Summary
Because a court cannot render judgment on matters a party has not applied for, the need for relief must be distinguished from the scope of adjudication.
1.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
Good intentions do not confer the authority to adjudicate disputes that the parties have not chosen. The preceding section went as far as to say that the importance of the material and the statutory conditions for delay must be recorded separately, so that reasons for admission or exclusion are left behind. Now the question is the criterion that marks the entrance to adjudication. May the court add performance that it considers more just? This question compels one first to settle not how great the need for relief is, but how far the range of matters the court may adjudicate remains open. The plaintiff seeks delivery of an object, and the issue is whether the court may order other performance on the ground that it would help resolve the dispute. To answer this question, one must first examine the ground that sets the outer boundary of adjudication.
The source text corresponding to this section is Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act. That provision declares: "The court shall not render a judgment on a matter for which the parties have made no application" (Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act). The subject indicated by this text is the court; the prohibited act is rendering a judgment on a matter for which no application has been made; and the condition is that the matter does not fall within the parties' application. Here, an application means the act of requesting of the court the performance demanded by a party. The provision is read as stipulating the principle of party disposition, that is, the principle that the parties' applications define the scope of adjudication. This provision addresses only the limitation that the court cannot adjudicate matters outside the application. How the performance within the application is specified, and what form of action is chosen, are separate questions.
The above text and the conclusion of this section meet on the same line. The entrance to this relief opens only where the necessary performance falls within the scope of a lawful application and is adjudicated within that scope in the dispositive part. In other words, the passage to adjudication is secured when the demanded performance, the parties, and the conditions are specified in the statement of the claim, and when the right asserted in the chosen form of action can be defended. This judgment matters because it treats the need for relief and the scope of adjudication as different things. The circumstance that a need exists explains only why the performance is desirable; it creates no new authority for the court to reach beyond the application. One is the reason for wanting the performance, and the other is the boundary of what the court may decide, so neither may be reduced to the other.
Yet the point most sharply targeted by the objection that leaving errors of application uncorrected weakens substantive protection of rights is precisely this distinction. There is the concern that a party, unfamiliar with the law, used an inept expression; that insisting on that expression produces the result of refusing an obvious redress of rights; and that ultimately, unless the court steps forward somewhat more actively, a preventable loss is left unaddressed. This loss directly touches the value of substantive redress of rights, and it brings with it the inconvenience of losing the lawsuit in order to observe form. But the foregoing answer is clear. Performance outside the application cannot be added to the dispositive part on the ground that a need exists. This answer does not erase the disadvantage identified by the counterargument, and it leaves in place the outer boundary that prevents the court from adding the necessary performance.
Placing this perspective against this scene, one must first confirm whether the demanded performance, the parties, and the conditions are specified within the scope in which the plaintiff sought delivery of an object, and whether that performance is adjudicated in the dispositive part. The decisive question is whether ordering a performance other than delivery of the object falls within this scope or remains outside the application. The Records take as the objects of comparison the statement of the claim and amendment applications, service, the dispositive part of the judgment, and the reasoning, but since this scene is not a reproduction of an actual case, the result of that comparison is not fixed. In particular, if the correspondence between the final statement of the claim and the judgment cannot be confirmed, the assessment remains undetermined. However, as a comparison that alters the conditions, if the performance enters the scope of the application by way of a lawful amendment, the prior bar as being outside the application is reconsidered.
Accordingly, the conclusion permitted by this section is clear. Where the necessary performance falls within the scope of a lawful application and is adjudicated within that scope in the dispositive part, the entrance to this relief opens, provided that the demanded performance, the parties, and the conditions are specified in the statement of the claim and the right asserted in the chosen form of action can be defended. By contrast, where the desired performance remains outside the scope of the application and the court cannot add it to the dispositive part at its discretion, adjudication is not permitted however great the need for relief may be. However, the results of service or performance in an actual case, and any settled outcome of the dispute, are not determined in this scene and remain unverified.
1.2The Conditions That Block Relief
The plaintiff sought delivery of an object, and the issue is whether the court may order other performance on the ground that it would help resolve the dispute. In this situation the question is whether the court may add to the dispositive part the performance that it considers more just. Performance here means concrete acts such as delivery or performance prescribed in the dispositive part of the judgment, and here the claim for delivery of an object and other acts that are not such delivery are set in contrast as different objects.
The text needed to answer this question is set out in Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act. It provides that the court shall not render a judgment on a matter for which the parties have made no application (Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act). Here the subject is the court; the act is the act of fixing the object by way of a judgment; and the prohibited condition is the case in which the matter is not included in the parties' application. An application means the act of presenting to the court, in specified form, what a party seeks, such as through a complaint or an application to amend the statement of the claim, and this provision does not address other requirements of an application.
This text and the conclusion of this section connect as follows. Where the desired performance remains outside the scope of the application and the court cannot add it to the dispositive part at its discretion, the channel of relief is closed if even one of the statutory requirements is not satisfied. The reason one must distinguish the need for relief from the scope of adjudication is that the former asks what is lacking for the substantive resolution of the dispute, whereas the latter determines what this trial can speak about. The principle of party disposition is the principle that sets the limit of the latter, and satisfaction of the former does not widen the range of the latter.
Meanwhile, the point most persuasively targeted by the objection that leaving errors of application uncorrected weakens substantive protection of rights lies in this: that a party's mistake in expression results in the refusal of an obvious redress of rights. If the court recognizes performance that would actually help resolve the dispute yet cannot place it in the dispositive part, that loss remains entirely with the party seeking relief. Yet notwithstanding this objection, where the necessary performance remains outside the scope of the application and the court cannot add it to the dispositive part at its discretion, performance outside the application cannot be added to the dispositive part on the ground that a need exists. The task of reducing the disadvantage identified by the objection remains another share of work to be done, without altering this conclusion.
In the synthetic scene, the facts relevant to this question are that the plaintiff sought delivery of an object, and that the performance in issue is the other performance raised on the ground that it would help resolve the dispute. Whether this other performance is included within the scope of the application is not fixed, and it is a matter to be checked against the statement of the claim and amendment applications and service, and against the dispositive part and reasoning of the judgment. So long as that point is not confirmed, the inside and the outside of the application cannot be assessed from the scene alone, and the assessment therefore remains undetermined. By way of contrast, if the performance enters the scope of the application by way of a lawful amendment, the prior bar as being outside the application is reconsidered. Any year not in the scene, and any result of the judgment, cannot be determined here.
The conclusion permitted by this section is limited to the following: where the necessary performance falls within the scope of a lawful application and is adjudicated within that scope in the dispositive part, that performance may be handled in the dispositive part. Conversely, the conclusion that performance outside the scope of the application may be added to the dispositive part at discretion on the ground that a need exists is not permitted. The distinction between what is asked for and why it is asked for is a matter for the next discussion and is not determined in this section.
1.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Up to that step, it has been confirmed that the importance of the material and the statutory conditions for delay must be recorded separately, so that reasons for admission or exclusion are left behind. Now, going one step beyond the question whether the court may add performance that it considers more just, one examines where that addition is barred, and how the barred point should be recorded. Here the question is whether the necessary performance can come within the scope of the application and be adjudicated in the dispositive part.
The text answering this question is in Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act. That provision draws the line: "The court shall not render a judgment on a matter for which the parties have made no application" (Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act). The subject indicated by this text is the court, and the prohibited act is taking up a matter as an object of judgment. The condition is when the matter does not fall within the parties' application. Here the word "matter" refers to the performance asked for, that is, the object and scope of the claim, and it stands on a different plane from any explanation or argument as to why it is asked for.
Connecting this text with the conclusion of this section, whether the materials of judgment are specifically determined remains a separate step. The point that performance outside the application cannot be added to the dispositive part is a judgment that follows directly from the text; whether, from the standpoint where that judgment has been laid down, the correspondence between the final statement of the claim and the judgment can be confirmed is another question. If it cannot be confirmed, matters for which the materials of judgment are not specifically determined are left undetermined, distinguished from impossibility. The reason for dividing the two steps is that, if cases where the boundary of the application is clear and cases where the records are reticent are bundled into one lump, the strong conclusion of impossibility is brought forward without grounds.
The strongest objection is that leaving errors of application uncorrected weakens substantive protection of rights. A party's mistake in expression results in the refusal of an obvious redress of rights, and it may amount to the court withholding performance that it knows perfectly well, on the strength of form alone. This loss and inconvenience do not disappear, and the value of the rights and interests targeted by the objection remains as it is. Even so, unless the necessary performance comes within the scope of a lawful application and is adjudicated within that scope in the dispositive part, performance outside the application cannot be added to the dispositive part on the ground that a need exists.
The Records to be checked in the synthetic scene are the statement of the claim and amendment applications, service, the dispositive part of the judgment, and the reasoning. The scene fixes only the point that the plaintiff sought delivery of an object; it does not fix what amendment applications were actually made, or how the dispositive part of the judgment answered the statement of the claim. Accordingly, from the state of the material that the correspondence cannot be confirmed in the records, one cannot immediately fix whether that application was in fact made, or whether a judgment was in fact rendered.
The conclusion permitted by this section is that, where the matter has been adjudicated in a dispositive part within the scope of the application, the performance may be included in the dispositive part, and that performance remaining outside the scope of the application cannot be added by the court at its discretion. Matters for which the correspondence between the final statement of the claim and the judgment cannot be confirmed are left undetermined as they stand, and insufficiency of material is not read immediately as an inability to grant relief. Conversely, transcribing the expression "impossibility" into every place where the material is empty likewise goes beyond the boundary of this section.
1.4The Records Needed for Determination
Following that conclusion, which confirmed that the importance of the material and the statutory conditions for delay must be recorded separately so that reasons for admission or exclusion are left behind, the question now posed is not the records but the outer boundary of the application. In this scene it is not fixed what performance the court judged would actually help resolve the dispute. What is confirmed is only that the application refers to the claim for delivery, and that the question has been asked whether the court may consider performance outside it.
The ground for answering this question is written in Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act. This provision declares that the court shall not render a judgment on "a matter for which the parties have made no application." Here "the parties" means the plaintiff who has raised the claim in the lawsuit and the defendant who defends that claim, and "application" means the matter that a party has demanded of the court and sought to have adjudicated. The phrase "shall not render a judgment" takes the form of a prohibition, not of a condition. Therefore, the subject of the act addressed by this provision is the court, that act is a judgment on a matter for which no application has been made, and the condition under which adjudication is permitted is limited to the case where the application encompasses that matter.
Linking the text of Article 203 with the conclusion of this section reveals what the step-by-step assessment requires. The range the court may adjudicate is defined by the parties' application, and performance outside it cannot be placed in the dispositive part however necessary it may appear. Here lies the reason for distinguishing "the need for relief" from "the scope of adjudication." The former is a substantive inquiry into what performance helps resolve the dispute; the latter is a procedural boundary that determines whether the court has the authority to translate that judgment into the dispositive part. If the two are mixed, a dispositive part is issued that crosses the boundary of authority on the sole ground that it is helpful.
The result following from this distinction is uncompromising. Just as with the requirement that the importance of the material and the statutory conditions for delay must be recorded separately so that reasons for admission or exclusion are left behind, the assessment is made on the recorded material alone. Only the material recorded in the statement of the claim and amendment applications and service, and in the dispositive part of the judgment and its reasoning, becomes the material of judgment, and absent records are not filled in by presumption. Here the objection that leaving errors of application uncorrected weakens substantive protection of rights is at its sharpest. A party may choose a legal term wrongly or draft the statement of the claim clumsily, so that the court misses what it regards as an obvious redress of rights. Yet acknowledging that loss does not permit adding performance outside the application to the dispositive part.
Measured against the synthetic scene, these conditions present a situation in which the plaintiff sought delivery of an object, and the court considers that other performance would help resolve the dispute. Yet it cannot be confirmed whether that other performance has come within the scope of the application through the statement of the claim or a lawful amendment application. Unless the correspondence between the final statement of the claim and the judgment is confirmed by the records, one cannot assert whether that performance lies inside or outside the application. If that performance enters the scope of the application by way of a lawful amendment, the prior bar as being outside the application is reconsidered. But from the present scene alone one cannot know whether that premise has been satisfied, and so it remains undetermined. The result of the judgment and the result of performance are likewise not fixed.
Therefore the conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. The performance may be placed in the dispositive part only where it has been adjudicated in a dispositive part within the scope of the application and that scope is confirmed by the records. Performance outside the scope of the application cannot be added by the court to the dispositive part at its discretion, and the circumstance of necessity does not alter that conclusion. Records that cannot be confirmed are left undetermined, but insufficiency of source material is not read immediately as an inability to grant relief.
1.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
The question now is whether the court may add to the dispositive part a performance it deems more just, and it also asks what turns that determination over.
There is one source text that answers this question. Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that the court "may not" render a judgment "on a matter for which a party has made no application." This wording defines the subject as the court, the act as judgment, and the condition as whether a party has made an application. The name the author gives this provision is the principle of party disposition, and its meaning is the principle that a party's application determines the scope of adjudication.
If this wording and its name are joined together, the reason the two determinations diverge becomes clear. One is whether the performance is necessary for relief; the other is whether that performance falls within the scope of the application and can therefore be adjudicated. The author gives priority to the latter. Even a necessary performance, if it does not fall within the scope of the application, leaves the scope of adjudication closed. Even without adding any requirement or exception to this distinction, the principle that the scope of adjudication is fixed by the application is sufficient.
The counterargument squarely targets the loss that remains from this distinction. It contends that leaving the error in the application uncorrected weakens substantive protection of rights, and it maintains that the result is a refusal of plainly available relief because of a party's error of expression. The author does not change the answer even while leaving this disadvantage unalleviated. However great the need for relief, the scope of adjudication does not expand.
The facts confirmed in the scene are only that the claim sought delivery of an object and that another performance was raised on the ground that it would help resolve the dispute. Whether another performance can be ordered cannot be determined from the scene alone. If that amendment is confirmed, the existing blockage and the effectiveness determination are discarded and the determination is redone from the first step. The statement of the claim, the application to amend, and the service, dispositive part, and reasons are the records used for that confirmation.
Accordingly, what the court may add to the dispositive part is a performance within the scope of the application, and a performance outside the application cannot be added no matter how necessary it may be. The direction of adding to the dispositive part a performance outside the application on the ground of necessity is a conclusion this section does not permit. The difference between the words saying what is requested and the words saying why it is requested is not settled here.
1.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
In this scene, the question is whether the court exceeds the limits of the principle of party disposition. It must also weigh the point that leaving the error in the application uncorrected weakens substantive protection of rights.
The basis for answering this question lies in Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act. Its wording provides that "the court may not render a judgment on a matter for which a party has made no application" (Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act). Here the subject is the court, its act is judgment, and the condition is a matter for which a party has made no application. The principle of party disposition means the principle that a party's application determines the scope of adjudication.
The provision limits the objects that cannot be judged to matters outside the application. This basis leads to the settled conclusion that, however great the need for relief, the court cannot add to the dispositive part a performance outside the application. The reason the need for relief and the scope of adjudication must be distinguished here is that the former is the reason in the words saying why, while the latter is the object in the words saying what is requested. Where a performance remains outside the scope of the application and the court therefore cannot add it to the dispositive part at its discretion, that blockage operates as it stands.
The strongest counterargument targets the cost this blockage actually exacts. If the result is a refusal of plainly available relief because of a party's error of expression, the plaintiff loses substance through a formal defect. Nevertheless, the court cannot add to the dispositive part a performance outside the application on the ground that it is necessary. The loss the counterargument identifies is not erased, but that loss cannot be a reason for widening the outer line of the scope of adjudication.
All that can be confirmed from the synthetic scene is the fact that Plaintiff A sought delivery of an object and that another performance came into question. Whether that other performance entered the scope of the application as a lawful amendment is determined by the correspondence among the statement of the claim, the application to amend, and the service, dispositive part, and reasons. Because the correspondence between the final statement of the claim and the judgment cannot be confirmed, the matter remains undetermined so far as those records are concerned.
Accordingly, the permitted conclusion is that a performance outside the application cannot be added to the dispositive part. Conversely, what is not permitted is the court's expansion of the scope of the judgment on the sole ground that the performance is more necessary. The condition on which the legal route opens is that the performance enters the scope of the application by a lawful amendment and is adjudicated within that scope by way of the dispositive part.
1.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The preceding section received the conclusion that a performance outside the application cannot be added to the dispositive part on the ground of necessity alone, but what line that conclusion draws is not yet revealed. In this situation, the question whether the court may add a performance it deems more just remains as it stands. However urgent the need for relief may be, the court's authority may not expand to follow that need. This question asks where the outer line of the application lies. Whether the justness of a judgment and the scope of a judgment are the same question must be distinguished from the outset.
The wording that answers this question lies in the Civil Procedure Act. Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that "the court may not render a judgment on a matter for which a party has made no application." In this wording the subject is the court, the act is judgment, and the condition is the fact that a party made no application for the matter in question. The author calls this principle the principle of party disposition, and its meaning is the principle that a party's application determines the scope of adjudication. That is, according to how far the application extends, the horizon of matters the court may adjudicate is fixed accordingly. What the wording prohibits is a judgment on matters outside the application, not the method of decision within the application. Accordingly, this provision is read as a rule concerning the scope of the judgment rather than the manner of the judgment.
The link joining this wording to the conclusion of this section is the correspondence between the 'scope of the application' and the 'scope of adjudication.' The reason the author says the need for relief and the scope of adjudication must be distinguished is that these two concepts do not begin from the same place. The need for relief felt by the plaintiff arises from the demand to fill the loss left by the dispute, whereas the scope of adjudication is set within the limits reached by the application submitted to the court. The court cannot widen the latter scope on its own by taking account of the former need. If a performance outside the application could be added to the dispositive part on the ground of necessity, the principle that the application determines the scope of adjudication collapses on the spot. The reason the two stages must be kept separate is that the necessary performance and the permitted judgment belong to different questions.
Even so, this distinction is not free from the charge of weakening the protection of rights. The strongest counterargument is aimed at the point that leaving the error in the application uncorrected weakens substantive protection of rights. If a party failed to make the appropriate application through an error of expression, the court grasps the substance of the problem, and ordering the correct performance would plainly help resolve the dispute, yet the court must refuse because of the wording, the rights remain only on paper. The author does not erase this disadvantage but repeats the answer. That is, while acknowledging the loss identified by the counterargument, the author answers that filling that loss with a performance outside the scope of the application does not fall within the court's authority.
The facts revealed in this scene are simple. Plaintiff A sought delivery of an object, and the court is led to ask whether it may consider another performance on the ground that it would help resolve the dispute. The materials taken as the records of the determination are the statement of the claim, the application to amend, and the service, dispositive part, and reasons. Contrasting these with the conditions of the principle of party disposition, so long as the application for delivery of an object and the other performance are different matters, the court cannot add the latter to the dispositive part. However, if the performance enters the scope of the application by a lawful amendment, the previous blockage of being outside the application is reconsidered. From the scene alone, the correspondence between the final statement of the claim and the dispositive part is not confirmed, and so the determination of that correspondence remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow and clear. Even a performance the court deems more just, if a party has not applied for it, cannot be added to the dispositive part of the judgment, and the circumstance that the need for relief is great does not allow crossing the outer line of the application. The conclusions it does not permit are broader. The determination that a performance outside the application may be ordered, the determination that the scope of adjudication expands when there is necessity, and the determination that the court may freely select a better performance and place it in the dispositive part all lie outside the conclusion of this section. What is fixed is only the condition that a performance must enter the scope of the application before it can be adjudicated by way of the dispositive part; which performance is substantively right is not answered here.
1.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
In this scene, if the solution the court deems favorable to the plaintiff exceeds the scope contained in the statement of the claim, the question of this section is whether that excess may be made the subject of adjudication. The question whether the court may add a performance it deems more just is made concrete here.
As the wording that answers this question, Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act provides as follows: "The court may not render a judgment on a matter for which a party has made no application." (Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act) The subject of this wording is the court, the prohibited act is judgment, and the condition is a judgment on a matter for which a party has made no application. The author reads this wording to mean that 'a matter for which a party has made no application' refers to something a party has not put forward as an object to be adjudicated, and therefore a performance the court itself deems necessary is not included among those objects.
The principle of party disposition means the principle that a party's application determines the scope of adjudication. Here the need for relief and the scope of adjudication are different stages. The former asks which performance helps resolve the dispute; the latter determines what the court may fix by way of judgment. The reason the scope of adjudication does not expand merely from a determination that a performance is substantively necessary is that the cause fixing the scope of adjudication is the party's application. The limitation that no matter how great the necessity, a matter for which there is no application cannot be judged is made concrete here.
The counterargument that challenges this distinction most strongly is the point that leaving the error in the application uncorrected weakens substantive protection of rights. If the court completely refuses even a performance a party failed to request because it was unskillful in expression, the protection of rights the court has already confirmed from the facts is left with a gap. The result that the court cannot touch a solution it regards as just appears as though the form of procedure has overwhelmed substance. Even while not erasing the loss this counterargument identifies, the author answers as follows: because the loss arising from an error of expression does not change who bears the responsibility for setting the scope of the application.
Contrasting this scene with this question, the performance the plaintiff sought is delivery of an object, and the other performance the court regarded as helpful lies outside that application. From this scene alone, none of the statement of the claim, the application to amend, and the service, dispositive part, and reasons is determined as to what actually happened. Because the correspondence between the final statement of the claim and the judgment cannot be confirmed, the facts of the actual case, the service, and the results of performance remain undetermined. However, the condition alone that if the performance enters the scope of the application by a lawful amendment, the previous blockage of being outside the application is reconsidered is maintained together with the wording.
The conclusion this section permits is that the court cannot add a performance outside the application to the dispositive part, and the conclusion it does not permit is the expansion of that scope on the ground of necessity alone. Where the necessary performance lies within the lawful scope of the application and is adjudicated within that scope by way of the dispositive part, it remains within the subject of determination.
1.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
The issue is whether, on the consideration alone that it would be more helpful in resolving the dispute, the court may itself determine a performance that is not sought in the motion and include it in the dispositive part, or whether the adjudication ends within the range the parties have requested. This question examines where the need for relief and the authority of adjudication part company. What must be answered now is not the vague possibility itself that a different performance may be ordered, but what the text supporting such a determination points to. It also examines whether the authority may be broadened in advance on the assumption that the inconvenience will appear only after judgment has been rendered. If the relief the parties designate and the relief the court considers necessary differ, it remains to determine which of the two the boundaries of adjudication should follow.
The text corresponding to this occasion is Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act. That Article provides: "The court shall not render a judgment on any matter on which the parties have not made a motion." This wording binds the objects that the court, as the subject that renders the judgment, may handle within the limited range defined by the parties' motion. A matter on which the parties have not made a motion is a matter that the parties have not demanded in their claim or newly added by amendment thereof, and the wording that the court shall not render a judgment means that on such a matter the dispositive part may contain neither a finding of success nor of defeat. Accordingly, under the wording the subject is the court, the prohibited act is rendering a judgment on a matter outside the motion, and the condition is that the parties have not made a motion on that matter. This Article does not separately provide whether the court may find during the hearing that a performance in a different form is more appropriate. Here the wording alone is read as the basis for a dispositive part within the scope of the motion.
The line connecting this wording to the preceding conclusion lies in who determines the scope of adjudication. Here, the principle of party disposition means the principle that the parties' motion determines the scope of adjudication, and it distinguishes the object as to which the need for relief is felt from the object actually to be adjudicated by judgment. That a given performance is of substantive help in resolving the dispute remains an evaluation concerning the need for relief, and the attribution that such a performance has entered the scope of adjudication is a separate determination. If the two steps are mixed, the understanding the court gained in the hearing becomes, as its result, an expansion of the scope of the motion, and the subject and the condition set by the wording are reversed. The condition of effectiveness is satisfied only where the necessary performance falls within a lawful scope of motion and is adjudicated within that range by a dispositive part. Where that performance remains outside the scope of the motion and the court cannot add it to the dispositive part at its discretion, that is a zone in which a judgment on the motion is impossible. A dispositive part exceeding the scope of the motion is not permitted by the wording and therefore cannot be supplemented by separate records or reasons alone.
If the error in the motion is left as it is, substantive protection of rights is weakened. If the performance demanded does not actually reach a right already recognized by law, and, because the claim was miswritten, an obvious relief is omitted, the party bears that disadvantage in full. This is the risk that, going beyond the limits of expression, the relief itself is reduced, and the more complex the case, the longer-lasting the consequence of failing to correct the exact form the parties demanded. However, the fact that this loss raised by the counterargument is great does not serve as a ground for adding to the dispositive part a performance outside the motion. Even where there is a necessity, no judgment may be rendered on a matter on which the parties have not made a motion as the wording defines it, and accordingly the weakening of remedies must be resolved through the route of changing the range by means of a motion, and cannot be remedied outside the scope of the wording. The disadvantage raised by the counterargument remains as it is, but that disadvantage does not alter the attribution of authority.
The facts that can be confirmed in the synthetic scene are that plaintiff A sought delivery of an object, and that ordering a different performance on the ground that it would help resolve the dispute became an issue. In this scene, if plaintiff A's final claim and the correspondence of the judgment are set side by side, the performance selected as demanded is delivery of an object, and it is not confirmed that there is a record showing the other performance entering the scope of the motion. Accordingly, the other performance remains outside the scope of the motion, and since the court cannot add it to the dispositive part at its discretion, in that zone it does not become an object of judgment. If the performance enters the scope of the motion by a lawful amendment, the prior blockage is reassessed, but the requirements or the timing of the amendment are not yet fixed. As no year, amount, or result of performance is designated in the scene, whether the details of the final claim and the correspondence of the judgment still diverge remains undetermined. Undetermined does not mean leaving open whether a judgment is possible, but means rendering a determination only within the scope confirmed by the records.
The conclusion this section permits is to judge a dispositive part within the scope of the motion by using the relevant text alone, and the application of that wording remains confined to the limited determination that no judgment may be rendered on a matter on which the parties have not made a motion. What is not permitted is a reading that takes that wording as a ground for expanding the reasons for judgment, nor is a performance outside the motion added to the dispositive part merely because there is a need for it. This determination is limited to the stated conditional distinction. Unless the conclusion is moved in the direction of broadening a performance that, out of good intentions, was thought more just, the boundary of the wording is preserved.
1.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
In this scene it must be made clear whether the court may itself set the width of its intervention, or whether it cannot cross the outer line drawn by the motion. The present question concerns what portions may be further divided and adjudicated within a dispositive part within the scope of the motion. The court's dividing up the details within a performance already brought in the motion does not newly create a different performance outside the motion.
To this question the corresponding wording declares the principle of party disposition. Under Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act, no judgment may be rendered on "a matter on which the parties have not made a motion." The subject of this sentence is the court, the act is the judgment, and the condition is a matter on which the parties have not made a motion. Here, a motion refers to the scope of adjudication that the parties demand of the court, and a matter means together the object and the content that can be attached to that adjudication. Once the condition is satisfied, the court cannot render a judgment on that matter, and whether it may render a judgment because the condition is not satisfied remains open as it is.
The foregoing wording leads to the conclusion that the motion determines the scope of adjudication. Accordingly, whether one adjudicates within the scope of the motion or outside the scope of the motion are different stages of determination. The former determines how the court shall divide and reach a conclusion on the issues it already holds; the latter determines whether the court may newly take in that issue itself. These are not a matter of adding and subtracting quantities, but differ in dimension as to whether adjudication is possible at all. Where the necessary performance falls within a lawful scope of motion and is adjudicated within that range by a dispositive part, subdivision of the details is possible. Where the desired performance remains outside the scope of the motion and the court cannot add it to the dispositive part at its discretion, subdivision of the details likewise finds no object.
The Counterarguments that leaving the error in the motion as it is weakens substantive protection of rights press in at this point. A party that misspeaks or attaches a wrong legal name suffers the loss of not receiving the relief that fits its own right. If the court, even knowing those circumstances, cannot put it into the dispositive part, the dispute remains after the judgment has ended, and the party must go through the procedure again. If such inconvenience and expense were erased altogether, the value Counterarguments aim at would not disappear. The circumstance that the court saw the need for relief cannot substitute for the fact that the performance has entered the motion, nor can it serve as a route for correcting a mistake of expression by an order outside the scope of the motion.
The facts that can be confirmed within the synthetic scene are this scene alone, and it contains no year, amount, or judgment result. Plaintiff A sought delivery of an object, and it is assumed that the ground that a different performance would help resolve the dispute was raised. On these facts alone one cannot know what the claim, the motion to amend, and the service, the dispositive part of the judgment, and the reasons actually were. Accordingly, which performance entered the scope of the motion and was adjudicated by a dispositive part, and which performance remained outside the range, is likewise undetermined. The kinds of records that must serve as the basis for the determination have been noted down, but as those records have not been assembled, the scene alone cannot tell which is the case. If the performance enters the scope of the motion by a lawful amendment, the prior blockage of being outside the motion is reassessed.
The conclusion this section permits is to divide the details within a dispositive part within the scope of the motion and adjudicate them separately; what it does not permit is adding to the dispositive part a performance outside that range on the sole ground that it is necessary. Nor is the fresh invention of a step outside the stated conditions a conclusion of this section. The determination operates only where the necessary performance has entered a lawful scope of motion and is adjudicated within that range by a dispositive part; it is blocked where the desired performance remains outside the scope of the motion and the court cannot add it at its discretion; and it remains undetermined where the correspondence between the final claim and the judgment cannot be confirmed. These three do not substitute for one another, and the fact that which of the three obtains has not been settled does not immediately turn into unavailability of relief.
1.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
That conclusion was that it is not permitted for the court to add to the parties' motion a performance it considers more just. Now the shape of the determination created by that limit must be drawn and distinguished. This question calls for distinguishing when a dispositive part within the scope of the motion exerts its own force, when it is blocked, and when its state cannot yet be fixed.
The statutory wording is short but clearly draws the outer line of the determination. Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "The court shall not render a judgment on any matter on which the parties have not made a motion." Taking the court as the subject and the judgment as the act, this wording prohibits where that judgment targets a matter not contained in the parties' motion. Here, a matter refers to the object of the claim that the parties have put forward to be resolved by adjudication, and that motion comes to determine the scope of adjudication.
This wording and the foregoing conclusion continue without a break. The principle of party disposition means the principle that the parties' motion determines the scope of adjudication, and it reveals that the need for relief and the scope of adjudication are two different questions. That a given performance is useful in resolving the dispute is an evaluation concerning the former need, and whether the court may render a judgment with that performance is a determination concerning the latter scope. It opens only where the necessary performance within the scope of the motion has been adjudicated by a dispositive part, and it is blocked where the performance remaining outside the motion cannot be added by the court at its discretion.
The strongest counterargument aims at the point that this distinction makes the victim of a party's written mistake a victim in full. If a court that knows the substance of the dispute simply passes over a motion whose expression is off the mark, the inconvenience remains that an obvious remedy is refused, caught on the fence of the wording. That is, the procedure that ought to protect the party and that party's rights instead produces the costly result of losing those very rights. The loss that the counterargument points to remains as it is, but no authority thereby arises to take on even the disputes the court has not chosen.
In the synthetic scene, plaintiff A sought only delivery of an object, and the other performance is merely an evaluation that it would help resolve the dispute. Since the fact that the necessary performance entered a lawful scope of motion and was adjudicated within that range by a dispositive part does not appear in the scene, it cannot be said to have opened into effect. However, as there are no materials to check in the scene for the correspondence between the performance contained in the plaintiff's motion and the dispositive part of the judgment, whether that dispositive part is undetermined cannot be confirmed here.
Accordingly, what this section permits is to say that, only where the necessary performance within the scope of the motion has been adjudicated by a dispositive part, that dispositive part opens, and it does not permit adding a performance remaining outside the motion on the ground of necessity alone. Undetermined is the state that remains where the correspondence between the final claim and the judgment cannot be confirmed, and it is not immediately turned into unavailability of relief merely because there are no data.
1.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
The preceding analytical step handed down the conclusion that the importance of the material and the statutory conditions of delay must be recorded separately, and that reasons for admission or exclusion must be left behind. What this section takes as its question does not overlap with that. That it helps resolve a dispute means only that there is a need for relief; it does not mean that the court may place that performance in its dispositive part. If these two are not separated, the court's mercy becomes the basis of adjudicatory power. The crux here is how far the outer line drawn by the application extends — in other words, whether the court may add a performance that it regards as more just.
The basis for answering this question is provided by Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Act. Its text provides: "The court shall not render a judgment on a matter for which a party has made no application." The subject fixed by this text is the court; the prohibited act is rendering a judgment on a matter for which no application has been made; and the condition is that the matter is not included in the party's application. The wording that the court "shall not render a judgment" means not merely that the court's discretion is narrow, but that the scope of adjudication is itself fixed by the application. Even if the usefulness of dispute resolution or the need for remedies is added to this, the condition does not change. What this Article addresses is the limited question of what may be added to the dispositive part beyond the application.
This joins the foregoing text to the conclusion established earlier. A court cannot add a performance beyond the application to its dispositive part on the ground that there is a need for it. In this conclusion, the need for relief and the scope of adjudication are distinguished as operating at different stages. The need for relief asks whether the performance desired is useful for actually resolving the dispute. The scope of adjudication asks over what matters the court has authority to render judgment. No matter how fully the former is satisfied, a matter not fixed by the latter cannot become a subject of judgment. If these two are merged into a single stage, the examination of necessity becomes at once the confirmation of adjudicatory power, and the function of the application disappears. This is why the request and the reasons for it must be separated. A needed performance can be realized only if it falls within the scope of a lawful application and is adjudicated as an order within that scope.
The strongest counterargument is directed at the point that leaving an error in the application as it stands weakens substantive protection of rights. The loss spoken of by this counterargument is not abstract. Suppose a party did not know what performance was needed, misstated the prayer for relief, and the court came to learn during the hearing that the performance was useful for resolving the dispute. In that case, the result is the refusal of an obvious remedy on account of the party's error of expression. Where the matter could be resolved by the court's simply issuing one more order, commanding only the delivery of a tangible object, bound by the framework of the written pleading, leaves outside the need that the court, as an organ for the protection of rights, ought properly to contain. Even without erasing these disadvantages, the conclusion stands. The loss identified by the counterargument must be addressed through a procedure that broadens the application; it cannot be filled by an order exceeding the application.
Only one fact is confirmed in the synthetic scene. Set against the foregoing conditions, the other performance remains outside the prayer for relief as applied for, and the necessity of that performance is merely a judgment as to usefulness in resolving the dispute. Usefulness cannot become a circumstance that broadens the scope of the application, and therefore the court cannot add that performance to the dispositive part. However, because the final form of the application and its correspondence with the dispositive part of the judgment have not been confirmed, how this boundary was drawn in the actual records remains undetermined. The prayer for relief, the application to amend, and the service, the dispositive part, and the reasons of the judgment are the records that are the object of this determination.
What this section permits is a conclusion rendered as to an order within the scope of the application. If the scope of the performance applied for is fixed and judgment has been rendered within that scope, the court has exercised its adjudicatory power within it. What is not permitted is the addition to the dispositive part of a performance outside the application, however just and necessary it may appear. The boundary between these two is drawn not by the presence or absence of the necessity of the performance, but by the presence or absence of an application. A matter that could not be confirmed for lack of material is merely undetermined; that in itself does not mean that relief is unavailable. In what respect do the words "what is asked for" differ from the words "why it is asked for"?