Summary
The logical link in the Summary of Decision between truthfulness and public interest, on the one hand, and serious and manifest loss that is difficult to remedy, on the other, is preserved as in the original text.
3.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
접속어를 바꾸는 순간 표현을 막을 수 있는 범위도 바뀐다. 표현 사전금지는 판례가 밝힌 엄격하고 명확한 예외 요건에 따라야 한다. 이 전제 위에서 원고 A는 피고 B의 표현이 명예를 해친다며 삭제와 장래 금지를 요구하고 피고 B는 공익적 비판이라고 다툰다. 이 장면에서 법원이 먼저 가려야 할 것은 어느 쪽의 말이 옳은가가 아니라, 금지라는 구제가 성립하려면 어떤 기준을 통과해야 하는가이다. 이 구제의 통로가 열리는 기준은 무엇인가.
판결요지는 출판물 발행·판매 금지가 “위와 같은 표현행위에 대한 사전억제에 해당”하고, 그 대상이 “종교단체에 관한 평가나 비판 등의 표현행위”에 관한 것이라도 사전금지는 “원칙적으로 허용되어서는 안 될 것”이라고 전제한다(대법원 2005. 1. 17. 자 2003마1477 결정). 여기서 말하는 주체는 발행·판매 등으로 표현을 유통시키려는 자이고, 행위는 그 유통을 미리 멈추게 하는 금지이며, 조건은 원문이 이어서 적시한 예외 상황이다. 이 문언은 평가나 비판의 형식을 이유로 금지를 예외 없이 막는 뜻이 아니라, 사전억제를 원칙적 금지로 두고 예외의 문을 좁게 연다는 뜻이다.
원문은 예외 요건을 “그 표현내용이 진실이 아니거나 그것이 공공의 이해에 관한 사항으로서 그 목적이 오로지 공공의 이익을 위한 것이 아니며, 또한 피해자에게 중대하고 현저하게 회복하기 어려운 손해를 입힐 우려가 있는 경우”로 적는다(대법원 2005. 1. 17. 자 2003마1477 결정). 이 문장 안에는 선택 조건과 누적 조건이 함께 있다. 앞의 진실성과 공익성 요건은 ‘또는’으로 묶여 있고, 뒤의 중대하고 현저한 회복곤란 손해 우려는 ‘또한’으로 이어진다. 두 묶음을 구별해야 하는 이유는 앞 묶음에서 한쪽만 갖췄다고 해서 뒤 묶음까지 채운 것이 되지 않기 때문이다. 따라서 현재·장래 침해에 대한 금지 근거가 있고, 표현 사전금지인 경우 이 예외 요건을 충족하면 이 구제의 입구가 열린다.
가장 강한 반론은 요지의 복합 문장이 독자에게 어렵다는 점에서 출발한다. 문장이 길고 접속어가 겹치면 독자는 필요한 요건만 골라 읽기 쉽고, 예방적 금지는 진실한 공익적 비판까지 침묵시키는 수단이 될 수 있다는 우려가 뒤를 잇는다. 그러나 난독의 불편을 해소하는 방법으로 원문의 ‘또는’ 관계를 ‘그리고’로 바꾸거나 누적 손해 조건을 삭제할 수는 없다. 그렇게 바꾸면 진실하지 않은 표현이면서도 공익 목적이 없는 경우의 선택 구조가 사라지고, 회복곤란 손해라는 독립된 문턱도 함께 지워진다. 반론이 지적하는 침묵의 위험은 사전억제를 원칙적 금지로 두는 전제와 좁은 예외라는 답변으로 다룬다.
이 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 것은 요청과 방어의 모양뿐이다. 원고 A는 삭제와 장래 금지를 요구하고, 피고 B는 자신의 표현이 공익적 비판이라고 다투며, 문제 표현의 내용과 진실성, 공익성과 목적, 회복곤란 손해, 금지 범위, 중단 기록은 판단에 필요한 자료의 갈래로 열거된 상태이다. 이 기록들이 실제로 어떻게 채워졌는지는 장면이 정하지 않았다. 따라서 표현 사전금지의 예외 요건 충족 여부는 이 장면만으로 확정할 수 없고, 미확정으로 남는다. 만약 비판으로 불쾌하다는 사정만 남는다고 확인되면 사전금지의 엄격한 조건을 충족했다고 보지 않는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 판례가 정한 선택 조건과 누적 조건의 결합 관계를 그대로 두고, 청구취지의 특정과 방어 가능성까지 갖춘 때에 한해 이 구제의 통로가 열린다고 말할 수 있다. 허용되지 않는 것은 유리한 단어만 골라 요건을 재조립하는 해석이고, 누적 손해 조건을 빼고 금지를 성립시키는 해석이며, 미확정인 기록을 성립 사실로 채우는 읽기이다.
3.2The Conditions That Block Relief
표현 사전금지는 판례가 밝힌 엄격하고 명확한 예외 요건에 따라야 한다는 전제에서 출발한다. 원고 A는 피고 B의 표현이 명예를 해친다며 삭제와 장래 금지를 요구하고 피고 B는 공익적 비판이라고 다툰다. 이 장면에서 요구된 금지는 발표·유통을 미리 막는 구제이고, 그 구제를 허용할 수 있는지 가르는 요건들을 유리한 단어만 골라 결합할 수 있는지가 이번 물음이다.
이 판례는 출판물 발행·판매 금지를 표현행위에 대한 사전억제로 보면서도, 그 표현내용이 "진실이 아니거나 그것이 공공의 이해에 관한 사항으로서 그 목적이 오로지 공공의 이익을 위한 것이 아니며, 또한 피해자에게 중대하고 현저하게 회복하기 어려운 손해를 입힐 우려가 있는 경우"에 예외적 사전금지를 허용한다고 밝힌다. 이 문언에서 '또는'은 앞의 진실성·공익성 조건을 가르고, '또한'은 회복곤란 손해 조건을 앞 조건들에 겹친다. 다시 말해 선택 조건과 누적 조건이 서로 다른 자리에 놓여 있다는 뜻이다. (대법원 2005. 1. 17. 자 2003마1477 결정)
이 연결을 그대로 두는 것은 요건을 골라 결합하지 못하게 하는 장치다. 진실하지 않음 또는 공익적 목적의 결여라는 선택 조건 가운데 하나가 성립하더라도, 중대하고 현저하게 회복하기 어려운 손해의 우려라는 누적 조건까지 함께 갖추어지지 않으면 표현 사전금지의 예외 요건은 충족되지 않는다. 여기서 예외 요건의 결합은 판례가 정한 선택 조건과 누적 조건의 관계를 뜻한다. 어느 한쪽만 골라 잡아도 다른 쪽이 비면 그 단계의 구제 통로는 닫힌다. 그 문턱에서 미끄러진 사정은 뒤 단계에서 다시 주워올 수 없다.
요지의 복합 문장이 독자에게 어렵다는 반론은 실질적인 불편을 겨냥한다. 진실한 공익적 비판이 예방적 금지의 표적이 되어 침묵을 강요받을 수 있다는 손실과, 사전억제라는 무게가 표현의 자유에 미치는 영향이 크다는 가치가 그 안에 있다. 그렇더라도 원문의 또는 관계를 그리고로 바꾸거나 누적 손해 조건을 삭제할 수는 없다. 반론이 지적한 비판의 침묵이라는 불리한 결과까지 지워버리지 않은 채, 문언이 정해 둔 결합 관계만을 그대로 지킨다.
합성 장면으로 돌아가면, 피고 B가 내세우는 공익적 비판이라는 항변은 선택 조건의 한쪽, 즉 공공의 이해에 관한 사항이자 오로지 공공의 이익을 위한 목적이라는 평가와 맞닿는다. 원고 A가 주장하는 명예 훼손과 삭제·장래 금지의 요구는 반대편 주장에 불과하고, 중대하고 현저하게 회복하기 어려운 손해의 우려에 관한 자료는 장면에 들어 있지 않다. 따라서 이 장면만으로는 예외 요건의 충족 여부를 확정할 수 없다. 비판으로 인해 불쾌하다는 사정만 남으면 사전금지의 엄격한 조건을 충족했다고 보지 않는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 문언이 정한 선택 조건과 누적 조건의 관계를 그대로 두고, 법정 요건 중 하나라도 비면 발표·유통을 미리 막는 구제의 문이 닫힌다는 판단이다. 허용하지 않는 것은 유리한 단어만 골라 요건을 새로 조립해 예외의 폭을 넓히는 읽기다.
3.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
이번의 물음은 요건을 유리한 단어만 골라 결합할 수 있는가이며, 자료가 없어 확정할 수 없는 경계는 어디인가라는 점으로 좁혀진다. 원고 A는 피고 B의 표현이 명예를 해치며 삭제와 장래 금지를 요구하고 피고 B는 공익적 비판이라고 다투는 장면에서 이 물음은 판단 재료의 유무가 아니라 그 결합 방식의 문제로 다뤄진다.
해당 원문은 예외 요건의 관계를 다음과 같이 쓴다. "그 표현내용이 진실이 아니거나 그것이 공공의 이해에 관한 사항으로서 그 목적이 오로지 공공의 이익을 위한 것이 아니며, 또한 피해자에게 중대하고 현저하게 회복하기 어려운 손해를 입힐 우려가 있는 경우에는"이라는 문언이다. 여기서 '또한'은 회복곤란 손해를 별도로 요구하는 누적 조건임을 드러내고, 앞의 선택 조건 사이의 '또는'은 진실성과 공익성·목적의 요소 중 하나로 족한 관계를 뜻한다. 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 금지를 청구하는 피해자이고, 행위는 표현행위의 사전억제이며, 조건은 세 요소가 결합된 때이다.
이 문언과 이 절의 결론을 잇는 것은 선택 조건과 누적 조건의 구별이다. 진실이 아니거나 공공의 이해에 관한 사항으로서 목적이 오로지 공공의 이익을 위한 것이 아니라는 두 가지는 한쪽으로 충족되어도 나머지 판단을 면제하지 않으며, 여기에 중대하고 현저하게 회복하기 어려운 손해 우려가 함께 있을 때만 예외적 사전금지가 문제된다. 이 구별을 지워 선택 조건을 누적으로 묶거나 그 반대로 바꾸면 표현을 막을 수 있는 범위가 임의로 넓어지거나 좁아진다. 따라서 판례가 정한 선택 조건과 누적 조건의 관계는 문언대로 보존되어야 한다.
그 결합을 그대로 두는 일에는 불리한 점이 남는다. 가장 강한 반론은 예방적 금지가 진실한 공익적 비판까지 침묵시키는 수단이 될 수 있다는 데 있다. 비판 대상이 종교단체 같은 공동체의 평가나 비판인 경우 그 표현에는 공적 논의의 가치가 있어서, 사전금지의 문턱이 낮아지면 말하려는 쪽이 먼저 위축되고 듣는 쪽의 판단 기회도 사라진다. 또 요지의 복합 문장이 독자에게 어렵다는 지적도, 문언을 한 문장으로 읽지 못하게 만든다는 점에서 불편이 된다. 그렇더라도 원문의 ‘또는’ 관계를 ‘그리고’로 바꾸거나 누적 손해 조건을 삭제할 수는 없으며, 그 변경이 생기는 순간 원문이 정한 범위를 벗어난 판단이 된다.
합성 장면에서 이 물음에 관련된 사실은 피고 B가 공익적 비판이라고 다투고 있고, 표현의 내용과 예상 손해에 관한 자료가 확정되지 않았다는 점이다. 이 사정을 앞의 조건과 대조하면, 진실성·공익성·목적과 회복곤란 손해 우려가 각각 확인된 것이 아니고 확인되지 않은 것으로 남는다. 판단 재료가 특정되지 않은 이런 사항은 사전금지의 요건이 충족되지 않았다는 확정도, 충족되었다는 확정도 낼 수 없다는 뜻에서 불능과 구별해 미확정으로 남겨야 한다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 원문의 선택 조건과 누적 조건의 관계를 그대로 두고, 자료가 없는 사항을 미확정으로 표시한 뒤 그 경계를 넘지 않는 판단이다. 허용하지 않는 것은 유리한 단어만 골라 요건을 새로 결합하거나, 미확인의 상태를 불능이나 요건 충족으로 환원하는 해석이다. 표현의 내용에 관한 자료와 예상 손해 또는 공익성에 관한 자료가 없어 판단 재료가 특정되지 않은 사항은 불능과 구별해 미확정으로 남긴다.
3.4The Records Needed for Determination
표현 사전금지는 판례가 밝힌 엄격하고 명확한 예외 요건에 따라야 한다는 전제에서 출발한다. 이 전제 위에서 다루는 물음은 요건을 유리한 단어만 골라 결합할 수 있는가이다. 원고 A는 피고 B의 표현이 명예를 해친다며 삭제와 장래 금지를 요구하고 피고 B는 공익적 비판이라고 다투는 장면에서, 이 물음은 단계 판정에 어떤 기록이 필요한가라는 형태로 더 좁혀진다. 이 물음에 답하려면 요지가 요구하는 자료의 종류를 먼저 정해야 한다.
대법원 2005. 1. 17. 자 2003마1477 결정의 판결요지는 표현 사전금지의 예외 요건을 이렇게 서술한다. “그 표현내용이 진실이 아니거나 그것이 공공의 이해에 관한 사항으로서 그 목적이 오로지 공공의 이익을 위한 것이 아니며, 또한 피해자에게 중대하고 현저하게 회복하기 어려운 손해를 입힐 우려가 있는 경우에는” 사전금지가 예외적으로 허용된다. 이 문언에서 주체는 명예를 침해당했다고 주장하는 피해자이고, 행위는 출판물의 발행·판매 같은 표현행위에 대한 사전억제이며, 조건은 진실성·공익성과 목적의 결함 그리고 회복곤란 손해의 우려다. 문제 표현의 내용을 기록에 올리는 일은 이 조건들 중 어느 것도 판단 없이 지나갈 수 없는 출발점이다.
이 문언이 요구하는 자료의 갈래는 문제 표현과 진실성, 공익성과 목적, 회복곤란 손해, 금지 범위, 중단 기록이다. 선택 조건은 진실성이 없거나 공익적 목적이 결여된 경우를 가리키고, 누적 조건은 그 위에 중대하고 현저하게 회복하기 어려운 손해의 우려까지 겹치는 경우를 가리킨다. 두 층을 나누어 읽는 이유는 전자만으로는 사전금지가 열리지 않고 후자가 겹칠 때 비로소 예외가 성립하기 때문이다. 따라서 단계 판정은 정해진 기록에 담긴 자료만으로 한다. 없는 기록을 추정으로 메우면 요건의 결합이 아니라 빈칸을 메운 조합이 된다.
요지의 복합 문장이 독자에게 어렵다는 반론은 타당한 지적이다. 한 문장 안에 선택 조건과 누적 조건이 이어져 있고 접속어까지 판단의 일부이므로, 독자가 그 구조를 놓치기 쉽다. 그러나 이 어려움은 문장의 배치를 바꾸어 해소할 수 있는 종류가 아니다. 원문의 “또는” 관계를 “그리고”로 바꾸거나 누적 손해 조건을 삭제할 수는 없다. 그렇게 되면 선택 조건만으로 사전금지가 열려, 진실한 공익적 비판까지 예방적으로 침묵시키는 수단이 될 수 있다. 반론이 지적하는 불편은 그대로 두되, 접속어를 고쳐서 예외의 범위를 넓히는 방식으로는 답하지 않는다.
합성 장면으로 돌아가면, 원고 A는 문제 표현의 삭제와 장래 금지를 구하고 피고 B는 공익적 비판이라고 방어한다. 이 장면은 진실성·공익성과 목적에 관한 자료가 기록에 올랐는지, 그리고 회복곤란 손해의 우려가 어떤 근거로 제시되었는지를 따져 보는 자리다. 금지 범위와 중단 기록 역시 마찬가지로, 구체적으로 무엇을 얼마나 멈추게 할 것인가가 기록에 담겨야 한다. 다만 장면에는 연도·금액·기산일·판결 결과가 설정되어 있지 않으므로, 어느 쪽이 이겼는지나 손해의 규모는 이 자리에서 확정할 수 없다. 만약 비판으로 불쾌하다는 사정만 남는다고 확인되면 사전금지의 엄격한 조건을 충족했다고 보지 않으며, 이는 기록이 그 지점에서 멈춘 경우에만 적용된다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 판례가 정한 선택 조건과 누적 조건의 관계를 원문의 접속어대로 보존하고, 문제 표현·진실성·공익성과 목적·회복곤란 손해·금지 범위·중단 기록에 담긴 자료만으로 단계를 판정한다는 것이다. 허용되지 않는 결론은, 유리한 단어만 골라 요건을 재조합하거나, 없는 기록을 추정으로 채워 예외를 성립시키는 방식이다. 표현의 내용과 예상 손해 또는 공익성 자료가 없는 경우는 미확정으로 남으며, 곧바로 구제 불능으로 단정할 수 없다.
3.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
Can the requirements be combined by picking out only favorable words? The premise that a prior restraint on expression must follow the strict and clear exception requirements set out by precedent is already firmly settled. Under this premise, the remaining questions are whether only the helpful phrases among the requirements may be extracted and joined together, and what change in circumstances overturns an existing stage determination.
To answer this question, the relevant original passage must be left as it is. Premising that the prohibition of publication, sale, and the like of a publication constitutes prior restraint on expressive conduct, the precedent then states that, exceptionally, prior restraint is permitted where the content of that expression is not true, or where, although it concerns a matter of public interest, its purpose is not solely the public interest, and where there is a concern that it will inflict on the victim a serious and considerable irreparable harm (Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005). This wording binds truthfulness, public interest and purpose, and irreparable harm together within a single sentence.
The alternative condition is the passage leading to the case where the content is not true or where the purpose is not a public-interest one, and the cumulative condition is the passage where the concern of a serious and considerable irreparable harm is required in addition. The two perform different roles, so leaving only one or cutting out only one yields a different standard, not the range drawn by the precedent. If a designated change—namely, changing the 'or' relation to 'and,' or deleting the cumulative harm condition—is confirmed, the existing blocking/effectiveness determination is discarded and the determination is redone from that stage.
The strongest counterargument begins from the difficulty the compound sentence of the Summary of Decision poses to the reader. When a sentence is long and its connectives lie in several layers, the reader picks out only the needed requirements, and if that convenience is carried over into preventive prohibition, it may silence even truthful public-interest criticism. This loss and inconvenience are not erased. The answer, however, is clear. The way to relieve the difficulty of reading does not lie in removing requirements.
In this scene, plaintiff A demands deletion and a future prohibition on the ground that defendant B's expression harms reputation, while defendant B contends that it is public-interest criticism. On this scene alone, it is not determined whether the expression at issue is true, whether its purpose is solely the public interest, and whether there is a concern of a serious and considerable irreparable harm. The remaining determinations stay undetermined.
If one separates the conclusions this section permits from those it does not, what is permitted is a determination that views falsity, public interest, and irreparable harm together along the connection of the original text, and what is not permitted is a determination that selects only favorable requirements and joins them, then treats the remaining conditions as nonexistent. If a designated change is confirmed, the existing blocking/effectiveness determination is discarded and the stage determination is reopened from the beginning.
3.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
Reading the Summary of Decision by picking out only favorable words makes the sentence easier, but in exchange it alters even the place at which prohibition becomes permissible. In this scene, the question whether expression can be stopped in advance depends on how one reads the combination of the exception requirements—that is, the relation between the alternative condition and the cumulative condition set by precedent. A prior restraint on expression must follow the strict and clear exception requirements set out by precedent. Even if the sentence of the Summary of Decision is difficult, omitting the connectives does not solve this problem; it merely changes the size of the problem.
The original passage to be read here appears in the Summary of Decision [2] of Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005. That sentence first fixes the prohibition of publication, sale, and the like of a publication as prior restraint on expressive conduct, and lays down that even where the expression of evaluation or criticism concerning a religious organization is taken as the subject, prior restraint must in principle not be permitted. Here the actor is the party seeking prior restraint, the act is the preclusion of announcement and distribution through the prohibition of publication, sale, and the like, and the conditions are the substantive requirements that open as an exception to the principle of prohibition. The wording turns back to the opening of that exception with "provided, however," and states that it is permitted only when the following conditions are given together.
Within that sentence, the conditions are not set side by side. First comes the alternative relation that the content of the expression is not true, or that although it concerns a matter of public interest, its purpose is not solely the public interest, and then is added the concern of a serious and considerable irreparable harm, connected by "also." Thus, reading the relation between this alternative bundle and the cumulative condition—that is, the combination of the exception requirements—is not a matter of counting the number of requirements but of following the line of logic drawn by the connectives. Herein lies the reason why, as concluded in the preceding section, one must keep the strict and clear exception requirements as they are and then read that line. If the connectives are changed, the shape of the requirements changes, and if the shape of the requirements changes, the range in which prior restraint is opened changes with it.
The strongest counterargument pits readability and freedom of expression against each other. If the compound sentence is difficult, the reader cannot properly read the combination of the requirements, and there is a risk that the blank so left will be construed broadly and used as a means to silence even truthful public-interest criticism in advance. In the scene where defendant B contends that the expression is public-interest criticism, that disadvantage appears in the form that the difficulty of the sentence becomes the critic's burden as it stands. Even so, the answer cannot be to change the "or" relation of the original text to "and" or to delete the cumulative harm condition. The moment one rewrites the combination of requirements in order to erase the disadvantage the counterargument targets, the logical connection between the truthfulness and public interest of the expression's content and serious and considerable irreparable harm no longer remains as in the original text. Preserving the form of connection set by the original text and explaining the sentence of the Summary of Decision in plain terms are different matters.
What can be confirmed in a synthetic scene is only the facts that scene fixes. Since plaintiff A seeks deletion and a future prohibition and defendant B contends that the expression is public-interest criticism, it is not determined in this scene what shall fill the problematic expression, truthfulness, public interest and purpose, irreparable harm, scope of prohibition, and cessation records. Whether the content of the expression is untrue, whether its purpose is not solely the public interest, and whether a concern of a serious and considerable irreparable harm separately remains are not settled at this point. Since no values remain, one can neither assert that the exception requirements for prior restraint are satisfied nor that they are not. Where the only circumstance remaining is displeasure at criticism, the precedent's statement that the strict conditions for prior restraint are not regarded as satisfied recalls that boundary. Material left undetermined is a lack of material, not an immediate bar to relief.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. It is that the connection between the alternative condition and the cumulative condition drawn by the wording of precedent must be read as it is, and that even when a new word is coined to summarize that combination, the "or" relation of the original text and the cumulative condition of the concern of a serious and considerable irreparable harm must both remain. The fact that the compound sentence of the Summary of Decision is difficult is a reason to unpack and explain that sentence, but not a reason to change the connectives or delete the cumulative harm condition in order to widen the range within which expression may be stopped. What this conclusion does not permit is an interpretation that rewrites the combination of the exception requirements and then permits prior restraint by that rewritten standard.
3.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
Before this dispute stands the question whether the logical connection in the Summary of Decision between truthfulness and public interest and serious and considerable irreparable harm must be preserved as in the original text, or whether the requirements may be combined by picking out only favorable words. The preceding section concluded that the "or" relation of the original text cannot be changed to "and," nor can the cumulative harm condition be deleted.
The wording of the Summary of Decision first indicates the nature of the prohibition of publications. The phrase "the prohibition of publication, sale, and the like of a publication constitutes prior restraint on such expressive conduct," shows that the act of the actor is one that precludes in advance, by a court order, the announcement and distribution of the expression at issue. Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005 further declares that "prior restraint on such expressive conduct must in principle not be permitted," yet at the same time opens the door of the exception with the connective "provided, however, even in such a case." This sentence makes clear that expressions of evaluation or criticism concerning a religious organization do not fall outside the application of the principle.
The way in which the door of the exception opens must be read precisely. The part "where the content of that expression is not true, or where, although it concerns a matter of public interest, its purpose is not solely the public interest," binds the former and the latter with "or," creating the frame of an alternative condition under which the value of the expression recedes if only one of the two holds. At the same time, the phrase "and where there is a concern that it will inflict on the victim a serious and considerable irreparable harm" attaches as a condition cumulative upon the preceding alternative condition. What the author calls the combination of the exception requirements means this relation between the alternative condition and the cumulative condition, and this relation set by precedent must be preserved exactly where the wording places it.
If the positions of "or" and "and" are shaken within a long sentence, the reader becomes confused as to under which condition alone a prohibition is possible, and those who apply the law also lose the path of judgment. Moreover, preventive prohibition can become a means of silencing even truthful public-interest criticism, so the counterargument points as well to the harm suffered by the value of freedom of expression. The circumstance that the sentence is hard to read is no ground for altering the requirements, and the prohibition condition simplified by deletion runs counter to the framework of the exception established by precedent.
In the synthetic scene, the facts corresponding to this question are limited. Since plaintiff A demands deletion and a future prohibition on the ground that defendant B's expression harms reputation and defendant B contends that it is public-interest criticism, the content of the expression at issue, its truthfulness and public interest, and the concern of a serious and considerable irreparable harm become the subject of the records. The judgment records set by the author are the expression at issue and truthfulness, public interest and purpose, irreparable harm, scope of prohibition, and cessation records; this defines the categories of material, not that such material has been furnished. Since the scene alone does not settle the content of the expression or the materials on anticipated harm and public interest, whether the exception requirements for prior restraint are satisfied remains undetermined.
What can be confirmed in this section is the narrow conclusion that the combination of the requirements must be preserved as in the original text. A reading that selects one of the alternative conditions of truthfulness and public interest and the cumulative condition of irreparable harm and erases the other is not permitted. Yet that conclusion does not itself mean that prior restraint is permitted in the scene, and whether the individual exception requirements are satisfied has not yet been determined.
3.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
That is, the premise is that a prior restraint on expression must follow the strict and clear exception requirements set out by precedent. Upon that premise, the question this stage takes up is whether the requirements may be combined by picking out only favorable words. The logical connection in the Summary of Decision between truthfulness and public interest and serious and considerable irreparable harm must be preserved as in the original text. In this scene, the scope of prohibition varies according to the order in which the requirements are read.
This problem arises from the sentence in which Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005 describes the exception requirements for prior restraint on expression in its Summary of Decision. After premising that prior restraint on expressive conduct, such as a prohibition of publication and sale of publications, is in principle not permitted, the original text presents the conditions of the exception. The first bundle of conditions runs: where the content is not true, or where, although it concerns a matter of public interest, its purpose is not solely the public interest. This phrase deals with truthfulness and public interest, and what the connective between the two is lies at the core of the wording. The concern of a serious and considerable irreparable harm that follows is a condition standing in a different position from this bundle.
The reason the relation between the alternative condition and the cumulative condition must be distinguished is that the structure of the sentence itself fixes the permissible range. The two circumstances—that the content is untrue, or that the purpose is not solely the public interest—are an alternative condition bound by the 'or' relation of the original text. The wording means that either one alone suffices as a requirement narrowing the door of prior restraint. By contrast, the concern of a serious and considerable irreparable harm is a cumulative condition added to this alternative bundle. Only when this harm requirement is also in place does one reach the substantive requirement at which it is clear that the expression does not prevail over the victim's reputation and the necessity of prohibition is also recognized. The conclusion of this section is to keep this logical connection as it is in the original text.
If a sentence in which several requirements are strung together at length is taken as the standard of judgment, both judge and parties are tempted to cull the requirements and rearrange them into an easy, simple form. The price of that convenience is high. If the 'or' relation set by precedent is changed to 'and,' even truthful or public-interest criticism no longer appears as expression violating all the conditions, and the door of prior restraint widens. The answer stated above is clear. The combination of the exception requirements is the relation between the alternative condition and the cumulative condition set by precedent, and that relation may not be shifted or reduced.
Returning to the synthetic scene, plaintiff A demands deletion and a future prohibition on the ground of defamation, and defendant B defends on the ground of public-interest criticism. Viewed in light of the foregoing conditions, whether a prohibition is permitted is a question that can be determined only by examining together whether the content of defendant B's expression is untrue, whether its purpose is not solely the public interest, and whether there is a concern that it will inflict on plaintiff A a serious and considerable irreparable harm. Whether the scene holds further material on the content of the expression, the anticipated harm, or public interest is not settled, so the concrete determination remains undetermined. The problematic expression, truthfulness, public interest and purpose, irreparable harm, scope of prohibition, and cessation records are merely required On the records.
The conclusion this section permits is that the substantive requirements for exceptionally permitting a prior restraint on expression must be determined according to the wording of the Summary of Decision—that is, preserving the relation between the alternative condition and the cumulative condition. Conversely, what it does not permit is an interpretation that mixes truthfulness, public interest, and the harm requirement by selecting the favorable side, or that changes the connectives to reduce the number of requirements. The point at which the scope of prohibition changes lies precisely in those connectives.
3.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
On the premise that a prior injunction against expression must follow the strict and clear exception requirements set out by precedent, this section now examines how far the text of the source passage itself is used in adjudicating the prohibition of infringements of personality rights and the recovery of residual harm. In the scene where plaintiff A claims that defendant B's expression injures his reputation and demands deletion and a future injunction, while defendant B disputes this as public-interest criticism, the basis of adjudication is limited not to matters outside the source passage but to the language of that passage itself.
The language in question continues: "Prohibitions on the publication, sale, etc. of a publication constitute prior restraint upon such expressive acts, and even where the subject of such acts concerns evaluations of or criticism of a religious organization, a prior injunction against such expressive acts should, in principle, not be permitted; however, even in such a case, where the content of the expression is untrue, or where it concerns a matter of public interest and its purpose is not solely the public interest, and where, in addition, there is a risk of causing serious and manifest harm to the victim that is difficult to recover from." This passage from Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005 calls a prohibition on publication and sale a prior restraint, and, even where the subject is evaluative or critical expression, asks after the exception requirements.
This language places alternative conditions and cumulative conditions side by side. It is a structure in which the risk of harm that is difficult to recover from is cumulated by "and where, in addition" onto the alternative conditions of untruthfulness, or of a matter of public interest whose purpose is not solely the public interest. Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005 adds to this conjunction: "such expressive acts are manifestly not of such value as to be superior to the victim's reputation, and the necessity of an injunction is also recognized as an effective and appropriate remedy therefor; accordingly, a prior injunction is exceptionally permitted only where such substantive requirements are met." When the logical connection between truthfulness and public interest on the one hand and irreparable harm on the other is preserved as written in the source, the prohibition of infringements of personality rights opens exceptionally only where these substantive requirements are met.
The objection that the compound sentence of the Summary of Decision is difficult for readers carries a valid appeal. With alternative conditions, cumulative conditions, and the assessments of superiority and necessity overlapping within a single sentence, it becomes easy to read by selecting only the favorable words. If either of those two alterations were permitted, the range would open in which even truthful public-interest criticism becomes subject to prior injunction without exception, and the silence that the objection fears would only grow. The objection's disadvantage—the fact that the compound sentence is hard to read—is left as it is, while the conjunctive structure of the language is preserved.
In the synthetic scene, the deletion and future injunction demanded by plaintiff A constitute prohibitions on publication, sale, etc., and are treated as prior restraint. Defendant B's contention of public-interest criticism falls under the assessment of public interest within the alternative conditions, but the cumulative condition, in which the risk of harm that is difficult to recover from is placed by "and where, in addition," must be satisfied separately. Only when the expression at issue and its truthfulness, public interest and purpose, irreparable harm, the scope of the injunction, and the record of cessation are assembled together can the substantive requirements be compared; yet the scene merely fixes the items needed for judgment and does not mean that those items are in place. Even if the comparison is settled that, where only the circumstance of feeling displeased by criticism remains, the strict conditions for a prior injunction are not met, on the scene alone the content of the expression and the materials on anticipated harm remain undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Only the language of the source passage in question is used as the basis for adjudicating the prohibition of infringements of personality rights and the recovery of residual harm. Only language within the scope of the source passage is applied, and it is not extended to other parts of the reasoning of the judgment. That is, a reading that extracts the alternative conditions, or that removes the cumulative harm condition to widen the scope of prior injunction, is not permitted. No further finding of fact or determination of outcome opens on this language alone.
3.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
Continuing from the standard set earlier—that a prior injunction against expression must follow the strict and clear exception requirements set out by precedent—what remains is to determine which parts within the prohibition of infringements of personality rights and the recovery of residual harm must be separately divided and adjudicated. In this scene, the question is whether the requirements can be combined by selecting only favorable words. Here lies the reason why the combination of the exception requirements fixed by precedent—that is, the relationship between alternative conditions and cumulative conditions—must be read as written in the source.
Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005 proceeds from the premise that prohibitions on the publication, sale, etc. of a publication constitute prior restraint upon expressive acts, and that even where the subject concerns expressive acts such as evaluations of or criticism of a religious organization, a prior injunction should in principle not be permitted. Precedent states that an exception arises where the content of the expression is untrue, or where it concerns a matter of public interest and its purpose is not solely the public interest, and where, in addition, there is a risk of causing serious and manifest harm to the victim that is difficult to recover from. In this language, untruthfulness and the purpose not being solely the public interest are linked earlier by "or" as an alternative, while the subsequent "and where, in addition" is a conjunction that separately adds the risk of irreparable harm. Therefore, the content and purpose of the expression and irreparable harm are matters that must be written down separately.
Maintaining this distinction between alternative and cumulative is not a question of sentence difficulty but a question of the scope of adjudication. The compound sentence of the Summary of Decision is difficult for the reader. Even so, the author firmly states that the author cannot change the "or" relation of the source into "and," nor delete the cumulative harm condition. If changed to "and," prohibition would be permitted only in cases where both untruthfulness and the absence of a public-interest purpose are present, and the range would widen in which even defensible criticism is blocked. If the cumulative harm condition were erased, prohibition would become possible on the basis of the content and purpose of the expression alone, and the substantive requirement of irreparable harm would drop out. One would have to accept the consequence that the items to be recorded in the scope of the injunction and the record of cessation are reduced accordingly.
A's demands for deletion and a future injunction are prior restraint that blocks B's expression at the stage of publication and sale, and insofar as B disputes this as public-interest criticism, it is contested whether the expression is untrue and whether its purpose is not solely the public interest. Yet the author's answer does not change. The disadvantage of silence pointed out by the objection has already been exacted as a price by the very language of precedent, which states that a prior injunction against expression should in principle not be permitted and is permitted only where the exception requirements are met. As a means of reducing that price, one must not be permitted to change the conjunctions or to erase one of the requirements.
The facts that can be confirmed in this scene are only that A seeks deletion and a future injunction on grounds of defamation, and that B defends on grounds of public-interest criticism. Whether the expression at issue is truthful, whether its purpose is solely the public interest, and whether there is a risk of causing A serious and manifest harm that is difficult to recover from must be checked against the records. In this case, the content of the expression and the materials on anticipated harm or public interest are absent, and the matter remains undetermined. Since no facts of an actual case and no judgment outcome were set, the outcome cannot be fixed on this scene.
What this section permits is adjudication limited to the conditions of the working case, the blocked case, and the undetermined case, as detailed distinctions within the step. Inventing additional steps to multiply the stages of adjudication, or re-bundling the requirements by selecting only favorable words, are conclusions this section does not permit.
3.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
Before this question stands plaintiff A, who claims that defendant B's expression injures his reputation and demands deletion and a future injunction, and defendant B, who disputes this as public-interest criticism. What remains in this scene is how to distinguish the cases in which prohibition and the recovery of residual harm are opened, blocked, and undetermined.
The Summary of Decision states that prohibitions on the publication, sale, etc. of a publication constitute prior restraint upon such expressive acts. (Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005) It firmly states that even where the subject concerns expressive acts such as evaluations of or criticism of a religious organization, a prior injunction against such expressive acts should, in principle, not be permitted. The language places the actor imposing the prohibition on publication and sale in the court adjudicating the claim, and defines the act not as a disposition that belatedly blocks expression already published, but as restraint prior to publication. The condition does not change where the expression at issue is an evaluation of or criticism of a religious organization.
The basis connecting that language to the conclusion of this section lies in the structure by which the exception opens. Precedent states: "however, even in such a case, where the content of the expression is untrue, or where it concerns a matter of public interest and its purpose is not solely the public interest, and where, in addition, there is a risk of causing serious and manifest harm to the victim that is difficult to recover from, such expressive acts are manifestly not of such value as to be superior to the victim's reputation, and the necessity of an injunction is also recognized as an effective and appropriate remedy therefor; accordingly, a prior injunction is exceptionally permitted only where such substantive requirements are met" (Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005). Here, being untrue or not being solely for the public interest is a series of alternative conditions, while "and where, in addition" is a cumulative condition added onto the preceding conditions. This relationship is called the combination of the exception requirements. Thus the opening condition is that there is a basis for an injunction against present and future infringement and, in the case of a prior injunction against expression, that the strict exception requirements of precedent are met; the blocking condition is that those exception requirements are not met, so that a remedy preventing publication and distribution in advance cannot be permitted. The undetermined case remains that in which there are no materials on the content of the expression, on anticipated harm, or on public interest. Settling the meaning of the procedural efficacy after judgment, or of the necessity of an injunction as a remedy, is outside the scope of this section.
The strongest objection aims at the point that a preventive injunction can become a means of silencing even truthful public-interest criticism, and at the point that the compound sentence of the Summary of Decision is difficult for readers. Yet one cannot change the conjunctions on account of this loss and inconvenience. The combination as written in the source does not automatically block even criticism whose purpose is solely the public interest, and leaves it so that the necessity and superiority of an injunction do not follow unless there is, together with it, a risk of serious and manifest harm that is difficult to recover from. The risk of silence pointed out by the objection is not erased by deletion, and the fixed answer of this section is maintained on the line of not permitting the edit of bundling the requirements by selecting only favorable words.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only that plaintiff A claims deletion and a future injunction on the ground that the expression at issue defames his reputation, and that defendant B sets up the defense of public-interest criticism. Contrasting this with the foregoing conditions, truthfulness and public interest and purpose, the risk of serious and manifest irreparable harm, the superiority of the value of the expression over reputation, and the necessity of an injunction have all failed to be presented as materials. Therefore, on this scene alone the opening case and the blocking case cannot be fixed, and the matter remains in the third stratum of the undetermined. However, if only one fixed adjudication condition were changed, so that only the circumstance of feeling displeased by criticism remained, the strict conditions for a prior injunction would not be regarded as met.
What this section permits is judgment that distinguishes the strata of the opening case, the blocking case, and the undetermined, and attaches only the foregoing conditions to each. What it does not permit is the work of changing the "or" of the alternative conditions to "and," or of omitting the cumulative harm condition, in order to make the Summary easy to read as a simpler sentence. The distinction that the injunction stopping infringement and the recovery of residual harm are not joined and adjudicated in this section is maintained only within this sentence as well. If infringement is stopped, do past harms disappear?
3.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
This section does not re-argue its premise, and now asks how the wordings making up those exception requirements are combined with one another. In the scene where plaintiff A claims that defendant B's expression injures his reputation and demands deletion and a future injunction, while defendant B disputes this as public-interest criticism, the question concerns not any single requirement but the conjunctions by which those requirements are linked. A change in one sentence structure immediately becomes a change in the breadth of the prohibition permitted.
Summary of Decision [2] of Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005 treats prohibitions on the publication, sale, etc. of a publication as prior restraint upon expressive acts, and draws the line that even where the subject is expressive acts of evaluation of or criticism of a religious organization, it should in principle not be permitted. It then presents, as the times when a prior injunction is exceptionally permitted, the case where the content of the expression is untrue, or where it concerns a matter of public interest and its purpose is not solely the public interest, and where, in addition, there is a risk of causing serious and manifest harm to the victim that is difficult to recover from. In this sentence, "or ... is untrue" and "is not ... and, in addition" play different roles. The former two requirements link the absence of truthfulness and of a public-interest purpose together as one alternative bundle, while requiring the subsequent irreparable harm requirement separately.
This conjunctive structure becomes the basis for dividing the steps when adjudicating whether a prior injunction against expression is permissible. The alternative bundle corresponding to being untrue or lacking a public-interest purpose cannot by itself justify a prior injunction; only when, added to this, there is also a risk of causing the victim serious and manifest harm that is difficult to recover from is the combination of the exception requirements complete. The author views it as producing the effect of lowering the threshold of prohibition if this relationship is compressed and read as a single bundle. The Summary of Decision distinguishes the alternative and cumulative elements of the language as a device for handling exceptions to prior restraint strictly, and that distinction arises not from an editorial standard of judgment but from the very arrangement of the conditions fixed by precedent.
Even so, the observation that the compound sentence of the Summary of Decision is difficult for readers is no trivial inconvenience. Within one sentence lie truthfulness, public interest, purpose, irreparable harm, comparison of the value of the expression, and the necessity of an effective and appropriate remedy, so that readers easily lose track of which condition is alternative and which is cumulative. The concern follows that the obscurity of the language itself chills freedom of expression, because when the conjunctions are changed in reading, the range in which a prior injunction is permitted widens, and because if the irreparable harm requirement is removed, a path opens to block publication even without any risk of serious harm. The author regards the obscurity as a task of interpretation to be resolved, but holds that it must not be resolved by changing even the conjunctive structure of the requirements.
In the scene where plaintiff A claims that defendant B's expression injures his reputation and demands deletion and a future injunction, while defendant B disputes this as public-interest criticism, two matters are to be compared with the foregoing conditions. First, it is at issue whether defendant B's expression concerns a matter of public interest and is for the public interest, and this circumstance falls under the judgment of the alternative bundle. Next, it is separately required whether there is a risk of causing plaintiff A serious and manifest harm that is difficult to recover from, and this circumstance falls under the judgment of the cumulative condition. Yet the scene does not specify the content of the expression, the materials on public interest, or the degree of anticipated harm, so neither judgment can be fixed. As the categories of materials needed for judgment, the expression at issue, truthfulness, public interest and purpose, irreparable harm, the scope of the injunction, and the record of cessation have merely been designated; it does not mean that those materials are in place.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Leaving the language of the Summary of Decision as it is, the alternative condition binding the absence of truthfulness, public interest, and purpose, and the cumulative condition of the risk of serious and manifest irreparable harm, play different roles, and the range confirmed here extends only as far as the point that this relationship must not be read by changing it in a favorable direction. The conclusions this section does not permit go further. That the permissibility of a prior injunction in this scene is finally fixed on the mode of combining the requirements alone, or that the availability of relief is asserted even in the absence of materials on the content of the expression and anticipated harm, does not follow here. The circumstance that materials are absent remains undetermined and does not mean an inability to obtain relief, and the editorial standard of paragraph construction can likewise not be transferred and read as a statutory requirement.