Summary
This chapter distinguishes the parties from the scope of effect fixed by law, such as successors and possessors of the subject matter.
1.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
The fact that one did not participate in another's lawsuit and the statement that one receives no effect from it are not the same. Once it has been confirmed in the preceding section that the facts stated in the reasons of another judgment are not automatically established as facts of common knowledge but may be evaluated as evidence, the question now becomes to whom the effect of a judgment reaches first. In the scene where creditor B, holding a judgment against Group A, demands that member C of the group perform the same obligation, whether B and C fall under the influence of that earlier judgment depends on what range of persons that judgment targets.
The statutory text that answers this question identifies the persons who bear the effect of a final and conclusive judgment in Article 218 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act. That provision states: "A final and conclusive judgment is effective against the parties, successors after the close of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, successors after the pronouncement of the judgment), or persons who possess the subject matter of the claim for their benefit" (Civil Procedure Act, Article 218). Here, the parties are the persons named as the subject and the counterparty of the performance demanded in the lawsuit of that judgment; a successor is a person who received that status after the point of reference of the judgment; and a possessor of the subject matter is a person who holds the subject matter of the claim for the benefit of the judgment party.
The personal scope that this text composes constitutes the range of persons reached by the effect of the judgment, that is, the subjective scope. Not falling within this scope does not mean that one is immediately free of all influence; however, opening the gateway to this relief by applying the earlier judgment as it stands requires a separate ground. That ground is furnished where one has the proof required for enforcement on the basis of succession, or where one contests through an action for a grant. Because falling within the statutory personal scope and the requirements of that proof or defense are two distinct stages of determination, the former cannot be substituted for the latter.
The concern that an extended effect may bind a person who stood without any opportunity to defend is aimed at the loss that a person who never even heard of that judgment may be saddled with a predetermined obligation. Even so, one cannot bind all economically interested persons in the same range as the parties. Placing a person whose interests are merely entangled alongside the parties to the earlier judgment produces the result that the same burden falls on one who never had the chance to defend in that judgment. Rather than filling that gap, the author leaves open the path of contesting either by falling within the statutory scope to which the effect reaches or on some other ground.
In the synthetic scene, the judgment against Group A is one rendered with A as the party, and creditor B, holding that judgment, is demanding the same performance from member C. For this demand to be established solely on the effect of the earlier judgment, C must fall within the subjective scope of the judgment, and the materials for deciding whether that is so include the parties to the prior action, the point of reference, the succession materials, the writ of enforcement, and the relationship between the group and its members. If the relationship of group membership is confirmed as an independent individual right, it revises the conclusion that the group judgment binds as a matter of course. However, since no year, amount, or commencement date is fixed in this scene and there are no actual records of service or performance, whether enforcement against C is actually possible cannot be determined here.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Where one falls within the statutory personal scope reached by the effect of the judgment and has the proof required for enforcement on the basis of succession, or contests through an action for a grant, one may say that the entrance to this relief is open. By contrast, where there is only an economic connection and no statutory scope of effect or ground of succession so that the earlier judgment cannot be enforced against that person, one cannot assert that the effect of that judgment reaches that person.
1.2The Conditions That Block Relief
The preceding stage of analysis extended to the point that the facts stated in the reasons of another judgment are not automatically established as facts of common knowledge but may be evaluated as evidence. Leaving that conclusion as it is, the remaining question stands one step ahead of it. Only when the persons reached by the effect of the earlier judgment are determined does a demand founded on that judgment find its footing. Under what conditions is this demand not accepted?
The statutory text corresponding to this question is the Civil Procedure Act of the Republic of Korea. Article 218 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act describes the persons reached by the effect as follows: "(1) A final and conclusive judgment has effect upon the parties, successors after the close of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, successors after the pronouncement of the judgment), or persons who possess the subject matter of the claim for their benefit." This text enumerates and limits the subjects of the effect to the parties, successors, and possessors of the subject matter, and does not draw other persons into that range.
If the subjects indicated by this text are expressed in the same terms, the subjective scope, meaning the range of persons reached by the effect of the judgment, is determined. If one falls within that range, the earlier judgment may be used as a ground against that person; if one does not, the judgment has no preclusive effect against that person. Here, whether succession occurred and economic connection are two distinct stages of determination. The author took the view that where there is only an economic connection and no statutory scope of effect or ground of succession so that the earlier judgment cannot be enforced against that person, the gateway of relief is closed if any one of the statutory requirements is not met. Confirming the scope of effect and linking it to enforcement are not the same thing.
The counterargument that presses most strongly is aimed at the loss that arises when a person without an opportunity to defend is bound. That person may bear an obligation under another's judgment without ever having obtained a place to present his own arguments in the earlier lawsuit. Yet if a new trial is demanded at every succession, merely transferring a right opens a way to evade enforcement. The answer the author sets is not a choice between two losses but a limitation of scope. Just as no supplement drawing persons outside the statutory scope into it arises merely because the lack of an opportunity to defend is a concern, the separate requirement of succession does not disappear merely because the convenience of transferring a right is a concern.
In this scene the facts belonging to this question narrow to one. Creditor B, holding a judgment against Group A, demands that member C of the group perform the same obligation. For this demand to follow directly from the judgment against Group A, there must be a ground for C to fall within the subjective scope of that judgment. The record items the author fixes are the parties to the prior action, the point of reference, the succession materials, the writ of enforcement, and the relationship between the group and its members. However, whether C is a party, a successor, or a possessor of the subject matter cannot be confirmed from this scene alone. If the relationship of group membership is confirmed as an independent individual right, it revises the conclusion that the group judgment binds as a matter of course, but without that confirmation it remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Where one falls within the statutory personal scope to which the effect of a final and conclusive judgment reaches, or has the proof required for enforcement on the basis of succession, or contests through an action for a grant, the gateway to this relief may open. Conversely, where there is only an economic connection and no statutory scope of effect or ground of succession so that the earlier judgment cannot be enforced against that person, the gateway is closed if any one of the statutory requirements is not met. This determination cannot be extended to the statement that once the effect reaches one may immediately enforce, nor to the statement that if a certificate is lacking enforcement is forever blocked.
1.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Considering the so-called subjective scope, that is, the range of persons reached by the effect of the judgment, is a matter separate from whether one had an opportunity to defend. Creditor B is holding a judgment against Group A and demanding performance of the same obligation from member C of the group. What force the judgment between B and A has over the person C, and at what point lies the boundary that cannot be determined from the materials alone, is the present question.
The statutory text corresponding to this question narrows the persons reached by the effect of the judgment to three and states them. Article 218 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "A final and conclusive judgment has effect upon the parties, successors after the close of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, successors after the pronouncement of the judgment), or persons who possess the subject matter of the claim for their benefit." The subjects indicated by this text are the parties themselves, successors after a certain point in time, and persons who possess the subject matter for another's benefit. The criteria for the act and the conditions rest on that point in time and on the purpose of possession. Other issues lie outside the scope of commentary on this paragraph.
The path connecting this text with the conclusion of this section is clear. Since the persons reached by the effect are limited to the range set by law, whether one falls within that range and whether the materials showing that one falls within that range have been furnished must be asked separately. Thus, where the object or timing of the succession, or the identity with the party, is not confirmed, matters for which the adjudicative materials are not specified are left undetermined, distinguished from cases in which enforcement is impossible. The former is a state in which the materials are wanting; the latter is a state in which the legal gateway is blocked. Calling both by one name would push a person lacking materials out of the realm of rights at once.
The view that most strongly opposes this distinction is aimed at the point that an extended effect binds a person without an opportunity to defend. The person C did not stand in the oral argument between A and B, and the criticism is that if that judgment operates to C's disadvantage, C bears an obligation having lost the chance to speak. The moment the bound range is widened to economic relatedness, the structure becomes one in which anyone bears the outcome of another's lawsuit, and that harm falls more heavily than the earlier criticism. The deficit of the right of defense noted by the counterargument retains a path of relief, by leaving matters for which there are no materials undetermined.
The facts confirmed in this scene are only that there is a judgment between B and A and that B demands from C performance of the same obligation. There are no materials as to whether C is A's successor, whether succession occurred after the point of reference of that judgment, or whether identity with the party to the prior action is established. The relationship of group membership alone cannot specify that C falls among the successors or the possessors of the subject matter provided for in the above provision, and what the relationship between the group and its members is also remains open on this scene alone. Accordingly, the success or failure of the claim against C cannot be determined on this scene, and what is confirmed is limited to the standard for the scope of effect and the fact that its materials have not been specified.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. The range reached by the effect of the judgment is limited to the parties and the successors and possessors of the subject matter set by law, and matters for which the materials showing that one falls within that range are not specified remain undetermined, not declared to be without right. This section does not accept the conclusion of extending the earlier judgment to anyone on the basis of economic connection alone. At the same time, it does not mean that enforcement is accomplished as soon as the materials are gathered, nor that the obligation of C is confirmed in this scene.
1.4The Records Needed for Determination
Up to the preceding stage of analysis, the conclusion has been confirmed that the facts stated in the reasons of another judgment are not automatically established as facts of common knowledge but may be evaluated as evidence. The question now is, in the scene where creditor B, holding the judgment of Group A, in which B did not participate, demands performance of the same obligation from member C, what the ground is for dividing the range of persons to whom the effect of the judgment reaches first. Here, subjective scope means the range of persons reached by the effect of the judgment. Therefore, in whose name the lawsuit was conducted and to whom that person's status was transmitted become the starting point of the determination.
Article 218 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act enumerates the persons to whom the effect of a final and conclusive judgment reaches and provides: "(1) A final and conclusive judgment has effect upon the parties, successors after the close of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, successors after the pronouncement of the judgment), or persons who possess the subject matter of the claim for their benefit" (Civil Procedure Act, Article 218). This text limits the subjects reached by the effect to three: the parties, successors after the designated point in time, and persons who possess the subject matter of the claim for their benefit. Here, a successor means a person who legally inherited the status held by the party to the earlier judgment, and a possessor of the subject matter means a person who holds the subject matter of the claim determined in the judgment for that party's benefit. Paragraph (1) does not prescribe other scopes of effect or requirements for enforcement, and therefore other issues are not determined by the wording of this paragraph.
Connecting this text with the conclusion of the preceding section, the stage determination depends not on whose economic interests are entangled, but on what status was confirmed in the earlier judgment and to whom that status was transmitted by what records. At this point the author distinguishes the determination that divides the subjective scope of effect from the determination that proves the fact of falling within that range. The former is the question of fixing the statutory personal scope reached by the final and conclusive judgment; the latter is the question of showing in records the link that creditor B may apply for enforcement against a person within that range. In accordance with that distinction, the parties to the prior action, the point of reference, the succession materials, the writ of enforcement, and the relationship between the group and its members become the materials of determination. Records that are absent are not filled in by presumption, and that stage remains undetermined.
The strongest objection is aimed at the proposition that only by reading the effect of the judgment broadly can one avoid producing persons bound without an opportunity to defend. The concern is that if C, who did not stand in the oral argument of the earlier judgment, simply bears the disadvantages of that judgment, the institution of finality becomes a gateway that creates losses for persons without a right of defense. The author maintains the conclusion without erasing that loss and inconvenience, because all economically interested persons cannot be bound in the same range as the parties. If one tries to protect the right of defense through the bias of setting the subjective scope broadly, the result is that even persons not reached by the effect of the judgment are bound by the framework of the prior judgment, preventing a new determination. That is also why the provision narrows the scope to the parties, the designated successors, and the possessors of the subject matter.
In this scene, creditor B, holding a judgment against Group A, demands from member C performance of the same obligation; accordingly, the facts relevant to the stage determination are only that B obtained a final and conclusive judgment against Group A and that C stands in the relationship of a member of the group. Who the parties to the prior action were, when the point of reference of that judgment was, what succession materials exist for C, whom the writ of enforcement designates as the debtor, and in what terms the relationship between the group and its members is recorded are not fixed by the scene. Therefore, the conclusion that C falls within the range set in Article 218 (1) cannot be determined on this scene alone, and is decided only when the records are completed. If the relationship of group membership is confirmed as an independent individual right, the conclusion that the group judgment binds as a matter of course changes.
The conclusion this section permits is this: the materials necessary for determining the priority range of the effect of the judgment are limited to the parties to the prior action, the point of reference, the succession materials, the writ of enforcement, and the relationship between the group and its members, and the stage is decided on those records alone. If the fact of falling within the statutory personal scope and the link of succession are confirmed by those materials, the effect of the earlier judgment reaches that person; if the same materials are absent, no presumption is supplied and the matter is left undetermined. Undetermined does not mean that relief is impossible, nor does it mean that enforcement has actually taken place. The conclusions not permitted are that everyone is bound in the same range as the party to the prior judgment merely because economic interests are entangled, and, further, the determination that on the records of this scene alone a judgment ordering performance against C or the success of enforcement is already settled.
1.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
Therefore, the mere fact of not having participated in the lawsuit does not permit one to say that the effect of the judgment does not reach that person. The remaining question is where the boundary of the persons upon whom the effect reaches lies, and by what standard that boundary is set. This section addresses the relationship between a creditor holding a group judgment and the members of the group, but the determination begins from the text that fixes the personal scope of effect of a final and conclusive judgment.
Article 218(1) of the Civil Procedure Act confines the persons upon whom a final and conclusive judgment has effect to "the parties, successors after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, successors after the pronouncement of judgment), or persons who possess the object of the claim for them" (Civil Procedure Act, Article 218). This text enumerates three categories: first, the parties to the judgment; second, persons who succeeded to the rights and obligations after a prescribed point in time; and third, persons who possess the object of the claim for the successor. Here, for the successor, the point in time is fixed specifically, and the condition of being after the conclusion of oral argument is distinguished from the condition of being after the pronouncement of judgment in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument. The subjects fixed by the text are these three categories, and an interpretation placing persons standing in other relationships among them cannot be drawn directly from the text of this paragraph.
Applying this text to the foregoing question, the subjective scope—that is, the range of persons upon whom the effect of the judgment reaches—is confined to the subjects enumerated by law. This limitation connects with the conclusion of this section. Put differently, the point that the status of being a member cannot itself be regarded as falling within the parties or the successors, and the point that, where an independent individual right has been confirmed in favor of a member, the conclusion that the group judgment necessarily binds him cannot be maintained, must be distinguished from each other. The former is a textual limitation on the scope of effect; the latter is a change in the determination where the confirmed structure of rights has altered. If the two steps are mixed, a binding effect that cannot be drawn from the text fixing the scope will be produced.
There remains, then, the counterargument that extended effect can bind a person who had no opportunity to defend. If a person who could not participate in the lawsuit must bear the outcome of the prior judgment as it stands, a disadvantage arises without that person having been given an opportunity to defend, and what that disadvantage concretely amounts to in loss is at issue. This counterargument, however, cannot alter the text that fixes the scope. That answer does not erase the hardship identified by the counterargument. The circumstance that there was no opportunity to defend still remains, and the point is that, for that reason, the matter is settled in the direction of not applying the judgment to persons outside the scope fixed by the text, rather than broadening the scope of effect.
In this scene, Creditor B, holding a judgment against Group A, demands that Member C of the group perform the same obligation. What is confirmed in this scene is who the parties to the prior action were and what the relationship between the group and its members is, and the determination records specify the parties to the prior action, the reference date, the succession materials, the writ of execution, and the relationship between the group and its members. Comparing these facts with the text, the heart of the issue becomes whether C was a party to Group A or a successor after the prescribed point in time. The scene, however, does not settle whether C held an independent individual right, and neither the object and time of the actual succession nor the identity of the parties has been confirmed. Accordingly, on the present scene alone it cannot be settled that the group judgment necessarily has effect upon C, and the matter remains undetermined.
The conclusion permitted in this section is that the effect of the judgment reaches a person who falls within the range of subjects fixed by the text; the conclusion not permitted is to place a person in the same range as a party on the basis of the mere relationship of being a member of a group, or of economic connection alone. In the designated modification—that is, where the relationship of being a member is confirmed as an independent individual right—the existing determinations on blocking and effect are discarded, the determination is redone from that step onward, and matters not confirmed remain undetermined.
1.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
Before the question of whom a judgment primarily has effect upon, the scene presented is this: Creditor B holds a judgment against Group A while demanding that Member C of the group likewise perform the same obligation. The question here is how far the subjective scope of the judgment—that is, the range of persons upon whom the effect of the judgment reaches—should be drawn. In particular, if extended effect can bind even a person who had no opportunity to defend, by what standard is that limit set?
The persons upon whom the effect reaches are limited by the text. Article 218(1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "A final and conclusive judgment has effect upon the parties, successors after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, successors after the pronouncement of judgment), or persons who possess the object of the claim for them." Here, "the parties" denotes the persons directly adjudicated in the lawsuit of the prior judgment; "the successors" denotes persons who, taking as their dividing line the reference point before and after the judgment, succeeded to the rights and obligations; and "the possessor of the object" denotes a person holding the object of the claim for that party. These three are merely the defined range of personal connection with the prior judgment.
Accordingly, even if one accepts that extended effect can bind a person who had no opportunity to defend, this must be distinguished from the determination that binds such a person in the same range as a party. The former is an explanation that the effect of the prior judgment may reach beyond what the text prescribes; the latter is the question of determining which persons fall within that range. The conclusion of this section on that question is that not all economically related persons can be bound in the same range as a party. Having an economic interest does not bring one within the parties, successors, or possessors of the object prescribed by the text, so the scope of effect cannot be broadened by relatedness alone.
The counterargument that presses this distinction most forcefully targets the loss caused by evasion of execution upon succession. That is, if a new trial is demanded upon every succession, a mere transfer of rights suffices to evade execution. This counterargument points to the time and cost the creditor must incur in re-litigating a judgment already final and conclusive, and the convenience of shedding the obligation by transferring the right. The answer of this section, however, remains exactly as stated: not all economically related persons can be bound in the same range as a party. This does not mean that a way of alleviating the inconvenience the counterargument describes dissolves the requirements for successors fixed by the text, nor does it deny the loss itself identified by the counterargument.
Taking only the facts fixed in the synthetic scene and examining this question, the heart of the matter is whether the demand of Creditor B can fall within the scope of effect of the judgment against Group A. Article 218(1) of the Civil Procedure Act lists the parties, successors, and possessors of the object, but which of these capacities Member C corresponds to cannot be confirmed from this scene alone. At the step of personal connection between the effect of the judgment and execution by a successor, to enforce the prior judgment against C it must be presupposed that C falls within the statutory personal scope of persons upon whom the effect reaches and possesses the proof required for execution by a successor, or that the matter is contested by an action for a grant of execution. Among the parties to the prior action, the reference date, the succession materials, the writ of execution, and the relationship between the group and its members, what is presently confirmed is only the direction of the relationship; the rest remains undetermined.
Accordingly, the conclusion permitted by this section is that the effect of the prior judgment reaches within the personal scope fixed by the text; the conclusion not permitted is that one is bound in the same way as a party on the basis of the mere economic connection of being a member of a group. To the extent that neither the object and time of the succession nor the identity of the parties has been confirmed, no settled determination is made, and where an independent individual right is confirmed in the relationship of being a member of a group, the conclusion of the group judgment's necessary binding effect is corrected.
1.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
Some persons had the opportunity to defend themselves in the course of trial; others are placed in a position where another person's judgment reaches into their own lives. The preceding section reached the conclusion that not all economically related persons can be bound in the same range as a party, but that conclusion alone does not yet determine which persons come within that range and which do not. Creditor B, holding a judgment against Group A in hand, demands that Member C of the group perform the same obligation. In this scene the question is clear. Upon whom does the judgment primarily have effect?
As the text answering this question, Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act provides as follows: "(1) A final and conclusive judgment has effect upon the parties, successors after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, successors after the pronouncement of judgment), or persons who possess the object of the claim for them." This text sets out the persons upon whom the effect reaches in three categories. First, the parties; second, successors after a certain point in time. Third, persons who hold the thing that is the object of the claim for that successor. That the text places the qualifier "for them" upon the third category shows that it does not mean a mere possessor standing in no relationship whatsoever.
The conclusion distinguishing this text from the scope of the effect of the judgment connects as follows. If the range of persons upon whom the effect of the judgment reaches is called the subjective scope, that range is limited to the persons written in the above text and is not something a court may arbitrarily broaden. The reason the two steps must be seen separately here is that the fact of having participated in the lawsuit and the determination that the outcome of the lawsuit binds that person are different questions. The former is one's status in the procedure; the latter is a question of the attribution of effect. That the text states the point in time expressly shows that the reason successors fall within the scope of effect lies not in the transfer of the right itself but in the ground set by law, namely succession after a particular point in time connected with the progress of the lawsuit.
The counterargument raised most strongly against this distinction is the concern that extended effect can bind a person who had no opportunity to defend. If a person who could not even unfold his own story in court is disadvantaged by another's judgment, this, it is said, is incompatible with the fairness of procedure. The loss and inconvenience this counterargument targets are real. Whether the person who must accept the outcome of the trial had an opportunity to defend is a matter that supports the legitimacy of that determination. The mere fact of being related to that person cannot be said to bring one within the statutory range required by the above text, and the way to dispel the concern about binding without an opportunity to defend that the counterargument identifies lies not in arbitrarily broadening the range but in strictly observing the range set by law.
What can be confirmed in the synthetic scene is sparse. That Creditor B holds a judgment against Group A and, extending the effect of that judgment to Member C, demands performance of the same obligation—this much is the given fact. On this fact alone, which category of the above text the relationship between Group A and Member C falls under cannot be settled. It has not been confirmed whether Group A is a successor, or whether C possesses the object of the claim for Group A, or whether there is merely an economic connection. Even if the relationship of being a member of a group were confirmed as an independent individual right, the conclusion of the group judgment's necessary binding effect would have to be corrected. As yet, the relationship between the group and its members has not itself been confirmed by the records, so whether C falls within the scope of effect of the above text remains undetermined in this scene.
What can be confirmed in this section is that, in fixing the subjective scope of persons upon whom the effect of the judgment reaches, the parties, successors after a certain point in time, and persons who possess the object of the claim for that person, as written in the text, must be distinguished from one another and judged separately. By this determination alone, neither who is the actual successor nor which thing is the object of the claim is newly determined. Nor does it mean that the prior judgment can be applied as it stands to other economically related persons. Just as the fact of not having participated in another's lawsuit is not the same as saying that one receives no effect at all, the circumstance of non-participation and the determination of being outside the scope of effect must also be examined separately.
1.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
At the preceding step, only the point that the facts stated in the reasons of another judgment are not automatically established as notorious facts but may be evaluated as evidence is taken up, and the range of persons to whom the prior judgment itself has effect is left as a separate question. In the scene where Creditor B, holding a judgment against Group A, demands that Member C of the group perform the same obligation, C did not directly participate in the prior lawsuit. Whether the effect of the prior judgment reaches C, then, is not concluded by the fact of participation in the lawsuit alone.
The text answering this question is found in Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act. The text of the Article provides that a final and conclusive judgment "has effect upon the parties, successors after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, successors after the pronouncement of judgment), or persons who possess the object of the claim for them" (Civil Procedure Act, Article 218). The subjects indicated by this text are three. First, the parties who participated in the lawsuit; second, persons who succeeded to that status after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, after the pronouncement of judgment); and third, persons who possess the object of the claim for the party. That the time of succession is limited to after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, after the pronouncement of judgment) is a condition stated expressly in the text. Without addressing the other issues of the Article, only the personal scope fixed by this text is confirmed.
The range fixed by this Article is called the 'subjective scope,' that is, the range of persons upon whom the effect of the judgment reaches. The question of whom a final and conclusive judgment primarily has effect upon is ultimately a matter of this subjective scope, and is treated at a step separate from the factual determination of whether one participated in the lawsuit. The reason the parties must be distinguished here from the successors and possessors of the object prescribed by law is that the former denotes the status of a party to the lawsuit as recorded in the judgment, while the latter denotes a relationship in which the status of that party has been transferred, or in which the object is held for that party. Though the grounds of these two differ, in that the Article binds them together in one line as the subjects of effect, the mere circumstance of having an economic interest does not create a qualification to be newly placed within the range.
Nevertheless, the criticism that extended effect can bind a person who had no opportunity to defend is not to be taken lightly. C had no opportunity to unfold his own defense in the prior lawsuit; if he must bear the disadvantageous content of another's judgment as it stands, the value of fairness in procedure is impaired. Yet even if one accepts the loss this criticism targets, not all economically related persons can be bound in the same range as a party. If everyone whose asset value changes, or who has an indirect interest in the payment of the price, were bound by the prior judgment, the range of that judgment could not be fixed and, on the contrary, persons without an opportunity to defend would be bound more widely. The personal scope set by law is the foregoing answer to this criticism.
Returning to the synthetic scene and comparing only the facts relevant to this question, what has been settled is merely that the party to the prior judgment advanced by Creditor B is Group A, and that C is only its member. The possessor denotes the condition of a person holding the object of the claim for Group A, a party to the prior lawsuit; there are no materials concerning C. As there is neither material to acknowledge the relationship of successor nor confirmation of the fact of possessing the object of the claim, this falls under the case where neither the object and time of the succession nor the identity of the parties has been confirmed.
Accordingly, the conclusion permitted by this section is that the effect of the final and conclusive judgment reaches the parties and the successors, possessors of the object, and others prescribed by law—that is, the personal scope enumerated by the text—and that a person who has only an economic connection and no ground to fall within that statutory range is not placed under the necessary binding effect of the prior judgment. The submission of evidence by reason of the content of the prior judgment is a separate matter, and the conclusion that the effect of the prior judgment itself reaches as it stands a person who did not participate in the prior lawsuit is not permitted. The Next question is the matter of personal connection within the settled range.
1.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
As confirmed earlier, facts stated in the reasons of another judgment are not automatically established as facts of common knowledge but may be evaluated as evidence. On this premise, the question is opened upon the recognition that the scope of effect of the earlier judgment and the proof in the later judgment are separate stages. Only the text of the relevant source provision is used as the ground for adjudicating the personal connection between the effect of the judgment and execution by a successor. Under this adjudication standard, upon whom does the judgment have effect in the first instance? This definition does not reset the starting point of the preceding section; it delimits the scope of adjudication for the present question.
The relevant source passage is Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act. Article 218 (1) provides that "A final and conclusive judgment has effect upon the parties, a successor after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, a successor after the pronouncement of judgment), or a person in possession of the subject matter of the claim on behalf of such person" (Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act). This text divides the persons upon whom the effect of a judgment extends into three classes. The first is the parties to the judgment; the second is a person who succeeded to that position after the conclusion of oral argument or, in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, after the pronouncement of judgment; and the third is a person in possession of the subject matter of the claim on behalf of the party. Here, a successor denotes a person who, after the reference time of the judgment, took over the position of a party or a right bound up with the subject matter of suit. A possessor of the subject matter means a person who has that subject matter in his possession but does so in place of the party.
The reason the three classes prescribed by this text must be distinguished is that the personal scope to which effect extends and the stage of execution are different questions. Falling within the subjective scope means that the effect of the earlier judgment extends to that person; it is not the same as meaning that that person bears the same obligation. The above text marks the boundaries among the parties, the successors prescribed by law, and the possessors of the subject matter; it does not draw any other person into the scope of effect. Accordingly, to whom a judgment rendered in a lawsuit brought for another person redounds requires a separate determination, and even then this text serves as the starting line of the personal connection.
The concern that an extended effect may bind a person who has had no opportunity to defend is a valid source of unease. If that person had no actual opportunity to speak in the earlier lawsuit yet bears the adverse content of the earlier judgment as it stands, he bears a disadvantage for a defense he was unable to raise. The mere fact of an economic interest cannot bring him within the parties, successors, or possessors of the subject matter, and the text takes only that limited personal scope as the object of effect. The problem of disadvantage is addressed not by widening the text of this scope, but by placing outside that scope the persons who do not fall within the range to which effect extends.
In the synthetic scene, creditor B holds a judgment against organization A and demands that C, a member of the organization, perform the same obligation. What can be confirmed in this scene is only the fact that a judgment exists between B and A, and that C stands in the relation of not being a party to that judgment but a member. Whether C falls among the parties, successors, and possessors of the subject matter prescribed by the text is a matter to be confirmed on the record — the parties to the prior action, the reference time, the materials of succession, the writ of execution, and the relationship between the organization and its members — and that record has not been given in this scene. In that case, the statutory personal scope to which effect extends and the connection of the writ of execution must each be examined anew.
The conclusion permitted in this section is that, in adjudicating the personal connection between the effect of a judgment and execution by a successor, only the text of the relevant source provision is taken as the standard, and the determination is confined to the subjects within the range prescribed by that text. What is not permitted is a conclusion that makes the effect of the earlier judgment extend to that person on the basis of economic relevance alone, or that places a subject outside the range prescribed by the text in the same position as a party. This question is closed without taking away the concern that an extended effect may bind a person who has had no opportunity to defend, and in a manner that does not widen the text of the personal scope.
1.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
In this scene, the starting point of the inquiry is the question of the persons upon whom B's demand operates. The provision corresponding to this question is Article 218 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act. That paragraph provides: "① A final and conclusive judgment has effect upon the parties, a successor after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, a successor after the pronouncement of judgment), or a person in possession of the subject matter of the claim on behalf of such person." This text defines and divides the persons upon whom effect extends into the parties, a successor after the conclusion of oral argument or, in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, a successor after the pronouncement of judgment, and a person in possession of the subject matter of the claim on behalf of such person.
The range designated by that text and the conclusion of this section meet. The detailed distinctions are confined to the stated conditions. This distinction is necessary so that the boundary is not collapsed. Falling within the statutory personal scope to which effect extends and possessing the proof required for execution by a successor, or contesting it in an action for grant, is a permitted route. By contrast, where there is only an economic connection and no statutory scope of effect or ground of succession, so that the earlier judgment cannot be executed against that person, that route is closed. Where the object or time of succession, or the identity of the party, has not been confirmed, it remains undetermined.
The strongest counterargument aims at the point that an extended effect may bind a person who has had no opportunity to defend. If a person who could not participate in the lawsuit must be affected by the earlier judgment, that person loses the opportunity to present his own arguments. Such loss and inconvenience cannot be treated lightly. This answer does not erase the adverse aspect of the counterargument. It leaves in place the risk that a person without an opportunity to defend may be bound, while limiting that risk to the effect that it does not serve as a ground for placing everyone within the scope of parties on the basis of economic relevance alone.
The facts meeting this scene are only B's demand and C's position. When these records are assembled, they can be compared against the conditions. The object or time of succession, or the identity of the party, which cannot be determined from the scene, remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. The route opens only where one falls within the statutory personal scope to which the effect of the judgment extends, possesses the proof required for execution by a successor, or contests it in an action for grant. Beyond that range, the earlier judgment cannot be tied to a person on the basis of economic relevance alone. Where the materials are insufficient, the matter is undetermined and is not immediately irremediable.
1.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
The personal connection between the effect of a judgment and execution by a successor is classified as branching into three courses. The case in which the route opens is where one falls within the statutory personal scope to which effect extends and possesses the proof required for execution by a successor, or contests it in an action for grant. The case in which it is closed is where there is only an economic connection and one fails to fall within the statutory scope of effect, or where there is no ground of succession so that the earlier judgment cannot be executed against that person. The undetermined case corresponds to where the object or time of succession, or the identity of the party, has not been confirmed. To answer this question, the text of the subjective scope is first examined.
The persons upon whom the effect of a final and conclusive judgment extends are enumerated in the text. The subjects designated by this text are the parties, a successor after the conclusion of oral argument, and a person in possession of the subject matter of the claim on behalf of such person. As regards the time for a successor, the principle is that it is after the conclusion of oral argument, and in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, it is set after the pronouncement of judgment. On whose behalf the subject matter of the claim is possessed also constitutes a requirement.
If this text and the conclusion of this section are joined, the range to which effect extends is adjudicated by whether one falls within the personal scope prescribed by law. If the subjective scope means the range of persons upon whom the effect of the judgment extends, the fact of falling within that range and the fact that there exists an economic stakeholder outside that range belong to different stages of determination. Whether the earlier judgment can be executed against that person passes through a separate stage of proof. Even though the case of possessing the proof required for execution by a successor and the case of contesting it in an action for grant are combined as opening conditions, the reason the determination of the statutory range and the determination of proof are kept apart lies here. Rather than repeating the same conclusion in every paragraph, the conditions of each stage are compared separately.
The strongest counterargument is directed at the loss that an extended effect may bind a person who has had no opportunity to defend. In a scene where creditor B, holding a judgment against organization A, demands that C, a member of the organization, perform the same obligation, if C did not participate in the lawsuit against organization A, the criticism holds that he is affected without any opportunity to defend. Without erasing the disadvantage of the lack of an opportunity to defend pointed out by the counterargument, placing that person side by side with the parties on the basis of economic relevance alone remains a closing condition because he does not fall among the subjects prescribed by the text. The inconvenience that, if a new trial were required for each succession, execution could be evaded by a mere transfer of rights, remains a cost so long as not all economic stakeholders are bound into the scope of the parties.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are that creditor B holds a judgment against organization A and demands that C, a member of organization A, perform the same obligation. On these facts alone, the object and time of succession have not been confirmed, and no records concerning the parties to the prior action, the reference time, the materials of succession, the writ of execution, and the relationship between the organization and its members have been specified. Accordingly, it cannot be established that the earlier judgment naturally extends to C merely by reason of the relation of being a member of the organization, and this falls under a ground of undetermined status.
What this section permits is to take as the conditions of effect the fact of falling within the subjective scope and the case of possessing the proof for execution by a successor or contesting it in an action for grant. What it does not permit is to treat the earlier judgment as executable against that person on the basis of economic relevance alone; the statutory scope of effect and the ground of succession are required together. It does not convert at once the state of undetermined status arising from insufficient materials into a state of no remedy. The premise that facts stated in the reasons of another judgment are not automatically established as facts of common knowledge but may be evaluated as evidence blocks the path of fixing the personal scope on the basis of those facts in the reasons alone.
1.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
In that regard, the subjective scope treated by this section, that is, the range of persons upon whom the effect of the judgment extends, is entangled with but not identical to the question of whether one participated in the lawsuit. To ask whether that demand takes effect, one must first settle upon whom the judgment has effect in the first instance. The question now opened is not the result of another's lawsuit, but upon whom that result operates.
The source provision corresponding to this question is Article 218 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act. Its text provides: "① A final and conclusive judgment has effect upon the parties, a successor after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, a successor after the pronouncement of judgment), or a person in possession of the subject matter of the claim on behalf of such person." The subjects set up by this sentence are the parties named in the judgment, a successor at the time prescribed by law, and a person in possession of the subject matter of the claim on behalf of such person. The acts and conditions to which effect extends are placed under the premise of a final and conclusive judgment. The other contents of this paragraph are not read further at this point.
To join that text and the conclusion of this section, the two ranges must be seen separately. One is the personal scope prescribed by law to which effect extends, such as the parties, successors, and possessors of the subject matter enumerated by the text; the other is the economic stakeholders who are merely entangled by circumstances outside it. For those falling within the former range, it remains to be examined in the Next section whether the same effect extends regardless of the time of succession; the latter range is the place that raises the question of the qualification for effect to extend in the first place. If this distinction is ignored, the stage asking the time of succession and the stage asking the persons upon whom effect extends are mixed together at once. Without adding any new requirement or exception, the range is already fixed by the mere fact that the text specifies the three subjects.
Imposing the disadvantages of that judgment upon a person without drawing him into the lawsuit is a loss that procedural fairness can hardly allow. Notwithstanding such inconvenience, this section answers that not all economic stakeholders can be bound into the same range as the parties. The contrary disadvantage — that execution must not be evaded by a transfer of rights — remains as it is. It means only that the manner of resolving that disadvantage should not be the infinite widening of the scope of effect. The problem of the lack of an opportunity to defend is acknowledged, but the answer is not to make everyone a party.
Taking only the passage of the synthetic scene in which creditor B, holding a judgment against organization A, demands that C, a member of the organization, perform the same obligation, it is not confirmed that any direct trial has been held between B and C. However, for B's demand to be established, C must fall within one of the three subjects of the text. Whether C is a successor, whether he possesses the subject matter of the claim on behalf of such person, or whether the relation is only that of a member of the organization, the scene does not determine. In this position, remaining undetermined, what this section permits is only the distinction of the personal scope prescribed by the text, and it does not permit a conclusion that elevates an economic connection outside that scope to party status. Passing over without confirmation of the object or time of succession or the identity of the party is undetermined, nor is a shortage of materials read immediately as no remedy.
Accordingly, what this section hands over is the starting point that confines the personal scope to which effect extends to statutory subjects. A person standing outside the categories of parties, successors, and possessors of the subject matter written in the text does not, by that fact alone, escape the effect of the judgment; it means that a separate ground is required in order to derive that effect from this judgment. Conversely, the fact of falling within the categories of the text satisfies the condition that effect may extend, but it does not also resolve the questions of the time of succession or proof. The remaining question opens not outside the range but inside it: if there has been succession, does the same effect extend regardless of the time?