Summary
Whether a document is one for self-use is determined not by its label but by the purpose of its preparation, its contents, the possibility of external use, and the like.
2.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
Before the question whether one may refuse merely because a document was created within the company, a single label of "internal" cannot permanently conceal information needed in a lawsuit. This question leads, at the present stage, to asking where that place lies. Under the premise that the statutory duty of production and its exceptions are to be judged in accordance with the nature of the document, it is necessary to examine whether a document prepared through internal approval procedures is itself a ground for refusal. An attitude of refusing everything on the sole ground that the document was created inside the company, as in the position of Defendant B, must be examined separately from what force is carried by that name.
Supreme Court Decision 2014Ma2239 decided July 1, 2016 frames the language on this question as follows. "Whether a given document falls within a self-use document must not be judged by the title or designation of the document alone, but must be judged objectively by comprehensively considering the purpose for which the document was prepared, the information set out in its contents, the characteristics generally possessed by documents of that type or kind, the circumstances under which the document came to be held, and other circumstances." Here the subject spoken of in the precedent is a written document whose production the person possessing it seeks to refuse; the act is a refusal taken as an exception under Article 344 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act; and the conditions of judgment are not the label but a comprehensive assessment of circumstances such as the purpose of preparation, the contents, and the circumstances of possession. This concerns whether the document falls within the exception prescribed in Article 344 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act, namely "a document to be used solely by the person possessing the document," the so-called self-use document.
The reason this language touches the foregoing conclusion is that the stage of judgment moves from designation to circumstances. The fact that a document's title reads "internal approval," and whether that document is assessed as being solely for the possessor's use, are different questions. The former is one circumstance revealed on the face of the document; the latter is the result of an assessment combining the purpose of preparation, the information recorded, the characteristics of the type, and the circumstances of possession. If the two stages are not distinguished and the latter assessment is drawn directly from the former fact, documents that do not qualify as self-use documents are placed within the statutory grounds of protection on the strength of a single designation. The conclusion of this section that the entrance is open is, in the end, a position that can be taken only after passing through that assessment.
The loss this standard actually targets is the constriction of free internal debate. If review opinions exchanged during the approval process are exposed through production of documents, the practice of recording candid objections and reservations within the company may decline. Moreover, the fact that disclosure of documents may irreparably harm trade secrets and the rights of third parties is a concern pointing in the same direction. Even so, self-use document status cannot be fixed by the designation "internal approval document" alone. For if it were fixed by designation alone, refusal would become easy, but production of documents that do not qualify as self-use documents would be blocked along with it. The interest in protecting internal debate is of a nature to be handled together along the pathway of examining the document's purpose of preparation and the circumstances of external use.
In the synthetic scene, Plaintiff A moves for the approval document held by Defendant B, and Defendant B refuses it in its entirety on the ground that it is an internal document. The facts confirmed in this scene are that the document sought is an approval document and that the ground B advanced for refusal is that it is an internal document. Placed against the foregoing standard, the type "approval document" and the designation "internal document" are only some of the circumstances entering the judgment, while the purpose of preparation, the information recorded, whether external use was contemplated, and other circumstances of possession do not appear in the scene. If it is confirmed that the purpose of preparation and the circumstances of external use are different, then even a document bearing the same label must be re-assessed as to self-use document status; hence the character of this document cannot be fixed by the label alone. Accordingly, from the scene alone it is not determined whether this approval document is a self-use document, and the matter remains undetermined.
What this section permits is the direction of judgment that does not assert self-use document status from the document's title or designation alone. Considering the duty to produce documents, the fact that a document is an internal approval document does not operate as a ground of refusal standing alone; it is one circumstance assessed comprehensively together with the purpose of preparation, the information recorded, and the like. What is not permitted is the conclusion that production may be refused in its entirety merely because the document was created within the company. At the same time, it is not thereby settled that a production order must necessarily issue.
2.2The Conditions That Block Relief
A single label of "internal" cannot permanently conceal information needed in a lawsuit. On the premise that the statutory duty of production and its exceptions are judged in accordance with the nature of the document, this stage asks, along with the question whether refusal may rest solely on the fact that the document was created within the company, what the conditions are under which the avenue of relief is closed.
A self-use document means a document assessed as being solely for the possessor's use. This definition carries over as written to Supreme Court Decision 2014Ma2239 decided July 1, 2016, which explains that Article 344 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act lists as an exception "a document to be used solely by the person possessing the document" (the so-called "self-use document"). Here the subject is the person who possesses the document, and what is at issue is that person's act of refusing to produce the document. The document must have been prepared solely for that person's use, with disclosure to outsiders not contemplated, and there must be a concern that serious disadvantage would arise upon disclosure.
The reason self-use document status must be determined not by designation but by the purpose of preparation, the contents, the possibility of external use, and the like, is that the single fact that a document was prepared within the company through internal approval does not fix a ground for refusing production. The precedent held that it must not be judged by the title or designation of the document alone, but must be judged objectively by comprehensively considering the purpose of preparation, the recorded contents, the characteristics of the document type, the circumstances of possession, and the like. Distinct from this judgment is the judgment of the need for evidentiary examination. Where the duty to produce is not recognized, or where there is no need for evidentiary examination so that the motion for document production is not accepted, if any one of the statutory requirements is unmet, the avenue of relief is closed.
The strongest counterargument targets the loss that disclosure of documents may irreparably harm trade secrets and the rights of third parties, and that free internal debate may be constricted. The precedent likewise holds that the individual's privacy or the free formation of opinions within a corporation (juristic person), trade secrets, and other rights must be weighed in comparative weighing. Even so, the counterargument does not overturn the conclusion by the mere designation "internal document." The principle remains that self-use document status cannot be fixed by the designation "internal approval document" alone; and where circumstances enumerated in the precedent exist, such as the inclusion of identical information or the contemplated external disclosure of the information or its public interest, one should not readily assert that the document is a self-use document on the ground that it is an internal document.
The facts confirmed in this scene are only that the document sought is the approval document held by the defendant and that the ground of refusal is that it is an internal document. The precedent held that even if a document was prepared within the company through internal approval with internal use as its principal purpose subjectively, where it contains the same information as a document for which the applicant holds a legal right to demand inspection or the like, or information constituting the direct basis or grounds therefor, one should not readily so assert. However, the scene does not reveal the document's purpose of preparation, the nature of the recorded information, or whether external disclosure is contemplated, so whether it is a self-use document remains undetermined. Even with the same document label, if the purpose of preparation and the circumstances of external use change, the self-use document determination is made anew.
The conclusion permitted by this section is that a ground for refusing production cannot be fixed by the label "internal document" alone; the conclusion not permitted is that the statutory requirements are met on the strength of that designation alone. The avenue of relief of a production order opens only where the duty to produce documents, relevance, and the need for evidentiary examination are recognized and the limits under statutory grounds of protection are satisfied, and if any one of these is blocked, it closes. This is distinguished from the claim that whenever there is a duty to produce, an order must always issue.
2.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
The starting point is the decision taken at the preceding stage to judge the statutory duty of production and its exceptions in accordance with the nature of the document. This question is limited to cases where the materials are insufficient to specify the nature of the document.
The source text sets the criteria for determining a self-use document as follows. Supreme Court Decision 2014Ma2239 decided July 1, 2016 states: "whether a document falls within a self-use document must not be judged by the title or designation of the document alone, but must be judged objectively by comprehensively considering the purpose for which the document was prepared, the information corresponding to the recorded contents, the characteristics generally possessed by documents of that type or kind, the circumstances under which the document came to be held, and other circumstances; and" Here a self-use document means a document assessed as being solely for the possessor's use. The subject indicated by this language is the person who possesses the document, the act is refusal to produce, and the condition is the sole purpose of use as determined through comprehensive consideration. It does not extend to the other requirements of the provision.
Its basis and the conclusion of this section connect as follows. A designation is but one clue showing the nature of the document, and the purpose of preparation, the recorded contents, and the like must be considered together. Accordingly, designation and substance must not be merged into a single stage of judgment, and the order must not be one of fixing by designation first and then searching for an exception. Self-use document status cannot be fixed by the designation "internal approval document" alone. Cases where the materials are absent and the material for judgment is not specified, however, are different. Where what the document is, or where it is held, is not specified, matters whose material for judgment is unspecified are left undetermined, distinct from impossibility. Impossibility is the conclusion that there is no way to judge; undetermined is the state in which the grounds are presently lacking.
The strongest counterargument targets the constriction of free internal debate. The anxiety that internal review and opposing opinions may be opened to outsiders impairs the free formation of opinions within a corporation (juristic person), and meets the concern that disclosure of documents may irreparably harm trade secrets and the rights of third parties. This loss and inconvenience are real and cannot be disregarded. Even so, fixing a ground of refusal by reliance on the name "internal document," as the counterargument demands, does not fall within the scope of the foregoing answer. Even for documents in which internal interests are at stake, the court proceeds through comprehensive consideration and comparative weighing; refusal is not justified by designation alone.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are limited to those needed within this question and answer. A's target of application is the approval document, B's ground of refusal is that it is an internal document, and that refusal is total. Yet the scene has not determined the purpose of preparation of the document in question, the information contained in the recorded contents, whether external use is included in the purpose of preparation, whether external disclosure of the information is contemplated, and the like. Since aspects remain in which what the document is, or where it is held, is not specified, this matter cannot be asserted to be impossible as a self-use document. The scene merely leaves it undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is that a ground of refusal cannot be fixed by designation alone, and that unspecified matters cannot be declared impossible either. Outside that boundary, the conclusion this section does not permit is the judgment that converts the paucity of materials directly into either the establishment of a ground of refusal or the impossibility of refusal.
2.4The Records Needed for Determination
A single label that a document was created within the company cannot permanently conceal information needed in a lawsuit. At the preceding stage the standard of judging the statutory duty of production and its exceptions in accordance with the nature of the document was organized; the present stage takes up the question of on what basis that nature is to be read. In this scene, the analysis examines whether refusal may rest solely on the fact that the document was created within the company, and what records are needed for the judgment.
The Summary of Decision answering this question sets out in words the criteria for recognizing a self-use document. Supreme Court Decision 2014Ma2239 decided July 1, 2016 holds that it must not be judged by the title or designation of the document alone, but must be judged objectively by comprehensively considering the purpose for which the document was prepared, the information corresponding to the recorded contents, the characteristics generally possessed by documents of that type or kind, the circumstances under which the document came to be held, and other circumstances. The subject indicated by this standard is the person who possesses the document; the object of the judgment is the purpose for which the document was prepared and the information it contains; and the condition lies in whether disclosure to the outside is not contemplated and whether there is a concern that serious disadvantage would arise upon disclosure.
The point at which its basis meshes with the conclusion previously settled is the scope of the records. The materials used for determination are limited to the specific document, the relationship of possession, the reason for the application, the ground for refusal to produce, and the materials recorded in the decision. The stage determination is made only on these fixed records, and absent records are not filled in by inference. The reason the two distinctions part ways here is that Supreme Court Decision 2014Ma2239 decided July 1, 2016 forbids determination by designation while requiring the purpose of preparation, the recorded information, and the possibility of external use to be examined comprehensively as well. Since the character shown in the name and the character of the materials actually used in the judgment are not the same, the former cannot be substituted for the latter.
Nevertheless, there is a counterargument that worries over the free formation of opinions within a corporation (juristic person) and trade secrets being brought to light together. If employees hold their tongues out of concern that proposals and criticisms exchanged internally may be opened to outsiders, the company finds it difficult to gather candid review at the consultation stage. The concern that disclosure of documents may irreparably harm trade secrets and the rights of third parties arises in the same direction. Such losses and inconveniences do not disappear, but even so self-use document status cannot be fixed by the designation "internal approval document" alone. Even if the object of protection indicated by the counterargument remains among the decision factors, declaring it by way of a name does not fit the standard.
Returning to the synthetic scene, the mere fact that Defendant B refused in its entirety on the ground that it is an internal document does not settle whether the approval document is a self-use document. What the specific document is, where Defendant B holds it, why Plaintiff A applies for this document, and how the ground for refusal to produce was recorded in the decision are not determined in the scene. The state in which these items are not filled in the records is undetermined, and the fact that there are no records cannot be converted directly into a judgment on the character of the approval document. Even for the same document, if the purpose of preparation and the circumstances of external use differ, the assessment differs.
Accordingly, the permitted conclusion remains within the narrow compass that self-use document status must be read not by designation but by the purpose of preparation, the contents, and the possibility of external use. Neither the judgment that production may be refused on the sole ground that the document was created within the company, nor conversely the judgment that it must be produced on that ground alone, can be drawn from these records. Content not in the fixed records is not added by inference.
2.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
This question remains confined to distinguishing what, behind the name 'internal document,' must be reconsidered with regard to a document the company prepared within itself.
The provision sets the standard of decision as follows. The precedent states: "Whether a document falls within the category of a document for one's own use must not be determined solely by the title or designation of the document; rather, it must be determined objectively by comprehensively considering the purpose of preparation of the document, the information constituting its recorded content, the characteristics generally possessed by documents of the relevant type or kind, the circumstances under which the document came into possession, and other circumstances" (Supreme Court Decision 2014Ma2239 decided July 1, 2016). Here, the title of the document means the name written on the outside of the paper, the purpose of preparation means the reason the document was made, and the information constituting the recorded content means the facts contained in the words written there; and these circumstances and others must be comprehensively considered and objectively weighed in making the determination.
That provision and the conclusion of this section connect as follows. A document for one's own use means a document evaluated as being solely for the possessor's use, and that evaluation emerges only when the items listed above are set side by side and considered together. Accordingly, the mere circumstance that a document was created within the company does not conclude the matter; whether a document is for one's own use is determined not by its designation but by its purpose of preparation, content, and the possibility of external use. A designation is one person's expression, whereas an evaluation is the result obtained by reading together the circumstances that lie behind that expression; if the two are placed on the same footing, the requirement remains that, even where the document's cover is the same, the determination of whether the document is for one's own use must be redone once the purpose of preparation and the circumstances of external use change.
The counterargument pressing most forcefully against the harm this distinction brings is that free internal discussion may be chilled. If an apprehension lies beneath exchanges of opinion within the company that they may leak outside, people may move toward speaking sparingly and leaving no documents behind. Compounding this is the further concern that disclosure of documents may irreparably harm trade secrets and the rights of third parties. Yet what the protection targeted by this counterargument demands is not a fixation upon a single name, and the answer that a document cannot be confirmed as a document for one's own use by the designation 'internal approval document' alone is maintained in this passage.
Among the facts placed in the synthetic scene, one bears on this question. The defendant refused production in full on the ground that these were internal documents, and that ground for refusal rests solely on the designation. If it is confirmed that the purpose of preparation and the circumstances of external use have changed, the determination of whether the document is for one's own use must be redone; but the scene does not determine which of the purpose of preparation and the circumstances of external use changed, or in what way. Therefore, on the basis of this scene alone it is not settled whether the existing determination of exclusion and effectiveness must be set aside, or from which stage the assessment must be redone, and that place remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. The single fact that a document bears the name 'internal approval document' does not confirm that it is a document for one's own use; and the boundary of this position extends only to the point that if a change in the purpose of preparation and the circumstances of external use is confirmed, that determination must be redone. Conversely, this position yields no conclusion that any document must be unconditionally handed over while such change remains unconfirmed, nor the conclusion that a document must ultimately be produced merely because the ground for refusal was of a single kind.
2.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
What is at issue in this scene is whether that ground for refusal arises automatically. The contention that the whole designation 'internal approval document' should be shielded, on the ground that free internal discussion may be chilled — what basis does it require?
On this question, the confirmed text is the starting point of the analysis. Supreme Court Decision 2014Ma2239 decided July 1, 2016 explains that Article 344, paragraph (2) of the Civil Procedure Act in principle does not permit refusal to produce, while setting up as an exception 'a document intended solely for the use of the person possessing the document.' Yet the precedent firmly states: "Whether a document falls within the category of a document for one's own use must not be determined solely by the title or designation of the document." Accordingly, the label 'internal approval' affixed to the document is not itself a label that determines its character.
Following that text, the subject and the object of the determination are revealed. It is the court that has received a motion for document production that evaluates the character of the document, and the object of that evaluation is not the document's designation but its purpose of preparation and the information constituting its recorded content. The criteria set out by this precedent are the purpose of preparation, the information constituting the recorded content, the characteristics generally possessed by documents of the relevant type or kind, and the circumstances under which the document came into possession or other circumstances. Defendant B's explanation that these are internal approval documents is merely one of the circumstances of possession or other circumstances placed at the end of the list, and cannot take the place of the preceding evaluation factors. The precedent requires that this comprehensive consideration be conducted 'objectively.'
Accordingly, this determination can be established only by distinguishing two stages. The first stage is the work of examining whether the document was prepared solely for the possessor's use, whether disclosure to outside parties was contemplated, and whether there is a concern of serious disadvantage upon disclosure. The second stage is the work of examining whether, even for such a document, there exist circumstances that prevent one from readily concluding, on the ground that it is an internal document, that it is a document for one's own use. As circumstances of this second stage, the confirmed text lists: the inclusion of information that is identical to information covered by a private-law right entitling one to demand inspection or the like, or that constitutes the direct basis or ground therefor; cases in which it cannot be regarded that external use was wholly excluded from the purpose of preparation; and cases in which external disclosure of the recorded 'information' was contemplated or the information possesses public interest. If a single designation is used as the final ground for confirmation, these two stages vanish at once.
What is most sharply raised as a counterargument in this section is the fact that the free formation of opinions within the corporation (juristic person) is impaired. If it becomes known that opinions produced during the approval process can at any time be disclosed in a lawsuit, those in charge will find it difficult to record dissenting views or reserved judgments arising in the review process, and the company may lose the stage at which internal judgments are coordinated. This loss is not hypothetical; it targets the substantial function of the corporation (juristic person), namely the formation of opinions. Yet the settled answer does not mean that, merely because that disadvantage is great, the character may be confirmed by the label. A document cannot be confirmed as a document for one's own use by the designation 'internal approval document' alone; instead, the loss spoken of by the counterargument lies not in the expressed decision factors but in the comparative weighing of the need for production and justifiable reasons.
Even returning to the synthetic scene, what can be confirmed is limited to this range. Plaintiff A's application for the approval documents held by Defendant B, and the circumstance that Defendant B refused production in full on the ground that these were internal documents, are the designated facts; the purpose of preparation and recorded content of those documents, and whether external disclosure of the information was contemplated, are not determined by the scene. If it is confirmed that the purpose of preparation and the circumstances of external use have changed, then even documents bearing the same label require the determination of whether they are for one's own use to be redone — and this is precisely the point. Accordingly, what conclusion the court reaches in this scene remains undetermined. The reasons for the judgment and the detailed facts lie outside the grounds read here and cannot be supplemented.
The conclusion permitted in this section is the distinction that a document cannot be confirmed as a document for one's own use by the designation 'internal approval document' alone; it does not permit extending that conclusion to assert that the document will ultimately not be produced, or that the company's free internal discussion is thereby always protected.
2.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
After the preceding section concluded that a document cannot be confirmed as a document for one's own use by the designation 'internal approval document' alone, this section pushes that determination one step further. Whether this refusal is justified is examined by narrowing the question to whether one may refuse on the sole ground that the document was created within the company. It is here that it is decided whether a single designation monopolizes the exception to the duty of production.
The precedent explains that Article 344, paragraph (2) of the Civil Procedure Act places upon the person possessing a document a general duty to produce, while setting up as an exception 'a document intended solely for the use of the person possessing the document,' that is, a document for one's own use (Supreme Court Decision 2014Ma2239 decided July 1, 2016). The subject dealt with here is the person possessing the document, the act dealt with is refusal to produce, and the axis of the determination rests not on the designation but on the purpose of preparation and the recorded information.
Accordingly, whether a document is for one's own use is determined not by its designation but by its purpose of preparation, content, and the possibility of external use. As defined above, a document for one's own use is a document evaluated as being solely for the possessor's use, and the criteria of that evaluation are not the wording on the label but the information contained in the document and the circumstances of its preparation. The two determinations differ from each other. One is a criterion that asks for what purpose and why the document was prepared; the other is a manner of asking whether that criterion can be substituted by the title or designation. The same precedent adds that even where a document was prepared within the company through an internal approval process with internal use as its principal purpose subjectively, the document should not be readily concluded to be a document for one's own use on the ground that it is an internal document in cases such as where the recorded content of the document contains information identical to that of a document for which the applicant holds a private-law right to demand inspection or the like, or information constituting the direct basis or ground therefor; where, objectively, it cannot be regarded that external use was wholly excluded from the purpose of preparation; or where, even though the document itself is not to be disclosed externally, external disclosure of the 'information' recorded in the document was contemplated or the information possesses public interest (Supreme Court Decision 2014Ma2239 decided July 1, 2016). Herein lies the reason the single circumstance of having passed through internal approval cannot constitute a sufficient condition for refusal.
To this position there attaches the sharp censure that free internal discussion may be chilled. If an application to look into the decision-making process is filed, the organization may move toward speaking sparingly and keeping no records, and the interest in the free formation of opinions within the corporation (juristic person) may be diminished. The same precedent is not unaware of such circumstances and records that, in determining the need for document production, it considers together infringements upon an individual's privacy, the free formation of opinions within the corporation (juristic person) and trade secrets, and other rights (Supreme Court Decision 2014Ma2239 decided July 1, 2016). Nevertheless, the conclusion stands. The concern about chilled discussion is a circumstance that gains weight at the stage of determining the need for production and justifiable reasons; it is not a device that opens the exception by a single name written on a label.
Returning to this scene, the subject of Plaintiff A's application is the approval document held by Defendant B, and the ground for refusal advanced by Defendant B is only that these were internal documents. Measuring this circumstance against the criteria required by the precedent above, it has not been confirmed what the purpose of preparation of that document is, what information constitutes its recorded content, what characteristics documents of the relevant type or kind generally possess, or what the circumstances under which the document came into possession are. What is settled on the record is only the specified document and the relationship of possession, the reason for the application, the reason for refusal to produce, and the type of decision. Therefore, whether Defendant B's document falls within the category of a document for one's own use cannot be confirmed on the basis of this scene alone. What can be confirmed, however, is the direction of the determination. Under the condition that, even where the document's cover is the same, the determination of whether the document is for one's own use must be redone once the purpose of preparation and the circumstances of external use change, the conclusion cannot be fixed by the single fact that the cover is inscribed 'internal document.'
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. One cannot refuse to produce on the sole ground that the document was created within the company, and whether a document is for one's own use is determined not by its designation but by its purpose of preparation, content, and the possibility of external use — that is as far as it goes. That the ground for refusal has collapsed does not mean that a production order issues immediately. Only where the duty to produce the document, relevance, and the need for evidentiary examination are recognized, and the limitations under statutory grounds for protection are satisfied, does the matter proceed to the stage of a production order against the opposing party's document; where the duty to produce is not recognized or the need for evidentiary examination is absent, the motion for document production may not be granted.
2.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
법정 제출의무와 예외를 문서의 성격에 맞추어 판단한다. 신청과 거부 사이의 간격은 오직 '내부문서'라는 하나의 표지로 설명된다. 그러나 문서의 표지는 그 문서가 어떤 목적에서 태어났고 어떻게 사용될 운명이었는지를 말해주지 않는다. 소송에서 필요한 정보가 사내 결재선을 지났다는 사실 하나만으로 영원히 봉인된다면, 문서제출의무의 구조는 그 자체로 빈틈이 된다.
대법원 2016. 7. 1. 자 2014마2239 결정은 이 문서를 '오로지 문서를 가진 사람이 이용하기 위한 문서'라고 부르며, 문서제출의무를 정한 민사소송법 제344조 제2항이 열거한 예외사유 가운데 하나로 둔다. 이 문언이 규정하는 주체는 문서를 실제로 가지고 있는 사람이다. 그 사람은 원칙적으로 제출을 거부하지 못한다. 그러나 문서가 오로지 자신의 이용만을 위하여 작성되었고 외부자에게 개시하는 것이 예정되어 있지 않으며, 개시될 경우 심각한 불이익이 생길 염려가 있다면 예외가 성립한다. 요건은 작성 목적, 개시 예정 여부, 불이익 염려의 세 가지이며, 그 기준은 판례가 정한 것이다.
그러나 대법원 2016. 7. 1. 자 2014마2239 결정은 이어서 완전히 다른 차원의 판단 기준을 제시한다. 자기이용문서에 해당하는지는 문서의 표제나 명칭만으로 판단하여서는 아니 되고, 작성 목적·기재 내용·해당 유형의 성향·소지 경위 등을 종합적으로 고려하여 객관적으로 판단하여야 한다고 본다. 쉽게 단정할 수 없는 경우는 다음과 같이 명시되어 있다. 신청자가 열람 등을 요구할 수 있는 사법상 권리를 가지는 문서와 동일한 정보 또는 직접적 기초·근거가 되는 정보가 기재되어 있는 경우, 객관적으로 외부 이용이 작성 목적에 전혀 포함되어 있지 않다고 볼 수 없는 경우, 문서 자체는 외부에 개시되지 않더라도 기재된 정보의 외부 개시가 예정되었거나 정보가 공익성을 가지는 경우다. 이 판단은 두 단계로 나뉜다. 전 단계는 명칭으로 확정할 수 없는 사정들을 한꺼번에 놓고 보는 요건 검사이고, 후 단계는 그 요건이 다소 미약해 보여도 쉽게 단정할 수 없게 만드는 배제 사정들을 다시 놓아 보는 보정 작업이다. 두 단계를 합쳐야 완성되는 것이며, 둘 중 하나로 끝내면 자기이용문서의 경계는 무너진다.
자유로운 내부 토론이 위축될 수 있다. 법인 내부의 자유로운 의사 형성은 문서제출 판단에서 반드시 비교형량해야 할 가치다. 대법원 2016. 7. 1. 자 2014마2239 결정도 개인의 프라이버시나 법인 내부의 자유로운 의사 형성 및 영업 비밀, 기타 권리에 대한 침해를 제출로 얻을 이익과 비교하여야 한다고 말한다. 문서가 공개되면 앞으로 결재선에 아무도 서명하지 않고, 냉정한 비판 대신 형식적인 찬성만 오가는 조직이 될 수 있다. 그 손실은 소 하나를 넘어 사회 전체의 판단 품질을 떨어뜨린다. 그러나 답은 정해져 있다. 내부결재라는 표지를 그대로 두고, 그 표지가 부여한 보호를 넓히는 대신 판단 기준만을 옮기는 것이다. 회사가 주장하는 불이익은 비교형량의 항목일 뿐, 명칭이 곧 사유가 되는 것은 아니다.
이 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 것은 '결재문서'라는 유형과 '내부문서'라는 거부 사유뿐이며, 각 문서의 작성 목적과 기재된 정보의 성격과 그 정보가 외부에 이용되는지 여부는 합성 장면이 정하지 않았다. 따라서 피고 B의 전면 거부가 정당한지는 이 장면만으로 판단할 수 없다. 다만 확정할 수 있는 것이 하나 있다. 문서가 무엇인지, 어디에 보유되는지 특정되지 않은 경우에도 판단은 미확정으로 남는다. 특정 문서·보유 관계·신청 이유·제출 거부 사유·결정이 기록에 남으면 비로소 대조가 가능해진다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 자기이용문서 여부는 명칭이 아니라 작성 목적·내용·외부 이용 가능성 등으로 객관적으로 판단하며, 회사 내부에서 만들었다는 이유만으로 제출을 거부할 수는 없다. 그러나 이 결론이 허용하지 않는 범위가 함께 선명해져야 한다. 이 절은 자기이용문서라는 항변이 확정적으로 성립하는 요건만을 정할 뿐, 그 예외사유가 인정되지 않는다고 해서 곧바로 제출명령이 내려진다고 말하지는 않는다. 그 문제는 여기서 다루지 않았고, 명칭으로 확정할 수 없다는 전제를 넓히지 않는 한 다른 사유의 판단으로 확장할 필요도 없다.
2.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
앞 단계에서는 법정 제출의무와 예외를 문서의 성격에 맞추어 판단하기로 하였다. 그렇다면 지금 앞에 놓인 장면은 단순하다. 이 거부가 문서의 성격에 비추어 그대로 유지될 수 있는지가 이번에 판단할 물음이다. 내부문서라는 표지가 제출의무의 예외를 스스로 만들어내는지 확인해야 한다.
대법원 2016. 7. 1. 자 2014마2239 결정은 먼저 민사소송법 제344조 제2항을 소개하면서 예외사유를 특정한다. 그에 따르면 문서를 가진 사람은 제344조 제1항에 해당하지 아니하는 경우에도 원칙적으로 문서의 제출을 거부하지 못하고, 예외사유로서 ‘오로지 문서를 가진 사람이 이용하기 위한 문서’, 이른바 ‘자기이용문서’를 든다. 이 정의에서 출발점을 정하면 평가의 대상은 문서의 명칭이 아니라 이용 목적과 외부 개시 예정 여부가 된다. 따라서 어느 문서가 이 예외에 드는지는 소지자가 붙인 표제만으로 결정되지 않는다.
그렇게 정의한 문언은 판단 방법으로 이어진다. 이 문언은 작성 목적과 외부 이용 사정을 별도의 판단 항목으로 삼고, 그 항목들을 함께 보아야 문서의 성격이 가려진다고 말한다.
문서 공개가 영업비밀과 제삼자의 권리를 회복 불가능하게 해칠 수 있고, 자유로운 내부 토론이 위축될 수 있다는 반론이 제기될 수 있다. 회사가 내부 논의를 자유롭게 하지 못하면 의사 형성의 품질이 떨어지고, 그 손실은 문서를 낸 뒤 되돌릴 수 없다는 점에서 반론의 무게가 있다. 그런데 앞서 본 문언은 이런 불이익을 무시하지 않는다. 오히려 작성 목적과 문서가 갖는 성향, 소지 경위, 외부 이용 가능성 등을 종합해서 보라고 요구한다. 즉 반론이 지적한 손실은 판단 항목의 하나로 취급되며, 그 손실만으로 내부문서라는 명칭이 예외를 뒷받침하는 것은 아니다. 결국 대법원 2016. 7. 1. 자 2014마2239 결정이 정한 기준은 이러한 가치를 놓치지 않으면서도, 내부결재 문서라는 명칭만으로 자기이용문서를 확정할 수는 없다는 범위 안에서 판단을 유지한다.
정해진 장면에서 보이는 사실은 단순하다. 이 장면에는 결재문서라는 표지와 내부문서라는 거부 사유만이 놓여 있으며, 문서의 작성 목적, 기재 내용에 해당하는 정보, 문서의 소지 경위, 외부 이용 가능성에 관한 사정은 드러나지 않았다. 그러므로 장면만으로는 어느 문서가 자기이용문서에 해당하는지 판정하기에 충분하지 않고, 자기이용문서 여부에 관해 결론을 내리기 어렵다. 다만 문언에 비추어 확인할 수 있는 것은 작성 목적과 외부 이용 사정이 함께 놓여야 판단된다는 점이며, 그 조건을 바꾼 대조의 문장, 즉 문서 표지가 같아도 작성 목적과 외부 이용 사정이 바뀌면 자기이용문서 판단을 다시 한다는 점은 이 문언의 운용에서 드러나는 경계이다.
이번 물음에서 허용되는 결론은 좁다. 해당 원문 문언만 상대방 문서에 대한 제출명령의 판정 근거로 쓰고, 해당 원문 범위 안의 문언만 적용하며, 판결이유나 다른 항으로 확장하지 않는다는 범위를 지킨다. 이 범위 안에서 회사 내부에서 만들었다는 이유만으로 거부할 수 있는지에 대해서는 내부문서라는 명칭만으로 자기이용문서를 확정할 수 없다고 답할 수 있다. 그 밖에 문서제출의무가 인정되는지, 제출명령의 신청에 정당한 이유가 있는지, 또는 제출로 얻을 이익과 부담이 어떻게 비교되는지는 이 문단이 다루는 문언의 범위 밖에 있다.
2.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
즉 법정 제출의무와 예외를 문서의 성격에 맞추어 판단해야 한다. 이 문단은 그 거부의 근거를 제출명령 안에서 다시 나누어 판정한다. (대법원 2016. 7. 1. 자 2014마2239 결정)
민사소송법 제344조 제2항은 문서를 가진 사람이 제344조 제1항에 해당하지 아니하는 경우에도 원칙적으로 문서의 제출을 거부하지 못한다고 규정하면서 예외사유로서 '오로지 문서를 가진 사람이 이용하기 위한 문서'(이른바 '자기이용문서')를 들고 있다.
어느 문서가 오로지 문서를 가진 사람이 이용할 목적으로 작성되고 외부자에게 개시되는 것이 예정되어 있지 않으며 개시할 경우 문서를 가진 사람에게 심각한 불이익이 생길 염려가 있다면, 문서는 특별한 사정이 없는 한 위 규정의 자기이용문서에 해당한다. 여기서 어느 문서가 자기이용문서에 해당하는지는 문서의 표제나 명칭만으로 판단하여서는 아니 되고, 문서의 작성 목적, 기재 내용에 해당하는 정보, 당해 유형·종류의 문서가 일반적으로 갖는 성향, 문서의 소지 경위나 그 밖의 사정 등을 종합적으로 고려하여 객관적으로 판단하여야 하는데, 설령 주관적으로 내부 이용을 주된 목적으로 회사 내부에서 결재를 거쳐 작성된 문서일지라도, 신청자가 열람 등을 요구할 수 있는 사법상 권리를 가지는 문서와 동일한 정보 또는 직접적 기초·근거가 되는 정보가 문서의 기재 내용에 포함되어 있는 경우, 객관적으로 외부에서의 이용이 작성 목적에 전혀 포함되어 있지 않다고는 볼 수 없는 경우, 문서 자체를 외부에 개시하는 것은 예정되어 있지 않더라도 문서에 기재된 '정보'의 외부 개시가 예정되어 있거나 정보가 공익성을 가지는 경우 등에는 내부문서라는 이유로 자기이용문서라고 쉽게 단정할 것은 아니다. (대법원 2016. 7. 1. 자 2014마2239 결정) 내부결재 문서라는 명칭만으로 자기이용문서를 확정할 수는 없다.
반론은 자유로운 내부 토론이 위축될 수 있다는 점이다. 나아가 문서 공개가 영업비밀과 제삼자의 권리를 회복 불가능하게 해칠 수 있다는 손실과 불편도 함께 겨냥된다. 법인 내부의 자유로운 의사 형성 및 영업 비밀, 기타 권리에 대한 침해는 법원이 비교형량에서 고려할 사정으로 열려 있다. 그렇더라도 명칭만으로 자기이용문서를 확정할 수 없다. 법원은 문서가 쟁점 판단이나 사실의 증명에 어느 정도로 필요한지, 다른 문서로부터 자료를 얻는 것이 가능한지, 문서 제출로 얻게 될 소송상 이익과 피신청인이 문서를 제출함으로 인하여 받게 될 부담이나 재산적 피해 또는 개인의 프라이버시나 법인 내부의 자유로운 의사 형성 및 영업 비밀, 기타 권리에 대한 침해와의 비교형량 및 기타 소송에 나타난 여러 가지 사정을 고려하여 과연 문서제출이 필요한지 및 문서제출신청에 정당한 이유가 있는지를 판단하여야 한다.
합성 장면에서 판정할 수 있는 것은 피고 B의 거부 사유가 '내부문서'라는 표지에 그쳤다는 사실뿐이다. 특정 문서·보유 관계·신청 이유·제출 거부 사유·결정이라는 기록 항목이 정해졌으나 실제 사건의 사실·송달·이행 결과와 승패·회수·현장 효과는 미확정으로 남는다. 문서가 무엇인지 또는 어디에 보유되는지 특정되지 않은 경우에도 제출명령 단계의 판정은 열려 있고, 자료 부족은 곧바로 구제 불능이 아니다. 여기서는 작동하는 경우·막히는 경우·미확정인 경우에 한정한다.
문서제출의무·관련성·증거조사 필요가 인정되고 법정 보호 사유에 따른 한계를 충족한 경우에 제출명령이 작동하고, 제출의무가 인정되지 않거나 증거조사 필요가 없어 해당 문서제출신청이 받아들여지지 않는 경우에는 막힌다. 자료 부족으로 미확정인 경우에 머무는 경우를 예외나 추가 단계로 바꾸지 않고 미확정으로 둔다. 이 결론은 내부문서라는 이유만으로 거부할 수 없다는 범위에 머무르며, 명령의 발령과 집행의 성과를 이미 확정한 것은 아니다.
2.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
법정 제출의무와 예외를 문서의 성격에 맞추어 판단한 뒤에, 이제는 상대방이 가진 문서에 대한 제출명령이 실제로 열리는 경우와 막히는 경우, 그리고 아직 판단할 수 없어 남는 경우를 서로 구별하여야 한다. 이 셋은 각각 다른 조건에 매여 있으므로 하나의 문장으로 뭉뚱그려 말할 수 없다.
이 문제에 관한 판례는 “민사소송법 제344조 제2항은 문서를 가지고 있는 사람은 제344조 제1항에 해당하지 아니하는 경우에도 원칙적으로 문서의 제출을 거부하지 못한다고 규정하면서 예외사유로서 ‘오로지 문서를 가진 사람이 이용하기 위한 문서’(이른바 ‘자기이용문서’)를 들고 있다”고 전제한다(대법원 2016. 7. 1. 자 2014마2239 결정). 여기서 말하는 문서를 가진 사람은 제출을 거부하려는 상대방이고, 제출거부는 위 예외사유가 성립할 때에만 허용된다. 자기이용문서란 오로지 소지자의 이용을 위한 것으로 평가되는 문서를 뜻하며, 이 정의는 문서의 이름이 아니라 평가 결과에 붙는다.
그 문언은 열리는 조건과 막히는 조건을 서로 다른 단계에 두고 있다. 먼저 제출의무·관련성·증거조사 필요가 인정되고 법정 보호 사유에 따른 한계를 충족하면 제출명령의 문이 열린다. 반면 제출의무가 인정되지 않거나 증거조사 필요가 없어 해당 문서제출신청이 받아들여지지 않으면 문은 닫힌다. 미확정은 이 어느 쪽에도 넣지 않고, 문서가 무엇인지 또는 어디에 보유되는지 특정되지 않은 경우로 따로 둔다. 이 셋은 판정의 시점과 근거가 다르므로 섞어서는 안 된다.
이 구별을 흔드는 반론은 자유로운 내부 토론이 위축될 수 있다는 점에서 출발한다. 내부 결재 과정에서 오간 의견이 소송에서 드러나면 직원이 솔직하게 쓰기를 꺼리고, 그 문서를 만든 법인의 내부 의사 형성이 훼손된다는 것이다. 아울러 문서 공개가 영업비밀과 제삼자의 권리를 회복 불가능하게 해칠 수 있다는 점도 함께 겨냥한다. 그럼에도 법원은 명칭만으로 단정할 수 없다고 본다. 그 문서가 “오로지 문서를 가진 사람이 이용할 목적으로 작성되고 외부자에게 개시하는 것이 예정되어 있지 않으며 개시할 경우 문서를 가진 사람에게 심각한 불이익이 생길 염려가 있다면” 자기이용문서에 해당하지만, 문서의 작성 목적과 기재 내용, 해당 유형의 성향, 소지 경위를 종합적으로 고려해 객관적으로 판단하여야 한다(대법원 2016. 7. 1. 자 2014마2239 결정).
이 사정만으로는 어느 쪽 조건이 성립했는지 가리지 못한다. 신청된 문서가 무엇인지, 피고 B가 어떤 관계로 그 문서를 보유하는지, 신청 이유와 거부 사유가 무엇인지, 그리고 법원이 내린 결정이 무엇인지가 기록에 드러나야 열림과 닫힘을 판단할 수 있다. 그 가운데 하나라도 특정되지 않으면 미확정으로 남는다. 만약 작성 목적과 외부 이용 사정이 바뀌는 것이 확인되면 같은 표지의 문서라도 자기이용문서 판단을 다시 한다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 조건부 구별이다. 제출의무·관련성·증거조사 필요와 법정 보호 사유의 한계가 함께 인정되면 제출명령의 문이 열리고, 제출의무나 증거조사 필요가 없어 신청이 받아들여지지 않으면 닫히며, 문서나 보유 관계가 특정되지 않으면 미확정으로 남는다. 여기서 그쳐야 한다. 내부문서라는 이름을 붙였다는 사실 하나만으로 문이 열렸다고도, 닫혔다고도 단정할 수 없다. 미확정은 자료 부족의 표시일 뿐 곧바로 구제 불능을 뜻하지 않는다.
2.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
On the premise that the duty to submit documents in court and its exceptions are to be determined according to the nature of the document, Plaintiff A applies for an approval document held by Defendant B, and Defendant B refuses in its entirety on the ground that it is an internal document. Whether this refusal is an exception fitting the nature of the document, or merely one grounded in the label on its cover, must be discerned.
Here, the person holding the document is the subject who possesses it in actuality, and the act of refusing production relies on that ground of exception.
The foregoing language requires an objective judgment that comprehensively considers, as the criteria for evaluating a self-use document, the purpose for which the document was prepared, the information corresponding to its stated content, the character ordinarily possessed by documents of that type or kind, the circumstances under which the document came to be held, and other circumstances. Accordingly, the stage of judging by the title or name is distinct from the stage of judging by the purpose of preparation and the like. Even where the designation "internal document" is affixed, the mere circumstance that the document was drafted within the company after going through an approval procedure cannot establish a self-use document.
The counterargument that free internal discussion may be chilled is substantive. Where internal approval documents are opened to the outside, one cannot dispel the concern that the free formation of opinions within the corporation (juristic person), trade secrets, and other rights will be impaired. The loss that the counterargument fears is a matter to be dealt with at the stage of determining the necessity of production of documents, and cannot serve as a ground for escaping the duty to produce on the basis of the name alone.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only the items of a specific document, the custody relationship, the reason for the application, the ground for refusing production, and the records of the DECISION, while the purpose of the document's preparation and the circumstances of its external use have not been confirmed. Accordingly, whether Defendant B's refusal in its entirety falls precisely within the exception for self-use documents is not established by this material.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. A self-use document cannot be established, so as to escape the duty to produce, on the strength of the single label "internal approval document"; the purpose of preparation, the content, the possibility of external use, and the like must be considered together in place of the name. Conversely, the foregoing conclusion does not mean that a production order is issued immediately. If a duty to produce exists, must an order always be issued?