Summary
An execution clause against a successor requires that the succession be manifest or be proved by certificates.
5.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
The logic that the effect continues and the document to be presented to the enforcement authority are two different thresholds. As seen in the preceding section, that decision distinguished the unincorporated association from its individual members and held that the res judicata of a judgment against the association does not of course extend to an individual. If the effect of a judgment extends, can execution proceed immediately; and what is the criterion by which the channel of this remedy opens? In the scene where creditor B, holding a judgment against association A, demands that C, a member of the association, perform the same obligation, the question is whether B's demand can reach the entrance to the execution procedure.
As to this question, Article 31 of the Civil Execution Act provides: "Article 31 (Enforcement Instrument for a Successor) (1) An enforcement instrument may be issued for a successor of the creditor indicated in the judgment, or may be issued for enforcement against a successor of the debtor indicated in the judgment. Provided, That this shall apply only where the succession is a fact obvious to the court, or where the succession has been proved by a written certificate." It adds: "(2) Where the succession under paragraph (1) is a fact obvious to the court, this shall be entered in the enforcement instrument." In this wording, the party that issues the enforcement instrument is the court that issues it, the act is the issuance of an enforcement instrument for a successor, and the conditions are the obviousness of the succession or proof by a written certificate.
Connecting this Article with the conclusion reached earlier, the enforcement instrument for a successor is an enforcement instrument that permits enforcement for or against a successor, and thus is not a document that by itself brings the enforceability of the preceding judgment to the successor. Accordingly, the entrance to this remedy opens where one falls within the legally prescribed personal scope to which the effect extends and has the proof required for execution by succession, or where one contests the matter through an action for issuance. Whether the performance demanded, the parties, and the conditions are specified in the claim and whether one can defend the right of the chosen action is a separate determination, and one must distinguish confirming the personal scope from obtaining the proof.
Meanwhile, where the substantive succession is clear but formal proof may delay the remedy, the formal requirement may appear to turn its back on the substance of the transfer of right; and if a new trial were required for every succession, the loss would remain that execution could be evaded by a mere transfer of right. Even so, one cannot write that a mere assertion of transfer of right satisfies the requirements for the issuance of an enforcement instrument for a successor. If one were to regard the requirements as met on the basis of assertion alone, disregarding the requirements of obviousness and a written certificate demanded by the above Article, one would lose together the framework of judgment of the enforcement authority that relies on the enforcement instrument and the convenience contrasted with it.
What is demanded of B in the synthetic scene above is performance toward C, a member of the association, and the parties to the prior action, the reference date, the materials of succession, the enforcement instrument, and the relationship between the association and its members become the materials of judgment. On the premise of the preceding section, namely that the res judicata of a judgment against association A does not of course extend to C as an individual, C is not confirmed as a successor falling within the legally prescribed personal scope to which the effect extends, and B's demand lies in the case where there is only an economic connection and no ground of succession. Yet because the synthetic scene does not confirm the object or time of the succession or the identity of the parties, the matter remains undetermined.
What this section permits is the opening of the entrance on the premise of a case where the obviousness of the succession or proof by a written certificate has been obtained as a condition for the issuance of an enforcement instrument for a successor; what it does not permit is connecting the enforcement of the preceding judgment against C merely on the basis of the relationship of being a member of the association or an assertion of transfer of right. That said, whether execution by succession is forever barred where a written certificate is insufficient remains outside the determination of this section.
5.2The Conditions That Block Relief
Having divided the personal scope to which the effect of a judgment extends, one must now confirm the threshold of documents lying before a creditor who, even though within that scope, actually seeks to begin execution. Creditor B, holding a judgment against association A, demands that C, a member of the association, perform the same obligation. In this scene, the question remains whether B's demand can lead directly to the execution procedure relying on the preceding judgment alone.
The wording corresponding to this question is found in Article 31 of the Civil Execution Act. Paragraph (1) states: "An enforcement instrument may be issued for a successor of the creditor indicated in the judgment, or may be issued for enforcement against a successor of the debtor indicated in the judgment. Provided, That this shall apply only where the succession is a fact obvious to the court, or where the succession has been proved by a written certificate." In this wording, the party that issues the enforcement instrument is the authority that grants it, and the object is a successor of the creditor or debtor indicated in the judgment. For a person outside the parties to the preceding judgment to receive or suffer enforcement following that judgment, that person must be able to link the status of successor to the parties to the preceding judgment.
The reason for requiring that link is the criterion of decision at this stage. An enforcement instrument for a successor means an enforcement instrument that permits enforcement for or against a successor. That is, the enforcement instrument for a successor does not newly create the effect of the preceding judgment, but is a document that opens up for use in enforcement the relationship extending from the already indicated parties to the successor. Therefore, where there is only an economic connection and no scope of legal effect or ground of succession, so that the preceding judgment cannot be enforced against that person, if even one of the statutory requirements is not met, the channel of remedy closes. Here the requirements are bound by the wording that this shall apply only where the succession is a fact obvious to the court or where the succession has been proved by a written certificate.
The strongest of the counterarguments arises from the point that where the substantive succession is clear, formal proof may delay the remedy. The loss aimed at by that counterargument is the inconvenience that, even after the right has already passed over, the successor cannot begin enforcement while obtaining a written certificate, and the debtor may in the meantime move assets and withdraw from actual performance. The concern that if a new trial were required for every succession, execution could be evaded by a mere transfer of right stands in the same place. Even so, though weight is given to this counterargument, the statutory wording does not disappear. Conviction as to substance and the proof to be used in enforcement are not placed as the same thing at this stage.
Returning to the scene, the only thing that appears from the scene is that B is the creditor of the preceding judgment and that C is a member of association A, the debtor indicated in that judgment. However, among the parties to the prior action, the reference date, the materials of succession, the enforcement instrument, and the relationship between the association and its members, the scene points to no material showing that there was a succession between association A and member C, no records that the succession was a fact obvious to the court, and no written certificate. The premise accepted by the preceding section is that the res judicata of a judgment against the association does not of course extend to an individual member; accordingly, enforcement against C turns on the personal link of being a successor. If that link is not confirmed, this scene alone cannot determine whether the requirements for the issuance of an enforcement instrument for a successor have been met.
Accordingly, the conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. The channel for the issuance of an enforcement instrument opens where one falls within the legally prescribed personal scope to which the effect of the judgment extends and has the proof required for execution by succession, or where one contests the matter through an action for issuance. Conversely, where there is only an economic connection and no scope of legal effect or ground of succession, so that the preceding judgment cannot be enforced against that person, the channel does not open at this stage. One cannot definitively state that the execution is forever closed merely because there is no written certificate.
5.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
If the effect of a judgment extends, can execution proceed immediately? In this scene, on which side the connection of effect is established touches upon the present question. The enforcement authority does not conjecture the logic of effect but decides through documents. Therefore, the question narrows down to whether enforcement begins as soon as the effect extends, and where the boundary lies that cannot be determined for want of materials.
An enforcement instrument for a successor requires the obviousness of the succession or proof by a written certificate. Article 31 of the Civil Execution Act provides: "An enforcement instrument may be issued for a successor of the creditor indicated in the judgment, or may be issued for enforcement against a successor of the debtor indicated in the judgment. Provided, That this shall apply only where the succession is a fact obvious to the court, or where the succession has been proved by a written certificate." Here the creditor and debtor indicated in the judgment are the parties to the prior action, and the successor is the person who has taken over that status. The condition that this be a fact obvious to the court or be proved by a written certificate attaches both to the enforcement instrument for a successor and to the enforcement instrument against a successor.
This wording neither presumes nor doubts the existence of the succession, and places the scope to which the effect of the judgment extends and the issuance of an enforcement instrument for a successor as separate stages of decision. The enforcement instrument for a successor is one that permits enforcement for or against a successor, and that document is not produced automatically merely because the effect extends. Accordingly, the task of confirming the connection of effect and the task of obtaining the document necessary for enforcement must be distinguished. Even after the former is established, the latter separately passes the threshold of a fact obvious to the court or a written certificate.
Where the substantive succession is clear, formal proof may delay the remedy. This delay is the inconvenience that even where the right appears to have actually been transferred over, the door to enforcing that right opens late. The enforcement instrument is the channel for enforcing a judgment rendered against the parties to the prior action as far as the successor, and therefore the connection cannot be treated as confirmed by assertion alone. The burden of delay pointed out by the counterargument remains as it stands.
In this scene it has not been confirmed whether C is a successor of association A, or whether C falls within the scope to which the effect of that judgment extends. The parties to the prior action, the reference date, the materials of succession, the enforcement instrument, and the relationship between the association and its members become the materials of judgment, and their content has not been determined. Matters as to which the object or time of the succession or the identity of the parties has not been confirmed are in a state of insufficient materials, and this is distinct from grounds for definitively stating that the judgment does not have effect on C.
What this section permits is the judgment of leaving undetermined, as distinct from impossibility, matters as to which the object or time of the succession or the identity of the parties has not been confirmed. This section does not reach the conclusion of fixing that execution is impossible despite the same absence of materials, nor does it reach the conclusion of leaving open, without confirming the requirements of the enforcement instrument for a successor at the threshold of a fact obvious to the court or a written certificate. If the relationship of being a member of the association is confirmed as an independent individual right, the conclusion of the natural binding effect of the judgment against the association changes. If a written certificate is insufficient, is execution by succession forever barred?
5.4The Records Needed for Determination
If the parties to the prior action, the reference date, the materials of succession, the enforcement instrument, and the relationship between the association and its members are not entered in the records, the stage of execution has not yet opened. To answer this question, one examines separately the work of confirming the scope of effect and the work of obtaining the records necessary for enforcement. The premise is the conclusion that the association and the individual member are distinguished.
Concerning the enforcement instrument for a successor, Article 31 of the Civil Execution Act writes as follows: "An enforcement instrument may be issued for a successor of the creditor indicated in the judgment, or may be issued for enforcement against a successor of the debtor indicated in the judgment. Provided, That this shall apply only where the succession is a fact obvious to the court, or where the succession has been proved by a written certificate." Here the successor means the person who has taken over the right or obligation of the party indicated in the judgment, and the enforcement instrument for a successor is an enforcement instrument that permits enforcement for or against that successor. Under the proviso, it may be issued only where the succession is a fact obvious to the court or where the succession has been proved by a written certificate.
What this wording requires is the fact that the criterion for determining the scope of the effect of the judgment and the records for the issuance of the enforcement instrument differ from one another. The former indicates which persons fall under the binding force of the preceding judgment; the latter is the question of proving to the enforcement authority that the person is the person concerned by the specified succession. The author's conclusion is that these two cannot be combined into one. One decides only on the materials recorded in the parties to the prior action, the reference date, the materials of succession, the enforcement instrument, and the relationship between the association and its members, and does not fill missing records by conjecture. If the materials are wanting, the matter merely remains undetermined.
The strongest of the counterarguments aims at the reality that formal proof follows behind substantive succession at a distance. If the fact of succession is actually clear but the remedy is delayed because a written certificate cannot be obtained, the formal requirement could become a channel for evading execution by taking transfer of right as its means. This disadvantage must not be erased, because Article 31 demands the basis of proof, and the persuasiveness of an assertion and proof by records are distinguished.
In the synthetic scene, creditor B holds a judgment against association A and demands that member C perform the same obligation. Because it is a judgment against association A, the effect of that judgment is against the association, and member C is not a party indicated in that judgment. Accordingly, to enforce the preceding judgment against C, one requires either falling within the legal scope of effect or records connecting the materials of succession and the enforcement instrument. Even if there are materials recording the relationship between the association and its member, one cannot definitively state that they as such correspond to the obviousness of the succession or to a written certificate. If the object or time of the succession of C or the identity of the parties is not confirmed, the determination at this stage is undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is that the stage of execution by succession can be determined only where the specified records have been obtained, and that an assertion of transfer of right or the mere relationship of being a member of the association cannot open that stage. Conversely, the very circumstance that there are no records is not immediately taken as a ground for the impossibility of remedy. If the relationship of being a member of the association is confirmed as an independent individual right, the conclusion of the natural binding effect of the judgment against the association is corrected.
5.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
In this scene, the questions are whether the demand of creditor B leads immediately to execution, and what change overturns the determination of the preceding stage.
The wording corresponding to this question is Article 31 of the Civil Execution Act. "Article 31 (Enforcement Instrument for a Successor) (1) An enforcement instrument may be issued for a successor of the creditor indicated in the judgment, or may be issued for enforcement against a successor of the debtor indicated in the judgment. Provided, That this shall apply only where the succession is a fact obvious to the court, or where the succession has been proved by a written certificate." This wording indicates the party and the object for which an enforcement instrument is issued, namely a successor of the party indicated in the judgment, and takes as a condition that the succession is a fact obvious to the court or is proved by a written certificate.
The reason that condition is required lies in the character of the enforcement instrument for a successor as one that permits enforcement for or against a successor. This definition separates 'upon whom the effect falls,' which the preceding stage handled, from 'who receives the document permitting enforcement,' which the present stage handles. The preceding conclusion that the res judicata of a judgment against the association does not of course extend to an individual member does not carry over under the same name to the issuance of an enforcement instrument against an individual. Here the threshold of the obviousness of the succession or proof by a written certificate is separately set.
The counterargument put most forcefully is this: that where the substantive succession is clear, formal proof may delay the remedy. That the succession actually took place is not disputed between the parties, but if execution is postponed by the lack of a single written certificate, does not the transfer of right itself become a means of evading execution? The inconvenience that formal proof may cause delay is acknowledged, but no conclusion is drawn that lowers the threshold on the basis of assertion alone.
Returning to the synthetic scene, the demand of creditor B rests on a judgment against association A and consists in seeking to enforce that judgment directly against member C. In the relationship where the association and its members are distinguished, C has never been confirmed as a successor of the party indicated in the judgment. In this scene where the object or time of the succession or the identity of the parties is not confirmed, the possibility of issuing an enforcement instrument for a successor remains undetermined. Only when the parties to the prior action, the reference date, the materials of succession, the enforcement instrument, and the relationship between the association and its members are confirmed together does that determination stand.
The conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. If the relationship of being a member of the association is confirmed as an independent individual right, the conclusion of the natural binding effect of the judgment against the association is corrected; and if the specified change is confirmed, the existing judgment of blocking or effectiveness is discarded and the determination is made anew from that stage onward. What is not permitted is the judgment that one may enforce against an individual merely by the relationship of being a member of the association, or that the requirements of the enforcement instrument for a successor are met merely by an assertion of succession.
5.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
Following the question of whether execution may be carried out immediately once the judgment's effect extends, I must examine where formal proof stands in the scene in which Creditor B, on the basis of a judgment against Organization A, demands of Member C, a member of the organization, the performance of the same obligation. That is, the question delimiting the scope of the effect and the threshold of the procedure for obtaining an enforcement clause are placed at different stages.
The statutory text corresponding to this question is Article 31 of the Civil Execution Act. Paragraph (1) provides that an enforcement clause may be issued for a successor to the creditor indicated in the judgment, or may be issued for enforcement against a successor to the debtor indicated in the judgment, but attaches the proviso that this shall apply only where the succession is a fact obvious to the court or where the succession has been proved by a documentary proof. Here, the successor refers to a person who has succeeded to the status of the creditor or debtor indicated in the judgment, and the documentary proof means a document substantiating the fact of succession.
This proviso is the provision that clarifies what a successor enforcement clause is. A successor enforcement clause is an enforcement clause permitting enforcement for or against a successor, and the mere assertion by the successor of a transfer of rights cannot be said to satisfy its issuance requirements. The proviso to paragraph (1) separately requires two branches: the court's state of awareness as to the obviousness of the succession, and proof by means of a documentary proof through the production of a document. These two branches do not state the same condition twice, but distinguish the routes by which the enforcement agency confirms the fact of succession. Paragraph (2) adds that where the succession under paragraph (1) is a fact obvious to the court, this shall be entered in the enforcement clause, thereby separately prescribing the duty of entry when the route of obviousness is followed.
The Counterarguments that, where the substantive succession is clear, formal proof may delay relief, are directed here at a concrete inconvenience. Where neither party denies the fact that the rights have already passed and the materials are to some extent in place, if issuance of the enforcement clause is delayed solely on the ground that the documentary proof is incomplete, the creditor loses the proper occasion for recovery, and the debtor gains room in the meantime to move assets. Further, the concern is also placed alongside that if a new trial is required for every succession, enforcement could be avoided merely by transferring rights. Even so, it cannot be stated that the issuance requirements for a successor enforcement clause are satisfied by a mere assertion of transfer of rights, and the disadvantage of delay pointed out by the Counterarguments remains unabated.
In the synthetic scene, only the fact is fixed that Creditor B, holding a judgment against Organization A, demands of Member C, a member of the organization, the performance of the same obligation. In this scene, one can only contrast with the condition that, for an enforcement clause to be issued, that succession must be a fact obvious to the court or the succession must be proved by a documentary proof. However, how the rights were actually transferred between B and C, what the object and timing of that succession were, and what documents were prepared as the documentary proof, are unverified. Accordingly, on the basis of this scene alone, whether a successor enforcement clause may be issued cannot be determined, and that part remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. The issuance requirements for a successor enforcement clause require the obviousness of the succession or proof by a documentary proof, and it cannot be stated that a mere assertion of transfer of rights satisfies those requirements. The fact that the inconvenience of formal proof delaying relief is acknowledged does not mean that the requirements themselves disappear, and a state in which the materials are still insufficient is not immediately a declaration of no remedy.
5.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
In this scene, the question is whether, even assuming that the scope within which the judgment obtained by Creditor B against Organization A already has its effect has been determined, execution against Member C immediately becomes possible. Although the preceding section reached the conclusion that the mere assertion that rights were transferred cannot be said to satisfy the issuance requirements for a successor enforcement clause, the present question goes one step back and asks whether the scope of the judgment's effect in personam and the requirements for the enforcement clause to be delivered to the enforcement agency are the same. The determination of whom the judgment's effect reaches and the determination of what documents must be in place in order to translate that effect into actual execution constitute different thresholds.
The text that sets this threshold is Article 31 of the Civil Execution Act. It provides: "An enforcement clause may be issued for a successor to the creditor indicated in the judgment, or may be issued for enforcement against a successor to the debtor indicated in the judgment: Provided, That this shall apply only where the succession is a fact obvious to the court, or where the succession has been proved by a documentary proof," and paragraph (2) adds: "Where the succession under paragraph (1) is a fact obvious to the court, this shall be entered in the enforcement clause" (Article 31 of the Civil Execution Act). The actor spoken of here is a successor to the creditor or debtor indicated in the judgment, and the act is the issuance of an enforcement clause for that successor or the issuance of an enforcement clause for enforcement against that successor. The condition is that it applies only where the succession is a fact obvious to the court or the succession has been proved by a documentary proof.
What this text requires is not a re-determination of the scope of the judgment's effect, but proof for transcribing into the enforcement clause the fact that there exists a successor falling within that scope. Accordingly, the legal route is opened only for a person who falls within the statutory personal scope to which the effect extends and who possesses, or is granted through an action for such grant, the proof required for successor enforcement. A successor enforcement clause means an enforcement clause permitting enforcement for or against a successor, and this clause is a document that connects the effect of the judgment to the person who is the successor, not the effect of the judgment itself. The reason the two routes of the obviousness of the succession or proof by a documentary proof were placed separately is that the conclusion that the effect has been carried over and the conclusion that this can be presented in documentary form before the enforcement agency are not the same. The connection of the effect is a matter of determination, and the issuance of the enforcement clause is a matter of documents.
If so, it is difficult to deny that, where the substantive succession is clear, formal proof may delay relief. Where the rights have already passed, if proof to be furnished by the successor is separately required, a clear transfer of rights alone in the relation with the parties to the prior action cannot commence execution, and to that extent realization of the right is delayed. Further, the counterargument that requiring a new trial for every succession would allow enforcement to be avoided merely by transferring rights connects with this. Notwithstanding such losses and inconvenience, Article 31 of the Civil Execution Act provides that an enforcement clause may be issued only where the succession is a fact obvious to the court or has been proved by a documentary proof (Article 31 of the Civil Execution Act). Therefore, it cannot be stated that the issuance requirements for a successor enforcement clause are satisfied by a mere assertion of transfer of rights. While acknowledging the delay in relief pointed out by the counterargument, the requirements cannot be shifted in the direction of failing to distinguish assertion from proof.
Contrasting this with the synthetic scene, what Creditor B holds is a judgment against Organization A, and only a person who falls within the statutory personal scope to which its effect extends and who possesses the ground and materials of succession may enforce that earlier judgment. As to the parties to the prior action, the reference time, the succession materials, the enforcement clause, and the nature of the relationship between the organization and its member, nothing has been fixed by the present records. That the relationship of membership in the organization is confirmed as an independent individual right is indeed a condition for revising the conclusion that the organization's judgment naturally binds them, but that alone does not confirm the object or timing of the succession. Where there is only an economic connection and no statutory scope of effect or ground of succession, so that the earlier judgment cannot be enforced against that person, the route of successor enforcement is closed, and the parts as to which the object or timing of the succession, or the identity of the parties, remains unconfirmed are left undetermined. However, the mere fact that the materials are insufficient does not itself mean that no remedy is available.
Accordingly, the mere fact that the judgment's effect extends does not automatically satisfy the documentary requirements before the enforcement agency. The conclusion this section permits is that, when one falls within the scope of the judgment's effect and possesses the obviousness of the succession or proof by a documentary proof, one may obtain a successor enforcement clause and proceed to execution; the conclusion it does not permit is that, by falling within the scope of the effect alone, those requirements are deemed satisfied and execution may proceed immediately. Whether enforcement following succession is forever barred when the documentary proof is insufficient is also outside the scope of this section.
5.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
That conclusion holds that the res judicata of an organization's judgment does not naturally extend to the individual members, and here that determination is not re-argued. In this scene, B's demand is directly connected to the question asking whether execution may proceed immediately once the judgment's effect extends. This question asks that the problem of defining the scope of the effect and the problem of securing the documents that enable execution be viewed as different thresholds. For even if the personal connection between B and C is confirmed, one cannot say that the papers to be presented to the enforcement agency are in place as well.
It provides: "Where the succession under paragraph (1) is a fact obvious to the court, this shall be entered in the enforcement clause." The actor indicated by this text is a successor to the creditor or debtor indicated in the judgment, and the act is the issuance of an enforcement clause for that successor or for enforcement against them. That enforcement clause is precisely the successor enforcement clause, and it means an enforcement clause permitting enforcement for or against a successor. The condition permitting issuance of the enforcement clause is limited to the case where the succession is a fact obvious to the court or the succession has been proved by a documentary proof. This section deals only with the proof requirements of this text and does not expound the other issues addressed by the provision.
The core that connects the above text with the conclusion of this section lies in distinguishing the stage of determining the effect from the stage that enables execution. Determining whether one falls within the statutory personal scope to which the judgment's effect extends is, as fixed earlier, a matter of viewing Organization A and Member C separately, and whether a successor enforcement clause may be obtained is a matter of separately satisfying the requirements of the document permitting enforcement for or against that person. Hence, a successor enforcement clause requires the obviousness of the succession or proof by a documentary proof, and the answer to whether execution may proceed immediately once the judgment's effect extends is not determined by the scope of the effect alone, but requires that proof to be in place as well. These two distinctions create no new requirement or exception, but read as they stand the structure by which the provision places side by side the connection termed succession and the documentary requirement of proof of succession.
The strongest counterargument is directed at the point that, where the substantive succession is clear, formal proof may delay relief. The concern that requiring a new trial for every succession would allow enforcement to be avoided merely by transferring rights stands in the same place as this counterargument. The inconvenience does not disappear that, while the creditor has confirmed the actual transfer of rights, time passes and performance is delayed because the creditor cannot obtain an enforcement clause for want of the formality of a documentary proof. Even so, the conclusion cannot be changed within the scope of this question. For it cannot be stated that the mere assertion of a transfer of rights satisfies the issuance requirements for a successor enforcement clause. While acknowledging the delay in relief pointed out by the counterargument, it cannot be said that the threshold required by Article 31, namely the obviousness of the succession or proof by a documentary proof, is replaced by assertion alone.
In the synthetic scene, the facts belonging to this question are the relationship of demand between B and C, and the place of the records that would be set behind it: the judgment, the succession materials, and the enforcement clause. Since B's demand starts from the judgment against Organization A, natural binding effect upon C individually cannot be assumed, as handed down above. Where the proof requirements of the successor enforcement clause overlap here, obtaining an enforcement clause permitting enforcement for or against C separately requires the confirmation of the obviousness of the succession or of a documentary proof. From the scene alone, the object or timing of the succession, or the identity of the parties, remains unconfirmed, and the year, the amount, or the starting date of the term, as well as the fruits of actual execution, has not been set. Accordingly, what enforcement clause B's demand will lead to, and whether a documentary proof is prepared, remain undetermined. The parties to the prior action, the reference time, the succession materials, the enforcement clause, and the relationship between the organization and its members serve as materials for the determination.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. The task of defining the scope within which the judgment's effect extends and the task of translating that effect into actual execution must be viewed separately, and at the latter place the successor enforcement clause, as an enforcement clause permitting enforcement for or against a successor, is required to have the obviousness of the succession or proof by a documentary proof. Conversely, the conclusion this section does not permit is the attitude of treating the proof requirements as fulfilled merely by a determination that one falls within the scope of the effect or by a mere assertion of a transfer of rights. The circumstance that a documentary proof is not yet available means only that this threshold has not been met, and how enforcement following succession stands when the documentary proof is insufficient is not determined in this section.
5.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
앞 단계가 확인한 것은 판결의 효력 범위와 실제 집행을 구별해야 한다는 점이다. 합성 장면에서 채권자 B는 단체 A에 대한 판결을 이미 가지고 있다. B의 요구는 그 판결의 이름으로 단체의 구성원 C를 묶는 것이다. 효력이 이어진다는 논리와 집행기관에 제시할 문서가 서로 갈라지는 자리에서 판결 효력과 승계집행의 인적 연결이 판정되어야 한다.
이 물음에 대한 문언은 민사집행법 제31조이다. 그 제1항은 집행문을 판결에 표시된 채권자의 승계인을 위하여 내어 주거나 판결에 표시된 채무자의 승계인에 대한 집행을 위하여 내어 줄 수 있다고 규정한다(민사집행법 제31조). 승계집행문에는 승계의 명백성 또는 증명서에 의한 증명이 요구된다. 제31조는 그 승계가 법원에 명백한 사실이거나 증명서로 승계를 증명한 때에 한하여 판결에 표시된 채권자의 승계인을 위하여 또는 판결에 표시된 채무자의 승계인에 대한 집행을 위하여 집행문을 내어 줄 수 있다고 규정한다.
이 문언은 두 가지를 따로 요구한다. 첫째는 판결 효력이 미치면 즉시 집행할 수 있는가에 대한 판결의 인적 범위 판단이고, 둘째는 승계인을 위한 또는 그에 대한 집행을 허용하는 집행문을 받기 위한 승계의 증명이다. 제31조는 그 승계가 법원에 명백한 사실이거나 증명서로 증명된 때에 한해 승계집행문을 내어 줄 수 있다(민사집행법 제31조). 두 판단은 각자 근거를 따로 요구하지만 이 둘 중 하나만으로 그 판결의 이름으로 구성원 C를 묶는 결론에 이르지는 못한다.
이 절의 가장 강한 반론은 형식 증명이 구제를 늦출 수 있다는 점을 겨냥한다. 실체적 승계가 분명한데 승계의 명백성과 증명서라는 형식 요건이 구제를 늦출 수 있다. 그렇더라도 이 절의 결론은 권리를 이전했다는 주장만으로 승계집행문 발급 요건을 충족했다고 쓸 수 없다는 것이다. 형식 증명이 가져오는 불편은 반론에 유리한 측면이지만, 판결 효력의 인적 범위와 승계의 증명은 별개의 문제이다. 승계의 증명으로 이미 확정된 판결의 인적 범위까지 넓힐 수는 없다. 이미 정해진 효력 범위는 승계의 증명만으로 자동으로 넓어지지 않으므로 이 절의 결론은 유지된다.
판결 효력의 인적 범위 판정에 승계집행문 발급 요건과 승계의 증명을 대조하면 이렇다. 채권자 B의 판결은 단체 A에 대한 것이다. B가 승계의 명백성이나 증명서로 승계를 증명해 승계집행문을 받는다고 하더라도 제31조가 요구하는 것은 승계인에 대한 집행문의 요건이다. 단체 구성원 C는 이 문언상 채권자 B의 승계인에 해당하지 않는다. 증명서로 승계를 증명했다는 점은 C에 대한 인적 연결을 독립된 권리 근거로 확인하는 데 필요하지 않은 수준을 넘어설 수 없다. 다만 승계의 대상·시점이 확인되지 않았으므로 승계집행문이 실제로 C에 대해 어떤 형태로 발급되었는지는 장면으로 판단할 수 없다.
이 절에서 허용되는 결론은 좁다. 승계집행문 발급 요건과 판결 효력의 인적 범위 판정은 별개의 문제이다. 승계의 명백성이나 증명서로 승계를 증명했다는 점은 승계인에 대한 집행문을 받기 위한 요건일 뿐이고, 해당 문언은 판결 효력과 승계집행의 인적 연결의 판정 근거로 쓰인다. 권리를 이전했다는 주장만으로 승계집행문 발급 요건을 충족했다고 쓰는 결론은 이 절이 허용하지 않는다.
5.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
그 앞 단계에서는 판결 효력이 미치는 인적 범위와 곧바로 집행할 수 있는지를 분리하여 살폈고, 단체 판결의 기판력이 구성원 개인에게 당연히 미치지 않는다는 점을 받아들였다. 이제는 그 효력이 어떤 경로로 누구에게 이어진다고 말할 수 있는지, 그리고 그 이어짐을 집행기관 앞에서 문서로 보여 주어야 하는지를 하나의 장면에서 묻는다. 이 장면에서 B의 요구는 판결 효력의 인적 범위를 넘어서는 명령이며, 그 명령이 집행으로 이어지려면 판결 효력과 승계집행의 인적 연결 안에서 다시 나누어 판정할 부분이 무엇인지 밝혀야 한다.
이 물음에 대응하는 해당 원문은 민사집행법 제31조 승계집행문 조항이다. 해당 조문 제1항은 집행문을 판결에 표시된 채권자의 승계인을 위하여 내어 주거나 판결에 표시된 채무자의 승계인에 대한 집행을 위하여 내어 줄 수 있다고 규정한다. 다만 그 승계가 법원에 명백한 사실이거나 증명서로 승계를 증명한 때에 한한다고 단서를 달았다(민사집행법 제31조). 여기서 말하는 주체는 판결에 표시된 채권자 또는 채무자의 승계인이며, 행위는 그 승계인을 위한 집행문의 발급이나 그에 대한 집행을 위한 집행문의 발급이다. 조건은 승계의 법원에 대한 명백성 또는 증명서에 의한 증명이며, 그 밖의 다른 쟁점은 이 조문의 해설 범위에 넣지 않는다. 같은 조 제2항은 그 승계가 법원에 명백한 사실인 때에는 이를 집행문에 적어야 한다고 덧붙인다(민사집행법 제31조).
조문이 요구하는 승계의 명백성 또는 증명서에 의한 증명이라는 문언은 단계 안의 세부 구분을 세우는 근거가 된다. 저자는 승계집행문이란 승계인을 위한 또는 그에 대한 집행을 허용하는 집행문을 뜻한다고 정의하며, 이 정의 자체가 효력의 귀속 문제와 집행문의 발급 문제를 구별한다. 효력이 어느 사람에게 미친다고 말하는 것은 그 사람을 판결의 인적 범위 안에 두는 판단인 반면, 승계집행문의 발급은 집행기관이 앞 판결을 그 승계인에 대해 집행하는 문서를 내어 주는 별도의 통로이기 때문이다. 이 두 판단을 한 덩어리로 다루면 효력의 귀속을 확인한 것이 곧 집행 요건을 갖춘 것으로 보게 된다. 단계 안의 세부 구분은 작동하는 경우, 막히는 경우, 미확정인 경우에 한정한다. 작동하는 경우는 효력이 미치는 법정 인적 범위에 들고 승계집행에 필요한 증명을 갖추거나 부여의 소로 다투는 경우이고, 막히는 경우는 경제적 관련만 있고 법정 효력 범위나 승계 근거가 없어 그 사람에게 앞 판결을 집행할 수 없는 경우이며, 미확정인 경우는 승계의 대상과 시점이나 당사자 동일성이 확인되지 않은 경우이다.
실체적 승계가 분명한데 형식 증명이 구제를 늦출 수 있다는 반론은 증명 요건이 만들어 내는 지연과 비용의 손실을 겨냥한다. 이 반론은 권리를 이미 넘겨받은 사람이 금방 받아야 할 구제를 증명서 한 장 때문에 받지 못한다는 점, 그리고 승계마다 새 재판을 요구하면 권리이전만으로 집행을 피할 수 있다는 점을 함께 꼬집는다. 형식 요건이 실체를 가로막을 때 생기는 불편과, 채무자가 권리 이전을 방패 삼아 집행을 끌 수 있다는 공정의 가치가 이 반론의 바탕에 놓인다. 그러나 저자는 그 불리한 부분을 지우지 않은 채로 권한 이전 주장만으로 승계집행문 발급 요건을 충족했다고 쓸 수는 없다고 답한다. 조문이 요구하는 것은 승계의 법원에 대한 명백성 또는 증명서에 의한 증명이므로, 주장만으로 그 요건을 갖춘 것으로 기록할 수 없다. 증명이 늦어지는 손실은 인정되지만, 그 손실을 줄이려는 방식이 요건 자체를 주장으로 대체하는 방식이어서는 안 되며, 부여의 소로 다투는 통로는 별도로 열려 있다.
이 조건들을 합성 장면에 적용하면 B의 요구가 어디에 놓이는지가 분명해진다. B가 가진 판결은 단체 A에 대한 것이며, B와 C 사이에 승계의 대상·시점이 확정된 기록은 장면에 나타나지 않았다. 전소 당사자, 기준시점, 승계 자료, 집행문, 단체와 구성원 관계에 비추어 보아도 승계의 대상과 시점이나 당사자 동일성은 미확인 상태로 남는다. 따라서 C에게 앞 판결을 집행하려면 작동하는 경우의 증명을 갖추었거나 부여의 소로 다투는 경로를 밝혀야 하지만, 이 장면만으로는 그 충족 여부를 확정할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 효력의 인적 범위와 승계집행문의 발급을 서로 다른 문턱으로 다루고, 작동하는 경우·막히는 경우·미확정인 경우의 조건에 따라 그 안에서 나누어 판정하는 것으로 한정된다. 효력이 미치는 범위에 들었다는 확인만으로 집행문이 당연히 따라온다고 말할 수 없고, 반대로 증명이 미비하다는 이유로 권리 이전을 주장하는 모든 사람이 집행 요건을 갖춘 것으로 볼 수도 없다. 권리 이전 주장만으로 승계집행문 발급 요건을 충족했다고 쓰는 것은 이 절이 허용하지 않는다. 미확인 항목이 남아 있어도 명시한 조건의 구별은 유지되며, 증명 자료가 없다는 사실이 곧 영원한 구제 불능을 뜻하지 않는다는 확정은 이 절의 범위 밖에 놓인다.
5.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
그 결론은 판결 효력이 미치면 그 범위 안에서 곧바로 집행할 수 있다는 뜻은 아니라고 본다. 이제 판결 효력과 승계집행의 인적 연결이 열리거나 막히거나 확인되지 않는 경우를 어떤 기준으로 갈라야 하는지가 남는다. 그 구별은 단체 판결을 가진 채권자와 구성원 사이의 요구에 바로 적용되어야 한다.
그 발급 대상은 판결에 표시된 당사자에서 그 승계인으로 넘어간 자리이고, 넘어간 사실이 법원에 명백하거나 증명서로 입증되어야 한다.
이 문언은 승계가 있었다는 이야기와 그 승계로 앞 판결의 집행을 잇는 것을 구별한다. 판결 효력이 미치는 법정 인적 범위에 들고 승계집행에 필요한 증명을 갖추거나 부여의 소로 다투는 경우에 연결이 열린다. 경제적 관련만 있고 법정 효력 범위나 승계 근거가 없어 그 사람에게 앞 판결을 집행할 수 없는 경우에는 연결이 막힌다. 권리 이전의 주장과 집행문 발급의 요건이 같은 것이 아니라는 점이 이 구별의 이유다.
실체적 승계가 분명한데 형식 증명이 구제를 늦출 수 있다는 반론은 권리가 이미 넘어갔는데 문서를 갖추지 못한 채권자가 기다려야 하는 손실을 겨냥한다. 승계마다 새 재판을 요구하면 권리이전만으로 집행을 피할 수 있다는 점도 함께 지적된다. 그 주장은 문언이 요구하는 법원에 대한 명백성이나 증명서의 제출로 바로 바뀌지 않으며, 절차상 서류의 부족은 아직 확정되지 않은 상태로 남는다.
이 장면에서 채권자 B는 단체 A에 대한 판결을 가지고 단체의 구성원 C에게 같은 의무의 이행을 요구한다. 이 요구는 전소 당사자·기준시점·승계 자료·집행문·단체와 구성원 관계의 기록과 대조되어야 한다. 앞 절이 정리한 전제는 해당 판례가 비법인사단과 구성원 개인을 구별하고 단체 판결의 기판력이 개인에게 당연히 미치지 않는다고 본다는 것이다. 따라서 단체에 대한 판결의 효력이 구성원 C에게 당연히 미친다는 근거가 없는 한, C에 대한 집행은 막힌 쪽에 놓인다. 승계의 대상·시점이나 당사자 동일성이 확인되지 않은 부분은 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 효력이 미치는 법정 인적 범위와 승계의 근거가 갖추어진 경우의 연결이고, 허용하지 않는 것은 경제적 관련이나 권리 이전의 주장만으로 앞 판결을 특정인에게 집행하는 것이다. 증명서가 없거나 승계의 대상이 확인되지 않은 상태는 영구한 차단이 아니라 아직 확정되지 않은 상태로 둔다. 이 구별은 판결 효력이 미치면 즉시 집행할 수 있는가라는 물음에 대한 답변이며, 다른 절차의 요건이나 구제의 성과까지 확정하지 않는다.
5.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
앞 단계에서 해당 판례는 비법인사단과 구성원 개인을 구별하고 단체 판결의 기판력이 개인에게 당연히 미치지 않는다고 본 점만 넘어온다. 이제 단체 A에 대한 판결을 가진 채권자 B는 단체의 구성원 C에게 같은 의무를 이행하라고 요구하는 장면에서, 판결 효력이 미치면 즉시 집행할 수 있는가라는 물음이 남는다.
이 물음에 대해서는 해당 문언이 좁은 문턱을 제시한다. 「민사집행법 제31조」 제1항은 집행문을 채권자의 승계인을 위하여 내어 주거나 채무자의 승계인에 대한 집행을 위하여 내어 줄 수 있다고 하면서, 다만 그 승계가 법원에 명백한 사실이거나 증명서로 승계를 증명한 때에 한한다고 적는다. 같은 조 제2항은 승계가 법원에 명백한 사실인 때에는 이를 집행문에 적어야 한다고 덧붙인다. 여기서 ‘승계인’이란 판결에 표시된 채권자 또는 채무자의 지위를 넘겨받은 사람이다.
이 문언은 판결의 인적 효력 범위와 집행을 가능하게 하는 서류의 갖춤을 구별한다. 앞 단계에서 비법인사단과 구성원 개인이 구별되었고 단체 판결의 기판력이 개인에게 당연히 미치지 않는다고 본 것은 효력 범위에 관한 판단이다. 반면 제31조가 요구하는 것은 그 범위 안에서 승계라는 연결 고리가 법원에 명백한 사실이거나 증명서로 증명된 때인지에 관한 판단이다. 권리가 넘어간다고 말하는 것과 그 이전을 집행문 발급 단계에서 보여 주는 것은 같은 일이 아니다.
형식 증명을 요구하는 탓에 실체적 승계가 분명한데도 구제가 늦어지는 불편은 크다. 그렇더라도 저자의 답은 변하지 않는다. 채권자 B가 단체 A의 지위가 개인 C에게 넘어갔다고 주장하는 것만으로는 제31조 제1항 단서가 정한 명백성 또는 증명에 이르렀다고 할 수 없다. 다만 이 답은 증명서가 없으면 영구히 집행이 막힌다는 뜻은 아니다. 이러한 막힘은 서류상의 막힘에 그친다.
이 장면에 보이는 사실만으로도 이 구별은 드러난다. 장면의 판단 자료는 전소 당사자, 기준시점, 승계 자료, 집행문, 단체와 구성원의 관계이며, C가 언제 어떻게 단체 A의 지위를 승계했는지, 채권자 B와 C 사이에서 승계의 대상과 시점이 무엇인지 확인되어 있지 않다. 만약 단체 구성원이라는 관계가 독립된 개인 권리로 확인되면 단체 판결의 당연한 구속이라는 결론은 달라지지만, 장면만으로는 그 확인이 이루어진 바 없으므로 이 항목은 미확정으로 남는다.
따라서 이 절이 허용하는 결론은 승계가 법원에 명백한 사실이거나 증명서로 증명된 때에 한해 승계집행문이 발급될 수 있다는 것이고, 허용하지 않는 결론은 권리 이전 주장만으로 그 요건을 충족했다고 보는 것이다. 형식 증명이 구제를 늦춘다는 점은 사라지지 않으며, 남은 자료가 없어 확인되지 않는 상태는 구제 불능과 같은 것이 아니다.