Summary
Prior restraint of expression must comply with the strict and clear exceptional requirements set out in case law.
2.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
A decision that stops words before they are delivered also creates a silence that is hard to undo. This weight of prior restraint remains even after one accepts, as such, the possibility of prohibition confirmed in the preceding section. Precedent recognizes, on the basis of the right to reputation, the exclusion of present infringement and the possibility of prohibiting future infringement. Then, can publication be blocked in advance at the slightest sign of apprehended infringement, or is there a separate standard that opens the channel of this remedy?
The wording of precedent on prior restraint of expression lays the first clue to this question. The precedent states: "Prior restraint on expressive conduct may be permitted only in cases meeting strict and clear requirements, in light of the purport of Article 21 (2) of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of expression and prohibits censorship," (Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005). Here, prior restraint refers to acts that block the publication or distribution of an expression at a point when it has not yet been announced, and its subjects are the party seeking the prohibition and the court that determines it. What the wording says is not a relaxation of the requirements but their strictness and clarity.
The reason this wording and the possibility of prohibition mentioned above point to different stages is that their objects differ. The prohibition of present and future infringement based on the right to reputation is a channel for eliminating a state of infringement; prior restraint is a channel for binding in advance content that is not yet to be expressed. The author reads the precedent as placing a separate strict and clear exception requirement, as demanded by precedent, only for the latter channel. Accordingly, the mere fact that a ground for prohibition exists does not automatically permit prior restraint; conversely, the existence of a threshold for prior restraint does not alter the possibility of other prohibitions based on the right to reputation.
Even so, counterarguments point to clear disadvantages. Once an expression is published, its content spreads, and the reputational harm that then arises may be difficult to undo with money later, and the point at which recovery becomes difficult is precisely the moment of publication. Another disadvantage is raised at the same point. A preventive prohibition can become a means of silencing even truthful, public-interest criticism, and for the party contending that its criticism serves the public interest in particular, it is a fearful thing that its words are blocked before they ever come out. While acknowledging both of these losses, the author takes the view that displeasure or the intensity of criticism cannot be substituted for the precedent's exception requirements. The intensity of criticism does not fill the absence of the requirements, and therefore the difficulty of recovery can only be a reason for demanding proof of the requirements, not something that changes the requirements themselves.
Returning to this scene, the situation is one in which plaintiff A, alleging that defendant B's expression harms reputation, demands deletion and a prohibition for the future, while defendant B contends that it is public-interest criticism. What can be confirmed in this scene is the fact that the claim targets both deletion and a future prohibition, and the fact that whether that expression is public-interest criticism is disputed. Whether prior restraint is at issue is a matter to be judged from the records of whether publication occurred and the scope of the prohibition; accordingly, this scene alone leaves undetermined what the content of the specific expression is, what the irreparable harm is, and to what degree the public interest is present. These items, for which there is no material, remain undetermined. If all that remains is the circumstance of being displeased by criticism, it is not considered that the strict conditions for prior restraint have been met.
The boundary drawn by this section is as follows. Prior restraint of expression must follow the strict and clear exception requirements stated in precedent, and the entrance to this remedy should be regarded as opening only when those requirements are met. The fact that a ground for prohibition exists, the fact that the harm is great, and the fact that criticism is displeasing each do not independently justify prior restraint. Conversely, where the exception requirements for prior restraint of expression are not met and a remedy blocking publication or distribution in advance cannot be permitted, the door to prior restraint is closed. The fact that this door is closed, however, does not mean that other forms of remedy are forever absent, nor does the fact that unverified material remains predetermine their specific scope.
2.2The Conditions That Block Relief
In the preceding stage, the premise was accepted that precedent recognizes the exclusion of present infringement based on the right to reputation and the possibility of prohibiting future infringement. Under that premise, the scene should be revisited in which plaintiff A, alleging that defendant B's expression harms reputation, demands deletion and a future prohibition, and defendant B contends that it is public-interest criticism. Here the question narrows to whether publication can be blocked in advance on the basis of apprehension alone, and what the conditions are under which such a remedy is barred.
The source text corresponding to this question is as follows. This wording designates 'expressive conduct' as its object, 'prior restraint' as the manner of dealing with that conduct, and cases meeting 'strict and clear requirements' as the condition for permission. Here, prior restraint means a remedy that blocks publication or distribution before the expression is made.
This wording and the conclusion of this section connect as follows. What precedent requires are strict and clear requirements that allow an exception to remain an exception, and cases in which a remedy blocking publication or distribution in advance cannot be permitted for failure to meet those requirements are precisely the cases in which the channel of prior restraint is closed. Accordingly, on whether prior restraint is permissible, two things must be distinguished. One is the circumstance that there is a concern about infringement; the other is the determination that the exception requirements set by precedent have been met. The former alone cannot substitute for the latter, and if even one of the legal requirements is not met, the channel of prior restraint is closed.
There is a counterargument that criticizes this threshold sharply. Because reputational harm may be difficult to recover after publication has concluded, it argues, unless it is blocked in advance, substantive protection becomes impossible. A counterargument pointing out the loss that even truthful public-interest criticism may be silenced by preventive prohibition is aimed at the same point as well. The two counterarguments each reveal the disadvantages of difficulty of recovery and the chilling of criticism, respectively, but the conclusion does not change on that account. Displeasure or the intensity of criticism cannot be substituted for the precedent's exception requirements. While leaving intact the losses the counterarguments point out, the threshold of strict and clear requirements is maintained as is.
Taking out only the facts relevant to this question from the synthetic scene, plaintiff A alleges that defendant B's expression harms reputation and demands deletion and a future prohibition, and defendant B contends that it is public-interest criticism. In this scene, no material concerning the expression at issue, its truthfulness and public interest, and the purpose is presented. Therefore, whether the exception requirements demanded by precedent have actually been met cannot be determined from this scene alone. What is confirmed is the kind of items to be placed on the record, namely the expression at issue, truthfulness, public interest and purpose, irreparable harm, scope of prohibition, and record of cessation. Circumstances for which there is no material are left undetermined, and are not immediately pronounced to be without remedy.
Dividing the conclusions this section permits from those it does not, a remedy blocking publication in advance on the mere circumstance of concern about infringement does not open. Conversely, concluding that the channel of prior restraint is closed on the ground that the strict and clear exception requirements have not been met is permitted. What this paragraph does not address, however, is whether the requirements may be combined by selecting only favorable words.
2.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
On the premise that, on the basis of the right to reputation, present infringement may be excluded and future infringement prohibited, the next question concerns the boundary that cannot be determined for want of material. If there is a concern about infringement, can publication be blocked in advance? In the scene where plaintiff A, alleging that defendant B's expression harms reputation, demands deletion and a future prohibition, and defendant B contends that the expression is public-interest criticism, the question narrows into the form of how undetermined materials of judgment are to be handled.
There is a separate source text that defines the line of demarcation of this problem. The precedent states as follows. This wording makes clear the point that prior restraint—that is, a remedy blocking publication or distribution before the expression is made—is not permitted as a rule. Here, 'strict and clear requirements' is read to mean that the threshold of the exception is high, and that the circumstances composing that threshold must be set in a form that does not waver. The reason for quoting Article 21 (2) of the Constitution is that the background of guaranteeing freedom of expression and prohibiting censorship explains the exacting nature of this threshold.
Connecting this wording with the conclusion set out earlier clarifies the order of judgment. First, the content of the expression at issue and the character of the anticipated harm it will bring must be specified. Next, if a party presents material on public interest, what that material indicates must be confirmed. The reason these two stages are not mixed is that the earlier stage deals with the character of the expression itself and the harm arising from it, while the later stage deals with the separate dimension of the public interest that expression aims at. If all these materials are absent, the matter remains 'undetermined' for want of materials of judgment, not 'impossible' in the sense that the remedy could not be established from the outset. Distinguishing the impossible from the undetermined is not a trivial classification but the work of guarding the threshold of a strong remedy such as prior restraint.
The counterargument comes squarely from the side of protecting reputation: once an expression is published, reputational harm may thereafter be difficult to recover. Words, once out, cannot be gathered back, and the concern that the interest of reputation, once lost, is hard to restore is a real one. While acknowledging the weight of this loss, the conclusion is maintained that displeasure or the intensity of criticism cannot be substituted for the precedent's exception requirements. In the author's view, what precedent requires is a particular threshold called 'strict and clear requirements,' and how displeasing defendant B's expression was to plaintiff A, or how fierce the criticism was, are not elements composing that threshold. In effect, one answers that while not erasing the loss the counterargument targets, the magnitude of that loss cannot fill the place of the exception requirements.
Applying this distinction to this scene narrows further the scope that can be determined at present. Although plaintiff A demands deletion and a future prohibition and defendant B contends that it is public-interest criticism, the scene does not fix what the specific content of the expression at issue is, what form the harm anticipated upon publication would take, or what material supports defendant B's assertion of public interest. In the absence of such information, it cannot be said that the strict exception requirements for prior restraint have been met. The remainder that this scene cannot adjudicate remains undetermined, to be watched over time.
Accordingly, the conclusion permitted on this question remains within the narrow scope of not pronouncing impossible the matters that cannot be determined for want of material but leaving them undetermined. When the content of the expression and the anticipated harm or the material on public interest is absent, the exception requirements for prior restraint must be regarded as unmet, and this does not mean that the remedy is forever impossible. What is impermissible is filling the gap in that material with displeasure or the intensity of criticism.
2.4The Records Needed for Determination
Now, from the question of whether publication can be blocked in advance if there is a concern about infringement, what remains is what records must be gathered to judge that prohibition. If the remedy for this problem is prior restraint—that is, a remedy blocking publication or distribution before the expression is made—then the scope of the material to serve as the basis of the determination must also be fixed in advance. Otherwise, at the place where the question of prohibition is judged, it will not be revealed what was taken as the ground.
The source text corresponding to this question is the wording of Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005. The subject this wording designates is the party seeking prior restraint, the conduct is a claim to block it before the expression is published, and the condition is the satisfaction of strict and clear requirements. Here the author uses this wording solely as the ground for setting the threshold of prior restraint of expression. Which requirements to combine and in what manner is not within the scope of this question.
The stage determination is made only on the basis of the material recorded in the record of the expression at issue, truthfulness, public interest and purpose, irreparable harm, scope of prohibition, and cessation. Here, record means the category of material preserved in the procedure, and does not mean that the material has been furnished. Why this material must be viewed in two branches is the key. One side comprises items that reveal the content and character of the expression; the other comprises items that reveal the loss for which prohibition is required and its scope. With the former alone one cannot fully speak to the intensity of the concern about infringement; with the latter alone one cannot fully speak to the need for the remedy. Thus, the manner of not filling absent records with presumptions binds the two items together.
The strongest counterargument targets the point that reputational harm may be difficult to recover after publication. Once words are already out, it is difficult to gather their effects, and the distrust that arises in the meantime is difficult to reverse. This loss cannot be treated lightly. Yet this circumstance alone does not lower the strict threshold of prior restraint. The difficulty of recovery the counterargument points out is handled merely as one of the record items, and cannot itself become a judgment standard replacing the exception requirements.
Taking out only the facts posited in the synthetic scene, plaintiff A alleges that defendant B's expression harms reputation and demands deletion and a future prohibition, and defendant B contends that it is public-interest criticism. This scene shows together the assertion as to the expression at issue and the dispute over truthfulness and public interest. The scene, however, contains no material that determines irreparable harm, the scope of prohibition, or the record of cessation. If it is confirmed that all that remains is the circumstance of being displeased by criticism, the strict conditions for prior restraint are not regarded as met. Therefore, the stage cannot be determined from this scene alone, and the remaining items are left undetermined.
The conclusion permitted in this section is narrow. The stage determination is made only on the established records, and absent records are not filled with presumptions. Conversely, conclusions that the exception requirements are regarded as replaced by the mere feeling of difficulty of recovery, or that the blank spaces in the records are regarded as filled by conjecture, are not permitted. The efficacy spoken of here opens the door of judgment bound to the stages of prohibiting violations of personality rights and recovering residual harm, and does not refer to the results of actual payment, delivery, or recovery. The state of insufficient material is undetermined and is not immediately a want of remedy.
2.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
It starts from the point that precedent recognizes the possibility, on the basis of the right to reputation, of exclusion of current infringement and prohibition of future infringement. Upon this premise, the analysis posits a scene in which plaintiff A demands deletion and a future prohibition on the ground that defendant B's expression harms reputation, while defendant B disputes the charge on the ground of public-interest criticism. In this scene, the question to ask now is what threshold a decision that blocks publication in advance, before any statement is made, must cross in order to be permitted. And together with it, the further question is what change would reverse the determination of that threshold.
The relevant passage of the source text states the threshold of prior restraint as follows: "Prior restraint on expressive conduct, in light of the purport of Article 21 paragraph (2) of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of expression and prohibits censorship, may be permitted only where strict and clear requirements are met," (Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005) This language presupposes that the subject of prior restraint refers to public authority such as a court, and that the act in question is a measure that blocks expression before it is realized. What the language requires is strict and clear requirements, and it makes plain that only where these are met is such restraint permitted.
Linking this basis to the settled conclusion, where all that remains is the circumstance that one feels displeased by criticism, this is not regarded as satisfying the strict conditions of a prior prohibition. Here two steps must be distinguished. One is the question whether there exists a risk of infringement, namely that the expression harms reputation; the other is the question whether that risk alone can justify permitting the exceptional remedy of a prohibition before the statement is made. Even if the former is confirmed, the latter does not follow automatically. The strict and clear requirements are the threshold of the latter, so the mere existence of a risk of infringement cannot be said to reach that threshold. If the designated change is confirmed—that is, a situation in which displeasure or the intensity of criticism takes the place of the requirements—then the existing blocking and effectiveness determinations are discarded and the determination is redone from the first step.
Once an expression has already been published and circulated, deletion and damages alone can hardly restore a lost reputation in full, and there is the concern that the harm spread in the meantime is difficult to reverse. Added to this is the burden that a preventive prohibition may become a means of silencing even sincere public-interest criticism. The stronger the intensity of the criticism or the greater the displeasure in a given case, the greater the risk, rather, that a prior prohibition will be abused. The existence of irreparable harm is an element to be weighed in the judgment, but it does not itself replace the strict and clear threshold.
Returning to the synthetic scene, plaintiff A asserts defamation and a future prohibition, while defendant B merely asserts public-interest criticism. The items to be put on the record are the expression at issue, truthfulness, public interest and purpose, irreparable harm, the scope of prohibition, and the interruption record. In this scene, however, no year, amount, start date, or judgment outcome is set. Where there is no material on the content of the expression, the anticipated harm, or the public interest, the judgment itself cannot be fixed. Accordingly, from the scene alone one cannot assert either that the exceptional requirements of a prior prohibition have been met or that they have not. Only one condition, however, is clear. Where all that remains is the circumstance that one feels displeased by criticism, this is not regarded as satisfying the strict conditions of a prior prohibition, and if that designated change is confirmed, the existing determination is discarded and the determination is redone from the first step.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Even if a risk of infringement exists, a remedy that blocks publication in advance, before any statement is made, is permitted only where the strict and clear exceptional requirements are met. Conversely, the conclusion not permitted is the judgment that a prior prohibition is justified merely by the intensity of the criticism or the displeasure of the person targeted. The purport of guaranteeing freedom of expression and prohibiting censorship is the reason the threshold is set high.
2.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
After posting, the fact that reputational harm may be difficult to reverse remains a standing concern. The more this worry grows, the more readily courts face the demand that speech must be stopped before it is made, and there is a substantial risk that in practice the threshold of the exception set by precedent will be applied too loosely. The strongest counterargument now under consideration proceeds in the direction that, on the ground that recovery may be difficult once publication has taken place, it is permissible to block even sincere public-interest criticism in advance. The core question here is whether the threshold of a prior prohibition may be lowered on the strength of such difficulty.
A prior prohibition means a remedy that blocks publication and circulation before an expression is made, and in that case, in light of the purport of Article 21 paragraph (2) of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of expression and prohibits censorship, it may be permitted only where strict and clear requirements are met, and this rests on the language of the precedent in the following terms (Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005). Here the subject is the person who intends to engage in expressive conduct, the act in question is the publication and circulation of content by speech or writing, and the condition is the satisfaction of requirements strict and clear enough to permit prior restraint. The precedent makes this threshold plain by attaching it to the constitutional purport of freedom of expression and the prohibition of censorship.
The point at which this language connects with the conclusion carried over from the preceding section is the very existence of the exceptional requirements. Even as precedent recognizes, on the basis of the right to reputation, the possibility of exclusion of current infringement and prohibition of future infringement, it distinguishes that prior restraint on expression before any statement is made is permitted only under strict and clear requirements. In other words, the fact that a risk of infringement exists and the judgment that the threshold of a prior prohibition has been crossed are separate steps, and the former cannot be substituted for the latter. If this distinction is collapsed, the meaning of the precedent's recognition of the possibility of prohibiting future infringement is itself absorbed into the grounds for permitting a prior prohibition.
Notwithstanding this distinction, the strongest counterargument takes aim at the magnitude of the loss and inconvenience. Before publication, reputational harm may arise that is difficult to reverse, and damages or deletion after the fact alone can hardly undo the spread of an expression already made public; hence, unless it is blocked in advance, the costs borne by the victim are large. The counterargument goes further, emphasizing in the same breath that a preventive prohibition may become a means of silencing even sincere public-interest criticism. The inconvenience identified by this counterargument is real and cannot be erased.
In the synthetic scene, plaintiff A demands deletion and a future prohibition on the ground that defendant B's expression harms reputation, while defendant B disputes the charge on the ground of public-interest criticism; the facts that can be confirmed here are only the content of the expression, the assertions as to whether reputation was harmed, the claim for deletion and future prohibition, and the direction of the defense of public-interest criticism. The truthfulness and public interest of the expression at issue, its purpose, the occurrence and scope of irreparable harm, the scope of prohibition, and the interruption record cannot be fixed from this scene alone. Accordingly, this scene provides no basis for determining whether the strict and clear exceptional requirements of a prior prohibition have been met, and the relevant circumstances remain undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. The circumstance that irreparable reputational harm is feared cannot substitute for the judgment that the strict and clear exceptional requirements of prior restraint have been met, and the work of confirming those exceptional requirements remains a separate judgment. Yet neither can it be asserted at once that relief is unavailable merely because the circumstances of irreparable harm or public-interest criticism are not confirmed in the record.
2.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The preceding section confirmed that displeasure or the intensity of criticism cannot be substituted for the exceptional requirements of precedent, and now it asks how that threshold operates with respect to what application and what order. In the scene where plaintiff A demands deletion and a future prohibition on the ground that defendant B's expression harms reputation, while defendant B disputes the charge on the ground of public-interest criticism, the question remains whether publication can be blocked in advance on the strength of a risk of infringement alone.
The basis for this question is the language stated in Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005. That judgment states: "Prior restraint on expressive conduct, in light of the purport of Article 21 paragraph (2) of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of expression and prohibits censorship, may be permitted only where strict and clear requirements are met," Here prior restraint refers to a prior prohibition, that is, a remedy that blocks publication and circulation before an expression is made; the party blocked is the person who seeks to put forth the expression, and the party seeking the block is the party claiming the prohibition.
The threshold set by this language fixes the order of judgment. First, the purport of Article 21 paragraph (2) of the Constitution, namely the guarantee of freedom of expression and the prohibition of censorship, forms the background of prior restraint. Next, for the exception to arise, strict and clear requirements must be in place. In other words, an order blocking a statement cannot be issued on the strength of the circumstance that a risk of infringement exists alone; prohibition is permitted only when that risk falls within the framework of the exception set by precedent. If the two steps are mixed and the degree of concern is converted directly into a ground for prohibition, the threshold collapses.
The strongest counterargument lies in the point that this threshold may leave the harm irreparable. Once the expression has already come out, reputational harm may be difficult to reverse, and the fact that a prior prohibition may be the only means of preventing that harm cannot be erased. The concern also remains that a preventive prohibition may become a means of silencing even sincere public-interest criticism. Even so, the answer of this work is one.
Contrasting the synthetic scene with the foregoing conditions, what plaintiff A raised is deletion and a future prohibition, and defendant B's defense is public-interest criticism. These facts alone do not reveal the content and truthfulness and public interest of the expression at issue, its purpose, or what the irreparable harm is, nor can it be determined whether the strict and clear exceptional requirements demanded by precedent have been met. Even though it is settled what items of the expression at issue, truthfulness, public interest and purpose, irreparable harm, scope of prohibition, and interruption must be put on the record, the content of that record itself remains undetermined.
Accordingly, what this section permits is not an order blocking publication in advance on the strength of a risk of infringement alone, but a prior prohibition limited to cases possessing the strict and clear exceptional requirements of precedent. Conversely, where the concern remains merely a concern and the requirements are not confirmed, a remedy blocking publication and circulation cannot be permitted.
2.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
These circumstances mean that a judgment severing the path of an expression before it ever reaches the world is difficult to rectify after the fact. Within the scene, plaintiff A demands deletion and a future prohibition on the ground that defendant B's expression harms reputation, and defendant B disputes the charge on the ground of public-interest criticism. Before this dispute stands the question whether publication can be blocked in advance where a risk of infringement exists.
As to this question, the precedent stated that prior restraint on expressive conduct, in light of the purport of Article 21 paragraph (2) of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of expression and prohibits censorship, may be permitted only where strict and clear requirements are met (Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005). Here prior restraint means a remedy that blocks publication and circulation before an expression is made, and it carries the same meaning as the prior prohibition defined above. The language confines its object to control over expressive conduct, and fixes the point in time as before the expression comes into being.
The threshold set by precedent has two layers: direction and threshold. Because the purport of Article 21 paragraph (2) of the Constitution points to both the guarantee of freedom of expression and the prohibition of censorship, prior restraint is treated as control that runs directly counter to those values. Accordingly, the language that it is permitted only where requirements are met sets the arrangement of principle and exception. Even where plaintiff A seeks a future prohibition on the strength of a risk of infringement alone, before this threshold the existence of the concern itself does not become a sufficient condition for permission. A prior prohibition on expression must follow the strict and clear exceptional requirements stated by precedent.
The reason that threshold stands firm lies in the counterargument that, after publication, reputational harm may be difficult to restore. The counterargument points out that if restoration is delayed the harm remains in an irreversible form, and it aims at the proposition that prevention should take precedence over damages. The weight of this loss cannot be taken lightly. Yet the language of precedent took the degree of difficulty of restoration as an element of the exceptional requirements, so the irreparable harm identified by the counterargument is already reflected as one of the substantive requirements of a prior prohibition. Without erasing the difficulty raised by the counterargument, the settled answer does not alter the place of the requirements.
In the synthetic scene, the facts relevant to this question are only the structure of the two parties' assertions. Plaintiff A seeks deletion and a future prohibition together, and defendant B defends his expression as public-interest criticism. These circumstances alone do not settle the content, truthfulness, and public interest of the expression at issue, its purpose, or the concrete form of the irreparable harm. Therefore, whether there is a ground for prohibiting future infringement, and whether the exceptional requirements of a prior prohibition have actually been met, cannot be fixed from this scene alone. If it is confirmed that all that remains is the circumstance that one feels displeased by criticism, then this is not regarded as satisfying the strict conditions of a prior prohibition—and only this marks the boundary of the present judgment.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Expression cannot be blocked in advance on the strength of the circumstance that a risk of infringement exists alone, and prior restraint is limited to cases possessing strict and clear requirements, in light of the constitutional purport of freedom of expression and the prohibition of censorship. Conversely, what this section does not permit is a judgment that goes beyond the language of the requirements and justifies prohibition by the magnitude of concern or displeasure. The items for which material is still lacking remain undetermined, and this is not the same as saying that relief is impossible.
2.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
이 물음은 인격권 침해의 금지와 잔존 손해 회복을 다루지만, 이번 자리에서 판정 근거로 삼는 것은 해당 원문의 문언뿐이다. 인용한 원문 문언만 적용하며, 판결이유의 다른 대목으로 확장하지 않는다.
해당 원문 구절은 이렇게 이어진다. 이 문언이 가리키는 행위는 표현행위에 대한 사전억제이고, 그 주체는 사전억제를 허용할 수 있는지 판단하는 재판부다. 문언은 그 허용의 조건을 "엄격하고 명확한 요건을 갖춘 경우"로 한정하며, 헌법 제21조 제2항의 취지에 비추어 그 예외를 좁게 본다. 이 구절은 표현 사전금지, 즉 표현이 이루어지기 전에 발표·유통을 막는 구제가 예외적으로만 가능함을 말한다. 여기에 더해 다른 조문이나 판결이 이유로 되어 있는 부분을 결합하지 않는다.
이 문언을 앞서 확인한 결론과 이으면 두 단계가 구별된다. 하나는 인격권 침해의 금지, 다른 하나는 잔존 손해 회복이다. 사전억제 문언은 앞의 단계, 곧 표현이 반포되기 전에 발표·유통을 막는 구제가 지닌 엄격하고 명확한 문턱에 직접 관련된다. 잔존 손해 회복은 이미 생긴 손해를 메우는 문제이므로 그 문언의 사전억제 문턱과 같은 자리에 두지 않는다. 이 절의 결론은 해당 원문 문언만을 이 두 대상의 판정 근거로 삼는다는 것이고, 문언을 벗어난 확장으로 둘 사이의 경계를 옮기지 않는다. 사전금지와 사후 손해 회복을 한 판단 안에 섞으면, 사전억제에 요구되는 엄격한 조건이 갑자기 느슨해지거나, 반대로 이미 지나간 손해를 막는 조건으로 다루게 된다. 그러므로 각 단계마다 해당 문언이 맡은 자리를 확인한다.
가장 강한 반론은 발표 뒤에는 명예 손해를 회복하기 어려울 수 있다는 점, 그리고 예방적 금지가 진실한 공익적 비판까지 침묵시키는 수단이 될 수 있다는 점을 겨냥한다. 이 반론은 두 가치가 충돌하는 자리를 드러낸다. 한쪽에서는 명예가 이미 훼손된 뒤의 회복이 늦다는 손실이, 다른 쪽에서는 공익을 위한 표현이 미리 묶이는 불편과 가치 훼손이 남는다. 반론이 지적한 어려움을 지우지 않더라도, 불쾌감이나 비판의 강도를 판례의 예외 요건으로 대체할 수는 없다. 원고 A와 피고 B의 다툼에서 비판이 거세다는 사정만으로 엄격하고 명확한 요건이 충족되었다고 볼 수 없고, 반대로 회복이 늦다는 사정만으로 요건 없이 발표를 막을 수도 없다.
이 장면에서 이 물음과 관련된 사실은 좁다. 이 사실들은 문제 표현의 존재와 삭제·장래 금지의 요구, 그리고 비판이라는 방어가 함께 놓여 있음을 보인다. 해당 문언의 조건에 견주면, 사전억제를 허용하려면 엄격하고 명확한 요건을 갖춘 경우여야 한다. 장면이 확정한 것은 요구와 항변의 모습뿐이며, 엄격하고 명확한 요건을 충족하는 구체 자료는 정하지 않았다. 따라서 장면만으로 사전금지의 허용 여부를 확정할 수 없고, 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절에서 허용되는 결론은, 표현 사전금지는 판례가 밝힌 엄격하고 명확한 예외 요건에 따라야 하고, 그 판정 근거는 해당 원문 문언에 묶인다는 것이다. 허용되지 않는 결론은, 문언을 넘은 판결이유의 다른 대목으로 요건을 넓히는 것, 또 불쾌감이나 비판의 강도가 예외 요건의 자리를 대신하게 하는 것이다. 회복 곤란한 손해를 걱정한다는 사정만으로도 결론을 바꾸지 않는다.
2.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
표현 사전금지의 문턱에 이르렀다. 이 흐름 안에서 인격권 침해의 금지와 잔존 손해 회복 안에서 다시 나누어 판정할 부분은 무엇인가? 이 장면에서 먼저 정해야 할 것은 판정할 단계와 그 안의 구분이다. 이 구제의 문턱을 정하는 기준이 지금의 물음이다.
대법원 2005. 1. 17. 자 2003마1477 결정은 이렇게 밝힌다. "표현행위에 대한 사전억제는 표현의 자유를 보장하고 검열을 금지하는 헌법 제21조 제2항의 취지에 비추어 엄격하고 명확한 요건을 갖춘 경우에만 허용된다고 할 것인바," 이 문언이 가리키는 대상은 표현행위에 대한 사전억제이고, 그것은 표현이 되기 전에 막는 결정이다. 조건은 엄격하고 명확한 요건의 충족이며, 헌법 제21조 제2항이 표현의 자유를 보장하고 검열을 금지하는 취지가 그 기준의 배경이다. 판례가 이 자리에서 밝힌 것은 사전억제의 문턱 자체이다. 어떤 요건을 어떻게 결합하는지까지 이 문언에서 읽어내지 않는다.
이 문언은 사전금지 구제의 허용 조건을 정하고, 지금의 결론은 그 조건에 맞춘 세부 구분에 머문다. 작동하는 경우는 현재·장래 침해에 대한 금지 근거가 있고 표현 사전금지의 경우 판례의 엄격한 예외 요건을 충족한 경우이다. 막히는 경우는 표현 사전금지의 예외 요건이 충족되지 않아 발표·유통을 미리 막는 구제를 허용할 수 없는 경우이다. 이 셋은 서로 다른 상태이며, 하나로 뭉뚱그리면 어느 쪽 판정인지 알 수 없다. 같은 절 안의 세부 구분은 이 조건들에 한정한다.
발표 뒤에는 명예 손해를 회복하기 어려울 수 있다. 표현이 나간 뒤에는 그 파급을 되돌리는 일이 어려우므로, 막는 편이 손해를 줄인다는 점을 강하게 주장할 수 있다. 예방적 금지는 진실한 공익적 비판까지 침묵시키는 수단이 될 수 있다. 이 점 역시 놓치지 않는다. 미리 막는 구제가 넓게 열리면 비판이 발표되지 못하는 비용이 생긴다. 그래도 이 손실과 불편을 이유로 예외 요건을 느슨하게 바꾸지 않는다. 반론이 지적한 회복 곤란은 사전금지의 엄격한 문턱을 낮추는 근거가 되지 못하며, 그 불리한 부분은 그대로 남긴다.
합성 장면에서 전제한 사실만 대조하면, 원고 A는 삭제와 장래 금지를 요구하고 피고 B는 공익적 비판이라고 다툰다. 이 장면에 표현의 내용, 진실성, 공익성, 목적, 회복곤란 손해, 금지 범위, 중단 기록이 어느 쪽으로 확정되어 있는지는 나타나 있지 않다. 따라서 현재 이 장면만으로 작동하는 경우나 막히는 경우 중 어느 쪽에 해당한다고 단정할 수 없다. 문제가 된 표현의 내용과 예상 손해 또는 공익성 자료가 없는 지금, 미확정의 상태에 놓인다. 판정 기록에 넣어야 할 항목은 문제 표현·진실성·공익성과 목적·회복곤란 손해·금지 범위·중단 기록이다. 판단에 필요한 자료의 갈래만 정한 것이며, 그 자료가 갖춰졌다는 뜻은 아니다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 사전금지의 세부 구분이 작동하는 경우·막히는 경우·미확정인 경우의 명시된 조건에 한정하는 것이다. 허용하지 않는 것은, 이 셋 바깥에 판정 단계를 하나 더 만들어 내거나, 불쾌감이나 비판의 강도만으로 예외 요건을 대신하는 것이다. 사전금지가 열리는 조건은 엄격하고 명확한 요건의 충족이고, 그 조건 자료가 없으면 미확정으로 남긴다. 미확정은 곧 구제 불능이 아니며, 자료가 채워질 때 같은 조건에 따라 다시 판정할 대상이다. 요건을 유리한 단어만 골라 결합할 수 있는지의 문제는 이 경계 바로 바깥에 남는다.
2.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
원고 A는 피고 B의 표현이 명예를 해친다며 삭제와 장래 금지를 요구하고 피고 B는 공익적 비판이라고 다투는 장면에서, 침해 우려가 있으면 출판을 미리 막을 수 있는지라는 물음에 이어 인격권 침해의 금지와 잔존 손해 회복의 실효·차단·미확정을 어떻게 구별할지가 남는다.
이 판례는 표현 사전금지에 관하여 이렇게 밝힌다. “표현행위에 대한 사전억제는 표현의 자유를 보장하고 검열을 금지하는 헌법 제21조 제2항의 취지에 비추어 엄격하고 명확한 요건을 갖춘 경우에만 허용된다고 할 것인바,” (대법원 2005. 1. 17. 자 2003마1477 결정). 여기서 표현 사전금지는 표현이 이루어지기 전에 발표·유통을 막는 구제를 가리키고, 이 문언은 사전억제를 허용할 주체가 요구되는 요건의 엄격함과 명확함에 두는 평정 기준을 제시한다.
이 문언과 판단을 잇는 고리는 사전억제의 문턱이 일반적인 금지 판단과 같은 높이가 아니라는 구별이다. 명예권에 기초한 현재 침해의 배제나 장래 침해의 금지는 인정되는 금지 근거가 있는 경우에 열리지만, 표현을 미리 막는 사전금지는 그 위에 판례가 밝힌 엄격하고 명확한 예외 요건까지 충족해야 한다. 요건의 격이 다르므로 이 둘을 하나의 금지 판단으로 뭉뚱그리면 안 되고, 두 단계 중 어느 단계에 자료가 서 있는지가 판정의 첫 구분이 된다.
사전금지의 엄격한 문턱이 겨냥하는 손실은 앞서 말한 되돌리기 어려운 침묵이지만, 같은 문턱은 회복이 어려운 명예 손해를 애타게 보아야 하는 처지도 지우지 않는다. 그러나 그렇더라도 불쾌감이나 비판의 강도를 판례의 예외 요건으로 대체할 수는 없고, 진실한 공익적 비판이라는 주장이 막힐 수 있다는 불리함은 예외 요건 충족 여부의 문제로 남는다.
이 장면에서 확인되는 것은 표현이 명예를 해친다는 원고 A의 주장과 그것이 공익적 비판이라는 피고 B의 대응뿐이고, 그 장면에는 그 표현의 내용과 예상 손해, 공익성 자료가 제시되지 않는다. 이에 따르면 문제 표현·진실성·공익성과 목적·회복곤란 손해·금지 범위·중단 기록이 비어 있는 셈이므로, 사전금지를 허용할 요건이 충족되었다고도, 충족되지 않았다고도 정하지 못한다. 이 자료가 없어진다고 해서 금지가 자동으로 차단되는 것은 아니며, 다만 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 현재·장래 침해에 대한 금지 근거가 있고, 표현 사전금지라면 판례의 엄격한 예외 요건까지 갖춘 경우 금지의 길이 열린다는 구별이고, 예외 요건이 충족되지 않아 발표·유통을 미리 막는 구제를 허용할 수 없으면 그 길이 막히며, 표현의 내용과 예상 손해 또는 공익성 자료가 없으면 미확정으로 남는다는 구별이다. 다만 불쾌감이나 비판의 강도 하나로 예외 요건이 갖춰졌다고는 할 수 없다.
2.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
앞서 판례는 명예권에 기초한 현재 침해의 배제와 장래 침해의 금지 가능성을 인정했다. 이 물음에 답하고 나면, 요건을 유리한 단어만 골라 결합할 수 있는가라는 후속 물음이 남는다. 현재 절은 앞 절이 세운 침해 우려의 전제를 그대로 두고, 사전금지의 문턱을 채우는 것이 무엇인지에만 머무른다.
이 절에서 다룰 문언은 사전금지의 허용 범위를 가리키는 판례의 다음 구절이다. 이 문언의 주체는 사전억제를 구하는 당사자가 아니라, 허용 여부를 판단하는 법원이며, 대상은 표현행위이다.
이 문언이 정하는 문턱은 사전금지가 요건이 엄격하고 명확한 경우에만 허용된다는 데 있다. 사전금지는 표현이 이루어지기 전에 발표·유통을 막는 구제이다. 사전금지의 문턱과 그 문턱을 구성하는 각 요건의 조합은 서로 다른 판단 단계이다. 현재 절은 앞의 문턱만 다루고, 요건의 조합은 다음 절에 넘긴다.
이런 점에서는 예방적 금지가 진실한 공익적 비판까지 침묵시키는 수단이 될 수 있다는 비판도 무게가 있다. 두 손실을 함께 놓더라도, 불쾌감이나 비판의 강도를 판례의 예외 요건으로 대체할 수는 없다. 회복이 어렵다는 사정만으로 엄격하고 명확한 문턱이 낮아지지 않는다는 결론은 유지된다.
이 장면의 요소를 사전금지의 문턱과 대조하면, 문제 표현이 발표 전인지 뒤인지, 공익적 비판이라는 다툼이 어떤 요건에 대응하는지는 장면만으로 정해지지 않는다. 그 밖의 판단에는 자료가 부족하므로 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 사전금지가 엄격하고 명확한 예외 요건 아래서만 허용된다는 문턱의 확인이다. 불쾌감의 크기나 비판의 강도가 그 문턱을 대신하거나 낮추는 것은 허용되지 않는다. 확인한 문언은 허용의 문턱을 정할 뿐이고, 문턱을 채우는 요건의 구체 조합은 확정하지 않았다. 요건을 유리한 단어만 골라 결합할 수 있는가?