Summary
This chapter distinguishes the statutory requirements of State compensation, such as intent or negligence in the performance of official duties, violation of statutes, and loss to another person, from the grounds for revocation.
1.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
A judgment that removes the defect cannot also substitute for the requirements for compensation of harm already suffered. Accepting the premise that the binding force of the decision granting the appeal and the duty to re-disposition and the basis of the judgment of revocation must be stated separately and that the actual subsequent disposition must be confirmed, this section takes up the distinction left by the previous section and pursues it to the end in the present question. Once the disposition was revoked, plaintiff A seeks to claim from the State B all costs incurred thereafter. The question is whether the mere fact that the disposition has disappeared already transfers the harm that has already arisen to the responsibility of the State.
Article 2 of the State Compensation Act provides: "Where a public official or a private person entrusted with public duties (hereinafter referred to as a 'public official') intentionally or negligently violates statutes or regulations in the course of executing duties and thereby causes damage to another, or where the State or a local government is liable for damages under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, the State or the local government shall compensate for that damage pursuant to this Act." Here the party liable is the State or a local government, the actor is a public official or an entrusted private person, and the requirement is a violation of statutes or regulations through intent or negligence in the course of duty.
The provision above does not bind the ground for revocation and the ground for compensation into a single sentence. The requirements of State Compensation mean the conditions of liability relating to unlawful acts in the course of duty, damage, and the like, and the statement that if an administrative action is unlawful it therefore equals State Compensation skips over this definition. A judgment of revocation confirms the illegality of the disposition, but by the mere existence of that judgment other essential requirements such as damage and causation are not thereby determined. Thus the reason for separating the stages of adjudication is so that the confirmation of illegality and the establishment of liability are not smudged together into one question.
The reason this distinction feels heavy is that its weight falls on the victim. If an individual finds it difficult to expose negligence within the agency, the loss left by unlawful administration may remain with the victim as it stands. It is harsh for a victim who has proved illegality to bear the burden of proof again. Even so, the whole of liability for compensation cannot be established by the mere existence of a judgment of revocation. Duty, protective statutes, negligence or defects in a facility, damage, causation, and the status of compensation and exceptions must be weighed on the records.
In the scene where, once the disposition was revoked, plaintiff A seeks to claim from the State B all costs incurred thereafter, the only fact confirmed is the revocation of the disposition. Whether each item of those subsequent costs is damage incurred for the protection of some duty in the course of duty, and by what causal connection it followed from the disposition, is not determined by this scene. Where there are only grounds for revocation and no material linking the damage to the protective purpose of the duty in the course of duty, whether this remedy operates remains undetermined. If it is confirmed as the peculiar mental distress of the surviving family members eligible by statute, the conclusion that excluded everything on the former limiting clause alone is corrected.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. It is that where the relevant liability requirements, such as unlawful acts in the course of duty or defects in a public structure, together with damage and causation, are present and the statutory limitations and exceptions are applied, this remedy operates; the extension that a single judgment of revocation establishes the whole of liability for compensation is not permitted. Conversely, one cannot immediately declare the remedy unavailable on the basis of a record confirming illegality alone.
1.2The Conditions That Block Relief
In this scene the question is whether all remaining claims stand on the judgment of revocation alone, and one must ask what blocks the stage following the confirmation of illegality. For it is not the case that, once the illegality of the disposition has become final, the requirements of State Compensation are automatically satisfied as well. What a judgment of revocation addresses is the existence and effect of the disposition, whereas liability for compensation demands separate statutory requirements. This section examines only which of those requirements, if missing, closes the path of a claim for damages.
Article 2 of the State Compensation Act directly sets out the premises of liability in its text. Paragraph (1) of that Article 2 lists as one type the case where a public official or a private person entrusted with public duties, in the course of executing duties, intentionally or negligently violated statutes or regulations and thereby caused damage to another. Here the subject is a public official or an entrusted private person, the act is an act in the course of executing duties, and the ground is a violation of statutes or regulations through intent or negligence. In addition, the wording that damage must thereby be caused to another is placed alongside. These wordings are not independent items but parallel conditions for the establishment of liability. Accordingly, it is clear that the wording of the provision at least requires unlawful acts in the course of duty and damage separately. Only, since the wording does not state the detailed criteria of the other requirements, at this stage only the list and distinctions of the requirements are fixed.
The reason the confirmation of illegality and liability for compensation must be judged separately is that what the two judgments demand differs. What a judgment of revocation determines is whether the disposition was made in accordance with statutes and regulations, and thus whether its effect can be maintained. Liability for compensation, by contrast, asks together what the protected damage is, whether that damage arose from the unlawful act in the course of duty, and whether the other essential requirements are met. Therefore, where only illegality is confirmed and protected damage and causation, or other essential requirements of the relevant liability, are not recognized, one of the statutory requirements is in any event unmet. In that case the path of the claim for damages is closed. This is not a judgment denying illegality; it is a distinction that illegality alone cannot substitute for the remaining requirements of liability for compensation.
Then the fact that a victim who has already proved illegality must thereafter bring to light damage and causation afresh operates as a harsh burden upon him. Especially where the circumstances of negligence known only within the agency, or the choice of protective statutes, are difficult for an individual to expose, the result may be that the loss left by unlawful administration remains with the victim. This inconvenience is real and not light. Yet one cannot regard the remaining requirements as satisfied by the confirmation of illegality alone. If the conditions set by the statutory requirements are omitted, there is no longer a standard for fixing the scope of liability for compensation, and the matter is instead viewed only as a question of burden. Thus the fact that a judgment of revocation does not lighten the victim's burden of proof cannot shake the distinction between the requirements.
In the synthetic scene, only the fact that plaintiff A's disposition was revoked is established; whether all the subsequent costs are protected damage, and what the causation is between the performance of duties by the State B and that damage, is not confirmed. Nor is there any material as to whether there was intent or negligence in the course of duty, or as to the status of other essential requirements and exceptions. Accordingly, on the facts of this scene alone it cannot be said that all the requirements of State Compensation are met. Conversely, one cannot assert that the requirements are not met. Unconfirmed material must remain undetermined, and an undetermined state does not at once turn into unavailability of relief. It is possible, however, to see whether the judgment changes if one condition is altered.
The conclusion permitted in this section is the distinction that liability for compensation does not stand together with illegality alone, and that if any one of the statutory requirements is missing the path of the claim for damages is closed. What is not permitted is to regard all the requirements of State Compensation as satisfied by the single fact that the disposition was revoked, or to assert that the entire amount claimed automatically becomes subject to compensation. Holding the boundary between the confirmation and the non-confirmation of the requirements is not suspending judgment but precisely distinguishing what has been established.
1.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Above, the view was taken that where only illegality is confirmed and protected damage and causation, or other essential requirements of the relevant liability, are not recognized, this remedy is blocked. This judgment does not place a blocked determination and a determination that can never be known as the same and pass over them. Where there are only reasons supporting illegality and no material linking the damage to the protective purpose of the duty in the course of duty, where is the determination placed?
Article 2, paragraph (1) of the State Compensation Act provides: "The State or a local government shall compensate for damage pursuant to this Act where it is liable in that a public official or a private person entrusted with public duties (hereinafter referred to as a 'public official'), in the course of executing duties, intentionally or negligently violated statutes or regulations and thereby caused damage to another, or where it is liable for damages pursuant to the Automobile Damage Compensation Guarantee Act." Here the subject of liability is the State or a local government, and the actor is a public official executing duties or a private person entrusted with public duties. This provision requires both a violation of statutes or regulations through intent or negligence and damage to another, and this section addresses Article 2, paragraph (1).
This statutory requirement may overlap with the grounds for revocation of the disposition, but it is not the same. Revocation is an adjudication that removes the defect of the disposition, whereas the requirements of State Compensation spoken of here are the conditions of liability relating to unlawful acts in the course of duty, damage, and so forth. Therefore, even when the ground for revocation has been made clear, intent or negligence, damage, and the other essential requirements have not thereby been proved as well. A time when only part of the requirements is confirmed by material and the remaining links are empty must be distinguished from a time when the requirements are unmet and relief is blocked. The former is undetermined; the latter is foreclosed.
The counterargument that it is harsh for a victim who has proved illegality to bear the burden of proof again also points to the difficulty for an individual to expose negligence within the agency. If the burden continues to be placed on the individual under these circumstances, the loss of unlawful administration ends up remaining with the victim. Even without denying this point, the answer remains the same. If one asserts that all conditions of liability are met by the illegality confirmed as the ground for revocation alone, the room to examine whether the link between damage and protective purpose remains in the material disappears.
In the synthetic scene, the only fact bearing on this question is that plaintiff A, after obtaining revocation of the disposition, seeks to claim all costs from the State B. This fact establishes only that the disposition was revoked and that A contemplates a claim. Among duty, protective statutes, negligence or defects in a facility, damage, causation, and the status of compensation and exceptions, the material needed for this question is not presented. The same is true of years, amounts, and judgment outcomes that are not set. Accordingly, neither the existence nor the extent of liability for compensation can be established on this scene alone, and it remains undetermined without determining that link of material.
What this section permits goes no further than placing that determination in an undetermined state where there are only grounds for revocation and no material linking the damage to the protective purpose of the duty in the course of duty. This conclusion neither converts the confirmation of illegality into the establishment of liability for compensation nor reads the absence of material at once as unavailability of relief. An interpretation that binds the case where relief is blocked and the case of non-determination into the same determination by the same sentence also lies outside this section.
1.4The Records Needed for Determination
In such a situation, the question is whether liability for compensation stands together on the mere fact that the illegality of the disposition has been confirmed, or whether separate records are additionally required. A judgment that erases illegality and a judgment compensating harm that has already occurred have different objects, and if the two are handled as the same, the stages collapse.
Article 2, paragraph (1) of the State Compensation Act, the statutory provision corresponding to this question, sets out the conditions for the establishment of liability as follows: "The State or a local government shall compensate for damage pursuant to this Act where a public official or a private person entrusted with public duties (hereinafter referred to as a 'public official'), in the course of executing duties, intentionally or negligently violated statutes or regulations and thereby caused damage to another, or where it is liable for damages pursuant to the Automobile Damage Compensation Guarantee Act." (Article 2 of the State Compensation Act) The subject indicated by this wording is the State or a local government, and the act is that a public official, in the course of executing duties, intentionally or negligently violates statutes or regulations and thereby causes damage to another. Under the proviso, where a soldier, a civilian military employee, a police officer, or a member of the reserve forces is killed in action, dies in the line of duty, or suffers a work-related injury in connection with the performance of duties such as combat or training, and compensation such as disaster compensation benefits, survivor's pensions, or disability pensions can be paid under other statutes or regulations, damages under this Act and the Civil Act cannot be claimed.
The provision above requires together the execution of duties, intent or negligence, violation of statutes or regulations, and damage to another, and these requirements are distinguished from the judgment necessary to revoke the disposition. Here the requirements of State Compensation mean the conditions of liability relating to unlawful acts in the course of duty, damage, and so forth. That is, the illegality of the disposition addresses only the part corresponding to the violation of statutes or regulations among the requirements of State Compensation. The author's conclusion presents in the form of records the reason why this distinction is necessary. The stage is determined only on the material recorded as to duty, protective statutes, negligence or defects in a facility, damage, causation, and the status of compensation and exceptions, and absent records are not filled in with presumptions. That the stage determination relies only on the established records is in order not to mix the ground for revocation with the requirements of compensation.
Yet it is harsh for a victim who has already proved illegality to bear the burden of proof again. If an individual finds it difficult to expose negligence that occurred within the agency, the Counterargument carries valid weight in that the loss arising from unlawful administration remains with the victim as it stands. The circumstance that it is disadvantageous for a victim who has proved illegality to bear the burden of proof again does not disappear. Only, the author's answer remains as it is. While not denying the difficulty of the Counterargument, this answer maintains the distinction that the grounds for revocation contained in the text of the judgment and the material on the requirements of liability for compensation must be looked at separately. If adjudication is made only on the established records, items that are absent remain undetermined, and not filling these with presumptions is the way to hold the stages.
In the synthetic scene, only the fact that plaintiff A's disposition was revoked is confirmed. In this case the records corresponding to the grounds for revocation can be seen, but the material linking the duty in the course of duty and the protective purpose to the damage—that is, the records of protective statutes, negligence or defects in a facility, damage, and causation—is not determined in this scene. Therefore liability for compensation cannot be established in its present state, and this is not a declaration that relief is impossible but a maintenance of non-determination. If it is confirmed as the peculiar mental distress of the surviving family members eligible by statute, the conclusion that excluded everything on the former limiting clause alone changes. Loss of life, years, amounts, and starting dates that are not in the scene are not added and are not established here.
What this section permits is a judgment distinguishing the stages of illegality and liability for compensation. Compensation for damage caused by unlawful public power operates where the relevant liability requirements, such as unlawful acts in the course of duty or defects in a public structure, together with damage and causation, are present and the statutory limitations and exceptions are applied. Conversely, where only illegality is confirmed and protected damage and causation, or other essential requirements, are not recognized, this legal path is closed. Yet the fact that the material is not yet present means there is no confirming result, and does not mean that relief is impossible.
1.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
The binding force of the reconsideration decision granting the appeal, the duty to re-disposition, and the grounds for the judgment of revocation are set out separately; only the condition that the actual subsequent disposition must be confirmed carries over. The question this time is whether a court's finding that a disposition was unlawful automatically determines even the compensation for damage that has already occurred. If the grounds for revocation and the grounds for compensation are not the same, it must also be asked what facts must be newly confirmed in order to undo the determination reached at the preceding stage.
Article 2 (1) of the State Compensation Act provides: "The State or a local government shall, in accordance with this Act, compensate for damage caused to another person by a public official or a private person entrusted with public duties (hereinafter referred to as a 'public official') in the course of performing his or her duties, through intent or negligence, in violation of statutes or regulations, or where liability for damages arises under the “Motor Vehicle Damage Compensation Guarantee Act”" (Article 2 of the State Compensation Act). This wording designates as the subject the State or a local government, and as the actor the public official or entrusted private person who performed the duties. It further requires, together, intent or negligence in the course of performing duties, violation of statutes or regulations, and damage inflicted on another person. These are conditions distinct from the grounds for revocation.
If the above provision is taken as the standard for the statutory requirements, the requirements for State compensation mean the liability conditions relating to unlawful acts in the course of duty, damage, and the like. There, duty, protective statutes, negligence or facility defect, damage, causation, and the status of compensation and exceptions remain in the record. A judgment of revocation exposes the defect in the disposition, but it does not adjudicate the whole of the above requirements in its place. The two stages must be distinguished because the subject matter they address and their requirements differ.
The core of this counterargument is that, if an individual finds it difficult to bring to light negligence inside an agency, the loss caused by unlawful administration remains with the victim. A criticism follows that, once a defect has already been confirmed by a judgment of revocation, requiring the requirements to be examined anew imposes a double burden on the victim. Yet the existence of a judgment of revocation alone cannot fix the entirety of liability for compensation. If there is no material linking the damage to the protective purpose of the duty-based obligation, the determination remains undetermined, and compensation follows only within the scope in which the requirements are met. Without erasing the disadvantage identified by the counterargument, one still cannot fill what cannot be determined with what has been determined.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only the revocation of the disposition and the intention to claim all costs thereafter. What the grounds for revocation were, and whether damage falling within the scope of protection and causation are supported in the record, are not determined in this scene. The facts of an actual case, service, and the results of performance, as well as the year, amount, date of accrual, and judgment outcome that do not appear in the scene, cannot be determined. Accordingly, the mere fact that a disposition was revoked cannot fix the entirety of liability for compensation nor produce a dismissal. If any change is confirmed, the prior determinations as to blocking and effect are discarded and the assessment is redone from the stage, but the parts in which no change is confirmed remain undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is not that liability for compensation is fixed in its entirety by the mere existence of a judgment of revocation, but that liability is determined only within the scope in which the statutory requirements and exceptions are each confirmed in the record. The mere fact that an unlawful disposition existed cannot be taken to satisfy the requirements for State compensation in their entirety; and where there is no confirmation whatsoever that those requirements are met, compensation cannot be fixed either.
1.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
Taking up the condition identified in the previous section, this section now targets the attitude of plaintiff A, who seeks, using the revocation of disposition as a springboard, to shift all subsequent costs onto the State B. The problem this attitude targets is clear. Even after a judgment of revocation has already been rendered, must the victim separately prove the requirements for State compensation anew, or does the revocation itself constitute the entire basis for compensation?
Article 2 of the State Compensation Act states the starting point of liability as follows. "The State or a local government shall, in accordance with this Act, compensate for damage caused to another person by a public official or a private person entrusted with public duties (hereinafter referred to as a “public official”) in the course of performing his or her duties, through intent or negligence, in violation of statutes or regulations, or where liability for damages arises under the “Motor Vehicle Damage Compensation Guarantee Act”." This wording sets the subject of liability as the State or a local government, and the acting party as the public official performing the duties. The requirement as to the act is a violation of statutes or regulations through intent or negligence, and together with it, that damage arise to another person as a result.
What this wording requires is called the requirements for State compensation. It means the liability conditions relating to unlawful acts in the course of duty, damage, and the like. A judgment of revocation has the effect of removing the defect in the disposition, that is, the erroneous administrative act, but its existence alone does not establish the whole of those requirements. The illegality confirmed as the ground for revocation is but one pillar of liability; the relationship between that illegality and the damage, the scope of damage falling within the scope of protection, and the other essential requirements each remain separate objects of determination. Thus the finality of a judgment of revocation and the finality of liability for compensation occupy different stages.
There is another, and the strongest, counterargument. It is that it is harsh for a victim who has already proved the illegality to bear a burden of proof again. It also points out that where an individual finds it hard to expose negligence within an agency, the loss from unlawful administration remains with the victim. Yet even knowing the weight of this burden, the existence of a judgment of revocation alone cannot fix the entirety of liability for compensation. If liability were declared wholesale while leaving aside item-by-item determination of the requirements for State compensation, the distinction among the conditions set by the wording would disappear, and room would arise for shifting even damage that does not in fact meet the requirements.
In the synthetic scene, plaintiff A seeks to claim from the State B all costs following the revocation of the disposition. Contrasting this scene with the requirements for State compensation, the connection between the revoked disposition and the subsequent costs, whether the costs constitute damage falling within the scope of protection, and whether they accord with the protective purpose of the duty-based obligation all remain unverified. Because the scene fixes no year, amount, or date of accrual and shows no actual result of performance, these items cannot be determined on the basis of this scene alone. The condition remains, however, that if the matter is confirmed as the intrinsic mental suffering of a bereaved family member falling within the statutory scope, the conclusion that excluded it entirely on the basis of the former limiting phrase shall be corrected.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. The finality of a judgment of revocation does not stand in for the whole of liability for compensation, and the illegality confirmed as the ground for revocation alone does not complete the establishment of the requirements for State compensation. What this section does not permit is a determination that fixes the entirety of liability for compensation on the strength of the existence of a judgment of revocation alone. It excludes the attitude of letting a claim pass without properly comparing the relationship between the requirements and the damage. The mere fact that unverified grounds remain, however, does not itself mean that relief is impossible; only where the liability requirements are met does the path remain open for a determination of compensation applying the statutory limitations and exceptions. Is State compensation established the moment an administrative act is unlawful?
1.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The previous section proceeded from the premise that the existence of a judgment of revocation alone cannot fix the entirety of liability for compensation. Under that premise, this question asks whether State compensation is established the moment an administrative act is unlawful, or whether there are, in between, judgment stages that must be passed separately. In the scene where plaintiff A, upon revocation of the disposition, seeks to claim all subsequent costs from the State B, the issue of this section is at what point the illegality of the disposition and the establishment of liability for compensation part ways. Clarifying what the distinction—that the illegality serving as the ground for revocation does not mean the requirements for compensation—points to here also falls within this question.
Article 2 of the State Compensation Act prescribes the conditions for the establishment of liability in its wording. Article 2 (1) thereof provides that "the State or a local government shall, in accordance with this Act, compensate for damage caused to another person by a public official or a private person entrusted with public duties (hereinafter referred to as a "public official") in the course of performing his or her duties, through intent or negligence, in violation of statutes or regulations, or where liability for damages arises under the "Motor Vehicle Damage Compensation Guarantee Act"". In this wording, the subject of liability is the State or a local government, and the actor is the public official performing the duties. And as a condition of that act, a violation of statutes or regulations through intent or negligence is written together with the requirement of damage inflicted on another person as a result. Such wording merely enumerates the conditions necessary for the establishment of liability for compensation; it does not mean that those conditions are satisfied merely by the ground for revocation of the disposition.
The reason the grounds for revocation and the requirements for compensation must be distinguished is that the two determinations ask different things. A determination on revocation asks whether the disposition itself accords with statutes or regulations, that is, the defect in that administrative act. By contrast, the requirements for State compensation are liability conditions relating to unlawful acts in the course of duty, damage, and the like, in which intent or negligence in the course of duty, violation of statutes or regulations, and damage to another person are required together. The confirmation of illegality alone does not suffice: in light of the protective purpose of the duty-based obligation, what damage falls within the scope of protection, and whether that damage stemmed from the unlawful act, must be determined separately. Accordingly, even where a judgment of revocation has established the illegality, the entirety of liability for compensation cannot be fixed by that judgment alone.
The strongest counterargument arising from this distinction concerns the allocation of the burden of proof. If, after having already proved the illegality, the victim must prove again negligence in the course of duty, damage, or causation, then where an individual finds it difficult to expose negligence inside an agency, the loss left by unlawful administration ultimately remains with the victim unchanged; that is the disadvantageous point. This is not a matter to be passed over lightly. Yet even with this inconvenience, the existence of a judgment of revocation alone cannot fix the entirety of liability for compensation. Because the illegality confirmed by the judgment as the ground for revocation and a liability for compensation that satisfies separate liability conditions have distinguishable requirements, the loss identified by the counterargument cannot abolish the distinction among the liability requirements themselves.
The facts relevant to this question in the synthetic scene are that the disposition was revoked and that plaintiff A seeks to claim all costs after the revocation of the disposition from the State B. On these facts alone, one cannot tell which of the items—duty, protective statutes, negligence or facility defect, damage, causation, and the status of compensation and exceptions—has been filled in in the record. In particular, what duty-based obligation the ground for revocation based on illegality violated, whether the claimed costs fall within the range of damage that obligation sought to protect, and whether causation exists between them are not determined in this scene. These items fall under the case where, on the ground for revocation alone, there is no material connecting the damage to the protective purpose of the duty-based obligation, and so they remain undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is that an administrative act being unlawful does not at once establish State compensation, and that the statutory requirements for State compensation—intent or negligence in the course of duty, violation of statutes or regulations, damage to another person, and the like—are distinct from the grounds for revocation. Even where a judgment of revocation has established the illegality, the entirety of liability for compensation cannot be fixed by that judgment alone, and a record relating to duty, protective statutes, negligence or facility defect, damage, causation, and the status of compensation and exceptions must be assembled separately. This determination does not mean, however, that compensation is impossible even when illegality is confirmed. Where the liability requirements are met independently of the grounds for revocation, liability for compensation may be established, and a state of insufficient materials is undetermined, not a denial of relief.
1.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Article 2 (1) of the State Compensation Act prescribes the conditions for the establishment of liability provided in the State Compensation Act. What is required by the wording is the case in which a public official or a private person entrusted with public duties, in the course of performing duties, violates statutes or regulations through intent or negligence and thereby inflicts damage on another person. Here, the "requirements for State compensation" refer to the liability conditions relating to unlawful acts in the course of duty, damage, and the like, and these are distinguished from the requirements demanded in an action seeking revocation of an administrative disposition. The grounds for revocation go no further than revealing the illegality of the disposition, whereas liability for compensation must satisfy separate conditions—intent or negligence in the act of performing duties, violation of statutes or regulations, and the occurrence of damage to another person. Accordingly, the recognition that an administrative act is unlawful cannot be said to establish State compensation liability immediately.
The existence of a judgment of revocation alone cannot fix the entirety of liability for compensation, because the two determinations each have their own purpose and structure. An action for revocation has as its object the elimination of the effect of a disposition and thus goes no further than adjudicating on the ground of the disposition's illegality, whereas an action for compensation, aiming at indemnification for damage, requires separate requirements such as the actor's intent or negligence in the performance of duties, violation of statutes or regulations, the occurrence of damage, and causation. Put differently, the ground of illegality adopted as the reason for revocation does not also satisfy the requirements of liability for compensation. The requirements for State compensation addressed in this section mean the liability conditions relating to unlawful acts in the course of duty, damage, and the like, and must be adjudicated as distinct from the illegality established in the judgment of revocation.
There remains the harshness that a victim who has already proved the illegality must bear a burden of proof again in order to obtain compensation. This is because State compensation liability demands separate statutory requirements—intent or negligence in the performance of duties, violation of statutes or regulations, damage to another person, and the like—so the illegality revealed as the ground for revocation is not enough. Yet this distinction does not wholly negate the possibility of relief for the victim; room remains for determining liability for compensation separately within the scope in which requirements for compensation such as damage and causation are recognized, apart from the illegality.
In this scene, the illegality may be confirmed through the revocation of the disposition, but that does not permit the categorical conclusion that all damage suffered by plaintiff A satisfies the requirements for State compensation, such as intent or negligence in the performance of duties and causation. Because the liability conditions corresponding to the requirements for State compensation—unlawful acts in the course of duty, damage, and the like—must be separately recognized, the grounds for revocation and the grounds for compensation are adjudicated as distinct.
This section confirms only the narrow conclusion that the illegality of an administrative act and the requirements of State compensation liability are distinct. Illegality does not immediately determine the entirety of liability for compensation, but neither does it mean that a claim for damages is impossible in its entirety. Within the scope in which the statutory requirements—intent or negligence in the course of duty, violation of statutes or regulations, damage to another person, and the like—are recognized, liability for compensation may be determined separately. When a violation of statutes or regulations and damage are both present, is causation also sufficient?
1.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
In the preceding analytical stage, the binding effect of the decision granting the appeal and the duty of re-disposition, and the grounds of the judgment of revocation, were each set out separately, and only the conclusion carries forward that the actual subsequent disposition must be confirmed separately. Within this flow, the present question is posed narrowly: whether State liability for compensation arises from the mere fact that a disposition was revoked, or whether separate conditions of liability must be satisfied. This question arises not from any wish to diminish the meaning of a judgment of revocation, but from the need to distinguish the criteria for deciding who will bear how much of the harm that has already occurred.
The relevant original text is the opening part of Article 2 (1) of the State Compensation Act. Its wording, in the sentence "The State or a local government, where a public official or a private person entrusted with a public duty, in the course of executing the duty, intentionally or negligently violates a statute or regulation and thereby causes harm to another person," (Article 2 of the State Compensation Act), designates the State or a local government as the subject of liability and a public official or a private person entrusted with a public duty as the actor. Here, "public official" is a designation defined within the above wording. The conduct condition required by this phrase is a violation of a statute or regulation through intent or negligence in the course of executing a duty, and the damage condition is harm caused to another person.
Read as written, the above wording shows that State liability for compensation does not arise from the unlawfulness of the act alone. The execution of a duty, intent or negligence, violation of a statute or regulation, and harm to another must all be present together, and these elements lie at different stages of adjudication. A judgment of revocation that declares the unlawfulness of a disposition merely indicates that the exercise of public power did not accord with the legal order; it has not simultaneously confirmed negligence in the course of executing a duty, harm to another, and the causation between them. The reason for not conflating these two adjudications is simple: the former is a question that asks whether fault exists, whereas the latter is a question that asks about the allocation of the loss caused by that fault.
If an individual finds it difficult to expose negligence within an agency, the result is that the loss arising from unlawful administration remains wholly with the victim. This criticism does not disappear. Yet the existence of a judgment of revocation alone cannot establish the entirety of the liability for compensation. The object addressed by a judgment of revocation and the requirements demanded by liability for damages differ in scope, and no basis for transferring the confirmation of one to the confirmation of the other can be found in the relevant text.
What must be confirmed in this situation is whether that cost is connected to a violation of a statute or regulation through intent or negligence in the course of executing a duty, and whether it falls within the case where that violation caused harm to A. In addition, it must also be confirmed together whether that cost arose within the protective purpose against the violation of the statute or regulation. However, the scene fixes no year, amount, or accrual date, and there are no materials of an actual case; accordingly, whether there are materials to link the scope of harm and causation, and the protective purpose of the duty of office, cannot be determined from this scene alone. This item remains undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is narrow: State liability for compensation cannot be regarded as arising from the mere fact that a disposition was revoked, and the execution of a duty, intent or negligence, violation of a statute or regulation, and harm to another, all required by the relevant wording, must be confirmed together. A contrary conclusion that a single judgment of revocation substitutes for the confirmation of all of the above requirements cannot be established on the basis of this wording. However, the distinction drawn up to this point concerns the separation of unlawfulness from the requirements of compensation; the judgment on the sufficiency of causation remains.
1.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
Accepting the point that the binding effect of the decision granting the appeal and the duty to re-disposition are set out separately and that the actual subsequent disposition must be confirmed, the analysis returns to the scene in which plaintiff A, upon the revocation of the disposition, seeks to claim from the State B every cost thereafter. In this scene, the ground for revocation asserted by plaintiff A and the liability for damages that the State B is said to properly bear pass through different thresholds. Accordingly, what must now be asked is what part within this liability is to be divided and adjudicated anew. In particular, it must be made clear why the statutory requirements of State compensation—intent or negligence in the course of duty, violation of a statute or regulation, harm to another, and the like—must be distinguished from the reasons for the revocation.
Article 2 (1) of the State Compensation Act provides that where a public official, in the course of executing a duty, intentionally or negligently violates a statute or regulation and thereby causes harm to another person, the State or a local government shall compensate for that harm (Article 2 of the State Compensation Act). In this wording, the subject is a public official or a private person entrusted with a public duty, and the act is a violation of a statute or regulation through intent or negligence in the course of executing a duty. The condition that follows is that the violation causes harm to another person, and as the effect, the liability of the State or a local government for damages is stipulated. The proviso to the same paragraph makes an exception, providing that a person or surviving family member who can receive compensation under other statutes for death in battle, death in service, or an injury sustained in the line of duty in connection with the execution of duties such as combat or training cannot claim damages under this Act or the Civil Act. This section places in issue only the subject, act, condition, and effect prescribed by the provision.
The above wording shows that the grounds of a judgment of revocation and the requirements of liability for damages are separate questions. If the reasons for revocation constitute a judgment addressing defects in an administrative disposition, the requirements of State compensation are conditions of liability that examine whether the separate elements of intent or negligence, violation of a statute or regulation, harm caused to another person, and the relation between that harm and the official act are each in place. The reason for not conflating the two stages is that, even if a court annuls an unlawful disposition, the requirements for compensation of the harm that has already occurred are not thereby automatically satisfied. If, in accordance with the conclusion of the preceding section, the binding effect of the decision granting the appeal and the duty to re-disposition are to be kept separate and the actual subsequent disposition must be confirmed, then at the compensation stage as well the satisfaction of each requirement must be judged on separate records. The conclusion of this section is that it confines itself to the conditions under which the fine distinctions within the stage operate, are blocked, or remain undetermined.
The strongest counterargument targets the fact that a victim who has already proved unlawfulness must bear a burden of proof again. From that standpoint, because an individual finds it difficult to expose negligence within an agency, the loss from unlawful administration remains wholly with the victim. If a victim, having obtained even a judgment revoking the disposition, must then re-present and substantiate the remaining harm piece by piece, the weight of the procedure tilts toward the individual. Yet even without denying these costs and inconveniences, the existence of a judgment of revocation alone cannot establish the entirety of the liability for compensation. Because the scope established by the reasons for revocation and the requirements of liability for damages differ from each other, the judgment of revocation itself does not substitute for all essential requirements.
Returning to the synthetic scene, plaintiff A, after the disposition was revoked, seeks to claim from the State B every cost thereafter. Here the relevant facts go no further than that the disposition was revoked and that A expressed an intention to make a claim against the State B. The records concerning the duty, protective statutes, negligence or defect in a structure, harm, causation, and the status of compensation and exceptions serve only to fix the kinds of materials used in the adjudication; they do not mean that actual records have been filled in. If the public official's intent or negligence and the violation of a statute or regulation are confirmed, and the other essential requirements—such as harm within the protected scope and causation—are also met, then, after applying the statutory limitations and exceptions, liability for compensation arises. If only unlawfulness is confirmed and harm within the protected scope and causation, or other essential requirements, are not recognized, the liability for compensation is blocked. Where there are only grounds for revocation and no materials to link the harm with the protective purpose of the duty of office, the matter remains undetermined. Because the year, amount, accrual date, and outcome of the judgment were not fixed in the scene, they are not determined.
What this section permits is to determine the presence or absence of the statutory requirements condition by condition; what it does not permit is to establish the entirety of the liability for compensation on the basis of a single judgment of revocation, or to adjudicate here such matters as causation and the scope of the surviving family members' claim for damages, which other parts, before and after, have in their charge. If confirmed as solatium for the independent mental suffering of the surviving family members who are the statutory subjects, this revises the conclusion that excluded everything merely by virtue of the former restrictive wording.
1.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
A judgment that removes unlawfulness cannot also substitute for the requirements of compensation for the harm that has already occurred. Yet the revocation of a disposition does not mean that liability for compensation for every cost thereafter is thereby established. If so, under what conditions does compensation for harm caused by unlawful public power open, under what conditions is it blocked, and in what cases must adjudication be withheld?
The wording that answers this question is found in Article 2 of the State Compensation Act. Article 2 (1) provides: "Where a public official or a private person entrusted with a public duty (hereinafter referred to as a 'public official') intentionally or negligently violates a statute or regulation in the course of executing the duty and thereby causes harm to another person, or is liable for damages under the Motor Vehicle Damage Compensation Security Act, the State or a local government shall compensate for such harm pursuant to this Act." (Article 2 of the State Compensation Act). This wording specifies, respectively, the State or a local government as the subject of liability, a public official or the like executing a duty as the actor, and the violation of a statute or regulation through intent or negligence and harm to another person as the conditions.
Accordingly, the requirements of State compensation mean the conditions of liability concerning unlawful acts in the course of duty, harm, and the like. These include the duty, the protective statutes, negligence or defect in a structure, harm, causation, and the status of compensation and exceptions as subjects of the records. The reasons for revocation are a judgment that the disposition is defective, whereas the requirements of State compensation are separate conditions for liability to arise. The mere fact that the former has been established does not automatically fill in the latter. Only with this distinction can compensation for harm caused by unlawful public power be divided into the three cases of effectiveness, blockage, and undetermined.
If an individual finds it difficult to expose negligence within an agency, the loss arising from unlawful administration remains as it is with the victim. This section does not disregard this counterargument. However, the principle that one who has proved unlawfulness must separately satisfy the requirements of compensation is a different question from how difficult the proof of each requirement actually is. Hence, the existence of a judgment of revocation alone cannot establish the entirety of the liability for compensation. Where only the reasons for revocation have been confirmed and harm within the protected scope and causation are missing, liability does not open; it is blocked.
Contrasting this principle with this scene makes the distinction clear. That the disposition received by plaintiff A was revoked means that the grounds for revocation were recognized. However, whether all costs thereafter fall within harm within the protected scope, whether the duty of office was intended to prevent that harm, and whether the defect in the disposition actually caused that harm are not confirmed by the scene alone. Without such materials, the matter remains undetermined.
Only by viewing the matter in this way are the boundaries of effectiveness, blockage, and undetermined maintained. Effectiveness refers to the case where the requirements of the relevant liability, such as an unlawful act in the course of duty or a defect in a public structure together with harm and causation, are met and the statutory limitations and exceptions are applied. Blockage means the case where only unlawfulness is confirmed and harm within the protected scope and causation, or the other essential requirements of the relevant liability, are not recognized. Undetermined refers to the case where there are only grounds for revocation and no materials to link the harm with the protective purpose of the duty of office.
1.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
This scene is now retraced. The revocation of a disposition has the effect of removing the unlawfulness that the disposition possesses. Yet whether the State must redress the harm that has occurred remains a question of whether separate conditions of liability must be passed. The question addressed in this section is solely that of gauging the distance between these two.
Article 2 of the State Compensation Act sets out the premises of liability in words. The provision states that the State or a local government bears liability for compensation where a "public official or a private person entrusted with a public duty" "in the course of executing the duty, intentionally or negligently violates a statute or regulation and thereby causes harm to another person" (Article 2 of the State Compensation Act). The wording specifies the subject as a public official or a person entrusted with a public duty, the act as a violation of a statute or regulation in the course of executing a duty, and the result as harm to another person.
Accordingly, the wording divides the materials of liability into several parts. The unlawfulness of the disposition that serves as the reason for revocation forms one axis of the conditions of liability, but the remaining axis—harm and the causation between the unlawfulness and the harm—are independent requirements. Here, causation does not mean mere temporal precedence, but the connection of liability that an unlawful act in the course of duty gave rise to harm to another person. Even if a judgment of revocation has put one requirement in place, the other requirements do not arise together with it. This is precisely the reason why the stages of adjudication must be distinguished.
This distinction leaves the victim with a burden hard to put into words. After proving unlawfulness with great difficulty, one must once again lay out in materials the nature of the duty, the purpose of the statutes sought to be protected, negligence, the scope of harm, and the link of causation. The concrete circumstances of the fault that occurred inside an agency are difficult for an individual outside to ascertain, and meanwhile the loss remains as it is. These disadvantages cannot be ignored, yet the existence of a judgment of revocation alone cannot establish the entirety of the liability for compensation. The confirmed unlawfulness is one axis of liability, not a judgment that additionally establishes the scope of compensation and the remaining requirements.
What is established in this scene is only that the disposition was revoked and that what A seeks to claim is every cost following the disposition. There are no materials as to which statute or regulation was violated and how, into the purpose of which protective statute that violation falls, what negligence occurred inside the agency, which of the claimed costs is harm the law protects, and whether that harm stemmed from the unlawfulness of the disposition. Nor are the facts of an actual case, the outcome of win or loss, or the result of performance known. Accordingly, the establishment and scope of the liability for compensation cannot be determined from this scene alone, and the requirements separate from the confirmed unlawfulness remain undetermined.
What this section permits is to keep the grounds for revocation and the statutory requirements of liability for compensation distinct. What it does not permit is the determination that, because there was a revocation, the State B must redress every cost following the disposition. If the entire liability were recognized on the confirmed unlawfulness alone, the meaning of separately confirming the conditions of liability would vanish.