Summary
The relevant precedent distinguishes an unincorporated association from its individual members and holds that the res judicata of a judgment against the organization does not automatically extend to the individuals.
4.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
A trial held in the name of a group must not erase an individual's separate rights as well. Where a person became plaintiff or defendant for the sake of another, the final and conclusive judgment has effect on that other person as well. Yet creditor B, holding a judgment against Association A, demands that member C of the association perform the same obligation. Faced with this demand, one asks where the threshold at the entrance to the stage is placed.
The relevant basis is the text concerning the distinction of parties in group litigation. Under Article 52 of the Civil Procedure Act, even where an unincorporated association with a representative becomes a party to a lawsuit, since that unincorporated association is a subject separate from its representative or members, it is natural that the res judicata of a judgment in which the representative or members were parties does not extend to the unincorporated association, and that likewise the res judicata of a judgment in which the unincorporated association was a party does not extend to the representative or members (Supreme Court Decision 2010Da58889 decided December 23, 2010).
If this text is joined to the settled conclusion, the separation of the group and its members is none other than the distinction between the subject of the lawsuit and the subject of individual rights. As confirmed earlier, the effect of a judgment rendered for another person extends within the range of persons fixed by law, but the fact of falling within that range and the proof enabling actual enforcement to be attached stand at separate stages. Accordingly, the entrance to this remedy opens only where one falls within the statutory range of persons to whom effect extends and has obtained the proof required for successor enforcement, or contests the matter in an action for the grant of an execution clause.
The counterargument that, if members litigate again, the group dispute may not come to an end, points to a real inconvenience. The observation that requiring a new trial with every transfer would allow execution to be avoided merely by transferring the right also carries the concern of those who desire a watertight result. Even so, the answer the author offers is clear. Membership in a group alone cannot convert an individual into a successor after the close of oral argument. Where there is merely an economic connection and no basis in the statutory range of effect or grounds of succession, so that the earlier judgment cannot be enforced against that person, the channel of this remedy is closed.
What is confirmed in this scene is only the situation in which creditor B, on the basis of a judgment obtained against Association A, demands the same performance of member C. The parties to the prior action, the reference date, the succession documents, the execution clause, and the relationship between the group and its member serve as materials for decision, while the scene fixes no year, amount, period, or commencement date. Matters that remain unconfirmed as to the object or timing of succession, or the identity of parties, are left undetermined. If the relationship of being a member of the group is confirmed as an independent individual right, the conclusion of the group judgment's natural binding effect changes.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. It confirms that the res judicata of a group judgment does not naturally extend to an individual member, and that to make that individual the object of the earlier judgment, separate confirmation of the statutory range of persons and of grounds of succession is required. Conversely, it is not permitted to recognize a person as a successor to a lawsuit already concluded on the sole basis of group membership, or to say that as a result the fruits of enforcement have at once been secured.
4.2The Conditions That Block Relief
Building on this conclusion, the question is whether a trial held in the name of a group must not erase an individual's separate rights. Yet whether such a demand is possible on the basis of the single relationship of membership in a group, or whether, in addition, there must separately be a basis in the statutory range of effect or proof that the effect of the judgment has been succeeded to a particular person, has not yet been settled. What this section asks is what conditions close off the channel of remedy.
The relevant basis for this question is that "on the one hand, under Article 52 of the Civil Procedure Act, even where an unincorporated association with a representative becomes a party to a lawsuit, since that unincorporated association is a subject separate from its representative or members, it is natural that the res judicata of a judgment in which the representative or members were parties does not extend to the unincorporated association, and that likewise the res judicata of a judgment in which the unincorporated association was a party does not extend to the representative or members" (Supreme Court Decision 2010Da58889 decided December 23, 2010). The subjects this text identifies are the unincorporated association, its representative, and its members; the acts are becoming a party to a lawsuit and the attribution of res judicata to a judgment. The condition is limited to the case where an unincorporated association with a representative becomes a party to a lawsuit under Article 52 of the Civil Procedure Act. The text deals only with the non-transmission of res judicata among these three subjects, and does not deal with the detailed facts of the case or other issues.
The above text proceeds on the premise that an unincorporated association is a subject separate from its representative or members, and from that premise derives the non-transmission of res judicata in both directions. The conclusion this section has fixed is that, where there is merely an economic connection and no basis in the statutory range of effect or grounds of succession so that the earlier judgment cannot be enforced against that person, the channel of remedy at this stage is closed if even one of the statutory requirements is not satisfied. Here, the separation of the group and its members means the distinction between the subject of the lawsuit and the subject of individual rights. The reason these two concepts must be held apart is that the procedural question of who possessed the status of party to the lawsuit and the question of personal effect of whether the effect of that judgment extends even to an individual's separate rights lie at different stages. If one is reduced directly to the other, the provisions on the effect of representative litigation set out earlier and the distinction of subjects of unincorporated associations fall out of alignment with one another.
The greatest loss that arises when this distinction is firmly maintained is that, if members litigate again, the group dispute may not come to an end. Where a lawsuit against a group and a lawsuit against an individual, each concerning the same obligation, proceed separately, a dispute the group believed had already been resolved by judgment reopens before an individual member, and the creditor must bear the inconvenience that the judgment already obtained alone does not reach recovery. Yet even if this disadvantage appears large, membership in a group alone cannot convert an individual into a successor after the close of oral argument. If the scope of the judgment's effect is expanded without statutory requirements, the single fact of belonging to a group becomes grounds for stripping an individual of the right to defend. Here lies the reason this conclusion can be maintained without removing the weight of the counterargument.
The facts ascertainable in the synthetic scene are as follows. What is fixed in this scene is that the party to the prior action was Association A, that the target of the demand is member C, and that the obligation contested is the same obligation as was the object of the earlier judgment. On the other hand, what succession C received from Association A after the close of oral argument in the earlier judgment, and the object and timing of that succession, are not in the scene. One must examine the records—parties to the prior action, reference date, succession documents, execution clause, and the relationship between the group and its member—but this scene alone cannot settle the matter. Accordingly, with this scene, in which the object or timing of succession and the identity of parties remain unconfirmed, whether this stage is constituted cannot be determined and remains undetermined. If the relationship of group membership is confirmed as an independent individual right, the conclusion of the group judgment's natural binding effect is revised.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Under the premise that an unincorporated association and its representative and members are separate subjects, it is the distinction between the fact that the res judicata of a group judgment does not naturally extend to an individual member, and the fact that this does not immediately mean that enforcement against the individual is possible merely by reason of economic connection. Conclusions not permitted are treating C as the successor of Association A after the close of oral argument on the basis of group membership alone, or declaring the channel of remedy at this stage open without confirmation of statutory requirements. Turning a state of insufficient materials into a reading of impossibility of remedy also exceeds the scope of this section. However, the separate route—where one falls within the scope of the earlier judgment's effect and has obtained the proof required for successor enforcement, or contests the matter in an action for the grant of an execution clause—is left as a matter for determination outside this section.
4.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Does a group's judgment bind all individual members? Even starting from the point that the preceding stages dealt with the scope of effect of a group judgment, this stage asks by what materials for decision to distinguish those who do not fall within that scope. In the synthetic scene, creditor B, holding a judgment against Association A, demands performance of the same obligation of member C, and the limit to which that demand reaches the individual's separate rights is the present issue.
The original text corresponding to this section writes the distinction of subjects between group and individual thus: "the res judicata of a judgment in which that unincorporated association was a party likewise does not extend to its representative or members" (Supreme Court Decision 2010Da58889 decided December 23, 2010). The subjects indicated by this text are the unincorporated association with a representative under Article 52 of the Civil Procedure Act and its representative and members; since the act is a judgment in which that association was a party, the condition that res judicata does not extend to the individual member is declared.
The connection between this text and the preceding sentence is that the separation of the group and its members is none other than the distinction between the subject of the lawsuit and the subject of individual rights. The subject of the lawsuit is the group that becomes the party to the judgment, and the subject of individual rights is the member who holds separate rights; therefore the scope of res judicata confirmed in the preceding stage and the succession connection handled at this stage must be judged separately. An individual does not become a successor after the close of oral argument in the prior action merely by membership in a group, and matters unconfirmed as to the object or timing of succession or the identity of parties remain as those for which the materials for decision are not specified.
The strongest counterargument points to the loss that, if members litigate again, the group dispute may not come to an end. There is a value there in preserving the meaning of a single judgment despite the inconvenience of multiple parties intervening in one dispute, and there also arises the concern that requiring a new trial with every transfer would allow execution to be avoided merely by transferring the right. Even against that counterargument, membership in a group alone cannot convert an individual into a successor after the close of oral argument; accordingly, the conclusion that the res judicata of a group judgment does not naturally extend to the individual is maintained. What the counterargument identified—the possibility of repetition of disputes—is not, however, eliminated.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene extend only to the point that creditor B holds a judgment against Association A, and that B demands performance of the same obligation of member C of that group. As the scene is silent on the contents of the records—parties to the prior action, reference date, succession documents, execution clause, and the relationship between the group and its member—whether C falls among the successors after the close of oral argument in the prior action, and the object, timing, and identity of parties of the succession, are not confirmed. One can only examine the conditions that would revise the conclusion of the group judgment's natural binding effect if the relationship of group membership were confirmed as an independent individual right.
The conclusion this section permits extends to the distinction that the res judicata of a group judgment does not naturally extend to an individual member, and to the judgment of leaving unconfirmed succession matters undetermined as distinct from impossibility. Rather than settling that there are no grounds of succession, one leaves the limitation of absent materials; conversely, it is not permitted to regard the effect of the group judgment as naturally passing to the individual on the sole ground that materials are absent.
4.4The Records Needed for Determination
Taking up the point that a trial held in the name of a group must not erase an individual's separate rights, this time it asks what records must be assembled in order to judge whether a group's judgment binds all individual members. The conclusion from the preceding analytical stages is inherited in the single sentence that where a person became plaintiff or defendant for the sake of another, the final and conclusive judgment has effect on that other person as well. Within that frame, the kinds of materials that divide creditor B's demand stage by stage are determined.
The passage read this time states: "on the one hand, under Article 52 of the Civil Procedure Act, even where an unincorporated association with a representative becomes a party to a lawsuit, since that unincorporated association is a subject separate from its representative or members, it is natural that the res judicata of a judgment in which the representative or members were parties does not extend to the unincorporated association, and that likewise the res judicata of a judgment in which the unincorporated association was a party does not extend to the representative or members" (Supreme Court Decision 2010Da58889 decided December 23, 2010). This text separates into distinct elements—three subjects and one object, namely, an unincorporated association with a representative, its representative or members, and a judgment in which that association was a party—treating them as different from one another.
This distinction is joined to the settled conclusion. Here the separation of group and members means the distinction between the subject of the lawsuit and the subject of individual rights, and it does not alter the scope of effect of a judgment in a lawsuit conducted for another as fixed by the preceding section. Once that distinction stands, Association A's judgment does not immediately become a judgment concerning member C's individual rights; therefore, the stage-by-stage determination of which judgment reaches whom is made only upon materials recorded in the parties to the prior action, the reference date, the succession documents, the execution clause, and the relationship between the group and its member. Not filling absent records with presumptions is a condition of this judgment.
The strongest counterargument points to the facts that, if members litigate again, the group dispute may not come to an end, and that requiring a new trial with every transfer would allow execution to be avoided merely by transferring the right. This loss is indeed burdensome. Even so, membership in a group alone cannot convert an individual into a successor after the close of oral argument, and the risks of repetition and avoidance identified by the counterargument are not erased by this conclusion.
In this scene creditor B holds a judgment against Association A and demands that member C of the group perform the same obligation. However, the scene does not determine whether the party to the prior action was Association A, what status C held before and after that lawsuit, or in what documents the relationship between the group and its member is recorded. While these materials remain unconfirmed, the object or timing of the succession and the identity of parties have not been settled, and that portion remains undetermined.
What this section permits is the work of determining, upon the records that are fixed, over what range of subjects the group judgment has effect; it does not permit converting an individual into a successor on the basis of the single fact of group membership, nor erasing that individual's rights as well. Items that do not reach the fixed records are left blank; the empty place is neither filled with an unfounded settlement nor read at once as impossibility of remedy. The next proceeds to whether enforcement is possible immediately once the judgment's effect extends.
4.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
A final and conclusive judgment rendered for or against a person who became plaintiff or defendant on behalf of another extends its effect to that other person as well; on that premise, B, as creditor, holds a judgment against the unincorporated association A. B now demands that C, a member of the unincorporated association A, perform the same obligation. Two points must be asked before this demand: whether a judgment against the association binds all of its individual members, and what change overturns the existing stage determination.
The relevant text corresponding to this question separates the association from the individual. The precedent states: "Even where, under Article 52 of the Civil Procedure Act, an unincorporated association having a representative becomes a party to a lawsuit, that unincorporated association is a subject distinct from its representative or members." Here, the unincorporated association is an organization that appoints a representative and becomes a party to a lawsuit, while the member is an individual belonging to that organization. The precedent then holds that "it goes without saying that the res judicata of a judgment rendered with that representative or those members as parties does not extend to the unincorporated association, and likewise that the res judicata of a judgment rendered with the unincorporated association as a party does not extend to its representative or members" (Supreme Court Decision 2010Da58889 decided December 23, 2010).
The ground linking this text to the settled conclusion is the distinction of subjects. The mere fact that the association was a party to the judgment cannot be taken to bind C, the individual member, to that judgment, and the premise of effect extension carried over from above rests on the statutory scope of persons to whom the effect extends where a lawsuit was conducted on behalf of another. The reason for preserving this distinction is that a determination against the association and a determination on the individual's separate rights address different objects.
The strongest counterargument targets the point that the dispute never ends. If members may each contest the matter again, then even with a judgment already finalized against the association, creditor B's demand for performance of the obligation may continue to be blocked. Moreover, if a new trial is required at every succession, the loss arises that a mere transfer of the right suffices to evade execution. This answer does not remove the inconvenience flagged by the counterargument. Still, the status of successor after the close of oral argument is not conferred by the mere relation of membership in the association, and if the specified change is confirmed, the existing blocking and the determination of effectiveness change accordingly.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only that creditor B holds a judgment against the unincorporated association A and demands that C, a member of the unincorporated association A, perform the same obligation. Placing this demand at the stage of the personal connection between the effect of the judgment and execution against a successor, that stage opens where one falls within the statutory scope of persons to whom the effect extends and possesses the proof required for execution against a successor, or contests the matter by an action for a grant of an execution clause. If, in accordance with the text above, the res judicata of the association's judgment does not naturally extend to the members, then C does not simply fall within that scope. Whether C separately holds the status of successor after the close of oral argument can be determined only on the basis of records such as succession materials or the execution clause, and cannot be settled from the scene alone.
What this section permits is the determination that the res judicata of the association's judgment does not naturally extend to individual members, together with the qualification that the mere relation of belonging to the association cannot convert a person into a successor after the close of oral argument. What this section does not permit is the conclusion that the separate rights of the individual C have been erased by the association's judgment, or, conversely, the conclusion that execution against C has been blocked forever. Where the object or timing of the succession, or the identity of the parties, remains unconfirmed, the matter remains undetermined. What the next stage asks is whether execution can proceed immediately once the effect of the judgment extends.
4.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
If the association and its members are bundled into one, the rights held separately by individual members are effectively erased in adjudication. Against this backdrop, creditor B, holding a judgment against the unincorporated association A, demands that C, a member of the association, perform the same obligation. The question is under what conditions this demand is established. Whether room must be left for member C to contest the matter in an individual capacity is the question at hand.
To answer this question, the relevant original text is set out first. The precedent in question makes the distinction of subjects clear with the wording: "Even where, under Article 52 of the Civil Procedure Act, an unincorporated association having a representative becomes a party to a lawsuit, that unincorporated association is a subject distinct from its representative or members, and therefore." The object spoken of here is an unincorporated association having a representative, and the side compared with that object is its representative or members. The act addressed by this wording is becoming a party to a lawsuit, and what is discussed as its result is the scope to which the res judicata of the judgment extends. (Supreme Court Decision 2010Da58889 decided December 23, 2010).
This text is joined to the preceding determination. If the object, the unincorporated association, is a subject distinct from its representative or members, then the res judicata of a judgment rendered with one side as a party does not automatically carry over to the other. That the res judicata of a judgment rendered with the unincorporated association as a party does not extend to its representative or members is the natural consequence of this distinction. It now becomes clear why the distinction of subjects in the preceding paragraph and the scope of res judicata in this paragraph must be viewed separately. One concerns who is a party to the lawsuit; the other concerns to whom the effect of that judgment extends.
The losses and inconveniences this distinction targets are of a different kind. If member C contests the matter again in an individual capacity, the dispute already waged with the association may be waged once more among the members. The controversy over the same obligation does not end, and creditor B may have to repeat the same argument. A successor after the close of oral argument refers to the position of one who takes over the effect of the preceding judgment after that judgment has concluded, and this position must be separately confirmed in the lawsuit. That position is not conferred on an individual merely by the relation of belonging to the association. The inconvenience of repetition flagged by the counterargument remains, but the distinction of subjects cannot be erased on account of that inconvenience.
The comparison is limited to the facts confirmed in the synthetic scene. Creditor B holds a judgment against the unincorporated association A, and the target of the demand is C, a member of the association. In this scene, the unincorporated association A is the subject of the lawsuit, and member C corresponds to a separate subject of individual rights distinct from the association. Accordingly, the res judicata of the judgment against the unincorporated association A cannot be taken to naturally extend to member C. The materials for determination in the scene are the parties to the prior action, the reference point in time, the succession materials, the execution clause, and the relationship between the association and its members. The object and timing of the succession, and the identity of the parties, remain unconfirmed, and no materials to settle them have been provided. These items remain undetermined.
The conclusions this section permits and does not permit are set out separately. What is permitted is the determination that the association and its representative or members are distinct subjects, and that the res judicata of a judgment rendered with the association as a party does not naturally extend to its members. What is not permitted is converting an individual into a successor after the close of oral argument on the sole basis of the relation of belonging to the association.
4.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
Having passed through the discussion of the preceding section, creditor B has obtained the conclusion that an individual cannot be converted into a successor after the close of oral argument merely by belonging to the association; and now, in the scene where creditor B, holding a judgment against the unincorporated association A, demands that C, a member of the association, perform the same obligation, creditor B asks in which direction the effect of that judgment reaches C. The question at this point is whether a judgment finalized against the group to which C belongs, by the mere fact of belonging to that group, also binds the separate rights of C as an individual.
Supreme Court Decision 2010Da58889 decided December 23, 2010 sets out, in clear terms, the text answering this question. The confirmed original text stated: "Even where, under Article 52 of the Civil Procedure Act, an unincorporated association having a representative becomes a party to a lawsuit, that unincorporated association is a subject distinct from its representative or members; and therefore, it goes without saying that the res judicata of a judgment rendered with that representative or those members as parties does not extend to the unincorporated association, and likewise that the res judicata of a judgment rendered with the unincorporated association as a party does not extend to its representative or members" (Supreme Court Decision 2010Da58889 decided December 23, 2010). The subject indicated by this wording is the unincorporated association having a representative under Article 52 of the Civil Procedure Act, while the representative or the individual members are placed as subjects distinct from that association.
The point where this text and the conclusion of this section meet is already contained in the sentence above. In addressing the effect where an unincorporated association becomes a party to a lawsuit, the precedent explains that it goes without saying that the res judicata of a judgment rendered with that association as a party does not extend to its representative or members (Supreme Court Decision 2010Da58889 decided December 23, 2010). So long as the subject standing in the position of a party to the lawsuit is distinguished from the subject bearing individual rights in its own name, matters settled in the preceding lawsuit must not be deemed automatically applicable to the individual in the latter case. The precedent draws the reach of the effect on the premise of the distance between the two subjects, and the application of this section is limited to that distinction.
This does not mean that only untroubled tranquility remains. The strongest counterargument is that, if members contest the matter again, the dispute at the association level may never end, and it further targets the loss and inconvenience that, if a new trial is required at every succession, a mere transfer of the right suffices to evade execution. If, even though a single dispute has ended at the level of the association, individual members may raise the same obligation again, the creditor is denied the benefit of the settlement of the dispute and must contest the same issue repeatedly. Yet the foregoing answer does not waver. If one invokes the fact of membership and places the individual in the position of successor to that preceding judgment, the distinction drawn above between the subject of the lawsuit and the subject of individual rights is erased.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are not broad. Creditor B, holding a judgment against the unincorporated association A, demands that C, a member of the association, perform the same obligation; and this does not include the circumstance that C succeeded to anyone in the lawsuit of that judgment. Of the parties to the prior action, the reference point in time, the succession materials, the execution clause, and the relationship between the association and its members, what this scene reveals is only the relationship between the association and its members; and so long as the object or timing of the succession, or the identity of the parties, remains unconfirmed, whether the preceding judgment can be enforced against C remains undetermined. The mere relation of belonging to the association cannot be taken to have covered, by the preceding judgment, even the question of the separate rights of C as an individual; and within this scene, the room for C as an individual to contest the matter as the subject of its own rights has not been erased.
Accordingly, the conclusion permitted at this point is narrow. The res judicata of the judgment against the unincorporated association A remains within the scope of the unincorporated association as the subject of the lawsuit, and converting member C as an individual into a successor after the close of oral argument so as to naturally bind that person to the judgment does not accord with the conclusion of this section. What is not permitted is the determination that the single fact of belonging to the association has settled, by the preceding judgment, even the questions concerning the rights of C as an individual. A shortage of materials does not mean that no remedy is available, but neither can one hastily conclude that the preceding judgment can be enforced against C without succession materials.
4.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
This stage starts from the position taken in the preceding section—that a final and conclusive judgment rendered for or against a person who became plaintiff or defendant on behalf of another extends its effect to that other person as well—but now asks where the boundary of that personal extension lies. For this demand to be established, it must first be settled who the persons are to whom the effect of the judgment extends. Does a person who did not directly participate in the lawsuit receive the effect of the judgment? The question here is especially whether a judgment received by an association binds all of its individual members.
As to this question, the precedent states as follows: "Meanwhile, even where, under Article 52 of the Civil Procedure Act, an unincorporated association having a representative becomes a party to a lawsuit, that unincorporated association is a subject distinct from its representative or members; and therefore, it goes without saying that the res judicata of a judgment rendered with that representative or those members as parties does not extend to the unincorporated association, and likewise that the res judicata of a judgment rendered with the unincorporated association as a party does not extend to its representative or members" (Supreme Court Decision 2010Da58889 decided December 23, 2010). This wording presupposes the case where an unincorporated association having a representative becomes a party to a lawsuit under Article 52 of the Civil Procedure Act. The subjects spoken of here are the unincorporated association and its representative or members; the act is the pronouncement of a judgment with each of them as a party; and the condition is the distinction of subjects as defined above.
Joining this wording to the premise of extension set out from above divides the stages of determination. The extension of effect in the case of becoming plaintiff or defendant on behalf of another was viewed, in the relation of litigation on behalf of another, as placing that other person in the position of a party. By contrast, in adjudication with an unincorporated association as the party, the association itself stands as the subject of the lawsuit. Hence the definition of the separation of the association and its members—that is, the distinction between the subject of the lawsuit and the subject of individual rights—operates here. The mere fact that the association prevailed in the lawsuit does not settle the rights or burdens separately held by individual members; nor, in the opposite direction, does a judgment against the representative or members bind the association.
The strongest counterargument is concerned with the finality of disputes. If members contest the matter again, the dispute at the association level may not end, and if a new trial is required at every succession, a mere transfer of the right can evade execution. This inconvenience is in fact great. If a controversy over the same obligation, having ended once at the level of the association, is repeated on an individual basis, litigation is wasted and the creditor must obtain one more judgment. To view a person as a successor, the succession itself—including the object and timing of the transfer of the right—must be confirmed, since the status of member is a relation of a different kind.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only that creditor B holds a judgment against the unincorporated association A and demands the effect of that judgment against member C. The condition to be contrasted with this is that the res judicata of the association's judgment does not naturally extend to its representative or members. Accordingly, for B to apply the preceding judgment to C as it stands, it must be separately confirmed that C is a person who obtained the judgment in the lawsuit on behalf of the association, or a person who succeeded after the close of oral argument. The mere fact that C belongs to the association is not enough. Since the object and timing of the succession, or the identity of the parties, has not been confirmed, the success or failure of that demand cannot be settled from this scene alone.
The conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. As to the question whether an association's judgment binds all of its individual members, it distinguishes the matter by holding that an unincorporated association and its representative or members are distinct subjects, and that the res judicata of that judgment does not naturally extend to the individuals. Conversely, it does not deny every case in which the effect of the judgment extends to an individual. Execution in the case of a lawsuit conducted on behalf of another, or following a confirmed succession, awaits separate determination. Still, the mere relation of belonging to an association cannot place individual members in the same position as a successor after the close of oral argument.
4.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
앞 절이 이미 받아들인 전제는 다른 사람을 위하여 원고나 피고가 된 사람의 확정판결은 그 다른 사람에게도 효력이 미친다는 것이다. 이 전제를 그대로 둔 채, 이번 단계의 물음은 단체 명의의 판결이 구성원 개인을 모두 묶는가이다. 채권자 B의 요구가 앞 판결의 효력 범위 안에 드는지, 아니면 별개 주체에 대한 새로운 다툼으로 남는지가 여기서 갈린다. 이 물음은 앞 절의 논증을 다시 펴는 일이 아니라, 그 결론에 이어 적용할 문언의 범위를 정하는 일이다. B가 C에게 앞 판결을 내세우려면 판결이 개인에게 미치는 인적 연결이 먼저 확정되어야 한다.
해당 원문 구절은 대법원 2010. 12. 23. 선고 2010다58889 판결이 판결요지 [1]에 둔 다음 문장이다. 해당 문언은 민사소송법 제52조에 의하여 대표자가 있는 법인 아닌 사단이 소송의 당사자가 되는 경우에도, 그 법인 아닌 사단은 대표자나 구성원과는 별개의 주체라고 설명한다(대법원 2010. 12. 23. 선고 2010다58889 판결). 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 민사소송법 제52조에 의한 법인 아닌 사단과 그 대표자나 구성원이고, 행위는 소송의 당사자가 되는 일이며, 조건은 대표자가 있는 사단의 소송 당사자 지위를 전제로 한 경우이다. 같은 문언은 그 대표자나 구성원을 당사자로 한 판결의 기판력이 법인 아닌 사단에 미치지 아니함은 물론, 그 법인 아닌 사단을 당사자로 한 판결의 기판력도 그 대표자나 구성원에게 미치지 아니하는 것이 당연하다고 밝힌다(대법원 2010. 12. 23. 선고 2010다58889 판결). 이 구절은 주체의 구별만을 담당하며, 판결의 객관적 범위나 집행 요건까지 다루는 문언이 아니다.
위 문언과 이 절의 결론을 잇는 실은 주체의 구별이 판결 효력의 인적 연결을 가르는 판정 근거라는 점이다. 소송 주체란 앞 판결에서 당사자로 싸운 자를, 개인 권리 주체란 그 판결 밖에서 자기 이름으로 권리를 가진 자를 각각 지칭한다. 이 둘을 나누지 않으면 법인 아닌 사단에 대한 판결과 그 구성원에 대한 권리가 한 덩어리로 묶여, 앞 판결에 서지 않았던 C가 그 판결의 대상이 된다. 판정 근거는 이 구별을 지키는 문언이다. 앞 절이 받은 전제가 효력을 미치는 다른 사람의 범위를 정한다면, 이 문언은 그 범위에 구성원 개인이 당연히 들지 않는다는 경계를 짓는다.
구성원이 다시 다투면 단체 분쟁이 끝나지 않을 수 있다는 반론이 겨냥하는 손실은 분쟁의 종결이다. 단체 A에 대한 판결로 모임의 이름에 관한 다툼이 정리되었는데도 구성원 C가 같은 의무를 개인 자격으로 다시 쟁점으로 삼으면, 채권자 B로서는 단체 판결을 얻은 뒤에도 한 번 더 재판을 각오해야 한다. 승계마다 새 재판을 요구하면 권리이전만으로 집행을 피할 수 있다는 점도 같은 불편에 속한다. 그러나 앞의 답은 변함이 없다. 반론이 지적한 재판의 중복은 실재하지만, 그 불편을 없애려고 소속 관계만으로 개인의 지위를 승계인으로 바꾸는 것은 허용되지 않는다. 이 답은 반론의 불리한 점을 지우지 않은 채 유지된다.
합성 장면의 사실 중 이 물음에 걸리는 것은 단체 A에 대한 판결을 가진 채권자 B가, 그 단체의 구성원인 C에게 같은 의무의 이행을 요구한다는 점이다. 이 사실을 앞의 조건과 대조하면, B가 앞 판결로 구속하려는 자는 단체 A이고 C는 그 구성원 개인이다. 해당 문언에 따르면 법인 아닌 사단을 당사자로 한 판결의 기판력은 대표자나 구성원에게 미치지 아니하므로, 단체 A에 대한 판결만으로 C를 앞 판결의 대상으로 옮길 수 없다. 승계의 대상·시점이나 당사자 동일성이 확인되지 않은 채 남아 있고, B의 요구가 성립할지 여부는 이 장면만으로 확정되지 않는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 판결 효력과 승계집행의 인적 연결은 해당 문언으로 판단한다. 단체와 구성원이 별개 주체라는 구별이 서면, 단체 A에 대한 판결의 기판력이 구성원 C에게 당연히 미친다고 보아 그 판결로 C를 묶는 것은 이 절이 허용하지 않는 결론이다. 반대로 단체 소속만으로 개인을 변론종결 뒤 승계인으로 바꾸는 해석도 이 결론 밖이다. 앞 판결의 효력이 어떤 범위에 미치는지 따지는 일이 남았더라도, 그 판단의 근거는 이번에 다룰 문언에 묶인다.
4.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
단체의 판결이 구성원 개인을 모두 묶는가를 묻는 앞 단계에서 이미 한 문장으로 이어받은 결론이 있다. 이제 채권자 B가 단체 A에 대한 판결을 가지고 단체의 구성원 C에게 같은 의무를 이행하라고 요구하는 장면에서, 판결 효력과 승계집행의 인적 연결 안에서 무엇을 다시 나누어 판정할지가 문제이다. 이 단계는 새로 단계를 더하거나 앞뒤 단계의 답을 앞당겨 쓰지 않고, 이번 단계가 허용하는 구분의 틀만을 확정한다.
이 물음에 해당하는 근거는 대법원 2010. 12. 23. 선고 2010다58889 판결이 남긴 문언이다. 그 판결요지 [1]은 “민사소송법 제52조에 의하여 대표자가 있는 법인 아닌 사단이 소송의 당사자가 되는 경우에도 그 법인 아닌 사단은 대표자나 구성원과는 별개의 주체”라고 본다. 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 소송의 당사자로 선 법인 아닌 사단과 그 대표자나 구성원 개인이며, 여기서 말하는 행위는 판결의 기판력이 미치는 범위를 정하는 판단이다. 따라서 조건은 사단이 소송의 당사자가 된 경우에 한정된다.
그 문언은 앞서 받은 전제와 이어진다. 다른 사람을 위하여 원고나 피고가 된 사람의 확정판결은 그 다른 사람에게 효력이 미치지만, 사단과 대표자·구성원은 별개의 주체이므로 한쪽에 대한 판결이 다른 쪽에 당연히 미치지 않는다. 이 판단은 ‘효력이 미치는 법정 인적 범위’와 ‘승계집행에 필요한 증명’을 구별해야 비로소 서 있을 수 있다. 전자는 앞 판결이 누구를 묶는가이고, 후자는 그 묶임을 집행문으로 이어갈 근거를 갖추었는가이다. 이 두 단계만으로 작동하는 경우, 막히는 경우, 미확정인 경우의 세 가지 조건이 나뉜다. 효력 범위에 들고 증명을 갖추거나 부여의 소로 다투는 경우는 허용되고, 경제적 관련만 있고 효력 범위나 승계 근거가 없는 경우는 막히며, 승계의 대상, 시점이나 당사자 동일성이 확인되지 않은 경우는 미확정이다.
가장 강한 반론은 구성원이 다시 다투면 단체 분쟁이 끝나지 않을 수 있다는 데 있다. 단체를 상대로 이미 판결을 받은 채권자 B가 같은 의무를 놓고 구성원 C와 다시 다투어야 한다면, 분쟁은 한 번에 접히지 않고 권리 회수도 늦어진다. 승계집행의 관점에서 보면 승계마다 새 재판을 요구하면 권리이전만으로 집행을 피할 수 있다는 손실도 크다. 그러나 이 불이익을 없애려고 단체 소속이라는 사실만으로 개인을 변론종결 뒤 승계인으로 바꿀 수는 없다. 앞서 확인한 주체 구별을 무너뜨리는 길이기 때문에, 반론이 지적한 지연과 반복은 남겨두더라도 결론은 유지된다.
합성 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 것은 채권자 B가 단체 A에 대한 판결을 갖고 있고, 그 요구의 상대가 단체의 구성원 C라는 관계뿐이다. 그 사실을 앞의 조건과 대조하면, B의 요구는 허용되는 경우에 들지 못한다. C에 대한 승계 자료나 집행문, 또는 부여의 소를 통한 다툼이 확인되지 않았기 때문이다. 단체와 구성원 관계라는 기록만으로는 승계의 대상, 시점이나 당사자 동일성이 확인되지 않았으므로 미확정 상태에 머문다. 이 장면은 막히는 경우와 미확정인 경우 가운데 어느 쪽인지 확정할 수 없고, 실제 이행이나 회수 성과도 여기서 단정하지 않는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 단체 판결의 기판력이 구성원 개인에게 당연히 미치지 않는다는 구별을 전제로, 이번 단계의 판정은 작동하는 경우·막히는 경우·미확정인 경우 세 조건에 한정되고 그 밖의 단계를 새로 만들지 않는다. 반대로 단체 소속만으로 개인을 변론종결 뒤 승계인으로 보거나, 경제적 관련만으로 앞 판결을 그 사람에게 집행하는 결론은 허용되지 않는다. 다만 단체 구성원이라는 관계가 독립된 개인 권리로 확인되면 단체 판결의 당연한 구속이라는 결론을 고치는 것으로 한정된다.
4.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
앞 분석 단계까지는 단체를 당사자로 한 판결이 구성원 개인에게 당연히 묶인다고 볼 수 없다는 결론에 이르렀고, 이제는 그 거리를 실제로 판단할 기준을 정해야 한다. 채권자 B는 단체 A에 대한 판결을 가지고 있는데, 단체의 구성원 C에게 같은 의무를 이행하라고 요구한다. 이 장면에서 B는 앞 판결에 기대어 C 개인에게 직접 집행하려는 셈이다. 그런데 그러한 요구가 가능한지는, 그 사람이 앞 판결의 효력이 미치는 범위에 들어가고 승계집행의 근거까지 갖추었는지에 따라 갈린다. 이 물음은 결국 판결 효력과 승계집행의 인적 연결이 실제로 열렸는지, 막혔는지, 아니면 아직 확인되지 않았는지로 나누어 살펴보아야 한다.
이 물음에 대한 근거는 민사소송법 제52조를 설명하는 판례 문언이다. 판례는 “한편 민사소송법 제52조에 의하여 대표자가 있는 법인 아닌 사단이 소송의 당사자가 되는 경우에도 그 법인 아닌 사단은 대표자나 구성원과는 별개의 주체이므로, 그 대표자나 구성원을 당사자로 한 판결의 기판력이 법인 아닌 사단에 미치지 아니함은 물론 그 법인 아닌 사단을 당사자로 한 판결의 기판력 또한 그 대표자나 구성원에게 미치지 아니하는 것이 당연하다.”고 밝혔다. 이 문언에서 정해지는 것은 주체의 구별이다. 즉 법인 아닌 사단은 그 대표자나 구성원과 별개의 주체이고, 어느 한쪽을 당사자로 한 판결의 기판력은 다른 한쪽에 그대로 미치지 않는다(대법원 2010. 12. 23. 선고 2010다58889 판결).
그 문언과 앞서 정한 결론은 다음과 같이 이어진다. 앞 판결의 효력이 C에게 열리려면, C가 효력이 미치는 법정 인적 범위에 들고 승계집행에 필요한 증명을 갖추었거나 부여의 소로 다투는 경우여야 한다. 반대로 막히는 쪽은 경제적 관련만 있고 법정 효력 범위나 승계 근거가 없어 그 사람에게 앞 판결을 집행할 수 없는 경우다. 두 가지를 굳이 나누는 이유는, 한쪽은 “누구의 판결인가”라는 효력의 인적 범위를 다루고 다른 한쪽은 “그 판결을 어떻게 이 사람에게 쓰는가”라는 집행의 연결을 다루기 때문이다. 소송 주체와 개인 권리 주체의 구별이 전자의 기준이고, 승계집행의 증명이나 부여의 소가 후자의 통로다.
그 구별을 가장 강하게 밀어붙이는 반론은 분쟁이 끝나지 않는다는 점에 있다. 구성원이 다시 다툴 수 있게 두면, 단체를 상대로 이미 끝난 싸움이 구성원마다 되살아나고, 단체 분쟁의 종국성이 흔들린다. 여기에 권리이전만으로 집행을 피할 수 있다는 걱정까지 겹친다. 승계할 때마다 새 재판을 요구하게 되면, 채권자는 채무자가 사람을 바꾸는 것만으로 집행에서 밀려나게 된다. 구성원이라는 관계는 그 개인의 별도 권리 주체성을 자동으로 없애지 않고, 앞 판결을 그 사람에게 집행하기 위한 법정 범위와 승계 근거도 함께 요구한다.
이 장면을 이 기준에 놓고 보면, 확인되는 것은 B와 단체 A 사이의 판결과 B의 요구 방식뿐이다. C가 단체 A의 구성원이라는 관계만으로는, 그가 효력이 미치는 법정 인적 범위에 들었다거나 승계집행에 필요한 증명을 갖추었다고 볼 수 없다. 단체와 구성원의 분리라는 전제에서 단체를 당사자로 한 판결의 기판력은 구성원에게 당연히 미치지 않으므로, 이 사정만으로는 열리는 쪽으로 확정할 수 없다. 다만 승계의 대상·시점이나 당사자 동일성이 확인되지 않았으므로 막혔다고 단정할 수도 없다. 전소 당사자·기준시점·승계 자료·집행문·단체와 구성원 관계라는 기록이 정해졌을 뿐 실제 값이 주어지지 않았기 때문에, 이 장면으로는 미확정 구간이 남는다.
이 절에서 허용되는 것은 조건부 구별이고, 허용되지 않는 것은 단체 소속의 자동 확장이다. C에게 앞 판결을 집행할 수 있으려면 효력이 미치는 법정 인적 범위와 승계집행의 근거가 따로 확인되어야 하고, 경제적 관련만으로는 그 연결이 열리지 않는다. 다만 자료가 아직 모자란다고 해서 바로 구제 불능으로 돌릴 수 없으며, 대상·시점·당사자 동일성이 확인되지 않은 채로는 확정할 수도 없다.
4.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
앞 절까지의 결론은 단체 A에 대한 판결의 효력이 구성원 개인에게 당연히 미치지 않는다는 한 문장으로만 이어받는다. 이제 남은 물음은 그런 판결을 손에 쥔 채권자 B가 같은 의무의 이행을 구성원 C에게 직접 요구할 수 있는지이다. 단체와 구성원 사이의 거리가 판결 효력의 범위와 집행의 문턱에서 각각 어떻게 작동하는지가 이 자리의 관심사이다.
확인한 원문은 단체가 소송 당사자가 된 경우를 다룬다. 대법원 2010. 12. 23. 선고 2010다58889 판결은 민사소송법 제52조를 근거로 “그 법인 아닌 사단을 당사자로 한 판결의 기판력 또한 그 대표자나 구성원에게 미치지 아니하는 것이 당연하다”고 본다. 이 문언은 판결 효력의 주체 범위를 말한다. 대표자나 구성원이 그 판결의 당사자가 아니라는 점이 확정된 것이고, 누구를 상대로 어떤 행위를 요구할 수 있는지는 별도의 문제로 남는다.
이 문언과 이 절의 결론을 이어주는 고리는 판결 효력의 미침과 집행의 가능함이 서로 다른 단계라는 점이다. 앞 절이 효력이 개인에게 미치지 않는다고 확인했다면, 효력이 미치는 사람이 아니라는 이유만으로 그 사람에게 앞 판결의 집행을 바로 열어젖힐 수는 없다. 단체가 다퉈 얻은 판단과 개인이 가진 별도 권리는 각자의 주체를 두고 서며, 전자가 후자를 대신할 수 있다는 근거는 이 문언 안에 들어 있지 않다.
그러나 구성원이 제각기 다시 다투면 단체 분쟁이 끝나지 않을 수 있다는 반론이 남는다. 승계 때마다 새 재판을 요구하게 되면 권리의 이전만으로 집행을 벗어나는 통로가 열리고, 단체를 상대로 이미 확정된 판단의 실익이 줄어든다. 이 답은 반론의 불이익을 지우지 않은 채, 소속 관계 하나를 승계의 근거로 삼을 수 없다는 선을 지킨다.
합성 장면으로 돌아가 보면, 채권자 B가 든 것은 단체 A에 대한 판결이다. 그 판결이 구성원 C를 묶으려면 C가 그 효력이 미치는 법정 인적 범위에 들고, 승계집행에 필요한 증명을 갖추거나 부여의 소로 다투는 경우에 해당해야 한다. 이 장면은 연도·금액·기산일을 정하지 않았고, C와 A 사이의 관계, 전소 당사자와 기준시점, 승계 자료와 집행문의 유무도 밝혀 두지 않았다. 따라서 C에게 그 판결을 집행할 수 있는지는 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 단체와 구성원을 별개 주체로 구별한 뒤, 단체 소속만으로 개인을 변론종결 뒤 승계인으로 만드는 통로를 닫는 것이다. 허용하지 않는 것은 효력이 미치지 않는 사람을 상대로 한 집행이 아예 불가능하다고 선언하는 판단이며, 승계 자료가 없다는 이유만으로 구제가 영원히 막힌다고 단정하는 것도 아니다. 판결 효력이 미치면 즉시 집행할 수 있는가?