Summary
The statutory reference point, such as the conclusion of oral argument, must be examined separately from the presumption concerning a failure to state the fact of succession.
2.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
If the time at which the rights were succeeded to is left out, it is impossible to determine who stands outside the judgment. Although the scope of effect was earlier distinguished as between the parties and successors or holders of the subject matter designated by law, the mere fact of falling within that scope leaves open the question of when entry into it occurred. Creditor B, holding a judgment against Organization A, demands that Member C, a constituent member of the Organization, perform the same obligation, and a single question lies before this demand. If there was succession, does the same effect extend to it regardless of the point in time? To answer this question, one must separate the statutory reference points, such as the conclusion of oral argument, from the presumption concerning the failure to state the fact of succession.
The text of Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act is divided into two paragraphs, each addressing different subjects. Paragraph (1) provides: "①A final and conclusive judgment shall have effect on the parties, their successors after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, successors after the pronouncement of the judgment), or persons who possess the subject matter of the claim on their behalf." (Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act), thereby limiting the subjects on whom the effect of a final and conclusive judgment operates to the parties, successors at a designated point in time, and holders of the subject matter of the claim. In this text, the parenthetical attached to successors means that, for a judgment rendered without oral argument, the pronouncement of judgment is taken as the reference point, and "persons who possess the subject matter of the claim on their behalf" is a separate subject placed alongside the successors.
The link between this wording of paragraph (1) and the conclusion of this section lies in the fact that the subjects have been designated. Where one falls within the statutory personal scope on which effect operates and either possesses the proof required for execution on the basis of succession or contests the matter through an action for grant, the entrance to this remedy is opened. Here, the time of succession means the time of transfer of rights to be compared with the statutory reference point, and it is defined for the purpose of that comparison with the statutory reference point. Unless one sets up coordinates for comparing when the rights passed, one cannot record who remains outside the judgment, nor can one explain why the personal scope and the requirements of proof move together.
The counterargument this distinction targets is the reality of proof. Materials on the time of succession lie within the parties themselves and are difficult to verify, and where the transfer of rights takes place quietly within an organization, it is hard to gauge in which record that time is to be found. The counterargument further points out the loss that, if a new trial were demanded for every succession, execution could be evaded merely by transferring rights, and it cautions against the result that the transfer of rights itself becomes a means of defense. Even so, one cannot assert that every succession is a succession after the conclusion of oral argument. Paragraph (2) provides that "if a party fails to state the fact of succession by the time of the conclusion of oral argument … it shall be presumed that the succession occurred" (Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act), and thus goes no further than establishing a presumption arising from the failure to state; the failure to state does not proceed to a determination that the time of every succession has been fixed.
In this scene, Creditor B, holding a judgment against Organization A, demands that Member C, a constituent member of the Organization, perform the same obligation, and what is confirmed by this scene is only the direction and the relationship of the demand. Accordingly, the adjudication of the scope of effect examines, against the parties to the prior lawsuit, the reference point, the succession materials, the certificate of execution, and the relationship between the Organization and its constituent members as fixed in the record of decision, how the person's ground of succession and time of succession mesh with the statutory reference point. Where the subject or time of succession, or the identity of the parties, is not confirmed, the matter remains undetermined, and where there is only an economic connection and no statutory scope of effect or ground of succession, so that the earlier judgment cannot be executed against that person, the passage to this remedy is closed. The only boundary engaged by this scene is the contrast whereby, if the relationship of being a constituent member of the Organization is confirmed as an independent individual right, it corrects the conclusion of the automatic binding effect of the Organization's judgment.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow: it is the judgment that the entrance is opened when the statutory personal scope and the proof are in place, or when a contest is established in the action for grant; reasons concerning other points in time, or questions belonging to other columns, are not concluded here. Conversely, conclusions that assert every succession to be a succession after the conclusion of oral argument, or that determine the effect to have operated on that assertion alone, are not permitted. Next, the analysis within the same section passes to the layer of how far matters are blocked when the materials are lacking.
2.2The Conditions That Block Relief
Where one falls within the statutory personal scope on which effect operates and either possesses the proof required for execution on the basis of succession or contests the matter through an action for grant, this remedy operates. Then what are the conditions that block a demand for execution of the earlier judgment against a person standing outside those who have already received that judgment? The problem of proof of succession, treated in the preceding section, forms that boundary here.
Article 218 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act sets out the personal scope on which the effect of a final and conclusive judgment operates. Its text declares: "①A final and conclusive judgment shall have effect on the parties, their successors after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, successors after the pronouncement of the judgment), or persons who possess the subject matter of the claim on their behalf." The subjects this sentence establishes are three: the parties, successors after the statutory reference point, and persons who possess the subject matter on their behalf. As to conduct and conditions, performance of the same obligation as the obligation stated in the earlier judgment is demanded, and as regards a successor, both the fact of having succeeded to the rights and the time of that transfer are at issue together.
The earlier judgment cannot simply be executed against a person who does not fall within this personal scope fixed by the court. This is because one does not fall within that scope merely because one shared in the economic benefit or was involved in the same transaction. Accordingly, the condition that blocks this remedy is the case where, there being only an economic connection and no statutory scope of effect or ground of succession, the earlier judgment cannot be executed against that person. The fact of succession and the time of succession must be examined separately, because the former constitutes the ground for falling within the personal scope, while the latter becomes the material for adjudicating what kind of succession it is through comparison with the statutory reference point. If, without such a distinction, one disposes of the question of time together on the basis of the fact of succession alone, it is not explained why the statutory reference point was separately fixed.
Materials as to when the time of succession occurred generally remain within the transactions between the parties, making it difficult for the party seeking to execute the judgment to verify them all. The point that the side lacking materials is always placed at a disadvantage remains as it is. The presumption established by Article 218 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act is bound by the wording: "②In the case of paragraph (1), if a party fails to state the fact of succession by the time of the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, by the time of the pronouncement of the judgment), it shall be presumed that the succession occurred after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, after the pronouncement of the judgment)." That is, the presumption presupposes the condition that there was no statement, and it cannot be extended beyond the scope the presumption reaches so as to place every succession at a single point in time.
In the designated scene, Creditor B holds a judgment against Organization A and demands that Member C perform the same obligation as that judgment. The facts touching this remedy here are who the parties to the prior lawsuit were, what the subject and time of succession were if there was any succession, and whether there is a relationship between the Organization and its constituent members sufficient to fall within the statutory personal scope. The mere relationship of being a constituent member of the Organization does not confirm the subject or time of succession, or the identity of the parties. So long as materials remain that cannot be adjudicated on the basis of the synthetic scene alone, whether the earlier judgment can be executed against C remains undetermined. If the relationship of being a constituent member of the Organization is confirmed as an independent individual right, it corrects the conclusion of the automatic binding effect of the Organization's judgment.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow: it is the judgment that this remedy is blocked where, there being only an economic connection and no statutory scope of effect or ground of succession, the earlier judgment cannot be executed against that person. This judgment does not lead to binding the time of every succession to a single point in time, nor does it permit asserting every succession to be a succession after the conclusion of oral argument. Conversely, it does not hold that the mere fact that materials are lacking immediately means the remedy is blocked.
2.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
The conclusion of the preceding stage is that the scope of effect is distinguished among the parties and the successors, holders of the subject matter, and others designated by law. On the premise of that distinction of scope, Creditor B, holding a judgment against Organization A, demands that Member C, a constituent member of the Organization, perform the same obligation. The party to the judgment asserted by Creditor B is Organization A, and C was not named in that judgment. Here the premise is the case where succession has not been confirmed. The question that follows is where the boundary lies that cannot be determined for want of materials.
Article 218 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "①A final and conclusive judgment shall have effect on the parties, their successors after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, successors after the pronouncement of the judgment), or persons who possess the subject matter of the claim on their behalf." Here the subjects of effect are the three designated by law. The first is a party to the judgment; the second is a successor after the conclusion of oral argument. In the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, a successor after the pronouncement of the judgment fills that place. The third is a person who possesses the subject matter of the claim on their behalf. To determine whether each subject falls within the statutory scope, it must be revealed in what capacity that person succeeded to the rights.
The text of paragraph (1) above enumerates the scope of persons on whom the effect operates; it does not confirm in one's stead whether one has fallen within that scope. Accordingly, the conclusion that one falls within the scope and whether there are materials supporting that conclusion must be examined separately. When Creditor B asserts Member C as a constituent member, what is required is not merely the relationship of being a constituent member, but confirmation that C was a party to the above judgment, or a successor at law, or otherwise possessed the qualifications prescribed by the text. This confirmation belongs to the stage of decision as to the personal scope of the judgment's effect, while the stage of proof—whether one possesses the succession materials forming the ground of that capacity—is placed separately. The distinction of the preceding stage means precisely that the two must not be read as overlapping.
The counterargument that materials on the time of succession lie within the parties themselves and are difficult to verify targets a practical loss. If the fact of succession did not surface in the previous lawsuit, that record alone makes it difficult to verify when the rights were succeeded to, and those holding the materials are already the parties who have finished the prior lawsuit. Such circumstances may be a reason why the decision is difficult. Even so, one cannot assert that every succession is a succession after the conclusion of oral argument. Such an assertion goes beyond the conditions of the presumption established by paragraph (2). Even while leaving aside the circumstance that there are no materials, one must also prevent fixing matters outside the scope of effect on the ground that the point in time has not been confirmed. The inconvenience the counterargument points out is left as it is, but that inconvenience is not converted into a determined conclusion.
Paragraph (2) provides: "②In the case of paragraph (1), if a party fails to state the fact of succession by the time of the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, by the time of the pronouncement of the judgment), it shall be presumed that the succession occurred after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, after the pronouncement of the judgment)." Here the time of succession means the time of transfer of rights to be compared with the statutory reference point. The above presumption operates under the requirement that there was no statement; it does not overturn the fact of succession itself. In the synthetic scene, it is not made clear, as between Creditor B and Member C, when and in what capacity the succession occurred, nor is it recorded whether the requirements of paragraph (2) above are met. So long as that state of facts is unconfirmed, the point in time cannot be specified from the scene alone. Matters whose subject or time of succession, or identity of parties, is not confirmed cannot be determined.
The conclusion this section permits is to determine which of the subjects in paragraph (1) the person falls under, and then to judge that the effect operates only in cases where the ground of that capacity and its time are confirmed. Matters for which the materials of decision are not specified for want of materials are left undetermined, distinguished from impossibility, and are not asserted to fall outside the scope of effect merely on the ground of being unverified. If the relationship of being a constituent member of the Organization is confirmed as an independent individual right, the conclusion of the automatic binding effect of the Organization's judgment changes. Next, one must consider to whom a judgment obtained in a lawsuit brought for another person devolves.
2.4The Records Needed for Determination
On the premise that the scope of effect has been distinguished among the parties and the successors or holders of the subject matter designated by law, this stage asks, in the scene where Creditor B, holding a judgment against Organization A, demands that Member C, a constituent member of the Organization, perform the same obligation, whether, if there was succession, the same effect operates regardless of the point in time. The time of succession means the time of transfer of rights to be compared with the statutory reference point, and if that time cannot be specified, it is impossible to determine who must be placed outside the judgment.
This text enumerates the subjects on whom the effect operates as the parties, successors after the conclusion of oral argument, and holders of the subject matter, and attaches to successors the reference point of the conclusion of oral argument. Accordingly, when distinguishing the personal scope of the judgment's effect, the side on which the time of transfer of rights falls becomes the criterion for fixing the subject.
If the distinction of that reference point is connected to the record, the stage determination becomes established. The stage is determined solely by the materials recorded as to the parties to the prior lawsuit, the reference point, the succession materials, the certificate of execution, and the relationship between the Organization and its constituent members, and the stage determination is made only upon the designated record. Records that do not exist are not filled in by presumption. This distinction is for separating the fact of having succeeded to the rights itself from the question of which reference point the time of that transfer was placed at. The former must show the subject and identity of the succession; the latter is fixed by contrast with the statutory reference point. Neither can stand in for the other.
The strongest counterargument targets the difficulty of proof and the resulting evasion of execution. Materials on the time of succession lie within the parties themselves and are difficult to verify, and if a new trial were demanded for every succession, execution could be evaded merely by transferring rights. Such losses and inconveniences are real. The answer above, however, remains unchanged. The law only presumes succession in the limited case where the fact of succession has not been stated by the time of the conclusion of oral argument, and that presumption attaches to the record condition of non-statement; it is not a rule fixing the time of every succession in one direction.
However, the facts confirmed in the synthetic scene go no further than the relationship in which Creditor B holds a judgment against Organization A and demands that Member C, a constituent member of the Organization, perform the same obligation. Where one falls within the statutory personal scope on which the effect of the judgment operates and either possesses the proof required for execution on the basis of succession or contests the matter through an action for grant, the legal passage to the stage judgment is opened; but where there is only an economic connection and no statutory scope of effect or ground of succession, so that the earlier judgment cannot be executed against that person, it remains blocked as it is. In what succession relationship the parties to the prior lawsuit and C were placed and when, and what was recorded in the certificate of execution, are not determined by the scene and remain undetermined.
What this section permits is the work of distinguishing the stage by contrasting the subjects, reference points, and succession materials left in the record, and it is not permitted to place presumptions where the designated record should stand so as to fill the gaps. At the same time, the circumstance that confirming materials are lacking does not immediately mean that no relief is possible.
2.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
That is the judgment that distinguishes the scope of effect—for the parties, and for successors, possessors of the subject matter, and others as provided by law. In the scene, Creditor B demands performance of the same obligation from Member C on the basis of the judgment against Entity A. The question at the center of this demand is whether it falls within the statutory scope of effect, or whether it is merely that the materials on the succession come to be confirmed later.
The statutory text that answers this question is divided into two layers. First, Article 218(1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "A final and conclusive judgment has effect on the parties, successors after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, successors after the pronouncement of the judgment), or a person possessing the subject matter of the claim on behalf of such a person" (Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act). The subjects prescribed by this text are the parties, successors after the reference point in time, and persons possessing the subject matter on their behalf. The reference point in time is the time of the conclusion of oral argument; in a judgment rendered without oral argument, it changes to the time of pronouncement.
Paragraph (2) of the same Article treats the statement of the fact of succession as a presumption rule. Paragraph (2) declares: "Where the parties have not stated the fact of succession by the time they conclude oral argument … the succession is presumed to have occurred" (Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act). The reason these two layers must be distinguished is simple. Paragraph (1) fixes the personal scope to which the effect extends, while paragraph (2) merely shifts the burden of proof as to the point in time of entering that scope. A presumption is not an adjudication that determines a fact. Whether the designated reference point in time and the actual time of succession are the same, or different, remains as it is.
The strongest counterargument has two faces: the difficulty of verification and the evasion of enforcement. There is the reality that materials on the time of succession lie within the party's internal sphere and are difficult to bring to light in the lawsuit, and there is also the concern that if a new determination is required at every succession, a mere transfer of the right would suffice to evade enforcement of the earlier judgment. Yet the foregoing answer is clear. "Not all successions can be asserted to be successions after the conclusion of oral argument." What the presumption in paragraph (2) creates is a standard subject to rebuttal, not a blanket prohibition. The disadvantage of that counterargument, namely the inconvenience provisionally postponed for lack of materials, remains and is not erased.
The discussion now returns to the synthetic scene. The demand of Creditor B targets Member C, but its basis is the judgment against Entity A. What must be asked here are the facts of the parties to the earlier action, the reference point in time, the materials on succession, the writ of execution, and the relationship between the entity and its members. The designated change is one. "If the relationship of being a member of the entity is confirmed as an independent individual right, the conclusion that the entity's judgment binds as a matter of course must be revised." If this condition is confirmed, the existing determinations as to blocking and effectiveness are discarded and the determination is redone from that step. However, whether that relationship is an individual right or an entity right, and when those materials were created, cannot be ascertained from the scene alone and thus remain undetermined.
In sum, one cannot assert that the same effect applies regardless of the point in time on the sole ground that a succession occurred, nor may one defer all successions to after the conclusion of oral argument in reliance on the presumption in paragraph (2). If a change is confirmed, the determination at the previous step is discarded; if there is no confirmation or the materials are insufficient, the determination is reserved, but the conclusion is not overturned. Only within that scope is the foregoing distinction valid.
2.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
Upon the conclusion that the scope of effect is distinguished—for the parties, and for successors, possessors of the subject matter, and others as provided by law—this step targets the problem of materials that are difficult to verify. Materials on the time of succession lie within the party's internal sphere and are difficult to verify. It is precisely at this point that the strongest counterargument arises from an uncomfortable reality. The point in time at which the right was succeeded lies outside the records, yet in order to determine the binding force of the judgment, that point in time must be known. The next point examined is how to answer the question that, without the time of succession, one cannot determine who remains outside the judgment.
Article 218(1) of the Civil Procedure Act states the persons on whom the effect of a final and conclusive judgment extends. "A final and conclusive judgment has effect on the parties, successors after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, successors after the pronouncement of the judgment), or a person possessing the subject matter of the claim on behalf of such a person." (Article 218 of the Civil Procedure Act) This text places three kinds of subjects side by side. First the parties to the judgment, next the successors after the conclusion of oral argument, and last the persons possessing the subject matter of the claim on behalf of that person. The parenthetical means that, in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, the time of pronouncement is taken as the standard. The word "successor" takes up the problem of the transfer of the right raised earlier, and becomes the object compared with the time of transfer.
If one follows exactly what this text indicates, successors on whom the effect extends are limited to those who succeeded after the conclusion of oral argument. This limitation is a standard of procedure meaning that the mere fact that a succession occurred is not sufficient. Yet the fact that the text states that the effect extends to successors after the conclusion of oral argument does not mean that all successions occurred after the conclusion of oral argument. The author maintains this distinction and explains that the statutory reference point in time and the presumption concerning non-statement of the fact of succession must be examined separately. The reason the preceding step distinguished the scope of parties and successors as provided by law lies here. Distinguishing the scope and fixing the point in time are different determinations.
The strongest counterargument at this step arises from this inconvenience: materials on succession lie within the party's internal sphere and are difficult to verify, and if one simply fixes all successions as successions after the conclusion of oral argument, the difficulty of verification seems to be resolved wholesale. But if one asserts it that way, persons who had already received the transfer of the right before the conclusion of oral argument are also bound as later successors, and the disputes surrounding them require a new trial. The loss remains that enforcement can be evaded by a mere transfer of the right. The author's answer is that the circumstance of difficulty of verification does not change the statutory reference point in time. The presumption of non-statement merely makes the fact convenient; it does not bar a contrary verification.
This answer, however, leaves undetermined the cases where the object of succession, the time of succession, or the identity of the parties is not confirmed. The parties to the earlier action, the reference point in time, the materials on succession, the writ of execution, and the relationship between the entity and its members become the materials for determination. In the scene, Creditor B, holding a judgment against Entity A, demands that the entity's member C perform the same obligation; if the relationship of being a member of the entity is confirmed as an independent individual right, the conclusion that the entity's judgment binds as a matter of course changes. Absent such confirmation, the present demand remains in an unconfirmed state.
What this section permits is not to push the time of succession behind the statutory reference point in time merely because verification is difficult. What it does not permit is to assume that, once the materials have been gathered, the time of succession cannot be fixed anew at that point. A judgment litigated on behalf of another—to whom does it accrue?
2.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
Creditor B, holding a judgment against Entity A, demands that the entity's member C perform the same obligation. In this scene, B's demand, as already confirmed in the preceding section, can be examined only under the premise that not all successions can be asserted to be successions after the conclusion of oral argument. Borrowing the accepted premise, one cannot regard a person who has succeeded to the right as simply bearing the effect of the earlier judgment as it stands merely because that person stands in place of the right-holder. Whether such a person remains outside the effect of the judgment cannot be determined without knowing the time of succession. Here, "time of succession" means the time of the transfer of the right, to be compared with the statutory reference point in time. At this point the question is posed: if there has been a succession, does the same effect apply regardless of the point in time?
This text lists three kinds of persons on whom the effect of a final and conclusive judgment extends. First, the parties who contested the matter in the lawsuit and received the judgment; second, the successors who succeeded to that right after the conclusion of oral argument; third, the persons possessing the subject matter of the claim on behalf of that successor. In the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, the time of pronouncement takes the place of the time of the conclusion of oral argument. The words "after the conclusion of oral argument" written in the text are the condition for identifying a successor, meaning that the scope of effect divides according to where the time of succession falls before or after that reference point in time.
Accordingly, the above text means fixing the personal scope to which effect extends by distinguishing the temporal order of the time of succession and the reference point in time, and the conclusion of this section as to this question is that the statutory reference point in time such as the conclusion of oral argument and the presumption concerning non-statement of the fact of succession must be examined separately. Whereas the time of succession as defined above is the time of the transfer of the right, this reference point in time is the time at which the lawsuit procedure comes to an end, and their character differs. The reason the two must be examined separately is that the former is the time at which the right actually moved, while the latter is the statutory threshold for the conclusive force and enforcement force of the judgment to reach the successor. Even if the time of succession itself is fixed, one does not immediately arrive at the evaluation of a succession after the reference point in time. Meanwhile, Article 218(2) of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "(2) Where, in the case of paragraph (1), the parties have not stated the fact of succession by the time of the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, by the time the judgment is pronounced), the succession is presumed to have occurred after the conclusion of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, after the pronouncement of the judgment)." Since this presumption provision operates where the fact of succession is ultimately never stated, it must be dealt with together with the determination under paragraph (1) that fixes the fact itself of being a succession after the reference point in time.
The strongest counterargument against drawing such a distinction lies in that materials on the time of succession lie within the party's internal sphere and are difficult to verify. The only persons who know when the succession occurred are the parties to the earlier action and the successor, and such materials accumulate outside the trial. Moreover, if a new trial is required for every succession, enforcement can be evaded by a mere transfer of the right, and the right of a creditor who has obtained and confirmed a judgment comes to no avail. Such inconvenience and loss are indeed great in reality. Yet not all successions can be asserted to be successions after the conclusion of oral argument. The circumstance that materials on the time of succession cannot be grasped at hand is merely a difficulty in proof, and invoking that difficulty does not alter the very meaning of "after the conclusion of oral argument" as fixed by the above text. Instead, the circumstance that the party did not state the fact of succession by the reference point in time is dealt with separately by paragraph (2); here one can only look differently at the conditions on which the presumption operates. It makes it possible to verify indirectly by linking with the condition of non-statement, without reducing to nothing the fact of a succession after the reference point in time.
Comparing concretely the scope of the foregoing counterargument and answer in the synthetic scene, it is as follows. In the scene where Creditor B, holding a judgment against Entity A, demands that the entity's member C perform the same obligation, C is a person separate from Entity A, the party to the earlier action. The parties to the earlier action, the reference point in time, the materials on succession, the writ of execution, and the relationship between the entity and its members cannot be confirmed from this scene alone. Whether C, merely by the relationship of being a member of the entity, is a successor to the judgment against Entity A, or a person possessing the subject matter of the claim on its behalf, cannot be fixed from the scene alone. Where the object of succession, the time of succession, or the identity of the parties is not confirmed, the matter remains undetermined. Moreover, if the relationship of being a member of the entity is confirmed as an independent individual right, the conclusion that the entity's judgment binds as a matter of course must be revised. In that case, it must first be confirmed that B's demand falls within the personal scope of effect of the judgment.
Accordingly, what is confirmed in this section is that, even where a succession has occurred, the effect of the earlier judgment does not extend in the same form regardless of where the time of succession falls. To fall within the scope to which effect extends, one must fall under one of the persons prescribed in paragraph (1)—the parties, successors after the reference point in time, or persons possessing the subject matter on their behalf—and the materials identifying that person must follow. On the sole ground that materials on the time of succession are lacking, one cannot assert that the succession is fixed as one after the reference point in time; conversely, the circumstance that the fact of succession was not stated is left to the conditions of the presumption prescribed in paragraph (2). Even judged in this way, unless the object of succession, the time of succession, or the identity of the parties is confirmed, the final determination remains undetermined.
2.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
In the scene where Creditor B, holding a judgment against Entity A, demands that the entity's member C perform the same obligation, the question arises: if there has been a succession, does the same effect apply regardless of the point in time? If the time of succession—that is, the time of the transfer of the right to be compared with the statutory reference point in time—is left out, that question cannot be answered. Taking up the framework that distinguished the scope of effect—for the parties, and for successors, possessors of the subject matter, and others as provided by law—this section deals with the time of succession and its proof.
The relevant text is divided into two stages. This text, while limiting the subjects that receive the effect to successors, fixes the time at which that successorship must lie as after the conclusion of oral argument or after the pronouncement. That is, the fact of succession itself and the time of succession are required together.
Paragraph (2) sets up a presumption supporting that determination of time. Article 218(2) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that where the parties have not stated the fact of succession by the time they conclude oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, by the time the judgment is pronounced), the succession is presumed to have occurred after the conclusion of oral argument. This presumption is a device that deals with the time of succession, not one that brings the existence of a succession into being. Accordingly, the distinction of the statutory reference point in time under paragraph (1) and the presumption in the case of no statement under paragraph (2) must be examined separately. If the two stages are bundled together, one misses the point that the object of succession and the time of succession are each a different problem.
The strongest counterargument targets the difficulty of proof. Materials on the time of succession lie within the party's internal sphere and are difficult to verify, and if a new trial is required at every succession, enforcement can be evaded by a mere transfer of the right. This disadvantage cannot be ignored. Yet because of that difficulty, not all successions can be asserted to be successions after the conclusion of oral argument. The counterargument's proposal effectively erases the distinction of the statutory reference point in time. The author's answer is to hold this ground. The presumption remains a device dealing with the case where there is no statement, and if there is rebuttal evidence going beyond that presumption, the time of succession again becomes an object of verification.
In the synthetic scene, the relationship between Creditor B and Member C is at issue, but from this scene alone it is not fixed when C took over the obligation of Entity A. As no year, amount, or commencement date is set in the scene, the time of succession cannot be fixed. If the relationship of being a member of the entity is confirmed as an independent individual right, the conclusion that the entity's judgment binds as a matter of course changes; hence it is asked separately whether this relationship corresponds to a succession and what its time is. Accordingly, in this scene the object of succession, the time of succession, or the identity of the parties remains undetermined.
What this section permits is to examine separately the statutory reference point in time and the presumption concerning non-statement of the fact of succession, to fix the time of succession as the time of the transfer of the right to be compared with the statutory reference point in time, and to determine accordingly. What it does not permit is to sweep all successions into successions after the conclusion of oral argument merely because succession is difficult, or to apply the effect of the earlier judgment to that person as a matter of course while the fact of succession is unconfirmed. Whether one falls within the personal scope to which the effect of a final and conclusive judgment extends and possesses the proof required for execution by succession, or contests it by an action for a grant, remains a subsequent matter of procedure.
2.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
즉 당사자와 법이 정한 승계인·목적물 소지자 등의 효력 범위를 구분한다. 이 물음은 단순한 권리 이전의 사실만으로는 닫히지 않는다. 단체 A에 대한 판결을 가진 채권자 B는 단체의 구성원 C에게 같은 의무를 이행하라고 요구하는 장면에서, 누가 앞 판결의 바깥에 남는지 정하려면 권리를 이어받은 때를 법정 기준시점과 견주어 보아야 한다. 바로 그 견줌의 자리를 가리켜 승계시점이라 부른다.
판정의 근거가 되는 문언은 제218조 제1항과 제2항이다. 여기서 당사자는 확정판결의 소송 주체를, 승계인은 그 지위를 이어받은 사람을, 목적물 소지자는 당사자를 위하여 청구의 목적물을 가진 사람을 가리킨다. 같은 조 제2항은 “제1항의 경우에 당사자가 변론을 종결할 때(변론 없이 한 판결의 경우에는 판결을 선고할 때)까지 승계사실을 진술하지 아니한 때에는 변론을 종결한 뒤(변론 없이 한 판결의 경우에는 판결을 선고한 뒤)에 승계한 것으로 추정한다”(민사소송법 제218조)고 이어간다.
위 두 문언은 서로 다른 판단 단계를 맡는다. 제1항은 효력이 미치는 사람을 주체 유형으로 정하고, 제2항은 그중 승계인에 한해 승계의 때를 밝히는 절차를 둔다. 따라서 기준시점은 승계의 대상을 정하는 문언이 아니라, 승계사실의 진술 유무에 따라 승계의 때를 정하는 데 쓰인다. 변론종결 뒤의 승계인이라고 적힌 문언은 모든 승계를 변론종결 뒤에 일어난 것으로 바꾸는 뜻이 아니다. 당사자가 기준시점까지 승계사실을 진술하지 않은 경우에만 뒤 승계로 추정한다는 조건이 별도로 붙어 있다. 이 두 단계를 나누어 보아야 승계사실을 진술한 경우와 그렇지 않은 경우를 같은 취급으로 끌고 가지 않는다.
이 구분이 가장 큰 불편을 남기는 자리는 증명의 부담이다. 승계의 대상·시점이나 당사자 동일성이 확인되지 않으면 앞 판결을 그 사람에게 집행할 길이 열리지 않고, 집행을 막으려는 쪽이 오히려 승계의 때를 은폐할 수 있다는 손실이 뒤따른다. 그러나 모든 승계를 변론종결 뒤 승계로 단정할 수는 없다. 그와 같은 단정은 승계사실을 기준시점까지 진술한 사람에게 문언이 정한 예외를 지우는 결과가 된다. 판단 근거는 확정판결의 효력 범위와 승계의 때에 관한 문언으로 한정한다.
합성 장면에서 채권자 B가 요구하는 것은 단체 A에 대한 판결의 효력이 구성원 C에게 미치는지 여부이다. 그런데 제218조 제1항이 적은 당사자·승계인·목적물 소지자 중 어느 유형에 C가 드는지, 그리고 승계였다면 제2항의 기준시점까지 승계사실을 진술했는지가 장면에 적혀 있지 않다. 따라서 C가 단체 구성원이라는 관계만으로 자동으로 효력 범위에 드는지는 이 장면만으로 확정할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 제218조 제1항과 제2항의 문언이 판결 효력의 인적 범위와 승계의 때를 나누어 정한다는 것이고, 허용하지 않는 것은 기준시점의 존재만으로 모든 승계를 변론종결 뒤로 돌리는 판단이다. 문언상의 추정은 승계사실 미진술이라는 조건에 묶여 있으며, 그 조건이 채워졌는지 아닌지는 이 장면만으로 가려지지 않는다.
2.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
앞 절에서는 변론종결 등 법정 기준시점과 승계사실 미진술에 관한 추정을 나누어 보아야 한다는 점과 그 근거가 민사소송법 제218조의 문언임을 확인했다. 이제 단체 A에 대한 판결을 가진 채권자 B는 단체의 구성원 C에게 같은 의무를 이행하라고 요구하는 장면에서, 승계했다면 시점에 상관없이 같은 효력이 미치는가라는 물음에 맞추어 살핀다. 이 물음의 답은 승계시점이 무엇을 뜻하는지를 먼저 정해야 갈린다.
그 기준이 되는 문언을 먼저 둔다. 이 문언은 확정판결의 효력이 미치는 주체를 당사자, 정해진 시점 뒤의 승계인, 그를 위하여 청구의 목적물을 소지한 사람으로 나누어 적는다. 여기서 승계인에 붙은 "변론을 종결한 뒤의"라는 한정은 시점에 상관없다는 쪽을 가리키지 않고, 권리 이전의 때를 어떤 기준과 견주어 보아야 함을 예정한다.
이 문언을 이 장면의 결론에 이을 때, 저자는 승계시점을 법정 기준시점과 비교할 권리 이전의 때로 정한다. 이 정의는 단순한 연월일의 기록이 아니라, 그 이전이 앞인가 뒤인가를 가를 좌표를 뜻한다. 같은 조문 안에서 효력의 대상이 되는 주체를 적는 문언(제1항)과, 미진술에 따른 법적 평가를 정하는 문언(제2항)이 서로 다른 일을 하기 때문이다. 그래서 변론종결 등 법정 기준시점과 승계사실 미진술에 관한 추정을 나누어 보아야 하며, 하나의 승계사실만 가지고 두 가지를 한꺼번에 단정할 수 없다.
이 구별에는 분명한 불편이 따른다. 승계시점 자료가 당사자 내부에 있어 확인이 어렵기 때문이다. 자료가 없는 쪽은 자기에게 유리한 시점을 보이지 못해 판결 효력의 바깥으로 밀릴 수 있고, 상대방은 그 틈을 이용해 앞 판결을 회피하는 수단으로 삼기도 한다. 저자가 여기에 대해 내놓는 답은 좁다. 확인이 어려운 사정을 들어 시점의 구별 자체를 없애면, 이미 그 시점 앞에서 권리를 이어받은 사람까지 같은 처리를 당하게 되기 때문이다.
이 점을 합성 장면에 놓고 보면, 채권자 B와 구성원 C 사이에서 정해져야 할 것은 단지 단체 구성원이라는 관계가 아니라 C가 권리를 이어받았다면 그 이전의 때가 어느 쪽인지이다. 다만 이 장면만으로는 승계의 대상·시점이나 당사자 동일성이 확인되지 않은 채로 남는다. 따라서 장면만으로는 어느 쪽의 시간인지 가릴 수 없고, 전소 당사자, 기준시점, 승계 자료, 집행문, 단체와 구성원 관계에 비추어 판단한다.
따라서 이 절이 허용하는 것은 승계시점을 법정 기준시점과 견주어 보는 판단이고, 허용하지 않는 것은 승계의 유무만 가지고 같은 효력이 언제나 미친다고 보는 일이다. 이는 변론종결 등 법정 기준시점과 승계사실 미진술에 관한 추정을 나누어 보아야 한다는 결론을 지지한다. 판결 효력과 승계집행의 인적 연결의 작동과 차단과 미확정은 어떻게 구별되는가?
2.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
이전 분석에서 당사자와 법이 정한 승계인·목적물 소지자 등 효력 범위를 구분한 터에, 이번에는 그 구분이 실제 연결로 이어지는지를 묻는다. 합성 장면은 단체 A에 대한 판결을 가진 채권자 B가 단체의 구성원 C에게 같은 의무를 이행하라고 요구하는 경우다. 여기서 B의 요구가 판결 효력의 바탕을 얻으려면 C가 어느 범위에 놓이는지가 문제로 남는다. 판결 효력과 승계집행의 인적 연결의 실효·차단·미확정을 어떻게 구별하는가?
해당 문언은 민사소송법 제218조 제1항이 정한 바와 같다. “확정판결은 당사자, 변론을 종결한 뒤의 승계인(변론 없이 한 판결의 경우에는 판결을 선고한 뒤의 승계인) 또는 그를 위하여 청구의 목적물을 소지한 사람에 대하여 효력이 미친다.” 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 당사자 자신, 변론 종결 뒤의 승계인, 그리고 당사자를 위하여 청구의 목적물을 소지하는 사람이다. 행위 기준은 승계와 목적물의 보유이며, 조건은 확정판결의 효력이 미치는 인적 범위에 드는 것이다. 민사소송법 제218조 제2항은 승계사실 진술이 없던 때를 다룬다. 당사자가 변론 종결 때까지 승계사실을 진술하지 아니한 때에는 변론 종결 뒤에 승계한 것으로 추정한다.
이 문언과 앞서 나눈 결론을 잇는 줄기는 인적 범위의 확인이다. 효력이 미치는 법정 인적 범위에 들고 승계집행에 필요한 증명을 갖추거나 부여의 소로 다투는 경우에 판결의 연결이 열린다. 반면 경제적 관련만 있고 법정 효력 범위나 승계 근거가 없어 그 사람에게 앞 판결을 집행할 수 없는 경우에 막힌다. 여기서 경제적 관련이라 함은 이해관계나 이해의 방향을 뜻할 뿐, 법정 인적 범위의 성립 요건을 대신하지 못한다. 아울러 변론종결 등 법정 기준시점과 승계사실 미진술에 관한 추정은 구별되어야 한다. 전자가 권리 이전의 때를 비교하는 기준이라면, 후자는 진술이 없던 경우의 절차적 정리를 뜻하며 둘은 같은 판단이 아니다.
승계시점 자료가 당사자 내부에 있어 확인이 어렵다는 반론은 실무의 큰 불편을 겨냥한다. 자료가 내부에 묶여 있으면 C가 승계의 경위를 밝히기 어렵고, B 역시 앞 판결에 의존해 이행을 구하는 데 지장을 받는다. 더 나아가 승계마다 새 재판을 요구하면 권리이전만으로 집행을 피할 수 있다는 손실이 제기된다. 그러나 이 반론은 권리이전만으로 집행을 피할 수 있다는 결과를 막기 위하여, 판정 기준을 느슨하게 만들 것을 요구하는 셈이다. 앞의 답은 그렇더라도 모든 승계를 변론종결 뒤 승계로 단정할 수는 없다는 것이다. 미진술 추정은 진술이 없던 경우를 위한 정리일 뿐, 앞서 확정한 법정 범위와 증명의 요건을 지워버리지 못한다.
합성 장면에서 이 물음에 속한 사실은 B가 단체 A의 판결을 가지고 있고, 같은 의무의 이행을 구성원 C에게 요구한다는 점이다. 이 요구를 앞의 조건과 대조하면, C가 당사자인지 승계인인지 목적물 소지자인지가 먼저 가려져야 한다. 단체 A와 구성원 C의 관계가 경제적 관련에 그친다면 막히는 조건이 놓이고, 법정 인적 범위에 들고 승계집행에 필요한 증명을 갖추거나 부여의 소로 다투는 경우 열리는 조건이 검토된다. 승계의 대상·시점이나 당사자 동일성이 확인되지 않은 구간은 미확정으로 남는다. 장면만으로는 실재한 송달·이행 결과나 승계 자료의 내용이 정해지지 않았으므로, 그러한 사항은 이 장면으로 확정할 수 없다. 다만 단체 구성원이라는 관계가 독립된 개인 권리로 확인되면 단체 판결의 당연한 구속이라는 결론을 고친다는 대조는 이 물음의 경계를 표시한다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 조건부의 구별이다. 효력이 미치는 법정 인적 범위에 들고 증명을 갖추거나 부여의 소로 다투는 경우를 열리는 쪽에 두고, 경제적 관련만 있고 법정 범위나 승계 근거가 없는 경우를 막히는 쪽에 둔다. 승계의 대상·시점이나 당사자 동일성이 확인되지 않은 경우를 미확정으로 남겨두는 것도 같은 구별에 속한다. 허용되지 않는 것은 모든 승계를 변론종결 뒤 승계로 단정하여 미확정을 지워버리는 읽기다. 이와 함께 승계 대상과 시점의 미확인을 곧바로 구제 불능으로 적는 것도 이 절의 답이 아니다. 남은 기록은 전소 당사자·기준시점·승계 자료·집행문·단체와 구성원 관계이며, 그 확인 여부에 따라 구별의 자리를 놓을 수 있다.
2.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
앞의 분석이 당사자와 법이 정한 승계인, 목적물 소지자 등 효력이 미치는 사람의 범위를 나누어 둔 뒤에도 남는 물음은 하나다. 권리 이전이 언제인지에 따라 C가 앞 판결의 바깥에 놓일 수 있으므로, 승계했다면 시점에 상관없이 같은 효력이 미치는가를 따져야 한다.
이 물음에 답할 문언은 민사소송법 제218조에 있다. 이 문언은 효력이 미치는 주체를 당사자, 정해진 시점 뒤의 승계인, 그를 위하여 목적물을 소지한 사람으로 나열하며, 승계인에 관하여는 변론종결이라는 기준시점을 분명히 적시한다.
따라서 이 문언에 따라 승계사실은 승계시점, 즉 법정 기준시점과 비교할 권리 이전의 때를 기준으로 평가된다. 제218조 제2항은 "②제1항의 경우에 당사자가 변론을 종결할 때(변론 없이 한 판결의 경우에는 판결을 선고할 때)까지 승계사실을 진술하지 아니한 때에는 변론을 종결한 뒤(변론 없이 한 판결의 경우에는 판결을 선고한 뒤)에 승계한 것으로 추정한다."고 하여, 그 추정은 승계사실의 진술이 없었을 때 작동하는 별도의 장치다. 법정 기준시점 뒤 승계인이라는 요건과, 진술 부재에 따른 추정이라는 장치를 각각 둔 것은 전자가 효력의 범위를 정하고 후자가 시점의 입증을 완화하기 때문이다.
이 구별을 굳이 두는 까닭은 승계시점 자료가 당사자 내부에 있어 확인이 어렵다는 데 있다. 이는 사실과 증명의 문제다. 기준시점의 정함은 법이 정한 판단이고, 추정의 작동 여부는 진술의 유무에 달렸으므로, 자료의 부족만으로 그 둘을 한 덩어리로 봐서는 안 된다. 채권자 B가 집행하려는 상대가 법정 효력 범위에 들지 않는다면 승계자료가 아무리 부족해도 그 사람에게 앞 판결을 집행할 수 없다. 그 경계는 문언이 정한 범위에 관한 것이며, 자료가 모자란다는 사정으로 지워지지 않는다.
이 구별을 지킬 때 남는 불안은 이러하다. 승계의 시점과 자료가 대부분 당사자 쪽에 있으므로, 이를 따져 묻는 순간 권리를 이미 이어받은 사람만이 판결의 구속을 벗어나며, 그 결과 권리이전만으로 집행을 피할 수 있다는 손실이 생긴다. 그러나 이에 대해서도 모든 승계를 변론종결 뒤 승계로 단정할 수는 없다. 그렇게 단정하면 문언이 정한 기준시점의 구별과 진술 부재의 추정이라는 장치가 함께 무너진다. 집행 회피라는 우려는 전소 당사자·기준시점·승계 자료·집행문·단체와 구성원 관계 같은 기록을 모아 추정이 작동하는지 살펴보는 방식으로 다루어야 한다.
합성 장면에 등장하는 사실 가운데 이 물음에 닿는 것은 앞서 인용한 요구 하나다. B가 판결의 구속을 주장할 수 있으려면, C가 법정 효력 범위에 들거나 승계집행에 필요한 증명을 갖추거나 부여의 소로 다투어야 한다. 이 가운데 어느 쪽인지는 확인되지 않았고, 단체 구성원이라는 관계가 독립된 개인 권리로 확인되면 단체 판결의 당연한 구속이라는 결론을 고친다. 승계의 대상·시점이나 당사자 동일성이 확인되지 않은 채 남는 것은 미확정으로 두어야 하며, 이것은 곧바로 구제 불능의 판단이 아니다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 이 둘을 나누어 보는 판단, 다시 말해 기준시점의 문언을 따르되 진술 부재의 추정을 별도로 두는 판단이다. 허용되지 않는 것은 모든 승계를 한 시점으로 묶어 효력을 확정하는 판단이다. 승계의 대상·시점이나 당사자 동일성이 확인되지 않는 한, 확정된 것은 구별의 기준뿐이며 그 적용의 결론은 남아 있는 것이다.