Summary
Only by keeping the scope of the object of prohibition and the actual cessation of conduct separate are the legal order and real-world restoration distinguished.
6.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
When the prohibited sentence and the sentence that continues to circulate differ, the fruits of relief differ as well. When reading the Civil Act's provision on measures for restoration of honor, one goes a step beyond refraining from proposing compelled apology while erasing the limit—of the unconstitutional apology advertisement—printed alongside the official text; the present question takes up the injunction order itself. Whether one can say that the infringement has ceased once an injunction order is obtained, and what the criteria are for opening this channel of relief, is the question now.
The relevant language reads as follows: the phrase stating that "one may also seek an injunction against an act of infringement in order to exclude an act of infringement currently being carried out or to prevent an infringement that may arise in the future" is precisely it (Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005). What this language prescribes is the subject and direction of the claim for injunction. A claim to exclude an act of infringement currently being carried out and a claim to prevent an infringement that may arise in the future are mentioned together, and the conduct targeted by such claim is the act of infringement itself. Circumstances not dealt with by the provision are not read out of this language.
This basis determines the entrance to this relief. There must be a basis for injunction against present and future infringement, and, in the case of prior restraint on expression, the strict exceptional requirements of precedent must be satisfied. Upon that foundation, the performance, parties, and conditions demanded must be specified in the claim's statement of relief, and only when rights can be defended through the chosen form of action does the entrance to this relief open. Here the reason why the scope of the target of the injunction and the actual cessation of conduct must be left as separate items becomes clear. The former asks what the legal command reaches; the latter asks what has ceased in reality. If the two are superimposed as one, the infringement will be read as having ceased at once at the moment the injunction decision is pronounced, but that skips over the judgment that legal command and restoration in reality are distinct.
The strongest counterargument targets cost. The concern is that relief may rather produce harm: that excessive cost attends tracking every modified expression, and further, that a preventive injunction could become a means of silencing even sincere public-interest criticism. This unfavorable aspect is not erased. One cannot write that deletion of a post or cessation of distribution has been confirmed merely by the existence of an injunction decision. Even if the risk the counterargument points to is tolerated, the pronouncement of a legal command and the cessation in reality must not be recorded as the same fact.
Returning to the synthetic scene, the figure of Plaintiff A asserting that Defendant B's expression harms their honor and demanding deletion and a future injunction, while Defendant B contends that it is public-interest criticism, is what falls within the scope of this section. In this scene, the reach of the injunction means the state in which the act of infringement targeted by the order has actually ceased, and the expression at issue, truthfulness, public interest and purpose, irreparable harm, the scope of the injunction, and cessation records are placed at the seat of judgment. That where only a circumstance of displeasure at criticism remains, the strict conditions of prior restraint are not regarded as satisfied is also placed alongside this contrast. However, because the facts of the actual case and the results of service and performance have not been verified, neither victory or defeat nor the fruits of recovery can be determined from the scene alone. What this section permits is a conditional distinction, and if, even where an injunction decision has issued, the exceptional requirements of prior restraint on expression are not satisfied so that a remedy blocking publication and distribution in advance cannot be allowed, then that channel is closed.
Accordingly, the line this section draws is as follows: this channel of relief opens when the basis for injunction and the exceptional requirements, the specified claim, and a defensible choice of form of action are all in place, and the mere fact of having passed through that door does not lead to the conclusion that the infringement has actually ceased. The scope of the target of the injunction and the actual cessation of conduct must be recorded as distinct items, and if the record is empty, that remains undetermined.
6.2The Conditions That Block Relief
Plaintiff A asserts that Defendant B's expression harms their honor and demands deletion and a future injunction, while Defendant B contends that it is public-interest criticism. In this scene, whether one can say that the infringement has ceased once an injunction order is obtained, and what the conditions are that block relief, are the remaining questions. Because the order the court issues and whether the expression ceases in reality lie in different dimensions, the conditions for this channel of relief are examined without presupposing that this gap is bridged.
The relevant language is that "one may also seek an injunction against an act of infringement in order to exclude an act of infringement currently being carried out or to prevent an infringement that may arise in the future" (Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005). This language indicates that the subject of the claim for injunction is the exclusion of an act of infringement currently in progress or the prevention of an infringement that may arise in the future. Here the subject is a person who has suffered an infringement of personality rights, the conduct is that act of infringement, and the condition is that it is currently being carried out or that the possibility of its arising in the future exists. The language leaves open the possibility of a claim for injunction and does not go so far as to prescribe what effect that order actually produces.
The core that links this language with the conclusion of this section lies in distinguishing the existence of the injunctive means from the reach of the injunction. The reach of the injunction means the state in which the act of infringement targeted by the order has actually ceased. The fact that a legal command has been issued and the fact that restoration has been achieved in reality are each different objects of determination, so if one is reduced to the other, the effectiveness of the relief cannot properly be assessed. If, because the exceptional requirements of prior restraint on expression are not satisfied, a remedy blocking publication and distribution in advance cannot be allowed, the channel of relief is closed.
The strongest counterargument targets the point that excessive cost attends tracking every modified expression. Even if one phrase is prohibited, expressions with altered meaning or altered word order may keep appearing, and each time, the cost of confirming and enforcing cessation may exceed the practical benefit of the injunction. Further, it must also be considered together that a preventive injunction could become a means of silencing even sincere public-interest criticism. While not erasing the unfavorable circumstances the counterargument points out, the conclusion that legal command and cessation in reality must be distinguished is maintained.
The fact confirmed in the synthetic scene is that Plaintiff A demands deletion and a future injunction while Defendant B contends that it is public-interest criticism. The expression at issue and truthfulness, public interest and purpose, irreparable harm, the scope of the injunction, and cessation records are items needed for judgment; this does not mean that those items are in place. In the present state, lacking the content of the expression and materials on anticipated harm or public interest, whether the strict conditions of prior restraint are satisfied cannot be determined. If it is confirmed that only a circumstance of displeasure at criticism remains, it is difficult to regard the strict conditions of prior restraint as satisfied, and thus, on the scene alone, it is difficult to affirm the satisfaction of those conditions.
The conclusion this section permits is that the scope of the target of the injunction and the actual cessation of conduct must be kept separate so that legal command and restoration in reality are distinguished, and that the existence of an injunction decision alone cannot be written up as confirmation of cessation. By contrast, conclusions are not permitted that assert the infringement has ceased on the sole fact that an order has been issued, or that abandon the confirmation of cessation merely because tracking costs are high. Even if items remain undetermined, this narrow distinction already settled is maintained.
6.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
The question whether one can say that the infringement has ceased once an injunction order is obtained is asked in order not to overlay the command issued by the court and the trace that command has left in reality as a single count. This question demands that the existence of the order not be read as the fruit of restoration, and the present question of the undetermined boundary targets precisely that gap.
Summary of Decision [1] of Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005 provides that "one may also seek an injunction against an act of infringement in order to exclude an act of infringement currently being carried out or to prevent an infringement that may arise in the future." The subject this language denotes is a person whose personality rights have been infringed, the conduct is the exclusion of the act of infringement and the prevention of future infringement, and the condition is that the infringement is being carried out at present or may arise in the future. That the court declared one may seek an injunction means that the channel of relief has opened; it does not mean that some result has come about by passing through that channel.
This language and the determination of the reach of the injunction are placed at different stages. The reach of the injunction means the state in which the act of infringement targeted by the order has actually ceased, whereas the existence of the injunctive relief allowed by precedent stands independently of the actual occurrence of that state. The reason the two stages must be distinguished is that if restoration in reality is confirmed merely by the existence of the legal means allowed by precedent, one will have asserted a fact that was not confirmed. Accordingly, the author leaves these two separately, and takes the view that a judgment that erases the gap between the existence of the legal injunctive means and actual cessation does not hold in answering this question.
When this distinction is insisted upon, the counterargument encountered most forcefully is that excessive cost attends tracking every modified expression. Each time the sentences of a post are revised little by little and re-uploaded, the work of finding and erasing which sentence, at which point in time, is the prohibited expression requires continuing time and manpower, and materials where tracking failed remain in place. Alongside this, the concern is also raised that a preventive injunction could become a means of silencing even sincere public-interest criticism. Even without erasing such losses and inconveniences, one cannot write that deletion of a post or cessation of distribution has been confirmed merely by the existence of an injunction decision.
In this scene, the fact fitting this question is that the demand and the defense stand opposed, and that no record that deletion has been carried out or distribution has stopped accompanies them. The expression at issue, truthfulness, public interest and purpose, irreparable harm, the scope of the injunction, and cessation records merely indicate the kinds of materials that may be used in judgment; they are not an assertion that materials have been collected. Therefore, neither whether the requirements for injunction demanded by precedent are satisfied nor whether the reach of the injunction has occurred can be determined on this scene alone.
What this section permits is recording the existence of the legal command and actual cessation separately; what it does not permit is writing that the latter fact has been confirmed by the existence of the former alone. Matters for which the judgment material is not specified, because the content of the expression and materials on anticipated harm or public interest are lacking, are not thereby rendered impossible of relief but are placed in the position of the undetermined, for which material to determine is not yet at hand.
6.4The Records Needed for Determination
In the scene where Plaintiff A asserts that Defendant B's expression harms their honor and demands deletion and a future injunction, while Defendant B contends that it is public-interest criticism, whether one can say that the infringement has ceased once an injunction order is obtained remains the question. To answer this question, what must be left as records must also be settled together. For the existence of the order the court issued and the cessation that occurred in reality are different events. If these two are bundled together and read as one, the actual fruits of relief cannot properly be assessed. Accordingly, the present question lies in distinguishing the range the legal command reached from the record of conduct that followed that command.
The language of precedent on this issue states that one may seek an injunction against an act of infringement in order to exclude an act of infringement currently being carried out or to prevent an infringement that may arise in the future (Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005). The subject this language denotes is the person who has suffered the infringement, the conduct is the act of infringement continuing at present and the act of infringement that may arise in the future, and the condition is that exclusion and prevention of that conduct are sought by injunction. The language says only that an injunctive means exists; it does not say what actually ceased after the order was issued. This passage carries over only the existence of the injunctive means as its basis, and leaves the gap between legal command and cessation in reality separately in place. Other issues are not drawn out of this language.
Connecting this basis with the conclusion of this section makes the standard for the stage determination clear. This determination is made solely on the basis of the material recorded in the expression at issue, truthfulness, public interest and purpose, irreparable harm, the scope of the injunction, and cessation records. Here the scope of the injunction is the limit of the act of infringement targeted by the order, and the cessation record is material on whether that conduct actually stopped. The reason these two must be looked at separately is that the range the command reached and the restoration in reality each answer a different question. The former asks how far the court blocked; the latter asks what stopped thereafter. Circumstances not in the settled records are not filled in by presumption, and thus empty records are not turned into manufactured facts.
If an expression is altered little by little and keeps circulating, great effort and cost attend finding all of them and confirming cessation, and that burden operates unfavorably both for the side seeking to block the expression and for the side that must monitor it. At the same time, the worry also remains that an injunction could become a means of silencing even sincere public-interest criticism. Yet even if these costs and worries are acknowledged, one cannot write that deletion of a post or cessation of distribution has been confirmed merely by the existence of an injunction decision. The inconvenience the counterargument points out is left as it is, but a cessation not in the record must not be treated as established.
In this scene, the fact belonging to this question is that Plaintiff A demands deletion and a future injunction while Defendant B contends that it is public-interest criticism. The shape of the demand and the dispute shows on which side materials concerning the expression at issue and its purpose, and truthfulness and public interest, are needed. Yet the scene does not settle what is recorded in the scope of the injunction and the cessation record, or what stopped after the order. Accordingly, the reach of the injunction—that is, the state in which the act of infringement targeted by the order has actually ceased—cannot be determined here. Items remaining undetermined are a lack of absent records, not immediately a meaning of impossibility of relief. Where only a circumstance of displeasure at criticism remains, the strict conditions of prior restraint are not regarded as satisfied.
The conclusion this section permits is that the stages are determined solely on the basis of the material recorded in the six items of the settled records; what it does not permit is writing that deletion or cessation of distribution has been confirmed on the single fact that an injunction decision exists. So long as the range of the legal command and the cessation in reality are entrusted to their respective records, empty items remain undetermined and are not filled in by presumption.
6.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
After the scope of prohibition has been separated from actual cessation, this stage confronts together the question whether the infringement can be said to have ceased once a prohibition order is obtained, and the question what change overturns the existing stage-by-stage determination. In the scene where Plaintiff A demands deletion and future injunctive relief on the ground that Defendant B's expression harms A's reputation, and Defendant B contests this as criticism in the public interest, the question is in effect whether the fact that the court issued an order and the fact that the order took effect in reality mean the same thing. This question is a task of setting the standard for determinations that continue even after a prohibition decision has been rendered, and its scope is confined to the parties as designated in the scene and to the confirmed wording.
"In order to exclude an act of infringement currently being carried out or to prevent an act of infringement that may arise in the future, a claim for prohibition of the act of infringement may also be sought." (Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005) The subject referred to by this wording is the party suffering the infringement; its acts are a claim for prohibition aimed respectively at excluding the infringement now being carried out and at preventing future infringement; and the condition is that the act of infringement exists or there is a risk that it will arise. This is the extent of the confirmed source text, and the proposition that its wording established actual cessation as well falls outside the scope of this excerpt.
Connecting this wording to the foregoing question reveals that the existence of a legal means of prohibition and the question whether that means achieved recovery in reality are distinct stages of judgment. As carried over from the preceding section, when reading the Civil Act provisions on dispositions for the restoration of honor, the same discernment applies here as the attitude of not proposing a forced apology while setting aside, as written, the limits on apology advertising rendered unconstitutional alongside the official text. The wording of the precedent refers only to the means of prohibition; whether that means actually brought the expression in question to a halt is a question that remains separately. Accordingly, one must record the scope of the subject of prohibition and the cessation of actual conduct as separate items, so that the fact that a legal order was issued and the fact that reality was restored are not confused with one another as the determination proceeds.
The strongest counterarguments come in two branches. One is the concern that tracking every altered expression entails excessive cost; the other is the concern for public values that a prohibitory injunction may become a means of silencing even sincere criticism in the public interest. Both aim at real losses and inconveniences, and in particular the point remains untouched that if expressions containing criticism are bound in advance, public discourse may be chilled. However much weight the counterarguments give to cost and chilling, the practice of converting the fact that an order was issued into a record of cessation in reality cannot answer this question, and if all that remains is the circumstance that the expression is displeasing as criticism, it is not regarded as satisfying the strict conditions for prior restraint.
Returning to the synthetic scene, Plaintiff A demands deletion and future injunctive relief while Defendant B contests this as criticism in the public interest; what the items of problem expression, truthfulness, public interest, purpose, irreparable harm, scope of prohibition, and cessation record must record is thus settled, but what has been recorded in those items is not established. This scene is not a reproduction of an actual case, and it determines nothing as to victory or defeat, recovery, or the effect of cessation on the ground. The facts of the actual case, service, results of performance, and the details of the reasoning of the judgment lie outside the basis read, and so are left undetermined here. What can be determined from the scene and the confirmed wording is only the conditional distinction; if it is confirmed that all that remains is the circumstance that the expression is displeasing as criticism, the existing judgment must be reconsidered.
What this section permits is the conclusion that one records the existence of a legal means of prohibition and actual cessation as distinct matters, and that if it is confirmed that all that remains is the circumstance that the expression is displeasing as criticism, the existing judgment must be reconsidered. Conversely, this section does not permit the conclusion of writing that the deletion of a post or the halt of distribution has been confirmed merely because a prohibition decision has been rendered, nor the conclusion that the strict conditions for prior restraint are satisfied merely because the expression is displeasing as criticism. The "reach" of prohibition means the state in which the act of infringement targeted by the order has actually ceased, so the existence of the order and its reach must each remain as separate items. Where the material is blank, matters are left undetermined, but this narrow distinction already settled is maintained.
6.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
In this scene, the counterargument is raised that tracking every altered expression entails excessive cost. The question whether one can say the infringement ceased once a prohibition order is obtained lies in inquiring whether a legal order guarantees recovery in reality as well.
The precedent confirms: "In order to exclude an act of infringement currently being carried out or to prevent an act of infringement that may arise in the future, a claim for prohibition of the act of infringement may also be sought." (Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005) This wording states that the subject who may seek prohibition is the victim of an infringement of personality rights, and that its act is aimed at the exclusion or prevention of an act of infringement. The condition is the exclusion of a current act of infringement or the prevention of a future infringement, and it is not read broadly on the basis of confirmed facts from other matters.
On the basis of this wording, the conclusion of this section is that the mere existence of a prohibition decision cannot warrant writing that the deletion of a post or the halt of distribution has been confirmed. The judgment that a legal means of prohibition exists and the effect that means had in reality are separate stages. The former judgment establishes the basis for the order; the latter judgment concerns the facts addressed by the cessation record. If the two stages are merged, it will appear that recovery was already complete at the time the order was obtained, and the remaining harm and continued distribution will vanish.
The strongest counterargument begins from the point that tracking every altered expression entails excessive cost. The burden of finding, recording, and halting every derived sentence is excessive, and that burden may operate as grounds for limiting prohibition. Moreover, the concern overlaps that a prohibitory injunction may become a means of silencing even sincere criticism in the public interest. Without erasing these losses and inconveniences, what the counterargument points to is the cost of tracking, not the confirmation of cessation itself.
In the synthetic scene, the only facts relevant to this question are that Plaintiff A demands deletion and future injunctive relief and that Defendant B contests this as criticism in the public interest. These facts alone do not establish the content of the expression in question, its truthfulness, its public-interest character, its purpose, irreparable harm, the scope of prohibition, or the cessation record. Because the scene does not establish a cessation record, the reach of prohibition remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is to distinguish the existence of a legal means of prohibition from the actual cessation of conduct, and not to confirm the deletion of a post or the halt of distribution on the basis of the mere existence of a prohibition decision. The conclusions it does not permit are asserting flatly that the infringement ceased once a prohibition order was obtained, or treating cessation as confirmed merely because of the difficulty and cost of tracking.
6.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The preceding section yielded the conclusion that the mere existence of a prohibition decision cannot warrant writing that the deletion of a post or the halt of distribution has been confirmed; but then, can one say that the infringement ceased once a prohibition order is obtained? In this scene, whether recovery in reality has been reached merely because the court issued an order must be asked separately. The fact that an order was issued and the fact that the expression is no longer distributed are confirmed at different times and by different materials. If the two are bundled together as one mass in judgment, it becomes impossible even to discern which of the two has not been confirmed.
The precedent states: "In order to exclude an act of infringement currently being carried out or to prevent an act of infringement that may arise in the future, a claim for prohibition of the act of infringement may also be sought." (Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005) This wording establishes that the subject claiming prohibition of an act of infringement may aim in both directions: exclusion in the present and prevention for the future. The object of the order is not a person but an act, and that act is divided into an infringement currently in progress and an infringement that may arise thereafter. Accordingly, for an order to reach anything, what the specified act is must first be settled. It must also be noted together that the wording goes no further than stating the possibility of a claim for prohibition. Whether the means of prohibition exists and whether that means achieved its purpose in reality are separate questions.
That wording leads to a distinction between the stage of setting the scope of the subject of prohibition and the stage of seeing whether the actual conduct has ceased. The former is the work of establishing which act of infringement the order targets and whether it is exclusion in the present or prevention for the future; the latter is the work of confirming whether cessation actually occurred after the order was issued. Only by leaving the scope of the subject of prohibition and the cessation of actual conduct as separate items can the legal order and recovery in reality be distinguished. By this definition, the mere existence of an order does not speak of reach. Determining reach requires a separate confirmation such as a cessation record, and deciding what that record shall be differs from actually having gathered it.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the excessive cost of maintaining this distinction. If the defendant posts an altered expression, considerable resources are required to track all its derivatives and to leave a record of what was halted at what point in time, and that burden may turn into a means of suppressing the party exercising freedom of expression. The concern that a prohibitory injunction may become a means of silencing even sincere criticism in the public interest arises in the same direction. Even without erasing those disadvantages, the standard of confirmation cannot be lowered. The problem of cost cannot serve as grounds for omitting confirmation; rather, it leads to the work of demarcating, within the scope of the order, how far to track.
The only facts that can be confirmed in this scene are that Plaintiff A demanded deletion and future injunctive relief, and that Defendant B contested the matter on the ground that his expression was criticism in the public interest. In light of the wording of the precedent, the condition is laid down that one may seek prohibition aimed at exclusion in the present and prevention for the future, and the problem expression, truthfulness, public interest, purpose, irreparable harm, scope of prohibition, and cessation record are settled as the materials needed for judgment. However, this scene sets no outcome of the judgment, no question of performance, and no state of distribution channels. Accordingly, what order was issued, and whether the expression actually ceased thereafter, remain undetermined.
One cannot assert flatly that the infringement ceased merely because a prohibition order was obtained; only when what the scope of the subject of prohibition is and what conduct was actually halted are each left as their own records do the legal order and recovery in reality appear separated. This distinction does not belittle the existence of the order, but requires recording together the range the order reached and the situation beyond it.
6.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Having taken on board the form of the legal order addressed in the earlier stage, this question is the place of asking separately what that order achieved in reality. In the scene where Plaintiff A demands deletion and future injunctive relief on the ground that Defendant B's expression harms A's reputation, and Defendant B contests this as criticism in the public interest, the question remains whether one can say the infringement ceased immediately upon obtaining a prohibition order. Accordingly, this question is limited to clarifying what consequences that difference brings to the evaluation of remedies, on the premise that the scope of the subject of prohibition and the cessation of actual conduct are two distinct items.
It is the phrase "in order to exclude an act of infringement currently being carried out or to prevent an act of infringement that may arise in the future," which confirms that a claim for prohibition of the act of infringement may be sought (Supreme Court Decision 2003Ma1477 decided January 17, 2005). The subject referred to by this wording is the party suffering the infringement, and the acts are the exclusion of the infringement now in progress and the prevention of infringement that may arise in the future. The condition is that the act of infringement exists or is anticipated, and the means is to seek prohibition of that act. However, this phrase is merely wording confirming that the means of prohibition is legally provided for; it does not also record the fact that, after that means was actually exercised, the distribution of the expression stopped.
Along the line connecting this basis to the settled conclusion, the reason for separately recording the scope of the subject of prohibition and the cessation of actual conduct becomes apparent. The scope of the subject of prohibition is the item indicating which acts the order forbids; the cessation of actual conduct is a separate item indicating whether those forbidden acts stopped in reality. The former is the settled content of the legal order; the latter is the state of reality; and each requires a different record. If these two are lumped into one item, the fact that a legal order was issued and the fact that recovery in reality was achieved are not distinguished, and accordingly it becomes blurred which of the two facts has been confirmed.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the cost of establishing that distinction. To track every altered expression, each copy and route must be checked one by one, so the effort and cost are excessive, and moreover there is a risk of silencing sincere criticism in the public interest as well. This counterargument plainly pinpoints the inconvenience and the price of silence that remedies entail, and should not be erased. Even so, the foregoing answer does not change. The circumstance that the cost of tracking and the difficulty of scope are great does not justify writing that the deletion of a post or the halt of distribution has been confirmed merely because a prohibition decision exists. Items that cannot be confirmed remain unconfirmed.
Taking out only the facts relevant to this question from the synthetic scene, what Plaintiff A demands is the deletion of a specific expression and prohibition for the future, and what Defendant B contests is that the expression is criticism in the public interest. Here, what the range of acts that can be subject to prohibition is, and whether the posting or distribution of that expression actually stopped after the order was issued, are two items requiring separate records. However, from this scene alone the specific content of the expression and the anticipated harm, the degree of public interest, and the record of cessation are not established; therefore, whether the strict exception requirements for prior restraint were satisfied, or whether cessation actually occurred, cannot be determined at this point.
The conclusion this section permits goes only so far as leaving separately, each on its own, the fact that a legal means of prohibition exists and the effect that means had in reality. This section does not permit writing as a single fact both that the scope of the subject of prohibition has been set and that the conduct within that scope actually ceased. The reach of prohibition means the state in which the act of infringement targeted by the order has actually ceased, and this definition applies only within the confirmed records. Conversely, this section excludes writing that the deletion or the halt of distribution has been confirmed on the basis of the mere existence of a prohibition decision.
6.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
이 관찰은 법적 명령과 현실의 회복 사이에 놓인 간극을 남기며, 이번 단계에서는 그 간극을 판정할 원문 문언만을 따져야 한다. 해당 원문 범위 안의 문언만 적용하고, 판결이유나 다른 항으로 확장하지 않는다는 점이 이 물음의 출발선이다.
해당 구절은 (대법원 2005. 1. 17. 자 2003마1477 결정) 판결요지 [1] 중 하나이다. 이 문장이 지정하는 주체는 인격권의 침해를 당한 사람이고, 행위는 현재의 배제와 장래의 예방을 위한 금지의 청구이며, 조건은 인격권 침해의 금지를 구할 수 있다는 가능성에 대한 언급에 머문다.
이 문언과 이 절의 결론을 잇는 연결은 명령의 도달과 현실의 중단을 구별해야 한다는 데 있다. 판례의 문언은 법적 수단의 존재, 즉 침해를 배제하거나 예방하기 위하여 금지를 구할 수 있다는 통로를 열어 둘 뿐이다. 그 통로를 열었다는 사실과 주문이 겨냥한 침해행위가 실제로 중단된 상태, 곧 금지의 도달은 서로 다른 판단 단계다. 전자는 법이 허용하는 구제의 형태를, 후자는 구제가 현실에서 도달한 지점을 가리키며, 둘을 한 묶음으로 처리하면 법적 명령을 현실의 회복으로 바꾸는 오류가 생긴다.
그러나 변형된 표현을 모두 추적하는 데 과도한 비용이 든다는 점은 이 구별의 대가를 부각한다. 주문이 겨냥한 문장과 조금이라도 달라진 표현까지 하나하나 찾아내어 중단을 확인하는 일은 당사자에게 큰 불편과 비용을 남긴다. 더욱이 예방적 금지는 진실한 공익적 비판까지 침묵시키는 수단이 될 수 있어 표현의 자유라는 가치까지 위협한다. 그렇다고 하여 불이익이 크다는 이유만으로 법적 금지 수단의 존재와 실제 중단 사이의 구별을 지울 수는 없다. 금지결정의 존재만으로 게시물 삭제나 유통 중단을 확인했다고 쓸 수는 없다는 답이 유지되는 까닭이다.
이 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 원고의 요구가 삭제와 장래 금지를 겨냥한다는 점, 피고의 방어가 공익적 비판이라는 성격에 놓여 있다는 점이다. 금지의 도달을 주문이 겨냥한 침해행위가 실제로 중단된 상태라는 정의에 대조하면, 문제 표현·진실성·공익성과 목적·회복곤란 손해·금지 범위·중단 기록 가운데 어느 것도 장면에서 확정되어 있지 않다. 만약 비판으로 불쾌하다는 사정만 남는 것으로 확인되면 사전금지의 엄격한 조건이 충족되었다고 보기 어려우므로, 이 장면만으로는 금지의 도달이 성립하는지, 중단이 확인되는지를 단정할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 해당 원문 문언은 인격권 침해의 금지와 잔존 손해 회복을 판정할 근거가 되며, 그 문언은 현재 침해의 배제와 장래 침해의 예방을 위하여 금지를 구할 수 있다는 수단의 존재까지만 확인한다. 이 문언을 넘어서 금지결정의 존재만으로 게시물 삭제나 유통 중단을 확인했다고 쓰는 것은 이 절이 허용하지 않는다. 반대로 문언의 범위 안에서 금지 대상의 범위와 실제 행위 중단을 별도로 남겨야 법적 명령과 현실의 회복이 구별된다고 확인하는 것은 이 절이 허용하는 판단이다.
6.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
앞서 금지 주문을 얻으면 침해가 멈췄다고 할 수 있는가에 답하며 법적 명령과 현실의 중단이 다르게 남을 수 있음을 확인했다. 이 장면 안에서 지금 물어야 할 것은 그 차이를 법적 금지 수단과 실제 회복으로 나누어 확인하기 전에, 인격권 침해의 금지와 잔존 손해 회복이라는 하나의 단계 안에서 판정을 다시 구분해야 할 부분이 무엇인지 정하는 일이다.
해당 원문은 침해의 배제와 예방이 모두 금지 구제의 안에 들어올 수 있음을 말한다. 대법원 2005. 1. 17. 자 2003마1477 결정은 “현재 이루어지고 있는 침해행위를 배제하거나 장래에 생길 침해를 예방하기 위하여 침해행위의 금지를 구할 수도 있다”라고 적는다. 이 문언에서 정해지는 것은 금지의 주체인 인격권자, 금지의 대상인 침해행위, 그리고 지금 침해가 진행 중이거나 앞으로 침해가 생길 상황이라는 조건이다. 문언은 금지 주문의 태양이 현재의 배제와 장래의 예방으로 갈릴 수 있다는 점을 가리킬 뿐, 주문을 받은 자가 실제로 무엇을 내려놓았는지는 다루지 않는다.
이 문언을 근거로 이 절의 결론은, 단계 안의 세부 구분이 작동하는 경우·막히는 경우·미확정인 경우 세 조건에 한정된다는 것이다. 구분이 갈리는 지점은 금지 대상의 범위와 실제 행위 중단이다. 전자는 주문이 겨냥한 침해행위의 경계를, 후자는 그 주문이 현실에서 닿아 침해행위가 멈춘 상태를 말하며, 여기서는 이를 금지의 도달이라 부른다. 법적 금지 수단의 존재는 전자를 확정하는 근거가 될 수 있으나, 그것만으로 후자를 확인한 것이 되지는 않는다. 이 둘을 섞으면 주문의 범위를 기준으로 한 판정과 도달 여부를 기준으로 한 판정이 서로의 자리를 먹어, 단계 안의 구분이 사실상 새 단계를 만들어내는 결과가 된다.
표현이 조금씩 바뀐 채 계속 유통될 때 그 변형을 모두 찾아 기록하고 중단시키는 데 드는 노력이 구제의 이익을 넘어설 수 있다는 불편이다. 표현의 자유를 함께 고려하면, 예방적 금지는 진실한 공익적 비판까지 침묵시키는 수단이 될 수 있다는 부담까지 뒤에 붙는다. 저자는 이 손실과 부담을 지우지 않으면서도 답을 유지한다. 변형의 추적 비용이 커서 어디까지가 문제 표현인지 가리기 어려워도, 금지결정의 존재만으로 게시물 삭제나 유통 중단을 확인했다고 쓸 수는 없기 때문이다. 이 답은 반론의 어려움을 인정하는 자리에서 오히려 분리된 기록을 요구한다.
합성 장면으로 돌아가면, A는 삭제와 장래 금지를 요구하고 B는 공익적 비판이라 다투므로 문제 표현의 범위, 그 표현의 진실성과 공익성, 그 표현을 한 목적, 그리고 회복곤란 손해가 기록으로 남겨져야 한다. 금지 범위와 중단 기록이 함께 있을 때 비로소 주문이 겨냥한 침해행위가 실제로 멈추었는지, 즉 금지의 도달이 이루어졌는지를 볼 수 있다. 다만 장면은 연도·금액·기한을 두지 않았고 실제 사건의 이행 결과도 지정하지 않았으므로, 도달의 성패는 이 장면만으로 확정되지 않는다. 만약 비판으로 인하여 불쾌하다는 사정만 남는다고 확인되면 사전금지의 엄격한 조건을 충족했다고 보지 않는다는 점은, 자료가 비어 있는 경우에 판정을 서둘러 내리지 않기 위한 경계로 남는다.
따라서 이 물음이 허용하는 결론은 이렇다. 금지 근거가 있고, 표현 사전금지라면 판례의 엄격한 예외 요건까지 충족하면 작동하는 경우가 성립하고, 그 예외 요건을 충족하지 못해 발표와 유통을 미리 막는 구제를 허용할 수 없으면 막히는 경우가 된다. 표현의 내용과 예상 손해 또는 공익성 자료가 없으면 미확정인 경우로 남긴다. 이 세 구분 밖에 추가 단계를 세우는 것은 허용되지 않으며, 금지결정의 존재를 도달의 증거로 바꾸는 것도 허용되지 않는다.
6.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
앞에서 확인한 대로 금지 주문을 얻더라도 침해가 멈춘 것은 따로 확인해야 할 사실이었다. 이 물음은 주문의 발령과 그 주문이 현실에서 이행된 상태를 서로 다른 것으로 놓고 본다.
이 문언은 금지를 구할 수 있는 대상이 지금 벌어지는 침해행위를 배제하는 경우와 아직 생기지 않은 침해를 예방하는 경우임을 가리킨다. 앞에 놓인 것은 이미 진행 중인 행위의 배제이고, 뒤에 놓인 것은 장래 발생할 침해의 예방이다. 판례는 이 둘을 나란히 두어 금지 청구가 미래의 사건에까지 미칠 수 있음을 확인한다.
이 문언을 현재의 판단과 연결하면, 금지 수단이 법적으로 존재한다는 사실과 그것이 실제로 작동했다는 사실이 구별된다. 대상을 특정한 주문이 집행되어 침해행위가 멈춘 경우를 살핀 뒤, 그 주문의 도달 범위와 중단된 범위를 대조한다. 이 정의는 주문 자체가 아니라 주문이 목표한 행위가 멈추었는지를 기준으로 삼는다. 따라서 주문을 받았다는 기록과 행위가 중단된 기록은 함께 두어야 하며, 하나로 합쳐 읽으면 법적 명령과 현실의 회복이 뒤섞인다.
이 구별을 강하게 반대하는 입장은, 변형된 표현을 모두 추적하는 데 과도한 비용이 든다는 데서 시작한다. 금지된 문장을 조금 바꾼 글이 계속 올라오고 번역·인용·요약된 형태로 퍼지는 상황에서, 주문의 범위를 일일이 확장해 추적하려면 비용을 감당하기 어려울 수 있다. 같은 문제는 예방적 금지가 진실한 공익적 비판까지 침묵시키는 수단이 될 수 있다는 걱정으로 이어진다. 공익적 비판이라고 다투는 피고 B의 입장은, 미리 막는 수단이 쓰이면 비판의 기회 자체가 사라질 수 있음을 지적한다. 이 결론은 비용과 위험이 크다는 점을 인정하면서도, 주문의 존재와 이행의 결과를 나누어 기록해야 한다는 요구를 거두지 않는다.
원고 A는 피고 B의 표현이 명예를 해친다며 삭제와 장래 금지를 요구하고 피고 B는 공익적 비판이라고 다투는 장면에서, 이 물음과 관련된 사실만 꺼내 보면 세 가지다. 문제 표현의 내용, 그것이 진실한지 공익적인지, 그리고 회복이 어려운 손해가 예상되는지다. 이 세 가지가 확인되면 현재·장래 침해에 대한 금지 근거가 있고, 표현 사전금지의 경우에는 판례의 엄격한 예외 요건을 충족한 것으로 볼 수 있다. 반대로 표현 사전금지의 예외 요건이 충족되지 않아 발표·유통을 미리 막는 구제를 허용할 수 없는 경우에는 그 길이 막힌다. 표현의 내용과 예상 손해 또는 공익성 자료가 없는 경우는 판단 자료가 모자라 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 금지 대상의 범위와 실제 행위 중단을 별도로 남겨야 법적 명령과 현실의 회복이 구별된다는 것이다. 금지 주문이 내려졌다는 사실만으로 침해가 멈췄다고 적으면 안 되며, 주문이 겨냥한 행위가 실제로 중단되었는지 별도로 확인해야 한다. 이와 달리 허용되지 않는 것은, 표현 사전금지의 예외 요건이 충족되지 않았는데도 발표·유통을 미리 막는 구제를 마땅한 것으로 서술하는 것이다. 자료가 없어 판단하지 못한 항목은 미확정으로 남기며, 그 자체로 구제가 불가능하다고 단정하지 않는다. 이 구별은 금지의 도달을 주문이 겨냥한 침해행위가 실제로 중단된 상태로 두는 정의에 맞추어 유지된다.
6.12이 권의 결론과 남는 물음
앞 단계에서 민법의 명예회복 처분 규정을 읽으면서도 강제 사과를 제안하지 않은 채 남겨 둔 선을 그대로 이어, 이번에는 금지 주문을 얻고 난 뒤의 상태를 묻는다. 원고 A는 피고 B의 표현이 명예를 해친다며 삭제와 장래 금지를 요구하고 피고 B는 공익적 비판이라고 다투는 장면 안에서, 법원이 금지 명령을 내렸다는 사실만으로 피해가 실제로 멈추었는지는 별개의 판단이다. 금지 주문을 얻으면 침해가 멈췄다고 할 수 있는가? 이 물음은 법적 명령이 도달한 범위와 현실에서 중단된 행위를 서로 나누어 보아야만 답이 갈린다.
이 물음에 해당하는 근거는 대법원 2005. 1. 17. 자 2003마1477 결정이 남긴 한 구절이다. 그 문언은 “현재 이루어지고 있는 침해행위를 배제하거나”라는 표현으로 지금 이어지는 침해를 끊는 수단을 말하고, 이어서 “장래에 생길 침해를 예방하기 위하여 침해행위의 금지를 구할 수도 있다”고 덧붙여 앞으로 벌어질 침해를 미리 막는 청구까지 열어 둔다(대법원 2005. 1. 17. 자 2003마1477 결정). 여기서 주체는 침해를 당한 자이고, 행위는 명예를 해치는 표현의 작성·게시·유통이며, 조건은 현재의 침해 배제와 장래 침해의 예방이라는 두 갈래로 나뉜다. 이 구절이 다루는 것은 금지를 구할 수 있다는 청구의 길이지, 그 주문이 내려진 뒤 표현이 세상에서 사라졌다는 사실의 확인이 아니다.
따라서 금지 대상의 범위와 실제 행위의 중단을 한 덩어리로 묶지 않는 것이 이 판단의 핵심이다. 법원이 어떤 문장이나 어떤 표현 행위를 금지 대상으로 적어 두었다는 것은 그 범위에 드는 행위가 법적으로 금지되었다는 뜻이고, 그와 별개로 주문이 겨냥한 침해행위가 실제로 중단되었는지는 중단 기록 같은 다른 자료로만 확인된다. 두 가지를 구별해야 법적 명령과 현실의 회복이 갈라지는 지점이 드러난다. 금지의 도달이라는 말은 바로 이 구별을 위해 두는데, 그 뜻은 주문이 겨냥한 침해행위가 실제로 중단된 상태를 가리킨다. 이 정의를 붙여 두지 않으면 금지결정의 존재와 침해의 정지가 같은 말로 뒤섞인다.
가장 강하게 이 구별을 밀어붙이는 반론은 비용에 관한 것이다. 변형된 표현을 모두 추적하는 데 과도한 비용이 든다. 표제가 금한 문장 그대로가 아니라 띄어쓰기나 단어를 바꾼 글이 계속 올라오고, 그 형태를 일일이 찾아내어 중단시켜야 한다면 피해자가 감당해야 할 수고와 자원이 눈덩이처럼 커진다. 같은 걱정이 예방적 금지의 쓰임새로도 이어져, 진실한 공익적 비판까지 미리 묶어 두는 수단이 될 수 있다. 반론이 지적하는 이 불리함은 그대로 두되, 그렇다고 금지결정 존재만으로 게시물 삭제나 유통 중단을 확인했다고 쓸 수는 없다. 추적의 비용이 크다는 사정은 중단을 확인하기 어렵게 만들 뿐, 확인을 대신해 주지는 않는다.
합성 장면으로 돌아가 보아도 원고 A가 요구하는 삭제와 장래 금지, 피고 B가 내세우는 공익적 비판이라는 대립만이 확정된 사실이다. 이 자리에서 문제 표현·진실성·공익성과 목적·회복곤란 손해·금지 범위·중단 기록 가운데 어떤 기록이 실제로 모였는지, 금지 주문이 언제 어떤 범위로 내려졌는지는 정해지지 않았다. 주문의 도달 범위와 중단 여부는 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 침해 배제와 장래 예방이라는 금지 수단이 존재하고, 표현 사전금지의 경우 예외 요건이 충족되었다면 금지의 법적 통로가 열린다. 그러나 금지결정이 있었다는 사실만으로 침해가 멈추었다거나, 문제가 된 글이 삭제되었고 유통이 중단되었다고 기록할 수는 없다. 금지의 도달은 주문이 겨냥한 침해행위가 실제로 중단된 상태를 뜻하므로, 그 상태는 중단 기록으로 따로 확인되어야 한다. 자료가 없어 확인이 되지 않는다고 해서 구제가 불가능해지는 것도 아니고, 반대로 구제의 문이 열렸다는 사실이 회복의 성과까지 뜻하지도 않는다. 피해가 많으면 서로의 행위도 함께 귀속되는가?
Decisions referred to
Questions left open
- 부분 삭제로 충분한 침해를 어떻게 구별할 것인가?
- 이미 확산된 표현에 대한 금지는 무엇을 회복하는가?
- 반복 게시 위험을 사전금지 요건으로 어떻게 다룰 것인가?