Summary
The statutory grounds for and prima facie proof of registration on the register form a procedure that reveals whether performance has occurred, and differ from the receipt of performance.
5.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
Placing non-performance on the public record is not the same act as paying money. Creditor A holds a title entitling him to demand payment of money, but he does not know the executable property of debtor B. Earlier, the applicant confirmed the premise of the procedure that he must specify the institutions and organizations to be queried and pay the costs in advance. What must be asked now is what sort of procedure registration on the register reveals, and what the threshold for entering that procedure is set at. The register of delinquent debtors means a register on which registration is made on statutory grounds of default.
Article 70 of the Civil Execution Act provides that "if the debtor falls under any one of the following subparagraphs, the creditor may apply to have the debtor placed on the register of delinquent debtors," and then enumerates grounds such as "where the debtor fails to perform the obligation within 6 months after the enforceable title of execution ordering payment of money has become final and conclusive, or after the enforceable title of execution has been drawn up" (Article 70 of the Civil Execution Act). Here the actor is the creditor, the act is an application for registration, and the condition is the existence of a statutory ground of default. Paragraph (2) of the same Article adds that "when making an application under paragraph (1), the applicant shall substantiate the ground therefor" (Article 70 of the Civil Execution Act). This wording addresses only the requirements of application and substantiation for registration.
Connecting the above wording to the conclusion makes clear the distinction that this is a procedure revealing whether performance has occurred, and that it differs from receipt of performance. Where one holds a monetary title of execution enabling an application for disclosure of property and satisfies the initiation requirements, and has specified the grounds for inquiry and the target institutions, the entrance to this remedy is opened. Substantiation of the grounds for registration is a matter of revealing the debtor's default, while the realization of performance is a separate stage. Not mixing the two judgments is the way to see this threshold accurately.
Meanwhile, it is difficult to deny that the pressure of registration may promote voluntary performance. The concern that protection of the debtor's information may assist in concealing property and shift search costs onto the creditor also remains with equal weight. Yet even if registration has the effect of pressuring performance, a decision of registration cannot be converted into complete recovery of the claim. Registration is only a record of whether performance occurred and does not signify receipt of performance; accordingly, the moment the effect of pressure is read as the achievement of recovery, the stages of the procedure become mixed up.
In the synthetic scene, creditor A holds a title ordering payment of money but does not know the executable property of debtor B. In this situation, the statutory grounds for registration on the register and their substantiation may reveal that performance did not occur, but they do not confirm the result of money reaching A's hands. What the actual reply contains, and whether any institution is missing from the scope of inquiry, cannot be determined from this scene alone. The fact that such material is undetermined does not mean that the remedy is unavailable.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. The grounds for registration on the register and their substantiation constitute a procedure revealing the absence of performance and must be distinguished from receiving performance; and the entrance to this remedy opens on the condition that one holds a monetary title of execution, satisfies the initiation requirements, and specifies the grounds for inquiry and the target institutions. Since registration itself does not mean recovery, one cannot say that a claim has been recovered on the basis of registration alone. Where there is only provisional execution and it becomes a final title subject to disclosure, the threshold of the information procedure is reassessed.
5.2The Conditions That Block Relief
In this scene, the creditor stands in a position where he must discover the debtor's property rather than receive performance. Since the measure of placing the debtor on the register does not itself produce the result of receipt of performance, the question is under what conditions the remedial channel opens and closes. The statutory grounds for registration on the register and their substantiation are a procedure revealing whether performance has occurred and differ from receipt of performance.
That wording limits the grounds for an application for registration. Article 70, paragraph (1) of the Civil Execution Act provides: "① If the debtor falls under any one of the following subparagraphs, the creditor may apply to have the debtor placed on the register of delinquent debtors." As grounds it lists: "1. Where the debtor fails to perform the obligation within 6 months after the enforceable title of execution ordering payment of money has become final and conclusive, or after the enforceable title of execution has been drawn up; except in cases of enforceable titles of execution prescribed in the proviso to Article 61, paragraph (1);" and it also lists: "2. Where the debtor falls under any of the grounds listed in the subparagraphs of Article 68, paragraph (1) or any of the grounds in paragraph (9) of the same Article" (Article 70 of the Civil Execution Act). In this wording, the applicant is the creditor, the target is a debtor falling under the above grounds, and the act is applying to have the debtor placed on the register. Paragraph (2) provides: "② When making an application under paragraph (1), the applicant shall substantiate the ground therefor" (Article 70 of the Civil Execution Act). Substantiation is merely a requirement that reveals the existence of the ground; it is not receipt of performance.
The link joining this wording to the conclusion of this section is that the stages of the procedure differ from one another. Even if the grounds for registration are revealed through substantiation and registration is carried out, the result is limited to a public record of the fact of default. By contrast, the receipt of performance that the creditor desires is a matter of another stage: finding the debtor's property and obtaining satisfaction out of that property. The author distinguishes these two stages and takes the view that performance cannot be deemed accomplished merely because the requirements for the grounds of registration have been met and substantiation has been completed. Where one holds only a provisional execution title, which is excluded from disclosure of property, or where the additional statutory grounds for inquiry are absent so that the relevant information procedure cannot be used, if even one of the statutory requirements is unmet, the remedial channel closes. That the channel is closed does not mean that receipt of performance is permanently blocked, but that this information procedure cannot be used at present.
The counterargument that the pressure of registration may promote voluntary performance is rooted in substantive inconvenience. It points out that protection of the debtor's information may assist in concealing property and shift search costs onto the creditor. The publicizing effect of registration on the register may burden the debtor and cause him to satisfy the debt voluntarily, and if in that process there is no need to go searching for property, that is a beneficial outcome for the creditor. The author responds, however, that even if that pressure has the possibility of drawing out voluntary performance, a decision of registration cannot be converted into complete recovery of the claim. If the pressure does not work and the debtor does not satisfy the debt, the creditor remains in the state of not having received performance. While leaving the search costs and the protection of information that the counterargument points out as they are, the conclusion that registration does not substitute for receipt of performance is maintained.
In the synthetic scene, the only facts that can be confirmed are that creditor A holds a title ordering payment of money and does not know the executable property of debtor B. From this scene alone it cannot be determined whether the enforceable title of execution is a final monetary title, whether the disclosure of property procedure has run its course, whether a list of property has been submitted, whether the grounds for inquiry and the target institutions have been specified, or whether an institution has replied. Accordingly, whether the case falls under any of the above grounds, whether substantiation is possible, and whether the statutory channel for access to property information opens are not determined by this scene alone. The items remaining undetermined are left as they are, while the narrow conclusion already established holds as written.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow: even if the grounds for registration are met and substantiation is in place, registration on the register does not substitute for receipt of performance; and where one holds only a provisional execution title, which is excluded from disclosure of property, or where the additional statutory grounds for inquiry are absent so that the relevant information procedure cannot be used, if even one of the statutory requirements is unmet, the remedial channel closes. From the mere fact that the threshold has closed, one cannot assert that the claim has become permanently unrecoverable; conversely, from the mere fact that registration has occurred, one cannot deem recovery complete. One cannot add satisfaction of the grounds or success of substantiation from facts absent from the scene.
5.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Under the procedural premise that the applicant must specify the institutions and organizations to be queried and pay the costs in advance, the part that this stage bears within the question of whether a claim is recovered once one is placed on the register of defaulting debtors is this: where lies the boundary that cannot be settled for want of materials of judgment?
Article 70, paragraph (1) of the Civil Execution Act provides: "① If the debtor falls under any one of the following subparagraphs, the creditor may apply to have the debtor placed on the register of delinquent debtors. 1. Where the debtor fails to perform the obligation within 6 months after the enforceable title of execution ordering payment of money has become final and conclusive, or after the enforceable title of execution has been drawn up; except in cases of enforceable titles of execution prescribed in the proviso to Article 61, paragraph (1). 2. Where the debtor falls under any of the grounds listed in the subparagraphs of Article 68, paragraph (1) or any of the grounds in paragraph (9) of the same Article." What this wording prescribes is this: the actor is the creditor who may apply, the target is the debtor falling under the grounds, and the act is applying to have the debtor placed on the register. The condition is limited to cases falling under one of the grounds in the respective subparagraphs.
Paragraph (2) of the same Article provides: "② When making an application under paragraph (1), the applicant shall substantiate the ground therefor." Substantiation is the stage of revealing through materials the ground on which the application rests, and this is a matter separate from receipt of performance. Registration goes no further than recording default on the public record, and the wording prescribes no result of specifying the debtor's property or securing money out of that property. Accordingly, substantiation of the grounds for registration and completion of recovery must be distinguished rather than bound together into a single stage of judgment.
The detriment or reputational loss that the register entry inflicts on the debtor can be a motive drawing out actual performance, and the structure whereby the creditor must bear those search costs in his stead has also been pointed out. The inconvenience that protection of the debtor's information may assist in concealing property and shift search costs onto the creditor also remains as it is. Even so, a decision of registration cannot be converted into complete recovery of the claim. Even if the possibility of pressure is confirmed, registration itself cannot be converted into receipt of performance, and whether recovery has occurred must be judged on separate materials.
In the synthetic scene, creditor A holds a title for payment of money but does not know the executable property of debtor B. Among the kind of enforceable title of execution, the course of disclosure of property, the list of property, the grounds for inquiry, the target institutions, and the reply, where the scope of the reply and whether any inquiry target is omitted cannot be known, the materials of judgment themselves are unspecified. In this case, a lack of materials does not immediately mean unavailability of relief or permanent impossibility of execution, and it must be kept as undetermined, distinct from confirmed facts. Herein lies the reason why matters that cannot be settled for want of materials and cases where the procedure itself is blocked cannot be merged into one state and judged together.
Where the scope of the reply and whether any inquiry target is omitted cannot be known, matters for which the materials of judgment are unspecified are left as undetermined, distinguished from impossibility. The register of defaulting debtors means a register on which registration is made on statutory grounds of default, and it cannot be asserted that such registration leads to recovery of the claim. Conversely, the existence of unverified materials does not permit a determination that recovery is permanently impossible. A conclusion converting a decision of registration into complete recovery of the claim is not permissible.
5.4The Records Needed for Determination
In such a scene, can the fact alone that the debtor has been placed on the register of defaulting debtors determine how far the recovery stage has advanced? The present question is not the meaning of registration itself, but by what record it shall be fixed how far the recovery process has progressed. Accordingly, to speak of the progress of the stage, one must first examine the statutory grounds for placing a debtor on the register.
Article 70, paragraph (1) of the Civil Execution Act provides: "if the debtor falls under any one of the following subparagraphs, the creditor may apply to have the debtor placed on the register of delinquent debtors." The applicant indicated by this wording is the monetary creditor, and the target is the debtor against whom there is a final monetary enforceable title of execution. Subparagraph 1 of the same paragraph gives as a ground "where the debtor fails to perform the obligation within 6 months after the enforceable title of execution ordering payment of money has become final and conclusive, or after the enforceable title of execution has been drawn up" (Article 70 of the Civil Execution Act). Subparagraph 2 draws in the grounds listed in the subparagraphs of Article 68, paragraph (1) or the grounds in paragraph (9) of the same Article (Article 70 of the Civil Execution Act). And Article 70, paragraph (2) requires that "when making an application under paragraph (1), the applicant shall substantiate the ground therefor" (Article 70 of the Civil Execution Act).
These provisions explain only the gateway to an application for registration and prescribe nothing as to receipt of performance. Substantiation means revealing the ground for the application; it does not mean specifying the debtor's property or attaching and converting it into money. Hence, in assessing the stage, two things must be separated: one is whether the procedure recording default on the public record stands; the other is whether the creditor has actually received performance. The latter does not follow from the wording of the former. Accordingly, the stage is assessed solely on the basis of materials recorded in the kind of enforceable title of execution, the course of disclosure of property, the list of property, the grounds for inquiry, the target institutions, and the reply. Missing records are not filled in by presumption. Here, the register of defaulting debtors means a register on which registration is made on statutory grounds of default.
From the standpoint of debtor B, the disadvantage of having his name remain on the register may operate as a cost that cannot be ignored, and this may help in realizing the title entitling the creditor to demand payment of money. The concern that protection of the debtor's information may assist in concealing property and shift search costs onto the creditor is persuasive in the same direction. The question whether pressure creates the motivation to perform, and the question whether recovery has actually occurred, are different matters. Even if registration is accomplished, the fact that performance has been received must be shown separately.
What can be confirmed in the synthetic scene is only that A is the creditor holding a title to demand payment of money, that B is that debtor, and that A does not know B's executable property. On this fact alone it cannot be known whether a list of property has been submitted, whether an application was made to some institution specifying the grounds for inquiry, or whether a reply has come. Whether the grounds for inquiry and the target institutions have been specified also lies outside the sentences of this scene. Accordingly, whether the statutory grounds for an application for registration are in place, what substantiation contained, and whether the disclosure of property procedure has run its course remain undetermined. Where the scope of the reply and whether any inquiry target is omitted cannot be known, the stage is not fixed.
The conclusions permitted in this section are the distinction that registration on the register is merely a procedure publicly revealing whether performance has occurred and differs from receipt of performance, and the judgment that completion of recovery cannot be declared on the sole basis of whether registration has occurred. The fact that registration has not occurred does not close the path to recovery of the claim, and the fact that registration has occurred does not mean that money has come in. Items for which no record remains are left as undetermined, while confirmed items must be read only within the scope confirmed. Conversely, the absence of a record itself must not be read as a determination of impossibility of execution.
5.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
In a scene such as this, the starting point of the present question is to confirm the distance between the measure of placing a debtor on the register and actual recovery. Under the condition that the applicant must specify the institutions or organizations to be inquired of and must pay the costs in advance, it must be asked separately what registration accomplishes and what it does not.
"(1) Where a debtor falls under any of the following subparagraphs, the creditor may apply for registration of the debtor in the Register of Debtors in Default: 1. Where the debtor fails to perform the debt within 6 months after an enforcement title ordering payment of money has become final and conclusive, or after such enforcement title has been prepared; except in cases of enforcement titles prescribed in the proviso to Article 61(1). 2. Where any ground under each subparagraph of Article 68(1) or under paragraph (9) of the same Article applies" (Article 70 of the Civil Execution Act) so provides. This provision designates the person entitled to apply as the creditor, the subject act as an application for registration in the register, and the requirements as an enforcement title ordering payment of money and non-performance over a prescribed period. Paragraph (2) of the same Article requires that "(2) When making the application under paragraph (1), the applicant shall make a prima facie showing of the grounds therefor" (Article 70 of the Civil Execution Act). What the prima facie showing indicates is the existence or non-existence of the grounds for registration, and not confirmation of the fact that the debtor has paid money.
Connecting this basis with the conclusion of this section, registration is the stage of creating a public record of non-performance, and recovery is the stage of actually receiving money pursuant to the enforcement title. The Register of Debtors in Default means the register in which registration is made according to statutory grounds of non-performance, and this definition already distinguishes the character of the two stages. Even when a registration decision is rendered, it does not lead to the fact that money has entered the creditor's hands; if it is judged as completed recovery, the conditions that the two stages must treat differently are lumped into one. If this distinction is missed, the procedural meaning of registration and the substantive effect of receipt of performance become entangled, and the question of this section, which asks about the threshold of the information procedure, is also blurred. It is therefore necessary to place the judgment confirming registration and the judgment confirming recovery side by side.
The counterargument points out that the pressure of registration may promote the debtor's voluntary performance. This observation also touches upon the disadvantage that protecting the debtor's information may assist concealment of property and shift search costs onto the creditor. The possibility that registration creates psychological pressure and induces some debtors to pay of their own accord is not denied. However, the circumstance that performance occurred in that way cannot be substituted for a judgment that recovery has been completed. The effect of pressure and the receipt of performance are separate facts, and converting a registration decision into completed recovery of the claim on the basis of the former alone, without confirming the latter, lies outside the conclusion of this section. Leaving intact the costs and inconvenience the counterargument points out, it only narrowly fixes the meaning of registration.
In a synthetic scene, Creditor A holds an enforcement title ordering payment of money and does not know the executable property of Debtor B. The facts confirmed here are only the existence of the enforcement title and the absence of property information, and the grounds for the application for registration, whether the prima facie showing was made, or the content of any reply are not settled by this scene. If the situation "where there is only provisional execution and it changes to a final enforcement title for which disclosure is available, the threshold of the information procedure is reconsidered" is confirmed, the foregoing judgment is examined anew. If that change is not confirmed, it remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is the distinction that the statutory grounds for registration in the register and the prima facie showing are a procedure that reveals whether performance has been made and are different from receipt of performance, and the limitation that a registration decision cannot be converted into completed recovery of the claim. What it does not permit is a judgment that reads registration itself as the achievement of recovery, or that draws out an unverified fact of performance from the registration. If a change of the enforcement title is confirmed, the threshold of the information procedure is to be reconsidered, but the extent that cannot be known as to the scope of the replies and whether inquiry targets were omitted remains undetermined.
5.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
In the preceding step, whether being placed on the roll of debtors in default is the same as the claim being recovered was examined separately. The question addressed next is that the pressure of registration may promote voluntary performance, and the strongest counterargument is that protecting the debtor's information may assist concealment of property and shift search costs onto the creditor. How is one to answer that problem of pressure and cost-shifting? It cannot be answered without converting registration itself into recovery.
Article 70(1) of the Civil Execution Act enumerates the grounds on which a creditor may apply for registration of a debtor in the Register of Debtors in Default. One of those grounds is "where the debtor fails to perform the debt within 6 months after an enforcement title ordering payment of money has become final and conclusive, or after such enforcement title has been prepared," and the proviso excludes enforcement titles under the proviso to Article 61(1). Here, the person designated by the statutory text is the creditor making the application, the act is an application for registration on grounds of non-performance, and the condition is satisfying the requirements of an enforcement title and a period of non-performance. Paragraph (2) of the same Article then provides that "the applicant shall make a prima facie showing of the grounds therefor," so that the applicant takes the grounds for registration as the subject of the prima facie showing (Article 70 of the Civil Execution Act).
What the above provision addresses is a procedure that reveals whether the debtor has fallen into a state of non-performance on prescribed grounds and thereby enables an application, and it is separate from the stage at which the creditor receives performance. The prima facie showing is a device that brings the existence or non-existence of the grounds to light at the application stage, and the registration decision is a disposition that records the debtor in the register pursuant to those grounds. The reason the two stages must be distinguished is that the former lies in creating a public record of the fact of non-performance, while the latter lies in the creditor's actually receiving satisfaction. Only within the scope of not reading registration as recovery, as in the conclusion of the preceding section, can one speak of the effect of pressure. Accordingly, a registration decision cannot be converted into completed recovery of the claim.
The most persuasive counterargument targets the structure of costs. If the debtor's property information is protected robustly, the creditor must go around inquiring of institutions one by one and bear search costs, and in that gap property may be concealed. This disadvantage is real and is not erased. Yet this counterargument does not serve as grounds for elevating a registration decision to recovery. Even if pressure may in fact induce voluntary performance, the result is performance, and the nature of registration itself does not change. As in the premise of the preceding section, since the applicant must specify the institutions or organizations to be inquired of and pay the costs in advance, the cost burden of the information procedure remains a separate question of conditions. Unless the cost problem is absorbed into the meaning of registration, a registration decision cannot be converted into completed recovery of the claim.
In a synthetic scene, the facts relevant to this question are that Creditor A holds an enforcement title and does not know the executable property of Debtor B, and no year, amount, or commencement date has been set. Whether the grounds and the prima facie showing requirements for an application for registration are satisfied in this scene, and what replies came after registration, remain undetermined. Whether registration led on to recovery cannot be judged from this scene alone. Only one condition change is compared: if a state of having only provisional execution changes to a final enforcement title for which disclosure is available, the threshold of the information procedure is reconsidered. A change in the enforcement title does not convert the registration decision into recovery.
The conclusions permitted in this section are that the statutory grounds for registration in the register and the prima facie showing, as a procedure revealing whether performance has been made, are distinct from receipt of performance, and that even in cases where the pressure of registration promotes voluntary performance, that distinction does not disappear. The conclusion not permitted is to regard the claim as having reached completed recovery merely on the circumstance that registration was made. The existence or non-existence of the grounds for registration, the sufficiency of the prima facie showing, and the scope of the replies each remain matters to be judged separately.
5.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
Although the conclusion was reached in the preceding section that a registration decision cannot be converted into completed recovery of the claim, on what standard that judgment rests must be separately made clear. In this scene, when one is placed on the Register of Debtors in Default, is the claim recovered?
Article 70(1) of the Civil Execution Act provides "(1) Where a debtor falls under any of the following subparagraphs, the creditor may apply for registration of the debtor in the Register of Debtors in Default," and then enumerates the grounds: "1. Where the debtor fails to perform the debt within 6 months after an enforcement title ordering payment of money has become final and conclusive, or after such enforcement title has been prepared; except in cases of enforcement titles prescribed in the proviso to Article 61(1)" (Article 70 of the Civil Execution Act). The subject of this provision is the creditor who applies, the object is the debtor in whom a specified ground of non-performance has appeared, and the act is applying to the court for registration.
Paragraph (2) of the same Article adds: "(2) When making the application under paragraph (1), the applicant shall make a prima facie showing of the grounds therefor" (Article 70 of the Civil Execution Act). What the prima facie showing requires is the existence or non-existence of the grounds for registration, and whether the creditor has actually received performance is not the subject of examination in this application. If the former is the stage of publicly confirming the debtor's state of non-performance, the latter is the stage at which the creditor actually receives performance according to the content of the enforcement title, so they can only be judged separately.
Of course, the pressure of registration may promote voluntary performance. If a credit-related burden is placed on the debtor, a flow may arise in which the remaining debt is repaid to avoid that burden, and this may save the creditor the time and cost involved in receiving cash. It is also difficult to deny that protecting the debtor's information may assist concealment of property and shift search costs onto the creditor. Yet the effect of such pressure concerns the atmosphere that registration may foster, and does not itself create the fact that performance has been rendered. Accordingly, a registration decision cannot be converted into completed recovery of the claim.
The facts confirmed in a synthetic scene are only that A holds an enforcement title for payment of money while not knowing the executable property of B; when and on what grounds B failed to perform, and what materials were submitted with the application for registration, are not fixed. The type of enforcement title, the lapse of the period for disclosure of property, the list of property, the reason for inquiry, the target institutions, and the replies have merely been placed as items of the records to be confirmed, and this is not an assertion that collected records exist. Accordingly, whether the requirements for registration are met in this scene, or whether the stage of application was not even reached, remains undetermined.
In sum, what the creditor can take is the path of applying with the prima facie showing of the grounds for registration completed, and the effect of that decision ends with leaving a public record of non-performance. Conversely, it is not the conclusion of this section to regard performance as having been received at once merely because an enforcement title exists, or to treat a dismissal on procedural grounds of the application for registration as a confirmation that no debt exists. Not hastening to fix the existence or non-existence of the grounds that remain undetermined is the way to keep that boundary.
5.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
While Creditor A holds an enforcement title ordering payment of money but does not know the executable property of Debtor B, the question remains whether the claim is recovered upon being placed on the Register of Debtors in Default. Setting aside in this situation the issue of the threshold of disclosure of property, which the neighboring section addresses, what is asked now is what relation the measure of placing the debtor on a public register bears to recovery. In order to answer the question whether the claim is recovered upon being placed on the Register of Debtors in Default, one must first examine what standard the statutory grounds for registration adopt.
"(1) Where a debtor falls under any of the following subparagraphs, the creditor may apply for registration of the debtor in the Register of Debtors in Default: 1. Where the debtor fails to perform the debt within 6 months after an enforcement title ordering payment of money has become final and conclusive, or after such enforcement title has been prepared; except in cases of enforcement titles prescribed in the proviso to Article 61(1)." and "2. Where any ground under each subparagraph of Article 68(1) or under paragraph (9) of the same Article applies" are cited as grounds. Here the subject is the creditor who may apply, the object is the debtor who has failed to perform, and the condition is falling under any one of the enumerated grounds, such as non-performance of the duty to perform pursuant to a final enforcement title ordering payment of money.
What this provision requires is a prima facie showing of the grounds. Article 70(2) of the Civil Execution Act provides: "(2) When making the application under paragraph (1), the applicant shall make a prima facie showing of the grounds therefor." The subject of the prima facie showing is the ground for registration, namely the fact that the debtor failed to perform within the prescribed period. What this procedure seeks to reveal is whether performance has been made, and the confirmed conclusion is that the prima facie showing of the statutory grounds for registration in the register is a procedure that reveals whether performance has been made and is different from receipt of performance. Since receipt of performance is a matter of the creditor's actually receiving money, and registration is a matter of procedurally confirming the state of non-performance and leaving it in a public register, the two cannot be merged into the effect of the same stage.
It cannot be denied that the pressure of registration may promote the debtor's voluntary performance. If the risk of being placed on the register induces Debtor B not to delay payment, Creditor A is spared the trouble of inquiry, and the tension between the value of protecting the debtor's information and the creditor's search costs is also eased. Yet even if that pressure actually brings in money, the registration decision itself cannot be converted into completed recovery of the claim. For the effect of pressure is an incidental action that raises the possibility of later performance, whereas completed recovery means the state in which the performance has reached the creditor.
In a synthetic scene, only the fact that Creditor A holds an enforcement title for payment of money and does not know the executable property of Debtor B has been confirmed. Under these conditions, registration in the register is not a procedure for finding property, so whether the enforcement title and initiation requirements for applying for disclosure of property are satisfied, and whether the reason for inquiry and the target institutions have been specified, cannot be judged from this scene alone. Whether the condition that the applicant must specify the institutions or organizations to be inquired of and pay the costs in advance has been established is also unverified, and the results of actual performance or recovery are likewise not recorded. Only the conditional test that, if a state of having only provisional execution changes to a final enforcement title for which disclosure is available, the threshold of the information procedure is reconsidered, holds, and all other matters remain undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. The Register of Debtors in Default means the register in which registration is made according to statutory grounds of non-performance, and its grounds and prima facie showing are a procedure revealing whether the debtor has performed, not an effect of receipt of performance. Therefore, one cannot say that the claim has been recovered merely because a registration decision has been obtained; conversely, the registration procedure does not become meaningless merely because recovery failed. The conclusion that registration in the register substitutes for recovery is not one that this section permits.
5.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
이 장면 앞에서 등재와 회수가 서로 다른 일이라는 구별이 놓인다. 신청인은 조회할 기관·단체를 특정하고 비용을 미리 내야 한다. 불이행자명부에 오르면 채권이 회수되는가? 이 물음은 등재를 뒤에 따라오는 절차의 관문으로 두고 읽어야 한다. 회수의 완료를 묻는 자리와 공적 기록을 두는 자리를 같은 단계로 겹쳐 놓지 않기 위해서다. 이 절의 물음은 재산정보에 접근하는 법정 통로가 어느 문언에 걸리는지로 좁혀진다.
해당 원문 문언은 민사집행법 제70조 제1항에서 채권자가 채무자를 명부에 올리도록 신청할 수 있는 사유를 적는다. 해당 문언은 금전의 지급을 명한 집행권원이 확정된 후 또는 집행권원을 작성한 후 6월 이내에 채무를 이행하지 아니하는 때를 첫 사유로 둔다. 이어서 같은 조 제1항은 제68조제1항 각호의 사유 또는 같은 조제9항의 사유 가운데 어느 하나에 해당하는 때를 두 번째 사유로 든다. 여기서 주체는 채권자이고, 행위는 신청이며, 조건은 각호 가운데 어느 하나에 해당하는 때다. 이 문언이 다루는 것은 등재 신청의 사유이지 급부의 수령이 아니다. 민사집행법 제70조 제2항은 제1항의 신청을 할 때에는 그 사유를 소명하여야 한다고 적는다. 소명은 신청이 붙는 방식을 정하는 문언이다.
이 문언과 이 절의 결론을 이으면 등재 사유의 판정과 회수의 판정이 다른 단계에 놓인다. 민사집행법 제70조 제1항이 정하는 것은 어느 때에 신청을 열어 두는가이고, 민사집행법 제70조 제2항이 정하는 것은 신청이 그 사유를 어떻게 떠받치는가이다. 이 둘은 채무의 이행 여부를 드러내는 절차의 문을 가리킬 뿐이다. 등재에 이르는 판단이 급부를 받아들이는 결과를 대신 만들어 주는 것이 아니다. 해당 원문 문언만 재산정보에 접근하는 법정 통로의 판정 근거로 쓴다. 그래서 회수 완료를 확정하는 판단으로 문언을 밀어 넣지 않는다.
등재의 압박이 자발적 이행을 촉진할 수 있다는 반론이 겨냥하는 것은 채권자가 겪는 탐색의 불편과 시간의 소모다. 채무자의 정보 보호가 재산 은닉을 돕고 채권자에게 탐색 비용을 전가할 수 있다는 지적도 같은 방향을 가리킨다. 공적 기록이 남는 압박이 채무자를 움직여 이행을 이끌면, 회수라는 가치가 앞당겨진다는 점에서 반론은 힘을 얻는다. 그러나 그 압박이 실제로 이행을 끌어냈는지는 이 문언이 판정하도록 맡긴 자리가 아니다. 압박의 가능성은 등재 절차의 기대 효과로 남겨 두되, 회수의 확정으로 옮겨 적지 않는다. 반론이 지적한 비용 전가는 그대로 읽히지만, 그렇다고 등재 신청의 사유가 급부 수령의 요건이 되지는 않는다.
합성 장면에서 채권자 A는 금전의 지급을 명한 권원을 갖고 있다. 그 권원이 확정된 권원인지 작성된 권원인지는 정해지지 않았고, 어느 날짜에 이행기와 6월 기산점이 잡히는지도 정해지지 않았다. 민사집행법 제70조 제1항의 사유가 성립하는지는 집행권원 종류와 이행 여부의 기록에 달렸다. 민사집행법 제70조 제2항의 소명은 그 사유를 떠받칠 자료가 무엇인지 가리키는 문제로 남는다. 채무자 B의 집행 가능한 재산을 A는 알지 못한다는 사실은 이 판단에 놓인 그대로다. 등재 신청이 가능하다는 판단과 급부를 수령했다는 판단을 장면 안에서 함께 확정할 수 없다. 만약 가집행만 있는 상태가 아니라 명시 가능한 확정 권원이 확인되면 정보 절차의 문턱을 다시 판단하여야 한다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 해당 원문 문언의 범위 안에서 등재 신청의 사유와 소명을 판정 근거로 삼는 데까지다. 금전의 지급을 명한 집행권원이 확정된 후 또는 집행권원을 작성한 후 6월 이내에 채무를 이행하지 아니하는 때와, 제68조제1항 각호의 사유 또는 같은 조제9항의 사유 가운데 어느 하나에 해당하는 때가 어디에 걸리는지 판단하는 것은 이 문언이 맡는다. 허용되지 않는 결론은 등재 결정을 회수의 완료로 읽는 것이다. 다음 물음은 이 경계 바깥에서 다시 열린다.
5.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
앞선 단계에서 밝힌 절차적 효과의 한정은 그대로 두고, 이번 장면에서는 정보에 접근하는 통로 안에서 판단을 새로 나눌 자리를 찾는다. 그런데 그 자리를 어디까지 정할 것인가. 이 물음은 회수가 아니라 판정의 범위를 겨냥한다.
명부 등재의 법정 사유는 법률이 열거한 조건에 따라 정해진다. 민사집행법 제70조 제1항은 “①채무자가 다음 각호 가운데 어느 하나에 해당하면 채권자는 그 채무자를 채무불이행자명부에 올리도록 신청할 수 있다”고 정하고, 이어서 금전의 지급을 명한 집행권원이 확정된 후 또는 집행권원을 작성한 후 6월 이내에 채무를 이행하지 아니하는 때 등을 그 사유로 든다(민사집행법 제70조). 여기서 정해지는 주체는 신청하는 채권자이고, 행위는 등재 신청이며, 조건은 열거된 불이행 사유의 발생이다.
같은 조 제2항은 “②제1항의 신청을 할 때에는 그 사유를 소명하여야 한다”고 덧붙인다(민사집행법 제70조). 이 소명은 신청이 갖추어야 할 요건을 가리키며, 등재 신청의 근거가 되는 불이행 사유의 존재를 드러내는 절차이다. 앞 문단의 열거 사유가 무엇을 조건으로 삼는지 정하는 일과, 이 문단의 소명이 그 조건의 출현을 어떻게 보여 주는지 정하는 일은 서로 다른 판단 단계이다. 후자를 전자의 증명 절차로만 옮겨 놓으면, 등재 자체가 급부를 가져온다는 잘못된 등식이 생긴다.
등재의 압박이 자발적 이행을 촉진할 수 있다는 반론은 현실적인 손실과 불편에 뿌리를 둔다. 명부에 이름이 남으면 거래상의 평판이 흔들리고, 채무자로서 겪어야 할 사회적 비용이 커지므로, 그 압박이 채무를 갚게 만드는 동인이 될 수 있다는 것이다. 나아가 채권자를 보호하겠다는 명분 아래 채무자의 재산 정보를 지나치게 닫아 두면, 재산을 숨기는 일이 쉬워지고 채권자가 그 정보를 찾아 헤매는 비용을 그대로 떠안게 된다는 걱정도 이 반론에 함께 놓인다. 그러나 이런 압박과 비용 배분의 걱정에 설득력이 있더라도, 등재 결정을 채권의 회수 완료로 바꿀 수는 없다. 반론이 지적한 불이익을 지우지 않으면서도, 등재가 급부 수령과 같지 않다는 결론은 그대로 유지된다.
합성 장면으로 돌아가 보자. 채권자 A는 집행권원을 근거로 삼고 있지만, 채무자 B의 재산이 어디에 얼마나 남아 있는지는 알지 못한다. 이 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 사실은 권원의 존재와 재산 정보의 부재뿐이며, 등재 신청의 사유가 실제로 발생했는지, 어떤 기관에 조회를 요청했고 무엇이 회신되었는지는 정해져 있지 않다. 작동하는 경우는 재산명시를 신청할 수 있는 금전 권원과 개시 요건을 갖추고 조회 사유·대상 기관을 특정한 경우로, 막히는 경우는 재산명시에서 제외되는 가집행 권원만 있거나 조회의 추가 법정 사유가 없어 해당 정보 절차를 사용할 수 없는 경우로, 미확정인 경우는 회신 범위와 조회 대상 누락 여부를 알 수 없는 경우로 한정한다. 이 셋에 드는 조건은 판정 기록으로 남길 항목, 즉 집행권원 종류·재산명시 경과·재산목록·조회 사유·대상 기관과 회신과 함께 놓이고, 이 밖의 사정은 이 장면으로 확정할 수 없다.
이 절에서 허용되는 결론은 좁다. 명부 등재의 법정 사유와 소명은 이행 여부를 드러내는 절차이며 급부 수령과 다르며, 단계 안의 세부 구분은 작동하는 경우·막히는 경우·미확정인 경우로 명시한 조건에 한정된다. 반대로 허용되지 않는 결론은, 등재가 곧 회수를 뜻한다거나, 명시한 세 조건 밖에 또 다른 판단 단계가 있다는 식의 확장이다. 회신이 오지 않았다는 사정만으로 집행불능이 영구적으로 확정된다고 보는 판단 역시 이 범위 안에 담기지 않으며, 자료가 없는 상태는 미확정으로 남는다.
5.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
앞 절에서 명부 등재의 법정 사유와 소명은 이행 여부를 드러내는 절차이며 급부 수령과 다르다는 절의 결론을 넘어선다. 이런 장면에서 등재가 아무리 이루어져도 회수는 별개의 문제로 남는다. 따라서 불이행자명부에 오르면 채권이 회수되는가라는 물음이 지금 놓이는 자리는 등재의 의미가 아니라 회수로 이어지는 경로의 작동 여부다.
명부 등재를 규정한 문언은 등재 사유의 성격을 분명히 한다. 민사집행법 제70조 제1항은 “금전의 지급을 명한 집행권원이 확정된 후 또는 집행권원을 작성한 후 6월 이내에 채무를 이행하지 아니하는 때”를 등재 사유 가운데 하나로 둔다(민사집행법 제70조). 같은 항 제1호의 단서는 제61조제1항 단서에 규정된 집행권원을 제외하고, 제2호는 제68조제1항 각호의 사유 또는 같은 조제9항의 사유를 함께 열거한다(민사집행법 제70조). 이 문언은 채권자가 채무자를 채무불이행자명부에 올리도록 신청할 수 있는 주체로 보면서도, 신청의 근거를 금전 권원의 확정·작성과 그에 따른 불이행의 경과라는 조건에 묶는다. 같은 조 제2항은 제1항의 신청을 할 때 그 사유를 소명하여야 한다고 요구한다(민사집행법 제70조). 여기서 말하는 행위는 채권자의 등재 신청과 사유의 소명이며, 채무자의 급부 이행이나 그 이행의 완료가 아니다.
이 문언이 가리키는 절차의 성격과 등재가 회수로 나아가는 경로의 작동은 구별되어야 한다. 전자는 이행 여부를 공적으로 드러내는 절차이고, 후자는 재산정보에 접근하여 집행 대상을 찾는 통로다. 등재 사유와 소명을 갖추었다는 사실은 불이행의 경과를 절차 안에 남기지만, 그 자체로 채무자의 재산이 특정되거나 급부가 수령되는 것은 아니다. 재산정보에 접근하는 법정 통로는 재산명시를 신청할 수 있는 금전 권원과 개시 요건을 갖추고 조회 사유·대상 기관을 특정한 경우에 작동한다. 같은 통로가 재산명시에서 제외되는 가집행 권원만 있거나 조회의 추가 법정 사유가 없어 해당 정보 절차를 사용할 수 없는 경우에는 막힌다. 두 판단 단계를 나누지 않고 등재의 성사를 곧 회수의 성사로 놓으면, 등재 사유와 소명이라는 절차 조건이 급부 수령이라는 별개의 결과를 대신하는 셈이 된다.
등재의 압박이 자발적 이행을 촉진할 수 있다는 반론이 겨냥하는 지점은 여기에 있다. 명부에 오르는 부담이 채무자에게 실질적인 심리적 압박이 되어 스스로 돈을 지급하게 만들고, 그 과정에서 채권자는 재산을 찾아 헤매는 탐색 비용을 아낄 수 있다는 것이다. 나아가 채무자의 정보 보호가 오히려 재산 은닉을 돕고 그 비용을 채권자에게 전가한다는 비판도 같은 자리에서 제기된다. 그러나 이 반론이 설득력을 얻는다 하더라도 등재 결정을 채권의 회수 완료로 바꿀 수는 없다. 압박이 이행을 이끌었다면 그 이행의 결과는 별도로 관찰되어야 하고, 압박이 이어지지 않았다면 등재는 그대로 남아 있어도 회수는 이루어지지 않은 상태로 남는다. 반론이 지적한 탐색 비용의 부담은 사라지지 않으며, 그 부담이 크다는 이유로 등재를 회수로 계상할 수는 없다.
이 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 채권자 A가 돈을 지급하라는 권원을 갖고 있고 채무자 B의 집행 가능한 재산을 알지 못한다는 것뿐이다. 이 사실을 앞의 조건에 놓으면, 명부 등재의 법정 사유와 소명이 이행 여부를 드러내는 절차이며 급부 수령과 다르다는 구별은 그대로 적용된다. 기록이 수집되었는지와 회신이 어떤 범위로 돌아왔는지는 확정되어 있지 않다. 회신 범위와 조회 대상 누락 여부를 알 수 없는 상태에서는 미확정이 유지된다. 가집행만 있는 상태에서 명시 가능한 확정 권원으로 바뀌면 정보 절차의 문턱을 다시 판단한다는 대조는, 조건 하나를 바꾸어 보는 검사일 뿐 장면에 실제로 일어난 사실이 아니다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 재산정보에 접근하는 법정 통로가 작동하는 경우와 막히는 경우, 그리고 회신 범위와 조회 대상 누락을 알 수 없어 미확정으로 남는 경우를 구별하는 데까지다. 명부 등재 사유와 소명을 갖추었다는 사실을 회수의 성취로 읽는 것은 이 구별을 넘어서는 해석이며, 등재 결정을 채권의 회수 완료로 바꾸는 판단과 같은 자리에 놓인다. 반대로 회신 범위가 확정되지 않았다는 이유만으로 영구적으로 정보에 접근할 수 없다고 단정하는 것도 이 절의 결론이 아니다. 미확정은 자료가 아직 정해지지 않았다는 상태이지 구제가 불가능하다는 선고가 아니다.
5.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
신청인이 조회할 기관·단체를 특정하고 비용을 미리 내야 한다는 조건 아래, 채권자 A는 돈을 지급하라는 권원을 갖고 있지만 채무자 B의 집행 가능한 재산을 알지 못한다. 등재 신청과 소명을 거쳐 공적 기록에 남는 불이행 사실이, 아직 손에 들어오지 않은 급부와 어떤 관계를 맺는지가 여기서의 물음이다.
민사집행법 제70조 제1항은 「①채무자가 다음 각호 가운데 어느 하나에 해당하면 채권자는 그 채무자를 채무불이행자명부에 올리도록 신청할 수 있다.」고 정하고, 이어서 「1. 금전의 지급을 명한 집행권원이 확정된 후 또는 집행권원을 작성한 후 6월 이내에 채무를 이행하지 아니하는 때. 2. 제68조제1항 각호의 사유 또는 같은 조제9항의 사유 가운데 어느 하나에 해당하는 때」를 사유로 든다. 문언상 주체는 등재를 신청하는 채권자이고, 대상은 사유에 해당하는 채무자이며, 행위는 명부에 올리도록 신청하는 것이다. 같은 조 제2항은 「②제1항의 신청을 할 때에는 그 사유를 소명하여야 한다.」고 하여, 신청 시점에 사유의 소명을 요구한다.
이 문언이 요구하는 것은 불이행 사유의 존재를 드러내는 소명이지, 급부의 교부나 회수가 아니다. 소명은 신청 요건을 충족하는 절차상 행위이고, 회수는 실행 결과로서 급부가 채권자에게 실제로 이르는 상태이며, 둘은 별개의 단계에 속한다. 등재 여부를 판단하는 법원은 이행의 유무를 확인할 뿐, 등재로 급부의 귀속을 확정하는 것이 아니다.
등재의 압박이 자발적 이행을 촉진할 수 있다는 점은 부인하기 어렵다. 채무자의 정보 보호가 재산 은닉을 돕고 채권자에게 탐색 비용을 전가할 수 있다는 점도, 채권자 A가 입는 불편의 한 모습으로 함께 인정된다. 등재가 가하는 평판상 부담과 그에 따른 이행 유인이 실제로 작동한다면 채권자는 우회적인 탐색 없이 급부를 받을 수도 있다. 등재로 얻어지는 것은 불이행 사실의 공적 기록이지, 재산의 특정과 압류와 환가를 거친 급부의 수령이 아니다.
합성 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 채권자 A가 돈을 지급하라는 권원을 갖고 있다는 점, 그리고 채무자 B의 집행 가능한 재산을 모른다는 점이다. 이 두 사실만으로는 집행권원의 종류와 확정 여부, 재산명시의 신청과 경과, 재산목록의 제출 여부, 조회 사유의 특정과 대상 기관의 지정, 그에 대한 회신의 범위가 모두 미확인이다. 조회 대상에서 누락된 기관이나 단체가 있었는지도 정해진 바가 없다. 이 조건은 새로 일어난 사실이 아니라 판단 조건을 한 가지 바꾸어 보는 검사에 그치며, 장면으로 확정할 수 없는 나머지 사항은 미확정으로 남는다.
따라서 이 절에서 허용되는 결론은 좁다. 법정 불이행 사유가 소명되면 등재를 신청할 수 있고, 그 등재는 이행 여부를 드러내는 절차상 사실을 남길 뿐이다. 등재가 채권의 회수 완료를 뜻하지 않는 이상, 회수의 성패를 등재 여부로 판단해서는 안 된다. 그 밖에 회수 가능성이 영구히 막혔는지, 어떤 절차가 남아 있는지는 이 절의 범위가 아니다. 조회 결과가 없으면 영구적 집행불능인가?