Summary
A new demand must go through the requirements and procedure for a lawful amendment of the claim and is not added merely on the basis of the court's perception.
4.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
The moment one learns of a new fact and the moment a new claim enters the court are not the same. Following the conclusion of the preceding section—that even if the scope of substantive relief is broad, the judgment must remain within the range requested—the question becomes how a new form of relief that emerges during the hearing is to be made an object of adjudication. The plaintiff sought delivery of an object, and the question is whether, on the ground that it would aid in resolving the dispute, another form of relief may be ordered. In this scene, the first question is whether a new demand that the court has recognized immediately becomes the object of adjudication, or whether it must pass through a separate transfer. This section addresses only the standard by which that pathway is opened.
Article 262 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that the plaintiff may amend the purport or grounds of a claim within the scope where the basis of the claim is not changed, until the conclusion of oral argument, and stipulates that an amendment to the purport of a claim shall be filed in writing and that the writing shall be served on the opposing party (Article 262 of the Civil Procedure Act). Here the actor is the plaintiff, the act is the amendment of the purport or grounds of the claim, and the form is the filing in writing and service on the opposing party. Whether a new form of relief will thereby be adjudicated is not determined by this language alone, but it is clear that an amendment is a transfer that follows the statutory requirements and form.
The entrance to this relief opens where the necessary relief falls within the lawful scope of the application and has been adjudicated within that scope in the dispositive part. Two things are distinguished here. One is the determination that a relief exists that would substantively aid in resolving the dispute; the other is the procedural determination that such relief was specified and adjudicated within the scope of the application. The former alone does not automatically establish the latter, and if the two are not separated, the statutory requirements and form governing a change in the object of adjudication—the transfer of a claim—become meaningless.
The counterargument that the formal amendment procedure delays swift relief targets concrete loss. It is said that where a party has learned of a new fact and, while awaiting the amendment application and service, the remedying of the right is delayed, the result is that the procedure becomes entangled in a matter that is a mere error of expression and refuses an obvious remedy. This disadvantage is not erased. Yet one cannot dispense with the amendment application and service merely because one has learned of a new fact. Since the court's recognition alone does not bring the new demand within the scope of the application, the value of speed does not furnish grounds for overriding the requirement of form.
The facts confirmed in this scene are only that the plaintiff sought delivery of an object and that the ordering of another form of relief was placed in issue. On these facts alone, the correspondence between the final purport of the claim and the judgment cannot be confirmed, and so whether this relief's pathway was actually opened remains undetermined. The conditions for comparison are clear. If the relief enters the scope of the application by a lawful amendment, the bar of being outside the previous application is reassessed. But since the scene does not include whether an amendment application was made, whether the writing was served, or the scope of the dispositive part of the judgment, all that can be determined here is the setting of the standard.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. The mere fact that a substantively necessary relief exists does not allow the court to add another relief to the dispositive part at its discretion; the entrance to this relief opens only when the relief demanded, the parties, and the conditions are specified in the purport of the claim and a defense is possible. Conversely, an unspecified demand or a demand against which no defense is possible can hardly be regarded as falling within the scope of the application. However, a state in which the correspondence of the records cannot be confirmed cannot be pronounced irremediable.
4.2The Conditions That Block Relief
Where the necessary relief falls within the lawful scope of the application and has been adjudicated within that scope in the dispositive part, this relief operates. But how is a new form of relief that emerges during the hearing to be made an object of adjudication? Here, a change in the object of adjudication means the transfer of a claim that follows the statutory requirements and form. Unless this transfer is completed, the new relief remains outside the application, and however necessary the court may deem it, it cannot be placed in the dispositive part.
Article 262 of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "① The plaintiff may amend the purport or grounds of a claim within the scope where the basis of the claim is not changed, until the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, until the pronouncement of judgment); provided, that this shall not apply where the litigation proceedings are significantly delayed. ② An amendment to the purport of a claim shall be filed in writing. ③ The writing under paragraph (2) shall be served on the opposing party." This language confines the party who amends to the plaintiff, the subject of amendment to the purport or grounds of the claim, and the time limit to the conclusion of oral argument. And it requires the writing known as the amendment application and its service.
Accordingly, a new demand must pass through the requirements and form of a lawful amendment of claim and is not added merely by the court's recognition. In the scene where the plaintiff sought delivery of an object and the question is whether, on the ground that it would aid in resolving the dispute, another form of relief may be ordered, the court cannot, merely because it knows the necessary relief, add it to the dispositive part at its discretion. The blocking condition where the scope of the application and the scope of the dispositive part diverge lies precisely here. Where the desired relief remains outside the scope of the application and the court cannot add it to the dispositive part at its discretion, this relief is blocked.
The counterargument that the formal amendment procedure delays swift relief targets the loss. It points out that, because of a party's error of expression, the result is that an obvious remedying of the right is refused. This counterargument has a point. Where the necessary relief is obvious but the dispositive part is delayed on account of the stages of writing and service, the timing of the remedying of the right is pushed back. Even so, one cannot dispense with the amendment application and service merely because one has learned of a new fact. Such omission would undermine the point that a change in the object of adjudication is a transfer that passes through the statutory requirements and form.
What can be adjudicated in this scene is only the correspondence between the scope of the application and the manner of amendment. In the state where the plaintiff sought delivery of an object, it must be determined whether another form of relief has come within the scope of the application, and, if the necessary relief enters the scope of the application by a lawful amendment, the bar of being outside the previous application is reassessed. But where the correspondence of the records—purport of claim, amendment application and service, dispositive part, and reasoning—cannot be confirmed, the adjudication is left undetermined. The results of service or performance, and the facts of an actual case, are not set in this scene and cannot be determined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. It recognizes only the blocking condition that the court cannot add to the dispositive part, at its discretion, a relief outside the scope of the application, and it does not declare any other possibility of relief or the propriety of the adjudication.
4.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
On the premise that even if the scope of substantive relief is broad, the judgment must remain within the range requested, the question is whether, where the plaintiff sought delivery of an object, another form of relief may be ordered on the ground that it would aid in resolving the dispute. What remains to be asked is what must be confirmed in order to place the newly surfaced relief within the object of adjudication, and where the boundary of materials that cannot be confirmed should be drawn.
Article 262 of the Civil Procedure Act places the amendment of a claim within a set procedure. Its language provides: "Article 262 (Amendment of Claim) ① The plaintiff may amend the purport or grounds of a claim within the scope where the basis of the claim is not changed, until the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, until the pronouncement of judgment); provided, that this shall not apply where the litigation proceedings are significantly delayed," and then adds: "② An amendment to the purport of a claim shall be filed in writing. ③ The writing under paragraph (2) shall be served on the opposing party." The actor indicated by this language is the plaintiff; the act is amending the purport or grounds of the claim; and the conditions are the limitation to the scope where the basis of the claim is not changed, the point in time of the conclusion of oral argument or the pronouncement of judgment, and the filing in writing and service on the opposing party. Here the issues of other provisions are not addressed; only the language of the requirements and form prescribed by this provision is conveyed.
The requirements and form of the above provision are interlocked with the concept of a change in the object of adjudication. Because the object of adjudication moves through the transfer of a claim, a new relief becomes material that the judgment can address only when it has entered the scope of the claim through an amendment that was filed in writing and served. The circumstance that the court learned of a new fact during the hearing does not, in itself, complete the transfer of the claim. Where the materials for decision and the correspondence of the judgment cannot be confirmed, that item must not be pronounced a matter on which no conclusion can be reached but must be left undetermined; this is a distinction made so that a state in which nothing can be determined for want of materials is not treated the same as the impossibility of adjudication where a relief remains outside the scope of the application.
The point most strongly targeted by the counterargument that the form requiring this distinction delays swift relief is the loss of time and cost. The party already knows of the relief that would aid in resolving the dispute, and the court too can recognize that need during the hearing; yet the procedure of newly undergoing a written application and service on the opposing party brings a corresponding delay and paperwork. It is also an inconvenience pointed out by this counterargument that, because of a party's error of expression, the result is that an obvious remedying of the right is refused. The inconvenience of delay is acknowledged, but the transfer of a claim enters the object of adjudication only through the requirements and form that are set down.
If one extracts only the facts from the synthetic scene that the plaintiff sought delivery of an object and that another form of relief was placed in issue on the ground that it would aid in resolving the dispute, what relation exists between the relief the plaintiff sought and the newly mentioned relief is not settled by this scene alone. If the other relief enters the scope of the application by a lawful amendment and the correspondence of the judgment is confirmed, then the bar of being outside the previous application is reassessed. But an item whose materials for decision are unspecified, in the state where the correspondence of the final purport of the claim and the judgment cannot be confirmed, is left as undetermined, in distinction from the inability of a relief remaining outside the scope of the application which the court cannot add to the dispositive part at its discretion. Since no year, amount, accrual date, or judgment outcome is set in the synthetic scene, matters such as the effect of service or performance cannot be determined by this scene.
What this section permits is to take as the object of adjudication the case in which a new relief has entered the object of adjudication through the set requirements and form of amendment of claim; what it does not permit is adding a new relief to the dispositive part on the strength of the court's recognition alone, or pronouncing materials that cannot be confirmed to be irremediable. Where the necessary relief falls within the lawful scope of the application and has been adjudicated within that scope in the dispositive part, that relief can be addressed by the judgment; where the desired relief remains outside the scope of the application and the court cannot add it to the dispositive part at its discretion, it cannot. Matters whose materials for decision are unspecified because the correspondence of the final purport of the claim and the judgment cannot be confirmed remain undetermined between these two.
4.4The Records Needed for Determination
That conclusion is that even if the scope of substantive relief is broad, the judgment must remain within the range requested. Here, a change in the object of adjudication means the transfer of a claim that follows the statutory requirements and form. To answer this question, what was requested and what was adjudicated must remain in the records.
The person who seeks to place a new relief upon the object of adjudication is called the plaintiff, and that transfer is called an amendment of claim. Article 262 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that the plaintiff may amend the purport or grounds of a claim within the scope where the basis of the claim is not changed, until the conclusion of oral argument. However, this shall not apply where the litigation proceedings are significantly delayed (Article 262 of the Civil Procedure Act). Yet an amendment to the purport of a claim shall be filed in writing, and that writing shall be served on the opposing party (Article 262 of the Civil Procedure Act). This language requires, for the completion of an amendment, a written application and service. The circumstance that the court has come to recognize a new relief during the hearing does not excuse that requirement.
Linking this basis with the fixed conclusion of the stage-by-stage adjudication, whether a new relief has entered the object of adjudication is adjudicated only by the established records. The Records used for the adjudication are the purport of claim, the amendment application and service, the dispositive part, and the reasoning (the adjudicative records). The first two show how the scope of the application moved; the latter two show what was adjudicated within that scope. The reason these two bundles must be distinguished is that the question of what was asked for and the question of what was judged are different from each other. Without the former, there can be no finding that there was an application; without the latter, no finding that there was an adjudication. No new requirement or exception can be added to this distinction.
That is, the result is that, because of a party's error of expression, an obvious remedying of the right is refused. The inconvenience spoken of by the counterargument is the situation of losing a helpful relief on account of an application that arrived late at court. This answer does not erase the cost of delay that the counterargument pointed out. It means only that, since the fact learned of and the application that entered the court are different things, one cannot pass the stage on the strength of the former alone, without the records of the latter.
What can be confirmed in the synthetic scene is the fact that the plaintiff sought delivery of an object and that another form of relief was placed in issue on the ground that it would aid in resolving the dispute. On this alone, it cannot be confirmed whether there was an amendment application and, if there was, whether that writing was served on the opposing party. Accordingly, because the correspondence of the final purport of the claim and the judgment cannot be confirmed, the stage-by-stage adjudication remains undetermined. One test can, however, be run with a single condition changed. This is nothing more than a comparison with a condition altered, not a fact that occurred.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Only where the new relief is recorded in the purport of claim, the amendment application and service, enters the scope of the application, and is adjudicated within that scope by the dispositive part and the reasoning can it be said that this stage has been passed. The conclusion it does not permit is a judgment that, seeing only part of those records, fills in the other parts by inference. Items for which there are no records are left as they are, and undetermined does not itself mean irremediable.
4.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
Under the carried-over premise that, however broad the range of substantive performance may be, the judgment must remain within the scope applied for, whether the court became aware of the usefulness of a new form of performance and whether it entered the subject of adjudication must be asked separately. A change in the subject of adjudication means a movement of the claim in accordance with statutory requirements and formalities, so the subject does not broaden merely by virtue of the court's recognition.
The provision governing the movement of a claim is Article 262 of the Civil Procedure Act. It provides: "The plaintiff may change the gist or grounds of the claim, within the limits in which the basis of the claim does not change, until the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, until the pronouncement of judgment); provided, that this shall not apply where the litigation proceedings are significantly delayed." (Civil Procedure Act, Article 262) Here the actor is the plaintiff, the act is changing the gist or grounds of the claim, and the conditions are the limit that the basis of the claim does not change, the time limit of the conclusion of oral argument, and the absence of significant delay (Civil Procedure Act, Article 262). What this language addresses is whether the plaintiff may apply for a movement of the subject, not whether the court may add on its own the performance it deems appropriate.
The same provision also divides and prescribes the manner of that movement. It stipulates that a change in the gist of the claim must be applied for in writing, and that the written document must be served on the opposing party (Civil Procedure Act, Article 262). Accordingly, the application for the change and the service on the opposing party are separate stages, and only after both have been completed is the changed claim regarded as having entered the subject of adjudication. The new demand must pass through the requirements and formalities of a lawful amendment of the claim, and this is the reason for saying that it is not added merely by the court's recognition. Once the specified change is confirmed, the existing blocking-and-defeat determination is discarded, and adjudication begins anew from the stage of an order within the scope applied for.
The counterargument that formal change procedures delay swift relief targets here a distinct loss. Because of a party's error of expression, the result is the refusal of an obvious remedy, and an inconvenience remains that facts already revealed during the examination must pass through the formalities of writing and service. That adverse aspect cannot be erased. If the omission of formality were tolerated, the opposing party would lose the opportunity to defend against the changed claim, and the judgment would adjudicate a performance that was not applied for, so that the limitation to the scope applied for—the carried-over premise—would collapse.
What is confirmed in the synthetic scene is only the fact that plaintiff A sought delivery of an article and that another form of performance became an issue on the ground that it would help resolve the dispute. The scene contains no record of an application to change the gist of the claim, no record of service of that written document, and no correspondence between the final gist of the claim and the dispositive part of the judgment. Therefore, whether the desired performance remained outside the scope applied for, so that the court could not add it to the order at its discretion, or whether the necessary performance fell within a lawful scope applied for and was adjudicated within that scope in the form of an order, cannot be determined from this scene alone. The records needed for the determination are the gist of the claim, the change application and service, the dispositive part, and the reasoning; since no material corresponding to these has been confirmed, the matter remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. If a performance enters the scope applied for through a lawful amendment, the prior blocking determination that it lay outside the scope applied for is reassessed, and once the specified change is confirmed, the existing blocking-and-defeat determination is discarded and adjudication begins anew from that stage. By contrast, the conclusion that the court adds to the order a performance outside the scope applied for merely because it is useful, or the conclusion that the amendment was completed despite the absence of a change application and service, is not permitted by this section. That the material remains deficient means undetermined, not immediately that no relief is available.
4.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
The mere fact that the need for a new form of performance emerged during the examination does not make that performance immediately a subject of adjudication. Under the premise—the conclusion of the preceding section—that, however broad the range of substantive performance may be, the judgment must remain within the scope applied for, how must a new demand enter the statutory subject of adjudication?
To answer this question, the text of Article 262 of the Civil Procedure Act is placed first. It provides: "The plaintiff may change the gist or grounds of the claim, within the limits in which the basis of the claim does not change, until the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, until the pronouncement of judgment); provided, that this shall not apply where the litigation proceedings are significantly delayed." This language fixes the actor as the plaintiff, the act as the change of the gist or grounds of the claim, and the conditions as the limit that the basis of the claim does not change and the time of the conclusion of oral argument. It prescribes the manner of obtaining a new form of performance in accordance with the results of the examination, and is not a route by which what the court recognized during the examination is automatically placed within the subject of adjudication.
The same provision also divides the requirements that this manner must satisfy. "The written document under paragraph (2) shall be served on the opposing party." The written application and the service on the opposing party are presented as part of the procedure that completes the change. The new demand must pass through these requirements and formalities of a lawful amendment of the claim, and is not added merely by the court's recognition. The reason for separating the satisfaction of the requirements for amendment from the court's recognition of the need for a new form of performance is that the former is a change in the subject of adjudication, namely a movement of the claim in accordance with statutory requirements and formalities, whereas the latter amounts to no more than circumstances grasped by the presiding judge during the examination.
The counterargument that formal change procedures delay swift relief targets the delay and inconvenience that this distinction brings. The requirement to go again through a written application and service consumes time and expense in itself, and where the plaintiff has erred in expression, the relief may appear to be delayed or refused on account of that error. If, instead of streamlining the legal route, the requirements and formalities are skipped, then when and how the subject of adjudication broadened is not preserved in the record, and the opposing party loses the opportunity to defend.
The facts in this scene belonging to this question are that plaintiff A sought delivery of an article, and that the question arises whether another form of performance can be ordered on the ground that it would help resolve the dispute. The relationship between the existing claim for delivery of an article and the new demand for another form of performance, and what that other form of performance is, the synthetic scene has not fixed. Thus only the conditions of the legal route can be compared, and whether this other performance falls within the limit that the basis of the claim does not change and enters the scope applied for through a lawful amendment cannot be determined from the synthetic scene alone.
Accordingly, the conclusion permitted is narrow. A new form of performance that emerged during the examination becomes a subject of adjudication only when it enters the scope applied for through a change satisfying statutory requirements and formalities, and whether those requirements and formalities have been completed is confirmed by the gist of the claim, the change application and service, the dispositive part, and the reasoning. Whether the requirements have been met and whether the other performance has entered the scope applied for are not determined by the synthetic scene alone, and therefore remain undetermined. If the reasoning recognizes a right, is that sufficient even when the dispositive part is inadequate?
4.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
Even if circumstances newly emerge of which the court becomes aware while the examination proceeds, that does not itself broaden the subject of the trial. The preceding section confirmed the conclusion that, merely because new facts have become known, the change application and service cannot be omitted. The question now is how a new form of performance revealed during the examination—that is, something other than what the plaintiff first sought—may be placed upon the subject of the judgment.
The basis for answering this question lies in Article 262 of the Civil Procedure Act. Paragraph (1) of that Article provides that "the plaintiff may change the gist or grounds of the claim, within the limits in which the basis of the claim does not change, until the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, until the pronouncement of judgment)," and cites as an exception the case where the litigation proceedings are significantly delayed (Civil Procedure Act, Article 262). Here the actor who changes is the plaintiff, the object of the change is the gist or grounds of the claim, and the limit within which change is possible is the range in which the basis of the claim does not change. Whether what is changed is the gist or the grounds, the point in time is before the conclusion of oral argument, or, in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, before the pronouncement of judgment.
The reason a change of claim is called a movement of the claim in accordance with statutory requirements and formalities, that is, a change in the subject of adjudication, lies here. If the plaintiff wishes to change the gist or grounds of the claim, the plaintiff must apply in writing pursuant to Article 262 paragraph (2), and must serve that written document on the opposing party pursuant to paragraph (3) (Civil Procedure Act, Article 262). What this manner protects is not merely the form of procedure. It creates a route by which the fact that the subject of the trial has moved by the plaintiff's expression of intention becomes known to the opposing party as well. Accordingly, even if the court recognizes during the examination the need for a new form of performance, it cannot draw that performance into the scope applied for. Recognition is only the grasping of circumstances; it is not a movement of the claim.
The counterargument that formal change procedures delay swift relief, and that a party's error of expression may result in the refusal of an obvious remedy, pinpoints precisely the burden this entails. It is the concern that, even though the fact that relief is needed has emerged in the lawsuit, the relief may be delayed by the gateway of a written application and service, and that although the plaintiff merely misstated the gist of the claim, the inaccuracy of that expression may become a disadvantage in itself. Notwithstanding that inconvenience, the change application and service cannot be omitted merely because new facts have become known. If the change application and service are omitted, the opposing party learns of the fact only after the claim it must defend has changed, and thus the requirement to remain within the scope applied for collapses.
In this case, delivery of an article is the performance applied for, and any other form of performance remains outside that scope applied for. In light of the premise that the dispositive part of the judgment must remain within the scope applied for, unless the plaintiff changes the gist of the claim and places another form of performance within the scope applied for, the court cannot add that performance to the order at its discretion. However, this scene does not fix whether the plaintiff actually filed a change application, whether that written document was served on the opposing party, or how the final gist of the claim and the dispositive part of the judgment correspond. Therefore, the outcome of the judgment or the results of performance cannot be determined.
What this section permits is the adjudication in the form of an order, within that scope, of a performance within the scope applied for that became the subject of adjudication through a change satisfying statutory requirements and formalities. What this section does not permit is the court's adding to the order a performance outside the scope applied for on the sole ground that it would help resolve the dispute. The omission of the change application and service in no case bridges that difference, and record items that are unverified remain unverified.
4.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
How is a new form of performance revealed during the examination made a subject of adjudication? Paragraph (2) of the same Article requires that "a change in the gist of the claim shall be applied for in writing," and paragraph (3) adds that "the written document under paragraph (2) shall be served on the opposing party." The actor indicated by this language is the plaintiff, the act is a change of the gist or grounds of the claim, and the conditions are the limit in which the basis of the claim does not change and the time of the conclusion of oral argument.
The requirements and formalities of this Article are not ornamentation confined to form, but the standard that determines from which claim to which claim the subject of adjudication has moved. The answer to this section's question divides into two stages. First, the subject of adjudication does not broaden merely by virtue of the circumstance that the court came to recognize the new form of performance revealed during the examination. Second, for a new demand to enter the subject of adjudication, it must pass through the requirements and formalities of a lawful amendment of the claim, and is not added merely by the court's recognition.
The counterargument that formal change procedures delay swift relief is no idle worry. While the party prepares the written document and serves it on the opposing party, the remedy is delayed, and the party's error of expression may result in the refusal of an obvious remedy. But even if these adverse aspects were erased, the conclusion would not change. Newly learned facts and a claim newly to be adjudicated belong to separate stages, and the convenience of advancing the latter is no ground for skipping the procedure of the former.
The facts that can be confirmed in the synthetic scene are that plaintiff A sought delivery of an article and that another form of performance is raised on the ground that it would help resolve the dispute. Comparing these two facts with the foregoing conditions, the order can stand only where the necessary performance falls within the lawful scope applied for and is adjudicated within that scope in the form of an order. Where the desired performance remains outside the scope applied for and the court cannot add it to the order at its discretion, that performance cannot become the subject of the order. However, since no year, amount, or commencement date is set in the scene, the portions where the actual correspondence among the gist of the claim, the change application and service, the dispositive part, and the reasoning cannot be confirmed remain undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is clear. A new form of performance revealed during the examination becomes a subject of adjudication only when it enters the scope applied for through a lawful amendment of the claim. That is to say, another form of performance cannot be added to the order merely on the ground that the court found it useful for resolving the dispute. The conclusion not permitted is equally clear. Placing a new claim within the subject of adjudication on the sole basis of the court's recognition while omitting the change application and service lies outside the scope of this section.
4.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
법원이 심리 과정에서 원고 A가 구하는 것 말고 다른 급부가 분쟁 해결에 도움이 될 수 있겠다고 알아차렸다고 하더라도, 그 인식만으로 심판 대상이 넓어지는 것은 아니다. 앞 분석 단계까지 실체적 급부의 범위가 넓더라도 판결은 신청한 범위 안에 머물러야 한다는 결론을 받아들이더라도, 그 범위 안에 어떤 주문이 들어가는지는 별도로 확인해야 한다.
이 물음에 해당하는 법문은 민사소송법 제262조이다. 제262조 제1항은 원고는 청구의 기초가 바뀌지 아니하는 한도 안에서 변론을 종결할 때까지 청구의 취지 또는 원인을 바꿀 수 있다(민사소송법 제262조)라고 정한다. 여기서 주체는 원고이고, 행위는 청구의 취지 또는 원인의 변경이며, 조건은 청구의 기초가 바뀌지 아니하는 한도 안이라는 문언으로 정해진다. 같은 조 제2항은 청구취지의 변경은 서면으로 신청하여야 하고, 제3항은 그 서면을 상대방에게 송달하여야 한다고 이어 간다. 따라서 새 급부가 심판 대상에 들어오려면 법원의 인식이 아니라 원고의 신청과 상대방에게 닿는 절차가 필요하다.
그 문언을 신청 범위 안의 주문에 적용하면, 필요한 급부가 적법한 신청 범위에 들어 있고 그 범위 안에서 주문으로 재판된 경우에 판정이 성립한다. 여기서 두 단계를 나누어 보아야 한다. 하나는 급부가 법정 요건과 방식을 거쳐 신청 범위에 들어왔는지이고, 다른 하나는 그 범위 안에서 실제로 주문으로 재판되었는지이다. 심판대상의 변경이 법정 요건과 방식에 따른 청구의 이동을 뜻한다고 규정한 까닭이 이 구별에 있다. 첫 단계를 뛰어넘은 채 두 번째 단계만 본다면, 법원이 알아차린 것을 그대로 주문에 옮긴 결과가 되고, 판결이유가 판정 근거로 확장되는 길이 함께 열린다.
형식적 변경 절차가 신속한 구제를 늦춘다는 반론은 그 불편을 숨기지 않고서 다가온다. 원고의 표현 실수 때문에 명백한 권리구제가 거절되는 듯한 결과가 생기고, 이미 심리 중에 드러난 사정을 상대방도 아는 상태에서 서면 신청과 송달을 다시 밟으면 당사자는 같은 내용을 두 번 다루는 셈이 된다. 지연은 시간과 비용으로 당사자에게 직접 닿는다. 제262조 제2항과 제3항이 정한 방식은 같은 문언 안에서 새 급부가 심판 대상에 이르는 통로이므로, 그 통로를 생략하면 신청 범위 안의 주문이 아니라 법원의 인식을 근거로 주문이 채워지는 상태가 남는다.
합성 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 사실은 원고 A가 물건 인도를 구했다는 것과, 다른 급부가 분쟁 해결에 도움이 된다는 이유로 주문에 더해질 수 있는지가 문제가 되었다는 것까지이다. 여기에 제262조의 요건과 방식을 대조하면, 다른 급부가 청구의 기초가 바뀌지 아니하는 한도 안에 드는지, 서면으로 신청되었는지, 그 서면이 상대방에게 송달되었는지를 확인해야 한다. 확인할 기록은 청구취지·변경신청과 송달·판결 주문·이유이다. 장면만으로는 청구의 기초가 바뀌었는지, 송달이 있었는지, 어떤 주문이 선고되었는지가 확인되지 않으므로 그 지점은 미확정으로 남는다. 실제 사건의 사실이나 이행 결과를 꾸며 넣어 이 미확정을 메울 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 신청 범위 안의 주문을 판정 근거로 삼을 때, 해당 원문 문언만 적용하고 판결이유로 확장하지 않는다는 것이다. 이를 넘어 다른 급부를 법원이 임의로 주문에 더하거나, 새 사실을 알았다는 이유만으로 변경신청과 송달을 건너뛴 주문을 같은 근거로 받아들이는 판단은 허용되지 않는다.
4.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
신청 범위 안의 주문에서 다시 나누어 판정할 부분은 무엇인가? 실체적 급부의 범위가 넓더라도 판결은 신청한 범위 안에 머물러야 한다.
민사소송법 제262조는 이 물음에 필요한 문언을 두 갈래로 둔다. 첫째, 원고는 청구의 기초가 바뀌지 아니하는 한도 안에서 변론을 종결할 때까지 청구의 취지 또는 원인을 바꿀 수 있다고 정한다(민사소송법 제262조). 둘째, “청구취지의 변경은 서면으로 신청하여야 한다”고 하며, 그 서면은 상대방에게 송달하여야 한다고 덧붙인다(민사소송법 제262조). 여기서 주체는 원고이고, 행위는 청구의 취지 또는 원인을 바꾸는 신청이며, 조건은 청구의 기초가 바뀌지 않을 것과 정해진 시기 안에 있을 것이다.
이 문언은 심판대상의 변경, 곧 법정 요건과 방식에 따른 청구의 이동이 무엇을 요구하는지 분명히 한다. 요구를 법정에 심판 대상으로 올리려면 신청과 송달의 형식을 거쳐야 하고, 법원이 심리 중에 그 급부를 알아차렸다는 사실만으로 주문에 더할 수는 없다. 따라서 이 절에서 말하는 신청 범위 안의 주문 안의 구분은 작동하는 경우·막히는 경우·미확정인 경우의 셋으로 한정된다. 필요한 급부가 적법한 신청 범위에 들어 있고 그 범위 안에서 주문으로 재판된 경우가 작동하는 경우이고, 원하는 급부가 신청 범위 밖에 남아 법원이 이를 임의로 주문에 더할 수 없는 경우가 막히는 경우이며, 최종 청구취지와 판결의 대응을 확인할 수 없는 경우가 미확정인 경우이다. 여기에 어떤 추가 단계를 더 만들어 넣지 않는다.
이 구분에 반대하는 쪽은 형식적 변경 절차가 신속한 구제를 늦춘다고 지적한다. 당사자의 표현 실수 때문에 명백한 권리구제를 거절하는 결과가 생긴다는 점은 사라지지 않는 손실이며, 이 절은 그 불이익을 부정하지 않는다. 서면 신청과 송달은 상대방이 바뀐 심판 대상을 방어할 기회를 만드는 절차이므로, 그 형식을 빼고 급부를 주문에 넣는 것은 오히려 한쪽의 구제 속도를 다른 쪽의 심판 기회 박탈로 바꾸는 일이다. 여기서는 방어 기회의 보전이라는 쪽으로 결론을 유지한다.
합성 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 그 두 점뿐이다. 원고 A는 물건 인도를 구했고, 다른 급부를 명하는 것이 분쟁 해결에 도움이 된다는 이유로 문제 되었다. 장면이 정하는 기록은 청구취지, 변경신청과 송달, 판결 주문과 이유이다. 따라서 다른 급부가 실제로 서면으로 변경신청되어 송달되었는지, 최종 청구취지가 어떻게 확정되었는지는 이 장면만으로 판단할 수 없다. 그 대응을 확인할 수 없는 사정은 앞의 셋 가운데 미확정인 경우에 그대로 남는다.
이 절에서 허용되는 결론은 좁다. 필요한 급부가 적법한 신청 범위에 들어와 그 범위 안에서 주문으로 재판된 경우에만 작동하는 경우가 성립하고, 신청 범위 밖에 남은 급부는 법원이 임의로 주문에 더할 수 없으므로 막히는 경우가 된다. 사정이 아직 드러나지 않았다면 미확정인 경우로 남기며, 이는 곧 구제 불능을 뜻하지 않는다. 새 사실을 알게 되었다는 이유만으로 변경신청과 송달을 뛰어넘어 급부를 판결에 올릴 수 있다는 결론은 이 절이 허용하지 않는다.
4.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
이 장면에서 법원이 개선에 유용하다고 보는 급부는 언제나 신청된 심판 대상이 되는 것은 아니다. 따라서 지금 물어야 하는 것은 새로 드러난 급부가 어떻게 하면 심판 대상에 들어오는지, 들어오지 못한 채로 남으면 어떻게 되는지다.
이 문제에 놓인 원문 구절은 청구 변경의 방식과 시기를 정한 것이다. 민사소송법 제262조는 원고가 "청구의 기초가 바뀌지 아니하는 한도안에서 변론을 종결할 때(변론 없이 한 판결의 경우에는 판결을 선고할 때)까지 청구의 취지 또는 원인을 바꿀 수 있다"고 정하면서도 "청구취지의 변경은 서면으로 신청하여야 한다"고 덧붙인다(민사소송법 제262조). 여기서 주체는 원고이고, 행위는 청구취지 또는 원인의 변경이며, 시기는 변론을 종결할 때까지이며, 변론 없이 한 판결의 경우에는 판결을 선고할 때까지다. 서면 신청과 상대방에게 하는 송달도 함께 요구되어, 법원이 새 급부를 인식하게 되었다는 사실만으로는 청구가 바뀌지 않는다.
이 문언과 정해진 결론을 잇는다. 필요한 급부가 적법한 신청 범위에 들어 있고 그 범위 안에서 주문으로 재판된 경우에 주문의 실효가 열리며, 원하는 급부가 신청 범위 밖에 남아 법원이 이를 임의로 주문에 더할 수 없는 경우에는 차단된다(민사소송법 제262조). 이 두 경우를 최종 청구취지와 판결의 대응을 확인할 수 없는 경우와 구별해야 하는 까닭은 판단의 기준이 다르기 때문이다. 앞의 두 경우는 신청 범위라는 확정된 자료로 가늠할 수 있지만, 뒤의 경우는 자료의 대응 자체가 확인되지 않아 무엇을 근거로 열림과 닫힘을 말해야 할지가 남는다. 여기서 심판대상의 변경이란 법정 요건과 방식에 따른 청구의 이동을 뜻하며, 변경의 요건과 방식을 거치지 않은 인식은 청구를 이동시키지 않는다.
형식적 변경 절차가 신속한 구제를 늦춘다는 반론은 강하다. 새 사실을 알게 되었는데도 서면 신청과 송달을 기다려야 한다면, 당사자의 표현 실수 때문에 명백한 권리구제가 거절되는 것과 같은 불이익과 지연이 생길 수 있다. 그렇게 얻는 편의에 비해 절차가 무거워 보이는 면도 지워지지 않는다. 그러나 확정된 답은 새 사실을 알았다는 이유만으로 변경신청과 송달을 생략할 수 없다는 것이다. 요건과 방식이 청구를 심판 대상에 넣는 통로라면, 사정의 인식이 그 통로를 대신한다고 할 수 없다. 불리한 지연 가능성은 남지만, 그 가능성만으로 신청 범위 밖의 급부를 주문에 더할 수 있게 되는 것은 아니다.
합성 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 사실은 여기까지다. 원고 A는 물건 인도를 구했고, 문제가 된 것은 분쟁 해결에 도움이 된다는 이유로 하는 다른 급부 명령이어서, 필요한 급부가 신청 범위 안에 드는지 밖에 남는지가 쟁점이 된다. 다만 실제 변경 신청의 서면 제출과 송달이 있었는지, 최종 청구취지가 무엇이었는지, 판결 주문과 이유가 그와 어떻게 맞았는지는 확인되지 않았다. 기록 자료가 확인되지 않으므로 최종 청구취지와 판결의 대응을 확인할 수 없는 경우에 해당하는지는 미확정으로 남는다. 미확정은 구제가 불가능하다는 뜻이 아니며, 자료가 확인되면 다시 가늠할 사안이다.
이 절에서 말할 수 있는 것은 명확하다. 필요한 급부가 적법한 신청 범위 안에 들어와 주문으로 재판되면 실효가 열리고, 신청 범위 밖에 남은 급부를 법원이 임의로 주문에 더할 수 없으면 차단된다. 말할 수 없는 것도 분명하다. 법원이 유용하다고 보는 급부를 이유만으로 주문에 보태거나, 변경 요건과 방식을 거치지 않은 새 청구가 심판 대상에 들어왔다고 보는 것은 이 절의 결론이 아니다. 미확인 자료로 실효와 차단의 조건을 확정할 수도 없고, 반대로 미확정을 곧바로 차단으로 적을 수도 없다.
4.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
실체적 급부의 범위가 넓더라도 판결은 신청한 범위 안에 머물러야 한다는 점이 그것이다. 이 장면에서 법원이 직권으로 새 급부를 알아채기만 하면 판결의 심판 대상으로 삼을 수 있는가라는 물음이 그대로 남는다.
이 물음에 대응하는 조문으로 민사소송법 제262조 청구의 변경이 있다. "제2항의 서면은 상대방에게 송달하여야 한다."라고 정한다(민사소송법 제262조). 이 문언에서 법원이 아니라 원고가 바꿀 수 있는 주체로 지정되고, 바꾸는 행위가 서면 신청과 송달을 필수 방식으로 요구받는다는 점이 드러난다.
이 근거가 가리키는 방식을 거치지 않은 새 급부는 판결 주문의 심판 대상이 되지 않는다. 이 정의는 실체법상 권리가 존재한다는 인정과 절차상 심판 대상에 들어왔다는 인정을 구별한다. 전자는 판결 이유에서 다루는 판단의 대상일 수 있지만, 후자는 신청 범위 안에서 주문으로 재판되었는지의 문제로 남는다. 이 둘을 섞으면 법원이 인식한 권리가 곧바로 주문의 근거가 되는 것처럼 보이지만, 이 절의 결론은 그런 편향을 받아들이지 않는다.
당사자의 표현 실수 때문에 명백한 권리구제를 거절하는 결과가 생긴다면, 법정 요건은 오히려 실체 정의를 가로막는 장애물로 보일 수 있다. 상대방이 새 급부를 방어할 기회를 받지 못한 채 주문에 새로운 급부가 실리면, 송달 절차가 겨냥한 심리의 균형이 무너진다. 반론이 지적한 지연의 불편은 사실이지만, 그 불편만으로 방식 요건의 존재가 소멸하지는 않는다는 점이 이 절의 답이다.
원고 A는 물건 인도를 구했는데 분쟁 해결에 도움이 된다는 이유로 다른 급부를 명할 수 있는지가 문제 된다는 전제만으로, 실제 변경신청이 있었는지, 서면이 송달되었는지, 판결 주문이 어떻게 쓰였는지는 확정되지 않았다. 따라서 원하고자 하는 급부가 신청 범위 밖에 남아 법원이 이를 임의로 주문에 더할 수 없는지, 아니면 적법한 변경으로 신청 범위 안에 들어와 주문으로 재판되었는지는 기록의 대응을 확인하기 전에는 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 제한적이다. 심리 중 드러난 새 급부는 그 자체로 심판 대상이 되지 않고, 원고의 신청 범위 안에서 판결 주문으로 재판되는 범위만 유효한 심판 대상으로 남는다. 허용되지 않는 결론은 법원이 새 급부를 실체적으로 필요하다고 여기는 만큼 곧바로 주문에 반영할 수 있다는 방향이다. 이 판단의 경계는 신청 범위 안의 주문이라는 판정 단계에 묶여 있으며, 최종 청구취지와 판결의 대응이 확인되지 않은 사안은 여기서 더 나아가 판정하지 않는다.