Summary
The disclosure of written judgments extends to cases that are not yet final, but is subject to both statutory exclusions and personal information protection.
5.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
An expansion of the point of disclosure does not mean that protective measures may be omitted. The preceding section confirmed that protective measures for personal information taken in view of concerns over harm to life or body may restrict disclosure to third parties, including the parties. The question is now narrowed to whether a judgment that has not become final and conclusive is also an object of disclosure, and what the threshold is for opening the channel of this remedy. The work of clarifying the threshold starts from the premise that widening the scope of disclosure and preserving protective measures move together.
The text that answers this question is found in Article 163-2 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act. It provides: "Notwithstanding Article 162, any person may view and copy, by electronic means such as the Internet or other computerized information processing systems, the written judgment in a case in which a judgment has been pronounced (including written judgments in cases that have not become final and conclusive; excluding written judgments in cases to which the Trial of Small Claims Act applies and written judgments under Article 4 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Trial of Appellate Cases and the main text of Article 429 of this Act; the same shall apply in this Article)." Here the subject is any person; the act is the electronic viewing and copying of the written judgment in a case in which a judgment has been pronounced; and the conditions require both that a judgment has been pronounced and that the material is not among the excluded objects.
The proviso left by the same provision serves to separate the fixing of the object from the fixing of access. The proviso permits: "In cases prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules, viewing and copying of the written judgment in a case in which oral argument was held closed to the public may be restricted in whole or in part." Disclosure of written judgments in this range means the electronic viewing and copying of written judgments that are statutory objects. Whether a judgment is final and conclusive is only a condition as to the object and does not take the place of all conditions of access; therefore, where one meets the distinct access requirements applicable to deliberations, written judgments, and litigation records and accesses the material in a range outside the statutory restrictions, the entrance to this remedy is open. This is why the determination that something is included in the object and the determination that one actually reaches that object must not be crushed together into a single step.
The strongest counterargument points out that before a judgment becomes final and conclusive its holding may change, and that disclosure in the interim may give readers the misimpression of a settled conclusion. This discomfort cannot be erased. The possibility of misunderstanding that a written judgment before finality carries remains as it is. Even so, disclosure of written judgments cannot be limited to final and conclusive judgments, nor can the excluded objects be erased. This is because the text expressly includes written judgments in cases that have not become final and conclusive, and because, even in cases where oral argument was held closed to the public, it provides for restriction in whole or in part as well. The risk of misunderstanding must be handled through the scope of protective measures and restrictions.
In a synthetic scene, Plaintiff A demands production of the entire record on the ground of an open trial, and Defendant B asserts the risk arising from the exposure of an address. In this scene, whether the judgment is final and conclusive has not been determined, and the object demanded is the entire record. Because the target documents and the basis and scope of any restrictive decision cannot be confirmed, that part remains undetermined. The protective measures fixed by the text, however, command that, prior to viewing and copying, protective measures prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules be taken so that personal information such as the names stated in the written judgment is not disclosed (Article 163-2 of the Civil Procedure Act). If the ground for protection is confirmed as protection against harm to life and body, the question whether the parties are included and the scope of access must be set differently.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. A written judgment that has not become final and conclusive also falls within the object of the text, but that does not mean that, by falling within that object, one may pass beyond the statutory exclusions or omit the personal information protective measures. Conversely, this section does not accept an interpretation that erases the distinction drawn by the text by moving the material into the excluded objects or abolishing the protective measures. Nor can it be concluded that access requirements are closed in their entirety merely because disclosure before finality gives rise to misunderstanding.
5.2The Conditions That Block Relief
Protective measures for personal information taken in view of concerns over harm to life or body may restrict disclosure to third parties, including the parties. Now, in the scene where Plaintiff A demands production of the entire record on the ground of an open trial and Defendant B asserts the risk arising from the exposure of an address, the analysis examines whether a judgment that has not become final and conclusive is also an object of disclosure and what the conditions are under which the channel of remedy is closed.
Article 163-2 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides, "Notwithstanding Article 162, any person may view and copy the written judgment in a case in which a judgment has been pronounced (including written judgments in cases that have not become final and conclusive; excluding written judgments in cases to which the Trial of Small Claims Act applies and written judgments under Article 4 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Trial of Appellate Cases and the main text of Article 429 of this Act)," thereby specifying the object of viewing and copying. The subject indicated by this text is any person; the act is viewing and copying by electronic means such as the Internet or other computerized information processing systems; and the condition is the written judgment in a case in which a judgment has been pronounced.
This text places written judgments in cases that have not become final and conclusive within the object of viewing and copying as well. At the same time, the same paragraph adds that, in cases prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules, viewing and copying of the written judgment in a case in which oral argument was held closed to the public may be restricted in whole or in part. Because the scope of the objects of disclosure and the grounds for restriction are fixed together within the same provision, the determination that places cases not yet final and conclusive among the objects of disclosure and the determination that blocks access to specified parts are examined as separate steps.
That a judgment may change and cause misunderstanding is a substantial discomfort. According to the author's conclusion, where the relevant secrecy or protection against harm, or a statutory ground for exclusion, is recognized and access to the designated part is restricted, the channel of remedy is closed if any one of the statutory requirements goes unsatisfied. That is to say, even a written judgment that has not fallen out of the objects of disclosure does not open the channel of this remedy if access to the designated part is restricted.
In the scene, what Plaintiff A demands is production of the entire record, and what Defendant B asserts is the risk arising from the exposure of an address. Because disclosure of written judgments means the electronic viewing and copying of written judgments that are statutory objects, it must first be determined whether a judgment has been pronounced and what kind of written judgment it is. Article 163-2 (3) of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "Court clerks and other court officials shall, prior to the viewing and copying under paragraph (1), take protective measures prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules so that personal information such as the names stated in the written judgment is not disclosed."
The permissible conclusion is that written judgments in cases that have not become final and conclusive also fall within the objects of disclosure, but that where statutory grounds for exclusion and personal information protection apply together and access to the designated part is restricted, the channel of remedy is closed. Here, however, that the channel of remedy is closed does not mean that access to other records or the protective measures themselves immediately become impossible, and if the target documents and the basis and scope of the restrictive decision cannot be confirmed, the determination remains undetermined.
5.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Is a judgment that has not become final and conclusive also an object of disclosure? The protective measures for personal information taken in view of concerns over harm to life or body, confirmed at the preceding stage, may restrict disclosure to third parties, including the parties, and that premise is laid down unchanged before the present question. What is to be newly settled here is whether finality divides the objects of disclosure of written judgments, and how to mark the boundary that cannot be settled for want of materials.
Article 163-2 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides "Notwithstanding Article 162, any person may view and copy the written judgment in a case in which a judgment has been pronounced (including written judgments in cases that have not become final and conclusive; excluding written judgments in cases to which the Trial of Small Claims Act applies and written judgments under Article 4 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Trial of Appellate Cases and the main text of Article 429 of this Act)," and paragraph (3) of the same Article provides "Court clerks and other court officials shall, prior to the viewing and copying under paragraph (1), take protective measures prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules so that personal information such as the names stated in the written judgment is not disclosed" (Article 163-2 of the Civil Procedure Act). The subject indicated by this text is anyone who wishes to view or copy a written judgment; the act is the electronic viewing and copying of written judgments that are statutory objects; and the conditions are that the case be one in which a judgment has been pronounced and that the material not fall among the enumerated excluded objects.
Setting the two provisions above side by side, the concept of disclosure of written judgments is settled as including cases that have not become final and conclusive, while following statutory exclusions and personal information protection at once. Whether a judgment is final and conclusive is not a requirement dividing the scope of the objects of disclosure, and protective measures are not an incidental condition of disclosure but a boundary of access operating at the same time as disclosure. Accordingly, matters for which the materials of determination are not specified are not pronounced an impossibility incapable of adjudication but are left undetermined, and this distinction is itself the conclusion of this section.
A counterargument is raised that disclosure of a judgment whose holding may change may cause misunderstanding. The concern is that if a judgment before finality is later overturned, a person who read the disclosed content will receive an impression different from the final and conclusive conclusion, and that such misunderstanding may remain with the parties as adverse reputation or confusion. The answer does not deny the risk of misunderstanding; it means that the means of dealing with that risk is sought not in the presence or absence of a final and conclusive judgment but in the statutory exclusions and protective measures.
In the scene above, the facts relevant to this question are only that Plaintiff A demands production of the entire record on the basis of an open trial, and that Defendant B asserts the risk arising from the exposure of an address. Contrasting these with the text above, Defendant B's assertion touches on the issue of personal information addressed by the protective measures in paragraph (3), and Plaintiff A's demand touches on the issue of how far the objects of viewing and copying under paragraph (1) extend. However, because the type of the target documents, the basis and scope of the restrictive decision, and where the designated protected part lies cannot be confirmed from the materials, this scene alone cannot settle whether viewing is permitted or restricted. That unverified matter remains undetermined as it is.
The conclusion this section permits is that disclosure of written judgments includes judgments that have not become final and conclusive, but takes place within the bounds of statutory exclusions and protective measures; what it does not permit is a conclusion that removes cases not yet final and conclusive from the objects of disclosure or erases the excluded objects. Points that cannot be settled for want of materials are not adjudged impossible but are left undetermined, which does not mean that relief is impossible but that the materials of determination are not yet specified.
5.4The Records Needed for Determination
It was previously confirmed that protective measures for personal information taken in view of concerns over harm to life or body may restrict disclosure to third parties, including the parties. Now, in the scene where Plaintiff A demands production of the entire record on the ground of an open trial and Defendant B asserts the risk arising from the exposure of an address, what remains is whether a judgment that has not become final and conclusive is also an object of disclosure and what records are needed to adjudicate that stage.
The relevant source text that answers that question is Article 163-2 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act. That Article provides: "Notwithstanding Article 162, any person may view and copy the written judgment in a case in which a judgment has been pronounced (including written judgments in cases that have not become final and conclusive; excluding written judgments in cases to which the Trial of Small Claims Act applies and written judgments under Article 4 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Trial of Appellate Cases and the main text of Article 429 of this Act)." Here the subject is anyone who wishes to view or copy the written judgment in a case in which a judgment has been pronounced; the act is viewing and copying by electronic means such as the Internet; and whether the judgment is final and conclusive does not serve as a condition dividing the objects of disclosure.
The same provision places the exception as "in cases prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules, viewing and copying of the written judgment in a case in which oral argument was held closed to the public may be restricted in whole or in part," thereby setting out together the statutory excluded objects and the possibility of restricting disclosure. In addition, Article 163-2 (3) requires that, prior to the viewing and copying under paragraph (1), protective measures be taken so that personal information such as the names stated in the written judgment is not disclosed. Accordingly, the determination that cases not yet final and conclusive are included among the objects of disclosure and the determination that the scope and manner of disclosure may be restricted are different stages, and each stage is adjudged only on the materials recorded in the application for viewing and in the matters of qualification, the decision restricting disclosure, the designated protected part, and the type of written judgment.
The counterargument with which this distinction collides most strongly is that disclosure of a judgment whose holding may change causes misunderstanding, and that repeated partial restrictions may in effect destroy the principle of disclosure. If a judgment not yet final is widely viewed, even if the later holding differs, the impression already spread is difficult to recall, and the more restrictions and protective measures are repeated, the more the target written judgment may remain formally disclosed while little actually remains. Nevertheless, the author's conclusion is maintained that disclosure of written judgments cannot be limited to final and conclusive judgments, nor can the excluded objects be erased. This is because an expansion of the objects of disclosure does not mean the omission of protective measures.
In this scene, the facts usable for stage adjudication are limited. What Plaintiff A took as its basis is the demand for production of the entire record, and the risk raised by Defendant B is the exposure of an address. The two assertions aim at different conditions, namely the scope of access outside statutory restrictions and protection against harm to life or body, and they cannot be bundled and dealt with as a single scope of access such as confidentiality protection. Only where both the condition that finality is included among the objects of disclosure and the scope of restrictions and protective measures remain in the records can the stages be distinguished; and in the range where entries such as the application for viewing, the type of written judgment, and the designated protected part are not confirmed, the matter remains undetermined.
The conclusion permitted in this section is that a judgment that has not become final and conclusive may also become an object of disclosure of written judgments, but that statutory exclusions and personal information protective measures apply together, and the stages of that application are adjudged only by the established records. By contrast, judging disclosure by limiting the target written judgments to final and conclusive judgments alone or by deleting the excluded objects is not permitted. Requirements and results absent from the records are not filled in by presumption, and the range for which there are no materials is left undetermined rather than as an impossibility of relief.
5.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
Under these circumstances, Plaintiff A demands the production of the entire record on the ground of an open trial, while Defendant B asserts a risk arising from the exposure of an address. In this scene, Plaintiff A's demand and Defendant B's assertion collide, and the questions open up whether a judgment that has not become final and conclusive is also subject to disclosure, and what change overturns the determination of the preceding stage.
The text answering this question is Article 163-2 of the Civil Procedure Act: "(1) Notwithstanding Article 162, any person may view and copy the written judgment in a case in which a judgment has been pronounced (including a written judgment in a case that has not become final and conclusive; excluding a written judgment in a case to which the Trial of Small Claims Act applies and a written judgment under Article 4 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning Trial Procedures for Appeals and the main text of Article 429 of this Act; the same shall apply in this Article) by electronic means such as the Internet or other computerized information processing systems. However, in the case of a written judgment in a case in which oral argument was closed to the public, as prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules, viewing and copying may be restricted in whole or in part." Here, the subject is any person; the act is the electronic viewing and copying of the written judgment; and the conditions are that it is a written judgment in a case in which a judgment has been pronounced and that it does not fall within the enumerated grounds for exclusion.
This text provides in paragraph (3) of the same Article: "(3) Court clerks, etc. and other court officials shall, prior to the viewing and copying under paragraph (1), take protective measures prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules so that personal information such as names entered in the written judgment is not disclosed" (Article 163-2 of the Civil Procedure Act). Why the permission of viewing and copying in paragraph (1) and the duty of protective measures in paragraph (3) must be viewed separately is the heart of this issue. Disclosure of a written judgment means the electronic viewing and copying of the written judgments that are the statutory subjects, and, independently of the widening of that scope, it must be determined together whether situations requiring protective measures remain.
That said, the counterargument that the disclosure of a judgment whose contents may change may give rise to misunderstanding does not disappear. Just as repeated partial restrictions may in practice undermine the principle of disclosure, so the loss and inconvenience remain that the narrower the scope of access becomes, the more the principle of disclosure itself is weakened. Yet the author's answer is clear: while maintaining the conclusion within this scope, it is not negated that the scope of disclosure and the protective measures must be evaluated together.
If this fact is contrasted with the foregoing conditions, the sentence that, if the protection changes to protection against harm to life or body, the parties may also be included, and that therefore it is not handled as a scope of access such as confidentiality protection, becomes an examination standard falling within the scope of this section. However, the outcome of an actual case, or the circumstances of service or performance, which cannot be determined from the scene, remain undetermined.
The conclusion that can be confirmed in this section is that a written judgment that has not become final and conclusive cannot be excluded from the subjects of disclosure, and that such disclosure follows both the statutory grounds for exclusion and the protective measures for personal information. Conversely, it is not permitted to carry the conclusion by limiting the subjects of disclosure only to final and conclusive judgments or by erasing the categories of exclusion. Interpretations that substitute the state in which the legal channel is open for actual access results are also excluded.
5.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
Even after the preceding stage confirmed that a judgment that has not become final and conclusive is also included among the subjects of disclosure, the protective measures remain separately. Now the point the counterargument targets is that the disclosure of a judgment whose contents may change may give rise to misunderstanding. Misunderstanding refers to a situation in which a reader reads a pronounced judgment as a final and conclusive conclusion and misconjectures the prior state of the case. Even if this misunderstanding is realistic, one must ask whether reverting the scope of disclosure to final and conclusive judgments is the only alternative. That question is the scope of this stage.
The original text answering this question is Article 163-2 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act. Here, the subject is any person; the act is electronic viewing and copying; and the condition is a written judgment in a case in which a judgment has been pronounced. The text includes within its subject written judgments in cases that have not become final and conclusive, and, in the same parentheses, excludes written judgments in cases to which the Trial of Small Claims Act applies and written judgments under Article 4 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning Trial Procedures for Appeals and the main text of Article 429 of this Act. The same text then adds: "However, in the case of a written judgment in a case in which oral argument was closed to the public, as prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules, viewing and copying may be restricted in whole or in part."
The distinction made by this text converges with the author's conclusion. Article 163-2 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act widens the subjects of disclosure while, at the same time, retaining both the categories of exclusion in the same parentheses and the grounds for restriction in the proviso. These two are not determinations at the same stage. One is the question of which written judgments are subject to viewing and copying, and the other is the question of which parts of a written judgment that has become subject are restricted. So long as this distinction is maintained, including cases not yet final within the subjects does not erase the categories of exclusion and the grounds for restriction. Conversely, nor can the subjects themselves be narrowed to final and conclusive judgments merely because the categories of exclusion and the grounds for restriction remain. Disclosure of a written judgment means the electronic viewing and copying of the written judgments that are the statutory subjects, and this definition is read as including cases not yet final. Accordingly, disclosure of a written judgment cannot be limited to final and conclusive judgments alone, nor can the categories of exclusion be erased. Paragraph (3) of the same Article provides that "court clerks, etc. and other court officials shall, prior to the viewing and copying under paragraph (1), take protective measures prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules so that personal information such as names entered in the written judgment is not disclosed," making clear that the protective measures precede the stage at which access is permitted.
The strongest counterargument proceeds to the demand that the scope of disclosure be limited to final and conclusive judgments. If a judgment whose contents may change is posted on the Internet, the reader may read that judgment as a final and conclusive conclusion and take a case in an undetermined state to be concluded. That misunderstanding becomes a direct inconvenience and loss to the parties. Damage to reputation caused by the misunderstanding, the inconsistency between the judgment later changed and the disclosed written judgment, and the cost of persuading readers who have already been misled are examples of this. The counterargument also points out that repeated partial restrictions may in practice undermine the principle of disclosure. Yet removing undetermined cases from the subjects of disclosure merely because these losses and inconvenience remain does not accord with the distinction set forth in the text. Article 163-2 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act included written judgments in undetermined cases among the subjects while placing the categories of exclusion and the grounds for restriction in the proviso alongside them, and paragraph (3) arranged the protective measures for personal information as a duty preceding viewing and copying. The author's answer, without denying the possibility of misunderstanding, is that disclosure of a written judgment cannot be limited to final and conclusive judgments alone, nor can the categories of exclusion be erased.
The foregoing condition is the fact that the trial is open; what was demanded is the production of the entire record; and the risk asserted is the exposure of an address. This assertion overlaps in part with the protective measures under paragraph (3) to the effect that personal information such as names entered in the written judgment is not disclosed. However, this scene does not determine whether the written judgment has become final and conclusive, whether it is a case in which oral argument was closed to the public, or whether it falls within the grounds for restriction prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules. Accordingly, only the records of the application for viewing, the qualifications, the decision on restriction of disclosure, the portion designated for protection, and the type of written judgment remain as the basis for comparison. The scope of the documents concerned and the grounds for the restriction decision, which cannot be determined from the scene, are left undetermined. If the protection changes to protection against harm to life or body, the parties may also be included, and therefore it is not handled as a scope of access such as confidentiality protection.
Article 163-2 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act includes written judgments in cases that have not become final and conclusive among the subjects of viewing and copying while maintaining together the categories of exclusion and the grounds for restriction in the proviso prescribed by the same text. Paragraph (3) requires protective measures for personal information prior to that access. Accordingly, disclosure of a written judgment includes undetermined cases but follows both the statutory exclusions and the protection of personal information, and this cannot be changed by limiting it to final and conclusive judgments alone or by erasing the categories of exclusion. The impermissible conclusions are also clear. Undetermined cases cannot be removed from the subjects of disclosure merely because of the possibility of misunderstanding, nor can new statutory grounds for exclusion be created merely because protective measures exist. The types of documents that cannot be confirmed and the scope of the restriction decision remain undetermined.
5.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The preceding section reached the conclusion that disclosure of a written judgment cannot be limited to final and conclusive judgments alone, nor can the categories of exclusion be erased, and the question now is whether that disclosure extends to written judgments in cases that have not become final and conclusive. In this scene, the issue is whether the protective measures follow along together with the scope of the subjects of disclosure.
The relevant text sets forth the subject and method of disclosure of written judgments in Article 163-2 of the Civil Procedure Act. Paragraph (1) opens the subject to any person by stating: "Notwithstanding Article 162, any person may view and copy the written judgment in a case in which a judgment has been pronounced (including a written judgment in a case that has not become final and conclusive; excluding a written judgment in a case to which the Trial of Small Claims Act applies and a written judgment under Article 4 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning Trial Procedures for Appeals and the main text of Article 429 of this Act)," and defines the act as viewing and copying by electronic means such as the Internet or other computerized information processing systems (Article 163-2 of the Civil Procedure Act). The text does not remove the status of finality from the subjects; instead, it excludes specific types of written judgment.
Disclosure of a written judgment means the electronic viewing and copying of the written judgments that are the statutory subjects, and the requirement of finality is not erected as a threshold for those subjects. Instead, two stages of determination are separated. First, one confirms whether it is a written judgment in a case in which a judgment has been pronounced, and whether it is not a type of excluded subject. Next, one confirms the protective measures. Paragraph (3) provides: "Court clerks, etc. and other court officials shall, prior to the viewing and copying under paragraph (1), take protective measures prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules so that personal information such as names entered in the written judgment is not disclosed" (Article 163-2 of the Civil Procedure Act). If these two stages are not separated, the scope of disclosure and the scope of protection become a single mass, and the distinction prescribed by the text is lost.
The strongest counterargument is that the disclosure of a judgment whose contents may change may give rise to misunderstanding. A judgment prior to finality may be altered in content in subsequent proceedings, and if a person viewing it takes the current state to be the final determination, that misunderstanding extends as far as transactions and reputation. The conclusion is maintained without erasing this inconvenience. The possibility of misunderstanding targeted by the counterargument is something to be handled by protective measures, and does not become grounds for preventing disclosure itself on the basis of finality. This is supported by the arrangement in which the text expressly includes written judgments in cases that have not become final and conclusive while requiring protective measures in a separate paragraph.
Returning to the synthetic scene, only the relevant facts are compared. Plaintiff A demands the production of the entire record on the ground of an open trial, but the subjects of disclosure of written judgments are the written judgments in cases in which a judgment has been pronounced, and this includes undetermined cases. Defendant B asserts a risk arising from the exposure of an address, but what paragraph (3) takes as the object of its protective measures is personal information such as names entered in the written judgment. However, whether an address falls within that personal information such as names, and what the scope of the protective measures prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules is, are not determined by this text alone. That item remains undetermined. Moreover, the demand in the scene for the production of the entire record is a question different from the viewing and copying of a written judgment, and therefore cannot be conclusively decided here.
Accordingly, the conclusion this section permits is that disclosure of a written judgment includes written judgments in cases that have not become final and conclusive, and at the same time follows both the statutory categories of exclusion and the protective measures for personal information. A reading that adds a requirement of finality to the subjects of disclosure, or erases the categories of exclusion and the protective measures from the subjects of disclosure, does not accord with this text. The protective measures are prescribed to be taken prior to viewing and copying, and how far the portion they designate extends must be confirmed by examining the grounds of each application for viewing and each decision on restriction of disclosure.
5.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
On the premise that the trial is open, whether the entire record can be obtained remains in question. This opposition is resolved only when the openness of the trial and the access to the record are viewed as different things. What this section addresses is the viewing and copying of written judgments among them, and the question is whether finality divides those subjects.
Article 163-2 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that, notwithstanding Article 162, any person may view and copy the written judgment in a case in which a judgment has been pronounced by electronic means such as the Internet or other computerized information processing systems. Here, "any person" refers to the claimant, who is not asked about qualifications; "a case in which a judgment has been pronounced" refers to the point in time of pronouncement; and "by electronic means, etc." refers to the means of viewing and copying, respectively. In this Article, "written judgment" includes a written judgment in a case that has not become final and conclusive. However, in the case of a written judgment in a case in which oral argument was closed to the public, as prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules, viewing and copying may be restricted in whole or in part.
This text answers the question whether a judgment that has not become final and conclusive is also a subject of disclosure by stating that disclosure of a written judgment includes undetermined cases but follows both the statutory exclusions and the protection of personal information. The reason is that pronouncement and finality are different stages of determination. The former stage widens the scope of the subjects of disclosure, and the latter stage discerns the parts to be safeguarded within that disclosure. This is why the requirement of finality must not be placed as a condition of the scope, while protective measures must be provided separately.
What the counterargument that the disclosure of a judgment whose contents may change may give rise to misunderstanding targets is the loss of reputation and trust. A judgment prior to finality may be overturned, and the record read in the meantime may leave the parties with inconvenience that is hard to reverse. Even so, the conclusion of this section is that disclosure of a written judgment cannot be limited to final and conclusive judgments alone, nor can the categories of exclusion be erased. Article 163-2 (3) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that court clerks, etc. and other court officials shall, prior to the viewing and copying under paragraph (1), take protective measures prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules so that personal information such as names entered in the written judgment is not disclosed. The risk of misunderstanding is addressed not by limitation to final and conclusive judgments but by the designation of protective measures.
In the synthetic scene, the facts bearing on this question are that Plaintiff A's demand is the production of the entire record based on the openness of the trial, and that the risk asserted by Defendant B is the exposure of an address. In accordance with the foregoing conditions, the written judgment is the electronic viewing and copying of the written judgments that are the statutory subjects, and the protective measures concern personal information such as names entered in the written judgment. Matters that cannot be confirmed as to the documents concerned or the grounds and scope of the restriction decision remain undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is that disclosure of a written judgment includes cases that have not become final and conclusive, and that the statutory exclusions and the protective measures apply together. To read that, beyond this scope, the production of the entire litigation record or even access to the hearing is permitted is an impermissible conclusion. The answer of the neighboring section is not given here in its place.
5.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
앞 단계가 확정되지 않은 판결도 공개 대상임을 확인했다면, 이번 단계는 그 공개가 어떤 문언에 따라 이루어지는지를 묻는다. 이 요구와 주장이 부딪히는 자리에서, 확정 여부와 무관하게 열리는 판결공개의 시점을 어디까지 넓히더라도 보호조치의 생략이 따라오지 않는다는 점을 먼저 분명히 해야 한다.
민사소송법 제163조의2 제1항은 "제162조에도 불구하고 누구든지 판결이 선고된 사건의 판결서(확정되지 아니한 사건에 대한 판결서를 포함하며, 「소액사건심판법」이 적용되는 사건의 판결서와 「상고심절차에 관한 특례법」 제4조 및 이 법 제429조 본문에 따른 판결서는 제외한다. 이하 이 조에서 같다)를 인터넷, 그 밖의 전산정보처리시스템을 통한 전자적 방법 등으로 열람 및 복사할 수 있다"라고 정한다(민사소송법 제163조의2). 같은 조 제3항은 "법원사무관등이나 그 밖의 법원공무원은 제1항에 따른 열람 및 복사에 앞서 판결서에 기재된 성명 등 개인정보가 공개되지 아니하도록 대법원규칙으로 정하는 보호조치를 하여야 한다"라고 정한다(민사소송법 제163조의2). 앞 문언은 대상과 행위를, 뒤 문언은 그에 앞서 수행할 조치를 각각 가리킨다.
제1항의 문언이 열어 놓은 것은 판결이 선고된 사건의 판결서를 전자적 방법으로 열람·복사하는 행위이며, 그 대상은 확정되지 아니한 사건을 포함한다. 이와 구분되어 제3항은 제1항에 따른 열람·복사에 앞서 수행할 보호조치를 법원사무관등 등 법원공무원의 의무로 규정한다. 즉 확정 여부에 따른 대상의 확장과, 그 대상에 적용되는 보호조치의 이행은 별개의 판단 단계다. 전자는 열람·복사의 문을 여는 문제이고 후자는 그 문 앞에서 개인정보를 지키는 문제이므로, 확정되지 않은 판결서가 대상에 포함된다는 사실만으로 보호조치가 면제되는 결론은 이 문언에서 나올 수 없다.
가장 강한 반론은 "판단이 바뀔 수 있는 판결의 공개가 오해를 낳을 수 있다"라는 점을 겨냥한다. 확정되지 않은 판결서에는 이후 다른 판단이 뒤따를 수 있어, 이를 그대로 공개하면 읽는 사람에게 확정된 결론처럼 비칠 위험이 있다. 그 손실은 명예와 평판에 대한 불이익이라는 구체적 형태를 띠며, 공개 원칙을 관철하는 대가로 당사자가 치러야 하는 불편이기도 하다. 제1항이 확정되지 아니한 사건을 명시적으로 포함하면서도 동시에 정한 제외 대상을 두고 있으므로, 반론이 지적한 오해의 가능성은 보호조치와 제한 사유를 통해 다루어야 할 몫으로 남는다.
앞의 조건에 따르면 판결서 공개는 법정 대상 판결서의 전자적 열람·복사를 뜻하므로, 재판이 공개되었다는 사실만으로 기록 전체가 그대로 제공되는 것은 아니다. 제1항의 대상에 해당하는 판결서라도 제3항의 보호조치를 거쳐야 하고, 피고의 주장처럼 주소가 성명 등 개인정보에 해당하여 공개되지 않도록 보호할 부분이 지정되면 그 부분의 접근은 제한된다. 다만 장면에 설정되지 않은 대상 문서의 종류와 제한 결정의 범위까지 이 자리에서 확정할 수는 없다.
이 절에서 확인할 수 있는 결론은, 확정되지 않은 판결서가 제1항의 공개 대상에 포함된다는 문언과 그에 따른 열람·복사에 앞서 제3항의 보호조치를 이행하여야 한다는 문언이 함께 작동한다는 것이다. 따라서 확정 여부를 이유로 공개 대상을 좁히거나, 보호조치를 거친다는 이유로 제외 대상을 없애는 해석은 이 문언에 어울리지 않는다. 다만 판결이유나 다른 항의 문언까지 끌어와 새로운 제한 사유를 만들어 내는 것은 이 범위 밖에 있다.
5.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
여기서 말하는 판결서 공개는 법정 대상 판결서의 전자적 열람·복사를 뜻하며, 열려 있는 공개 대상의 범위와 그 공개가 끝까지 지켜야 할 보호의 범위는 서로 다른 문제로 놓인다. 장면에서 정해진 사실은 이 대립뿐이고, 판결 결과나 금액·시기는 설정되지 않았다. 이 장면에서 법정 공개·열람과 보호조치 안에서 다시 나누어 판정할 부분은 무엇인가.
이 물음에 대응하는 문언은 민사소송법 제163조의2 제1항에 있다. 그 조문은 "누구든지 판결이 선고된 사건의 판결서를 인터넷, 그 밖의 전산정보처리시스템을 통한 전자적 방법 등으로 열람 및 복사할 수 있다"라고 정하면서, 괄호 안에서 "확정되지 아니한 사건에 대한 판결서를 포함"한다고 밝힌다. 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 제한 없이 누구나이고, 행위는 전자적 열람과 복사이며, 조건은 판결이 선고된 사건의 판결서에 해당하는가이다. 같은 조항은 괄호 안에서 「소액사건심판법」이 적용되는 사건의 판결서와 「상고심절차에 관한 특례법」 제4조 및 이 법 제429조 본문에 따른 판결서를 제외한다고 함께 적는다. 다만 뒤에서는 변론의 공개를 금지한 사건의 판결서로서 대법원규칙으로 정하는 경우에는 열람 및 복사를 전부 또는 일부 제한할 수 있다고 단서를 둔다(민사소송법 제163조의2).
이 문언과 이 절의 결론을 잇는 지점은 바로 저 괄호와 단서의 구별이다. 확정되지 아니한 사건에 대한 판결서가 포함된다고 한 것은 공개 대상의 시점을 확정판결 이후로 좁히지 않는다는 뜻이고, 그와 함께 적힌 제외 사건과 제한 단서는 공개하더라도 법정 제한이 그대로 남는다는 뜻이다. 이 두 가지를 함께 보아야 판결서 공개가 미확정 사건을 포함하되 법정 제외와 개인정보 보호를 함께 따른다고 말할 수 있다. 민사소송법 제163조의2 제3항은 그 보호의 한 예를 분명히 한다. 즉 열람·복사의 문을 넓힌다고 그에 앞서 하여야 하는 보호조치가 없어지지 않으며, 두 단계의 판단 요건은 서로 대체되지 않는다.
심리·판결서·소송기록의 서로 다른 접근 요건을 갖추고 법정 제한 밖의 범위에서 접근하는 경우에 판결서 공개의 열람·복사가 작동한다. 반대로 해당 비밀·위해 보호 또는 법정 제외 사유가 인정되어 지정 부분의 접근이 제한된 경우 그 범위는 막힌다. 대상 문서나 제한 결정의 근거·범위를 확인할 수 없는 경우에는 미확정으로 남긴다. 여기에 놓인 손실과 불편은 크다. 판단이 바뀔 수 있는 판결의 공개가 오해를 낳을 수 있고, 확정 전의 기록을 넓게 보여 주는 방식이 오히려 분쟁의 확정에 앞서 오해를 굳힐 위험이 있다. 저 괄호가 이미 확정되지 아니한 사건을 포함한다고 적고, 단서와 제3항이 그 안에서 제한과 보호조치를 따로 요구하기 때문이다. 반론이 지적한 오해의 가능성은 보호조치를 정하는 몫으로 남고, 공개 대상에서 미확정 사건을 빼는 몫으로 옮겨가지 않는다.
이 장면에 놓인 사실을 이 조건들과 대조하면, 원고 A의 요구는 열람신청과 자격·공개 제한 결정·보호 지정 부분·판결서 종류를 기록으로 남긴다는 절차의 틀 안에서 판단된다. 공개된 재판이 있었다는 사정만으로 기록 전체가 제공되는 것은 아니고, 피고 B가 주장하는 주소 노출로 인한 위험은 제3항이 정한 성명 등 개인정보 보호조치의 범위에서 다루어진다. 다만 장면은 판결서의 종류나 보호 지정 부분, 제한 결정의 근거와 범위를 정하지 않았다. 따라서 어떤 문서가 제1항의 대상이고 어떤 부분이 제3항의 보호 아래 놓이는지는 이 장면만으로 확정되지 않으며 미확정으로 남는다. 한 가지 조건을 바꾼 대비로, 생명·신체 위해 보호로 바뀌면 당사자도 포함될 수 있으므로 비밀보호와 같은 접근 범위로 처리하지 않는다. 이는 실제 사건의 추가 사실이 아니라 접근 범위를 나누는 조건을 바꾼 검사일 뿐이다.
따라서 이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 확정되지 아니한 사건의 판결서도 제1항의 공개 대상에 포함되지만, 그 공개가 법정 제외 사건이나 단서의 제한, 제3항의 개인정보 보호조치를 생략한다는 뜻은 되지 않는다. 반대로 이 절이 허용하지 않는 결론은 두 가지이다. 미확정 사건이 포함된다는 사정만으로 기록 전체의 제공을 확정하는 판단과, 보호조치나 제외 대상을 지우고 공개를 확정판결에만 한정하는 판단이다. 자료가 부족한 채로 남은 사항은 미확정이며 곧바로 구제 불능이 아니다. 적법하게 읽은 기록은 어떻게 써도 되는가?
5.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
판결이 선고된 사건의 판결서는 확정되지 않은 사건에 대한 판결서까지 열람과 복사의 대상으로 삼는다. 그러한 공개 범위의 확장이 곧바로 보호조치의 생략을 뜻하지는 않는다. 이제 법정 공개·열람과 보호조치의 실효·차단·미확정을 어떻게 구별할지가 문제이다.
이 물음을 가르는 문언은 민사소송법 제163조의2 제1항이다. "① 제162조에도 불구하고 누구든지 판결이 선고된 사건의 판결서(확정되지 아니한 사건에 대한 판결서를 포함하며, 「소액사건심판법」이 적용되는 사건의 판결서와 「상고심절차에 관한 특례법」 제4조 및 이 법 제429조 본문에 따른 판결서는 제외한다. 이하 이 조에서 같다)를 인터넷, 그 밖의 전산정보처리시스템을 통한 전자적 방법 등으로 열람 및 복사할 수 있다"라고 정하고, 이어 "변론의 공개를 금지한 사건의 판결서로서 대법원규칙으로 정하는 경우에는 열람 및 복사를 전부 또는 일부 제한할 수 있다"라고 단서를 둔다. 여기서 정해지는 주체는 누구든지이고, 행위는 판결서의 전자적 열람·복사이며, 대상은 판결이 선고된 사건의 판결서이다.
위 문언은 대상 판결서의 범위와 제한 사유를 함께 정한다. 그러므로 열리는 조건은 심리·판결서·소송기록의 서로 다른 접근 요건을 갖추고 법정 제한 밖의 범위에서 접근하는 경우이고, 막히는 조건은 해당 비밀·위해 보호 또는 법정 제외 사유가 인정되어 지정 부분의 접근이 제한된 경우이다. 이 둘은 같은 판정이 아니다. 전자는 대상 문서가 어느 접근 요건을 갖추었는지를, 후자는 제한 사유가 지정 부분에 미치는지를 각각 묻는다. 여기서 판결서 공개는 법정 대상 판결서의 전자적 열람·복사를 뜻하며, 판결서 공개는 미확정 사건을 포함하되 법정 제외와 개인정보 보호를 함께 따른다. 보호조치의 의무는 같은 조 제3항에 근거한다.
가장 강한 반론은, 판단이 바뀔 수 있는 판결의 공개가 오해를 낳을 수 있다는 점이다. 확정 전 단계의 판결은 뒤집힐 수 있고, 그 내용이 널리 알려지면 당사자가 겪을 손실과 오해의 불편이 크다. 여기에 부분 제한을 거듭하면 공개 원칙이 사실상 무너질 수 있다는 걱정이 겹친다. 이 문단의 결론은 제한 사유가 인정되는 지정 부분의 접근을 막되, 그 밖의 범위에서 접근 요건을 갖춘 열람·복사를 닫지 않는 것이다.
이 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 것은 열람신청과 자격·공개 제한 결정·보호 지정 부분·판결서 종류의 기록이다. 원고 A의 요구가 어느 범위에서 받아들여지는지는 대상 문서나 제한 결정의 근거·범위를 확인할 수 있는 경우에만 판정된다. 그 근거와 범위를 확인할 수 없으면 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 접근 요건을 갖춘 범위에서의 열람·복사와 제한 사유가 인정되는 지정 부분의 차단을 구별하는 것이다. 허용하지 않는 것은, 대상 판결서를 확정 판결로만 좁히거나 법정 제외 사유를 지워 버리는 판정이다. 제한 결정의 근거나 범위를 확인하지 못한 채 열림이나 막힘을 단정하는 것도 이 절이 허용하지 않는다.
5.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
앞 절은 심리·판결서·소송기록의 서로 다른 접근 요건을 갖추고 법정 제한 밖의 범위에서 접근하는 경우에는 작동하고, 해당 비밀·위해 보호 또는 법정 제외 사유가 인정되어 지정 부분의 접근이 제한된 경우에는 막히며, 대상 문서나 제한 결정의 근거·범위를 확인할 수 없는 경우에는 미확정으로 남는다고 정리했다. 이 결론을 전제로 이 절은 확정되지 않은 판결도 공개 대상인가라는 물음을 다룬다. 이 장면에서 확정 여부는 공개 대상의 결정에 어떤 영향을 주는가.
이 문언이 말하는 주체는 열람·복사를 구하는 사람이며, 대상은 판결이 선고된 사건의 판결서이고, 괄호 안은 확정되지 아니한 사건의 판결서를 포함한다고 열거한다. 동시에 같은 괄호는 세 가지 유형의 판결서를 제외 대상으로 적는다.
조문의 첫 문장과 다만 문장은 각각 다른 판단을 맡는다. 앞부분은 확정 여부를 공개 대상의 판단에서 중립으로 두고, 선고된 판결서의 범위에 미확정 사건의 판결서를 포함시킨다. 뒤의 다만 문장은 변론의 공개를 금지한 사건의 판결서로서 대법원규칙으로 정하는 경우에 전부 또는 일부를 제한한다. 여기서 판결서 공개는 법정 대상 판결서의 전자적 열람·복사를 뜻한다. 공개 대상이 넓어지는 것과 제한 가능성이 사라지는 것은 서로 다른 문장에 배치되었으므로, 하나를 다른 하나로 환원할 수 없다. 이 두 단계의 구별이 이 절의 결론을 만든다.
미확정 판결의 공개가 낳는 불안은 구체적이다. 이후 심리에서 사실 인정이 바뀌거나 법적 판단이 달라지면, 이미 열람한 독자는 끝내지 않은 판단을 최종적인 것으로 오해할 수 있다. 피고 B가 걱정하는 주소 노출 위험도 같은 방향에서 공개의 사회적 비용을 가리킨다. 그렇더라도 확정된 판결만 공개 대상으로 삼는 제한은 문언상 허용되지 않는다. 조문이 명시적으로 포함한 범위를 뒤집는 해석은 법정 제외 대상을 옮기는 결과도 함께 낳는다. 반론이 지적한 오해의 가능성은 남지만, 그 가능성은 확정판결 한정이라는 결론으로 이어지지 않는다.
합성 장면에서 이 물음과 관련된 사실은 제한되어 있다. 원고 A가 요구하는 것은 기록 전체의 제공이고, 근거로 내세우는 것은 공개된 재판이다. 반면 이 절이 다루는 판결서 공개는 법정 대상 판결서의 전자적 열람·복사에 머무른다. 소송기록 전체의 제공 요건은 다른 절의 물음으로 남으므로, 재판이 공개되었다는 사실 하나로 기록 전체가 열리는 것으로 확정할 수 없다. 피고 B의 주소 노출 우려에 대해서도 위협의 정도나 보호조치의 구체적 내용은 장면에서 정해지지 않았다. 어떤 보호조치가 필요한지는 미확인으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 확정되지 않은 사건의 판결서도 판결이 선고된 사건의 판결서에 포함되어 전자적 열람·복사의 대상이 된다는 것, 그리고 변론의 공개를 금지한 사건의 판결서로서 대법원규칙이 정하는 경우에는 전부 또는 일부 제한할 수 있다는 것이 그 범위다. 민사소송법 제163조의2 제3항은 “③ 법원사무관등이나 그 밖의 법원공무원은 제1항에 따른 열람 및 복사에 앞서 판결서에 기재된 성명 등 개인정보가 공개되지 아니하도록 대법원규칙으로 정하는 보호조치를 하여야 한다.”고 하여, 확정 여부와 무관하게 개인정보 보호조치를 요구한다. 공개 대상의 확대가 보호조치의 생략을 뜻하지 않는 이유가 여기 있다. 다만 공개 여부가 확정되었다고 소송기록 전체의 열람까지 열리는 것은 아니고, 반대로 주소 우려만으로 법정 제외 대상이 넓어지는 것도 아니다.