand, and a document prepared for the benefit of the movant or prepared with regard to the legal relationship between the parties. While the provision stipulates together the possessor as subject and the effect of the exclusion of refusal to produce, the proviso to paragraph (1), subparagraph 3 makes the grounds in items ga, na, and da exceptions. This phrase indicates that the object of assessment for a production order is not whether the document is possessed, but whether its character falls under the grounds of the respective subparagraphs.
If this text is joined to the foregoing definition, the detailed divisions within a production order are limited to operative cases, blocked cases, and undetermined cases. Operative cases mean cases where the duty to produce documents, relevance, and the need for examination of evidence are recognized and the limits under statutory grounds of protection are satisfied; blocked cases are those where the duty to produce is not recognized or the need for examination of evidence is absent, so that the motion for document production in question is not granted. The reason these two assessments must be distinguished is that the satisfaction of the statutory ground of the duty to produce and the outcome of the stage of granting the application pose different thresholds. Beyond these, undetermined cases refer to those where what the document is, or where it is held, has not been specified. Only this threefold distinction is the framework of adjudication this essay permits.
Disclosure of documents may irreparably harm trade secrets and third-party rights, and the moment a company puts forth to the outside the traces of its internal decision-making, that freedom may be curtailed. The loss the counterargument points out is by no means small. Yet the fact that this loss is great is not a reason for establishing the duty to produce without exception on the fact of possession alone. That the provision enumerates grounds of exception can also be read as meaning that the need for protection is not to be subordinated to the fact of possession. Accordingly, while acknowledging the weight of the counterargument, the conclusion that the duty to produce is judged according to whether the statutory grounds are satisfied is maintained.
Returning to the synthetic scene, Plaintiff A applies for the production of the approval documents and Defendant B refuses in full on the ground that they are internal documents. What is confirmed in these facts is only the form of the records: the requested document, the possession relationship, the reason for the request, the grounds for refusal of production, and the decision thereon. The ground for refusal appeals only to the label 'internal document'; whether that document was prepared for the benefit of the movant, prepared with regard to the legal relationship between the parties, or is a document intended solely for the use of the possessor, is not specified by this scene alone. Which subparagraph it falls under in the wording also remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow: it limits the detailed divisions within a production order to the express conditions of operative cases, blocked cases, and undetermined cases, and creates no further stages. In light of this, seeking to establish the duty to produce without exception on the fact of possession alone, or skipping over the satisfaction of the statutory grounds concerning the character of the document and fixing the outcome first, are conclusions this essay does not permit.
1.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
Even in the position of applying for documents held by the opposing party, the basis for the duty to produce and the basis for refusal to produce must be examined separately. In the scene where Plaintiff A applies for the approval documents held by Defendant B and Defendant B refuses in full on the ground that they are internal documents, one must distinguish when a production order for the opposing party's documents opens and when it is barred, and what remains undetermined.
The starting point of this question is the text of Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act. Its paragraph (1) states "in each of the following cases, a person who possesses a document may not refuse its production," and lists respectively a document cited by a party in the lawsuit, a document in respect of which the movant has a legal right to demand that it be handed over or to request to inspect it, and a document prepared for the benefit of the movant or prepared with regard to the legal relationship between the movant and the person possessing the document. The subject the text indicates is the person possessing the document, the act is the refusal to produce, and the condition is falling under any one of the enumerated grounds.
When this condition is recognized, the duty to produce documents—that is, the duty to produce documents according to statutory grounds—opens. However, the proviso to the same paragraph and paragraph (2) protect a document in which the matters provided in Articles 304 through 306 are stated and for which consent has not been obtained, a document in which the matters provided in the same Article concerning the person possessing the document or a person falling under any one of the subparagraphs of Article 314 in relation to that person are stated, and a document in which the matters of the subparagraphs of Article 315(1) are stated and for which the duty to keep secrecy has not been waived. Furthermore, paragraph (2) states that, in addition to the cases of paragraph (1), production may not be refused unless the document falls under one of the documents of those subparagraphs, and lists as an exception documents intended solely for the use of the person possessing the document. Because the assessment that opens and the assessment that is barred rest on different provisions, if the two stages are handled at once, the meaning of the grounds of protection is erased.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the point that broad production can impair confidentiality and autonomy and, more specifically, that disclosure of documents may irreparably harm trade secrets and third-party rights. This loss cannot be erased by a change of wording, and so it stands as it is; yet one cannot ignore the elements the foregoing text draws in as grounds of protection and establish the duty to produce without exception on the fact of possession alone. That is to say, even for a document made within the company, its purpose of preparation and the presence or absence of grounds of protection must be judged separately.
The facts visible in this scene are only that the requested document is an approval document and that the ground for refusal is that it is an internal document. Since it cannot be judged on these circumstances alone whether the duty to produce opens or is barred, it must be recorded whether the duty to produce, relevance, and the need for examination of evidence in respect of the document in question are recognized and whether the limits under statutory grounds of protection are satisfied. Such records must contain the specified document, the possession relationship, the reason for the request, the grounds for refusal of production, and the decision. If what the document is, or where it is held, is not specified, it remains in the realm of the undetermined.
What can be fixed in this section is only the distinction that the three states must not be mixed with one another, and it also leaves open the possibility that the assessment may change once materials concerning the purpose of preparation of a specific document and the circumstances of external use are gathered. The question whether one may refuse merely on the ground that the document was made within the company must be left to the interpretation of that text.
1.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
Taking up the thread of the previous section, which held that a fact stated in the reasons of a related civil judgment may be strong evidence of a fact but is not itself a fact notorious to the court, the present section addresses only the procedural starting point that leads to the materials. In this scene, the author squarely poses the question whether the opposing party is obliged to produce every document it holds. Whether the door to access to the materials is closed by the two facts alone—possession and refusal—is the concern of this section.
Article 344 of the Civil Procedure Act provides in paragraph (1) that "a person who possesses a document may not refuse its production in any of the following cases," and lists as those subparagraphs the cases where a person possesses a document cited by a party in the lawsuit, where the applicant has a legal right to demand that the person possessing the document hand it over or permit its inspection, and where the document has been prepared for the benefit of the applicant or concerning the legal relationship between the two parties. Here, 'a person who possesses a document' refers to the holder of the document sought by the application, and 'may not refuse' indicates that the duty to produce arises once a statutory ground is recognized. The proviso to paragraph (1), however, restores as exceptions documents on specified matters for which consent has not been obtained, documents concerning relevant persons, and documents for which the duty of confidentiality has not been waived. Paragraph (2) adds that, in cases other than those of paragraph (1), documents other than those related to official duties may not be refused if they do not fall under documents concerning a relevant person or documents used solely by the person possessing them. This language divides the grounds for the arising of the duty to produce and its limits according to the character of the document.
Connecting the statutory language above with the author's distinction, the duty to produce means the obligation to produce a document on statutory grounds, and is determined separately from the fact of possession. The reason the law confines to enumerated subparagraphs the cases in which a possessor is made unable to refuse production is that the character of the document itself determines the scope of the exceptions. Accordingly, the mere fact that a document was made within a company cannot be taken as establishing a ground for refusal, and conversely, that fact does not extinguish the duty to produce. The author maintains the conclusion that an unqualified duty to produce cannot be established on the fact of possession alone. These two determinations stand at different stages. One concerns whether a statutory ground applies; the other concerns whether, even where no such ground exists, the duty arises without exception. Placing the two together at once would erase the meaning of the reasons for protection of confidentiality that the legislature marked as exceptions. The duty to produce and its exceptions must each be verified separately at their respective stages.
The counterargument that broad production could impair confidentiality and autonomy points out that the mere outward release of a company's internal documents may damage trade secrets and the autonomy of internal decision-making to such a degree that they are difficult to restore. Once the opinions of the persons in charge or traces of review, as revealed along the internal approval route, are disclosed, they cannot be recalled, and where the document is entangled with the rights of third parties, the repercussions extend beyond the document's holder. Without erasing this disadvantage, the author answers that an unqualified duty to produce cannot be established on the fact of possession alone. Only by examining whether a statutory ground applies and whether an exception is satisfied does the protection of confidentiality and autonomy operate; yet the single fact that a document was made within a company does not constitute a basis for refusal. The loss feared by the counterargument remains as a share to be absorbed by the exception provisions.
What can be confirmed in this scene are only the items of the record—specified document, relationship of holding, reason for the application, ground for refusal to produce, and decision—while the service or performance results of the actual case are not determined. Whether the application of Plaintiff A falls under a statutory ground required by the subparagraphs of Article 344 (1) or by paragraph (2), and whether the refusal of Defendant B is based on a ground of exception under the items of the proviso, cannot be adjudged on this scene alone. Unless what the document sought is and where it is held are specified, whether the duty to produce arises must itself remain undetermined. Even if the duty to produce is recognized, one may proceed to the stage of a production order for the opposing party's documents only where the limits under legally protected grounds are satisfied, and if the duty to produce is not recognized, or if there is no need for the taking of evidence so that the motion for document production in question is not accepted, that motion is blocked.
The conclusion that can be confirmed in this section is that the path to the materials is not closed by the facts of possession and refusal alone, and that the arising of the duty to produce is determined step by step according to the statutory ground and the character of the document. A ground for refusal must not be regarded as established merely because the document was made within a company, nor does that fact serve as the basis for establishing an unqualified duty to produce. Concerns for confidentiality and autonomy remain as a share to be borne by the exceptions and limits of the duty to produce. Which document falls under which statutory ground is determined according to the individual circumstances, and the parts that cannot be established from this scene remain undetermined.