Summary
A confession of fact made in court has the effect of dispensing with proof, but its subject matter and the conditions for its revocation must be considered together.
1.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
Defendant B answered that he did not know the facts, but Plaintiff A cites this as a statement admitting them. A fact decided not to be addressed changes the scope of the examination before the weight of evidence does. It is precisely in this scene that the questions are posed: why does a confessed fact not require separate proof, and what is the criterion that opens the gateway to this relief? The preceding section left only the point that the failure of proof of one explanation must be distinguished from the finding of fact of the opposing explanation. This section now confines itself to the task of setting the criterion at the entrance to the stage, and examines what stands at that threshold.
The relevant text is found in Article 288 of the Civil Procedure Act. That Article provides: "Facts that a party has confessed in court and notorious facts shall not require proof" (Article 288 of the Civil Procedure Act). Confession here means, as defined above, a statement made in court admitting a fact favorable to the opposing party, the subject of that statement being a party, the act being the admission of a fact, and the place being the court. This text merely prescribes the object and the effect of a confession together; it does not newly define the form of the statement.
The same Article then adds: "A confession contrary to the truth may be revoked when it is proved to have been made by mistake" (Article 288 of the Civil Procedure Act). The no-proof effect of the preceding sentence and the revocation condition of the following sentence are distinct stages of determination; herein lies the reason why the issue of whether a fact fixed by confession may be contested must be examined separately from the issue of whether something is subject to confession. Reflecting a case that satisfies the statutory conditions for revocation of confession belongs to the former stage, while opening the entrance to this relief is a matter of the latter stage.
The strongest counterargument is that placing the form of statement ahead of truth is dangerous. If a party, though the fact was otherwise, misspoke, and that mistake ties up the trial for a long time, both procedural economy and the discovery of truth are harmed. In order not to erase this disadvantage, the author answers within a defined scope. Agreement as to legal evaluation cannot be fixed at once as a confession of fact. The conclusion is maintained that if an assertion as to the existence or nonexistence of legal effect, or a concession as to the application of a provision of law, is reduced to an admission of fact, it must be reconsidered from the outset whether that statement becomes a confession.
Returning to the synthetic scene, B's response is "I do not know," and Plaintiff A cites this as a statement admitting it. Here, what fact has been taken as the object of confession and what the context of the statement is are unclear, so the scope of facts for which a confession has been formed remains undetermined. If it is confirmed that the statement of not knowing was recorded as an admission, the conclusion changes under the rule that presumes contestation. Whether the statement sought to be relied upon is an admission of fact or not, and whether the revocation requirement supported by the mistake material has been satisfied, cannot be determined from this scene alone.
What this section permits is to distinguish the requirements for application of confession from the requirements for revocation and, where the latter are satisfied, to reflect that fact in applying the entrance criterion for this relief; it does not permit fixing agreement as to legal evaluation as a confession of fact. Neither expanding the scope of facts determined without proof, nor opening a pathway to deny a fact again so long as a judicial confession remains, is an answer of this section.
1.2The Conditions That Block Relief
Why does a confessed fact not require separate proof? On this problem, one must ask at the same time the conditions under which the pathway to deny that fact again is blocked. Under the premise that the failure of proof of one explanation must be distinguished from the finding of fact of the opposing explanation, if the preceding stage confirmed the no-proof effect of a confession, the present question aims at the conditions under which alone it may be contested again while that effect persists. A confession is a statement made in court admitting a fact favorable to the opposing party; the circumstances under which an attempt to revoke such a statement is not accepted are the blocking conditions to be addressed now.
The text corresponding to this question is as follows. "Facts that a party has confessed in court and facts of common knowledge shall not require proof. Provided, however, that a confession contrary to the truth may be revoked when it is proved to have been made by mistake" (Article 288 of the Civil Procedure Act). This text enumerates two categories of facts together; here attention is directed only to the confessed facts in the first part. The phrase "facts that a party has confessed in court" confines the subject to the party who spoke in court, the act to a statement admitting a fact favorable to the opposing party, and the condition to one carried out in court. The revocation phrase that follows, however, points to the conditions of a separate pathway for undoing a confession.
Connecting this basis to the conclusion of this section, a confessed fact remains in the state of not being required to be proved, and one who seeks to deny that fact again must surmount the conditions of the revocation phrase. Two stages must therefore be distinguished. One is the fact determined without proof and its binding force; the other is the determination of revocation that undoes a fact already determined. So long as the former persists, the latter door is closed, and if even one of the statutory requirements necessary to open that door is not satisfied, the pathway of relief is closed. Without adding any separate exception or effect, the distinction itself holds that the judgment is corrected to reflect the confession only in cases where the conditions for revocation are satisfied.
Yet the counterargument that placing the form of statement ahead of truth is dangerous is weighty. If a party, having misspoken by mistake, is bound by that form, the lawsuit may harden on a wrong footing even though a different fact is true, and this is a loss difficult for the party to bear and an unjust inconvenience of the procedure. The author's answer limits itself without erasing this risk. It is that agreement as to legal evaluation cannot be fixed at once as a confession of fact. A statement agreeing to a legal evaluation and an admission of fact must be distinguished, and only as to the latter confession do the no-proof effect and the revocation conditions come into issue. This limitation reduces the loss the counterargument targets while not collapsing the effect upon the hearing that the form of a confession carries.
In the synthetic scene, Defendant B answered that he did not know the facts, while Plaintiff A cites this as a statement admitting it. In this scene, B's answer is a statement of not knowing, so the crux is whether that statement can be regarded as admitting a fact favorable to the opposing party. Where the context of the statement or the fact taken as the object of confession is unclear — that is, if it is not clear of which fact the words speak or what has been admitted — it must be regarded that the object to be taken as a confession has not itself been determined, and this cannot be fixed in this section. Conversely, if it is confirmed that the statement of not knowing was recorded as an admission, the conclusion is corrected under the rule that presumes contestation, and one examines whether that record becomes the condition for overturning a determination premised on a confession. Win or loss and performance results not present in the scene are not determined here.
With this, to summarize the boundary between the conclusions this section permits and those it does not: a confessed fact does not require separate proof, but its object and the revocation conditions must be examined together, and if a valid confession remains and the requirements for revocation are not satisfied, the pathway to deny it again is closed. Accordingly, a determination that fixes agreement as to legal evaluation at once as a confession of fact is not permitted.
1.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
In this scene, the seat of the disturbance is not the weight of evidence but what has already been determined as fact without contest. The conclusion up to the preceding stage carries over in the single sentence that a circumstance in which one explanation failed to reach proof is viewed separately from the finding of fact of the opposing explanation. In the same direction: why does a confessed fact not require separate proof? This problem asks together what the object of confession is, and what should be left standing when the object itself is unclear.
Article 288 of the Civil Procedure Act, posted on the National Law Information Center, provides: "Facts that a party has confessed in court and facts of common knowledge shall not require proof." This text specifies the object of exemption from proof as "facts that a party has confessed in court." That is, the statement admitting that fact was made in court, and only when that statement corresponds to a confession does it become a confessed fact. What the Article addresses is the core of proof, and the contestation procedure outside the Article or other rules of proof are not thereby determined together.
The same Article then provides a proviso: "A confession contrary to the truth may be revoked when it is proved to have been made by mistake." The no-proof effect of a confession and the conditions for revocation of confession have differing uses. Because the former text respectively determines the scope of facts not requiring proof, and the latter text the route by which a confession already brought into being may be undone. If the two stages are bundled together, there arises the error of dragging in talk of revocation before determining what a confession is, or, conversely, of searching for the object of confession only after examining the revocation requirements. The conclusion of this section stands on that distinction. Once the object of confession is specified, the no-proof effect follows, but an unspecified matter stops right there.
This attitude of establishing form first calls forth two criticisms. That placing the form of statement ahead of truth is dangerous, and that it is unjust for a fact different from reality to tie up the trial on account of a party's mistake. If, because of a single line of confession, a statement with hazy memory or a wrongly written record hardens into fact, the outcome of the contest comes to be governed by the expression of words. Even without denying such loss and inconvenience, the work of first distinguishing facts confessed in court from other facts cannot be avoided. That is to say, merely having sided with one explanation on the existence or attribution of legal effect does not produce a statement admitting the factual events underlying that premise.
Placed as the materials of determination in this scene are the protocol of party's statement and the written answer, together with the mistake material submitted in support of the claim for revocation of confession. But Defendant B's statement was an answer that he did not know the facts, and Plaintiff A cites that answer as an admission statement favorable to himself. The contrasting sentence — that if the words of not knowing were recorded as an admission statement, the conclusion is corrected under the rule that presumes contestation — shows that the adjudication differs according to how the record is classified. Since a judicial confession is a statement made in court admitting a fact favorable to the opposing party, it must first be ascertained to which fact the answer of not knowing pertains, and in what sense that answer was recorded. From this material alone, that context and the fact taken as the object of confession cannot be fixed, and such items remain without a conclusion.
The line this section draws is thus distinct. When a fact confessed in court is specified, one may determine that it does not require separate proof, but one cannot pass over as determined without proof even those items whose fact has not been specified. An item of the materials of determination that is not specified differs from the impossibility in cases where a confession has been revoked or where there was no confession from the beginning. The former is a state of undetermined-ness in which what is to be judged is not yet known; the latter is a state in which the object of determination has not arisen. An undetermined item may be looked at again when more material accumulates or the meaning of the statement becomes clear, but until then it cannot be used as a determined fact. The question to carry over to what follows remains.
1.4The Records Needed for Determination
In the scene where Defendant B answered that he did not know the facts and Plaintiff A cites this as a statement admitting it, the direction of determination diverges according to what the protocol of party's statement and the written answer contain. In the preceding section, where the context of the statement or the fact taken as the object of confession was unclear, the adjudication was left undetermined, and this was distinguished from cases in which relief is blocked. The question that follows is what the record supporting that adjudication must be.
As the text answering this question, Article 288 of the Civil Procedure Act declares: "Facts that a party has confessed in court and facts of common knowledge shall not require proof." Confession here means a judicial confession, that is, a statement made in court admitting a fact favorable to the opposing party. The subject this text indicates is the party who stated in court, the act is the admission concerning a fact favorable to the opposing party, and the condition is that the admission was made in court. Whether the object of that statement is a legal evaluation or a fact must also be determined together.
That text determines the scope of facts exempted from proof while also addressing the object of confession and the revocation conditions together. The same Article adds: "Provided, however, that a confession contrary to the truth may be revoked when it is proved to have been made by mistake" (Article 288 of the Civil Procedure Act). The two sentences point to different stages. The preceding sentence determines the exclusion of the requirement of proof, and the following sentence the conditions for undoing that exclusion. Herein lies the reason this adjudication rests on the protocol of party's statement, the written answer, the claim for revocation of confession, and the mistake material. For only after fixing what the confessed fact is can the claim for revocation be examined.
An objection is raised to the attitude of inquiring into the record form first. It is that it is unjust for a fact different from reality to tie up the trial because of a party's mistake. This objection targets the cost by which the form of statement conceals substantive truth, and concretely points to the inconvenience the party must bear in disputes surrounding confession. Even so, the confirmed conclusion is maintained. If agreement as to an evaluation was not recorded as an admission of fact, that record cannot become the basis of this adjudication, and even though the concern of the objection remains, one cannot proceed to a groundless finding of fact.
Contrasting the facts appearing in the scene with the foregoing conditions, B's statement is an answer of not knowing, and Plaintiff A cites it as an admission statement. If it is unclear how the protocol of party's statement and the written answer recorded B's statement, and to which fact B's not-knowing was directed, the fact taken as the object of confession itself is not determined. Whether a claim for revocation of confession and mistake material were submitted together also belongs to the basis of this adjudication. However, the range that cannot be adjudicated from the scene alone remains undetermined. The undetermined-ness in cases where the object or the context of a confession is unclear is distinguished from cases where a judicial confession remains valid and the statutory requirements for revocation are not satisfied, so the pathway to deny that fact again is blocked.
What this section permits is the conclusion that this adjudication rests on the protocol of party's statement, the written answer, the claim for revocation of confession, and the mistake material, together with the limitation that without such a record the conclusion remains undetermined. What it does not permit is a conclusion that fixes a confession of fact without such a record, or that deems agreement as to legal evaluation to be a confession of fact. The facts, service, or performance results of an actual case, or a judgment result not present in the scene, cannot be fixed in this section.
1.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
A judicial confession means a statement made in court acknowledging a fact favorable to the opposing party, and that fact is treated as no longer requiring proof. The conclusion is that the failure of proof of one explanation must be distinguished from the finding of fact of the opposing explanation. Yet the stage determination of the preceding step left open the question of deciding first whether a matter is one of contesting facts at all, rather than the weight of the evidence or the direction of judgment. This section addresses what kind of change overturns such a stage determination.
The source text corresponding to this section is Article 288 of the Civil Procedure Act, which provides: "Facts admitted by a party in court and notorious facts shall not require proof: Provided, That a confession contrary to the truth may be revoked upon proving that it was made by mistake." In this wording, the subject of the confession is the party, the act is a statement of acknowledgment made in court, and the object of exemption from proof is the fact confessed. At the same time, the proviso adds the condition that, even where the confession itself remains validly formed, it may be revoked upon proving that it was made by mistake.
The reason the effect of exemption from proof and the conditions for revocation must be viewed separately at this point is that the two judgments answer different questions. The answer to why a confessed fact requires no separate proof is that, once the party has chosen not to contest it, the court has no need to re-establish that fact by evidence. By contrast, whether that confession may again be denied is judged by the separate condition of having proved a mistake. Accordingly, unless one examines side by side whether a confession has been formed and whether that confession may be revoked, the fact that became the object of the confession and the dispute surrounding that confession become intermingled.
The strongest counterargument against this rule is that it is dangerous to give the form of a statement priority over the truth. The concern is that a party may have made a statement merely through a slip of the tongue or a faulty memory, and if that statement narrows the scope of the court's examination on form alone, the disadvantage arises that a fact differing from reality becomes fixed. Plaintiff A seeks to read Defendant B's statement that he does not know the fact as an admission as it stands, yet that expression is far from a statement acknowledging the fact. What distinguishes a confession from a non-confession is whether it is a statement acknowledging a fact favorable to the opposing party, and if it is unclear how the statement should be read, the matter is already undetermined before reaching that stage.
The fact confirmed in the synthetic scene is only that Defendant B answered that he did not know the fact, while Plaintiff A cites this as a statement of acknowledgment. From this scene alone it cannot be determined what fact is recorded as having been acknowledged by B, nor how that record came to appear in a statement of examination record or in an answer. If the object of the dispute is unclear, whether a judicial confession has been formed likewise remains undetermined. If it is confirmed that a statement of not knowing was recorded as an admission, the conclusion changes under the rule that presumes the matter was contested.
In sum, a confessed fact requires no separate proof because the dispute over that fact has disappeared, and it is not permitted to fix an agreement as to legal evaluation immediately as a confession of fact. Only once it is ascertained what fact a statement acknowledged is the object of the confession determined, and only once that object is determined does the effect of exemption from proof arise.
1.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
It was settled in the preceding stage of analysis that a confessed fact requires no separate proof. Yet the trial record may also contain statements that appear to be an agreement as to legal evaluation rather than an acknowledgment of fact. The present question is whether, in such a scene, a confession may be fixed on the mere form of the statement. The counterargument that it is dangerous to give the form of a statement priority over the truth aims precisely at this point.
Here, a confessed fact means the object to which the judicial confession, that is, a statement made in court acknowledging a fact favorable to the opposing party, refers. That object must be an acknowledgment concerning fact, and the wording gives only the effect of exempting that fact from proof. Whether an agreement as to legal evaluation or as to the attribution of legal effect falls within the scope of this wording must be examined separately.
The same provision continues: "A confession contrary to the truth may be revoked upon proving that it was made by mistake" (Article 288 of the Civil Procedure Act). This phrase requires that the object of the confession and the conditions for its revocation be viewed together. What is fixed by a confession is a statement concerning fact, and if it is proved that that statement is contrary to the truth and arose from a mistake, the path to revocation opens. By contrast, an agreement as to legal evaluation is, since its object is not itself a fact, something that must first be distinguished as to whether it can serve as a confession before being placed within that framework of revocation. An evaluation lacking such a distinction renders the statutory conditions for revocation of confession nugatory.
The strongest counterargument points to the loss brought about by giving the form of a statement priority over the truth. The concern is that if a fact differing from reality is left in the record through a party's error, that single erroneous record binds the entire trial and leads to a conclusion diverging from substantive truth. This counterargument says that the risk of erroneous facts becoming fixed cannot be ignored as the price of establishing the stability of form. This answer preserves the conclusion in the direction of reducing that risk, by confining the object of a confession to an acknowledgment concerning fact, while not erasing the risk pointed out by the counterargument.
What is confirmed in the synthetic scene is that Defendant B answered that he did not know the fact, and that Plaintiff A cites that answer as a statement of acknowledgment. From this scene alone it cannot be asserted that B's answer constitutes a judicial confession, that is, a statement acknowledging a fact favorable to the opposing party. It is unclear whether B's answer is a denial of the fact or an equivocal answer, and Plaintiff A's citation is merely an assertion as to that interpretation. Where the context of the statement or the fact taken as the object of the confession is unclear, whether the confession has been formed remains undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is the narrow distinction that an agreement as to legal evaluation is not fixed as a confession of fact. Conversely, merely because the object taken as a confession is a legal evaluation, one must not hold that a confession is thereby formed; only after first examining whether that object is an acknowledgment concerning fact may one discuss the effect of exemption from proof and the conditions for revocation. If a statement of not knowing has been recorded as an admission, the conclusion is corrected under the rule that presumes the matter was contested.
1.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
In the scene where Defendant B answered that he did not know the fact while Plaintiff A cites this as a statement of acknowledgment, the answer of not knowing and the statement of acknowledgment are mixed together, and the question of what remains as a confession comes first. Here a judicial confession means a statement made in court acknowledging a fact favorable to the opposing party. Whether such a confessed fact truly requires separate proof is the question to be resolved now.
The relevant wording is that Article 288 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that "Facts admitted by a party in court and notorious facts shall not require proof" (Article 288 of the Civil Procedure Act). This provision lists together, as the objects to which no requirement of proof attaches at all, confessed facts and notorious facts. The subject is the party who made the statement in court, the act is the acknowledgment of a fact favorable to the opposing party, and the condition is that the statement be a confession made in court. This section addresses only the scope of exemption from proof prescribed by that wording.
The reason a confessed fact is not subject to a separate proof requirement is that, if the court were to take as an object of proof a fact that the party has chosen not to contest, it would reverse a matter on which the examination had already closed. At this point it is never to be omitted that the fact constituting the object of the confession and the conditions for revocation must be viewed together. The fact to which the effect of no proof required attaches is the fact admitted by the party, and the same wording contains the proviso that it may be revoked only where, upon its being contrary to the truth, it is proved to have arisen from a mistake (Article 288 of the Civil Procedure Act). Unless the conditions of the effect and of revocation are viewed separately, one is left holding only one side.
The counterargument that it is dangerous to give the form of a statement priority over the truth aims at the loss that a single fact wrongly admitted by a party through error can entangle the entire trial. This concern is not unfounded, in that if the court fixes the fact on the mere shape of the statement, the erroneous admission becomes a burden that cannot be undone to the end. Yet that risk is covered by the answer that an agreement as to legal evaluation cannot be fixed immediately as a confession of fact. If a confession is fixed on the form of the statement alone, without distinguishing whether it is an acknowledgment of fact or an agreement as to legal evaluation, the very loss pointed out by that counterargument arises.
The facts related to this scene are only the two stated above. Defendant B answered that he did not know the fact, and Plaintiff A cites this as a statement of acknowledgment. Measured against the statutory conditions, what fact has been taken as the object of the confession must first be ascertained, and it must also be settled whether an answer of not knowing is a statement corresponding to a confession. So long as the object of the confession or the context of the statement is unclear, this scene alone cannot fix whether a confession has been formed.
The conclusion permitted by this section extends no further than this: a confession of fact in court carries the effect of exemption from proof; that effect attaches only to the confessed fact; and a false confession arising from mistake may be revoked after proof. By contrast, one cannot conclude that a fact becomes fixed on the form of the statement alone while the object of the confession remains undetermined, or that an agreement as to legal evaluation is also fixed as a confession. The task of examining the statutory conditions for revocation of confession is also included within this conclusion.
1.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
In the scene now presented, Defendant B answered that he did not know the fact, while Plaintiff A cites this as a statement of acknowledgment. This scene is a wholly specified synthetic premise and not a reproduction of an actual case. What is asked in this situation is whether an attitude of not contesting a fact alters the boundaries of relief, and at the same time the scope that this section treats exclusively must be determined.
The wording corresponding to this question is Article 288 of the Civil Procedure Act. The provision first states that "Facts admitted by a party in court and notorious facts shall not require proof," and then adds the proviso that "A confession contrary to the truth may be revoked upon proving that it was made by mistake" (Article 288 of the Civil Procedure Act). Here, a confession means a statement made in court acknowledging a fact favorable to the opposing party, and a judicial confession, by virtue of that statement of acknowledgment having been made in court, becomes the starting point that sets the direction of the examination. The subject this wording covers is the party, the act is the statement of acknowledgment made in court, and the condition is that it concerns a fact favorable to the opposing party.
In that wording, the effect of exemption from proof appears in the form of not requiring proof. That is to say, the confessed fact is not thereby removed from the object of examination as such, but is treated as a fact determined without separate proof. Accordingly, it is necessary, while grouping together confessions and notorious facts in the stage determination, to distinguish and examine their respective requirements. The point divided in the preceding section, that the failure of proof of one explanation must be distinguished from the finding of fact of the opposing explanation, is understood in the same vein. The circumstance that one side failed to support its explanation does not become material negating facts already fixed by the other side's confession. One must, however, view together what the object of the confession is and the statutory condition that, to revoke it, a mistake must be proved.
The counterargument most strongly raised against this design is that it is dangerous to give the form of a statement priority over the truth. If, even where a fact differs from reality, a party's error results in the trial being bound, the lawsuit becomes captive to the recorded sentence and a judgment contrary to justice may harden. This loss and inconvenience are not light. Even so, the conclusion this section maintains remains unshaken, for the reason that an agreement as to legal evaluation cannot be fixed immediately as a confession of fact. The circumstance that a party agreed as to legal nature or legal effect is not the same as his having made a statement acknowledging a fact favorable to the opposing party. Therefore, grievance arising from error is dealt with through the path of proving a mistake, the statutory condition for revocation of confession, and the counterargument is answered by avoiding the result of fixing matters on the form of the statement alone.
In this scene there is one fact relevant to this question. Whether this statement constitutes a judicial confession, that is, a statement made in court acknowledging a fact favorable to the opposing party, varies according to the context of the statement and what fact is taken as the object of the confession. Here the answer "I do not know" showed an attitude of not knowing the fact and cannot be asserted to be a statement acknowledging a fact favorable to the opposing party. Accordingly, from the scene alone it is not determined whether a confession has been formed, nor how far the range of confessed facts extends. In this case one cannot judge whether the confession remains validly in place and the path to deny that fact again is blocked, or whether there was no confession from the outset and the matter should be seen as contested.
The conclusion permitted by this section is that the effect of exemption from proof is recognized for confessed facts, and that the object, namely the confessed fact, and the statutory conditions for revocation of confession are viewed together. What is not permitted is to fix a party's agreement as to legal evaluation immediately as a confession of fact, or to broaden the range of facts determined without proof without examining the object of the confession and the requirements for revocation. The point that the failure of proof of one explanation must be distinguished from the finding of fact of the opposing explanation is also placed within the same boundary.
1.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
한 설명의 증명 실패는 반대 설명의 사실 인정과 구별되어야 한다. 이 전제 위에서 법원에서의 사실 자백에는 불요증 효과가 있으나 그 대상과 취소조건을 함께 보아야 한다. 이 결론은 앞 절에서 받은 전제 위에 놓인다. 원고의 원용에 맞서 증거의 양을 세기 전에 먼저 따져야 할 것은 그 진술이 심리의 범위를 어떻게 바꾸는가이다. 이를 밝히는 데 해당하는 문언이 민사소송법 제288조이다.
이 조문은 먼저 무엇을 증명 없이 정할 수 있는지를 적는다. 그 문언은 "법원에서 당사자가 자백한 사실과 현저한 사실은 증명을 필요로 하지 아니한다"고 선언한다(민사소송법 제288조). 여기서 주체는 법원에서 말한 당사자이고, 행위는 자백이며, 대상은 자백된 사실이다. 같은 문장에 나란히 놓인 현저한 사실은 별도의 불요증 사유이므로, 이번 물음은 앞의 자백된 사실에 겨눈 것이다. 자백이 놓이는 자리는 재판정이고, 상대방에게 유리한 사실을 인정하는 진술이 그 자리를 채운다.
같은 조문은 뒤이어 취소의 문을 따로 둔다. "진실에 어긋나는 자백은 그것이 착오로 말미암은 것임을 증명한 때에는 취소할 수 있다"(민사소송법 제288조). 앞 문장의 불요증 효과와 뒤 문장의 취소 조건은 짝을 이루므로, 하나만 떼어 읽을 수 없다. 증명을 요구하지 않는다는 것은 자백된 사실이 심리의 범위에서 빠진다는 뜻이고, 착오를 증명하면 취소할 수 있다는 것은 그 범위가 다시 열릴 수 있다는 뜻이다. 두 단계를 함께 보아야 자백의 대상과 그 지속 조건이 구별된다. 법원에서의 사실 자백에는 불요증 효과가 있으나 그 대상과 취소조건을 함께 보아야 한다는 결론이 여기에서 나온다.
이 대목에서 반론은 진술 형식이 진실보다 앞서는 위험을 겨냥한다. 착오나 실수로 말한 진술이 그대로 자백으로 굳어지면, 실제와 다른 사실이 재판을 묶고 상대방의 입증 부담을 덜어줄 수 있다는 것이다. 그 손실은 말로 다 하기 어렵지 않다. 그런데 이 반론에 부딪힌 자백은 사실을 인정하는 진술이고, 그와 구별되는 것이 법률적 평가에 대한 동의이다. 이 답은 반론의 불리함을 지우지 않는다. 착오로 말미암은 것임을 증명한 때에 취소할 수 있다는 문언이 그 불리함을 받아들이는 자리이다.
이 장면으로 돌아가면, 피고 B는 사실을 모른다고 답했고 원고 A는 이를 인정한 진술로 원용한다. 자백이란 법원에서 상대방에게 유리한 사실을 인정하는 진술이므로, "모른다"는 답변이 그 정의에 들어맞는지는 기록만으로 단정할 수 없다. 원고의 원용에 맞서는 자백 취소 주장과 착오 자료가 함께 놓이는지도 이 장면은 정하지 않았다. 따라서 자백된 사실의 범위와 착오 증명의 충족 여부는 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 자백된 사실에 불요증 효과가 붙고, 그 효과가 지속되는 한 그 사실을 다시 부정하는 통로가 막힌다는 판단이다. 허용하지 않는 것은 자백의 형식만 보고 사실을 확정하거나, 법률적 평가에 대한 동의를 자백으로 돌리는 판단이다. 자료가 모자라면 미확정일 뿐 구제 불능이 되지 않으며, 착오를 증명한 때에는 취소할 수 있다는 문언의 조건을 따로 본다. 재판상 자백은 이 판단에서 무엇을 뜻하는가?
1.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
이러한 전제 아래 증명 없이 정해지는 사실과 그 구속 안에서 다시 나누어 판정할 부분은 무엇인지 살핀다. 여기서는 단계 안의 세부 구분을 작동하는 경우·막히는 경우·미확정인 경우로 표시한 조건에 한정하여 검토한다.
“제288조(불요증사실) 법원에서 당사자가 자백한 사실과 현저한 사실은 증명을 필요로 하지 아니한다. 다만, 진실에 어긋나는 자백은 그것이 착오로 말미암은 것임을 증명한 때에는 취소할 수 있다.” (민사소송법 제288조) 이 문언은 증명이 요구되지 않는 두 경우를 함께 적으면서도 자백한 사실과 현저한 사실을 나란히 둔다. 따라서 자백한 사실이란 법정에서 그 진술을 한 당사자를 기준으로 정해진다.
이상의 문언은 앞서 구별한 두 층위와 맞닿는다. 한 설명의 증명 실패가 그대로 반대 설명의 사실 인정이 되지 않는 것처럼, 증명이 면제되는 사실인지와 그 사실이 무엇인지 나누어 판정하는 작업도 서로 다른 순서를 밟는다. 먼저 자백·다툼·현저한 사실 가운데 어느 요건에 해당하는지를 나누고, 이어서 진실에 어긋난 자백의 취소는 착오로 말미암았음을 증명한 때라는 법정 조건을 충족하는지 확인한다. 그 조건을 충족한 경우에만 취소를 반영한 판정이 가능하다. 이렇게 나누는 까닭은 불요증 효과의 범위와 자백의 존속을 한꺼번에 묻지 않기 위한 것이다.
이러한 형식 우선이 남기는 손실도 분명하다. 실제로는 사실과 어긋난 진술이 당사자의 말실수로 굳어져 재판의 범위가 묶이면, 진실을 좇아 다투려는 쪽에 불리한 결과가 남는다. 진술 형식을 중시하는 비판은 바로 이 점을 겨냥한다. 위 문언이 다루는 대상이 자백한 사실이지만, 그것이 법률적 평가인지 사실인지는 별도로 가려야 하며, 그 구분이 끝나지 않았다면 다시 부정할 수 없다는 구속까지 생기지 않는다. 이 비판이 지적한 불이익은 남겨 둔 채 결론을 유지한다.
이 장면에서 판정에 관여하는 사실은 좁다. 모른다고 한 응답을 인정한 것으로 읽는가 아니면 다툼의 표시로 읽는가는 자백·다툼 요건의 구분에 속하며, 이 장면만으로는 그 대상으로 삼은 사실과 진술의 맥락이 모두 밝혀지지 않았다. 만약 알지 못한다는 진술을 인정한 것으로 기록한 것이 확인되면 다툰 것으로 추정하는 규칙에 따라 결론이 달라지며 작동하는 경우의 구분을 다시 적용한다. 아직 판정하지 못한 나머지는 미확정으로 둔다.
여기서 허용되는 결론은, 증명 없이 정해지는 사실의 범위와 그 사실을 다시 나누어 보는 판정을, 작동하는 경우·막히는 경우·미확정인 경우의 명시된 조건으로만 구분한다는 것이다. 반대로 같은 문언이 무조건적 사실 확정을 뜻하거나, 요건 구분 없이 곧바로 구속을 선언하는 해석은 이 절이 끌어내지 못한다. 이 절은 단계 안의 세부 구분을 조건에 한정한다는 결론만을 확정한다.
1.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
한 설명의 증명 실패는 반대 설명의 사실 인정과 구별되어야 한다는 전제 아래, 증명 없이 정해지는 사실이 어느 조건에서 심리를 벗어나는지, 어느 조건에서 다시 부정할 수 없게 묶이는지, 어떤 경우에는 확정되지 않은 채 남는지가 이번에 살필 물음이다. 피고 B는 사실을 모른다고 답했는데 원고 A는 이를 인정한 진술로 원용하는 장면에서, 이 물음은 진술의 형식과 내용이 서로 어긋날 때 그 구속을 어디에 둘지를 묻게 된다. 증명 없이 정해지는 사실과 그 구속의 실효·차단·미확정을 어떻게 구별하는가?
이 물음에 해당하는 문언을 민사소송법 제288조에 두어, “법원에서 당사자가 자백한 사실과 현저한 사실은 증명을 필요로 하지 아니한다”고 규정한다. 여기서 자백한 사실은 재판상 자백, 곧 법원에서 상대방에게 유리한 사실을 인정하는 진술이 가리키는 사실이다. 현저한 사실은 그와 나란히 놓이는 별도의 요건으로, 진술에 기대지 않고도 심리를 생략할 수 있는 사실을 뜻한다. 이 조문은 그 대상이 당사자가 자백한 사실임을 요구하므로, 진술의 주체와 진술이 겨냥한 대상이 무엇인지가 먼저 정해져야 한다.
같은 조문은 뒤이어 “다만, 진실에 어긋나는 자백은 그것이 착오로 말미암은 것임을 증명한 때에는 취소할 수 있다”고 덧붙인다(민사소송법 제288조). 이 예정 문언은 불요증 효과와 취소 조건을 하나의 판단으로 뭉뚱그리지 않고 단계를 나누어 살피도록 요구한다. 즉 자백에 해당하는 사실이 무엇인지 정하는 일과, 이미 유효하게 성립한 자백이 착오에 의한 것임을 증명한 경우에 한하여 되돌리는 일은 별개의 판단이다. 전자의 해당 요건을 충족한 사실이 자백으로 열리고, 후자의 법정 조건을 충족한 자백 취소가 반영될 때만 그 구속이 다시 움직인다.
가장 강한 반론은 진실보다 진술 형식을 우선하는 것은 위험하다는 점을 겨눈다. 당사자가 실제로는 알지 못하거나 기억을 잘못한 채 한 진술이 그대로 사실로 묶인다면, 실제와 다른 사실이 당사자의 실수 때문에 재판을 묶는 부당한 결과를 낳는다는 손실이 구체적으로 드러난다. 그렇다고 이 손실을 앞세워 진술 형식을 모두 뒤로 미룰 수는 없다. 법률적 평가에 대한 동의를 곧 사실자백으로 확정할 수는 없다는 점이 그 한계를 이룬다. 사실의 인정과 법률효과의 인정을 같은 것으로 놓아 버리면 자백의 대상이 흔들려, 반론이 지적하는 불리함은 그대로 두면서도 구속의 범위는 오히려 더 넓어지게 된다.
합성 장면에서 관련되는 사실은 두 가지로 좁다. 하나는 피고 B가 사실을 모른다고 답한 진술이고, 다른 하나는 원고 A가 이를 인정한 진술로 원용하는 주장이다. 앞의 진술은 알지 못한다는 맥락의 것이고, 뒤의 원용은 그 진술을 사실의 자백에 해당하는 것으로 삼는 주장이므로, 두 진술이 서로 다른 대상을 겨냥하는지가 앞의 조건에 부딪친다. 진술의 맥락이나 자백 대상으로 삼은 사실이 불분명한 경우, 본 절은 이를 미확정으로 남겨 두고 판단을 유보한다. 알지 못한다는 진술을 인정한 것으로 기록했다면 다툰 것으로 추정하는 규칙에 따라 결론을 고친다는 대목은, 자백 취소 주장과 착오 자료를 검토하는 판정 조건의 하나로만 주어진다. 여기에 실제 사건의 사실·송달·이행 결과나 합성 장면에 없는 연도·금액·기산일·판결 결과는 대입되지 않는다.
이 절에서 허용되는 결론은, 자백·다툼·현저한 사실의 해당 요건을 구분한 뒤 자백 취소의 법정 조건을 충족한 경우 이를 반영하여 사실이 다시 열릴 수 있다는 것과, 재판상 자백이 유효하게 남아 있고 법정 취소 요건을 충족하지 못한 경우 그 사실을 다시 부정하는 통로가 막힌다는 것이다. 여기에 더해 진술의 맥락이나 자백 대상이 불분명하면 확정을 유보한다. 이를 넘어 증명 없이 정해지는 사실을 곧 구속된 사실로 환원하거나, 반대로 법률효과의 인정에 대한 동의를 사실 자백으로 승격하는 것은 이 절이 허용하지 않는 판단이다.
1.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
한 설명의 증명 실패는 반대 설명의 사실 인정과 구별되어야 한다는 전제 아래, 남는 물음은 자백의 경계다. 여기서는 그 경계가 어디에 닿는지, 그리고 그 너머의 물음을 무엇으로 남기는지를 살핀다. 본 절의 범위는 자백의 정의와 불요증 효과, 그 대상과 취소 조건을 함께 보는 데 머무른다. 따라서 피고 B는 사실을 모른다고 답했는데 원고 A가 이를 인정한 진술로 원용하는 장면에서, 침묵이나 추정의 문제는 이 절의 밖에 남는다. 뒤의 물음은 그대로 다음 절로 넘긴다.
해당 문언은 다음과 같다. “법원에서 당사자가 자백한 사실과 현저한 사실은 증명을 필요로 하지 아니한다. 다만, 진실에 어긋나는 자백은 그것이 착오로 말미암은 것임을 증명한 때에는 취소할 수 있다.”(민사소송법 제288조) 이 문언은 주체를 ‘당사자’로, 장소를 ‘법원에서’로, 행위를 ‘자백한 사실’로 한정한다. 즉 재판상 자백은 법원에서 상대방에게 유리한 사실을 인정하는 진술을 뜻하며, 상대방이 유리하다고 보는 해석이나 평가가 곧 그 자백의 대상이 되는 것은 아니다. 문언이 함께 둔 ‘현저한 사실’은 이 절에서 다루는 자백과는 다른 요건을 이룬다.
이 문언과 앞의 결론이 만나는 지점은 대상의 구분에 있다. 법원에서의 사실 자백에는 불요증 효과가 있으나 그 대상과 취소조건을 함께 보아야 한다는 판단이 여기서 작동한다. 자백한 사실은 별도 증명을 요구하지 않지만, 그 사실이 무엇인지 특정되지 않았다면 불요증의 대상도 함께 정해지지 않는다. 같은 문언은 진실에 어긋나는 자백이라도 착오로 말미암았음을 증명한 때에는 취소할 수 있다고 함께 정하므로, 자백의 확정과 자백의 취소는 서로 다른 단계로 나뉜다. 앞 단계에서 확정된 사실을 뒤 단계에서 다시 부정하려면 별도의 조건이 충족되어야 한다.
이 구분이 생략되면 가장 큰 손실은 진술자의 실수다. 진실보다 진술 형식을 우선하는 것은 위험하다는 반론은, 실제와 다른 사실이 형식만으로 재판을 묶을 수 있다는 점을 겨냥한다. 실제로 다른 사실을 말한 당사자가 오해나 기억의 착오 때문에 말을 잘못 놓았다면, 그 한마디로 심리의 범위가 굳어지는 것은 부당하게 보인다. 이 절의 답은 그 우려를 지우는 것이 아니다. 오히려 법률적 평가에 대한 동의를 곧 사실자백으로 확정할 수는 없다는 선에서 물러선다. 상대방 주장의 타당성을 받아들이는 발언이나 법적 귀속에 대한 의견은, 그 자체로 사실의 인정으로 확정되지 않는다.
합성 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 것은 그 경계뿐이다. 이 장면의 기록으로는 당사자 진술 조서·답변서·자백 취소 주장과 착오 자료가 지정되어 있다. 다만 진술의 맥락이나 자백 대상으로 삼은 사실이 불분명한 경우, 이 장면만으로 자백의 성립과 대상을 확정할 수 없다. 만약 알지 못한다는 진술을 인정한 것으로 기록한 것이 확인되면 다툰 것으로 추정하는 규칙에 따라 결론은 달라지는데, 이는 이 절이 확정할 사실이 아니라 판정 조건 하나를 바꾸어 보는 것이다. 따라서 법적 평가에 대한 동의를 곧 사실자백으로 확정하면 이 절의 결론은 무너진다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 자백한 사실의 불요증과 그 대상의 특정, 그리고 착오를 이유로 한 자백 취소의 조건이 함께 요구된다는 판단이다. 허용하지 않는 것은, 아무 말이 없거나 대답을 피한 경우를 자백으로 간주하는 결론이다. 자백이란 인정하는 진술이라는 정의에 비추어, 침묵이나 진술 거부는 그 정의에 해당하지 않으며 그 처리는 별도의 규율을 요구한다. 증명 실패와 사실 인정의 구별을 받아들인 뒤에 남는 물음은, 말이 없는 경우를 어떻게 볼 것인가이다. 아무 말이 없으면 언제나 자백인가?