Summary
Compulsory execution of a foreign judgment in Korea requires an enforcement judgment, and that procedure is not a trial on the merits that rehears whether the judgment was right or wrong.
3.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
효력을 받아들이는 일과 국내 재산에 집행하도록 허가하는 일은 다르다. 앞 절에서는 법정 송달 또는 응소와 내용·절차의 공서 요건을 나누고 단순한 불리함을 공서 위반으로 바꾸지 않았다. 채권자 A는 외국의 재판문서를 가지고 국내에 있는 채무자 B의 재산에 집행하려 한다. 이 장면에서 승인 요건을 갖추면 집행판결은 필요 없는가, 그리고 이 구제의 통로가 열리는 기준은 무엇인가라는 물음이 놓인다.
해당 문언은 두 조문에 나뉘어 있다. 민사집행법 제26조 제1항은 “외국법원의 확정판결 또는 이와 동일한 효력이 인정되는 재판”에 기초한 강제집행은 대한민국 법원에서 집행판결로 허가하여야 할 수 있다고 규정한다. 이 문언의 주체는 대한민국 법원이고, 행위는 집행판결에 의한 허가이며, 대상은 외국법원의 확정재판등에 기초한 강제집행이다.
같은 법 민사집행법 제27조는 “집행판결은 재판의 옳고 그름을 조사하지 아니하고 하여야한다”고 밝힌다. 따라서 외국재판의 국내 강제집행에는 집행판결이 필요하되, 그 절차는 재판의 옳고 그름을 다시 심리하는 본안 재판이 아니다. 여기서 외국재판의 집행판결은 국내 강제집행을 허가하는 판결을 뜻한다. 이 두 단계는 구별되어야 한다. 전자는 외국 판단의 효력을 받아들여 국내에서 쓸 수 있게 하는 승인이고, 후자는 국내 재산에 강제집행을 허가하는 실행의 문을 여는 판결이다.
본안 재심리를 하지 않으면 실질적 오류가 남을 수 있다는 반론이 가장 강하게 겨냥하는 것은 국내 당사자 B의 방어권과 공서의 보호 공백이다. 외부 판단을 존중하면 잘못된 급부 명령이나 흠 있는 절차가 그대로 넘어올 수 있다는 걱정이다. 그렇더라도 승인을 집행 허가와 합치거나 집행판결을 전면 본안 재심리로 쓸 수는 없다. 이 답은 반론의 불리함을 지우지 않는다. 대신 승인 요건과 국내 집행 허가의 준점을 나누어 방어권과 공서가 요구하는 급부·당사자·조건의 특정에서 보호한다.
이 장면에 설정된 것은 문서와 두 당사자 그리고 집행의 방향뿐이다. 연도·금액·기산일·판결 결과는 정하지 않았다. 다만 외국재판의 승인 필수 요건이 없거나 자료가 확인되지 않은 경우, 그리고 외국 배상액의 크기 같은 사정을 이 장면에서 판단할 수 있는지 여부는 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 승인 요건을 갖추면 집행판결이 필요 없어진다고 말할 수 없고, 외국재판의 국내 강제집행에는 집행판결이 필요하며 그 절차는 본안 재판이 아니라고 말할 수 있다. 허용되지 않는 것은 승인을 집행 허가와 합치거나 집행판결을 전면 본안 재심리로 쓰는 결론이다.
3.2The Conditions That Block Relief
이 장면에서 승인 요건을 갖추면 집행판결은 필요 없는가와 함께 구제 통로가 막히는 조건은 무엇인가라는 물음이 놓인다. 전자는 외국재판의 효력을 국내에서 받아들이는 판단과, 그 효력을 근거로 국내 재산에 대한 강제집행을 허가하는 판단이 같은 단계인지 묻는다. 이 물음에 답하려면 먼저 국내 강제집행의 관문이 무엇으로 열리는지를 확인해야 한다.
외국재판의 국내 강제집행에 관하여 민사집행법 제26조 제1항은 “①외국법원의 확정판결 또는 이와 동일한 효력이 인정되는 재판(이하 “확정재판등”이라 한다)에 기초한 강제집행은 대한민국 법원에서 집행판결로 그 강제집행을 허가하여야 할 수 있다. <개정 2014. 5. 20.>”고 규정한다. 여기서 주체는 대한민국 법원이고, 행위는 집행판결에 의한 허가이다. 근거는 외국법원의 확정판결이거나 이와 동일한 효력이 인정되는 재판이며, 이를 확정재판등이라 부른다. 대상은 그 확정재판등에 기초한 강제집행이다. 집행판결은 국내 강제집행을 허가하는 판결을 뜻한다.
같은 이유로 민사집행법 제27조는 집행판결이 무엇을 조사하고 무엇에서 멈추는지를 정한다. “제27조(집행판결) ①집행판결은 재판의 옳고 그름을 조사하지 아니하고 하여야한다.”는 문언은 집행판결이 본안 재판이 아님을 보인다. 그러나 ②는 “집행판결을 청구하는 소는 다음 각호 가운데 어느 하나에 해당하면 각하하여야 한다. <개정 2014. 5. 20.>”고 정하고, “1. 외국법원의 확정재판등이 확정된 것을 증명하지 아니한 때”, “2. 외국법원의 확정재판등이 민사소송법 제217조의 조건을 갖추지 아니한 때”를 각하 사유로 든다. 이 두 단계가 갈리는 까닭은, 재판의 옳고 그름을 조사하지 않는 것과 법정 요건의 충족 여부를 조사하지 않는 것은 같은 일이 아니기 때문이다. 전자가 본안 재심리의 배제라면 후자는 승인 관문의 조사이다. 외국재판의 승인 필수 요건이 없거나, 해당 중재판정의 법정 승인 거절사유가 인정되어 국내 집행 허가를 받을 수 없는 경우, 법정 요건 중 하나라도 충족되지 않으면 구제 통로는 닫힌다.
이렇게 하면 재판에 남은 실질적 오류가 그대로 국내에 넘어올 수 있다는 점이 이 결론의 가장 큰 비용이다. 외부 판단을 존중하면 국내 당사자의 방어권과 공서가 충분히 보호되지 않을 수 있다는 우려도 같은 자리에서 나온다. 채무자 B의 입장에서는, 외국에서 제대로 방어할 기회를 얻지 못했거나 내용·절차가 공서에 어긋난 판단을 국내에서 그대로 집행당하면 구제할 자리가 남지 않는다. 그럼에도 이 우려를 근거로 승인을 집행 허가와 합치거나, 집행판결을 전면 본안 재심리로 쓸 수는 없다. 전자로 가면 외국재판의 승인과 국내 강제집행 허가의 법정 요건이 서로 섞이고, 후자로 가면 집행판결이라는 절차가 본안 재판이 되어 제27조 제1항이 정한 경계가 지워진다. 불리한 부분은 남는다. 다만 그 불리함은 승인 요건의 충족 여부를 조사하는 틀 안에서 다루는 것으로 한정한다.
합성 장면에서 채권자 A는 확정재판등을 근거로 채무자 B의 국내 재산에 대한 강제집행을 구하고 있다. 이 사실만으로는 확정재판등이 확정된 것이 증명되었는지, 민사소송법 제217조의 조건을 갖추었는지가 확인되지 않는다. 따라서 지금 이 장면으로는 어느 쪽인지를 확정할 수 없고, 확인되지 않은 항목은 미확정으로 남는다. 다만 판정의 방향은 정해져 있다. 확정 증명이 없거나 민사소송법 제217조의 조건을 갖추지 못한 것으로 드러나면 집행판결을 청구하는 소는 각하되고, 그 단계의 구제 통로는 닫힌다. 확정 증명과 조건 충족이 함께 확인되는 경우에만 집행판결에 의한 허가의 길이 남으며, 이때도 재판의 옳고 그름은 조사 대상이 아니다. 조건을 바꾸어 외국재판이 중재판정으로 바뀌면 집행판결과 집행결정의 경로 및 근거를 다시 고른다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론과 허용하지 않는 결론의 경계는 이와 같다. 외국재판의 국내 강제집행에는 집행판결이 필요하고, 그 절차는 재판의 옳고 그름을 다시 심리하는 본안 재판이 아니며, 집행판결은 국내 강제집행을 허가하는 판결이다. 승인 요건을 갖추었다는 사정만으로 집행판결이 불필요해지는 것은 아니다. 동시에 확정 증명이 없거나 민사소송법 제217조의 조건을 갖추지 못하면 각하되고, 그때 구제 통로는 닫힌다. 앞 분석 단계에서 나눈 법정 송달 또는 응소와 내용·절차의 공서 요건의 구분은 이 판단에서 전제로만 받는다. 단순히 불리하다는 사정은 공서 위반으로 바꾸지 않는다. 확정 증명이나 조건 충족에 필요한 자료가 확인되지 않은 때에는 미확정으로 남기되, 그 부족을 곧바로 구제 불능으로 읽지 않는다.
3.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
이전 분석에서 법정 송달 또는 응소 요건과 내용·절차의 공서 요건을 나누고, 단순한 불리함을 공서 위반으로 바꾸지 않는다는 점을 확인한 바 있다. 이 불리함은 앞 절이 이미 다룬 판단을 다시 여는 것이 아니라, 그 구별 위에서 자료가 갖추어졌을 때와 갖추어지지 않았을 때를 나누는 문제로 남는다. 채권자 A는 외국의 재판문서를 가지고 국내에 있는 채무자 B의 재산에 집행하려 하는데, 그 재판문서가 어떤 체계의 승인 요건 아래 있는지 확인할 수 없다면 어떤 판단이 가능한가. 그때 판단할 수 있는 것과 판단 재료가 없어 남기는 것을 어떻게 구별하는가.
“①외국법원의 확정판결 또는 이와 동일한 효력이 인정되는 재판(이하 “확정재판등”이라 한다)에 기초한 강제집행은 대한민국 법원에서 집행판결로 그 강제집행을 허가하여야 할 수 있다. <개정 2014. 5. 20.>”고 정한다(민사집행법 제26조). 이 문언에서 “확정재판등”은 외국법원의 확정판결 또는 이와 동일한 효력이 인정되는 재판을 가리키고, “기초한 강제집행”은 그 재판을 근거로 국내 재산에 대한 강제집행을 말한다. 문언은 그 집행이 어떤 절차를 통해서 허가되는지를 정하는데, 그 절차는 “집행판결로 그 강제집행을 허가”하는 것이다. 여기서 외국재판 집행판결이란 국내 강제집행을 허가하는 판결을 뜻한다.
민사집행법 제27조 제1항은 “①집행판결은 재판의 옳고 그름을 조사하지 아니하고 하여야한다.”고 정하고, 같은 조 제2항은 집행판결을 청구하는 소가 외국법원의 확정재판등이 확정된 것을 증명하지 아니한 때 또는 민사소송법 제217조의 조건을 갖추지 아니한 때 각하하여야 한다고 정한다(민사집행법 제27조). 따라서 제26조 제1항의 허가 절차와 제27조 제1항의 옳고 그름의 비심리는 하나로 합쳐질 수 없는데, 전자는 어떤 판결을 근거로 국내 집행을 열어줄지를 정하고 후자는 그 절차가 본안 재심리가 되지 않도록 한정하기 때문이다. 이 구별이 성립하면 승인 요건을 갖추었다는 확인만으로 집행판결 절차가 없어지는 것은 아니며, 반대로 집행판결 절차가 본안 재판의 심리를 가져오는 것도 아니다. 이때 판단은 확정 증명과 민사소송법 제217조 조건의 확인을 요구하는 문언 범위에 묶인다.
그러나 “①집행판결은 재판의 옳고 그름을 조사하지 아니하고 하여야한다.”는 문언이 재판 내용의 실질적 오류를 남길 수 있다는 점은 사라지지 않는다(민사집행법 제27조). 외국 법원이 내린 결론에 사실 인정 또는 법 적용의 오류가 남아 있고, 국내 당사자는 그 오류에 대해 방어할 기회를 얻지 못한 채 집행을 받게 될 수 있다는 손실이 그 반론의 중심이다. 여기에 국내 공서에 어긋나는 결과가 뒤따를 수 있다는 우려가 더해진다. 이유는 제27조 제1항이 집행판결의 심리 범위를 옳고 그름의 조사에서 떼어 놓은 문언과, 제26조 제1항이 집행 허가를 집행판결이라는 형태로 요구한 문언이 함께 성립하기 때문이다. 반론이 지적하는 불리함은 인정하되, 그 불리함을 해소하는 방식이 문언이 정한 절차의 성질을 바꾸는 방식이 되어서는 안 된다.
채권자 A가 들고 있는 외국의 재판문서가 어느 국가의 법원이 어느 체계에 따라 내린 것인지, 그 체계에 적용 협약이 있는지, 있다면 대한민국에 대한 유보가 어떻게 되어 있는지 자료로 확인되지 않는다. 그 문서가 확정되었는지, 당사자에게 송달되었는지, 응소의 기회가 있었는지도 이 장면에서 정해져 있지 않다. 이러한 미확인 항목은 확정되지 않은 수치나 판결 결과와 마찬가지로 임의로 메울 수 없다. 이 경우 대응하는 판단 재료가 특정되지 않은 것이므로, 승인 필수 요건이 없다고 확정한 경우나 그 요건이 충족되었다고 확정한 경우와 구별하여 미확정으로 남긴다. 이 구별은 외국재판에서 중재판정으로 바뀌면 집행판결과 집행결정의 경로 및 근거를 다시 고른다는 조건을 바꾸어 놓은 검사와 같은 방식으로, 확인된 자료의 범위 밖으로 판단을 미루지 않기 위한 것이다.
따라서 자료가 확인되지 않은 시점에서 집행판결의 필요성을 부정하는 결론은 성립하지 않고, 반대로 그 필요성이 사라졌다고 보는 결론 역시 성립하지 않는다. 미확정으로 남기는 것은 구제 불능을 뜻하지 않으며, 확인된 자료가 정해진 범위에서 채워질 때 판단은 그 범위 안에서만 진행된다. 한편 확정 증명이나 민사소송법 제217조 조건의 확인이 요구된다는 문언 범위는, 그 문언이 확인한 것 밖의 요건을 새로 만들어내는 것과 구별되어야 한다.
3.4The Records Needed for Determination
이 장면에서 승인 요건을 갖추면 집행판결은 필요 없는가를 묻는다. 아울러 이 문제를 판단하려면 어떤 기록이 필요한가를 함께 묻는다. 효력을 받아들이는 승인과 집행을 허가하는 절차는 서로 다른 기능을 담당한다.
민사집행법 제26조 제1항은 “외국법원의 확정판결 또는 이와 동일한 효력이 인정되는 재판(이하 ‘확정재판등’이라 한다)에 기초한 강제집행은 대한민국 법원에서 집행판결로 그 강제집행을 허가하여야 할 수 있다”고 정한다(민사집행법 제26조). 이 문언은 주체를 대한민국 법원으로, 행위를 집행판결에 의한 허가로, 기초를 확정재판등으로 정한다.
그 문언에 따라 승인 요건을 갖추었어도 국내 집행의 통로는 여전히 집행판결을 거친다. 민사집행법 제27조 제1항은 “집행판결은 재판의 옳고 그름을 조사하지 아니하고 하여야 한다”고 선언한다(민사집행법 제27조). 따라서 단계를 판정할 때 승인 요건의 충족과 집행 허가의 부여를 구별해야 한다. 재판 또는 판정 정본·확정·송달과 응소·적용 협약·승인 사유·집행판결 또는 결정에 기록된 자료만으로 그 단계를 판정하며, 없는 기록을 추정으로 메우지 않는다.
본안 재심리를 하지 않으면 실질적 오류가 남을 수 있다. 외부 판단을 존중하면 국내 당사자의 방어권과 공서가 충분히 보호되지 않을 수 있다는 우려도 크다. 그러나 그 손실이 남더라도 승인을 집행 허가와 합치거나 집행판결을 전면 본안 재심리로 쓸 수는 없다. 민사집행법 제27조 제1항의 금지는 변하지 않는다. 우려는 법정 송달 또는 응소와 내용·절차의 공서 요건을 나누어 다루는 것으로 해소하며, 단순한 불리함을 공서 위반으로 바꾸지 않는다.
합성 장면에서 채권자 A가 제시하는 외국의 재판문서와 국내에 있는 채무자 B의 재산이라는 사실만 꺼내어 보면, 확정재판등의 확정과 민사소송법 제217조의 조건은 각각 그 증명과 자료로 확인되어야 한다(민사집행법 제27조). 다만 장면에 연도·금액·기산일이 없어 수치가 필요한 적용은 확정하지 않는다. 승인 요건이 확인된 것으로 국내 집행이 곧 성사되었다고 말할 수는 없다.
이 절에서 허용되는 결론은 승인 요건을 갖추어도 국내 강제집행은 집행판결을 통해 허가되고, 그 절차는 재판의 옳고 그름을 다시 심리하는 본안 재판이 아니라는 것이다. 허용되지 않는 결론은 승인 요건의 충족만으로 집행판결이 필요 없어진다고 보거나, 반대로 집행판결을 본안 재심리의 기회로 쓰는 것이다. 단계 판정은 정해진 기록에 기록된 자료만으로 하고, 없는 자료는 미확정으로 남긴다. 미확정은 곧바로 구제 불능이 아니다.
3.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
In this scene there remains the question whether, once every requirement for recognition has been met, an execution judgment is no longer necessary, or whether that judgment opens a separate door. If recognition is the act of accepting the effect of a foreign judgment, execution is the act of permitting, in addition to that effect, compulsory execution against property in this country. The two, even where their conditions overlap, are not merged into a single step. This question lies in gauging the relationship between these two steps and in determining what change would render void the determination of the preceding step.
The statute corresponding to this question makes that distinction clear in its text. Article 26 of the Civil Execution Act provides: "Compulsory execution based on a final and conclusive judgment of a foreign court or a judgment recognized as having the same effect (hereinafter referred to as a 'final judgment, etc.') may be permitted by a court of the Republic of Korea through an execution judgment. <Amended May 20, 2014>" In this text, the subject is a court of the Republic of Korea, the act is the granting of compulsory execution by an execution judgment, and the condition is a claim for execution based on a final judgment, etc. of a foreign court. That is to say, domestic compulsory execution is not permitted merely by the fact that the requirements for recognition have been met; the execution judgment of a domestic court constitutes the form of that permission.
The reason for passing through an execution judgment and the limitation of that procedure follow in Article 27 of the Civil Execution Act. That Article provides: "(1) An execution judgment shall be rendered without investigating whether the judgment is right or wrong. (2) An action claiming an execution judgment shall be dismissed without prejudice (on procedural grounds) in any of the following cases: 1. Where the fact that the final judgment, etc. of the foreign court has become final and conclusive is not proved; 2. Where the final judgment, etc. of the foreign court does not meet the requirements of Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act." This text divides the scope of grounds for an execution judgment into two branches. One is the procedural limitation that the rightness or wrongness of the judgment is not reexamined; the other is the ground for dismissal on procedural grounds, which looks to whether the proof of finality and the requirements of Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act have been met. The satisfaction of the requirements for recognition and the form of permission to execute diverge at this distinction, and neither can substitute for the other.
The objection raised against this distinction targets the persistence of substantive errors. Unless the merits are reexamined, errors in the findings of fact or the assessment of liability contained in the foreign judgment become fixed as they stand in this country, and Debtor B must bear the disadvantage that defenses he would have contested in a domestic lawsuit are not opened at the execution stage. The concern that an attitude of deference to external judgments may fail to fill out sufficiently the protection of the right of defense and public policy of domestic parties lies in the same place. Yet the foregoing answer does not erase this concern. If the examination looking to the proof of finality and the requirements of Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act and the examination investigating the rightness or wrongness of the judgment were combined into a single procedure, the execution judgment would become a trial on the merits; conversely, if execution were permitted on recognition alone, the execution judgment would lose its place. The residual risk of error remains as the price of holding that boundary.
This determination is reversed if the designated change is confirmed. If the document brought by A is confirmed to be an arbitral award, one must again determine which route and basis to apply as between an execution judgment and an execution decision. If that change is confirmed, the existing determinations of blocking and effectiveness made on the premise of a foreign judgment are discarded and the determination is redone from that stage onward, and the route for foreign judgments prescribed by the two provisions cited above is not applied as it stands. However, in this scene, the materials to check whether the matter is a foreign judgment or an arbitral award, its finality, service and appearance, the applicable convention and the grounds for recognition, have not been fixed. Because no settled value exists, which route applies remains undetermined. A lack of materials does not immediately mean inability to execute, nor does it produce a determination beyond the scope of the confirmed facts.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Even if the requirements for recognition are met, an execution judgment is not rendered unnecessary for domestic compulsory execution of a foreign judgment, and that execution judgment is not a trial on the merits that reexamines the rightness or wrongness of the judgment. A conclusion that uses the execution judgment as a channel for reexamination of the merits, or merges recognition with permission to execute, lies outside this section. The objection pointing to the persistence of errors does not lose its persuasiveness, yet it cannot move this boundary. Only the conditional determination remains as well—that if the designated change from a foreign judgment to an arbitral award is confirmed, the route and basis will be chosen afresh and the existing determination discarded.
3.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
Is an execution judgment unnecessary once the requirements for recognition are met? The preceding step, while separately examining statutory service or appearance and the public policy requirements of content and procedure, confirmed that a violation of public policy cannot be recognized on the mere ground of circumstances unfavorable to a party. What effect is accorded to A's foreign court document, and whether compulsory execution against B's domestic property is permitted on the basis of that document, are separate determinations. To bind the two determinations into one and hold that execution is permitted as soon as recognition is obtained does not accord with the reasoning.
The relevant text directly governs the gateway to domestic compulsory execution. Article 26 of the Civil Execution Act provides: "(1) Compulsory execution based on a final and conclusive judgment of a foreign court or a judgment recognized as having the same effect (hereinafter referred to as a 'final judgment, etc.') may be permitted by a court of the Republic of Korea through an execution judgment." The subject of this text is a court of the Republic of Korea, the act is the granting of compulsory execution by an execution judgment, and the condition is compulsory execution based on a final judgment, etc. of a foreign court. Compulsory execution against B's property is not opened by the court document brought by A itself; only when a court of the Republic of Korea permits it by an execution judgment does the route of execution come into being. What the text prescribes is the form and gateway of that permission; it does not mean that the permission procedure is a trial on the merits that reexamines the substantive legitimacy of the judgment.
The basis for the execution judgment being a separate gateway and the limits of that procedure must be viewed side by side. Article 27 of the Civil Execution Act provides: "(1) An execution judgment shall be rendered without investigating whether the judgment is right or wrong. (2) An action claiming an execution judgment shall be dismissed without prejudice (on procedural grounds) in any of the following cases: 1. Where the fact that the final judgment, etc. of the foreign court has become final and conclusive is not proved; 2. Where the final judgment, etc. of the foreign court does not meet the requirements of Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act" (Civil Execution Act, Article 27). The fact that paragraph (1) directs that the rightness or wrongness of the judgment not be adjudicated is a device delimiting the scope of examination of the execution judgment; the fact that paragraph (2) lists the proof of finality and the requirements of Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act as grounds for dismissal on procedural grounds is a device requiring that the requirements for recognition be confirmed. These two devices do not overlap. If the former device excludes a reexamination of the merits so that substantive determinations cannot be drawn into the domestic execution procedure, the latter device filters only whether the requirements for recognition have been met, thereby opening or failing to open the door to domestic compulsory execution. That is not so. The requirements for recognition merely become the subject of examination in an execution judgment, and the mere circumstance that those requirements have been met neither obviates the execution judgment nor absorbs permission to execute into recognition.
The strongest objection to this distinction is the possibility of residual substantive error. Even if the outcome of the foreign court's determination is unjust from a domestic perspective, or there are errors in the findings of fact or the application of law, if the domestic execution judgment procedure confirms only finality and the requirements of Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act and does not investigate the rightness or wrongness of the judgment, there is the concern that erroneous content may be carried over directly into compulsory execution against B's property. It is also pointed out that, from the standpoint of Debtor B, the right of defense and public policy are not sufficiently protected. However, to answer this objection one cannot merge recognition with permission to execute, nor use the execution judgment as a full-scale reexamination of the merits. It does not erase the disadvantage and possibility of injustice that the objection points out, but that disadvantage alone cannot overturn the principle excluding a reexamination of the merits in an execution judgment. The author's conclusion, without denying the possibility of residual substantive error, is not to expand the domestic execution procedure into a substantive reexamination of the foreign judgment on the strength of that possibility. The device that separately confirms the requirement of service or appearance and the public policy requirements of content and procedure is left in place, and the refusal to convert mere unfavorableness into a violation of public policy also operates within this limit.
Placed in this scene, whether execution against B's property occurs is determined by comparison with the confirmed conditions. If it is compulsory execution based on the foreign court document brought by A, it must pass through the gateway of the execution judgment required by Article 26 (1) of the Civil Execution Act, and that procedure, pursuant to Article 27 (1) of the Civil Execution Act, does not investigate the rightness or wrongness of the judgment. However, if a ground under the subparagraphs of Article 27 (2) applies—that is, if finality has not been proved, or if the requirements of Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act have not been met—the action is dismissed without prejudice (on procedural grounds). If this condition is confirmed to have been met, the path to domestic permission to execute opens; if the requirements are not confirmed, permission through an execution judgment cannot be obtained. What is confirmed by the record of this section is the authenticated copy of the judgment or ruling, finality, service and appearance, the applicable convention, the grounds for recognition, and the type of execution judgment or decision. The outcome of performance of service and appearance in the actual case, the timing of finality, and whether the requirements for recognition are satisfied have not been determined in this scene and therefore remain undetermined. The circumstance that materials are lacking does not immediately mean that no relief is available or that recognition is refused.
Accordingly, what is settled is narrow. If the requirements for recognition are met, those requirements merely become the object of confirmation in an execution judgment; the execution judgment itself is neither obviated nor merged with permission to execute, and even so, the execution judgment is not used as a channel for reexamination of the merits. The objection that substantive error may remain accurately identifies the residual potential, but that objection alone cannot convert the execution judgment into a full-scale reexamination of the merits. Conversely, the fact that the requirements for recognition are not confirmed, or that the execution judgment has been dismissed without prejudice (on procedural grounds), does not negate the effect of the foreign judgment itself. To distinguish the two determinations is the conclusion of this section, and the remaining gaps in the materials are left in the realm of the undetermined.
3.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The preceding section proceeded on the premise that recognition cannot be merged with permission to execute, nor can the execution judgment be used as a full-scale reexamination of the merits. In this scene, the question is whether, if the requirements for recognition have already been met, one may proceed directly to execution without passing through the separate determination called an execution judgment. Here, rather than addressing the possibility of correcting errors, the crux is to distinguish the steps of determination necessary to execute a foreign judgment in this country and the scope those determinations cover.
This text fixes the subject of domestic compulsory execution as a court of the Republic of Korea, and limits its object to execution based on a final and conclusive judgment of a foreign court and a judgment recognized as having the same effect, namely a 'final judgment, etc.' The manner of permitting execution is specified as an 'execution judgment.' Accordingly, in domestic compulsory execution based on a foreign judgment, the execution judgment is not an option but a requirement that must be passed.
The execution judgment prescribed by the foregoing provision and the scope of adjudication that this judgment covers are separate matters. Article 27 (1) of the Civil Execution Act provides that "an execution judgment shall be rendered without investigating whether the judgment is right or wrong" (Civil Execution Act, Article 27), and paragraph (2) of the same Article provides that an action claiming an execution judgment shall be dismissed without prejudice (on procedural grounds) where the fact of finality cannot be proved and where the requirements of Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act have not been met (Civil Execution Act, Article 27). In other words, the execution judgment procedure handles only the fixed questions of proof of finality and whether the statutory conditions for recognition are satisfied, and does not make the validity of the content of the foreign judgment itself an object of reexamination. An execution judgment on a foreign judgment is a judgment permitting domestic compulsory execution, and that determination of permission does not mean adjudication such as a trial on the merits.
Is the criticism, then, that substantive errors of the foreign judgment remain as they are in the execution judgment procedure, powerless? No. The fact that the statutory conditions are met does not correct errors in the content of the original judgment, and from the standpoint of a domestic party there is plainly the disadvantage of having to accept the consequences that an erroneous foreign determination produces upon domestic property. Yet if, on the strength of that disadvantage, recognition and permission to execute were combined into one, or if the execution judgment were assigned the role of reexamining the rightness or wrongness of the merits of the foreign judgment, the distinction of procedures that the law has drawn would itself collapse. Accordingly, the author acknowledges the persistence of error but maintains the conclusion that the examination of the requirements for recognition cannot be combined with a reexamination of the merits.
What is confirmed in this scene is only the procedural position that the document Creditor A seeks to execute is a foreign court document, that its object is the property of Debtor B located in this country, and that the method of execution passes through an execution judgment of a court of the Republic of Korea. Whether the proof of finality and the requirements of Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act are actually satisfied, and what the applicable convention or reservation circumstances are, have not been determined in this scene. Accordingly, whether Creditor A can obtain an execution judgment remains undetermined. However, even under the assumption that the requirements for recognition are met, no route that bypasses the execution judgment is open.
The conclusion this section permits is clear: even if the requirements for recognition are met, domestic compulsory execution of a foreign judgment requires an execution judgment, and that procedure merely confirms the proof of finality and the statutory conditions for recognition and is not a trial on the merits that reexamines the rightness or wrongness of the judgment. Conversely, the conclusions this section does not permit are the interpretation that recognition immediately means permission to execute, and the interpretation that makes the execution judgment a procedure for substantive reexamination of the content of the foreign judgment. The fact that the possibility of error remains does not justify either of these two approaches.
3.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
On the premise that statutory service or appearance and the public policy requirements of content and procedure are distinguished, and that mere unfavorableness is not converted into a violation of public policy, Creditor A seeks to execute against the property of Debtor B located in this country on the strength of a foreign court document. In this scene, the question is whether the recognition of effect and the permission of execution are the same step, or separate determinations. Carrying over the conclusion of the preceding section as it stands, what remains is whether the execution judgment becomes unnecessary once the requirements for recognition are met.
There is a text prescribing the manner in which the door to domestic compulsory execution opens. Article 26 of the Civil Execution Act provides that "compulsory execution based on a final and conclusive judgment of a foreign court or a judgment recognized as having the same effect (hereinafter referred to as a 'final judgment, etc.') may be permitted by a court of the Republic of Korea through an execution judgment." The subject indicated by this text is a court of the Republic of Korea, the act is the granting of compulsory execution by an execution judgment, and the condition is compulsory execution based on a final and conclusive judgment of a foreign court or a judgment recognized as having the same effect. Here, an execution judgment means a judgment permitting domestic compulsory execution.
Article 27 of the Civil Execution Act provides that "an execution judgment shall be rendered without investigating whether the judgment is right or wrong," while providing that where finality has not been proved or the requirements of Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act have not been met, an action claiming an execution judgment shall be dismissed without prejudice (on procedural grounds). These two steps diverge because the act of accepting effect and the act of permitting execution against domestic property each require a different determination. Meeting the requirements for recognition does not substitute for an execution judgment, and an execution judgment is not a trial on the merits that reexamines the content of the foreign judgment.
This distinction carries a price. Unless the merits are reexamined, substantive error remains in the foreign judgment, and a loss is pointed out: this error may lead to domestic execution. The unease that, if external judgments are respected, the right of defense and public policy of domestic parties will not be sufficiently protected arises in the same direction. The author's answer is fixed on the side of maintaining this distinction, and the possibility of error identified by the counterargument is not erased.
What can be confirmed in the synthetic scene is limited. Because Creditor A seeks to execute against the property of Debtor B located in this country on the strength of a foreign court document, a determination on the condition of Article 26 of the Civil Execution Act, namely compulsory execution based on a final judgment, etc. of a foreign court, is possible. However, since no year, amount, date of accrual, or judgment outcome has been set in the scene, whether the proof of finality or the satisfaction of the requirements of Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act holds remains undetermined. If the document is confirmed to be an arbitral award, one must again determine which route and basis to apply as between an execution judgment and an execution decision, and thus it is distinguished from a determination premised on a foreign judgment.
What this section permits is the distinction that domestic compulsory execution of a foreign judgment requires an execution judgment, and that the procedure is not a trial on the merits that reexamines the rightness or wrongness of the judgment, together with the definition that an execution judgment is a judgment permitting domestic compulsory execution. What is not permitted is the merger holding that the execution judgment becomes unnecessary once the requirements for recognition are met, and the expansion placing the execution judgment in the position of reexamination of the merits. Whether recognition is always refused where the foreign amount of damages is large lies outside this distinction.
3.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
If the document that A brings before the court is a final and conclusive judgment of a foreign court or a judgment recognized as having the same effect, what force to give that document before a domestic court remains the question at hand. Because the determination accepting the effect and the determination permitting enforcement are separate, the distinction drawn earlier continues in force, and the next question must be addressed accordingly.
Article 26 of the Civil Execution Act provides: "(1) Compulsory execution based on a final and conclusive judgment of a foreign court or a judgment recognized as having the same effect (hereinafter referred to as a 'final and conclusive judgment, etc.') may be permitted by an execution judgment of a court of the Republic of Korea. <Amended on May 20, 2014>" In this text, the actor is a court of the Republic of Korea; the act is permitting compulsory execution by rendering an execution judgment; and the condition is that the compulsory execution is based on a final and conclusive judgment, etc. of a foreign court. If A's foreign judgment document falls within a final and conclusive judgment, etc., compulsory execution against B's domestic property may be permitted through this route.
Under this text, the execution judgment procedure is not a forum for re-examining the rightness or wrongness of the adjudication; only proof of finality and satisfaction of the conditions of Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act are listed as grounds for dismissal on procedural grounds. Accordingly, the text of that provision alone serves as the basis for adjudicating the domestic recognition of an external adjudication and its enforcement. Satisfaction of the requirements for recognition and the rendering of an execution judgment permitting enforcement lie at separate stages, and the mere fact that the earlier stage has been passed does not eliminate the later one.
If the judgment contained in A's foreign judgment is erroneous, or if a conclusion unfavorable to B has been reached, the avenues for B to redress that loss appear narrow. The concern that B's right of defense and domestic public policy may not be sufficiently protected lies in the same place. As Article 27 (1) expressly provides, an execution judgment shall be rendered without investigating the rightness or wrongness of the adjudication; to convert that procedure into a rehearing on the merits would exceed the boundary set by the text. The premise that a merely unfavorable conclusion cannot be treated as a violation of public policy also supports the scope of this answer.
If it is proved that the foreign judgment document produced by A is a final and conclusive judgment, etc. and that it satisfies the conditions of Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act, compulsory execution may be permitted by an execution judgment in light of the text of Article 26 (1). However, what documents were actually submitted between A and B, and how service and appearance were carried out, cannot be determined from this scene alone. Likewise, where the materials necessary to prove finality or to satisfy the conditions cannot be confirmed, the determination remains undetermined, and this does not itself mean that no relief is available. As the year, amount, accrual date, and outcome of the judgment are not set in the synthetic scene, they are not determined here.
The conclusion permitted by this section is limited to two points: that, for compulsory execution based on a final and conclusive judgment, etc. of a foreign court, a domestic court may permit enforcement by an execution judgment; and that the procedure is not a trial on the merits that re-examines the rightness or wrongness of the adjudication. It is not permitted under this text to read the matter as though, merely because the requirements for recognition are satisfied, the execution judgment becomes unnecessary, or as though the execution judgment extends into a rehearing on the merits. Whether the grounds for dismissal on procedural grounds, such as proof of finality and the conditions of Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act, are satisfied is addressed only within the scope of the relevant text and is not broadened to other grounds of adjudication.
3.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
The preceding stage separated the requirements of statutory service or appearance from the public-policy requirements of content and procedure, and confirmed that debtor B cannot contest the content of that judgment as contrary to public policy merely on the ground that it is unfavorable. Now, when creditor A seeks to execute against the property of debtor B located in the Republic of Korea on the basis of a foreign judgment document, the question remains whether A must separately go through the execution judgment procedure that permits domestic enforcement, given that the requirements for recognition of that foreign judgment have already been met. This question turns on whether recognition and permission to enforce perform functions distinct from one another.
The first text answering this question is Article 26 of the Civil Execution Act. Article 26 (1) provides that "compulsory execution based on a final and conclusive judgment of a foreign court or a judgment recognized as having the same effect (hereinafter 'final and conclusive judgment, etc.') may be permitted by an execution judgment of a court of the Republic of Korea" (Civil Execution Act, Article 26). In this text it becomes clear that the actor is a court of the Republic of Korea; the act is permission for compulsory execution by means of an execution judgment; and the condition is that the compulsory execution is based on a final and conclusive judgment, etc. of a foreign court. The term "execution judgment on a foreign judgment" as used here refers to a judgment that permits domestic compulsory execution. Accordingly, compulsory execution based on a foreign judgment does not occur of its own accord; rather, it follows the route of permission by a domestic court through an execution judgment.
The second text that further clarifies the meaning of an execution judgment is Article 27 of the Civil Execution Act. Article 27 (1) declares that "an execution judgment shall be rendered without investigating the rightness or wrongness of the adjudication," and paragraph (2) provides that the action claiming an execution judgment shall be dismissed without prejudice where it is not proved that the final and conclusive judgment, etc. of a foreign court has become final and conclusive, or where the conditions of Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act are not satisfied (Civil Execution Act, Article 27). What these two paragraphs together show is that an execution judgment is not a forum for re-determining the substantive validity of a foreign judgment, but a procedure that inspects the established requirements—proof of finality and the conditions of Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act—and thereby opens the door to domestic compulsory execution. This distinction directly explains why satisfaction of the requirements for recognition and the granting of permission to enforce must not be merged into one. The determination that the requirements for recognition are satisfied merely fixes the direction of the inspection that an execution judgment requires; it does not render the execution judgment itself unnecessary in place of that inspection. Thus, the detailed distinctions within the stage are limited to the stated conditions—cases where it operates, cases where it is blocked, and cases where the matter is undetermined—and the system of adjudication cannot be broadened by adding a new stage.
Even so, the strongest counterargument that this conclusion must bear is that, if adjudication proceeds on the basis of the execution judgment alone while excluding a rehearing on the merits, substantive errors remaining in the foreign judgment may carry over into domestic enforcement. Even for a judgment rendered by a foreign court that misunderstood the facts or wrongly evaluated the evidence, if the domestic court declines to investigate the rightness or wrongness of the adjudication, debtor B may have to bear the disadvantage of having B's domestic property attached and sold on the basis of an erroneous determination. The concern that a posture of deference to external adjudications may fail to protect the rights of defense and the public policy of domestic parties adequately also arises in the same place. Yet acknowledging this loss and inconvenience does not permit merging recognition with permission to enforce, nor does it permit using the execution judgment as a full rehearing on the merits. If the line drawn by Article 27 (1) of the Civil Execution Act—that no investigation shall be made into the rightness or wrongness of the adjudication—were to collapse, the execution judgment would already have become a separate action on the merits, a procedure different from the route of permission by an execution judgment prescribed in Article 26 (1). The possibility of error pointed out by the counterargument is left in place, but it cannot be addressed by altering the very character of the execution judgment on the strength of that possibility.
From this scene alone it cannot be confirmed whether it has been proved that the final and conclusive judgment, etc. of the foreign court has become final and conclusive, whether the conditions of Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act are satisfied, and what the applicable convention and its reservation status are. If it turns out that the finality of the foreign court's final and conclusive judgment, etc. cannot be proved, or that the conditions of Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act are not satisfied, the action claiming an execution judgment is dismissed without prejudice and creditor A's permission for domestic enforcement is blocked. If the document is confirmed to be an arbitral award, it becomes necessary to determine afresh which route and basis to apply—whether the execution judgment or the enforcement decision—so the outcome cannot be stated on the facts within the scene alone. Accordingly, what can be determined in this scene is only the conditional distinction, and whether enforcement against debtor B's property will actually be realized remains undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is clear: domestic compulsory execution of a foreign judgment requires an execution judgment, and that procedure is not a trial on the merits that re-examines the rightness or wrongness of the adjudication. The fact that the requirements for recognition are satisfied merely indicates the direction in which the execution judgment conducts its inspection; it is not a ground for omitting the execution judgment itself. By contrast, this section does not permit a reading that merges recognition and permission to enforce into a single adjudication, or that converts the execution judgment into a forum for rehearing the merits of the foreign judgment from the beginning. The detailed distinctions within the stage are limited to the conditions written down—cases where it operates, cases where it is blocked, and cases where the matter is undetermined—and adjudication cannot be divided by newly creating and attaching other criteria.
3.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
In this scene, does satisfying the requirements for recognition make an execution judgment unnecessary? Accepting the framework of the preceding stage, which separated the requirements of statutory service or appearance from the public-policy requirements of content and procedure, this stage places the act of accepting an external adjudication and the act of permitting domestic enforcement as two distinct gates and frames the question accordingly. Without rebuilding the argument of the preceding stage, it examines only how these two gates diverge.
Regarding domestic compulsory execution of a foreign judgment, Article 26 of the Civil Execution Act provides that "compulsory execution based on a final and conclusive judgment of a foreign court or a judgment recognized as having the same effect (hereinafter 'final and conclusive judgment, etc.') may be permitted by an execution judgment of a court of the Republic of Korea" (Civil Execution Act, Article 26). Here the actor is a court of the Republic of Korea; the act is the permission of compulsory execution by means of an execution judgment; and the object is execution based on a final and conclusive judgment, etc. of a foreign court. This text does not bind together in a single procedure the acts of recognizing the effect of a foreign judgment as it stands and of opening the channel for domestic compulsory execution; rather, it designates the execution judgment as the form of that channel. The discussion here does not extend to the other requirements of the provision.
Article 27 of the Civil Execution Act draws the line that "an execution judgment shall be rendered without investigating the rightness or wrongness of the adjudication" (Civil Execution Act, Article 27). Paragraph (2) of the same Article provides for dismissal on procedural grounds where proof is not made that the final and conclusive judgment, etc. of the foreign court has become final and conclusive, or where the conditions of Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act are not satisfied (Civil Execution Act, Article 27). Read together, these two provisions establish that an execution judgment is not a forum for re-determining the foreign judgment on the merits, but a forum that passes through the question of whether the requirements for recognition are satisfied and opens the door to domestic enforcement. The answer to the preceding question, then, is that the execution judgment does not become unnecessary merely because the requirements for recognition are satisfied; and the conditions are divided as follows. The condition under which the door opens is where the applicable framework, the conditions for recognition, and the permission for domestic enforcement are all met together, whether the matter concerns a foreign judgment or an arbitral award. The condition under which it is blocked is where a mandatory requirement for recognition of the foreign judgment is absent, or where a statutory ground for refusing recognition of the arbitral award in question is found and permission for domestic enforcement cannot be obtained.
The strongest counterargument aims at the point that, if a rehearing on the merits is excluded, any substantive error in the determination rendered by the foreign court remains uncorrected, and the right of defense and the public policy of domestic debtor B are not sufficiently protected. The loss that this counterargument fears is a result that opens the door to enforcement even in cases where B was unable to respond adequately in the domestic procedure, or where the foreign procedure was seriously flawed. Yet the preceding answer draws the boundary without erasing that disadvantage. Recognition cannot be merged with permission to enforce, and the execution judgment cannot be used as a procedure for a full rehearing on the merits. B's right of defense and public policy remain matters to be addressed at the forum of the grounds for dismissal on procedural grounds and the examination of requirements prescribed by Article 27, and are not extended to a renewed investigation into the rightness or wrongness of the adjudication.
The facts to be confirmed in this scene are only these: the foreign judgment document held by creditor A, and A's intent to execute against the property of debtor B located in the Republic of Korea. Whether the document is final and conclusive, the circumstances of service and appearance, the content of the applicable convention and its reservations, and whether the materials required for the conditions of recognition have been confirmed are not fixed by the scene. Therefore, from this scene alone it cannot be determined whether an execution judgment is required for compulsory execution based on a final and conclusive judgment, etc., or whether the requirements for recognition are satisfied. Undetermined does not mean that no relief is available; it is left as a case where the applicable convention and its reservations, or the materials required for the conditions of recognition, have not been confirmed. If the document is confirmed to be an arbitral award, it becomes necessary to determine afresh which route and basis to apply—whether the execution judgment or the enforcement decision—so a range of matters remains that cannot be adjudicated from this scene alone.
What is permitted in this section is the distinction that domestic compulsory execution of a foreign judgment requires an execution judgment and that the procedure is not a trial on the merits re-examining the rightness or wrongness of the adjudication, together with the settling of the terminology that an execution judgment on a foreign judgment is a judgment permitting domestic compulsory execution. No conclusion is drawn here that the execution judgment becomes unnecessary merely because the requirements for recognition are satisfied, or that the execution judgment serves concurrently as a function of a trial on the merits. The distinctions of operation, blockage, and undetermination remain bound to the conditions separated earlier.
3.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
Depending on whether, in this scene, the effect of the foreign judgment has already been accepted, and whether, further, the door to domestic compulsory execution is being knocked upon, the issues to be addressed divide. The statutory service-or-appearance requirement is separated from the public-policy requirements of content and procedure, and mere disadvantage is not converted into a violation of public policy. Within this scope, one question remains: if the requirements for recognition are satisfied, is the execution judgment no longer necessary?
First, confirm the wording of the provision that forms the gateway to domestic compulsory execution. Article 26 (1) of the Civil Execution Act provides: "Compulsory execution based on a final and conclusive judgment of a foreign court or a judgment recognized as having the same effect as such a judgment (hereinafter 'final judgment, etc.') may be permitted by an execution judgment of a court of the Republic of Korea" (Civil Execution Act, Article 26). Here, the actor indicated by the wording is a court of the Republic of Korea, and the act in question is the rendering of a judgment permitting compulsory execution based on a final judgment, etc. of a foreign court. The condition is that the subject matter is compulsory execution based on a final judgment, etc., and this judgment is precisely the execution judgment of the foreign judgment. An execution judgment is a judgment permitting domestic compulsory execution.
Under this wording, even if every requirement for recognition is fully satisfied, the execution judgment itself remains. That the requirements for recognition have been satisfied means that the final judgment, etc. has met the conditions for being accorded effect domestically, whereas the execution judgment is a separate judgment permitting compulsory execution on that basis. The two stages each undertake different functions, and the mere fact that the earlier stage has been passed does not render the later stage unnecessary. If this distinction is not maintained and the requirements for recognition and the permission for execution are merged into one, both the form of the judgment that the provision separately preserves and the scope of the examination disappear together. In other words, recognition is the acceptance of the effect of the foreign judgment, and the execution judgment is the permission, on that basis, to execute against domestic property.
The fact that an execution judgment is rendered without re-examining the merits carries substantive costs in its train. Reliance placed wholesale on the judgment of the foreign court may leave errors undetected that had not surfaced in the domestic procedure, and a domestic party such as B is left with the anxiety of not having been able to respond adequately in the position allotted to it. Even if such disadvantage is plainly substantial, the author considers that for that reason recognition cannot be merged with the permission for execution, nor can the execution judgment be put to use as a full re-examination of the merits. Article 27 (1) of the Civil Execution Act draws the line: "An execution judgment shall be rendered without investigating the correctness of the adjudication" (Civil Execution Act, Article 27). Nevertheless, this does not erase the concern that, by reason of respecting the external judgment of the foreign court, the right of defense of domestic parties and public policy are less well protected. That concern remains a matter to be addressed through proof of finality, which the provision sets out as a ground for dismissal on procedural grounds, and through whether the conditions of Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act (Civil Execution Act, Article 27) are satisfied.
Viewed against this scene, whether the document brought by A is a final judgment, etc. of a foreign court, whether its finality is proven, and whether it satisfies the conditions of Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act (Civil Execution Act, Article 27) are the issues placed at the gateway to the execution judgment. If these items are confirmed from the records, the requirements for recognition may be regarded as satisfied, and, on that basis, an execution judgment may be rendered and compulsory execution against B's domestic property permitted. However, this scene does not determine which of B's property is actually transferred, nor the extent to which performance is carried out. Matters that cannot be adjudicated on the basis of this scene alone therefore remain undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is narrow and clear. Domestic compulsory execution of a foreign judgment requires an execution judgment, and that procedure is not a trial on the merits that re-examines the correctness of the disposition; hence, the execution judgment cannot be skipped merely because the requirements for recognition have been satisfied. Conversely, an interpretation that turns the execution judgment into a channel for re-examination of the merits, or that treats a determination of recognition as leading directly to permission for execution — mixing the earlier and later stages in this way — lies outside the conclusion of this section. If the amount of foreign compensation is large, is recognition always refused?